ML993540257

IRC Harris 1999006 Integrated

ML993540257
Person / Time
Issue date:	11/02/1999
From:	Division Reactor Projects II
To:
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Download: ML993540257 (15)

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November 2, 1999 EA 99-270 Carolina Power & Light Company ATTN: Mr. James Scarola Vice President - Harris Plant Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. O. Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1 New Hill, NC 27562-0165

SUBJECT:

NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-400/99-06

Dear Mr. Scarola:

On October 9, 1999, the NRC completed an inspection at your Shearon Harris facility. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection. The results of that inspection were discussed with you and other members of your staff on October 21, 1999.

The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that one violation of NRC requirements occurred. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV),

consistent with Appendix F of the Enforcement Policy. This NCV is described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the NRC Resident Inspector at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant; and the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

CP&L 2

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Sincerely, (Original signed by B. Bonser)

Brian Bonser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.:

50-400 License No.: NPF-63

Enclosure:

Inspection Report cc w\encl: (See page 3)

CP&L 3

cc w/encl:

Terry C. Morton, Manager Performance Evaluation and Regulatory Affairs CPB 9 Carolina Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution Chris L. Burton Director of Site Operations Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Bo Clark Plant General Manager--Harris Plant Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Donna B. Alexander, Manager Regulatory Affairs Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Electronic Mail Distribution Johnny H. Eads, Supervisor Licensing/Regulatory Programs Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Electronic Mail Distribution William D. Johnson Vice President & Corporate Secretary Carolina Power & Light Company Electronic Mail Distribution John H. O'Neill, Jr.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N. Street, NW Washington, DC 20037-1128 Mel Fry, Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environmental Commerce & Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Peggy Force Assistant Attorney General State of North Carolina Electronic Mail Distribution Public Service Commission State of South Carolina P. O. Box 11649 Columbia, SC 29211 Chairman of the North Carolina Utilities Commission P. O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-0510 Robert P. Gruber Executive Director Public Staff NCUC P. O. Box 29520 Raleigh, NC 27626 Vernon Malone, Chairman Board of County Commissioners of Wake County P. O. Box 550 Raleigh, NC 27602 Richard H. Givens, Chairman Board of County Commissioners of Chatham County Electronic Mail Distribution Distribution w/encl: (See page 4)

CP&L 4

Distribution w/encl:

R. Laufer, NRR PUBLIC OFFICE DRP/RII DRP/RII DRP/RII EICS/RII SIGNATURE GMacDonald:vg JBrady RHagar ABoland NAME DATE 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 6/ /25 COPY?

YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: G:\HARRIS\Report\9906drp.wpd

Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket No:

50-400 License No:

NPF-63 Report No:

50-400/99-06 Licensee:

Carolina Power & Light (CP&L)

Facility:

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Location:

5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562 Dates:

August 29 - October 9, 1999 Inspectors:

J. Brady, Senior Resident Inspector R. Hagar, Resident Inspector Approved by:

B. Bonser, Chief, Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 NRC Inspection Report 50-400/99-06 The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection.

Inspection findings were assessed according to potential risk significance, and were assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while not necessarily desirable, represent little risk to safety. WHITE findings would indicate issues with some increased risk to safety, and which may require additional NRC inspections.

YELLOW findings would be indicative of more serious issues with higher potential risk to safe performance and would require the NRC to take additional actions. RED findings represent an unacceptable loss of margin to safety and would result in the NRC taking significant actions that could include ordering the plant shut down. Those findings that cannot be evaluated for a direct effect on safety with the Significance Determination Process, such as those findings that affect the NRCs ability to oversee licensees, are not assigned a color.

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity GREEN. The licensee failed to take appropriate corrective action under 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) when a maintenance rule (a)(1) performance goal was exceeded for the Target Rock Position Indication performance monitoring group in system 9001, containment isolation valves. The established goal of no more than one failure in 18 months was exceeded on June 11, 1999, but was not recognized by the licensee, and appropriate corrective action was not taken until another functional failure occurred on August 17, 1999. This issue was characterized as a Non-Cited Violation and was determined to have low risk significance because failure of the Target Rock position indicators did not prevent operators from determining valve positions, and other more time-consuming methods were available. Second, the failure to recognize that a maintenance rule goal had been exceeded did not affect the ability of any valve to operate (Section 1R12).

Report Details The unit was at essentially 100 percent power until September 9, when power was reduced to 86 percent due to problems with the steam generator preheater bypass valves. Power was returned to 100 percent on September 11 and remained at 100 percent for the remainder of the period.

1.

REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity 1R01 Adverse Weather Preparations

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparations for Hurricane Floyd on September 15, 1999.

b.

Observations and Findings No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.

1R03 Emergent Work

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following emergent items, as described in the referenced Work Request/Job Orders (WRJOs) and/or Action Requests (ARs):

Reference Title/Description WR/JO 99-AGUP1 Preheater bypass valve actuator air leaks WR/JO 99-AGNX1 Boron totalizer replacement AR 004097004097Letdown pressure control valve (PCV 145) problems AR 007914007914SSPS relay problem during MST I0417

b.

Observations and Findings No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors performed reviews of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater system when the turbine-driven pump was inoperable for preventive maintenance, and the control room ventilation system during preventive maintenance.

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b.

Observations and Findings No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.

1R05 Fire Protection

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the condition reports (CRs), work orders, and impairments associated with the fire suppression system. The inspectors reviewed the status of surveillance activities to determine whether they were current to support the operability of the fire protection system. The inspectors observed a fire drill associated with a direct current (DC) battery charger in the B switchgear room.

b.

Observations and Findings No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.

1R09 Inservice Testing (IST) of Pumps and Valves

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the performance of the following IST tests:

Number Rev.

Title OST 1051 7

Reactor Auxiliary Building Emergency Exhaust System IST Quarterly for damper 1AV-3 OST 1038 10 Sampling, Chemical Addition, and Main Steam Drain ISI Valve Test

b.

Observations and Findings No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed licensed operator requalification simulator examinations for operations crew C.

b.

Observations and Findings No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.

3 1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to the equipment issues described in the following CRs and Engineering Service Request (ESR):

CR 99-02358 Target Rock containment isolation valve position indication CR 99-01918 Contai nment isolatio n valve 1AF-157 stroke time proble ms ESR 97-00547 Essential Services Chilled Water nonessential isolation valve

b.

Observations and Findings The inspectors found that significant CR 99-02358 described two failures of Target Rock valve position indicators under system 9001, containment isolation valves (CIV). The description stated that the goals set forth in CR 97-03489 for the Target Rock Position Indication performance monitoring group (PMG) under system 9001 had been exceeded. The goal was for no more than one functional failure due to reed switch failure during an 18-month period starting at the completion of refueling outage (RFO)8 on December 2, 1998. Some 20 valves which were not CIVs were added to the PMG which included CIVs because the a(1) corrective actions had included a modification to upgrade the position indicators.

The inspectors reviewed the maintenance rule database to confirm the status of the Target Rock PMG in system 9001. The inspectors confirmed that the PMG was in a(1) status, that CR-97-03489-1 established the goals for the a(1) to a(2) transition, and that the goal was no more than one failure in the 18-month period between RFO8 and RFO9.

The inspectors reviewed the maintenance rule event log and found that functional failures under the Target Rock Position Indication PMG had occurred on January 18, 1999 (CR 99-00164); June 11, 1999 (CR 99-00699); and August 17, 1999 (CR 99-02358). Only the last one identified that the goal had been broken. None of these functional failures involved a failure of the valves to perform their containment isolation

4 function. The inspectors questioned why the occurrence on June 11 (CR 99-00699) had not been considered as the functional failure that caused the goal to be exceeded.

The licensee reviewed the associated information and initiated significant AR 00008315, Failure to Recognize Exceeding a Maintenance Rule a(1) Goal, as a result of their review. The AR identified that procedures ADM-NGGC-0101, Maintenance Rule Program, and CAP-NGGC-0001, Corrective Action Management, require that when an a(1) goal is exceeded, a significant adverse CR is to be initiated for the purpose of evaluating the need for additional corrective action.

10 CFR 50.65 a(1), Maintenance Rule, requires that when the performance or condition of a structure, system, or component does not meet established goals, appropriate corrective action shall be undertaken. As stated above, the licensee failed to recognize that the established goal of no more than one failure in 18 months was exceeded on June 11, 1999, and therefore did not take appropriate corrective action based on that until another functional failure occurred on August 17, 1999. This is considered a violation of 10 CFR 50.65 a(1) for not taking appropriate corrective action when a Maintenance Rule goal was not met. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix F of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensees corrective action program as AR 00008315. The inspectors have designated this violation NCV 50-400/99-06-01, Failure to Recognize That an a(1) Goal Was Exceeded.

This issue had relatively low (green) risk significance, for two reasons:

First, failure of the Target Rock position indicators did not prevent operators from determining valve positions, because other, more time-consuming methods were available.

Second, the failure to recognize that a maintenance rule goal had been exceeded did not affect the ability of any valve to operate.

1R13 Maintenance Work Prioritization & Control

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees assessments of the risk impacts of removing from service those components associated with the emergent work items listed in Section 1R03.

b.

Observations and Findings No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.

1R14 Nonroutine Plant Evolutions

a.

Inspection Scope

5 The inspectors reviewed the operating crews performance during the following non-routine evolutions:

Unexpected shutting of all three steam generator preheater bypass valves on September 9 and associated power reduction to 86%.

The planned shutting of the preheater bypass valves at 100% power on September 17.

b.

Observations and Findings No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the operability evaluations described in the following ESRs:

ESR 99-00114 R0 P-4 Operability Determination ESR 99-00142 R0 Essential Services Chilled Water Operability Evaluation for Shut Non-Nuclear-Safety Isolation Valves

b.

Observations and Findings No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.

1R16 Operator Work-Arounds

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed an operator work-around associated with the essential service chilled water non-essential isolation valves.

b.

Observations and Findings No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance tests:

Test Procedure

6 Number Title Related maintenance task OST-1077 Auxiliary Feedwater Valves Operability Test Quarterly Interval Mode 4-5-6 Steam generator preheater bypass valve air pump leak repair OST-1085 1A-SA Diesel Generator Operability Test Diesel generator preventive maintenance EPT-33 Emergency Safeguards Sequencer System Test Sequencer relay calibration.

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b.

Observations and Findings No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:

Number Rev.

Title MST-I0027 7

Steam generator B Narrow Range Level (L-0485)Calibration -

ATWS portion FPT-3004 9

Main Fire Pump Flow Test, Annual Interval

b.

Observations and Findings No findings were identified and documented through this inspection.

4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA4 Other (Closed) LER 50-400/98-004-00 and 01: Design deficiency related to inadequate runout protection for the Turbine Driven AFW Pump. This LER did not involve a violation of regulatory requirements and was closed.

4OA5 Management Meetings

1.

Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on October 21, 1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

8 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED NRC B. Bonser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4 R. Laufer, Harris Project Manager, NRR Licensee D. Alexander, Regulatory Affairs Manager C. Burton, Director of Site Operations B. Clark, Harris Plant General Manager J. Cook, Outage Manager R. Field, Nuclear Assessment Manager T. Hobbs, Acting Operations Manager J. Holt, Outage and Scheduling Manager M. Keef, Training Manager G. Kline, Harris Engineering Support Services Manager J. Scarola, Harris Plant Vice President B. Waldrep, Maintenance Manager E. Wills, Environmental & Radiation Control Manager

9 ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-400/99-06-01 NCV Failure to recognize that an a(1) goal was exceeded (Section 1R12)

Closed 50-400/99-06-01 NCV Failure to recognize that an a(1) goal was exceeded (Section 1R12) 50-400/98-004-00 LER Design deficiency related to inadequate runout protection for the Turbine Driven AFW Pump. (Section 4OA4) 50-400/98-004-01 LER Design Deficiency related to inadequate runout protection for the Turbine Driven AFW Pump. (Section 4OA4)