ML25273A277

Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05200025/2025010 and 05200026/2025010

ML25273A277
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	09/30/2025
From:	Alan Blamey NRC/RGN-II/DORS/PB3
To:	Coleman J Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR 2025010
Download: ML25273A277 (1)

Text

Jamie Coleman Regulatory Affairs Director Southern Nuclear Operation Company, Inc.

3535 Colonnade Parkway Birmingham, AL 35243

SUBJECT:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 3 AND 4 - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05200025/2025010 AND 05200026/2025010

Dear Jamie Coleman:

On August 21, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4 and discussed the results of this inspection with Patrick Martino, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your program complies with NRC regulations and applicable industry standards such that the Reactor Oversight Process can continue to be implemented.

The team also evaluated the stations effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, and its use of industry and NRC operating experience information. The results of these evaluations are in the enclosure.

Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4.

September 30, 2025

J. Coleman 2

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Alan J. Blamey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05200025 and 05200026 License Nos. NPF-91 and NPF-92

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV Signed by Blamey, Alan on 09/30/25

ML25273A277 x

SUNSI Review x

Non-Sensitive

Sensitive x

Publicly Available

Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RII/DORS RII/DORS RII/DORS NAME B Truss A. Alen Arias A. Blamey DATE 9/30/2025 9/30/2025 9/30/2025

Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Inspection Report Docket Numbers:

05200025 and 05200026 License Numbers:

NPF-91 and NPF-92 Report Numbers:

05200025/2025010 and 05200026/2025010 Enterprise Identifier:

I-2025-010-0050 Licensee:

Southern Nuclear Operation Company, Inc.

Facility:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4 Location:

Waynesboro, GA Inspection Dates:

August 04, 2025 to August 21, 2025 Inspectors:

A. Alen Arias, Senior Project Engineer A. Craig, Project Engineer J. Parent, Resident Inspector B. Truss, Resident Inspector Approved By:

Alan J. Blamey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety

2

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations Failure to Identify and Correct Degraded VES System Components Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05200025,05200026/2025010-01 Open/Closed

[P.1] -

Identification 71152B The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to identify and correct degraded conditions affecting the main control room emergency habitability system (VES) flow transmitters and pressure regulating valves.

Additional Tracking Items None.

3 INSPECTION SCOPES Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE 71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.

1.

Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees PI&R program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. They also reviewed activities dating back to August 2022 (Unit 3) and July 2023 (Unit 4), when the respective units entered the Reactor Oversight Process. The review focused on the Class 1E DC and UPS system (IDS), passive core cooling system (PXS), and main control room emergency habitability system (VES). As part of the assessment, the inspectors evaluated corrective actions for the following non-cited violations (NCVs), findings (FINs), and licensee-identified violations (LIVs):

2023001-01: Inadequate procedure to verify Technical Specification (TS) surveillance requirement 2023002-02: Failure to adequately implement design control measures 2023002-03: Failure to correctly implement an engineering design change 2023003-01: Failure to adequately implement severe weather procedure 2023003-02: Failure to remove manufacturer shipping flanges from the Main Condenser A and C flashbox nozzles 2023004-01: Debris in Unit 4 containment 2024002-01: Failure to perform adequate surveys to assess doses to the public from liquid effluent releases 2024002-02: Failure to perform adequate surveys to assess doses to the public from environmental direct radiation 2024003-01: Failure to follow procedure resulting in unplanned TS entry 2024004-01: Main steam safety valve lift pressure outside of limits due to setpoint drift 2.

Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience.

4 3.

Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.

4.

Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.

INSPECTION RESULTS Assessment 71152B

1) Corrective Action Program Effectiveness Problem Identification:

The inspectors determined that the licensee was effective in identifying problems and entering them into the Corrective Action Program (CAP), with a low threshold for issue entry.

This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating condition reports (CRs), as described in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, "Corrective Action Program,"

Version 20.0, and managements expectation that employees are encouraged to initiate CRs.

Site management was actively involved in the CAP and appropriately focused on significant plant issues. CRs were generally initiated in a timely manner across a range of issues.

However, the inspectors identified a failure to recognize and enter recurring degraded conditions of VES system flow transmitters into the CAP. Despite multiple instances of instrument drift during surveillance testing, no CRs were initiated. This issue was determined to be a finding with an associated non-cited violation (NCV) and is documented in the inspection results section of this report.

Problem Prioritization and Evaluation:

The inspectors reviewed CRs, technical evaluations, and completed or planned work orders.

The inspectors determined that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with NMP-GM-002-001, "Corrective Action Program Instructions," Version 55.

However, CRs related to degraded performance of the VES system pressure regulating valves (PRVs) were not consistently prioritized correctly. Two CRs were incorrectly screened as non-CAP items, and a third was closed without corrective action. This issue was also determined to be a finding with an associated NCV and is documented in the inspection results section.

Overall, the inspectors found that adequate consideration was given to the operability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs), as well as associated plant risk. Cause evaluations were generally conducted in accordance with NMP-GM-002-GL03, "Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions Guidelines," Version 38.0, and were appropriate to the significance of the issues.

Corrective Actions:

The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents, interviewed licensee staff, and verified the completion of corrective actions. With the exception noted above, corrective actions were generally timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective in correcting conditions adverse to quality (CAQs).

5 The licensee was generally effective in developing appropriately focused corrective actions.

The inspectors reviewed CRs and effectiveness reviews, as applicable, to verify that significant CAQs had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to preclude repetition were sufficient to ensure proper implementation and effectiveness.

The inspectors also reviewed corrective action documents associated with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) findings issued since the issuance of the 10 CFR 52.103(g) finding for the units. Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensees CAP complied with regulatory requirements and self-imposed standards, and its implementation adequately supported nuclear safety.

2) Operating Experience The team determined that the licensees processes for using industry and NRC operating experience were effective and compliant with regulatory requirements and internal standards.

Operating experience was adequately evaluated for applicability, and appropriate actions were implemented in accordance with applicable procedures. These processes adequately supported nuclear safety.

3) Self-Assessments and Audits The inspectors reviewed a sample of completed self-assessments and audits conducted by both plant and nuclear oversight personnel. The licensee was effective in identifying issues at a low threshold, properly evaluating them, and resolving them in accordance with their safety significance.

Self-assessments and audits were adequately self-critical, and performance-related issues were appropriately identified. The inspectors verified that CRs were created to document areas for improvement and findings, and that actions were completed consistent with recommendations.

4) Safety Conscious Work Environment The inspectors interviewed a sample of plant employees from various departments and roles.

The inspectors determined that:

Employees were generally willing to raise nuclear safety concerns to their supervisors or through the CAP.

Employees were aware of alternative avenues for raising concerns, such as the Employee Concern Program (ECP).

Interviewees had not experienced retaliation for raising safety concerns.

All individuals interviewed indicated they would feel comfortable raising concerns through the CAP and were aware of the ECP, stating they would use it if necessary. Most felt comfortable raising concerns to their supervisors and believed management was receptive and responsive to safety concerns.

However, many interviewees expressed frustration with the prioritization and timeliness of minor maintenance work orders. When asked whether there had been any instances where individuals experienced retaliation or other negative reactions for raising safety concerns, all individuals interviewed stated that they had neither experienced nor heard of any such instances at the site.

6 To supplement these interviews, the team reviewed the ECP case log and interviewed the ECP Coordinator to assess perceptions of employee willingness to raise concerns. The team also reviewed the most recent biennial safety culture survey and self-assessment results from March 2025. The team concluded that processes to mitigate potential safety culture issues were adequately implemented.

Failure to Identify and Correct Degraded VES System Components Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05200025,05200026/2025010-01 Open/Closed

[P.1] -

Identification 71152B The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to identify and correct degraded conditions affecting the main control room emergency habitability system (VES) flow transmitters (FTs) and pressure regulating valves (PRVs).

==

Description:==

The VES relies on compressed bottled air to deliver filtered, pressurized air to the main control room (MCR), ensuring habitability for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> during a design-basis accident or a loss of all AC power, when normal ventilation is unavailable. The system includes two redundant in-line FTs (VES-FT003A and VES-FT003B), which are required to monitor airflow to the MCR and provide indication and alarms in the control room. To partially verify VES system functionality, Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 3.7.6.3 requires the system be operated for at least 15 minutes every 31 days using one of two pressure-reducing valve (PRV) air delivery paths (VES-V002A or VES-V002B). During this test, both transmitters must read between 60-70 scfm (standard cubic feet per minute) to confirm proper air delivery. This surveillance is conducted using procedure VES-OTS-17-001, "Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System Valve Position And Operability Check",

version 2.0.

In response to operating experience (APP-VES-GEF-112, Secondary Pressure Indication for VES) indicating that the VES FTs have exhibited calibration drift during the monthly TS test, the licensee revised procedure VES-OTS-17-001 to allow use of a temporary pressure gauge as an alternate acceptance method (i.e., using PRV outlet pressure correlation to air flow) when one FT is non-functional or indicating outside the acceptable flow range. This method was intended as a short-term workaround, not a substitute for taking corrective action for a non-functional FT. The inspectors reviewed the six most recent monthly surveillances for Units 3 and 4 (March - August 2025) and found that in 10 of 12 tests, the licensee used the alternate acceptance method because one FT was outside the required range. For example, FT003A on Unit 4 consistently read below the minimum flow requirement (60 scfm) and approximately 10 scfm lower than FT003B. The FTs are safety-related instruments required to maintain an accuracy of +/-2.6 scfm. Drift in these instruments could delay operator response to degraded system performance, compromise control room habitability, or reduce the 72-hour air supply margin. Despite recurring indications of FT drift, the licensee did not capture these conditions in the corrective action program (CAP) via a condition report (CR) nor took any corrective actions.

Additionally, inspectors identified that PRV VES-002B failed to maintain the required flow range (i.e., flow above 70 scfm) or outlet pressure, per the alternate acceptance criteria, during three separate surveillances: the last two VES-002B surveillances for Unit 3 in March and May 2025 (work orders SNC2017098 and SNC2329455, respectively), and once for Unit

7 4 in March 2025 (work order SNC2005295). The licensee generated CRs for each of these instances; however, two CRs (11159622 and 11158951) were incorrectly screened as conditions not adverse to quality (i.e., non-CAP Priority Level 4, per the licensees CAP procedure). The third CR (11183266) was properly screened as a condition adverse to quality (CAQ) (i.e., Priority Level 2) but was closed without any corrective actions planned or taken.

According to the licensees CAP (NMP-GM-002-001, Corrective Action Program Instructions, Ver. 55), a CAQ includes failures, malfunctions, or deficiencies that affect nuclear safety or quality. Conditions that could prevent a safety-related system from performing its function are examples of CAQs and are screened or classified as Priority Level 2 in the CAP to ensure actions are taken to correct the condition. The inspectors determined that repeated use of alternate acceptance criteria due to persistent FT discrepancies and degraded PRV performance were CAQs; however, none of these conditions were entered into the CAP.

Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue into their CAP under CR11208522 and screened it as CAQ (or Priority Level 2) to initiate corrective actions.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to identify and correct CAQs associated with degraded VES system FTs and PRVs was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that maintain control room radiological barrier functionality.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding screened out as Green because it did not represent a degradation of the control room radiological barrier function nor represented a degradation of the control room barrier function against smoke or a toxic atmosphere.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.1 - Identification: The organization implements a corrective action program with a low threshold for identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the program. The licensee failed to implement a low threshold for identifying issues, as required by NMP-GM-002-001.

Specifically, the organization did not recognize the repeated use of alternate acceptance criteria for FTs and recurring PRV failures as conditions that prevented these components from performing their function; therefore, CAQs requiring corrective action.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, and deficiencies, are promptly identified and corrected.

8 Contrary to the above, between March 2025 and August 2025, the licensee failed to assure that degraded performance of VES flow transmitters and pressure regulating valves was promptly identified and corrected.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Minor Violation 71152B Vogtle Unit 4 Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.6.3 requires that the main control room emergency habitability system (VES) be operated for 15 minutes or more, every 31 days on a Staggered Test Basis (STB). As described in the TS Bases, this includes monthly testing of the three VES air flow paths via delivery valves VES-PL-V005A, VES-PL-V005B, and VES-PL-V001, to ensure that each air delivery valve is exercised at least quarterly. For three components, STB requires, as defined in TS 1.1, "Definitions", that one component be tested each surveillance interval and that all components be tested within three surveillance intervals (i.e., 93 days), or 116 days when including the 25% grace period allowed by SR 3.0.2. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to perform the required surveillance of valve 4-VES-V005A within the allowable interval. Specifically, the valve was last tested on April 6, 2025, and not tested again until August 3, 2025, resulting in a 119-day interval, which exceeded the maximum allowable interval of 116 days.

The inspectors determined that this condition occurred due to a scheduling vulnerability in the licensees preventive maintenance program, which assigned valve testing based on calendar months rather than tracking individual air flow path test intervals. This approach allowed for scenarios where the same valve could be tested twice in one month while another valve went untested, disrupting the intended staggered test pattern. The issue had been previously identified in the corrective action program (CAP) in condition report (CR) 11191303, which noted that month-based scheduling could lead to confusion and increase the risk of a missed surveillance if delays occurred near the end of a month; however, the licensee assessed the risk as low and relied on supervisory oversight to ensure the correct valve was tested. The missed surveillance demonstrated that the existing controls did not fully prevent interval exceedances.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The valve functioned properly when tested, and the scheduling vulnerability would only result in limited or isolated instances of missed surveillance.

Enforcement: This failure to comply with TS SR 3.7.6.3 constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The licensee entered the issue in the CAP for resolution as CR 11216095.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On August 21, 2025, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Patrick Martino, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

9 DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Inspection Procedure Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Date APP-VES-M3C-005 VES Air Tank Capacity Calculation 3

Calculations APP-VES-M3C-101 VES Instrumentation and Packaged Mechanical System Interface Requirements 6

Condition Reports 10914399, 10914781, 10917487, 10917725, 10917983, 10918518, 10922709, 10923629, 10926307, 10928573, 10928981, 10932418, 10937355, 10937670, 10939688, 10943068, 10943400, 10959532, 10959811, 10960826, 10960961, 10968199, 10970365, 10975594, 10977659, 10978648, 10982832, 10983212, 10985337, 10927947, 10995266, 10995904, 11005000, 11006034, 11007811, 11009833, 11013784, 11016466, 11019343, 11025216, 11025940, 11029176, 11029249, 11033168, 11036857, 11036896, 11036907, 11037000, 11037107, 11037659, 11038823, 11042657, 11044359, 11044717, 11047071, 11047533, 11049341, 11049380, 11052615, 11053036, 11062050, 11063071, 11064694, 11065203, 11069078, 11073457, 11077470, 11078423, 11079395, 11083772, 11084942, 11084945, 11095542, 11097101, 11097796, 11098006, 11098515, 11098522, 11105321, 11108752, 11111053, 11112004, 11112419, 11112721, 11113436, 11114049, 11117067, 11117973, 11118383, 11118894, 11118911, 11120662, 11123498, 11123843, 11124407, 11124765, 11130328, 11130485, 11130687, 11130753, 11134027, 11136234, 11136412, 11137634, 11139247, 11139439, 11151889, 11151998, 11158951, 11159622, 11165256, 11178897, 11180007, 11183266, 11184711, 11184754, 11184889, 11191034, 11191037, 11191303, 11191900, 20001297, 50155712, 50158106, 50159176 Corrective Action Reports (CARs) 323954, 361307, 363610, 404874, 439429, 446247, 592048, 706942, 718091, 747496, 776850 71152B Corrective Action Documents Technical 1112708, 1113382, 1113903, 1114663, 1114786, 1115307,

10 Inspection Procedure Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Date Evaluations (TEs) 1115909, 1116402, 1116408, 1116423, 1116436, 1119245, 1119713, 1120302, 1121847, 1121848, 1122397, 1123534, 1124171, 1124697, 1124781, 1125157, 1125168, 1127273, 1129956, 1130080, 1130106, 1132147, 1132160, 1133305, 1133312, 1133313, 1134256, 1137232, 1139391, 1140081, 1142381, 1143070, 1144499, 1144670, 1145592, 1147009, 1147153, 1151099, 1153476, 1154739, 1158486, 1159128, 1159725, 1159726, 1159727, 1159797, 1160836, 1161350, 1161384, 1161759, 1161763, 1161781, 1165524, 1165575, 1167911, 1167971, 1173838, 1173881, 1180208, 1182241, 45000062, 60000234, 60046945, 60048390, 60049138 Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection Condition Reports from the Inspection 11204841, 11207470, 11207514, 11208522, 11208531, 11216095 IDS P&ID Drawings SV3(4)-IDS-E3-001 - 014 PXS P&ID Drawings SV3(4)-PXS-M6-001, SV3(4)-PXS-M6-002, SV3-PXS-M6-002-CRTT, SV3(4)-PXS-M6-003, SV3(4)-PXS-M6-004, SV3(4)-PXS-M6-005 Drawings VES P&ID Drawings SV3(4)-VES-M6-001 & 002 SNC1426824 ADS-4 Vibration During Startup Testing in Mode 3 02/25/2023 SNC1664917 AOR SV3-VES-GEF-103: VES Load Shed Timer Modifications 08/07/2024 Engineering Changes SNC1714793 DRCS Overlap Logic, NAPs, Urgent Alarm 03/28/2024 Engineering Evaluations RER SNC1445450-03 Calorimetric Heat Loss due to PRHR Heat Exchanger Outlet FCV Leak-by 06/30/2023 ANSI/ANS 56.8 Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements 2020 APP-PV15-VMM-001 Instruction Manual for PV15, Pressure Regulating Valves, ASME Section III Class 3, Valcor 0

APP-PV15-Z0D-100 PV15 Datasheet 100 1

Miscellaneous APP-VES-GEF-VES Load Shed Timer Modifications 0

11 Inspection Procedure Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Date 511 CAR361307 Extent of Condition Walkdown Report of LISEGA TYPE 36 Pipe Clamp Saddle Plate Supports February 2023 E&DCR No. APP-VES-GEF-112 Secondary Pressure Indication for VES Rev. 0 Maintenance Rule a(1) Evaluation EVAL-VEGP34-VWS-06570, MRule a(1) Evaluation for VWS-001 Maintenance Rule a(1) Evaluation EVAL-VEGP34-VWS-06410, MRule a(1) Evaluation for VWS-002 ND-SC-FP-2023 Fire Protection Program Audit 05/11/2023 ND-SC-SEC-CSP-2024 Report of the Security and Cybersecurity Audit at Vogtle and Vogtle 3&4 06/05/2024 Regulatory Guide 1.163 Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program 1

Report No.

230627025-00 TRI Air Testing, Inc. 2023. Bank 4 Air Compressor Sample Results 6/25/2023 SV0-JE54-J0M-001 Vogtle AP1000 Class 1E Thermal Dispersion Mass Flow Transmitters Technical Manual 1

SVP_SV0_240557 WEC Evaluation of PRHR Heat Loss After 3R1. (Response to TE 1166402) 11/30/2024 SVP_SV0_240558 WEC Clarification to SVP_SV0_240557: PRHR Leak-by Monitoring 12/04/2024 System Health Reports 3(4)-PXS System Health Reports Unit 3 Operations Rounds Auxiliary Building, Rover, MCR Aux/HVAC/Radwaste, MCR Primary/Secondary/Electrical 8/14-15/2025 Unit 4 Operations Rounds Auxiliary Building, Rover, MCR Aux/HVAC/Radwaste, MCR Primary/Secondary/Electrical 8/14-15/2025 3(4)-AOP-703 Loss of Instrument Air 4 (3) 3(4)-AOP-202 Condensate Malfunctions 4 (4) 3(4)-AOP-205 Feedwater System Malfunction 4.1 (4.1) 3(4)-AOP-206 Malfunction of Feedwater Heaters and Extraction Steam 2 (2) 3(4)-AOP-901 Acts of Nature 2 (2)

Procedures 3(4)-GEN-OTS-12 Hour Technical Specification Surveillance 7 (8)

12 Inspection Procedure Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Date 17-002 3(4)-VES-OTS 001 Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System Valve Position and Operability Check 2 (2) 3(4)-VES-OTS 003 Main Control Room Habitability System Surveillance 4 (4) 3-AOP-302 Loss of AC Power 3

3-AOP-501 Loss of Main Control Room AC 3

3-GOP-301-006 Mode 6 Change Checklists 3

3-IDSB-SOP-001 Class 1E DC System - Division B 7

3-PXS-SOP-001 Passive Core Cooling System 15 3-RCS-OTS 005 Reactor Coolant System Squib Valve Test 4.1 3-RCS-OTS 001 Unborated Water Source Checklist 7

3-SFS-SOP-001 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System 13 4-VES-OTS 002 MCR Habitability System Relief Valve Test 1

D-GEN-CSP-007 Environmental OSLD Sampling 2

NMP-AD-005 Insider Mitigation Program (IMP) / Access Authorization 9.2 NMP-AD-012 Operability Determinations 17 NMP-EN-003-001 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)

Data Management and Special Reporting 5.1 NMP-ES-006 Preventative Maintenance Implementation and Continuing Equipment Reliability Improvement 13.1 NMP-ES-006-002 Preventive Maintenance Change Requests 11 & 13 NMP-ES-006-F01 PMCR Evaluation Form 7.1 & 8.2 NMP-GM-002 Corrective Action Program 19.1 NMP-GM-002-001 Corrective Action Program instructions 55 NMP-GM-002-002 Effectiveness Review Instructions 9

NMP-GM-002-004 CAP Training and Qualification Plan Instruction 7

NMP-GM-002-GL03 Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions Guideline 38 NMP-GM-003 Self-Assessment and Benchmark Procedure 37

13 Inspection Procedure Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Date NMP-GM-006 Work Management 24.1 NMP-GM-052 Performance Analysis 7.1 NMP-OS-006-002 Aggregate Operator Impact Review Instructions 5.1 NMP-OS-028 Adverse Condition Monitoring 1

VES Monthly Surveillance Work Orders (SNC#)

2005295, 2017098, 2061355, 2327885, 2327886, 2327897, 2329454, 2329455, 2329456, 2329735, 2329736, 2329737 March -

August 2025 Work Orders Work Orders (SNC#)

1390815, 1396465, 1398387, 1402971, 1403942, 1404076, 1428231, 1430057, 1472856, 1507333, 1517052, 1575817, 1581462, 1613319, 1658790, 1658795, 1686410, 1686436, 1686464, 1686668, 1708579, 1742431, 1750363, 1755590, 1760369, 1898093, 1964128, 1996050, 2017098, 2170036, 2170037, 2170089, 2327886, 2649064, 2649077, 2649080, 2652230, 2652233