ML24299A081

Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding American Centrifuge Operating, LLC Criticality Accident Alarm System (Enterprise Project Identification Number L-2024-LLA-0070)

ML24299A081
Person / Time
Site:	07007004
Issue date:	10/17/2024
From:	Karen Fitch American Centrifuge Operating
To:	John Lubinski Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
References
ACO 24-0077, EPID L-2024-LLA-0070
Download: ML24299A081 (1)

Text

Ame entrlfug rating October 17, 2024 ACO 24-0077 CUI// SP-EXPT /SP-SRI/ PROPIN // NO FORN Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Export Controlled Information and Proprietary Information ATTN: Document Control Desk John W. Lubinski, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 0001 American Centrifuge Plant; Docket Number 70-7004; License Number SNM-2011 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding American Centrifuge Operating, LLC Criticality Accident Alarm System (Enterprise Project Identification Number L-2024-LLA-0070)

INFORMATION TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS PROTECTED FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AS CONFIDENTIAL COMMERCIAL AND/OR TRADE SECRETS PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4) and 10 CFR 2.390(d)(l) AND INFORMATION TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO 10 CFR PART 810

Dear John Lubinski,

On September 17, 2024 (Reference 1), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for additional information (RAI) to American Centrifuge Operating, LLC's (ACO) amendment request dated May 9, 2024 (Reference 2). The purpose of this letter is to provide ACO's response to the RAJ as Enclosure I. Enclosure 2 provides the revised detailed description and justification as previously submitted by Reference 2 with changes shown in tracked changes. provides supplemental proposed changes to LA-3605-0001, License Application for the American Centrifuge Plant. Enclosure 4 provides supplemental proposed changes to LA-3605-0003, Integrated Safety Analysis Summery for the American Centrifuge Plant.

provides Revision 5 of NCSE-GEN-001, Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation for Large UF6 Cylinders.

Document/matter transmitted contains CUI// SP-EXPT /SP-SRI/ PROPIN // NO FORN Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Export Controlled Information and Proprietary Information When separated from Enclosures I, 4, and 5, this cover letter and Enclosures 2, 3, and 6 are uncontrolled.

American Centrifuge Operating, LLC 3930 U.S. Route 23 South - P.O. Box 628 Piketon, OH 45661

CUI// SP-EXPT /SP-SRI/ PROPIN // NO FORN Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Export Controlled Information and Proprietary Information John W. Lubinski October 17, 2024 ACO 24-0077, Page 2 Enclosures 1, 4, and 5 contain Security-Related Information and ACO requests these enclosures be withheld from public disclosure per 10 CFR 2.390(d)(l ). In accordance with the guidance provided by the U.S. Department of Energy, Enclosure 4 also contains Export Controlled Information. This information must be protected from disclosure per the requirements of 10 CFR Part 810. Additionally, Enclosures 4 and 5 contain Proprietary Information and ACO requests these enclosures be withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4). An affidavit required by 10 CFR 2.390(b)(l)(ii) is provided as Enclosure 6.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (740) 897-3859.

Enclosures:

As Stated

References:

Sincerely,

~Y7:}i(R Kelly L. Fitch Regulatory Manager

1. NRC letter from Y. Faraz to K.L. Fitch (ACO) regarding Request for Additional Information Regarding Centrus Energy Corp. American Centrifuge Operating, LLC American Centrifuge Plant Criticality Accident Alarm System (Enterprise Project Identification Number L-2024-LLA-0070), dated September 17, 2024

2. ACO 24-0035 from K.L. Fitch to J. Lubinski (NRC) regarding License Amendment Request: Proposed Changes to American Centrifuge Operating, LLC's License Application and Supporting Documents, dated May 9, 2024 Document/matter transmitted contains CUI// SP-EXPT /SP-SRI/ PROP IN// NO FORN Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Export Controlled Information and Proprietary Information When separated from Enclosures I, 4, and 5, this cover letter and Enclosures 2, 3, and 6 are uncontrolled.

CUI// SP-EX PT/ SP-SRI/ PRO PIN // NO FORN Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Export Controlled Information and Proprietary Information John W. Lubinski October 17, 2024 ACO 24-0077, Page 3 cc (without Enclosures unless otherwise noted):

C. Blanton, DOE Idaho J. Downs, NRC HQ (Enclosures)

Y. Faraz, NRC HQ (Enclosures)

A. Ford, DOE Idaho J. Hutson, Contractor J. Lingard, DOE Idaho J. Munson, NRC HQ (Enclosures)

N. Pitoniak, NRC Region II (Enclosures)

L. Pitts, NRC Region II (Enclosures)

M. Reim, DOE-NE T. Vukovinsky, NRC Region II (Enclosures)

D. Woodyatt, NRC HQ Document/matter transmitted contains CUI // SP-EXPT / SP-SRI / PROPIN // NO FORN Security-Related Information - Withhold under 10 CFR 2.390 Export Controlled Information and Proprietary Information When separated from Enclosures 1, 4, and 5, this cover letter and Enclosures 2, 3, and 6 are uncontrolled.

of ACO 24-0077 Revised Detailed Description and Justification Information Contained Within Does Not Contain Export Controlled Information Reviewing Official:

Lori Hawk, ACO Date:

10/17/2024

Revised Detailed Description and Justification

[Previously submitted under ACO 24-0035 dated May 9, 2024]

Detailed Description of Change ACO 24-0077 Page 1 of 14 American Centrifuge Operating, LLC (ACO) is requesting U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review and approval of the proposed changes for portions of the American Centrifuge Plant (ACP) License Application and Supporting Documents.

These proposed changes support amending the licensing documentation to provide and clarify exemptions from the requirements of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 70.24, Criticality Accident Requirements. Specifically, all of the subject exemption requests address only the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 subpart (a) regarding Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) coverage for areas in which special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored. Additionally, general proposed changes are also included within this license amendment that did not warrant the NRC's prior review and approval; however, are provided for completeness to assist in the review efforts. Proposed changes are described below:

LA-3605-0001, License Application for the American Centrifuge Plant [Enclosure 2 of ACO 24-0035 and Enclosure 3 of ACO 24-0077):

Section 1.1.5.6.5, Criticality Accident Alarm System, was revised to reference Section 5.4.4 of the License Application and to reference that exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 are documented within Section 1.2.5 of the License Application.

Section 1.2.5, Special Exemptions or Special Authorizations, includes additional exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 addressing criticality monitoring as identified in Section 3.10.6 of LA-3605-0003, Section 3.10.4 of LA-3605-0003A, and prepared per Section 5.4.4 of the License Application. As such, the following proposed changes have been made:

° Clarified that the original exemption for transportation, handling, and storage of solid UF6 filled cylinders is specific to the commercial ACP operations.

0 ACO proposes an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 for the handling, storage, and transportation of fissile 30-series cylinders used for the High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) Demonstration project. Note: The transportation aspect referred to under this exemption request is for on-site transportation following receipt of fissile 30-series cylinders (i.e., feed) from an NRC licensed shipper. Off-site transportation of special nuclear material is not an authorized activity under the currently described HALEU Demonstration project.

0 ACO proposes an exemption from Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAASt coverage when the CAAS or its associated equipment is out of service and compensatory measures that provide an equivalent risk reduction are in place.

0 ACO proposes an exemption from CAAS coverage for non-fissile material operations (NFMOs).

ACO 24-0077 Page 2 of 14 0

ACO proposes an exemption from CAAS coverage for areas in which a nuclear criticality safety evaluation (NCSE) has evaluated the fissile material operation and determined that a criticality accident is not credible. Conclusions of non-credibility require, at a minimum, that the inventory of 235U in the area is less than 700 grams.

0 ACO proposes an exemption from CAAS coverage for storage areas in which the only special nuclear material present is contained in packages defined in 10 CFR Part 71 or specifically exempt according to 10 CFR 71.15.

Sections 1.4.1, American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society, (ANSI/ANS) and l.4.2, American National Standards Institute, were revised to reflect the new section references provided within the LA-3605-0003 and LA-3605-0003A.

Section 5.4.2.1, Non-Fissile Material Operations, was revised to clarify that operations in which the uranium enrichment is less than l weight percent or an inventory of less than 100 grams 235U are termed "non-fissile material operations" and are performed without the need for NCS double contingency controls.

Section 5.4.4, Criticality Accident Alarm System Coverage, was revised to clarify that CAAS is required in each area where special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored unless the NRC has granted an exemption from the 10 CFR 70.24 and refers to Section 1.2.5 of the License Application for more details related to the CAAS exemptions.

Section 8.1.1, Nuclear Criticality, was revised to clarify that CAAS is required in each area where special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored unless the NRC has granted an exemption from the l O CFR 70.24 and refers to Section 1.2.5 of the License Application for more details related to the CAAS exemptions.

Section 8.2, References, was revised to remove a reference that was not used within this chapter.

Chapters 1.0, 5.0, and 8.0 of the License Application also contain grammatical and formatting changes throughout.

NR-3605-0008, Emergency Plan for the American Centrifuge Plant (Enclosure 3 of ACO 24-0035):

Section 2.2.4, Nuclear Criticality, was revised to clarify that CAAS is required in each area where special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored unless the NRC has granted an exemption from the 10 CFR 70.24 and refers to Section 1.2.5 of the License Application for more details related to the CAAS exemptions.

Sections 2.2.4 and 11.0, References, were revised to delete an old Gaseous Diffusion Plant reference based upon the fact that this portion of the site is undergoing decommissioning activities, as well as correct the year reference related to ANSI/ANS-8.23.

Document also contains grammatical and formatting changes throughout.

ACO 24-0077 Page 3 of 14 LA-3605-0003, Integrated Safety Analysis Summary for the American Centrifuge Plant [Enclosure 4 of ACO 24-0035 and Enclosure 4 of ACO 24-0077]:

Section 3.10.6, Criticality Accident Alarm System, was revised to clarify that CAAS is required in each area where special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored unless the NRC has granted an exemption from the 10 CFR 70.24 and refers to Section 1.2.5 of the License Application for more details related to the CAAS exemptions. Additionally, this section was revised to reference Section 5.4.4 of the License Application to clarify that the need for CAAS coverage is considered during the NCS evaluation process.

Section 3.10.6.1.1, Cylinder Storage Yard Criticality Accident Alarm System Exemption, was revised to clarify that the previously approved cylinder storage yard CAAS exemption is only applicable to the commercial ACP operation and that the exemption from CAAS requirements for fissile 30-series cylinders used for the HALEU Demonstration project is evaluated in LA-3605-0003A.

The following new sections were added to describe the exemptions documented in Section 1.2.5 of the License Application:

0 New Section 3.10.6.1.2, Criticality Accident Alarm System Out of Service Exemption 0

New Section 3.10.6.1.3, Non-Fissile Material Operations 0

New Section 3.10.6.1.4, Operations for Which a Criticality Accident is Not Credible 0

New Section 3. I 0.6.1.5, Special Nuclear Material Packaged as Defined in JO CFR Part 71 Section 3.16, References, added ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014 as used in new Section 3.10.6.1.4.

Document also contains grammatical and formatting changes throughout, and the new sections have been added to the Table of Contents.

LA-3605-0003A, Addendum 1 of the Integrated Safety Analysis Summary for the American Centrifuge Plant - HALEU Demonstration [Enclosure 5 of ACO 24-0035]:

Section 3.10.4, Criticality Accident Alarm System, was revised to clarify that HALEU Demonstration has CAAS coverage as required by l O CFR 70.24 unless the NRC has granted an exemption from the 10 CFR 70.24 CAAS requirements as documented in Section 1.2.5 of the License Application.

The following new sections were added to describe the exemptions documented in Section 1.2.5 of the License Application:

New Section 3.10.4.1, Criticality Accident Alarm System Exemption, was added which discusses the CAAS requirements of IO CFR 70.24 and 70.17. Additionally, this ACO 24-0077 Page 4 of 14 section clarifies that requested exemptions specific to HALEU Demonstration are described within and requested exemptions that are explicitly applicable to only the commercial ACP or that apply to both are discussed within Section 3.10.6.2 of LA-3605-0003.

New Section 3.10.4.1.1, Handling, Storage, and Transportation of Fissile 30-Series Cylinders, was added to describe the exemption for operations involving handling, storage, and transportation of fissile 30-series cylinders for HALEU Demonstration.

Document also contains grammatical and formatting changes throughout, and the new Section 3.10.4.1 has been added to the Table of Contents.

No changes are being proposed to the currently described commercial ACP or HALEU centrifuge cascade design, authorized uses, or authorized possession limits. Additionally, no changes are being proposed to the American Centrifuge Lead Cascade Facility Materials License that is undergoing NRC's review and approval to terminate.

The proposed changes contained within Enclosures 2 through 5 [of ACO 24-0035] are identified by the following method:

Blue Strikeout - Identifies text to be removed Red underline - Identifies text to be added Additionally, supplemental proposed changes contained within Enclosures 3 and 4 of ACO 24-0077 are identified by yellow highlight for NRC's ease of review.

Justification The following exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 addressing criticality monitoring are identified in Section 3.10.6 of LA-3605-0003, Integrated Safety Analysis Summary for the American Centrifuge Plant (Enclosure 4 of ACO 24-0035 and Enclosure 4 of ACO 24-0077), and Section 3.10.4 of LA-3605-0003A, Addendum I of the Integrated Safety Analysis Summary for the American Centrifuge Plant - HALEU Demonstration (Enclosure 5 of ACO 24-0035), and prepared in accordance with Section 5.4.4 of LA-3605-0001, License Application for the American Centrifuge Plant (Enclosure 2 of ACO 24-0035).

10 CFR 70.24, Criticality Accident Requirements, requires that licensees authorized to possess special nuclear material in a quantity exceeding 700 g of contained 235U shall maintain in each area in which such licensed special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored, a monitoring system capable of detecting a criticality that produces an absorbed dose in soft tissue of 20 rads of combined neutron and gamma radiation at an unshielded distance of two meters from the reacting material within one minute.

ACO 24-0077 Page 5 of 14 IO CFR 70.17 allows the Commission, upon application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, to grant such exemptions from the requirements of the regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. The requested exemptions are authorized by law because there is no statutory provision prohibiting the grant of the exemption. The requested exemptions will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest for the reasons discussed below.

The CAAS is a standalone system comprised of detectors and annunciators that do not interface with or affect property, defense, or security; therefore, the key requirement for evaluating the 10 CFR 70.24 exemption is that it "not endanger life." The activities that are mandated before and after a criticality event are the same, regardless of how the criticality is detected and personnel notified.

NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for Fuel Cycle Facilities License Applications, Revision 2, Section 5.4.3, states that "an applicant that does not meet applicable guidance in the standard review plan should describe and justify an acceptable alternative to meet the regulations." Section 5.4.3. l. l, states that Regulatory Guide 3.71, Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards for Fuels and Material Facilities, endorses ANSI/ ANS-8 national standards, with some exceptions and qualifications. The NRC endorsement of these standards means that they provide methods and practices generally acceptable to the NRC staff for the prevention and mitigation of criticality accidents. However, application of a standard is not a substitute for detailed NCS analyses for specific operations. This section also states that Regulatory Guide 3.71 endorses ANSI/ ANS-8.3-1997 (reaffirmed in 2003) in full.

ANSI/ ANS-8.3-1997, Criticality Accident Alarm System, Section 4.1. l states that "installation of an alarm system implies a nontrivial risk of criticality" and Section 4.1.3 states that "the purpose of an alarm system is to reduce the risk to personnel. Evaluation of the overall risk should recognize that hazards may result from false alarms and subsequent sudden interruptions of operations and relocation of personnel."

Each of the exemptions from 10 CFR 70.24 are discussed in more detail below to demonstrate that the change is justified and safe.

A. Handling, Storage, and Transportation of Fissile 30-Series Cylinders This proposed change requests an exemption from CAAS coverage for the handling, storage, and transportation of fissile 30-series cylinders as part of the HALEU Demonstration project. NCSE-GEN-001, Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation for Large UF6 Cylinders [Revision 5], provides the requirements necessary to maintain criticality safety for the handling and storage of large UF6 cylinders (30-series and 12-series) for HALEU Demonstration.

Also, NCSE-GEN-00 I provides an evaluation which demonstrates that the handling, storage, and transportation of solid UF6 filled 30-series ACO 24-0077 Page 6 of 14 cylinders presents a trivial risk of criticality. The NCSE states that operations involving handling, storage, and transportation of fissile 30-series cylinders shall be provided with CAAS coverage, unless NRC approved CAAS exemption criteria are met; therefore, the 30-series cylinders containing fissile UF6 will continue to be stored and handled within CAAS coverage until an NRC authorized exemption is obtained.

This exemption is based on the conclusion within NCSE-GEN-001 [Revision 5] that the risk of criticality for these operations is trivial and credits the robust design features, conservative evaluation assumptions, and multiple controls.

As discussed in Section 1.2.5 of the License Application, ACO proposes the following basis for the exemption for CAAS coverage not being required for the handling, storage, and transportation of fissile 30-series cylinders as part of HALEU Demonstration because there is a trivial risk of criticality for these operations.

The handling, storage, and transportation of fissile solid UF6 filled 30-series cylinders are based on robust passive design features that are subject to management measures and administrative controls that further ensure cylinder integrity and reliability. The passive design features for 30-series cylinder operations include the robust design of the cylinders and storage array fixtures. The 30-series cylinder is fabricated of fire-resistant materials and is designed in accordance with ANSI N 14.1. As such, 30-series cylinders are designed to not breach during a design basis fire and are resistant to damage from dropping, from contact with other cylinders and structures, and from corrosion. The controls, in combination with the robust design of the 30-series cylinders and the self-sealing nature of UF6 and water at the location of a credible crack or puncture, minimizes the accumulation of moderator within a fissile 30-series cylinder. The storage fixtures used in 30-series cylinder storage arrays are also made of fire-resistant materials and are designed to survive a design basis fire as well as minimize lateral movement of the stored cylinders and elevate the cylinders above the ground/floor.

The administrative controls associated with the handling, storage, and transportation of fissile 30-series cylinders support the passive design features discussed above by requiring periodic inspections of cylinders to identify damage, breaches, corrosion, and leak-related accumulation of fissile materials; limiting UF6 enrichment in the cylinders; prohibiting stacking of cylinders; establishing spacing from other fissile materials or processes; protecting the cylinders from conditions that could cause damage; and protecting the cylinders from conditions that could lead to water intrusion.

ACO 24-0077 Page 7 of 14 The fissile 30-series cylinders for HALEU Demonstration are limited to 5 weight percent 235U. The NCS analyses relied upon to demonstrate compliance with the double contingency principle and the 10 CFR 70.61 performance requirements are extremely conservative. Each 30-series cylinder is modeled with significantly more fissile material than what can be present in actual circumstances. In addition, the base model also eliminates spacing between cylinders in the storage array that could contribute to isolation of adjacent cylinders. This conservative cylinder base model is then employed to evaluate upset conditions for 30-series cylinder operations. Upset conditions for the 30-series cylinder operations are also very conservative including; 1) stacked cylinder upsets modeled a large number of stacked cylinders; 2) water intrusion upsets modeled a greater than credible amount of water entering an impacted cylinder; 3) modeled moderation/reflection conditions were extreme, including fully flooded storage array conditions; 4) interaction upsets modeled two failures instead of one; and finally 5) enrichment upsets modeled beyond credible amounts of higher enriched material in the impacted cylinder. Given the extreme configurations evaluated, and large number of failures required to achieve the configurations, the risk of criticality for 30-series cylinder

handling, storage, and transportation is well beyond extremely unlikely. Therefore, the conservative evaluation of upsets, combined with the robust controls for 30-series cylinder operations, supports a conclusion of a trivial risk of criticality.

The increased vehicular and pedestrian traffic necessary to support CAAS maintenance and calibration requirements would increase the likelihood for fire and impact events for 30-series cylinder operations such that workers would be at a higher risk for injury and exposure relative to the minimal mitigative value produced by the presence of CAAS. Therefore, CAAS coverage is not necessary for the handling, storage, and transportation of 30-series cylinders.

Further discussions related to this exemption for the HALEU Demonstration are documented within Section 3.10.4. l. l of LA-3605-0003A (Enclosure 5 of ACO 24-0035).

B. CAAS Out of Service Exemption ACO requests an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24U!} for circumstances in which the CAAS is out of service and compensatory measures are in place. Without this exemption, it is necessary for ACO to provide 10 CFR 70.50(b) notifications when CAAS is taken out of service, such as to support annual CAAS surveillances or other maintenance activities that require a CAAS outage.

ACO 24-0077 Page 8 of 14 Pursuant to 10 CFR 70.50(b )(2), on August 1, 2023, ACO notified the NRC of a pre-planned outage of the CAAS to perform periodic testing (NRC Event#56647).

Compensatory measures were implemented in accordance with Section 5.4.4 of the License Application.

These measures included the following: evacuation of non-essential personnel from the area of concern and the immediate evacuation zone (lEZ) before removing CAAS equipment from service, limiting access into the area; restricting fissile material movement; and the use of Personal Alarming Dosimeters for personnel that must access the area during the CAAS outage. These measures were implemented until CAAS coverage was verified to be operational, and the CAAS declared operable in accordance with approved plant procedures. The event was terminated after completion of the routine periodic testing and pursuant to 10 CFR 70.50(c)(2) on September 28, 2023, ACO submitted (ACO 23-0068) the required 60-day written event report to the NRC.

As evaluated and discussed in Section 5.3.4.4 of the previously approved NUREG-1851,

Safety Evaluation Report for the American Centrifuge Plant [ML062700087] dated September 2006, in the unlikely event CAAS coverage is lost, appropriate compensatory measures will be imposed. The applicant stated in Section 5.4.4 of the License Application that it would plan and document compensatory measures as part of off-normal operation procedures before initiation of operations. Section 5.4.4 of the License Application also indicates that these may include equipment shutdown, limiting access, or halting movement of uranium-bearing material. These compensatory measures satisfy the acceptance criteria in Section 5.4.3.4.3(7) of NUREG-1520.

These measures are consistent with usual industry practice and are therefore acceptable to the NRC staff.

The exemption being proposed in Section 1.2.5 of the License Application states as follows:

In the event CAAS or its associated equipment is out of service, ACO is exempt from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24W provided that compensatory measures are employed and remain effective until the CAAS has been restored to service. Plant procedures provide for compensatory measures which include limiting access, halting movement of fissile material, and use of Personal Alarming Dosimeters for personnel who access the area during a CAAS outage. The Personal Alarming Dosimeters used to augment the installed CAAS are evaluated against ANSI/ANS-8.3-1997 and the criteria for use shall be specified in procedures.

Further discussions related to this exemption for the ACP and for HALEU Demonstration are documented within Section 3.10.6.1.2 ofLA-3605-0003 (Enclosure 4 of ACO 24-0035 and Enclosure 4 of ACO 24-0077).

Therefore, ACO proposes that the proceduralized compensatory measures described in the License Application support documentation to "justify an acceptable alternative to meet the regulations" and provide equivalent risk reduction to the 10 CFR 70.24 compliant ACO 24-0077 Page 9 of 14 CAAS when implemented prior to CAAS outages. Based on the above discussion, an exemption from 10 CFR 70.24 for circumstances in which the CAAS is out of service and compensatory measures are in place is justified. Without this exemption, it is necessary for ACO to provide IO CFR 70.50(b) notifications when CAAS is taken out of service, resulting in unnecessary administrative burden. Additionally, an exemption for CAAS outages when compensatory measures are employed is consistent with Section 4.4.2 of ANSI/ANS-8.3-1997.

NRC has granted a similar exemption to other fuel cycle facilities. Reporting planned CAAS outages results in an administrative burden to both ACO and the NRC with no added value. This exemption will not alter reporting requirements for inadvertent criticality events.

C. Non-Fissile Material Operations NFMOs are controlled such that the enrichment and/or inventory are maintained below the enrichment or fissile mass necessary for criticality. The determination of which operations are fissile versus which operations are non-fissile are made by NCS and includes consideration of normal and credible abnormal upset conditions to ensure the enrichment and/or inventory are maintained below I weight percent 235U or below 100 grams mu. Section 5.4.4 of the License Application and Section 5.3.4.4 of the previously approved NUREG-1851, state that N FM Os and areas with less than 700 grams 235U do not require CAAS under 10 CFR 70.24(a).

NCS has determined that these operations cannot be made critical under normal and credible abnormal conditions at the ACP. For items containing less than 100 grams 235U, this mass is a factor of 7 below the minimum critical mass for uranium enriched to I 00 weight percent 235U, regardless of whether the material is optimally moderated and fully reflected. HALEU Demonstration is limited to less than 20 weight percent 235U, providing additional conservatism.

Conversely, CAAS false alarms may result in process disruption and injury to personnel.

Maintaining a CAAS in NFMO areas may also result in increased occupational exposure to personnel and increased foot traffic in those areas. ANSI/ANS-8.3-1997, Section 4.1.3 states that "the purpose of an alarm system is to reduce the risk to personnel" and that "evaluation of the overall risk should recognize that hazards may result from false alarms and subsequent sudden interruption of operations and relocation of personnel." Since these NFMOs cannot be made critical, there is no tangible risk benefit to requiring a CAAS for NFMO areas. Therefore, this exemption is being proposed in Section 1.2.5 of the License Application for completeness and states as follows:

Non-fissile material operations do not require CAAS coverage. ACO has established a threshold of I weight percent or higher enriched mu and I 00 g or more of mu for determining what evaluation for NCS ACO 24-0077 Page 10 of 14 considerations of planned operations must be performed. Operations in which the uranium enrichment is less than 1 weight percent or an inventory of less than 100 g 235U are termed "non-fissile material operations" and are performed without the need for NCS double contingency controls. The determination of which operations are fissile versus which operations are non-fissile is made by NCS and may be contained within a NCSE or as a separate document. The determination of an operation being non-fissile includes normal and credible abnormal upset conditions to ensure the enrichment and/or inventory are maintained below 1 weight percent 235U or below 100 g 235U. This 100 g mu mass is a factor of 7 below the minimum critical mass, regardless of whether the material is optimally moderated and fully reflected for uranium enriched to l 00 weight percent 235U. Based on this, the value is sufficiently low to use as a threshold limit for exemption from CAAS coverage.

Further discussions related to this exemption for the ACP and for HALEU Demonstration are documented within Section 3.10.6.1.3 of LA-3605-0003 (Enclosure 4 of ACO 24-0035).

Similar exemptions have previously been approved by the NRC and are actively used by other fuel cycle facilities for CAAS [

References:

ML19088Al01, ML093441396, ML I 03410249].

D. Operations for Which a Criticality Accident is Not Credible As stated within Section 5.4.4 of the License Application and confirmed in Section 5.3.4.4 of the previously approved NUREG-1851, CAAS is not required for areas in which an NCSE has evaluated the fissile material operation and determined that a criticality accident is not credible. The basis for incredibility requires that the inventory of the area be less than 700 grams mu at a minimum. The 700 grams mu inventory is consistent with the subcritical mass limit specified in Table 1 of ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014.

Section 5.4.4 of the License Application and Section 5.3.4.4 ofNUREG-1851 further states that areas with less than 700 grams mu do not require CAAS under 10 CFR 70.24(a).

Therefore, this exemption is being proposed in Section 1.2.5 of the License Application for completeness and states as follows:

CAAS coverage is not required for an area in which an NCSE has evaluated the fissile material operation and determined that a criticality accident is not credible. The basis for incredibility requires that the inventory of the area be less than 700 g mu at a minimum under normal and credible abnormal upset conditions. The 700 g mu inventory is consistent with the subcritical mass limit specified in Table 1 of ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014. The conclusion ACO 24-0077 Page 11 of 14 that a criticality in the area is not credible must be documented in an NCSE per Section 5.4.4 of this License Application.

Further discussions related to this exemption for the ACP and for HALEU Demonstration are documented within Section 3.10.6.1.4 ofLA-3605-0003 (Enclosure 4 of ACO 24-0035 and Enclosure 4 of ACO 24-0077).

Similar exemptions have previously been approved by the NRC and are actively used by other fuel cycle facilities for areas with less than 700 grams 235U. [

References:

ML19088A101, ML093441396, ML103410249].

E. Special Nuclear Material Packaged as Defined in 10 CFR Part 71 The transportation requirements of IO CFR Part 71 serve to limit special nuclear material quantities to shipping configurations, thus providing limitations on geometry and interaction of fissile material. Therefore, the maximum number of containers permitted in each area shall be unlimited for low specific activity packages as defined in 49 CFR 173.403, and the maximum number of other fissile packages in each area must be limited to a criticality safety index (CSI) of 100, with at least 6 meters 20 feet (20 feet6 meters) between areas. Therefore, the NRC has granted exemptions to 10 CFR 70.24 for areas involving special nuclear material that is contained in packages defined in transportation requirements of 10 CFR Part 71.

Section 173.403 of 49 CFR defines low specific activity packages as those that do not contain fissile material or are fissile exempt under 49 CFR 173.453. This material has been determined to be exempt from all requirements for the transport of fissile material, justifying the transport of unlimited numbers of such low specific activity containers. The CS! exemption is justified based on the requirements of 49 CFR l 76.704(e). Based on the low inherent risk of criticality with such materials, the potential for criticality involving these materials is trivial and therefore will not result in undue hazards to life or property.

As discussed above for NFMO areas, false alarms may result in process disruption and injury to personnel. Additionally, granting an exemption from the requirement for a CAAS represents a savings in cost and occupational exposure required to install, maintain, and calibrate the systems.

Therefore, this exemption is being proposed in Section 1.2.5 of the License Application for completeness and states as follows:

CAAS coverage is not required for storage areas in which the only special nuclear material present is contained in packages as defined in 10 CFR Part 71 or specifically exempt according to IO CFR 71.15.

The maximum number of containers permitted in each area shall be tmlimited to the size and basic configuration of the packages on the transport conveyance for low specific activity packages, and the maximum number of fissile packages in ACO 24-0077 Page 12 of 14 each area must be limited to a criticality safety index (CSI) of 100, with at least 6 meters 20 feet (20 feet6 meters) between areas, whether fissile or exempt. Fissile exempt packages as defined in 10 CFR 71.15 and fissile material in Part 71 packages are not commingled with each other or other fissile material within a storage area outside of CAAS coverage. The transportation requirements serve to limit special nuclear material quantities to shipping configurations, thus providing limitations on geometry and interaction of fissile material. Therefore, the potential for criticality involving these materials is trivial and will not result in undue hazards to life or property. The increased vehicular and pedestrian traffic necessary to support CAAS maintenance and calibration requirements would increase the likelihood for fire and impact events for these areas such that workers would be at a higher risk for injury and exposure relative to the minimal mitigative value produced by the presence of CAAS. Therefore, CAAS coverage is not required for storage areas in which the only special nuclear material present is contained in packages as defined in 10 CFR Part 71 or specifically exempt according to 10 CFR 71.15.

Further discussions related to this exemption for the ACP and for HALEU Demonstration are documented within Section 3.10.6.1.5 ofLA-3605-0003 (Enclosure 4 of ACO 24-0035 and Enclosure 4 of ACO 24-0077).

Similar exemptions have previously been approved by the NRC and are actively used by other fuel cycle facilities for material that is contained in packages defined in 10 CFR Part 71 or specifically exempt according to 10 CFR 71.15 [

References:

ML19088Al01,

ML09344l396, and ML103410249).

Exemptions for NFMO areas; operations for which a criticality is not credible; areas where material is contained in packages defined in 10 CFR Part 71; and the handling, storage, and transportation of fissile 30-series cylinders are warranted because the risk of criticality is trivial and there is no risk benefit to requiring a CAAS consistent with Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.3 of ANSI/ ANS-8.3-1997.

Therefore, based upon the above discussions, the requested exemptions are allowed by 10 CFR 70.17(a) which provides for exemptions that are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the pub I ic interest. The potential for criticality involving the operations listed above is very low (trivial) and will not endanger life or property. Additionally, the proposed exceptions do not impact the common defense and security. The requested exemptions are based on the operating experience of similarly licensed fuel cycle facilities employing similar compensatory measures, and accepted consensus standards.

Implementation of these proposed changes will not impact the design function, or method of performance or controlling design functions, structures, systems, and components, nor will the proposed changes decrease the effectiveness of any program or plan contained in the License ACO 24-0077 Page 13 of 14 Applications and Supporting Documents. Moreover, the proposed changes will not change the assumptions, or change, degrade or prevent actions described or assumed in accident sequences evaluated and described in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) Summary/Addendum 1 of the ISA Summary for HALEU Demonstration, nor will any Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) be affected. Therefore, no credible accident sequences could exceed the IO CFR 70.61 performance requirements and the potential exposure to the general public is anticipated to be negligible.

Environmental Considerations ACO proposes that there are no significant environmental impacts associated with the changes proposed in this amendment request. The proposed changes do not meet the criteria in l O CFR 51.60(b )(2) since they do not involve a significant expansion of the site, a significant change in the types of effluents, a significant increase in the amounts of effluents, a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure, or a significant increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents.

Additionally, this amendment request does not impact the transportation related to the receipt of feed material as previously evaluated for the HA LEU Demonstration project as currently described within the License Application and Supporting Documents. Therefore, it is believed that the previously documented Environmental Assessment/or the Proposed Amendment of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission License Number SNM-2011 for the American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio [ML2 l 085A 705] dated June 2021 remains bounded. The 2021 Environmental Assessment states in part:

NUREG-1834, Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio [ML061250131 Volume 1 and ML061250101 Volume 2] date published April 2006, estimated that I, l 00 feed shipments would be shipped annually to the [ commercial] ACP, evaluated that number of shipments, and determined transportation impacts from operation to be small. NUREG-1834 also estimated there would be 2,286 truckloads of construction-related material during the first five years of the [commercial ACP] license, evaluated that number of truckloads, and determined transportation impacts from construction to be small to moderate.

The potential transportation impacts during operation of the HALEU cascade would be due to feed shipments. The HALEU feed material would be shipped in U.S. origin 30-B series cylinders that have a 2.5-ton capacity. ACO would receive a very small fraction of the estimated feed shipments for the commercial ACP.

The NRC staff evaluated the small number of additional feed shipments when compared to the I, 100 feed shipments evaluated for the full [commercial] ACP, as well as daily vehicular traffic, and concludes that there would not be a significant impact due to transportation activities from the proposed action.

ACO 24-0077 Page 14 of 14 For the anticipated license amendment request, seeking operation of the HALEU cascade for an additional period of up to I 0-years, ACO estimates that three additional shipments of feed material per year would be necessary to meet the expected level of production. Transport ofHALEU product is not expected to occur during the period of continued operation. Considering this small number of feed shipments, when compared to the daily vehicular traffic and the larger number of feed material shipments anticipated for the ACP, the NRC staff does not anticipate a significant impact due to transportation activities during the period of continued operation.

Consequently, a separate supplement to the Environmental Report is not being submitted.

Significance Determination for Proposed Conforming Changes ACO has reviewed the supplemental proposed changes supporting the NRC' s request for additional information related to the exemptions from the 10 CFR 70.24 CAAS requirements and the previously provided Significance Determination remains unchanged (Reference 2).

of ACO 24-0077 Supplemental Proposed Changes for LA-3605-0001, License Application for the American Centrifuge Plant Information Contained Within Does Not Contain Export Controlled Information Reviewing Official: ____

L_or_i _H_a_w_k~, A_C_O ___ _

Date:

10/1 7/2024

LA-3605-0001 License Application for the American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio Docket No. 70-7004 Proposed Change Information Contained Within Does Not Contain Export Controlled Information Reviewing Official:

Lori Hawk / ACO Date:

I 0/ 17/2024 October 2024

IFOR INFORMATION ONLY I license Application for the American Centrifuge Plant Proposed Change October 2024 authorized an increase in the possession limits beyond those approved on June 11, 2021 (SNM-2011, Amendment 19).

3) Within the ACP Operations, the Licensee will provide a minimum 60-day notice to the NRC prior to initial customer product withdrawal of licensed material exceeding 5 wt.

percent 235U enrichment. This notice will identify the necessary equipment and operational changes to support customer product withdrawal, storage, processing, and shipment for these assays.

1.2.5 Special Exemptions or Special Authorizations The following exemption to the applicable IO CFR Part 20 requirements are identified in Section 4.8 of this license application:

UF6 feed, product, and depleted uranium cylinders, which are routinely transported inside the DOE reservation boundary between ACP locations and/or storage areas at the ACP, are readily identifiable due to their size and unique construction and are not routinely labeled as radioactive material. Qualified radiological workers attend UF6 cylinders during movement.

Containers located in Restricted Areas within the ACP are exempt from container labeling requirements of 10 CFR 20.1904, as it is deemed impractical to label each and every container.

In such areas, one sign stating that every container may contain radioactive material will be posted. By procedure, when containers are to be removed from contaminated or potentially contaminated areas, a survey is performed to ensure that contamination is not spread around the reservation.

ln lieu of the requirements of 10 CFR 20.160l(a), each High Radiation Area with a radiation reading greater than 0.1 Roentgen Equivalent Man per hour (REM/hour) at 30-centimeters (cm) but less than 1 REM/hour at 30 cm is posted Caution, High Radiation Area and entrance into the area shall be controlled by an R WP. Physical and administrative controls to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized access to High and Very High Radiation Areas are maintained. The on-site radiological impacts from the proposed exemptions to the requirements of IO CFR 20.1904 and 20.160 I would be minimal and are consistent with previously approved exemptions found in the GDP certification. Moreover, pursuant to the regulations in IO CFR 20.230 I, the requested exemption is authorized by law and would not result in undue hazard to life or property.

The following exemption from the applicable IO CFR 70.50 reporting requirement is identified in Section 11.6.3 of this license application:

The 10 CFR 70.50(c)(2) reporting criteria require that the ACP submit a written follow-up report within 30 days of the initial report required by 10 CFR 70.50 (a) or (b) or by 10 CFR 70.74 and Appendix A of Part 70. In lieu of the 30-day requirement described in IO CFR 70.50(c)(2), NRC approval to submit the required written reports within 60 days of the initial notifications is hereby requested.

1-63

license Application/or the American Centrifuge Plant Proposed Change October 2024 operation of the GDPs. 3) Finally, granting this exemption is in the public interest for the same reasons as stated above and will facilitate deployment of gas centrifuge enrichment technology by eliminating an unnecessary financial burden on the licensee.

The following exemption§ from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24 addressing criticality monitoring -i-s--are identified in Section 3.10.6 of the ISA Summary, Section 3.10.4 of Addendum 1 of the ISA Summary for the ACP - HALEU Demonstration, and discussed mprepared per Section 5.4.4 of this -blicense A~pplication. Ex.emption is required for criticality monitoring of the UFe C)1linder storage yards.

10 CFR 70.24, Criticality Accident Requirements, requires that licensees authorized to possess special nuclear material in a quantity exceeding 700 g of contained 235U shall maintain in each area in which such licensed special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored, a monitoring system capable of detecting a criticality that produces an absorbed dose in soft tissue of 20 rads of combined neutron and gamma radiation at an unshielded distance of two meters from the reacting material within one minute.

10 CFR 70.17 allows the Commission, upon application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, to grant such exemptions from the requirements of the regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest. The requested exemptions are--tS authorized by law because there is no statutory provision prohibiting the grant of the exemption. The requested exemption§ will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and

-i-5-are otherwise in the public interest for the reasons discussed below.

Transportation, handling,_ and storage of solid UF6 filled cylinders for the commercial ACP operations are doubly contingent. Double contingency is established by multiple controls that limit the likelihood for a solid product cylinder to be breached during transportation, handling or storage, and the likelihood for a breach to not be identified and repaired before sufficient moderation results in a criticality. Moderation control of UF6 filled cylinders is maintained by ensuring cylinder integrity through periodic cylinder inspections. If a UF6 filled cylinder is found to be breached, the cylinder is covered within 24-hours after discovery to reduce the potential accumulation of moderating material, i.e., rainwater. This time limit ensures a corresponding heavy rainfall will not result in accumulation of sufficient amounts of water to cause a criticality. Damaged cylinders are repaired as necessary and emptied. UF6 cylinders are uniquely identified and their design requirements are controlled to further ensure cylinder integrity and reliability (i.e., UF6 cylinders are QL-1 components and are controlled in accordance with the Quality Assurance Program Description), and the Licensee implements onsite cylinder handling practices (i.e., requiring the use of approved equipment in accordance with approved procedures), which reduces the likelihood that a solid UF6 cylinder would be breached. These requirements are established as items relied on for safety to ensure the health and safety of the public and workers.

1-66

license Applicalionfor the American Centrifuge Plant Proposed Change October 2024 The UF6 cylinders stored in storage yards are not covered by a criticality monitoring system unless those cylinders contain licensed material greater than 5.0 weight percent 235U. NCS evaluation of product cylinders of any size, configured in infinite planar arrays, containing material enriched up to 5.25 weight percent 235U, has concluded that subcritical conditions are maintained. The ACP ISA has concluded that cylinders containing licensed material less than or equal to 5.0 weight percent 235U cannot be involved in a criticality accident sequence that has a probability of occurrence that exceeds 5 x 10-6/year.

The frequencies of criticality events in the cylinder yards have been decreased to the Highly Unlikely range (<10-5/year) through the establishment of preventive controls established by the ISA in accordance 10 CFR 70.62. Considering the conservatism of the JSA methodology in developing the unmitigated frequency and actual historical data related to cylinder operations, the frequency values could be reduced further. This additional reduction considers the fact that during 50 years of GDP operations, only one cylinder breach has occurred due to mishandling or equipment failure. Since that occurrence, cylinder handling equipment has been redesigned and cylinder handling methods have been revised to minimize the potential for breaches to occur. Another fact not considered in the ISA is that holes with a dimension of less than one inch will self-seal such that moderating material cannot infiltrate the breach. A third factor not considered in the ISA is that enriched cylinder operations require constant use and monitoring of cylinders such that corrosion breaches in enriched cylinders are highly unlikely. Allowing for this additional reduction in frequency, the probability for a criticality event becomes incredible, therefore CAAS coverage is not necessary.

The increased vehicular and pedestrian traffic in support of CAAS maintenance and calibration requirements would cause a subsequent increased likelihood for impact events involving cylinders and there would be an increased safety risk for workers from radiation exposure due to the ongoing CAAS maintenance and calibration requirements. To meet the CAAS coverage requirements in ANSI/ ANS--8.3-1997 and the operating requirements for the ACP, enriched cylinder storage yards would require a minimum of 60 clusters. Clusters would need to be at a height of approximately 40 feet, which would require maintenance equipment and pedestrian traffic to perform testing and preventative maintenance tasks to ensure their reliability and operability.

This equipment and traffic would increase the likelihood for fire and impact events in the cylinder storage yards such that workers would be at a higher risk for injury and exposure relative to the minimal mitigative value produced by the presence of CAAS.

CAAS coverage is not required for the handling, storage, and transportation of fissile 30-series cylinders as part of HALEU Demonstration because there is a trivial risk of criticality for these operations.

The handling, storage, and transportation of fissile solid UF6 filled 30-series cylinders are based on robust passive design features that are subject to management measures and administrative controls that further ensure cylinder integrity and reliability. The passive design features for 30-series cylinder operations include the robust design of 1-67

license Application for the American Centrifuge Plant Proposed Change October 2024 the cylinders and storage array fixtures. The 30-series cylinder is fabricated of fire-resistant materials and is designed in accordance with ANSI N 14.1 (Reference 24). As such, 30-series cylinders are designed to not breach during a design basis fire and are resistant to damage from dropping, from contact with other cylinders and structures, and from corrosion. The controls. in combination with the robust design of the 30-series cylinders and the self-sealing nature of UF6 and water at the location of a credible crack or puncture, minimizes the accumulation of moderator within a fissile 30-series cylinder. The storage fixtures used in 30-series cylinder storage arrays are also made of fire-resistant materials and are designed to survive a design basis fire as well as minimize lateral movement of the stored cylinders and elevate the cylinders above the ground/floor.

The administrative controls associated with the handling, storage, and transportation of fissile 30-series cylinders support the passive design features discussed above by requiring periodic inspections of cylinders to identify damage, breaches, corrosion, and leak-related accumulation of fissile materials; limiting UF6 enrichment in the cylinders; prohibiting stacking of cylinders; establishing spacing from other fissile materials or processes; protecting the cylinders from conditions that could cause damage; and protecting the cylinders from conditions that could lead to water intrusion.

The fissile 30-series cylinders for HALEU Demonstration are limited to 5 weight percent 235U. The NCS analyses relied upon to demonstrate compliance with the double contingency principle and the IO CFR 70.61 performance requirements are extremely conservative. Each 30-series cylinder is modeled with significantly more fissile material than what can be present in actual circumstances. In addition. the base model also eliminates spacing between cylinders in the storage array that could contribute to isolation of adjacent cylinders. This conservative cylinder base model is then employed to evaluate upset conditions for 30-series cylinder operations. Upset conditions for the 30-series cylinder operations are also very conservative including; l) stacked cylinder upsets modeled a large number of stacked cylinders; 2) water intrusion upsets modeled a greater than credible amount of water entering an impacted cylinder; 3) modeled moderation/reflection conditions were extreme, including fully flooded storage array conditions; 4) interaction upsets modeled two failures instead of one; and finally 5) enrichment upsets modeled beyond credible amounts of higher enriched material in the impacted cylinder.

Given the extreme configurations evaluated, and large number of failures required to achieve the configurations, the risk of criticality for 30-series cylinder handling, storage, and transportation is well beyond extremely unlikely. Therefore, the conservative evaluation of upsets, combined with the robust controls for 30-series cylinder operations. supports a conclusion of a trivial risk of criticality.

The increased vehicular and pedestrian traffic necessary to support CAAS maintenance and calibration requirements would increase the likelihood for fire and impact events for 30-series cylinder operations such that workers would be at a higher risk for injury and exposure relative to the minimal mitigative value produced by the presence of 1-68

License Application for the American Centrifuge Plant Proposed Change October 2024 CAAS. Therefore, CAAS coverage is not necessary for the handling, storage, and transportation of 30-series cylinders.

In the event CAAS or its associated equipment is out of service, the licensee is exempt from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(ru provided that compensatory measures are employed and remain effective until the CAAS has been restored to service. Plant procedures provide for compensatory measures which include limiting access, halting movement of fissile material, and use of Personal Alarming Dosimeters for personnel who access the area during a CAAS outage. The Personal Alarming Dosimeters used to augment the installed CAAS are evaluated against ANSl/ ANS-8.3-1997 and the criteria for use shall be specified in procedures.

Non-fissile material operations do not require CAAS coverage. ACO has established a threshold of 1 weight percent or higher enriched 235U and 100 g or more of 235U for determining what evaluation for NCS considerations of planned operations must be performed. Operations in which the uranium enrichment is less than I weight percent or an inventory ofless than I 00 g 235U are termed "non-fissile material operations" and are performed without the need for NCS double contingency controls. The determination of which operations are fissile versus which operations are non-fissile is made by NCS and may be contained within a NCSE or as a separate document. The determination of an operation being non-fissile includes normal and credible abnormal upset conditions to ensure the enrichment and/or inventory are maintained below l weight percent 235U or below 100 g mu. This 100 g mu mass is a factor of 7 below the minimum critical mass, regardless of whether the material is optimally moderated and fully reflected for uranium enriched to 100 weight percent mu. Based on this, the value is sufficiently low to use as a threshold limit for exemption from CAAS coverage.

CAAS coverage is not required for an area in which an NCSE has evaluated the fissile material operation and determined that a criticality accident is not credible. The basis for incredibility requires that the inventory of the area be less than 700 g mu at a mm1mum nder normal and credible abnormal uQ,§_et conditions. The 700 g 235U inventory is consistent with the subcritical mass limit specified in Table 1 of ANSI/ANS-8.1-2014. The conclusion that a criticality in the area is not credible must be documented in an NCSE per Section 5.4.4 of this license application.

CAAS coverage is not required for storage areas in which the only special nuclear material presen~ is contained in packages as defined in IO CFR Part 71 or specifically exempt according to IO CFR 71.15. The maximum number of containers permitted in each area shall be unlimited limited to the size and basic configuration of the packages on the transport conveyance for low specific activity packages, and the maximum number of fissile packages in each area must be limited to a criticality safety index (CSI) of I 00, with at least 6 meters (20 fect6 meters) between areas, whether fissile or exempt. Fissile exempt packages as defined in IO CFR 71.15 and fiss ile material ini Part 71 packages are not commingled with each other or other fissile material within a storage area outside of CAAS coverage. The transportation requirements serve to limit special nuclear material quantities to shipping configurations, thus providing 1-69

license Application for the American Centrifuge Plant Proposed Change October 2024 limitations on geometry and interaction of fissile material. Therefore, the potential for criticality involving these materials is trivial and will not result in undue hazards to life or property. The increased vehicular and pedestrian traffic necessary to support CAAS maintenance and calibration requirements would increase the likelihood for fire and impact events for these areas such that workers would be at a higher risk for injury and exposure relative to the minimal mitigative value produced by the presence of CAAS.

Therefore, CAAS coverage is not required for storage areas in which the only special nuclear material present is contained in packages as defined in IO CFR Part 71 or specifically exempt according to 10 CFR 71.15.

The following exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.13b crediting DOE indemnity in lieu of nuclear liability insurance as discussed in Section 1.2.2 of this license application.

10 CFR 140.13b requires, that "Each holder of a license issued under Parts 40 or 70 of this chapter for a uranium enrichment facility that involves the use of source material or special nuclear material is required to have and maintain liability insurance. The liability insurance must be the type and in the amounts the Commission considers appropriate to cover liability claims arising out of any occurrence within the United States that causes, within or outside the United States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, death, loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of chemical compounds containing source material or special nuclear material. Proof of liability insurance must be filed with the Commission as required by § 140.15 before issuance of a license for a uranium enrichment facility under parts 40 and 70 of this chapter."

In support of this HALEU Demonstration Program, DOE amended the GCEP Lease Agreement, in which the parties agree that all work performed under the HALEU Demonstration Contract on leased premises shall be considered a permitted use; any alterations or changes to the premises pursuant to the Demonstration Contract with the DOE shall be a permitted change to the premises; and that any liabilities of the Corporation (Licensee) arising from or incident to the performance of work under the HALEU Demonstration Contract with the DOE shall be governed solely by such contract. Therefore, the Demonstration Contract exempts ACO from any financial assurance for any liability insurance during the HALEU Contract period.

In support offuture expansion of the ACP, in accordance with Section 3107 of the USEC Privatization Act, the Lease with DOE for the DOE owned facilities that will be used for the ACP includes an indemnity agreement from DOE under Section 170d of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) for liability claims.

The Commission may, pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, upon application of any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and are otherwise in the public interest. This exemption is authorized by law because there is no statutory prohibition on crediting the DOE indemnity agreement in lieu of nuclear liability 1-70 of ACO 24-0077 Affidavit Information Contained Within Does Not Contain Export Controlled Information Reviewing Official:

Lori Hawk, ACO Date:

10/ 17/2024

AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY B. CUTLIP SUPPORTING APPLICATION TO WITHHOLD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE CERTAIN INFORMATION PROVIDED TO NRC IN LETTER ACO 24-0077

[, Larry B. Cutlip, of American Centrifuge Operating, LLC (ACO), having been duly sworn, do herby affirm and state:

I. [ have been authorized by ACO to (a) review the information owned by ACO which is referenced herein relating to ACO's Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding American Centrifuge Operating, LLC Criticality Accident Alarm System (Enterprise Project Identification Number L-2024-LLA-0070) as the described in letter ACO 24-0077, which ACO seeks to have withheld from public disclosure pursuant to section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2167, and 10 CFR 2.390(a)(4), and 9.17(a)(4), and (b) apply for the withholding of such information from public disclosure by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on behalf of ACO.

2. Consistent with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.390(b)(4) of the Commission' s regulations, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld.

1.

The information sought to be withheld from public disclosure is owned and has been held in confidence by ACO.

11. The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by ACO and not customarily disclosed to the public. ACO has a rational basis for determining the types of information customarily held in confidence by it and, in that connection, utilizes a system to determine when and whether to hold certain types of information in confidence. The application of

that system and the substance of that system constitute ACO policy and provide the rational basis required. Under that system, information is held in confidence if it falls in one or more of several types, the release of which might result in the loss of an existing or potential competitive advantage, as follows:

a) The information reveals the distinguishing aspects of a process ( or component, structure, tool, method, etc.) where presentation of its use by any of ACO's competitors without license from ACO constitutes a competitive economic advantage over other companies.

b) It consists of supporting data, including test data, relative to a process ( or component, structure, tool, method, etc.), the application of which data secures a competitive economic advantage (e.g., by optimization or improved marketability).

c) Its use by a competitor would reduce their expenditure of resources or improve their competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing a similar product.

d) lt reveals cost or price information, production capacities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of ACO, its customers or suppliers.

e) It reveals aspects of past, present, or future ACO or customer funded development plans and programs of potential commercial value to ACO.

f)

It contains patentable ideas, for which patent protection may be desirable.

g) It reveals information concerning the terms and conditions, work performed, administration, performance under or extension of contracts with its customers or suppliers.

iii. There are sound policy reasons behind the ACO system which include the following:

a) The use of such information by ACO gives ACO a competitive advantage over its

competitors. It is, therefore, withheld from disclosure to protect the ACO competitive position.

b) It is information, which is marketable in many ways. The extent to which such information is available to competitors diminishes ACO' s abi lity to sell products and services involving the use of the information.

c) Use by our competitors would put ACO at a competitive disadvantage by reducing their expenditure of resources at ACO expense.

d) Each component of proprietary information pertinent to a particular competitive advantage is potentially as valuable as the total competitive advantage. If competitors acquire components or proprietary information, any one component may be the key to the entire puzzle, thereby depriving ACO of a competitive advantage.

e) Unrestricted disclosure would jeopardize the position of prominence of ACO in the world market, and thereby give a market advantage to the competition of those countries.

f) The ACO capacity to invest corporate assets in research and development depends upon the success in obtaining and maintaining a competitive advantage.

iv. The information is being transmitted to the Commission in confidence and, under the provisions of 10 CFR Section 2.390, it is to be received in confidence by the Commission.

v. The information sought to be protected is not available in public sources or available information has not been previously employed in the same original manner or method to the best of our knowledge and belief.

3. The proprietary information sought to be withheld is contained within Enclosures 4 and 5 of letter ACO 24-0077. Specifically, Enclosure 4 contains proposed changes to LA-3605-0003, Integrated Safety Analysis Summary for the American Centrifuge Plant, and Enclosure 5 contains Revision 5 ofNCSE-GEN-001, Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation for Large UF6 Cylinders. These enclosures provide detailed descriptions, diagrams, and process related information to the deployment of ACO's high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) enrichment Plant; therefore, determined to be proprietary. Public disclosure of this proprietary information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of ACO because it may enhance the ability of competitors to position and provide similar products.

Moreover, disclosure of this information may provide insights into the design of ACO's American Centrifuge technology, including structures, systems, and components categorized as Controlled Unclassified Information, Security-Related Information, and Export Controlled Information.

Further, this information has substantial commercial value as follows:

The development of the information described in part is the result of applying many hundreds of person-hours and the expenditure of thousands of dollars on design and analysis activities to achieve the information that is sought to be withheld; and In order for a competitor of ACO to duplicate the information sought to be withheld, a similar process would have to be undertaken and a significant effort and resources would have to be expended.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

Larry B. Cutlip, having been duly sworn, hereby confinns that I am the President of American Centrifuge Operating, LLC, that I am authorized on behalf of ACO to review the information attached hereto and to sign and file with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission this affidavit and the attachments hereto, and that the statements made and matters set forth herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

On this 17th day of October 2024, Larry B. Cutlip personally appeared before me, is known by me to be the person whose name is subscribed to within the instrument and acknowledged that he executed the same for the purposes therein contained.

In witness hereof I hereunto set my hand and official seal.

State of Tennessee Notary Public Anderson County My commission expires October 26, 2024