RA-24-0154, Supplemental Information Supporting the Request for Exemption from Certain Requirements in 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2) Using Risk-Informed Process for Evaluations

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Supplemental Information Supporting the Request for Exemption from Certain Requirements in 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2) Using Risk-Informed Process for Evaluations
ML24159A746
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/07/2024
From: Kidd C
Duke Energy, Duke Energy Progress
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
RA-24-0154
Download: ML24159A746 (1)


Text

Chad Kidd General Manager - Nuclear Engineering Harris Nuclear Plant 5413 Shearon Harris Rd New Hill, NC 27562-9300

984.229.3140

10 CFR 50.12 June 7, 2024 Serial: RA-24-0154

ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-400 Renewed License No. NPF-63

Subject:

Supplemental Information Supporting the Request for Exemption from Certain Requirements in 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2) using Risk-Informed Process for Evaluations

Ladies and Gentlemen:

By letter dated February 6, 2024 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML24037A284), as supplemented by letter dated April 3, 2024 (ADAMS Accession No. ML24094A105), Duke Energy Progress, LLC (Duke Energy) submitted a request under the Risk-Informed Process for Ev aluations (RIPE) for an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2), Protection systems, requiring protection systems meet the requirements of IEEE 279-1971, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 (HNP). Specifically, the exemption request would no longer require the Reactor Protection System (RPS) cables that terminate within the Turbine Control System (TCS) Cabinet G (1TCS-CAB-G) to meet IEEE 279-1971 Section 4.6, Channel Independence, for independence and physical separation.

A call was conducted on May 22, 2024 between Duke Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to discuss information made available on an online reference portal per the audit plan submitted to the site by electronic mail on April 22, 2024 (ADAMS Accession No. ML24113A252). The NRC staff requested that additional information related to the impact a fault on the subject cables would have on the non-safety-related turbine trip on reactor trip function be submitted on the docket to support the development of the NRC staffs safety evaluation.

The enclosure to this letter provides the requested supplemental information to the application.

There are no new regulatory commitments contained within this letter.

Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Ryan Treadway, Director - Nuclear Fleet Licensing, at 980-373-5873.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 2 Serial: RA-24-0154

Sincerely, Cg/./4!->>

Chad Kidd General Manager - Nuclear Engineering

Enclosure:

Supplemental Information

cc: P. Boguszewski, Senior NRC Resident Inspector, HNP L. Brayboy, Radioactive Materials Branch Manager, NC DHHS M. Mahoney, NRC Project Manager, HNP L. Dudes, NRC Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: RA-24-0154 Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

1 PAGE PLUS THE COVER

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 1 of 1 Serial: RA-24-0154 Enclosure

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 6, 2024 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML24037A284), as supplemented by letter dated April 3, 2024 (ADAMS Accession No. ML24094A105), Duke Energy Progress, LLC (Duke Energy) submitted a request under the Risk-Informed Process for Ev aluations (RIPE) for an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2), Protection systems, requiring protection systems meet the requirements of IEEE 279-1971, Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 (HNP). Specifically, the exemption request would no longer require the Reactor Protection System (RPS) cables that terminate within the Turbine Control System (TCS) Cabinet G (1TCS-CAB-G) to meet IEEE 279-1971 Section 4.6, Channel Independence, for independence and physical separation.

A call was conducted on May 22, 2024 between Duke Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to discuss information made available on an online reference portal per the audit plan submitted to the site by electronic mail on April 22, 2024 (ADAMS Accession No. ML24113A252). The NRC staff requested that additional information related to the impact a fault on the subject cables would have on the non-safety-related turbine trip on reactor trip function be submitted on the docket to support the development of the NRC staffs safety evaluation.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

A fault (e.g., short circuit, hot short, electrical anomaly, fire) on the Turbine Trip System (TTS) cables that interface with Solid State Protection System (SSPS) relay output contacts and the reactor trip switchgear breaker output contacts does not have an adverse impact on the ability of SSPS to trip the reactor. A fault of the TTS cables could impact the non-safety related automatic turbine trip on reactor trip function. For example, a fault could cause a short circuit which could bypass the SSPS turbine trip output relay contacts, thus preventing the turbine from tripping. If this were to occur and a reactor trip occurred, Operations would trip the turbine manually by the Main Control Board turbine trip switch per step 2 of HNP Emergency Operating Procedure EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.