ML24081A308
| ML24081A308 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/21/2024 |
| From: | Mohamed Shams NRC/NRR/DANU |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML24081A308 (1) | |
Text
NRC Advanced Reactor Construction Oversight Process (ARCOP) 1 Vogtle Units 1-4 Photo Credit: Georgia Power Stakeholder Workshop Series
Welcome 2
Mohamed Shams Director of the Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-power Production and Utilization Facilities (DANU)
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
Meeting Introductions and Guidelines 3
Purpose and Desired Outcome 4
Purposes of Workshops Discuss the objectives and draft conceptual framework of the proposed NRC Advanced Reactor Construction Oversight Process (ARCOP).
Initiate dialogue with the public stakeholders about advanced reactor construction oversight options.
Gain understanding of various perspectives on options being considered.
- Please note that NRC guidance discussions are preliminary and are not meant to convey a final regulatory position.
Planned Workshop Sessions 5
Session 1, February 28, 2024, and March 20, 2024:
Introduction to NRC Advanced Reactor Construction Oversight, and the ARCOP Framework.
Session 2, April 3, 2024:
Inspection Scoping Session 3, Date:
Enforcement and Assessment Session 4, Date:
Feedback/Wrap Up
ARCOP Terms - Review 6
Quality of Reactor Plant Construction or Construction Quality refers to quality assurance during the design, fabrication, manufacture, construction, and testing of plant structures, systems, and components (SSCs). Adequate quality of construction of nuclear power plants means that SSCs are built according to their approved licensing basis.
On-Site:
The site of the reactor plants final installation. (i.e., the site where the reactor is licensed to be installed and ultimately operated).
Manufacturer:
An entity that fabricates or assembles a complete, or nearly complete, reactor plant in an off-site location (i.e., a factory).
Vendors:
Suppliers of components and services (to manufacturers or on-site). Vendors remain in the existing NRC vendor inspection program.
Workshop Session #1 Review:
Conceptual ARCOP Framework 7
QUALITY OF REACTOR PLANT CONSTRUCTION Provide reasonable assurance that advanced reactors will be built and operated in accordance with their licensing and design bases, the atomic energy act of 1954 (as amended), and the NRCs rules and regulations SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS OPERATIONAL READINESS OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS License and regulate the use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials to ensure adequate security and safety for the public and the environment REACTIVITY CONTROL FSF*
HEAT REMOVAL FSF*
RADIONUCLIDE RETENTION FSF*
NRC Mission ARCOP Objective ARCOP Strategic Performance Areas ARCOP Cornerstones of Safety SECURITY PROGRAMS Draft Concept
- FSF = Fundamental Safety Function
Workshop Session #1 Review:
ARCOP Discussion Topics 8
Inspection:
How is inspection scope determined?
How do we scope activities occurring at manufacturing facilities?
Enforcement:
How can we best structure significance determination to reflect risk during construction?
How should we treat findings at manufacturing facilities?
Assessment:
How can we best assess licensee and manufacturer performance while appropriately focusing on project quality and safety?
Workshop Session #2 Discussion Topics 9
Inspection:
How is inspection scope determined?
How do we scope activities occurring at manufacturing facilities?
10 A. Specific SSCs and ITAAC targeted for inspection (AP1000)
B. Baseline Inspection Scoping Matrices:
Project-specific sampling of inspection areas.
C. Availability Based Inspection:
Periodic site inspections throughout construction Options Considered:
Key Decision #1: Inspection Scoping
Reasonable (and Efficient) Assurance 11 Option A:
SSC/ ITAAC Targeting Option B:
Baseline Inspection Scoping Matrix Option C:
Availability Based Inspection More Specific/
Less Flexible Less Specific/
More Flexible Inspection Scoping Spectrum: Specific SSC Scoping vs. Flexibility
Reasonable (and Efficient) Assurance 12 Option A:
SSC/ ITAAC Targeting Option B:
Baseline Inspection Scoping Matrix Option C:
Availability Based Inspection More Specific/
Less Flexible Less Specific/
More Flexible Option B provides flexibility by allowing inspectors greater freedom in choosing SSCs that are representative of inspection area quality. Minimum and maximum samples within inspection areas are specified in the baseline inspection plan.
- 1. Provides reasonable assurance of inspection area quality through a combination of SSC and QAP inspections.
- 2. Efficiency maximized with the goal of reaching reasonable assurance with a well-defined baseline inspection program.
- 3. Quantifies cumulative inspection effort.
13 Advantages of Option B:
Inspection Scoping Matrices
Advantages of Option B:
Inspection Scoping Matrices (cont.)
14
- 4. Provides a tool for inspection staff to efficiently manage and plan baseline inspections
- 5. Provides a basis for reasonable assurance that the facility is built in accordance with its licensing and design bases. This is an input into the OL issuance (Part 50) and the fuel load (Part
- 52) decisions.
Inspection Scoping Matrix (Draft Concept) 15 Safety Function SSCs Rick Importance Design (RID)
Risk Importance Construction (RIC)
Structures and Buildings Mechanical Components Reactor and Internals Equipment Qualifications (other than ASME)
ASME Instrumentation and Control Electrical Functional Testing Human Factors Engineering Minimum Inspection Area Samples Required 7
12 3
10 8
5 6
15 4
Maximum Inspection Area Samples 10 15 6
13 11 8
9 20 7
Fundamental Safety Functions:
- Reactivity Control
- Radionclide Retention Water Storage Tanks High Medium X
Steam Separators Medium Medium X
X X
Passive float valves High Medium X
X X
Dual wall leak barrier -
leak detection system High High X
Water level monitor-tank control system High High X
X Vessel High Medium X
X Core barrel High High X
Software Lifecycle High High (Installation)
X X
Field sensors High High X
X X
Reactor trip system High High X
X Shutdown Elements High High X
Reactor Coolant High Medium Spent Fuel Storage Rack High High X
Protection and Structural Support of SR SSCs Rx Bldg. Foundation High High X
Rx Bldg. Structural elements High Medium X
Inspection Scoping Matrix Draft Concept 16 Each inspection area (matrix column) is associated with an Inspection Procedure (IP).
IPs will verify implementation of the QAP, as it is applied to that inspection area.
This type of inspection gives reasonable assurance that a specific SSC is of adequate quality and builds confidence that SSCs not inspected in the inspection area are also of adequate quality.
This type of inspection is referred to as a vertical slice inspection - an SSC is chosen from an inspection area and each applicable QAP attribute is inspected.
17 Stakeholder Engagement Point
(Draft Concept)
Building an Inspection Scoping Matrix:
Inspection Areas 18 Inspection areas:
Represented by the inspection scoping matrix columns Represent different technical areas with similar implementation of QAP requirements.
May also represent programmatic aspects for efficiency gains (e.g., equipment qualification requirements)
Inspection of one SSC in an inspection area provides information about the application of the QAP for other SSCs in the inspection area.
Draft Concept
Building an Inspection Scoping Matrix: SSCs 19 SSCs populate the rows of the inspection scoping matrix.
Only SSCs that are important to fulfilling fundamental safety functions (FSFs) are included in the matrix.
Operational program inspections (FFD, security, in-service inspection, radiation protection, operator training, etc.) are scoped separately.
Draft Concept
- System, Structures, and Components FSF Safety Class.
Foundations and Buildings Reactor Vessel and Internals Mechanical Components Instrumentation and Control SSC #1 DK SR X
02.03.09 X
X SSC #3 HR, RR SR 02.01.06.i Building the Inspection Scoping Matrix Step 1a: Identify SSCs important to fulfilling the FSFs b: List the FSF that each SSC supports (may be multiple FSFs) c: List the safety classification of each SSC d: Identify Inspection Areas based on SSC commonalities e: Indicate which SSC apply to which Inspection Areas (X or ITAAC No.)
Draft Concept
Building the Inspection Scoping Matrix 21 Designate relative Risk Importance-Design (RID) to aid inspectors in sample selection (H, M, L).
Designate relative Risk Importance-Construction (RIC) to aid inspectors in sample selection (H, M, L).
Include additional information/bases for the risk rankings for inspectors information.
Draft Concept
- System, Structures, and Components FSF Safety Class.
RID RID Basis RIC RIC Basis IA #1 IA #2 IA #3 Additional IAs as necessary SSC #1 DK SR H
Primary FSF success path L
Preop ITP X
FSF DID M
ConE OE X
Primary FSF success path H
Complex Process 02.01.06.i SSC #4 RR SR L
SR supports FSF H
Complex Process 07.06.03 Building the Inspection Scoping Matrix (Draft Concept)
Step 2a: Assign design risk and basis to each SSC Step 2b: Assign manufacturing and construction risk and basis to each SSC Draft Concept
Building the Inspection Scoping Matrix 23 Assign minimum and maximum sample sizes to each inspection area. These will define the project baseline inspection plan in the Quality of Reactor Construction strategic performance area.
The minimum number of samples is an estimate of the number of samples required to gain reasonable assurance in that inspection area, based on complexity of design, design construction experience, etc.
The maximum number of samples is a threshold that would indicate that something out of the ordinary is present in that inspection area.
Draft Concept
Building the Inspection Scoping Matrix 24 The minimum and maximum sample sizes for a reactor design are estimates that will be refined as the NRC gains inspection experience with new designs.
The minimum sample sizes are estimates and may be adjusted for a project, or for nth-of-a-kind reactors, if warranted.
Inspections beyond the minimum are performed if reasonable assurance is not yet obtained.
Inspections beyond the maximum number of samples for an inspection area may only be exceeded when something out of the ordinary exists (e.g., unresolved findings, unresolved allegations, or new ConE/OE), and with NRC management approval.
Draft Concept
- System, Structures, and Components FSF Safety Class.
RID RID Basis RIC RIC Basis IA #1 IA #2 IA #3 Additional IAs as necessary Minimum Inspection Area Inspection Samples 4
8 10 Maximum Inspection Area Inspection Samples 8
11 14 SSC #1 DK SR H
Primary FSF success path L
Preop ITP X
FSF DID M
ConE OE X
Primary FSF success path H
Complex Process 02.01.06.i SSC #4 RR SR L
SR supports FSF H
Complex Process 07.06.03 Building the Inspection Scoping Matrix Step 3: Assign maximum and minimum samples sizes Draft Concept
ARCOP Inspection Scoping Matrix 26 Applies to the Quality of Reactor Plant Construction Strategic Performance Area.
Safeguards & Security and Operational Readiness Strategic Performance Area will be scoped separately.
Draft Concept
Conceptual ARCOP Framework 27 QUALITY OF REACTOR PLANT CONSTRUCTION Provide reasonable assurance that advanced reactors will be built and operated in accordance with their licensing and design bases, the atomic energy act of 1954 as amended), and the NRCs rules and regulations SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS OPERATIONAL READINESS OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS REACTIVITY CONTROL FSF HEAT REMOVAL FSF RADIONUCLIDE RETENTION FSF ARCOP Objective ARCOP Strategic Performance Areas ARCOP Cornerstones of Safety SECURITY PROGRAMS Quality of Reactor Plant Construction includes hardware and QAP inspections of SSCs that may impact FSFs Draft Concept
Using the Inspection Scoping Matrix/Baseline Inspection Plan 28 Reasonable Assurance of Inspection Area Quality Minimum Inspection Area sample sizes Maximum Inspection Area sample sizes Adjusting min/max samples Draft Concept
Executing the Inspection Scoping Matrix/Baseline Inspection Plan 29 Reasonable Assurance of Construction/Manufacturing Area Quality Minimum Construction/Manufacturing Area sample sizes Maximum Construction/Manufacturing Area sample sizes Adjusting min/max samples Reasonable assurance of quality (in each inspection area) =
confidence that the SSCs in an inspection area are being (and will continue to be) manufactured/constructed in accordance with quality standards specified in the license (LWA, CP, COL, etc.)
Each inspection area will be assessed for reasonable assurance of quality after inspections (referred to as the continuous assessment process).
Each inspection area is assessed separately but will consider QAP overlaps where applicable.
Draft Concept
Executing the Inspection Scoping Matrix/Baseline Inspection Plan 30 Reasonable Assurance of Construction/Manufacturing Area Quality Minimum Construction/Manufacturing Area sample sizes Maximum Construction/Manufacturing Area sample sizes Adjusting min/max samples Minimum sample sizes are specified for each inspection area.
Sample sizes are assigned based on risk-insights, design complexity, and construction experience.
Represents an NRC assessment hold point for each inspection area.
Draft Concept
Executing the Inspection Scoping Matrix/Baseline Inspection Plan 31 Reasonable Assurance of Construction/Manufacturing Area Quality Minimum Construction/Manufacturing Area sample sizes Maximum Construction/Manufacturing Area sample sizes Adjusting min/max samples Maximum sample sizes are specified for each inspection area.
Sample sizes are assigned based on risk insights, design complexity, and construction experience.
Refers to the maximum number of samples needed to make a reasonable assurance determination.
Requires review/approval by NRC management prior to exceeding maximum.
Draft Concept
Executing the Inspection Scoping Matrix/Baseline Inspection Plan 32 Reasonable Assurance of Construction/Manufacturing Area Quality Minimum Construction/Manufacturing Area sample sizes Maximum Construction/Manufacturing Area sample sizes Adjusting min/max samples Project-specific sample sizes:
- less than minimum may be approved by NRC management with sufficient justification of reasonable assurance.
- more than maximum may be approved by NRC management in cases where:
New ConE/OE becomes available Previous findings not closed due to an ongoing performance/quality issue Maximum samples reached without sufficient information to make a reasonable assurance determination (rare)
Significant QAP revision that changes previous information supporting the reasonable assurance determination Draft Concept
Building a Project-Specific Baseline Inspection Plan 33 Design-Specific SSC Inspection Planning and Scoping Matrix DCD/SDA Lead Plant CP or COL Application PRA/Risk insights PRA/Risk insights Project Application/
Licensee Input Revise if necessary 2
1 3 4 Project-Specific Baseline Inspection Plan Scoping Matrix Project-Specific Inspection Scoping Matrix Project-Specific Program Inspection Plan (security and operational programs)
Applicant/
Industry insights ConE/OE Draft Concept
34 Stakeholder Engagement Point
35 Exercise: Building an Inspection Scoping Matrix Hypothetical Reactor 1 (HR1)
Note: For this exercise, HR1 has submitted a construction permit (CP) application in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.
Inspection Scoping Exercise Draft Concept
Step 1a: Identify SSCs Note: this is a partial list of hypothetical SSCs for this exercise 36 Reactor Cavity Cooling System (RCCS)
Reactor Vessel System Reactor Protection System Primary Coolant Loop Refueling System Reactor Building Fire Protection System Water storage tanks Rx vessel Software Lifecycle Piping Fuel/Salt Mix tank Foundation Alarm system Steam separators Graphite reflector blocks Field sensors Heat exchanger Salt purification subsystem Core support structure Manual fire fighting equip Float valves Anti-siphon Instrumentation circuitry/ cabinets Primary Coolant Pump Fuel prep tank Geometrically safe floor drains Reactor cavity fire suppression Evaporator tubes/thimbles Core barrel Signal cables Flow control valves Isolation valves Biological shield Control room fire suppression Leak detection instruments Salt Level instruments Power supply Spill isolation valves Piping Tank supports Piping Dump Valves Misc.
maintenance isolation valves Structural steel supports Water level control system Geometrically safe dump tanks (4)
Instrumentation system Walls, floors, and ceilings Isolation valves Refueling isolation valves (inboard)
Control system Power Supply Circulation pump
Steps 1b and 1c: Supported FSFs and Safety Classifications 37 SSCs*
FSF Safety Class.
RCCS water tanks HR SR RCCS Water level control system HR SR RCCS Float valves HR SR RCCS Evaporator tubes/thimbles HR SR RCCS Piping HR SR Rx vessel HR, RR, DK SR Graphite reflectors DK SR Rx vessel level instruments RR, DK SR RPS Software Lifecycle DK SR RPS Field sensors DK SR RPS Instrumentation circuitry/ cabinets DK SR RPS Dump Valves DK, RR SR Rx Bldg Foundation HR, RR,DK SR Rx Bldg Steel supports HR, RR, DK SR Rx Building walls, floors, and ceilings HR, RR SR Acronyms SSC: Structures, Systems, and Components FSF: Fundamental Safety Function HR: Heat Removal FSF DK: Reactivity and Power Control FSF RR: Radionuclide Retention FSF SR: Safety Related NSRRS: Non-Safety Related, Risk Significant
- Associated with hypothetical plant shown on previous slide
Steps 1b and 1c: Supported FSFs and Safety Classifications (continued) 38 SSCs FSF Safety Class.
Primary salt loop piping HR SR Primary salt heat exchanger HR SR Primary Salt Pump HR SR Primary salt loop flow control valves HR SR Fuel/Salt Mix tank DK NSRRS Salt purification loop DK NSRRS Fuel prep tank DK NSRRS Fueling system isolation valves DK SR Fueling system piping DK NSRRS Fueling system maintenance isolation valves DK NSRRS Fueling system circulation pump DK NSRRS Fire alarm system
?
Not SR or NSRRS Control room fire suppression
?
Not SR or NSRRS Fire protection SSCs, like other program-related SSCs (security, emergency planning, radiation protection, etc.) are not included in the Quality of Reactor Plant Construction strategic performance area They should not be on this inspection scoping matrix.
Instead, fire protection and other SSCs not directly related to reactor safety may be included in safeguards/security or operational program inspections.
39 Steps 1d and 1e: Identify Inspection Areas and Assign SSCs to Inspection Areas (X or ITAAC No.)
SSCs FSF Safety Class.
Structural concrete Mechanical Components I & C ASME Quals.
Reactor Internals Piping Seismic Quals RCCS water tanks HR SR X
X RCCS Water level control system HR SR X
RCCS Float valves HR SR X
RCCS Evaporator tubes HR SR X
X RCCS Piping HR SR X
X X
Graphite reflectors DK SR X
Rx vessel level instruments RR, DK SR X
RPS Software Lifecycle DK SR X
RPS Field sensors DK SR X
RPS Dump Valves DK, RR SR 2.2.1.03.a X
Walls, floors, and ceilings HR, RR SR X
X Primary salt piping HR SR X
X Tank supports HR SR X
X Inspection areas are selected based on technical and QAP commonalities.
Some inspection areas, such as ASME or Seismic Qualifications may be created for greater inspection efficiency.
40 Steps 1d and 1e: Identify Inspection Areas and Assign SSCs to Inspection Areas (X or ITAAC No.)
SSCs FSF Safety Class.
Structural concrete Mechanical Components I & C ASME Quals.
Reactor Internals Piping Seismic Quals RCCS water tanks HR SR X
X RCCS Water level control system HR SR X
RCCS Float valves HR SR X
RCCS Evaporator tubes HR SR X
X RCCS Piping HR SR X
X X
Graphite reflectors DK SR X
Rx vessel level instruments RR, DK SR X
RPS Software Lifecycle DK SR X
RPS Field sensors DK SR X
RPS Dump Valves DK, RR SR 2.2.1.03.a X
Walls, floors, and ceilings HR, RR SR X
X Primary salt piping HR SR X
X Tank supports HR SR X
X 1
Xs indicate that the SSC (row) is an inspection sample opportunity in the associated inspection areas (columns).
Note: Most SSCs are expected to be included in multiple inspection areas.
41 Steps 1d and 1e: Identify Inspection Areas and Assign SSCs to Inspection Areas (X or ITAAC No.)
SSCs FSF Safety Class.
Structural concrete Mechanical Components I & C ASME Quals.
Reactor Internals Piping Seismic Quals RCCS water tanks HR SR X
X RCCS Water level control system HR SR X
RCCS Float valves HR SR X
RCCS Evaporator tubes HR SR X
X RCCS Piping HR SR X
X X
Graphite reflectors DK SR X
Rx vessel level instruments RR, DK SR X
RPS Software Lifecycle DK SR X
RPS Field sensors DK SR X
RPS Dump Valves DK, RR SR 2.2.1.03.a X
Walls, floors, and ceilings HR, RR SR X
X Primary salt piping HR SR X
X Tank supports HR SR X
X If there are ITAAC associated with the SSC, then the ITAAC number is used to indicate an inspection opportunity for that SSC in the appropriate inspection area.
42 Steps 2a and 2b: Assign a relative design risk, design risk basis, manufacturing and construction risk and basis to each SSC SSCs FSF Safety Class.
RID RID Basis RIC RIC Basis Structural concrete Mechanical Components I & C RCCS water tanks HR SR H
X RCCS Water level control system HR SR H
X RCCS Float valves HR SR H
X RCCS Evaporator tubes HR SR H
X RCCS Piping HR SR H
FOAK Rx vessel HR, RR, DK SR H
M conE Graphite reflectors DK SR L
H FOAK Rx vessel level instruments RR, DK SR M
M complex X
RPS Software Lifecycle DK SR H
M complex X
RPS Field sensors DK SR H
H conE/
complex X
Primary DK path M
conE X
Walls, floors, and ceilings HR, RR SR H
L X
Primary salt piping HR, RR SR M
M conE Tank supports RR SR M
L X
Risk Importance-Design (RID) is an SSCs importance relative to the other SSCs in matrix.
All SSCs on the matrix are legitimate inspection opportunities.
RID is based on PRA if available and other risk insights.
43 Steps 2a and 2b: Assign a relative design risk, design risk basis, manufacturing and construction risk and basis to each SSC SSCs FSF Safety Class.
RID RID Basis RIC RIC Basis Structural concrete Mechanical Components I & C RCCS water tanks HR SR H
X RCCS Water level control system HR SR H
X RCCS Float valves HR SR H
X RCCS Evaporator tubes HR SR H
X RCCS Piping HR SR H
FOAK Rx vessel HR, RR, DK SR H
M ConE Graphite reflectors DK SR L
H FOAK Rx vessel level instruments RR, DK SR M
M complex X
RPS Software Lifecycle DK SR H
M complex X
RPS Field sensors DK SR H
H ConE/
complex X
Primary DK path M
ConE X
Walls, floors, and ceilings HR, RR SR H
L X
Primary salt piping HR, RR SR M
M ConE Tank supports RR SR M
L X
Risk Importance-Construction (RIC) is based on the relative risk of a deficiency occurring during construction and the risk of not identifying the deficiency prior to operations.
Factors impacting RIC are:
industry experience with the activity (FOAK) complexity of the activity Construction Experience (ConE) or Operating Experience (OE) other planned verification or testing activities to assure quality prior to operations
Step 3: Assign maximum and minimum samples sizes to each inspection area 44 SSCs FSF Safety Class.
RID RID Basis RIC RIC Basis Structural concrete Mechanical Components I & C Minimum Inspection Area Sample Size 8
5 5
Minimum Inspection Area Sample Size 12 8
8 RCCS water tanks HR SR H
X RCCS Water level control system HR SR H
X RCCS Float valves HR SR H
X RCCS Evaporator tubes HR SR H
X RCCS Piping HR SR H
FOAK Rx vessel HR, RR, DK SR H
M conE Graphite reflectors DK SR L
H FOAK Rx vessel level instruments RR, DK SR M
M complex X
RPS Software Lifecycle DK SR H
M complex X
RPS Field sensors DK SR H
H conE/
complex X
Primary DK path M
conE X
Walls, floors, and ceilings HR, RR SR H
L X
Minimum sample size based on the minimum inspection information needed to come to a reasonable assurance of inspection area quality determination.
Exceeding the maximum sample size indicates that there may be problems in that inspection area that need NRC management attention, such as:
- 1. Quality issues resulting in NRC findings in the inspection area.
- 2. Unanticipated complexities in the inspection area potentially needing an adjustment in NRC resources and inspections in the inspection area.
- 3. Changes in a previous determination of reasonable assurance in the inspection area due to additional information such as ConE/OE, allegations, or significant changes in the construction organization (e.g., change in prime contractor).
Tracking inspections using the project inspection scoping matrix 45 SSCs FSF Safety Class.
RID RID Basis RIC RIC Basis Structural concrete Mechanical Components I & C Minimum Inspection Area Sample Size 8
5 5
Minimum Inspection Area Sample Size 12 8
8 Completed samples 5
6 3
Reactor Bldg sample #1 HR SR H
X Reactor Bldg sample #2 HR SR H
X Reactor Bldg sample #3 HR SR H
X RCCS Evaporator tubes HR SR H
X RCCS Piping HR SR H
FOAK Rx vessel HR, RR, DK SR H
M conE X
Graphite reflectors DK SR L
H FOAK Rx vessel level instruments RR, DK SR M
M complex X
RPS Software Lifecycle DK SR H
M complex X
RPS Field sensors DK SR H
H conE/
complex X
Primary DK path M
conE X
The number of completed samples in each inspection area is tracked to ensure assessments are performed after the minimum number of samples are complete, and each inspection thereafter.
Tracking inspections using the project inspection scoping matrix 46 SSCs FSF Safety Class.
RID RID Basis RIC RIC Basis Structural concrete Mechanical Components I & C Minimum Construction Area Sample Size 8
5 5
Minimum Construction Area Sample Size 12 8
8 Completed samples 5
6 3
Reactor Bldg sample #1 HR SR H
X Reactor Bldg sample #2 HR SR H
X Reactor Bldg sample #3 HR SR H
X RCCS Evaporator tubes HR SR H
X RCCS Piping HR SR H
FOAK Rx vessel HR, RR, DK SR H
M conE X
Graphite reflectors DK SR L
H FOAK Rx vessel level instruments RR, DK SR M
M complex X
RPS Software Lifecycle DK SR H
M complex X
RPS Field sensors DK SR H
H conE/
complex X
Primary DK path M
conE X
Cells are color coded to indicate which SSCs were sampled in the inspection area, and the results.
This aids in inspection planning and inspection area assessment.
Other Inspection Planning Notes 47 Using construction oversight experience, the NRC can estimate the inspection hours per sample in each inspection area.
A range of the total number of inspection hours for the Quality of Reactor Construction portion of the baseline inspection plan can then be generated using the minimum and maximum sample sizes of each inspection area.
Inspection plans can then be adjusted by using more or less inspection areas, or by adjusting the minimum and maximum required samples.
48 Stakeholder Engagement Point
Key Takeaways 49 Different SSC inspection scoping scales for advanced reactors (non-LWR, SMR, and microreactors) is achieved by use of an inspection scoping matrix that:
- includes only SSCs that affect FSFs
- organizes SSCs into inspection areas where general conclusions can be drawn about inspection area quality based on informed sampling
- requires inspection area assessments after a set number of inspection samples. An affirmative assessment of quality in an inspection area would result in no additional required samples in the inspection area.
- results in reasonable estimates of NRC oversight costs to licensees
- increases NRC inspection efficiency and reduces indirect* charges to licensees
- Indirect charges include travel, inspection planning, and inspection documentation costs.
Key Takeaways (continued) 50
- Inspection scoping of Safeguards, Security and Operational Programs is not included in the matrix and will be discussed at future workshops.
- Enforcement of findings and assessment of oversight results will be discussed in the next workshop.
- Feedback during this and future workshops will help guide development of ARCOP.
Thank you for attending.
Planned Workshop Sessions 51 Session 1, February 28, 2024, and March 20, 2024:
Introduction to NRC Advanced Reactor Construction Oversight, and the ARCOP Framework.
Session 2, April 3, 2024:
Inspection Scoping Session 3, Date:
Enforcement and Assessment Session 4, Date:
Feedback/Wrap Up
Feedback on this Public Meeting https://feedback.nrc.gov/pmfs/feedback/form?meetingcode=20240424 52