ML23345A113

Texas Response to En Banc Petition

ML23345A113
Person / Time
Site:	Consolidated Interim Storage Facility
Issue date:	12/11/2023
From:	Abrams M, Baasch R, Nielson A, Paxton K, Pettit L State of TX, Commission on Environmental Quality, State of TX, Governor
To:	NRC/OGC, US Federal Judiciary, Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit
References
21-60743, 243
Download: ML23345A113 (1)

Text

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 No. 21-60743 In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit State of Texas; Greg Abbott, Governor of the State of Texas; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality; Fasken Land and Minerals, Limited; Permian Basin Land and Royalty Owners, Petitioners, v.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission; United States of America, Respondents.

On Petition for Review of Action by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission RESPONSE TO PETITIONS FOR REHEARING EN BANC Ken Paxton Aaron L. Nielson Attorney General of Texas Solicitor General Brent Webster Lanora C. Pettit First Assistant Attorney General Principal Deputy Solicitor General Lanora.Pettit@oag.texas.gov Ryan S. Baasch Chief, Consumer Protection Michael R. Abrams Division Assistant Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)

Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Counsel for Petitioners State of Texas, Tel.: (512) 936-1700 Governor Greg Abbott, and Texas Fax: (512) 474-2697 Commission on Environmental Quality

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Certificate of Interested Persons No. 21-60743 State of Texas; Greg Abbott, Governor of the State of Texas; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality; Fasken Land and Minerals, Limited; Permian Basin Land and Royalty Owners, Petitioners, v.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission; United States of America, Respondents.

Under the fourth sentence of Fifth Circuit Rule 28.2.1, petitioners, as govern-mental parties, need not furnish a certificate of interested persons.

/s/ Lanora C. Pettit Lanora C. Pettit Counsel of Record for Petitioners State of Texas, Governor Greg Abbott, and Texas Commission on Environmental Quality i

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Table of Contents Page Certificate of Interested Persons ..............................................................................i Table of Authorities ............................................................................................... iii Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 Statement of the Issues ........................................................................................... 2 Statement of the Case ............................................................................................. 2 I. Statutory Framework and Historical Backdrop ..........................................2 II. The ISP License ........................................................................................ 4 III. The Panels Decision................................................................................. 4 Argument................................................................................................................ 5 I. The State of Texas Is a Party Aggrieved Under the Hobbs Act. ............ 6 II. NRC Lacks Authority to License a Consolidated Interim Storage Facility. ...................................................................................... 9 A. The NWPA provides no authority for the ISP license. ........................ 9 B. The AEA does not authorize the ISP license. .................................... 10 C. The panels decision is consonant with West Virginia v. EPA. ........... 14 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 16 Certificate of Service............................................................................................. 17 Certificate of Compliance ..................................................................................... 17 ii

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Table of Authorities Page(s)

Cases:

ACA Intl v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ............................................................................ 6 Aid Assn for Lutherans v. USPS, 321 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ........................................................................... 8 In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ...................................................................... 4, 15 Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902).............................................................................................. 8 Am. Trucking Assns v. ICC, 673 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) ............................................................ 7 In re Benjamin, 932 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2019)............................................................................. 13 Bhd. of Locomotive Engrs & Trainmen v. Fed. R.R. Admin.,

972 F.3d 83 (D.C. Cir. 2020) ............................................................................. 7 Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994) ........................................................................................... 15 Bullcreek v. NRC, 359 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ............................................................... 10, 13, 14 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,

567 U.S. 142 (2012).......................................................................................... 13 Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ............................................................................ 8 FTC v. Bunte Brothers, 312 U.S. 349 (1941) .......................................................................................... 15 Gage v. AEC, 479 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ........................................................................... 6 Idaho v. DOE, 945 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1991) ............................................................................... 3 Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010)............................................................................................ 7 La. Pub. Serv. Commn v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986) ............................................................................................ 9 iii

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Landrys, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa.,

4 F.4th 366 (5th Cir. 2021) ............................................................................... 11 Massachusetts v. NRC, 878 F.2d 1516 (1st Cir. 1989) .............................................................................. 7 NARUC v. DOE, 736 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ......................................................................... 1, 3 Natl Horsemens Benevolent & Protective Assn v. Black, 53 F.4th 869 (5th Cir. 2022)............................................................................. 10 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) ...................................................................................... 8, 14 NRDC v. NRC, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978) ................................................................................ 3 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Commn, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) .......................................................................................... 13 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).......................................................................................... 15 Reytblatt v. NRC, 105 F.3d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ............................................................................. 6 Texas v. United States, 891 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................... 4 United States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2015)............................................................................. 12 Wales Transp., Inc. v. ICC, 728 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1984)........................................................................... 5, 6 West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) ................................................................................ 14, 15 Statutes and Rules:

28 U.S.C. § 2344................................................................................................. 2, 4 42 U.S.C.:

§ 2011(b) ............................................................................................................ 2

§ 2014(aa) .......................................................................................................... 3

§ 2014(cc) ........................................................................................................ 11

§ 2014(dd) .................................................................................................... 3, 11

§ 2014(e) ........................................................................................................... 3

§ 2014(v) ......................................................................................................... 11

§ 2014(z)............................................................................................................ 3 iv

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/11/2023

§ 2073 ......................................................................................................... 11, 12

§ 2073(a) ............................................................................................................ 2

§ 2073(a)(1) ..................................................................................................... 12

§ 2073(a)(3) ..................................................................................................... 12

§ 2073(a)(4) ..................................................................................................... 12

§ 2093 ......................................................................................................... 11, 12

§ 2093(a) ........................................................................................................... 2

§ 2093(a)(i) ...................................................................................................... 12

§ 2093(a)(3) ..................................................................................................... 12

§ 2093(a)(4) ..................................................................................................... 12

§ 2111 .......................................................................................................... 11, 12

§ 2111(a) ............................................................................................................ 2

§ 2111(b)(1) ...................................................................................................... 12

§ 2131 ................................................................................................................. 2

§ 2132 .............................................................................................................. 10

§ 2133 .............................................................................................................. 12

§ 2210h(2)(B) .................................................................................................. 11

§ 2210i(b) ........................................................................................................ 11

§ 10101(23) ...................................................................................................... 11

§ 10131(a)(4) .................................................................................................... 10

§ 10131(a)(6) .................................................................................................... 14

§ 10131(a)(7) .................................................................................................... 14

§ 10132............................................................................................................... 3

§ 10134............................................................................................................... 3

§§ 10135-10138................................................................................................. 10

§ 10153 ........................................................................................................... 3, 9

§ 10155(a)(1) ...................................................................................................... 3

§ 10155(b)(1)(B)(i) ............................................................................................. 9

§ 10155(d)(1)-(2) ................................................................................................ 3

§ 10155(h) ........................................................................................................ 10

§ 10156............................................................................................................... 3

§ 10172a(a)......................................................................................................... 3 10 C.F.R.:

§ 2.711 ................................................................................................................ 8

§ 72.3 ............................................................................................................... 12 Other Authorities:

85 Fed. Reg. 27,447 (May 8, 2020) ......................................................................... 6 v

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Cong. Rsch. Serv., Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal (Sept. 17, 2021)...................... 14 NRC, NUREG-0527, Regulation of Federal Radioactive Waste Activities (Sept. 1979), https://perma.cc/ECF4-JMKU (last visited Dec. 11, 2023) ............................................................................................................... 14 vi

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Introduction Decades ago, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) to ad-dress the Nations burgeoning nuclear-waste problem by mandating the construction of a permanent repository for such waste in Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Aware that construction would take time, and that some interim storage might be necessary, Congress greenlit some limited stop-gap measures. But Congress has never allowed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to license a private facility far away from any reactor site to warehouse spent nuclear fuel.

For years, the federal government has palpably reject[ed] its statutory obliga-tion. NARUC v. DOE, 736 F.3d 517, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2013). As relevant here, in Sep-tember 2021, NRC proclaimed that the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), a precursor statute that has nothing to do with long-term nuclear-waste storage, authorized it to license a supposedly interim storage facility in the Permian Basinmore than 1,000 miles from Congresss chosen site at Yucca Mountain. This facility would pu-tatively store up to 40,000 metric tons of extremely radioactive waste for decades.

Through comment letters, Governor Abbott and the Texas Commission on Envi-ronmental Quality (TCEQ) objected to unprecedented implications of a new facility, including the probability that the facility would become the permanent so-lution for dispositioning the nations spent nuclear fuel. Certified Index (C.I. No.)

1148.

When NRC ignored those concerns, Texas did what aggrieved parties do: seek judicial review. A panel of this Court rightly granted the petition. It held that Texasonto whose soil NRC seeks to dump thousands of metric tons of radioactive

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 wasteis a party aggrieved by [NRCs] final order under the plain text of the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2344. The panel then meticulously searched federal statutes for any basis that would allow NRC to disregard Congresss chosen site for under-ground disposal simply by calling the above-ground, long-term facility a place for storage. Finding none, the panel vacated the license.

This case indisputably concerns questions of national importance. That is why Congress specifically spoke to the issue. But that alone does not warrant en banc review given the panels demonstrably correct conclusion that NRC lacks the au-thority to ignore Congresss command. The petitions should therefore be denied.

Statement of the Issues

1. Whether Texas is a party aggrieved under the Hobbs Act.

2. Whether federal law authorizes the challenged license.

Statement of the Case I. Statutory Framework and Historical Backdrop In 1954, the AEA declared Congresss policy that the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote world peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free competition in private enterprise. 42 U.S.C. § 2011(b). The AEA requires private persons to ob-tain a license issued by the Commission to handle nuclear materials. Id. § 2131.

Congress subsequently gave NRC authority over the possession of specific, constit-uent elements of spent nuclear fuelnamely, byproduct material, source mate-rial, and special nuclear material, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2111(a), 2073(a), 2093(a),

2

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 10 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 which were defined as distinct from spent nuclear fuel itself. Compare id.

§ 2014(e), (z), (aa), with id. § 2014(dd).

From the AEAs passage until the late 1970s, the civilian development of nuclear energy boomed with little concern about disposal of spent nuclear fuel be-cause [i]t was accepted that spent fuel would be reprocessed, Idaho v. DOE, 945 F.2d 295, 298 (9th Cir. 1991). Waste disposal issues were considered to be ones call-ing for long term research and study, and eventual solution. NRDC v. NRC, 582 F.2d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 1978). But that eventual problem, id., became immediate when, in the mid-70s, the entire reprocessing concept collapsed for techno-logical and political reasons. Idaho, 945 F.2d at 298-99.

In 1982, the NWPA tasked the Department of Energy with establishing a suita-ble location for a permanent, underground geologic repository to dispose of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. 42 U.S.C. § 10132. Congress amended the Act in 1987 to require Yucca Mountain as site for the Nations first permanent geologic repository, id. § 10134, by prohibiting the Department from evaluating other sites, id. § 10172a(a). Although it conferred limited authority to approve interim stor-age, id. §§ 10153, 10155(a)(1), 10156, Congress specifically required the Department exercise that authority though a cooperative agreement under which [the] State . . .

shall have the right to participate in a process of consultation and cooperation. Id.

§ 10155(d)(1)-(2).

The NWPA is obviously designed to prevent the Department from delaying the construction of Yucca Mountain as the permanent facility while using temporary facilities. NARUC, 736 F.3d at 519. Yet delay it did.

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[B]y its own admission, NRC refused to evaluate even a decades-late appli-cation to allow the Department to develop Yucca Mountain because it ha[d] no current intention of complying with the law. In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2013). That intransigence continued, Texas v. United States, 891 F.3d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 2018), even after the D.C. Circuit ordered NRC to promptly continue with the legally mandated licensing process. Aiken, 725 F.3d at 267. Now politically fraught, no other Congressionally authorized solution has come to fruition.

II. The ISP License In April 2016, Interim Storage Partners (ISP) predecessor-in-interest ap-plied for a license to operate a consolidated interim storage facility that would use an above-ground, dry-cask storage system to store up to 40,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel and highly radioactive waste in Andrews County, Texas. C.I. No. 5. In-itially valid for 40 years, see id., that license could be renewed for an additional 20 years, see C.I. No. 1148.

Many stakeholders objected. Governor Abbott submitted a comment letter, C.I.

No. 1128, as did TCEQ, which warned of the facilitys unprecedented implica-tions and the significant unease it created with the public, C.I. No. 1148. On September 13, 2021, NRC nonetheless issued the license.

III. The Panels Decision The State, Governor Abbott, and TCEQ sought review under the Hobbs Act, which permits [a]ny party aggrieved by NRCs final order to file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein venue lies. 28 U.S.C. § 2344. The 4

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 12 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 State maintained that it is a party aggrieved because it objects to the storage of the Nations nuclear waste within its borders, and because both it and its officials par-ticipated in the agency proceeding under review. Wales Transp., Inc. v. ICC, 728 F.2d 774, 776 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984). Substantively, the State asserted that federal law does not authorize the storage of spent nuclear fuel away from the relevant reactor site.

The panel unanimously agreed with the States arguments and vacated the li-cense. The panel explained that the plain text of the Hobbs Act requires only that a petitioner have participatedin some wayin the agency proceedings, which Texas did through comments. Op. 15. Next, the panel held that the AEA doesnt authorize the Commission to license a private, away-from-reactor storage facility for spent nuclear fuel, and that issuing such a license contradicts Congressional pol-icy expressed in the NWPA. Op. 18.

Argument None of NRC and ISPs three questions presented merit en banc review. As to jurisdiction, despite suggesting the panel created a clear circuit split, the NRC invites this Court to wade into context-specific questions of degree because NRC agrees (as do this Courts sister circuits) the degree of participation required for party status varies. NRC Pet. 7. Moreover, because Texas did participate in the proceedings below, this case is a poor vehicle to examine any split of authority regarding whether there is an ultra vires exception to the Hobbs Acts participation requirement. In any event, the ultra vires exception is rooted in longstanding precedent to prevent agen-cies from circumventing judicial review of their actions.

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Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 13 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 On the merits, both NRC and ISP are wrong to insist that the panel misread federal law, which provides no plausible textual support for licensing the ISP facility.

Moreover, because the panels decision rested on plain statutory text, ISPs com-plaint that the panel improperly invoked the major-questions doctrine as an alterna-tive basis for its holding is beside the point. It also rings hollow given that the peti-tions themselves highlight how this case does present major, nationally significant questions to which Congress must speakand indeed, has spoken.

I. The State of Texas Is a Party Aggrieved Under the Hobbs Act.

A. To start, en banc review of whether Texas is an aggrieved party under the Hobbs Act is unnecessary because Texas participated in the agency proceeding un-der review. Wales Transp., 728 F.2d at 776 n.1. Submitting a comment in a rulemak-ing confers party status under the Hobbs Act. See Reytblatt v. NRC, 105 F.3d 715, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1997). As does commenting on a petition in agency proceedings that resulted in a declaratory ruling. ACA Intl v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 711 (D.C. Cir.

2018). Because the Hobbs Acts textual requirement of party status does not dis-tinguish adjudicative and rulemaking proceedings, the same rule applies to adminis-trative adjudications like this one. See Gage v. AEC, 479 F.2d 1214, 1218 (D.C. Cir.

1973). And, as NRC recognized in its final environmental-impact statement, the Governor and TCEQ did submit comments during the licensing process. See 85 Fed.

Reg. 27,447, 27,448 (May 8, 2020); C.I. No. 125; C.I. No. 1128; C.I. No. 1148. That participation suffices to allow this Court to consider Texass arguments.

NRC nonetheless urges (at 7) the Court to find that no petitioner can be a party because the State did not formally intervene in accordance with NRCs 6

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 14 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 rules, and NRC denied Fasken and Land Minerals request to do so. This ignores that intervention should be unnecessary for Texas because federal law requires state participation in storage decisions like this one. Supra p. 3. Moreover, in complaining (at 11-12) that the panels approach incentivizes sandbagging, NRC effectively de-mands the unfettered right to insulate its orders from judicial review by denying in-tervention. NRC can identify no authority for that remarkable proposition because it is courtsnot an administrative agencythat determine aggrieved-party status un-der the Hobbs Act. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. NRC, 878 F.2d 1516, 1520 (1st Cir.

1989). And it is Congressnot an administrative agencythat can strip federal courts of the power of judicial review. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 251-52 (2010). Considering the strong presumption favoring judicial review, the panel rightly rejected this agency-controlled end-run of the Hobbs Act. Bhd. of Locomo-tive Engrs & Trainmen v. Fed. R.R. Admin., 972 F.3d 83, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

Because the panel correctly recognized that under the Hobbs Acts text the State was a party, Op. 15, this case is ill-suited to resolve NRCs challenge (at 9-11) to this Circuits limited ultra vires exception for whether a non-party may seek review.

B. Beyond that, this Court is correct to recognize that a party harmed by an agency action need not have participated in the original agency proceeding if the agency action is attacked as exceeding the power of the Commission. See Op. 16 (citing Am. Trucking Assns v. ICC, 673 F.2d 82, 85 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).

Such challenges have long been presumptively justiciable because [o]therwise, the

[challenger] is left to the absolutely uncontrolled and arbitrary action of a public and 7

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 15 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 administrative officer, whose action is unauthorized by any law, Am. Sch. of Mag-netic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 110 (1902), as would be the case here. In-deed, if NRC were correctand States were denied any reviewit may raise con-stitutional problems. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

NRC makes much (e.g., at 7) of the D.C. Circuits putative refusal to hold NRC to the standard set by the Supreme Court. But that Court has applied a similar prin-ciple in other contexts. E.g., Aid Assn for Lutherans v. USPS, 321 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Any inconsistency in the D.C. Circuits approach might justify en banc review in that Court, but it does not merit similar treatment here.

Nor is en banc review warranted to avoid incentiviz[ing] litigants to avoid an agencys proceeding and then ambush the agency by attacking its authority. Contra NRC Pet. 11; NEI Amicus Br. 5-6. Again, what ambush? As just discussed, both the State and Fasken raised objections to the agency before it issued the license. And speculating that parties may avoid formal intervention if the Court does not impose an extra-textual intervention requirement ignores that parties are allowed to skip that which Congress has not required. Nevertheless, there are a multitude of other rea-sons that someone would intervenefor example, to develop a more fulsome record for review. E.g., 10 C.F.R. § 2.711. The panels (entirely correct) jurisdictional hold-ing does not merit the full Courts review because it does not portend the ominous consequences that the petitions (and amici) now raise.

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Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 16 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 II. NRC Lacks Authority to License a Consolidated Interim Storage Facility.

En banc review of the Courts merits holding is also unwarranted because an agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it. La. Pub. Serv. Commn v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986). The NWPA did not authorize NRC to establish a nominally temporary storage facility for spent nu-clear fuel over a thousand miles from the disposal site that Congress selected. And the AEA gives NRC authority only over certain constituent elements of spent nuclear fuel, which Congress expressly distinguished from spent nuclear fuel.

The major-questions doctrine supports the panels decision regarding these statutes but is not necessary to it.

A. The NWPA provides no authority for the ISP license.

NRC has acknowledged the NWPA does not authorize the ISP license. NRC Br.

43; see ISP Br. 19. That is fatal because the NWPA was passed precisely to establish a comprehensive federal plan for spent nuclear waste after the collapse of the private reprocessing industry. Supra p. 3.

NRC counters (at 16-17) that the NWPA governs only where the federal govern-ment can store waste, not where it can license private parties to store it. But the NWPA in multiple provisions deals directly with private waste storage. It says, for example, that if the Yucca Mountain repository is not yet available, operators are to expan[d] [the] storage facilities at the site of [their] power reactor. 42 U.S.C.

§ 10155(b)(1)(B)(i). It also authorizes NRC to license technology for the storage of civilian spent nuclear fuel at the site of any civilian nuclear power reactor. Id.

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Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 17 Date Filed: 12/11/2023

§ 10153. And it specifically states it does not encourage, authorize, or require use of a storage facility located away from the site of any civilian nuclear power reactor and not owned by the Federal Government. Id. § 10155(h). That language contra-dicts both NRCs position (at 16) that the NWPA addresses only federal storage, and its notion (at 12-14, 17) that it can license private, away-from-reactor storage under a different statute.

That many NWPA provisions are directed to the federal government, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(4), does not change this analysis. Congress provided extensive protections for state and local governments, including rights of participation in the site-selection process and a veto to the siting decision altogether, subject to override only by both Houses of Congress. Supra p. 5; 42 U.S.C. §§ 10135-10138. The state interests protected by these statuteswhich, here, involve Texass most important oil-producing region, see C.I. No. 1128do not change depending on whether a re-pository is owned by the federal government or private party. If anything, our federal system is typically more skeptical of private efforts to impose obligations on States not less. Cf., e.g., Natl Horsemens Benevolent & Protective Assn v. Black, 53 F.4th 869, 872 (5th Cir. 2022).

B. The AEA does not authorize the ISP license.

Even if NRC could evade the limitations of its authority under the NWPA by reference to some other statute, the AEA doesnt cut it becauseas NRCs own authority demonstratesthe AEA does not specifically refer to the storage or dis-posal of spent nuclear fuel. Bullcreek v. NRC, 359 F.3d 536, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

It authorizes NRC to license utilization or production facilities. 42 U.S.C.

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Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 18 Date Filed: 12/11/2023

§ 2132. But these terms do not contemplate a stand-alone storage facility, away from a nuclear reactor. See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(v), (cc).

1. NRC nonetheless insists (at 13) that at least three AEA provisions support its position: 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073, 2093, and 2111. But these provisions do not mention nuclear-facility construction or the spent nuclear fuel that the ISP facility will house once constructed. Instead, those provisions principally govern the possession of Special Nuclear Material (Subchapter V, including Section 2073), Source Ma-terial (Subchapter VI, including Section 2093), and Byproduct Materials (Sub-chapter VII, including Section 2111). NRC concedes as much but suggests (at 13) that spent nuclear fuel contains each of these materials.

Federal law distinguishes those constituent elements from spent nuclear fuel itself. A neighboring provision directs NRC to set rules for transferring by-product materials, source materials, special nuclear materials, high-level radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, transuranic waste, and low-level radioactive waste. 42 U.S.C. § 2210i(b); see id. § 2210h(2)(B) (similar). Consistent with this distinction, fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, is de-fined directly from the constituent elements of which have not been separated by reprocessing. Id. §§ 2014(dd), 10101(23). [A] material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning, Landrys, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 4 F.4th 366, 370 (5th Cir.

2021), which means NRCs statutory authority applies only to specified constituent elements.

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Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 19 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Even if the lesser (constituent parts) could somehow include the greater (spent nuclear fuel), Sections 2073 and 2093 authorize licenses for the possession of spe-cial or source nuclear material for enumerated reasons, such as for research and de-velopment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2073(a)(1), 2093(a)(1). The only facilities that it authorizes are those established under section 2133 for utilization and production. Id.

§§ 2073(a)(3), 2093(a)(3). This does not include storage or disposal, in part because section 2111, which similarly governs possession of byproduct material, specifically mentions a disposal (but not storage) facility. Id. § 2111(b)(1). To that end, federal law authorizes disposal only of certain types of significantly less hazard-ous byproduct material that are not constituent parts of spent nuclear fuel. Id.; 10 C.F.R. § 72.3. Taken together, these provisions reflect that Congress knew that possession does not by its ordinary meaning include long-term placement of nu-clear waste in a repositorywhether termed disposal or storage. And Con-gress specified when it did and did not want to allow NRC to license such activities.

2. Equally off-base is NRCs criticism (at 15), joined by Holtec (at 5), that the panel improperly ignored the legislative history of the catchall provisions in sub-sections 2073(a)(4) or 2093(a)(4), which allow possession for such other uses as the Commission determines to be appropriate to carry out the purposes of this chap-ter, 42 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(4); id. § 2093(a)(4) (materially similar). Legislative his-tory cannot trump statutory text. E.g., United States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647, 658 (5th Cir. 2015). And the panel appropriately noted (at 19) that the canon of ejusdem generis limits general terms [that] follow specific ones to matters similar to those speci-12

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 20 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 fied. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 163 n.19 (2012) (alter-ation in original). Under this canon, the catchall provisions are not superfluous.

Contra ISP Pet. 11. Texas does not dispute that these provisions cover more than licenses for research, development, or a utilization or production facilities. But a li-cense must at least resemble those enumerated categories. A storage dump of the type contemplated here does not. See Texas Reply Br. 5-6, 10-11.

Indeed, it is unclear how ISPs license carries out the purposes of the AEA at all.

In its merits brief, NRC insisted (at 62) the ISP facility will encourage[] new power plant applicants to enter the market and prevent existing plants from shut[ting]

down. The D.C. Circuit adopted that argument in Bullcreek, 359 F.3d at 543, but started from a flawed premise: that the AEA delegates NRC authority to promote entry into the nuclear energy market. It then asked whether the NWPA repeal[ed]

or supersede[d] this pre-existing authority. Id. The Supreme Court has held, how-ever, that the AEA does not give [NRC either] comprehensive planning responsi-bility, or authority to advance what is economically wise for nuclear reactors.

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Commn, 461 U.S. 190, 218, 223 n.34 (1983). Because the recodification canon presupposes that the author-ity claimed by the agency already exists when it is putatively ratified by Congress, In re Benjamin, 932 F.3d 293, 300 (5th Cir. 2019), it does NRC no good to repeatedly invoke (at 12-13, 16-17) Congresss supposed acquiescence in a 1980 regulation ra-ther than statutory text. Put another, because NRC never had such authority in the 13

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 21 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 first place, there was no power for the NWPA to repeal or retain, and the panel cor-rectly rejected Bullcreek (and the Tenth Circuits later adoption of it) as unpersua-sive. Op. 21.

C. The panels decision is consonant with West Virginia v. EPA.

The final issue presented is just as unworthy of the Courts en banc resources:

that the panels invocation of the major-questions doctrine conflicts with West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022). ISP Pet. 14. For one thing, the panels dis-cussion of the issue was dicta: It rested its decision on the unambiguous language in the two relevant statutes. Op. 25.

Even if that were not the case, the panels decision is consistent with the key principle of West Virginia: Congress should set policy on the major issues of our time.

Here, Congress found the handling of spent nuclear fuel is a major question that sig-nificantly implicates States. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10131(a)(7), id. § 10131(a)(6); cf. New York, 505 U.S. at 150, 188 (State governor was understandably perturbed by pro-spect of storing the nations radioactive waste which posed a pressing national problem). It refused to delegate to NRC the power to license a private, away-from-reactor storage facilitywhich NRCs leadership has previously admitted it does not have. NRC, NUREG-0527, Regulation of Federal Radioactive Waste Activities, at G-8, G-10 (Sept. 1979), https://perma.cc/ECF4-JMKU (last visited Dec. 11, 2023).

Since 2015 alone, Congress has considered nearly 30 measures that would have ad-dressed this problem without adopting any change to existing policy. See Cong. Rsch.

Serv., Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal at 19-27 (Sept. 17, 2021). This intensity of in-terest underscores the importance of the issue. West Virginia, 142 S. Ct. at 2614.

14

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 22 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 ISP tries (at 15) to distinguish NRCs actions here from EPAs actions in West Virginia by insisting that NRC has consistently applied its Part 72 regulations in unspecified analogous circumstances since they were adopted in 1980. Cf. NRC Br. 16. But there are no analogous circumstances given the court order requiring NRC to comply with its statutory obligation to license Yucca Mountain was only issued in 2013. Aiken, 725 F.3d at 267. Even if that were not the case, there is no adverse possession rule of administrative law that insulates [agency] disregard of statutory text. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 752 (2006). A regula-tions age is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a statute. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994). Because NRCs actions here are plainly inconsistent with the language adopted by Congress, that should be the end of the matter. See FTC v. Bunte Brothers, 312 U.S. 349, 352 (1941).

15

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 23 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Conclusion The petitions for rehearing en banc should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

Ken Paxton Aaron L. Nielson Attorney General of Texas Solicitor General Brent Webster /s/ Lanora C. Pettit First Assistant Attorney General Lanora C. Pettit Principal Deputy Solicitor General Ryan S. Baasch Lanora.Pettit@oag.texas.gov Chief, Consumer Protection Division Michael R. Abrams Assistant Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Counsel for Petitioners State of Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Texas, Governor Greg Abbott, and Tel.: (512) 936-1700 Texas Commission on Environmen-Fax: (512) 474-2697 tal Quality 16

Case: 21-60743 Document: 243 Page: 24 Date Filed: 12/11/2023 Certificate of Service On December 11, 2023, this document was served via CM/ECF on all registered counsel and transmitted to the Clerk of the Court. Counsel further certifies that:

(1) any required privacy redactions have been made in compliance with Fifth Circuit Rule 25.2.13; (2) the electronic submission is an exact copy of the paper document in compliance with Fifth Circuit Rule 25.2.1; and (3) the document has been scanned with the most recent version of Symantec Endpoint Protection and is free of viruses.

/s/ Lanora C. Pettit Lanora C. Pettit Certificate of Compliance This brief complies with: (1) the type-volume limitation of Federal Rule of Ap-pellate Procedure 35(e) because it contains 3,878 words, excluding exempted text; and (2) the typeface requirements of Rule 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Rule 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface (14-point Equity) using Microsoft Word (the same program used to calculate the word count).

/s/ Lanora C. Pettit Lanora C. Pettit 17