ML23258A229

Order (Transmitting Prehearing Questions)

ML23258A229
Person / Time
Site:	Hermes
Issue date:	09/15/2023
From:	Thi Herrera NRC/SECY
To:	Kairos Power, NRC/OGC
SECY RAS
References
Construction Permit Mndtry Hrg, RAS 56787, Kairos Power, Hermes-M 50-7513-CP, 50-7513-CP
Download: ML23258A229 (18)

Text

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of KAIROS POWER LLC Docket No. 50-7513-CP (Hermes Test Reactor)

ORDER (Transmitting Pre-Hearing Questions)

On September 5, 2023, the Commission issued a notice that it would convene an evidentiary hearing at its Rockville, Maryland headquarters on October 19, 2023, pursuant to section 189a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to receive testimony and exhibits in the uncontested portion of the captioned proceeding. 1 In connection with that hearing, pursuant to my authority under 10 C.F.R. § 2.346(a) and (j), Kairos Power LLC and the NRC Staff should file written responses to the questions provided in the table below. Responses should be filed by September 28, 2023.

1 See Kairos Power LLC; Notice of Hearing, 88 Fed. Reg. 60,724 (Sept. 5, 2023).

Table of Questions No. Category Reference Directed Question To 1 SafetyGeneral Safety Evaluation Staff On page ii of the SE, the Staff states:

Related to the Kairos Power LLC On the basis of its review of the construction permit Construction Permit application, the staff has determined that the preliminary Application for the design and analysis of the Hermes test reactor, including the Hermes Test Reactor principal design criteria; design bases; information relative to (June 2023), Abstract materials of construction and general arrangement; and (ML23158A268) (SE). preliminary analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of structures, systems, and components of the 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.34, facility: (1) provides reasonable assurance that the final 50.35 design will conform to the design basis; (2) includes an adequate margin of safety; (3) describes the structures, systems, and components which will provide for the prevention of accidents and the mitigation of consequences of accidents; and (4) meets applicable regulatory requirements and satisfies applicable NRC guidance.

These statements appear to go beyond the criteria specified in 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.34 and 50.35. As noted in SE section 13, Kairos is not requesting Commission approval of the safety of any design feature or specification in the construction permit (CP) application, as permitted by 10 CFR 50.35(b). What is the regulatory basis for the conclusions stated on page ii of the SE and does this conclusion impose any limitations or constraints on the Staff at the operating licensing review stage?

2 SafetyGeneral SE §§ 1.1.2, 2.6, 3.7, Applicant 10 C.F.R. § 50.35(a) states, in part, that the Commission may issue 4.8, 5.2, 8.4, 9.9, 11.3, a construction permit if the Commission finds that (1) the applicant 13.3, 14.5) has described the proposed design of the facility, including, but not limited to, the principal architectural and engineering criteria for the Hermes Non-Power design, and has identified the major features or components Reactor Preliminary

Safety Analysis incorporated therein for the protection of the health and safety of Report, rev. 3 (May the public . . . .

2023), (ML23151A745)

(PSAR) Did you identify the major features or components for your design and, if so, what criteria did you use?

10 C.F.R. § 50.35(a) 3 Safety SE § 1.2 Staff Are any notifications to agencies or bodies under 10 C.F.R. § 50.50 Notifications required prior to issuance of the construction permit? If so, have 10 C.F.R. § 50.50 they been completed?

4 SafetyDose SE § 2.1.3 Staff PSAR section 2.1.1.2 Boundary and Zone Area Maps, states that, Criteria Applicant The doses at the EPZ are below the Environmental Protection (Child vs Adult PSAR § 2.1.1.2 Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guide (PAG) Manual guidelines for Thyroid Dose) protective action, as recommended by ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015 Emergency Planning (R2020), Emergency Planning for Research Reactors and for Research and Test pursuant to Regulatory Guide 2.6, Emergency Planning for Reactors and Other Research and Test Reactors and Other Non-Power Production and Non-Power Production Utilization Facilities.

and Utilization Facilities, Regulatory ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015 (R2020) specifies in Table 1 - Emergency Guide 2.6, rev.2 (Sep. classes, an actual or projected dose in the plume exposure pathway 2017), (ML17263A472) of 10 mSv (1 rem) TEDE or 50 mSv (5 rem) committed dose (Reg. Guide 2.6). equivalent to the thyroid.

American National The SE, section 2.1.3 (page 2-3), states, The staff verified that the Standards Hermes EPZ size is appropriate and consistent with guidance in Institute/American ANSI/ANS-15.16-2016 [sic], based on the Hermes preliminary Nuclear Society maximum hypothetical accident (MHA) dose calculations in PSAR (ANSI/ANS), Chapter 13, which indicate that accident doses at the EPZ boundary Emergency Planning (based on the assumption that the EAB and EPZ boundary is 250 m for Research (820 ft) from the reactor) would not exceed EPA protective action Reactors (2015), guides of 1 rem whole body or 5 rem thyroid.

(ANSI/ANS-15.16-2015). The EPAs PAG Manual: Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, incorporates the Food and

U.S. Environmental Drug Administrations 2001 guidance to lower the PAG for Protection Agency, administration of potassium iodide (KI) to 5 rem (50 millisieverts PAG Manual: (mSv)) projected child thyroid dose.

Protective Action Guides and Planning Given that there is a substantial difference in the projected dose to Guidance for a childs thyroid versus an adults thyroid, please confirm that Radiological accident doses at the EPZ boundary would not exceed EPA Incidents, EPA-400/R- protective action guides of 1 rem TEDE or 5 rem projected child 17/001 (Jan. 2017), thyroid dose.

https://www.epa.gov/ra diation/protective-action-guides-pags 5 SafetyCensus SE § 2.1.3 Staff In PSAR section 2.1.2, the Applicant states that population data Data from the 2010 census was used. However, in SE section 2.1.3, the PSAR § 2.1.2 Staff used the more recent 2020 census data in assessing the population center distance. Did the Staff also use the more recent 2020 census data when assessing other demographic information provided by Kairos in PSAR section 2.1.2 (which was based on the 2010 census)? For example, are the Staffs conclusions based on demographic information documented in SE section 2.1.3 (such as Kaiross data indicate that current and future projected populations within 1 mi (1.6 km) of the proposed site are very small) and the population information provided in PSAR figures 2.1-4 and 2.1-5 consistent with 2020 census data?

6 SafetyAircraft SE § 2.2.3.1.1 Applicant According to SE section 2.2.3.1.1, PSAR Section 2.2.2.1 states that Impact the proposed 5,000 ft (1,524 m) long runway of [the Oak Ridge PSAR § 2.2.2.1 Airport] would be oriented in such a way that the aircraft would not land or take off from this airport on a trajectory over the proposed site.

a. How was the hazard associated with the proposed site lying within an airport traffic pattern zone considered?

b. Because the airport has not yet been built, how did Kairos account for any potential future changes to flight patterns?

7 SafetyAircraft SE § 2.2.3.1.5 Staff The Applicant states that the safety related portion of the reactor Impact Applicant building will be designed to withstand the impact of small non-PSAR §§ 2.2.2.4, military general aviation aircraft or light general aviation aircraft.

3.5.3.4 What are the characteristics of the aircraft that will establish the aircraft impact design basis for the reactor building?

8 SafetyCredit SE §§ 2.2.3.1.5, Staff When assessing aircraft impact and flooding hazards, the Staff for Limited 2.4.3.2, 2.4.3.3, notes that risk during the four-year operating life of the facility is Operating 3.3.3.2 acceptable. For example, in SE section 2.4.3.2, the Staff states, Licensing Period extreme flood events causing inundation of the site are unlikely during the planned 4-year Hermes operational lifetime.

What basis did the Staff use to determine that the lifetime risk over a 4-year period is acceptable for these hazards? Was consideration of a limited operating life necessary to approve the siting? If so, how will any operating lifetime limit be imposed on the Applicant to ensure that the basis for these conclusions remains valid?

9 SafetyDam SE § 2.4.3.3 Staff SE section 2.4.3.3 states that the staff notes that potential flood Failure elevations for the hypothetical sunny-day dam failure could exceed the Hermes grade elevation but finds that such extreme flood events causing inundation of the site are unlikely during the planned 4-year period of Hermes operation. However, neither the Staff nor the Applicant appear to provide a probability or likelihood estimation for the hypothetical sunny-day dam failure. Please provide the likelihood of this event and the basis the Staff used to determine that this dam failure event was unlikely.

10 SafetySeismic SE § 3.4.3.1 Staff SE section 3.4.3.1 states:

Design Guidelines for The staff reviewed the information provided in the PSAR Preparing and and finds the approach acceptable because the Reviewing development of the DRS [design response spectrum] follows

Applications for the the guidance of ASCE 43-19 and the PSAR states that the Licensing of Non- SSCs will be designed in accordance with SDC 3 of ASCE Power Reactors, 43-19. In addition, the site seismic hazard characterization is NUREG-1537, pts. 1-2 used to develop the DRS. Following this approach aligns (Feb. 1996) with the applicable guidance and acceptance criteria in NUREG-1537, Part 1 and 2, Section 3.4, and provides A Performance-Based reasonable assurance that the reactor can be shut down Approach to Define and maintained in a safe condition following a seismic event.

the Site-Specific Earthquake Ground NUREG-1537, part 1, section 3.4, Seismic Damage, references Motion, Regulatory ANSI/ANS 15-7, IAEA-TECDOC403, and IAEA-TECDOC-348. How Guide 1.208, rev. 0 did the Staff determine that ASCE 43-19 was an acceptable (Mar. 2008) approach for the development of the design response spectrum and (ML070310619) that it aligned with the guidance and acceptance criteria in NUREG-1537?

11 SafetySeismic SE § 3.4.3.3 Applicant What design standards were used to design features protecting Design safety related SSCs from the seismic failure of nearby non-safety PSAR § 3.4.2 related equipment? Further, were potential adverse seismic impacts from the failure of any non-safety related SSCs assessed to ensure Guidelines for all safety related SSCs are adequately protected during a design Preparing and basis earthquake?

Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, NUREG-1537, pts. 1-2 (Feb. 1996)

(ML12251A353) 12 Safety SE §§ 3.6.3.1.3, Staff The reactivity control and shutdown system (RCSS) appears to Classification 4.2.1.3.2 Applicant operate similarly to pressurized water reactors in that a loss of power de-energizes the rod mechanism, allowing the rods to drop into the core via gravity. SE § 3.6.3.1.3 states SSCs in the RCSS (shutdown elements only) . . . are identified in PSAR Table 3.6-1 as safety related and are identified to be SDC-3 in accordance with

ASCE 43-19. Additionally, the most significant overpower transient involves a malfunction of the rod control mechanisms.

a. Why are the rod control mechanisms not also safety related?

b. Please identify what individual components of the RCSS are considered or are expected to be safety related.

13 Safety SE § 3.6.3.1.3 Staff The Staff states in SE § 3.6.3.1.3 that the safety and seismic Classification classification of these SSCs conforms with the guidance in RG 1.29, because safety related SSCs needed to control reactivity in the core are assigned correctly to the seismic classification, SDC-3 in accordance with ASCE 43-19. This explanation seems to address whether appropriately identified safety related SSCs have been assigned the appropriate seismic classification, but it does not appear to explain why the safety classification (of the components in the RCSS) itself is acceptable. Please discuss why this safety classification is acceptable.

14 Safety SE § 3.6.3.2.1 Staff In section 3.6.3.2.1 of the SE, the Staff states:

Definition of Applicant Safety Related Kairos Power LLC, The Hermes reactor uses the definition of 10 CFR 50.2 for and Regulatory Regulatory Analysis safety related SSCs to establish those SSCs that are Exemptions for the Kairos Power classified as safety related, with the exception of integrity of Fluoride Salt-Cooled the reactor coolant pressure boundary which has been High Temperature modified to integrity of the portions of the reactor coolant Reactor (Topical boundary relied upon to maintain coolant level above the Report), KP-TR-004- active core. This modification was made because the NP-A, rev. 4 (Jan. Hermes reactor does not rely on the functional capability of 2022) (ML22159A358) the primary heat transport system (PHTS) to remove decay heat from the reactor core. PSAR Table 3.6-1 identifies the safety related classification of SSC in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.2 definition with the modification. The staff finds that the modification of integrity of the portions of the reactor coolant boundary relied upon to maintain coolant

level above the active core, is acceptable based on NRCs staff approval of KP-TR-004-NP-A Regulatory Analysis for the Kairos Power Fluoride Salt-Cooled High Temperature Reactor.

In approved topical report KP-TR-004-NP-A, it is noted that use of the modified definition of safety related would require an exemption (e.g., see Table A-3, All Regulatory Requirements in 10 CFR That Require an Exemption for a KP-FHR Power Reactors, which discusses exemptions needed for the 10 C.F.R. § 50.2 definitions as well as other regulatory requirements). However, the SE does not discuss any exemptions for the Hermes construction permit.

a. For the Staff: Are the 10 C.F.R. § 50.2 definitions of Safety-related structures, systems, and components and Reactor coolant pressure boundary applicable to the Hermes facility?

Is an exemption necessary for the use of Kaiross modified definition of Safety-related structures, systems, and components for this application?

Kairos identifies additional items in KP-TR-004-NP-A as requiring exemptions from NRC regulations.

b. For the Applicant: Does Kairos intend to request any exemptions from the regulations for the Hermes reactor? If so, are the exemptions applicable at the construction permit or operating license stage?

c. For the Staff: In light of this topical report, please explain why no exemptions are necessary at the construction permit stage.

15 SafetyReactor SE § 4.2.1.1 Staff SE section 4.2.1.1 states:

Fuel Applicant PSAR § 4.2.1.1

PSAR Section 4.2.1.1 states that, in addition to the fuel pebbles, the reactor also contains moderator pebbles. The moderator pebbles have the same diameter as the fuel pebbles but contain no uranium and are made of graphite material. The graphite pebbles are non-safety related and serve to provide sufficient moderation for the thermal spectrum Hermes reactor. Similar to the fuel pebbles, the moderator pebbles are designed to maintain positive buoyancy under normal operation and postulated events.

a. Why are the graphite moderator pebbles not considered safety related? In particular, do the design bases for the Hermes reactor include any assumptions regarding the physical characteristics or reactivity influence of the moderator pellets? If so, could a deviation from these design basis assumptions have an adverse impact on the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition?

b. Could failure of one or more moderator pellets adversely impact a safety related function (e.g., the thermophysical properties of the Flibe coolant needed for natural circulation heat transfer chemistry)?

16 SafetyDecay SE §§ 5.1.3.2.6, Staff Potential fouling or plugging of the heat exchanger in the non-safety Heat 13.1.9.3 (p. 13-33 to 13- Applicant related primary heat transport system (PHTS) is to be monitored via Removal/Online 34) observing downcomer and core temperatures (see SE § 5.1.3.2.6 Performance at 5-6).

Monitoring of Safety Systems a. Will potential fouling or plugging of the safety related decay heat removal system (DHRS) be monitored in a separate, distinguishable way?

b. If the DHRS and PHTS are monitored via the same or similar parameters, how is plugging or fouling of the DHRS

distinguishable such that it would not be masked by strong or efficient performance of the PHTS?

17 SafetyTritium SE § 9.1.3.3 Staff PSAR section 9.1.3 states that the Tritium Management System Management Applicant (TMS) does the following: (1) provides tritium separation from argon System PSAR § 9.1.3 in the inert gas system (IGS), (2) provides tritium separation from air in the reactor building cells, and (3) provides final collection and disposal of tritium.

PSAR section 9.1.3.2, Design Bases, states: Consistent with PDC 13, proper instrumentation is provided to measure tritium inventories in the TMS and demonstrate compliance with imposed inventory limits. (emphasis added).

PSAR Table 3.6.-1, Structures, Systems, and Components, indicates that the TMS and the Inventory Management System are classified as non-safety related.

Section 9.1.3.3 of the SE states that:

PSAR Section 9.1.3 states that, consistent with PDC 13, Instrumentation and control, tritium inventories will be monitored to comply with the inventory limits set by Maximum Hypothetical Accident (MHA) assumptions. This will ensure that the dose due to accidental releases from the TMS are bounded by the MHA and would therefore meet the accident dose criteria in 10 CFR 100.11.

The SE then states that [t]he staff finds that the TMS is a non-safety related system that will be designed such that it will (1) not result in reactor accidents, (2) not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor, and (3) not result in unacceptable radioactivity releases or exposures.

a. Please provide additional information describing the term proper instrumentation in PSAR section 9.1.3.2.

b. In addition, please provide additional information describing the basis for the designation of the instrumentation provided to measure tritium inventories in the TMS as non-safety related.

18 SafetyQuality SE § 12.9.4 (p. 12-21 to Staff The Staff proposes to include a condition related to Kaiross quality Assurance 12-22) Applicant assurance program.

10 C.F.R. § 50.55(f)(3) a. Does 10 C.F.R. § 50.55(f)(3) apply to the Hermes reactor?

b. Section 12.9.4 of the SE states that the staff concludes that the information in PSAR Section 12.9 and PSAR Appendix 12B is sufficient and meets the applicable guidance and regulatory requirements identified in this section for the issuance of a construction permit in accordance with 10 CFR 50.35 and 50.40, and, as such, the Hermes QAPD is acceptable for implementation during the design and construction of the Hermes facility. Given this conclusion, please discuss why the license condition is necessary to provide reasonable assurance that regulatory requirements and license commitments for QA are adequately included in the design, procurement, and construction of the Hermes facility.

19 SafetyGeneral SE § 13.1.5.3 Staff Section 3.6.2, Tribology, in Fuel Qualification Methodology for the Applicant Kairos Power Fluoride Salt-Cooled High Temperature Reactor, Rev.

Fuel Qualification 2, states that tribological testing will be informed by the Methodology for the corresponding American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)

Kairos Power Fluoride Standard ASTM G99-17, Standard Test Method for Wear Testing Salt-Cooled High with a Pin-on-Disk Apparatus, where the contact surface will be Temperature Reactor, immersed in argon gas or in molten Flibe with a controlled argon Rev. 2, § 3.6.2 atmosphere representative of KP-FHR.

Tribology (ML23089A398) SE section 13.1.5.3, Technical Evaluation, indicates tribology testing will be conducted in Flibe and argon. Section 3.6.2 of the

fuel qualification program indicates the coefficient of friction will be measured in both Flibe and argon, but the wear rates will be measured in Flibe or argon.

Is erosion of the fuel pebbles expected to be higher in Flibe than in argon? If so, why will wear rates be measured in Flibe or in argon and not both?

20 Safety SE § 13.2.1.3 Staff The Staff SE, section 13.2.1.3, Technical Evaluation, states:

Maximum Applicant Hypothetical PSAR Ch. 13 Transport of the radionuclides within a fuel transport group Accident (MHA) is based on the transport of a representative element which Source Term has a complete set of diffusion information (i.e., diffusivities in the kernel, coating layers, and matrix). Diffusivity information is currently available for four elements (Cs, Sr, Ag, Kr). The radionuclides are assumed to be retained completely in the TRISO particle, or completely released depending on the element class, as described in the MST TR.

Given the importance of the isotopes of iodine and cesium for short term and long term dose consequences respectively, please provide additional information describing how these radionuclides are accounted for in the maximum hypothetical accident (MHA) dose consequence analysis.

21 Environmental Kairos Power LLC, Staff Section 4.4 of the Environmental Protection Plan (EPP) includes a Construction Draft - Hermes Test requirement that the permit holder shall request a license Permit Reactor Construction amendment to incorporate Terms and Conditions set forth in Environmental Permit, Appendix A - Incidental Take Statements of Biological Opinions issued Protection Plan Environmental subsequent to the effective date of the EPP. This provision was not Protection Plan, § 4.4 included in other recent EPPs (e.g. the Shine Medical Technologies, (ML23209A659) Inc., EPP (ML16041A473) and Northwest Medical Isotopes, LLC, EPP (ML18037A468)). Why is it necessary to request a license amendment to incorporate these terms and conditions?

22 Environmental Fiscal Responsibility Staff On June 3, 2023, President Biden signed into law the Fiscal General Act of 2023, Pub. L. Applicant Responsibility Act of 2023 (the Act). Section 321 of the Act included No. 118-5, 137 Stat. 10 amendments to NEPA. Congress did not include any delay in the effective date of these new amendments to NEPA; accordingly, National these amendments became applicable to the NRC upon enactment.

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. a. For the Staff: Do the FEIS and the Staffs initial testimony

§ 4321 et seq account for these amendments to NEPA?

10 C.F.R. § 51.105(a) Section 321(a) of the Act amended NEPA section 102(2), which outlines an agencys NEPA responsibilities and imposes Environmental Impact requirements for the preparation of EISs. As part of the findings Statement for the necessary to support issuance of this construction permit, we must Construction Permit determine whether the requirements of NEPA sections 102(2)(A),

for the Kairos Hermes (C), and (E) have been met.

Test Reactor (Final Report), NUREG-2263 b. For the Staff: Does the Commission need to consider any (Aug. 2023) other information outside of what was presented in the FEIS (ML23214A269) to make required findings under NEPA?

(FEIS)

c. For the Applicant: Does the Applicant have any views it wishes us to consider regarding the environmental findings we must make in light of these recent amendments to NEPA?

23 Environmental FEIS §§ 3.0, 3.1.5 Staff On July 14, 2023, the Applicant submitted a construction permit Cumulative application for the Hermes 2 facility, a two-unit fluoride salt-cooled, Impacts Hermes 2 Non-Power high temperature test reactor that would be situated within the 185-Reactor Preliminary acre Hermes project boundary. Does the cumulative impacts Safety Analysis analysis in the FEIS take into account the proposed Hermes 2 Report, rev. 0 (July facility?

2023), § 1.3 (ML23195A124)

24 Environmental FEIS § 3.1.5 Staff In describing the Applicants proposed Atlas Fuel Fabrication Cumulative Facility as a reasonably foreseeable new project with the potential Impacts to affect land use and visual quality in the area around the Hermes site, the FEIS states that [t]he NRC staff would ensure the compatibility of the Atlas facility with the land uses and visual quality of the Hermes site and the Heritage Center in general when reviewing a future licensing application for the Atlas facility project.

How would the Staff ensure such compatibility? What is the basis of the Staffs legal authority to ensure such compatibility?

25 Environmental National Historic Staff The Staffs analysis in the FEIS concludes that the potential Impacts on Preservation Act environmental impacts on cultural and historic resources from Cultural and (NHPA) § 106, constructing, operating, and decommissioning the Hermes project Historic 54 U.S.C. § 306108 would be small. The Staff also concludes, for the purposes of Resources satisfying section 106 of the NHPA, that there would be no adverse FEIS § 3.5 effects to historic properties from the proposed project.

The bases for both conclusions rely on the Staffs determination that there are no known historic and cultural resources (NEPA) or historic properties (NHPA) within the proposed Hermes reactor site.

However, the Staff also indicates that the Applicant is working with a consulting Tribe to develop and carry out an additional reconnaissance field investigation of the site.

a. What is the purpose of the additional reconnaissance field investigation?

b. How did the Staff reach its conclusions regarding impacts under NEPA and the NHPA when it appears that additional work to determine the presence of cultural resources or historic properties at the Hermes site is yet to be carried out?

c. How does the Staff plan to inform the Commission of the status of consultations with the Tribe during the pendency of the mandatory hearing process?

26 Environmental FEIS § 3.7.1.3 Staff Section 3.7.1.3 of the FEIS states:

Consequences of Operation on PSAR § 6.3.1 Nonradioactive gaseous wastes from operating areas would Nonradiological be passed through a high-efficiency particulate air filtration Human Health system before being vented to the atmosphere, and additional controls may be implemented as required by local permit conditions.

How was effluent that is vented directly to atmosphere from the Decay Heat Removal System (DHRS) considered in the environmental impact of operations? For example, PSAR section 6.3.1, states:

The DHRS is an ex-vessel system that continuously operates when the reactor is operating above a threshold power by removing energy from the vessel wall via thermal radiation and convective heat transfer to water-based thermosyphons. Inventory in the thermosyphons is boiled off and vents directly to the atmosphere outside of the reactor building.

27 Environmental FEIS § 3.9.1 Staff Section 3.9.1 of the FEIS states: While the Hermes reactor is not a Impacts of light-water-cooled nuclear power reactor, Kairos will rely upon the Uranium Fuel same uranium fuel cycle addressed by Table S-3.

Cycle How was the impact of use of higher enriched High-Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) considered (e.g., the impacts associated with achieving an enrichment level up to 20 weight percent) when addressing the applicability of Table S-3?

28 Environmental NEPA § 102(2)(C)(v), Staff NEPA section 102(2)(C)(v), as amended by the Fiscal Responsibility Commitment of 42 U.S.C. Act of 2023, requires federal agencies to describe any irreversible

§ 4332(C)(v) and irretrievable commitment of federal resources which would be

Federal involved in the proposed agency action. FEIS section 5.3.3 contains Resources 10 C.F.R. § 51.105(a) an analysis of the irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources noted in the environmental review of the Hermes project, FEIS § 5.3.3 but it does not specify whether any of these resources are federal resources.

Please clarify whether the FEIS analysis accounts for the irreversible and irretrievable commitment of federal resources.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

For the Commission Tomas E. Digitally signed by Tomas E. Herrera Herrera Date: 2023.09.15 15:46:18

-04'00' Tomas E. Herrera Acting Secretary of the Commission Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day of September 2023.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of )

)

KAIROS POWER, LLC ) Docket No. 50-7513-CP

)

(Hermes Test Reactor) )

)

(Mandatory Hearing) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing ORDER (Transmitting Pre-Hearing Questions) have been served upon the following persons by Electronic Information Exchange.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Counsel for Kairos Power, LLC Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLC Mail Stop: O-16B33 1111 Pennsylvania Ave NW Washington, DC 20555-0001 Washington, DC 20004 E-mail: ocaamail.resource@nrc.gov Ryan Lighty Alex Polonsky U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission E-mail: ryan.lighty@morganlewis.com Office of the Secretary of the Commission alex.polonsky@morganlewis.com Mail Stop: O-16B33 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: hearingdocket@nrc.gov U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop - O-14A44 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Anita Ghosh-Naber David Roth Susan Vrahoretis Jeremy Wachutka Georgiann Hampton Brian Newell E-mail: anita.ghoshnaber@nrc.gov david.roth@nrc.gov susan.vrahoretis@nrc.gov jeremy.wachutka@nrc.gov georgiann.hampton@nrc.gov brian.newell@nrc.gov Herald M. Digitally signed by Herald M.

Speiser Speiser Date: 2023.09.15 15:53:03 -04'00' Office of the Secretary of the Commission Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day of September 2023