ML23221A234

Nuclear Fuel Services - Core Inspection Report 07000143/2023002 and Notice of Violation

ML23221A234
Person / Time
Site:	Erwin
Issue date:	08/10/2023
From:	Mathis R NRC/RGN-II/DFFI
To:	Dailey R Nuclear Fuel Services
References
IR 2023002
Download: ML23221A234 (25)

Text

Ronald Dailey, President Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.

P.O. Box 337((

MS 123 Erwin, TN 37650-0337

SUBJECT:

NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES - CORE INSPECTION REPORT 07000143/2023002 AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Dear Ronald Dailey:

On June 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Nuclear Fuel Services. On July 11, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that two Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations were evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Enclosure 1) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report (Enclosure 2). The violations are being cited in the Notice consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy because they were considered self-revealing and not identified by the licensee.

The NRC has concluded that information regarding: (1) the reason for the violation(s); (2) the corrective actions that have been taken and the results achieved; and (3) the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in the enclosed NRC inspection report (Enclosure 2). Therefore, you are not required to respond to this letter unless the description herein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to provide additional information, you should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice.August 10, 2023 R. Dailey 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure(s), and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary, information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

Sincerely, Robert Mathis, Chief (Acting)

Projects Branch 1 Division of Fuel Facility Inspection Docket No. 07000143 License No. SNM-124 Enclosure(s):

As stated cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV Signed by Mathis, Robert on 08/10/23

ML23221A234 Non-Sensitive Publicly Available SUNSI Review Sensitive Non-Publicly Available

OFFICE RII: DFFI RII: DFFI RII: DFFI RII: DFFI RII: DFFI RII:DFFI NAME L. Harris L. Cooke T. Sippel P. Glenn J. Rivera R. Mathis

DATE 08/9/2023 08/10/2023 08/9/2023 08/10/2023 08/10/2023 08/10/2023 NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. Docket No.: 07000143 Erwin, TN License No.: SNM-124

During an NRC inspection completed on June 30, 2023, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violations are listed below:

1) Materials License SNM-124, Amendment 16, Safety Condition S-1, states that the licensee shall conduct activities in accordance with the statements, representations, and conditions in the license application.

License Application, Section 11.4, Procedure Development and Implementation, states in part that activities involving the handling of special nuclear material (SNM) are conducted in accordance with written procedures as defined in this section. This section also states, in part, that general safety procedures outline health and safety practices that help maintain occupational radiation exposures at levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

General Safety Procedure NFS-HS-A-42, "Drafting Safety Work Permits (U)," Revision 15, provides instructions for drafting Safety Work Permits (SWPs). Specifically, Section 4.4, Basic Considerations for Safety Work Permit Requirements, Step 4.4.1, Industrial Safety, states in part that specific non-radiological hazards and requirements will be designated by the Industrial Safety Specialist. That step lists chemical hazards as an example of non-radiological hazards to be considered. Additionally, Step 4.4.4, Respiratory Protection, states in part that the type of equipment selected shall provide a protection factor greater than the expected peak concentrations of radioactive materials or chemical hazards present in the work area, and that respirator requirements should be posted at the SWP entrance using insert signs or appropriate markings.

Contrary to the above, on January 30, 2023, the licensee failed to designate, in the SWP, the non-radiological hazards applicable to the planned inventory clean-out activities in Area 800. Additionally, the licensee failed to include in the SWP, and post in the work area, the respiratory protection equipment necessary for the chemical hazards present in the work area. Consequently, two operators were exposed to hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material without the appropriate respiratory protection for chemical hazards.

This is a Severity IV violation (Section 6.2.d.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy).

2) Materials License SNM-124, Amendment 16, Safety Condition S-1, states that the licensee shall conduct activities in accordance with the statements, representations, and conditions in the license application.

License Application, Section 11.4, Procedure Development and Implementation, states in part that activities involving the handling of SNM are conducted in accordance with written procedures as defined in this section. This section also states, in part, that general safety procedures outline health and safety practices that help maintain occupational radiation exposures at levels ALARA and are generally applicable on a plant-wide basis.

Enclosure 1 General Safety Procedure NFS-OPS-001, "Conduct of Operations (U)," Revision 23, Section 6.1, includes the general practices for operating routines. Step 6.1.6 states that if a chemical reaction occurs outside of process containment (i.e., within a handheld container, large chemical spill at bulk chemical, etc.), DO NOT approach the reaction.

The potential chemical and radiological exposure that may occur if personnel were to approach the reaction cannot be immediately determined. At NFS, only trained and qualified members of the Fire Brigade will respond to and address chemical reactions.

Contrary to the above, on January 30, 2023, plant staff who were not trained and qualified members of the fire brigade approached and responded to a chemical reaction involving NRC-licensed material outside of a process enclosure in Area 800. The action of approaching and handling the material exacerbated the reactive state of the material and ultimately resulted in a small fire with a minor release of hazardous chemical vapors.

This is a Severity IV violation (Section 6.2.d.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy).

The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violations, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violations and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved, is already adequately addressed on the docket in NRC Inspection Report No. 07000143/2023002 (ADAMS ML23221A234). However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to respond, clearly mark your response as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and send it to the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice).

If you choose to respond, your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or in the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

Therefore, to the extent possible, the response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working days of receipt.

Dated this 10th day of August 2023 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Inspection Report

Docket Number: 07000143

License Number: SNM-124

Report Number: 07000143/2023002

Licensee: Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.

Facility: Nuclear Fuel Services

Location: Erwin, TN

Inspection Dates: March 27, 2023 to June 30, 2023

Inspectors: P. Glenn, Executive Technical Assistant L. Harris, Senior Resident Inspector T. Sippel, Sr. Fuel Facility Projects

Approved By: Robert Mathis, Chief (Acting)

Projects Branch 1 Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Enclosure 2

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a core inspection at Nuclear Fuel Services, in accordance with the fuel cycle facility inspection program. This is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of licensed fuel cycle facilities. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac.html for more information.

List of Violations

Failure to Follow Procedure Requirements for Safety Work Permit Development Significance Report Section Severity Level IV 88135.02 NOV 07000143/2023002-01 Closed Inspectors identified a self-revealing, Severity Level (SL)-IV, cited violation of License Condition S-1 for the failure to follow a standard operating procedure (SOP) with regards to Safety Work Permit (SWP) development during inventory clean-out activities in Area 800.

Failure to Follow Procedure Requirements for Response to a Chemical Reaction Significance Report Section Severity Level IV 88135.02 NOV 07000143/2023002-02 Closed The inspectors identified a self-revealing, SL-IV, cited violation of License Condition S-1 for the failure to follow an SOP with regards to responding to a chemical reaction during inventory clean-out activities in Area 800.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status WER 07000143/2023-001-00 Chemical Reaction and 88135.02 Closed Fire in Area 800

2 PLANT STATUS

The following facility process areas were operating during the inspection period: Fuel Manufacturing Facility (FMF) and the Blended Low Enriched Uranium (BLEU) Preparation Facility (BPF), which includes the Uranium-Oxide (U-Oxide), solvent extraction and the down-blending lines. Normal support services and departments were operational during the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Inspections were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2600, Fuel Cycle Facility Operational Safety and Safeguards Inspection Program. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

SAFETY OPERATIONS

88015 - Nuclear Criticality Safety

The inspectors evaluated selected aspects of the licensees Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) program to verify compliance with selected portions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 70 (10 CFR 70), including Sections 70.61, 70.62 and Appendix A; Chapter 5, Nuclear Criticality Safety, of the facilitys license application; and applicable licensee procedures.

Criticality Analysis (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors interviewed licensee staff and reviewed nuclear criticality safety evaluations (NCSEs), and associated supporting documents and calculations, to verify compliance with 10 CFR 70 and applicable sections of the license application, including 5.1.1, 5.5.2, and 5.5.4. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed licensee staff and reviewed selected NCSEs and conducted associated activities as described below:

54T-14-0024, "Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation for the Uranium Metal Sampling and the Uranium Metal Shear System," Revision (Rev.) 5, including the review of the what-if analysis, the normal case, and selected credible and non-credible what-if scenarios related to the uranium metal shear and its enclosure 54T-14-0029, "Control Flowdown and Field Verification for the Uranium Metal Sampling and the Uranium Metal Shear System," Rev. 6, which was reviewed because it contained the NCS review documenting the implementation of criticality controls in the field 54T-15-0009, "Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation for CDL Liquid Waste Discard System," Rev. 1, including the review of the what-if analysis, the normal case, accident sequences CDLWD.009, CDLWD.022, and

3 CDLWD.023; which involve the transfer of high concentrations of uranium from the scrubber to the waste discard tank, the accumulation of uranium in the tank, and the inadvertent addition of uranium to the tank; and the basis for why the licensee screened certain accident sequences (e.g., CDLWD.009) as incredible 54T-16-0001, "Control Flowdown and Field Verification for the CDL Liquid Waste Discard System," Rev. 3, which was reviewed because it contained the NCS review documenting the implementation of criticality controls in the field, and contained information supporting assumptions in the NCSE reviewed results of sensitivity calculations for controlled parameters and reviewed input decks in the above NCSEs performed walk-downs, including the uranium metal shear and the liquid waste discard system, both in the 301 Building

Criticality Implementation (IP Section 02.02)

The inspectors selected engineered and administrative controls from the licensees integrated safety analysis (ISA) summary and NCSEs to verify proper implementation through a review of process and system descriptions, plant walk-downs, record reviews, procedure reviews, and operator interviews to verify compliance with 10 CFR 70 and applicable sections of the license application, including 5.3.5, 5.3.7, and 5.5.1. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed licensee staff and reviewed the following items relied on for safety (IROFS), and their management measures:

IROFS BMS-1, an administrative control on uranium mass, including review of the NCS Posting and procedure NFS-WST-008 IROFS BMS-2, a passive engineered spacing control, which was observed in the field IROFS CDWW-13, an administrative control on uranium mass, including reviewing SOP 409, Section 6.1, non-destructive assay (NDA) survey records (FM-ACC-123-01 and FM-ACC-123-02), and various NDA calibration records IROFS CDPV-08, a passive engineered control to prevent backflow of solution to ventilation, including observing the overflow drain in the field, reviewing SA-00089, Rev. 2, and the last safety-related equipment (SRE) Test N301XOVRFLO5A02 record IROFS CDPV-24, a passive engineered control to prevent backflow of solution to ventilation, including observing the air gap in the field and reviewing SA-00092, Rev. 1 IROFS CDPV-27, an administrative control on uranium mass, including reviewing NDA survey records (FM-ACC-123-01 and FM-ACC-123-02), and various NDA calibration records (including HEU-01-10-01)

The inspectors also reviewed the applicable ISA Summary document: 21T 0005, "Blended Low Enriched Uranium Preparation Facility," Rev. 20

Criticality Operational Oversight (IP Section 02.03)

The inspectors assessed the NCS staffs oversight of plant operations, procedures, and operations of systems involving special nuclear material (SNM) to verify compliance with 10 CFR 70 and applicable sections of the license application, including 5.3.2 and 5.3.4. Specifically, the inspectors performed the following activities:

4 reviewed operator training materials and training records for uranium metal shear and waste discard operations, including IROFS and NCS-related training records reviewed criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) evacuation training refresher material: FM-TRN-018, "Criticality Evacuation Procedure Review,"

dated June 9, 2021 observed weekly alarm familiarization training interviewed licensee NCS and NDA staff concerning criticality hazards and control methods, including monitoring for long-term accumulations reviewed the licensee's weekly NCS walk-down log of operating areas reviewed the NCS audit reports listed in the Documents Reviewed section of this report walked down the uranium metal shear and the liquid waste discard systems with an NCS engineer

Criticality Programmatic Oversight (IP Section 02.04)

The inspectors reviewed NCS program procedures, audits, and NCS staff qualifications to verify compliance with 10 CFR 70 and applicable sections of the license application, including 2.3.5.1 and 5.3.3. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed licensee NCS staff and reviewed program documents as described below:

reviewed NDA survey records and NDA calibrations records reviewed licensee NCS program procedures, including the most recent revision to licensee procedures for Nuclear Criticality Safety Design Considerations (NFS-NCS-Design, Rev. 6) and Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer Qualification (NFS-NCS-QUALP, Rev. 3) interviewed NCS manager concerning oversight of the NCS program interviewed NCS staff who are currently in the NCS qualification program reviewed the licensee's 2022 NCS training audit and the Safety and Safeguards Review Council Meeting minutes from February 2023

Criticality Incident Response and Corrective Action (IP Section 02.05)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees CAAS and problem identification, resolution and corrective system (PIRCS) to verify compliance with 10 CFR 70 and applicable sections of the license application, including 5.3.9 and 5.4. Specifically, the inspectors:

reviewed recent NCS-related PIRCS entries, including: 92236, 92235, 91762, 91224, 92315, and interviewed licensee NCS staff concerning these entries reviewed recent CAAS-related PIRCS entries, including: 88482, 88498, 91034, and interviewed licensee NCS and Radiation Protection staff concerning these entries reviewed recent NCS evacuation drill records and performance for 2022, including: SRG-22-005 and SRG-22-006 observed CAAS audibility testing, interviewed licensee staff conducting the tests, and reviewed CAAS audibility test records for the second quarter of 2023: FM-HS-A21-01-01 and FM-HS-A21-01-02

5 88135.02 - Plant Status

The inspectors routinely conducted walk-downs of licensee areas; observed operators, material control and accounting and security force personnel; inspected postings and licensee guidance documents; interviewed plant personnel; and discussed the results of operational and shift turnover meetings to gain insight into the status of facility activities, risk-inform the selection and implementation of the appropriate core IPs, and ensure compliance with license and regulatory requirements.

Plant Tours (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors performed weekly tours of plant operating areas housing SNM to verify that licensed activities were conducted safely and in compliance with the license and 10 CFR 70, Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material.

Status Meetings (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors, on a routine basis, attended and reviewed the results of scheduled licensee meetings to determine plant status and become aware of site activities so that inspection resources were appropriately focused on those activities with the higher safety significance. The inspectors selected the following meetings for review:

Safety and Security Review Council PIRCS Meetings Plan of the Day Meetings Corrective Action Review Board NFS Community Advisory Group Meeting Nuclear Safety Review Board

Record and Log Reviews (IP Section 03.03)

The inspectors reviewed selected records and logs to ensure they were developed, maintained, and reported, as required by applicable license and regulatory requirements.

The records selected for review are listed in the "Documents Reviewed" section of this inspection report.

Identification and Resolution of Problems (IP Section 03.05)

The inspectors reviewed selected issues to determine if the licensee was entering equipment, human performance, and other performance issues in a formalized program to identify, track and assure correction of safety and safeguard significant problems, in accordance with 10 CFR 70.62(a)(3) and applicable license requirements. The issues selected for review are listed in the "Documents Reviewed" section of this inspection report as PIRCS.

Event Review (IP Section 03.06)

The inspectors reviewed the plant event listed below to determine if the event warranted the use of formal event review criteria. As applicable, the inspectors reviewed the event to

6 determine whether the licensee reported the issue in accordance with 10 CFR Parts 40.60 (source material), 70.50 (mainly radiological events), 70.52 (criticality and safeguards events), 71.95 (transportation events), 73.71 (safeguards events), and 20.22 (radiological and environmental events). The inspectors also reviewed the licensees response, safety consequences, and corrective actions for the listed events.

Event Notice (EN) 56326, dated January 30, 2023, regarding a chemical reaction in Area 800 of the facility while operators were conducting clean-out activities for material inventory purposes. This event is tracked as WER 07000143/2023-001-00.

See "Inspection Results" section of this report for details.

Audits (IP Section 03.07)

The inspectors reviewed the internal and/or external audit listed below to determine whether it was performed in accordance with 10 CFR 70.22(h)(1), if applicable, and the license application.

Health Physics Audits and Inspections - First Quarter 2023

Procedures (IP Section 03.08)

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures to determine if the licensee was using and maintaining them in accordance with applicable license requirements. The procedures selected for review are listed in the "Documents Reviewed" section of this inspection report.

Radiation Work Permit (IP Section 03.09)

The inspectors reviewed and observed the radiation work permits (RWPs) or SWPs listed below to determine whether they contained the information required by Chapter 4, "Radiation Safety," of the license application; the Radiation Protection Manual; and implementing procedures:

SWP 18487 333 HEU SWP 18546 301 Building

Annual Security and Emergency Preparedness Drills/Exercises (IP Section 03.10)

The inspectors observed the licensees performance during the Emergency Preparedness and security Force-on-Force (FOF) tactical response exercise/training evolutions listed below to determine they were being implemented in accordance with 10 CFR 70.22(I)(3) and/or 10 CFR 73.46(b)(9):

Annual evacuation drill for all employees conducted on June 6, 2023 (first shift) - The NRC Resident Inspector conducted pre-drill walk-downs of the evacuation areas/routes and interviewed personnel to verify compliance with 10 CFR 70.24(a)(3). The inspector participated in the evacuation and observed alarms and alarm response of NFS employees. Additionally, the inspector observed an Emergency Response Organization training exercise that followed the evacuation drill.

7 Security FOF tactical response exercise conducted during the month of May 2023.

88135.04 - Resident Inspection Program Operational Safety

The inspectors reviewed the material condition and as-found configuration of selected site structures, systems, and components (SSCs); reviewed corresponding documentation, and interviewed licensee personnel to verify compliance with 10 CFR Part 70 and the license application. The inspectors also verified whether the selected SSCs were available and reliable to adequately protect plant workers and the public during normal, off-normal, and accident conditions.

Operations Safety Walk-down (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors performed walk-downs and evaluated the safety controls/IROFS listed below associated with the processing areas 302-700B, 303-700A, and 302-700A.

Area 302-700B FA7-3, FA7-27, and FA7-40

Area 303-700A FA7C-1, FA7C-5, and FA7C-19

Area 302-700A FA7-1, FA7-6, FA7-8, FA7-15, and FA7-25

88135.05 - Resident Inspection Program Fire Protection (Annual/Quarterly)

The inspectors evaluated the operational status and material condition of selected fire protection SSCs to verify compliance with the fire protection program as described in Chapter 7, Fire Safety of the license application, and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 801, Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials, as applicable.

Fire Area Walk-down (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors walked down and reviewed the documents listed below for two fire areas of the facility:

Building 333 (low enriched uranium portion):

o inspection reports for office, storage, and associated areas o emergency lights functional testing records o monthly door inspection records

Building 440:

o three-year dry pipe inspection records o fire hazard analysis

8 88135.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

The inspectors evaluated post-maintenance test activities to verify compliance with license application Chapter 11, Management Measures, and test procedures and/or work orders (WOs) to confirm functional capability of selected IROFS and/or safety control(s) following maintenance.

Post-Maintenance Testing (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests listed below. The inspectors either observed the tests directly or reviewed test results.

N302FRNCTIC0685 associated with WO 308043 N302XDRAINHD01

88135.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated IROFS and safety controls that required periodic surveillance and/or calibration tests to ensure they were available and reliable to perform their function when needed; to verify compliance with license application Chapter 11, Management Measures, and the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 and 70.62; and to verify the IROFS maintained their operational readiness consistent with the ISA Summary.

Surveillance and Calibration Testing (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors reviewed the surveillance test listed below. Tests were either observed directly or test results were reviewed.

N302VALVEHV0F08 N302VENDRAIN01A N302VENDRAIN02A N302VENDRAIN03A N302VENDRAIN01B N302VENDRAIN02B N302VENDRAIN03B

OTHER AREAS

92709 - Licensee Strike Contingency Plans

The contract between the United Steel Workers (USW) Union and the licensee was scheduled to expire at midnight on May 15, 2023. The USW Union represents hundreds of workers at the NFS facility. Negotiations resulted in a contract extension until October 15, 2023, that was accepted by the union rank and file on April 19, 2023.

Prior to the contract extension, the NRC staff initiated inspection activities in accordance with NRC IP 92709, Licensee Strike Contingency Plans. The inspectors reviewed the licensees strike contingency plan and discussed the implementation of the plan with licensee management, operations, and security personnel to evaluate the plans adequacy and to assess the licensees readiness in the event of contract expiration and a possible labor strike.

9 The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparations to ensure that the required minimum number of qualified personnel would be available for the proper and safe operation of the facility. The inspectors also focused on the licensees plans to provide adequate site security in the event of a labor-related work stoppage.

Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensees assumptions in developing associated contingencies, training, and staffing plans including:

the number and job classifications of potential strikers; the readiness of the safety contingency plan; the process for training and qualifying sufficient salaried staff for safety-critical positions; how critical safety and regulatory functions would transition to salaried personnel during a potential strike; methods to train and confirm qualifications of salaried personnel that might perform work in the operations area; and how the potential labor strike could affect the current contract between the licensee and the guard union to ensure hourly guard force continued performing their assigned duties in the event of a work stoppage.

Additionally, the inspectors met with representatives of the Erwin City Police Department to discuss the NRCs ongoing oversight role in the event of any potential labor dispute and the need to ensure continued unfettered site access to the licensees facility should a work stoppage ensue.

The inspectors also met with the USW Local President and Vice President to discuss the NRCs oversight role in the event of a job action and the regulatory requirement that NRC inspectors have unfettered access to and from the site. The union representatives acknowledged that they understood the requirement and would instruct the local membership not to impede NRC access to the site.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Follow Procedure Requirements for Safety Work Permit Development Severity Report Section Severity Level IV 88135.02 NOV 07000143/2023002-01 Closed The inspectors identified a self-revealing, SL-IV, cited violation of License Condition S-1 for the failure to follow an SOP with regards to SWP development during inventory clean-out activities in Area 800.

Description:

On January 30, 2023, a chemical reaction occurred outside of process containment equipment during routine inventory clean-out activities in Area 800. During the clean-out activities, chemical residue containing small quantities of licensed material was collected on a protective covering placed on the floor, underneath the process equipment being cleaned out. When the material was fully exposed to the surrounding air, the operators noticed indications of a chemical reaction. Following a recommendation from a fire brigade member and instructions from a supervisor, two operators wearing respiratory protection for radiological exposure approached, gathered, and attempted to transfer the chemical residue

10 from the floor covering to a metal pan. During that transfer a small, short duration flame was observed. Additionally, a strong chemical odor was noticed and inhaled by the operators.

The event did not result in significant personnel injuries, exposures, contamination, or releases to the environment exceeding regulatory limits. Due to an associated news release, the licensee reported the event to the NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (EN 56326) under 10 CFR Part 70, Appendix A, Reportable Safety Events, paragraph (c).

The licensee's cause investigation determined that the cause of the chemical reaction was that chemical holdup containing a small quantity of licensed material reacted with the room environment and produced chemical fumes exposing the operators handling the material.

Procedure SOP HS-A-42, Drafting Safety Work Permits, lists chemical hazards as an example of non-radiological hazards that need to be considered in the drafting of any work permits. The licensees investigation determined that NFS staff failed to follow the instructions in SOP HS-A-42 to identify the chemical hazards experienced during the event and the proper personal protective equipment needed prior to the clean-out activity, which directly contributed to the operators exposure to hazardous chemical vapors. Particularly, NFS staff did not identify the chemical reaction in question as a potential hazard in the SWP and therefore did not instruct the operators to use respiratory protection for chemical exposures in addition to the respiratory protection for radiological exposure already identified in the SWP.

Corrective Actions: The licensees immediate response and short them corrective actions for the event included:

The affected work area (Area 800) was evacuated, and personnel access restrictions were implemented.

The NFS's fire brigade responded, established a fire watch, and supported other response functions.

The Emergency Control Director activated the Emergency Response Organization and staffed the Emergency Control Center.

Other affected production areas were placed in a safe shutdown condition and work was suspended.

The licensee initiated damage assessment tasks to identify equipment damage or impaired safety systems around the area of occurrence.

The licensee established chemical and radiological sampling of the process area to assess the chemical and radiological consequences of the event.

The licensee arranged for offsite transport of the two exposed operators for medical evaluation. Both individuals were evaluated and released without the need for additional treatment.

The licensee developed a temporary procedure to address safe removal of the material at risk, and the SWP was revised to include additional protective equipment and monitoring for exposure during the remaining clean-out activities.

The licensee conducted a root cause evaluation and identified the following corrective actions (CAs) associated with the identification of chemical hazards prior to conducting an activity:

11 CAs 43899 through 43903 - Develop a process and procedure to identify and document potential chemical reactions and reaction by-products in each step of all manufacturing processes.

CA 43904 - Revise procedures for chemical hazard identification during the industrial safety development of SWPs.

CAs 43905 through 43908 - Upon completion of chemical reactions review and identification in all process areas, review all existing standard SWPs to determine if additional controls for chemical hazards are needed.

The licensee also identified the following CAs to address the other causal factors of the event:

CAs 43912 and 43913 - Revise procedures to incorporate lessons from post-event instruction regarding system heat treatment before clean-out activities.

CAs 43919 through 43925 - Revise procedures and develop communication plans, audits, annual refresher training, and leadership focus on the topic of pre-job briefs.

CAs 43909, 43910, 43911, 43914, and 43969 - Revise procedures to incorporate new methods to prepare for and conduct the clean-out activity associated with the event.

CAs 43973 through 43975 - Develop and conduct training to staff regarding response to chemical reactions outside process containment.

Corrective Action

References:

The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as PIRCS 91568.

Analysis: The inspectors determined the failure to identify all the potential chemical hazards, as required by NFS SOP HS-A-42, constituted a violation of License Condition S-1 for not handling SNM in accordance with written procedures as defined in Section 11.4 of the license application.

The violation was determined to be self-revealing because it became apparent as a result of a plant event. The inspectors determined the violation was more-than-minor based on the screening criteria in IMC 0616, Appendix B. The inspectors determined the violation could reasonably be considered a precursor to a significant event per Question 1 of the screening process because it was similar to Example 1a, in that the failure to follow a procedure resulted in an unsafe condition that impacted the safety of plant personnel. Specifically, the failure to follow procedure SOP HS-A-42 resulted in the issuance of an SWP that did not identify the potential chemical hazards experienced during the event and the need for additional respiratory protection against chemical vapors.

Additionally, the inspectors determined the event involved hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material as defined in 10 CFR 70.4. Particularly, the chemical vapors inhaled by the operators were produced from a toxic, corrosive, or reactive substance that normally comingles or interacts with licensed material as part of the main fuel production process licensed by the NRC.

The inspectors interviewed licensee staff and independently reviewed documentation for the determination of actual and potential consequences. This event did not result in serious safety consequences because: (1) operators recognized the chemical reaction and left the area, (2) fire brigade responded promptly; (3) the reaction occurred in an area demarked sufficiently to preclude additional personnel from entering the area, (4) protective equipment was used to address potential radiological exposure, (5) process ventilation controls prevented any environmental release from exceeding regulatory limits, (6) the reaction did not

12 involve amounts of SNM, or chemicals within NRC jurisdiction, that could result in an event of intermediate or high consequences as defined in 10 CFR 70.61 and the approved ISA methodology for the facility, (7) the affected process was in inventory shutdown mode in which normal amounts of SNM are removed to support inventory clean-out, (8) the area's air sample monitors did not detect activity requiring further action, and (9) the post-event medical evaluation of exposed employees did not identify a result requiring medical treatment.

The inspectors determined the violation was of SL-IV significance because it aligned with Example 6.2.d.2 of the Enforcement Policy in that the violation involved the failure to identify a chemical hazard in accordance with an SOP, but the failure did not result in an SL-I, II, or III violation based on the actual and potential safety consequences.

Enforcement:

Severity: This is an SL-IV violation consistent with Example 6.2.d.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Violation: Materials License SNM-124, Amendment 16, Safety Condition S-1, states that the licensee shall conduct activities in accordance with the statements, representations, and conditions in the license application.

License Application, Section 11.4, Procedure Development and Implementation, states in part that activities involving the handling of SNM are conducted in accordance with written procedures as defined in this section. This section also states, in part, that general safety procedures outline health and safety practices that help maintain occupational radiation exposures at levels as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

General Safety Procedure NFS-HS-A-42, "Drafting Safety Work Permits (U)," Revision 15, provides instructions for drafting SWPs. Specifically, Section 4.4, Basic Considerations for Safety Work Permit Requirements, Step 4.4.1, Industrial Safety, states in part that specific non-radiological hazards and requirements will be designated by the Industrial Safety Specialist. That step lists chemical hazards as an example of non-radiological hazards to be considered. Additionally, Step 4.4.4, Respiratory Protection, states in part that the type of equipment selected shall provide a protection factor greater than the expected peak concentrations of radioactive materials or chemical hazards present in the work area, and that respirator requirements should be posted at the SWP entrance using insert signs or appropriate markings.

Contrary to the above, on January 30, 2023, the licensee failed to designate, in the SWP, the non-radiological hazards applicable to the planned inventory clean-out activities in Area 800.

Additionally, the licensee failed to include in the SWP, and post in the work area, the respiratory protection equipment necessary for the chemical hazards present in the work area. Consequently, two operators were exposed to hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material without the appropriate respiratory protection for chemical hazards.

This violation is identified as NOV 07000143/2023002-01, Failure to Follow Procedure Requirements for Safety Work Permit Development and is considered closed based on the inspection activities documented under IP 88135.02, Section 03.06, of this inspection report.

Enforcement Action: Consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy, this violation is being cited because the licensee does not have an NRC-approved Corrective Action Program and did not identify the violation.

13 Failure to Follow Procedure Requirements for Response to a Chemical Reaction Severity Report Section Severity Level IV 88135.02 NOV 07000143/2023002-02 Closed The inspectors identified a self-revealing, SL-IV, cited violation of License Condition S-1 for the failure to follow an SOP with regards to responding to a chemical reaction during inventory clean-out activities in Area 800.

==

Description:==

On January 30, 2023, a chemical reaction occurred outside of process containment equipment during routine inventory clean-out activities in Area 800 as described in detail in NOV 07000143/2023002-01 above.

Procedure NFS-OPS-001, Conduct of Operations, instructs personnel not to approach a chemical reaction occurring outside of a process containment and additionally states that only a trained and qualified member of the fire brigade may do so. The licensees investigation determined that NFS staff failed to follow the instructions in procedure NFS-OPS-001 when two operators, who were not trained fire brigade members, approached the material to transfer it from the floor to a metal pan, which directly contributed to the operators exposure to hazardous chemical vapors produced from licensed material.

Corrective Actions: The licensees immediate response and short them corrective actions for the event are described in detail in NOV 07000143/2023002-01 above:

The licensee conducted a root cause evaluation and identified the following CAs associated with reinforcing expectations to comply with procedure NFS-OPS-001:

CA 43928 - Develop quarterly fire brigade training module to address lessons learned from fire brigade recommendations and instructions to take action that contradicts guidance in NFS-OPS-001 CA 43929 - Incorporate NFS-OPS-001 requirements regarding response to reactions into the annual safety refresher.

CA 43930 - Reinforce the requirements of NFS-OPS-001 to all employees.

The licensee also identified the following CAs to address the other causal factors of the event:

CAs 43912 and 43913 - Revise SOP 401-08 to incorporate lessons from post-event instruction regarding system heat treatment before clean-out activities.

CAs 43919 through 43925 - Revise procedures and develop communication plans, audits, annual refresher training, and leadership focus on the topic of pre-job briefs.

CAs 43909, 43910, 43911, 43914, and 43969 - Revise procedures to incorporate new methods to prepare for and conduct the clean-out activity associated with the event.

CAs 43973 through 43975 - Develop and conduct training to staff regarding response to chemical reactions outside process containment.

CAs 43899 through 43903 - Develop a process and procedure to identify and document potential chemical reactions and reaction by-products in each step of all manufacturing processes.

CA 43904 - Revise procedures for chemical hazard identification during the industrial safety development of SWPs.

14 CAs 43905 through 43908 - Upon completion of chemical reactions review and identification in all process areas, review all existing standard SWPs to determine if additional controls for chemical hazards are needed.

Corrective Action

References:

The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as PIRCS 91568.

Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to follow the instructions in NFS-OPS-001 for responding to reacting material constituted a violation of License Condition S-1 for not handling SNM in accordance with written procedures as defined in Section 11.4 of the license application.

The violation was determined to be self-revealing because it became apparent as a result of a plant event. The inspectors determined the violation was more-than-minor based on the screening criteria in IMC 0616, Appendix B. The inspectors determined the violation could reasonably be considered a precursor to a significant event per Question 1 of the screening process because it was similar to Example 1a, in that the failure to follow a procedure resulted in an unsafe condition that impacted the safety of plant personnel. Specifically, the failure to follow procedure NFS-OPS-001 resulted in operators, who were not trained fire brigade members, approaching and handling licensed material in a reactive state capable of producing hazardous vapors. The action of transferring the material from the floor by non-fire brigade members exacerbated the reactive state of the material and ultimately resulted in a small fire and minor release of hazardous chemical vapors.

Additionally, the inspectors determined the event involved hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material as defined in 10 CFR 70.4. Particularly, the chemical vapors inhaled by the operators were produced from a toxic, corrosive, or reactive substance that normally comingles or interacts with licensed material as part of the main fuel production process licensed by the NRC.

The inspectors interviewed licensee staff and independently reviewed documentation for the determination of actual and potential consequences. This event did not result in serious safety consequences as described in detail in NOV 07000143/2023002-01 above.

The inspectors determined the violation was of SL-IV significance because it aligned with Example 6.2.d.2 of the Enforcement Policy in that the violation involved the failure to respond to a chemical reaction in accordance with procedures, but the failure did not result in an SL-I, II, or III violation based on the actual and potential safety consequences.

Enforcement:

Severity: This is an SL-IV violation consistent with Example 6.2.d.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Violation: Materials License SNM-124, Amendment 16, Safety Condition S-1, states that the licensee shall conduct activities in accordance with the statements, representations, and conditions in the license application.

License Application, Section 11.4, Procedure Development and Implementation, states in part that activities involving the handling of SNM are conducted in accordance with written procedures as defined in this section. This section also states, in part, that general safety procedures outline health and safety practices that help maintain occupational radiation exposures at levels ALARA and are generally applicable on a plant-wide basis.

15 General Safety Procedure NFS-OPS-001, "Conduct of Operations (U)," Revision 23, Section 6.1, includes the general practices for operating routines. Step 6.1.6 states that if a chemical reaction occurs outside of process containment (i.e., within a handheld container, large chemical spill at bulk chemical, etc.), DO NOT approach the reaction. The potential chemical and radiological exposure that may occur if personnel were to approach the reaction cannot be immediately determined. At NFS, only trained and qualified members of the Fire Brigade will respond to and address chemical reactions.

Contrary to the above, on January 30, 2023, plant staff who were not trained and qualified members of the fire brigade approached and responded to a chemical reaction involving NRC-licensed material outside of a process enclosure in Area 800. The action of approaching and handling the material exacerbated the reactive state of the material and ultimately resulted in a small fire with a minor release of hazardous chemical vapors.

This violation is identified as NOV 07000143/2023002-02, Failure to Follow Procedure Requirements for Response to a Chemical Reaction and is considered closed based on the inspection activities documented under IP 88135.02, Section 03.06, of this inspection report.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being cited because the licensee does not have an NRC-approved Corrective Action Program and did not identify the violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

WER Chemical Reaction and Fire in Area 800 88135.02 (Closed) WER 2023-001 (EN 56326)

Description:

This written event report (WER) item was opened in NRC Inspection Report 07000143/2023001 (ADAMS ML23122A308) to track the NRCs review of EN 56326.

Because the event was reported under 10 CFR Part 70, Appendix A, paragraph (c), no actual written report is required from the licensee in response to this event. This WER item is being closed to NOVs 07000143/2023002-01 and 07000143/2023002-02 documented in this inspection report.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On July 11, 2023, the inspectors presented the core inspection results to Ronald Dailey and other members of the licensee staff.

On April 27, 2023, the inspectors presented the nuclear criticality safety (IP 88015) inspection results to Tim Knowles and other members of the licensee staff.

16 DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date 88015 Calculations HS-HTG-022, Att. A Calculating Corrective Factor Form, Rev. 0 For TANKXX-5A02 88015 Calculations SA-00089 OVRFLO-5A02 Setpoint Calc for TANKXX-5A02 Rev. 2 88015 Calculations SA-00092 Siphon Break Calculations Rev. 1 88015 Calibration FM-ACC-047-02 New NDA Calibration Factors Sheet 12/21/2021 Records 88015 Calibration FM-ACC-047-02 New NDA Calibration Factors Sheet 07/15/2022 Records 88015 Drawings 000-C0002-B Emergency Evacuation Routes 09/08/2022 88015 Engineering 21T-23-0005 Blended Low-Enriched Uranium Preparation Facility Rev. 20 Evaluations 88015 Engineering 54T-14-0024 Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation for the Uranium Rev. 5 Evaluations Metal Sampling and the Uranium Metal Shear System 88015 Engineering 54T-14-0029 Control Flowdown and Field Verification for the Uranium Rev. 6 Evaluations Metal Sampling and the Uranium Metal Shear System 88015 Engineering 54T-15-0009 Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation for CDL Liquid Rev. 1 Evaluations Waste Discard System 88015 Engineering 54T-16-0001 Control Flowdown and Field Verification for the CDL Rev. 3 Evaluations Liquid Waste Discard System 88015 Miscellaneous Sample Training Records - Operators (U-Metal Shear 04/26/2023 and Liquid Waste Discard Tank) 88015 Miscellaneous Sample Training Records - Operators (NCS Alarm and 04/26/2023 Alarm Panel) 88015 Miscellaneous Safety and Safeguards Review Council Meeting Minutes 02/03/2023 88015 Miscellaneous 2023 NCS Weekly Walk-down Log 04/27/2023 88015 Miscellaneous FM-HS-21-01-02 Criticality Alarm Speaker Functional Record - Non-SNM 04/14/2023, Areas 04/25/2023 88015 Miscellaneous FM-HS-21-04 Approval for Alarm System Maintenance and 04/11/2023 Unscheduled Testing 88015 Miscellaneous FM-HS-A-21-01-01 Criticality Alarm Speaker Functional Record - SNM Areas04/14/2023, 04/25/2023 88015 Miscellaneous FM-TRN-018 Criticality Evacuation Procedure Review 06/09/2021

17 Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date 88015 Miscellaneous NCS-2022-30 NCS Audit of the Training Program 02/13/2023 88015 Miscellaneous NCS-2023-03 Nuclear Criticality Safety Audit 1/30/2023 88015 Miscellaneous NCS-2023-06 Nuclear Criticality Safety Audit 02/20/2023 88015 Miscellaneous NCS-2023-12 Nuclear Criticality Safety Audit 4/13/2023 88015 Miscellaneous SRE Test IROFS 301-GENERAL Performed N301XOVRFLO5A02 01/23/2023 88015 Miscellaneous SRG-22-005 NFS Annual Criticality Alarm Evacuation Drills 12/08/2022 88015 Miscellaneous SRG-22-006 2022 NFS Annual Criticality Alarm Evacuation Drill for 12/14/2022 Dayshift Personnel 88015 Miscellaneous TPN-17 / SA-Annual Criticality Training 2022 NCSREFRESH 88015 NDE Reports FM-ACC-123-01 NDA Data Form for Building 301 Scrubber System 01/24/2022, 03/07/2022, 03/16/2022, 04/04/2022, 05/23/2022, 06/28/2022, 07/25/2022, 08/15/2022, 08/22/2022, 09/12/2022 88015 NDE Reports FM-ACC-123-02 NDA Data Summary for Building 301 Scrubber Systems 01/24/2022, 03/07/2022, 03/16/2022, 04/04/2022, 05/23/2022, 06/28/2022, 07/25/2022, 08/15/2022, 08/22/2022, 09/12/2022 88015 NDE Reports HEU-01-10-01 BLDG. 301 - Scrubber Rev. 0 88015 Procedures NFS-GH-913 Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Rev. 4 88015 Procedures NFS-HS-A-16 Safety Audits, Assessments, and Inspections Rev. 16

18 Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date 88015 Procedures NFS-HS-A-21 Operation and Testing of the Criticality Fire and CO2 Rev. 40 Alarm Systems 88015 Procedures NFS-HS-E-03 Emergency Response Organization Rev. 38 88015 Procedures NFS-MGT-13-038 Nuclear Criticality Safety Policy Rev. 1 88015 Procedures NFS-NCS-DESIGN NCS Design Considerations Rev. 6 88015 Procedures NFS-NCS-QUALP NCS Engineer Qualification Rev. 3 88015 Procedures NFS-WST-008 Receiving Radioactive Materials Rev. 31 88015 Procedures SOP 409 Section 61 Wastewater System in Building 301 Rev. 14 88135.02 Corrective Action 92179 (NRC 301 Building Documents identified) 88135.02 Corrective Action 92235 Area D Documents 88135.02 Corrective Action 92321 IT Services Documents 88135.02 Corrective Action 92331 SRE Test Review Documents 88135.02 Corrective Action 92334 (NRC 440 Building Documents identified) 88135.02 Corrective Action 92414 Area 200 Documents 88135.02 Corrective Action 92482 310 Building Documents 88135.02 Corrective Action 92570 Area E Documents 88135.02 Corrective Action 92576 420 Motor Pool Documents 88135.02 Corrective Action 92611 303 Building Documents 88135.02 Procedures NFS-HS-A-42 Drafting Safety Work Permits Rev. 015 88135.02 Procedures NFS-OPS-001 Conduct of Operations Rev. 020 88135.02 Procedures NFS-PD-001 Management of the On-Line Training and Qualification Rev. 007B System 88135.02 Procedures SOP 401-08 Area 800 Rev. 32 c 92709 Miscellaneous 2023 Contingency Plan

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