ML23214A080
| ML23214A080 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07109341 |
| Issue date: | 07/31/2023 |
| From: | Orano Federal Services |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML23214A079 | List: |
| References | |
| EPID L-2023-LLA-0090 | |
| Download: ML23214A080 (1) | |
Text
Orano BRRC Amendment Request Pre-Application Meeting (7-31-2023)
DOCKET NO. 71-9341 EPID L-2023-LLA-0090 ORANO FEDERAL SERVICES, LLC, and Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) l Idaho National Laboratory (INL)
Agenda
- Introductions Review of BRRC Package BRR Package Payloads Package Design Highlights
- Introduction to New Amendment New Payload New RIT, RITC (i.e., Canister) and RITC Basket
- Licensing Strategy Containment Structural Shielding Criticality Thermal Quality Assurance
- Project Schedule Milestones
- Q&A - Wrap Up Discussion 2
Introductions
- Orano Federal Services Chris Backus, Project Technical Lead Rich Smith, Project Manager Phil Noss, Advisory Engineer Dan Wick, Structural/Thermal Analysis Support Erik Gonsiorowski, Criticality/Shielding Analysis Support
- Idaho National Laboratory Eric C Woolstenhulme, Program Manager - Material Minimization, Security & International Safeguards Collin Knight, Battelle Energy Alliance (BEA), Deputy Director, Nuclear Science User Facilities (NSUF)
Nick Adams, BEA, Packaging and Transportation Manager Susan Case, INL, Shipping Coordinator Doug Morrell, University Fuel Services (UFS) Program Manager and Custodian of the BRR-1 Cask James Angell, INL Materials and Fuels Complex, Radiological Shipping Cask Engineer SME 3
Introduction- Review of BRR Package
- The BEA Research Reactor (BRR) package was licensed in 2010 to transport irradiated research reactor fuel
- Current certificate: NRC CoC USA/9341/B(U)F-96 Revision 10
- The leak tight containment and heavy shielding makes it adapted for many types of radioactive payloads
- Designed for operation in pool or hot cell
- Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) and Idaho National Laboratory requested the addition of segmented and encapsulated commercial fuel rods (Rods-in-Tubes) to the BRRC using a new aluminum basket 4
BRR Package
- Stainless steel, lead shielded
- Package details:
Outer dims: Ø6.5 ft x 10 ft tall Total gross weight: 32,000 lb.
97.5% weight is empty packaging weight 80% empty weight is cask body, 14%
impact limiters 8 in. of radial lead shielding
© Photo credit to be completed 5
BRR Package Details
- Body Ø38 in. x 77 in. long, Inner cavity: Ø16 in. x 54 in. long
- Leak tight bolted closure lid (Elastomer O-ring containment seal)
- Upper removable Shield Plug and Closure Lid
- Polyurethane foam filled impact limiters
Ø38.4 77.1 THERMAL SHIELD 54.0 (INNER CAVITY)
Ø16.00 (INNER CAVITY) 6
BRR Package Payloads RITC aka: Square Fuel 7
BRR Package Payloads
- Bounding decay heat and payload weight is Missouri University Research Reactor (MURR) fuel 8 elements, heat of 158 W each (total heat load 1,264 W), weight 770 lb
- Cobalt-60 payload targets also may attain up to 1264 watts decay heat
- Co-60 isotope target and MURR research reactor fuels are relatively large and distributed: heat loads are possible without overheating the fuel or targets
- Because decay heat and weight of the RITC basket and payloads are 7x and 6x times less than the MURR configuration, therefore the thermal and structural influence on the package safety basis is bounded 8
Package Design Highlights
Containment components: ASME Code Section III, Subsection NB Fuel basket components (fissile): Section III, Subsection NG Non-fissile payload basket & internal components: Section III, Subsection NF New Basket and Hardware will use Subsection NF, Table 1.1
- Buckling criteria: ASME Code Case N-284 Level A Service Conditions for NCT Level D Service Conditions for HAC
- Design Accelerations based on Free Drop testing - 120g HAC and 40g NCT Maximum impact achieved by testing at -20 °F; maximum deformation and NCT impact obtained by analysis Maximum full scale 30-ft free drop impact of 86.8g (15° slap-down) HAC, 32.9g (90° end drop) NCT (predicted) 9
Introduction to Amendment 10
New Fuel Segment Payloads
- PWR/BWR commercial fuel segment payloads UO2 fuel pellets with enrichments up to 5%
Discharged from PWR/BWR reactor and cooled a minimum of 1 year Either stainless or zircaloy cladding Mass of Fuel segments bounded by 8x8 BWR assembly with pellets with an initial diameter of 0.41 inches Bounding mass of segmented rod assuming 100% theoretical density is 1.21 kg UO2 or 1.07 kg Uranium
- Two Payload Burnup/Enrichment Categories allowed Category A has one possibility: 0.74%-5% enrichment range, maximum 100 GWd/MTU Category B has two possibilities: 3%-5% enrichment range, maximum 85 GWd/MTU or 0.74%-5% enrichment range, maximum 50 GWd/MTU 11
Rod-in-Tube Assemblies
- Encapsulated Rod Assemblies (Rod-in-Tube/RIT)
Segments placed into 3/8-in., Sched. 40 stainless steel pipes which are sealed with Swagelok Plugs or Caps Full or Partial Length RITs allowed.
Full Length fuel up to approximately 49.5 inches long Partial Length as short as 8.5 inches long Nominal 1/4 Fuel gap within tube
- Each RIT may contain multiple rod segments Highest rod segment within tube classifies entire tube and Category Category A allows maximum of two full length RITs Category B allows maximum of six full length RITs If there is one Category A in the shipment, then only one other RIT may be shipped, even if the other RIT is Category B
- Tubes will not contain any organic or temperature sensitive material 12
Rod-in-Tube Canisters (RITCs)
- Aluminum 6061 RITC holds the RITs Consists of three 1.13 diameter by
.06 thick carrier tubes Three variable height RITC options available depending on project need Heights may range from 12 to 53 Each option consists of 1/8 thick lateral tube support plates and 1/4 thick base plate The overall OD of the RITC is 3 and maximum tube height of 51.1, and overall maximum height of 53 Lifting pintle grapple available for operations to lift the RITC out of the RITC basket
- Only one RIT allowed per carrier tube, RIT may be shorter than carrier tube, but not longer 13
RITC Basket
- RITCs will be loaded into the RITC basket Made of aluminum (not relied on for criticality control)
Overall dimensions of 15.5 OD by 53.63 tall The large openings are not used Basket is nearly identical to an onsite basket (GTRI) used with the BRR GTRI basket was used for shipping experiments and test fuel assemblies at INL Basket fits the BRR package cavity the same as other approved baskets (minor dimension tweaks from GTRI to ensure no interference)
RITCs are placed into the 3.5 OD basket tubes 14
RITC Basket with RITCs Category B Payload Category B RITs may have up to three full Full Length RITC length RITs per basket tube Category A RITs may have up to one full length RIT per basket tube Maximum of 4 RITCs per basket, 2 stacked in each opening, but Cat A will only fill one RITC carrier tube Per basket, Up to 12 half-length RITs for Category B and up to 4 half-length RITs for Category A Due to lack of neutron shielding - goal to prevent side-by-side doubling up of the upper RIT assemblies with the lower RIT assemblies in the NCT case to ensure package surface dose rate < 200 mrem/hr 15
RITC Pedestal
- For any partial length RITCs, RITC pedestal used to elevate RITC
- Ensures lifting pintle on the RITC is always at the same height
- RITC pedestal provides no safety function, since there is no stacking of multiple assemblies, therefore is NITS
- RITC and RITC basket considered Cat. B since they provide a structural function:
RITC maintains the upper and lower RIT assemblies from intermingling Maintains separation between the two 3.5 OD basket tubes 16
Licensing Strategy 17
Containment
- The BRR package is leaktight to standard ANSI N14.5-2014
- No changes to current Containment section
- Payloads will be suitably sealed (confined) to prevent contamination of the interior of the cask
- Rods within RITs are already segmented, so not a gas generation source
- Structurally, the current weight limit of 770 lb for MURR basket will bound the RITC basket plus payload weight
- Containment will be maintained for the RITC payloads 18
Structural-NCT
- Structures perform no Criticality safety function, NCT Shielding (Side) is the bounding safety case
- RITC base plate and RITC baskets analyzed to remain intact NCT free drop
- Three areas of Structural consideration to ensure source separation:
- 1. Ensure that rod segments stay within the encapsulated tubes (i.e., RITs)
- 2. Ensure separation of the two 3.5 OD RITC basket tubes
- 3. Ensure that RITs in stacked RITCs cannot double up next to each other 40g NCT 2-foot free drop load from SAR Section 2.6.7 applied to basket Aluminum allowables of RITC and RITC basket are adjusted to account for temperatures attained from thermal analysis (< 240°F)
Stacked RITCs dont need to keep separation of RITs at the same level as each other RITC and RITC basket evaluated using Other Safety related components in Table 1.1 of NUREG/CR-3854 (i.e., ASME B&PV Code, Division III, Subsection NF, Class 1 components), RIT buckling analyzed per Code Case N-284 19
Structural-HAC
- HAC Shielding assumes worst case configuration of half-length rods doubled up, side-by-side
- Therefore, basket and RITC fail and only stainless-steel rod tubes are analyzed to remain structurally intact
- Use higher 120g SAR analytical acceleration rather than 86.8g maximum predicted impact
- Rod-in-Tubes analyzed to remain intact post-HAC free drop Calculations show buckling is adequate for RIT Analysis using Appendix F of BPVC with ASME Level D Service Limits Using procedures Per F-1331.5(c) Code Case N-284 Transport of High Activity Isotopes PATRAM 2019 20
Shielding
- Source Term High burnups exceed ORIGEN data resources Reactor libraries limited to 70 GWd/MTU Reflects lack of available data and need for sample transport Conservative scheme used to calculate bounding source terms at higher burnups Multiple source terms calculated at lower burnups Extrapolation used to calculate higher burnups (strong linear behavior) 21
Shielding
- Methodology Evaluated payloads:
2 full encapsulation tubes of 100 GWd/MTU segments 6 full encapsulation tubes of 85 GWd/MTU segments 6 full encapsulation tubes of 50 GWd/MTU segments Limited credit for structural materials and basket Structural materials relied on to prevent extreme reconfiguration scenarios Modeled using MCNP6.2 22
Shielding
- Results NCT Package Surface Vehicle Surface 2 Meters from Vehicle Surface Occupied Location Radiation Top Side Bottom Top Side Bottom Top Side Bottom 25 ft from cask center Gamma 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.8 - 0.0 - 0.0 Neutron 11.2 162.2 19.3 11.2 31.9 19.3 - 4.7 - 0.8 Total 11.4 162.9 20.2 11.4 32.2 20.2 - 4.7 - 0.8 10 CFR 71.47(b) Limit 200 200 200 200 200 200 10 10 10 2 HAC 23
Criticality
- Methodology Process consistent with previous SAR amendment Homogenous sphere of water and fuel No credit for structural materials Moderation optimized to determine maximum keff Modeled using MCNP6.2 and Whisper-1.1 (USL)
- Results Maximum ksafe (keff + 2) of 0.70391 USL of 0.92164 24
Thermal
- Purpose Confirm that the packaging components remain within their limits under NCT Ensure that the maximum accessible surface temperature meet the requirements of 10 CFR 71.43(g)
Verify that the NCT pressure of the cask remains below the design pressure
- Methodology The analysis uses the pre-existing SINDA/FLUINT Thermal Model for the BRR Package and adds the new payload and basket.
As before, the NCT analysis is a half-symmetric model using steady state analysis The new features of the thermal design related to the RITC will be added to the SAR Additional material properties are added for the rod segments, while the canister and basket rely on the SAR material properties for aluminum
- Heat Loads Decay heat load of 180W distributed between 6 fuel segments Insolation loads and outer boundary conditions are identical to those in the initial BRR Package thermal model 25
Thermal Temperature Distribution for NCT Basket and Payload NCT Temperatures 26
Thermal
- Results RITC Resulting Temperatures All NCT Temperatures remain well below their respective limits The NCT Pressure of 3.4 psig is within the cask is well below the design pressure of 25 psig.
The maximum surface temperature of 114°F is well below the 185°F limit without using a personnel barrier
- Conclusions The RITC payload is bounded by the existing payloads for NCT Due to the large margin in the resulting temperatures and low heat load, HAC will be bounded by existing MURR payload HAC The thermal design is sufficient to protect the RITC fuel 27
Quality Assurance
- Fabrication of the Rod-in-Tubes, RITCs and RITC baskets performed in accordance with 10 CFR 71, Subpart H program
- Indeterminate yet if INL will self-perform or Orano FS will contract out fabrication to fabricator on Orano ASL
- Orano FS has NRC approved 10 CFR 71, Subpart H program
- INL has DOE PCP 10 CFR 71, Subpart H approved program
28
Project Schedule Anticipated Milestones Submit Revised SAR End of September 2023 (goal)
SAR Review by NRC End of Jan. 2024 (goal)
Review and Address NRC RAIs End of Feb. 2024 NRC CoC Reviewed and Issued End of March 2024 29
Q&A WRAP UP DISCUSSION