ML23157A258
| ML23157A258 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/10/1997 |
| From: | Annette Vietti-Cook NRC/SECY |
| To: | |
| References | |
| PR-071, 62FR05907 | |
| Download: ML23157A258 (1) | |
Text
ADAMS Template: SECY-067 DOCUMENT DATE: 02/10/1997 TITLE: PR-071 - 62FR05907 - FISSILE MATERIAL SHIPMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS CASE
REFERENCE:
PR-071 62FR05907 KEYWORD: RULEMAKI NG COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete
DOCKET NO. PR-071 (62FR05907)
In the Matter of FISSILE MATERIAL SHIPMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 02/05/97 02/04/97 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - FINAL RULE 03/12/97 03/07/97 COMMENT OF MICHAEL K. SHEAFFER ( 1) 03/12/97 03/12/97 COMMENT OF GE NUCLEAR ENERGY (R. J. REDA) ( 2) 03/14/97 03/12/97 COMMENT OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (MICHAELE. WANGLER) ( 3) 03/14/97 03/12/97 COMMENT OF BABCOCK &WILCOX (ARNE F. OLSEN) ( 4) 03/18/97 03/12/97 COMMENT OF NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES, INC.
(THOMAS S. BAER, VICE PRESIDENT) ( 5) 06/16/97 06/13/97 COMMENT OF SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION (JAMES B. EDGAR) ( 6) 4/27/98 04/21/98 COMMENT OF RMI ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (J. W. HENDERSON, DIVISION MANAGER) ( 7) 12/08/98 10/02/98 COMMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (FELIX M. KILLAR, JR., DIRECTOR) ( 8)
DOCKET NO. PR-071 (64FR57769)
In the Matter of FISSILE MATERIAL SHIPMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS; RESPONSE TO COMMENTS AND REQUEST FOR INFORMATION DATE DATE OF TITLE OR
- DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 10/26/99 10/20/99 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - FINAL RULE: RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS AND REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
I DOC KfTfD I Jc;: ~(;
NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE DIRECTOR, Material Licensees & Nuclear Insurance Oirect Line 202.739.8126 l'ntemet fmk@nei.org October 2, 1998 Ms. Susan F. Shankman Deputy Director, Licensing and Inspection Directorate Spent Fuel Project Office Office of the Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Reference:
NUREG/CR-5342, "Assessment and Recommendations for Fissile Material Packaging Exemptions and General Licenses within 10 CFR Part 71," Emergency Final Rule 10 CFR Part 71 (62FR.5907, February 10, 1997)
Dear Ms. Shankman:
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), 1 has reviewed the Emergency Final Rule 10 CFR Part 71 as issued on February 10, 1997 and NUREG/CR-5342 "Assessments and Recommendations for Fissile Material Packaging Exemptions and General Licenses within 10 CFR Part 71." In response to the February 10, 1997 notice the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) received a comment letter from Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) questioning the 500 gram Uranium-235 permissible mass limit for shipments of fissile material, when mixed with substances having hydrogen density less than or equal to water. NUREG/CR-5342 discussed the use of words "manifest," "conveyance," "shipment," "consignment," and the fissile material limit per shipment/manifest/conveyance/consignment. The comment letter and the NUREG point out that this ambiguity is causing considerable confusion. The 1 NEI is the organization responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEI's members include all utilities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel fabrication facilities, materials licensees, and other organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear energy industry.
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Ms. Susan F. Shankman October 2, 1998 Page 2 result is that shippers are making multi-shipments in lieu of a single shipment, so as not to exceed the 500 grams fissile material per conveyance limit. This in essence results in higher risks to the public due to the increased number of shipments than would occur if the 500 grams per conveyance was not a limiting condition for such shipments.
The NUREG refers to the 350 gram limit at low level disposal facilities and implies, therefore, that the 500 gram limit is not an issue. This is not the case since the low-level waste disposal limit may be raised. Additionally, the industry has been shipping low fissile material concentrate material under such exemptions for reasons beyond waste disposal. These include shipments for soil washing and/or scrap recovery.
We will be providing detailed comments on the NUREG by the end of October. In these comments we will recommend the NRC consider a fissile material concentration limit instead of a mass limit.
The industry would like to work with the NRC to develop an appropriate set of regulatory conditions for shipments of low concentrations of fissile isotopes mixed with other materials.
We would appreciate the opportunity to meet with you to discuss our recommendations on this issue. I will contact your office to arrange a meeting after we prepare our comments on the NUREG.
- Sincerely,
- _/4/{f!/d Felix M. Killar, Jr.
c: John Greeves Facility Operation Steering Committee Fuel Cycle Facility Forum
DOCK ETED P.O. BOX 579
~----
USNR C ASHTABULA, OHIO 44004-0579 216/992-7442 FAX 216/993-1995 "98 APR 27 A10 :40
£rrice§ RMI-MGR:98-077 A Division of RMI Titanium Company File 1.1.2 OFh .". V RU! c AOJUL 1*
April 21, 1998 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, DC 20555-0001
SUBJECT:
10 CFR 71, RIN 31500- F58, Fissile Material Shipments and Exemptions
- (Federal Register: Vol. 62, No. 27, 2/10/97, p. 5907 (rule))
To whom it may concern:
We would like to identify to the NRC a potential inconsistency and severe restriction in the subject rulemaking. Attachment I summarizes the general concern, background, and recommendations.
Based on RMI's review of the noted Federal Register, it appears that there is an inconsistency between the emergency rule as promulgated in IO CFR 71 and the intended latitude/flexibility noted in the background and discussion sections of the Federal Register notice.
The rulemaking identified the point-of-contact as Mr. Naiem Tanious, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. After speaking to him, he suggested that we provide written comments to assist with further review and/or revision of this or other associated rulemakings (i.e. DOT- 49 CFR 173).
If the NRC staff has comments or additional questions, please feel free to call Mr. Scott Altmayer at 440-993-2018. Thank you for considering this input.
JWH/SAA/cws Attachments cc: Naim Tanious, NRC Eric Marsh, RMI Frank Willis, RMI APR 3 0 1998 Acknowledged by card umUHIHIIIIHHIIIUIHI.....
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RULEMAl<INGS &ADJUDICATIONS STAFF OFACE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmar1c Date 4/ t;l// q ?
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Attachment #1 Problem Statement The use of an absolute moderator limitation for radioactive material shipments is too restrictive.
Waste shipments from remediation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities often contain incidental quantities (=masses) of carbon, graphite, or beryllium that are routinely encountered in, or as, items (i.e. process materials, motors, charcoal filters, batteries, pencils).
/
Back:round The change in sections (10 CFR 71.18, 10 CFR 71.22, and 10 CFR 71. 53 - see Exhibit A) which:
"... restricts the quantity of beryllium, graphite, or hydrogenous matenal enriched in a package to no greater than 0.1% of the fissile material mass... " [paraphrase]"
appears to be inconsistent with some of the technical bases of the rulemaking The policy sets an absolute mass of moderator .. relative to the mass of (SNM) ... allowed in a package. It does not provide any flexibility for the concentration or geometry (i.e. distribution, mixing, blending) of the.moderator(s) as implied in the discussion (Exhibit B).
The "Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact (FONS!): Availability" also indirectly refers to blending, processing, and dilution as mechanisms to prevent criticality concerns (Exhibit C & D).
~
The initiating event of this rulemaking was driven by a uranium-beryllium filtercake wasteform The wasteform resulted from the processing of strategic material to downblend weapons-usable fissile material from the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Based on the description for the filtercake wasteform of concern, it appears that the moderator and fissile uranium are inherently blended and uniformly distributed with each other to obtain an optimum moderator configuration. This configuration could be considered a conservative worst-case "pseudo" nuclear latticing effect that could increase, nuclear reactivity.
Recommendations (suggested) 1 Revise the rulemaking to specify a quantitative limit ( concentration-based or discrete quantity) only for those blendable materials that can form a homogeneous or latticed mixture of moderator and fissile material.
2 Revise the rulemaking to specify an "exemption statement" for moderator as components, blocks, or articles.
Basis The rulemaking should not hinder tasks involving remediation-and decommissioning of nuclear facilities where incidental quantities
(=masses) of carbon, graphite, or beryllium that are being managed as waste during routine D&D operations (i.e. motors, charcoal filters, pencils).
3 Encourage USDOT make equivalent/identical revisions to 49 CPR 173.
shippers.
page 5910 ----
This alternative was c~osen by the NRC staff, and is the basis for the following specific changes in Secs. 71.18, 71.22, and 71.53.
Changes in 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22, and 71.53 Section 71.18.
The title of Sec. 71.18: General license: Fissile material, limited quantity per package, remains the same. Also paragr*aphs (a), (b), and (c) in Sec. 71.18 remain the same.
The old paragraph (d) in Sec. 71.18 is replaced by three new paragraphs: {d), (e), and (f). The new paragraph (d) covers general licenses for packages containing no more than a type A quantity of radioactive material where fissile material is mixed with substances having an average h arogen densit greater tan water defined in Sec. 71.20). The new paragraph (e) restricts the quantity of beryllium, graphite, or hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium in a package to no greate~ than 0.1% of the fissile material mass. The* .
new paragraph (f) is a modification of the old paragraph (d) that includes a simplified formula for calculation of the minimum transport index.
Section 71.22 The title of Sec. 71.22: General License: Fissile material, limited quantity, controlled shipment, remains the same.
Also paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) in Sec. 71.22 remain the*
same. The old paragraph (d) is modified with the addition of a new table and accompanying formula which restrict the mass of uranium-235 and other fissile material in a controlled shipment. The table gives both new limits of 290 g and 180 g for uranium-235 and other fissile materials, when these materials are mixed with substances having hydrogen density greater than water; the table also gives the old Sec. 71.22 llmits for shipments of U-235 and other fissile material when mixed with substances having a hydrogen density less than or equal to water. The new paragraph (e) restricts the l quantity of beryllium, graphite, or hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium in a package to no greater than 0.1%
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old paragraph (e}.
Section 71.53 The title of Sec. 71.53 remains the same. The introductory paragraph restates the old Sec. 71.53 language that packages are exempted from the fissile material standards of Sec.
( G,,.41-br+ B)
The safety problem uncovered by the B & W calculations, and verified by the NRC, involves guantities, geometries, and concentration of fissile materials and moderators which cou resu tin crit ca ity when shipped in compliance with sections of the regulations for which criticality analyses are not required. The current regulations (fissile exemptions in Sec. 71.53 and the general licenses in Secs.
71.18 and 71.22} are based on the assumption that water is the only moderator which might be present in fissile exempt shipments. These rules are assumed to provide inherent criticality safety without a need for shippers to perform )
separate analyses. However, some moderators (herein referred to as special moderating materials) can increase the number of
page 5909 ----
neutrons available to cause fission as compared to ordinary'\
water and result in the potential for criticality in _./
shipments where these moderators are present, even though the shipments are in compliance with 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453.
Until recently, the presence of special moderating materia~s) in significant quantities in NRC-regulated shipments of -
fissile exempt materials was not anticipated. However,
- certain international initiatives, including efforts of -
reduction in stockpiles of strategic material by processing for commercial use, have resulted in the greater likelihood - ~
of inclusion of these materials in NRC regulated shipments.
The materials proposed to be shipped by B&W, which prompted*~ 1 1 1,~
this final rule, resulted from such a source. A recent ~ b j contract was awarded to B&W to process weapons-usable ~~,
enriched uranium materials from the Republic of Kazakstan. * ~
The waste product of the processing, a uranium-beryllium / '
- filtercak~ met the fissile exemption provisions in IuCFR/ ;r--
fi.53(d) and 49 CPR 173.453(d). However, B&W us~d a computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, to demonstra~e that if the packages were loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at the regulatory fissile exempt concentration limit, adequate
~'
confidence in nuclear criticality safety would not have been provided. NRC has verified through independent analyses that the concerns raised by the B&W analysis are valid and apply to other geometries and moderating characteristics as wel).
To guard against inadvertent criticality, this final rule restricts shipments of fissile material with three special
., moderating materials: beryllium, graphite, and deuterium .
However, limiting beryllium, graphite, and deuterium to trace quantities would not completely eliminate the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt or generally licensed shipments. There is also a need to limit the quantity of material in a single consignment (the B&W
material shipments containing special moderating materials, but does estimate that 50,000 NRC-certified fissile material packages (used for larger quantities of, and/or more highly enriched, fissile materials) would be shipped in 1985. The number of shipments affected by this final rule is a small fraction of the NRC certified fissile package shipments because fissile materials containing special moderating materials are less common than moderately enriched fissile materials.
The options available to licyees under this final rule include shipping the materia I sing different administrative controls (i.e., shipping it a fissile material and not
-... using the quanti~y-limited exemption/general license)@
..J j
1
@r~ducing the sEecial moderating material c o n c e n t ~ to
.l specified limits. The NRC staff believes the rirst option may prove more economical because the increase in cost in 1 making a single shipment under fissile material controls is less than that involved in reducing or removing the special i moderating material. Under this opcion, the same number of shipments are made as before the rule change, but shipments of fissile materials containing special moderating material would be made in NRC certified packages. Under the latter.
option, the concentration of special moderating material ..
j roug a itiona_ processing, per aps * .
l u io or ex raction. Tis option may nvo ve *
- a i iona or a ion, eit er due to the increase in shipment volume due to dilution, o~ the transportation of extracted materials. Since the quantities of affected fissile materials are relatively smal~, staff believes the additional transportation would also be small.
The two options provide the added nuclear criticality safety control the rule seeks, either through the use of NRC-certified packages, and e administrative controls associated with their r through the reduction of the l concentratio of sec acceptably low lev impact o~ c is increased.
- n mater als o hus, the ultimate environmental rue is beneficial in that criticality safety Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0008.
Public Protection Notification The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless
1 1996. [Graphite is limited by the current general licenses in 10 CFR 71.20 and 71.24.] The NRC believes that it is appropriate to continue to limit graphite (being a special moderating material) in domestic regulations for shipment o, fissile material. Therefore, the revisions to the fissile exemptions in 10 CFR 71.53 and the general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 71.20 provide for exclusion of other than trace quantities of graphite.
ves Considere To determine the appropriate amendments to 10 CFR. 71.18, 71.22, and 71.53, the NRC s~aff considered the following three alternatives:
- 1. The No-Action Alternative. This alternative is not 4
acceptable to the NRC. Shipments of fissile material (Be-U mixtures) meeting the fissile material exemption requirements could be made in a configuration that does not maintain criticality safety during transport. Therefore, this alternative was not pursued.
'J
- 2. Eliminate the fissile material exemption. This F
alternative is not acceptable to the NRC. Elimination of fissile material exemption, while solving the criticality 1
safety problem identified by B&W, would create other problems. Many packages, such as those containing lowlevel
.radioactive waste materials (e.g., ion-exchange resins),
contain only trace concentrations of fissile nuclides, which are incidental to the overall radioactivity of the package contents, and criticality events are not credible for shipments of these packages. The Sec. 71.53 fissile material exemptions are applied for t~ese shipments, and there is a continuing need to provide for this application. Elimination of Sec. 71.53 would place an addi~ional burden and cost on many shippers whose shipments posed no cri~icality safety concerns. Therefore, this alternative was not pursued.
- 3. Revis , sile material exemotions in Sec. 71.53 and the general licensees in Secs. 71. 18 ana TI.. 22 .. o exc uae special mode~ating ma eri s such as ery um, eu er um an grap te not er tan trace
_quantities, and place consignment limits on shipments.
Together these changes solve the criticality safety problem identified by B&W and the related problem of the potential accumulation of an unsafe quantity of fissile materials in a shipment. Given the limited number of affected shipments and the small number of licensees involved, some additional
~osts on shippers may be expected because they can no longer use the fissile material exemptions and general licenses for materials with beryllium, deuterium and graphite in other_-
t an trace antities, and because some shipments may have to e divided to meet the consignment limits. It keeps the exemption and general license provisions available for other
SIEMENS DOCKETED USNRC DOCKET NUMBER PR June 13, 1997 PROPOSED RU 1. "97 JUN 16 P3 :31 JBE:97:108 { It,:< F;e 5101)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OFFICE OF SECRETARY OOCKETIW"'
- SERVICE Attn: Docket and Service Branch BRA CH Washington, DC 20555-0001 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Comments on Emergency Rule on Fissile Material Shipments and Exemptions Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) has reviewed the emergency final rule on "Fissile Material Shipments and Exemptions", published in the Federal Register on February 10, 1997. We have
- the following comments:
- 1. We feel that the rule, as written, unreasonably restricts licensees' ability to make certain shipments, for example waste shipments and LSA shipments, that have no foreseeable relationship to the issue the NRC is addressing. The vast majority of licensees do not use "special moderating materials" such as beryllium in their processes and thus have no possibility of mixing these materials in waste and LSA shipments. The rule, instead of globally restricting such shipments, should have identified a category of material descriptive of the special moderator - containing material and restricted that category only.
- 2. SPC will, in the next few years, decommission surface impoundments potentially requiring the shipment of up to 4000 drums of waste and 200,000 ft 3 of contaminated soil to burial. The impact of this emergency rule, if applied to this material, will be to increase transportation costs by a factor of almost four to nearly
$1. 1 million.
The emergency rule, by needlessly restricting a large segment of low-risk shipments, will discourage the minimization of waste inventories at the same time licensees are being encouraged by the NRC's Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards to decrease such inventories.
SPC appreciates the opportunity to comment on this regulation.
Very truly yours,
--i6-s. Edgar Staff Engineering, Licensing cc: C. Hopper - ORNL Siemens Power Corporation Nuclear Division 2101 Horn Rapids Road Tel: (509) 375-8100 Engineering & Manufacturing P.O . Box 130 Fax: (509) 375-8402 Richland, WA 99352-0130 JUN 2 0 1997_
~cknowledged by rd...... ..... ......,..,-,,;: _.
- .,. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI~
DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Date ~ /13 / q1 Copies Received ______/ - : - - - - -
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CERTIFIED MAIL USt-'RC Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.
PO. Box 337, MS 123 Erwin, TN 37650 "91 t\A"n \B p3:24<423) 743-9141 zlG-91_0040 REfURN RECEIPT REQUFSIBD , LIC-06-02 OFFICE o~Gsf cI'trI-t"k.< oov-01-55-06 OOCKET~ft4,NC\-\ ACF-97-058 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co~ion Washington, DC 20555-0001 March 12, 1997 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch DOCKET NUMBER _
Gentlemen:
PROPOSED RULE PR 1-l-( (p~ fR 5101)
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) offers the following comments on recent changes made to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulation, Part 71 (62 FR 5907), which revised paragraphs 71.18, 71.22, and 71.53.
The change in the requirements for cl~ifying a radioactive material shipment as fissile-excepted in paragraph 71.53 has the greatest impact on NFS' operations, since 49 CFR 173.427(a)(3) requires that material cl~ified as Low Specific Activity (LSA) or Surface Contaminated Objects (SCO), must also meet the requirements of 49 CFR 173.453 (identical to 10 CFR 71.53).
NFS supports the changes made to paragraph 71.53 which limit the amount of fissile material which may be shipped when special moderating materials such as beryllium, graphite, or hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium are also present. However, the change appears to have introduced a new requirement limiting the amount of fissile material which may be included on any individual shipment ("consignment") to 400 grams of U-235, which NFS believes may not have been intended by the NRC when the rule was promulgated.
This interpretation is based on the wording in paragraph 71.53(a), which states in part:
"Fissile materials meeting the requirements of one of the paragraphs in (a) through (d) of this section are exempt from .. . material classification and ... package standards...
(a) Fissile material such that [... unity formula ... ) for an individual consignment (emphasis added), where X and Y are the mass limits defined in table following paragraph (a)(3) of this section, provided that .... "
This wording was not in the former version of 71.53. Previously, there had been no limitation on the amount of fissile material that could be included in a "consignment".
MAR 2 0 1997 "cknowledged by card ..._"--.....~ *,,.,
~S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMl::i~IOo DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Document Statistics Postmark Date .3 Ulf /
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T. S. Baer to U.S. NRC 21G-97-0040 March 12, 1997 LIC-06-02 Page 2 GOV-01-55-06 ACF-97-058 Based on this new wording, the limits in the table following paragraph 71.53(a) now appear to apply to each consignment. If this is not the case, please provide clarification.
If this is a correct interpretation, then NFS is concerned that this limitation may unnecessarily increase the number of radioactive materials shipments that NFS and others will have to make, thereby increasing the transportation risk to members of the general public with little or no added benefit.
In the past, NFS has routinely shipped more than 400 grams of U-235 on a single fissile-excepted material shipment (consignment) under the exemption provisions of 71.53(a)(3).
If limited to 400 grams of fissile material per consignment, NFS could anticipate an increase of 200-300 % in the number of fissile-excepted material shipments required to transport materials associated with decommissioning activities, Naval fuel manufacturing, and other uranium processing operations at our Erwin, TN, facility. This results in a corresponding increase in transportation risk to the general public, and an increase in the paperwork required for each shipment, which impacts both the shipper and the receiver.
These are not inconsequential costs to NFS, a Small Business under the provisions of the Small Business Act.
The justification for this rule change without public comment is well-founded, and the change addresses a valid safety concern regarding shipments of fissile-excepted material which also contain special moderating materials. However, the change, as written, seems to impact all shipments of fissile-excepted materials, not just those containing special moderators.
In addition to the comments above, NFS also wishes to point out that, in the discussion supporting these changes as well as in the rule itself (e.g., in the table following paragraph 71.53.(a)(3)), the NRC has indicated that the more restrictive limits are necessary for material having an "average hydrogen density" greater than that of water.
NFS would like to point out that it is not so much the average hydrogen density that is important as it is the moderating effect of the material. Beryllium and carbon do not have an average hydrogen density greater than water, but they do have a moderating effect greater than that of water. This could be clarified in the rule by replacing the terminology "average hydrogen density greater than that of water" with "moderating effect greater than that of water".
NFS requests that 10 CFR 71 be revised to clarify that the 400 gram U-235 limit reflected in the table immediately following paragraph 71.53(a) applies only to consignments (shipments) of fissile material mixed with the special moderators.
T. S. Baer to U.S. NRC 210-97-0040 March 12, 1997 LIC-06-02 Page 3 GOV-01-55-06 ACF-97-058 If you need additional information, please contact me or Mr. Gilbert Rosenberger, Health Physicist, at extension 1196. Please use our unique document identification number (21G 0040) in any correspondence concerning this letter.
Sincerely, Thomas S. Baer, Ph.D.
Vice President Safety and Regulatoiy Management TSB:DGC:GGR/jpc cc: Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatoiy Commission Region II 101 Marietta St, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323 Mr. William B. Gloersen Project Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatoiy Commission Region II 101 Marietta St, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323 Mr. Felix M Killar Director, Materials Licensees Programs Nuclear Energy Institute 1776 I Street, NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006-3708
(i)
Babcock & Wilcox Naval Nuclear Fuel Division a McDermott company P.O. Box 785 Lynchburg, Virginia 24505-0785 (804) 522-6000
---i March 12, 1997
.:;-1 MAP 1 4 1997 97-028
-)_ DOC 'ETING &
, ,, SERVICE BRANCH
- ,.,A SECY-NRC 1)>"1-,-..,~ ~~ r, CVET NUMBER U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission C
,. '"TD RULE PR ATIN: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, DC 20555-0001
( &a. r1<-s-10---1......) -
Reference:
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 27 / Monday, February 10, 1997 (5907)
Fissile Material Shipments and Exemptions .
W Gentlemen:
Babcock & Wilcox, Naval Nuclear Fuel Division (B&W) is taking this opportunity to comment on the Emergency Regulation that was published in the referenced Federal Register.
B&W identified a safety problem existing in the regulations regarding the shipment of exempt quantities of fissile material in combination with beryllium. The emergency rule that was published to correct this discrepancy does prevent the shipment of unsafe quantities of fissile in combination with Special Moderators (beryllium, graphite, and etc.) but it does so at the penalty of other perfectly safe shipments. Prior to the emergency rule making, one could declare a shipment of 5 grams U-235/10 liters or less as being fissile exempt, with no limit applied to the conveyance. This is a very conservative value since the minimum critical concentration for fully enriched U-235 and water with full water reflection is approximately 12 grams U-235/liter (120 grams/10 liters). The American National Standard ANSS.1-1988 supports 11.6 grams U-235/liter, in any configuration, as being a subcritical fissile concentration limit. Unless Special Moderators are involved there does not appear to be a technical justification to change the previous fissile exemption limit by applying a conveyance limit.
The rule, as published, restricts the amount of fissile material on a conveyance to 400 grams of fissile material when not in combination with Special Moderators. We disagree with this restriction because there is no historical basis for it nor does the restriction benefit criticality safety. Safety was not jeopardized by shipments of fissile material, not in connection with Special Moderators, under the pre-existing exemption and it is not now.
The emergency rule, as it applies to shipment of fissile material not in combination with Special Moderators, will double the number of shipments needed to transport the same amount of material. This will increase the cost of shipping the material, increase the chance of injury to workers due to loading accidents, and will increase the probability of highway accidents due to the increased number of transport vehicles on the road. These results are not in keeping with MAR 1 4 1997 A.cknowftwffted vw~
by card . .....................
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,,5. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM1S::i1u1 ,
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U.S. N. R. C. March 12, 1997 the ALARA principle. These negative aspects of the emergency rule are also not balanced with a concomitant increase in safety to the public.
B&W requests that the emergency rule be modified to reinstate the fissile material exemptions for shipments that do not involve Special Moderators Your consideration of comments will be appreciated.
Sincerely,
~J.~
AmeF. Olsen Licensing Officer
DOCKET NU 1BER HO OS D E= ~/
( {pf). F~ 5'10 7)
DOCKETED U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission US RC Docketing and Service Branch Washington, DC 20555-0001 "97 MAR 14 A7 :11 Gentlemen:
On behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE}, I am enclosing commente OFI I~E OF s _f't;:ET,c,R Y El ~ ~e~ v1rE rule change to 10 CFR Part 71, which was published in the Federal Register on e ~ ~~~ *- * ~
1997. Although these comments specifically address the fissile exemptions in §71.53, they are in some cases also applicable to the rule changes in the general license provisions of Part 71 .
We are concerned about the exigency associated with this rulemaking. Since this issue has been known for more than two years, we fail to understand why an emergency action was needed at this time.
The issue of special moderators has been addressed in the international forum through the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which the Commission participates. The international consensus on this issue is the primary basis for your emergency rulemaking. However, no compelling reason has been given to support your action, which goes beyond that recommended by the international community. The international community did not include graphite moderation as a restriction.
In addition your action addresses only a small number of specialized shipments of the size of a large freight container. The rule appears to be too conservative for individual smaller packages.
Thus the rule not just "corrects a recently discovered defect," but jeopardizes a large number of shipments by incorrectly including them in the universe of affected shipments. Furthermore, as stated in the Federal Register Notice, these shipments were addressed by NRC Information Notice 96-63. This mechanism should have provided sufficient warning of the problem for the limited number of shipments. Given this warning the prescribed public participatory process for rulemaking should have been available.
Finally, the rulemaking failed to address the value and impact of the rule change. The rule does not consider the type and number of shipments that have been or will be made or impacted. Nor does it provide an indication of value through traditional measures, such as dose or lives saved.
These comments were prepared by the DOE's packaging certification team. Please contact me at (301} 903-5078 if you have any questions.
Very truly yours,
[Do cument retrie ved from Electronic Bulletin Board on 03/12/97- - -ATB]
Michael E. Wangler Headquarters Certifying Official Office of Transportation, Emergency Management and Analytical Services, EM-76 Michael E. Wa ngl er U. S. Department of Energy Office of Transportation Mai l Stop EM- 76 1991 Germantown Rd.
Germantown , MD 20874 ~cknowledged by card ___ ..U MAR ,,., ......1992 ., ._
>-.5. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM1$::itOr, DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION Doc1 " / Sta'isti~s Postmark Date ~ ~ ~ g.-, 3/1~/,,,, ~ ~ C1. Ak.U~
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Comments on February 1997 Rule Change to 10 CFR Part 71
- 1. Mass Wroits on Special Moderating Materials.
The rationale for limiting the mass of the special moderating material to only 0.1 % of the fissile mass is not clear. The examples described by B&W appear to have a beryllium mass several orders of magnitude /arr,er than that of the uranium-235.
The limit of 0.1 % prevents fissile exempt shipment of radioactive material that contains only trace quantities of both fissile and special moderating materials. For example, if a waste stream contains 1 part per billion (ppb) of beryllium and 0.9 part per million (ppm) of uranium-235, it is not fissile exempt.
Furthermore, a shipper can circumvent this rule by adding fissile material. For the example given above, increasing the uranium concentration from 0.9 to 1.1 ppm satisfies the 0.1 % limit. Meeting the fissile exempt requirement by increasing the fissile material seems to be inconsistent with good safety practice and the intent of the rule.
- 2. Definition and Umjts of Material Enriched in Deuterium.
The rule modifies the IAEA restriction on deuterium by specifying "material enriched in deuterium," apparently to avoid an inconsistency resulting from the fact that naturally occurring hydrogen contains a small fraction of this heavier isotope. However, from the wording in the rule, it is not clear whether the 0.1 % limit applies to all deuterium or only to the quantity that exceeds the naturally occurring deuterium.
For example, any hydrogenous material that has been in a fissile environment will be enriched in deuterium because some fission neutrons will convert hydrogen-1 to hydrogen-2 by neutron capture. If such material is considered to be enriched in deuterium, the mass of deuterium in a solution of 5 g U-235 per liter (0.005 glee) appears to always exceed 0.1 % of the fissile mass, and the two conditions in §71.53(a)(2) cannot both be satisfied.
- 3. Ljmjts on Total Mass of Fissile Material per consignment and Scope of the Emergency Rule.
The limits on the total mass of fissile material per consignment, specified in §71.53(a), apply to shipments of packages with no special moderating material, and consequently appear to be beyond the scope of the emergency rule. Unless the NRC can clear1y demonstrate an emergency need for imposing these limits, the formal process of prior public comment appears to be applicable for such a rule change.
The examples described by B&W appear to consist of rather large quantities (10-20 kg) of very highly enriched (100%) fissile material in the presence of special moderators. No issues seemed to be addressed that deal with a small quantity of fissile material (comparable to that in the rule),
either with or without the presence of special moderating material.
- 4. Limits on Total Mass of Fissile Material per Consignment.
The limits on total mass of fissile material appear to have three negative impacts that have not been justified as necessary to permit safe transport of small quantities of fissile material:
(1) Under the old rule, when a package was closed and prepared for shipment, a final determination could be made as to whether it qualified as fissile exempt. No further accounting of the fissile material was necessary for this purpose. Under the new rule, the small quantity of fissile material present in the package must be considered when a group of packages is prepared for consignment, even though these packages are not labeled as fissile. This action can result in unnecessary accounting and record keeping so that the rule will not be inadvertently violated.
(2) The limit on the total fissile mass can significantly reduce the number of packages that can be included in a fissile exempt shipment and result in increased costs, even though criticality is not an issue. For example, a 55-gallon (210-liter) drum with a fissile concentration of approximately 5 g per 10 liters would contain about 100 g of fissile material, and the shipment would be limited to at most a few drums (depending on the type of fissile and hydrogenous material). In the absence of special moderating materials, the concentration of fissile material in these packages is significantly below the subcritical limit even for an infinite package or array of packages.
(3) Determination of the actual fissile material will generally need to be much more accurate to satisfy the limit on total material per shipment. For example, in many cases the shipper has good justification that the fissile material concentration in a package is less than 5 g in any 1O liter volume. On the other hand, determining that the concentration is actually 1 g or 2 g per 1O liters might be significantly more difficult. As shown above, merely using the upper allowable limit can overty restrict the number of packages in the consignment.
GE Nuclear Energy General Electr,c Company PO Box 780, Wilmington NC 28402 DOCKET NUMBER 910 675-5000 PROPOSED RULE PR 1I March 12, 1997
( ft; t) Fl<. SCf 0 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention : Docketing and Service Branch Washington , D . C. 20555-0001
Dear Sir:
Subject:
Comment on Fissile Materials Shipments and Exemptions - Final Rule
Reference:
Comment on Final Rule, RIN3150-AF58 Federal RegisterNol. 62, No. 27, 2/10/97, Page 5907 GE's Nuclear Energy Production (NEP) facility , in Wilmington , N.C. supports the NRC's emergency final rule to restrict the use of special moderating materials in fissile exempt shipments based upon the information provided by another licensee. We believe that expeditious actions and public notification by regulatory agencies are the correct steps to be taken when potential health and safety issues are involved .
We also noted changes were made to the regulations that did not involve the moderating material restrictions. Part 71 .53(a) now limits the number of consignments to 400 grams 235 U that may be shipped on an individual conveyance by any one consignor. This is unnecessarily restrictive and is not warranted when the special moderating materials are not involved. Another topic that may be related to inadequate or misunderstood definitions is the use of the term "unpackaged material".
We request that only those issues directly associated with the moderating material restrictions be included in the emergency rule, and that the fissile material exemptions be reinstated as they previously appeared in the regulation . These changes may be needed, but should be left in the regulation until they go through the normal rulemaking review process.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments and hope that you find them useful in your regulatory process .
Please contact me on (910) 675-5889 if you have any questions regarding this matter.
Sincerely,
~-1;1:Pd R. J. Reda, Manager Fuels and Facility Licensing
/zb MAR 1 3 1997 cc: RJR-97-024
~ckno ledged by ca~ -~ -
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- .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM1s::;,or.
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March 7, 1997
( i;;_ ~f< 5'10'1) °97 MAR 12 P3 :17 Off ICE OF SECRETA.R Y DOCKET! G & SE ,VICE U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission BRANC ' .
Washington, DC 20555-0001 RE; Fissile Material Shipments and Exemptions Gentlemen:
Attached are comments on the emergency rule change to 10 CFR Part 71, which was published in the Federal Register on February 10, 1997.
Although these comments specifically address the fissile exemptions in §71.53, they are in some cases also applicable to the rule changes in the general license provisions of Part 71.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely, Michael K. Sheaffer Encl.
as MAR 1 3 1997
~cknowledged by card .. _ .....,... _., .....--&t
1-S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C 1S~1Q ,
DOCKETING & SERVICE ECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETA Y OF THE COMMISSION Document Statis *cs Postmark Date 3 h/ 91 Copies Received _ _ _ _ , --r---
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Comments to February 1997 Rule Chaoa:e to 10 CFR Part 71
- 1. Mass Limits on Special Moderatin~ Materials.
The rationale for limiting the mass of the special moderating material to only 0.1 % of the fissile mass is not clear. The examples described by B&W appear to have a beryllium mass several orders of magnitude larger than that of the uranium-235.
The limit of 0.1 % prevents fissile exempt shipment of radioactive material that contains only trace quantities of both fissile and special moderating materials. For example, if a waste stream contains 1 ppb of beryllium and 0.9 ppm of uranium-235, it is not fissile exempt.
Furthermore, a shipper can sometimes circumvent this rule by adding fissile material. For the example given above, increasing the uranium concentration from 0.9 to 1.1 ppm satisfies the 0.1 %
limit. Meeting the fissile exempt requirement by increasing the fissile material seems inconsistent with the intent of the rule.
- 2. Definition and Limits of Material Enriched in Deuterium.
The rule modifies the IAEA restriction on deuterium by specifying "material enriched in deuterium," apparently to avoid an inconsistency resulting from the fact that naturally occurring hydrogen contains a small fraction of this heavier isotope. However, from the wording in the rule, it is not clear whether the 0.1 % limit applies to all deuterium or only to the quantity that exceeds the naturally occurring deuterium.
For example, any hydrogenous material that has been in a fissile environment will be enriched in deuterium because some fission neutrons will convert hydrogen-I to hydrogen-2 by neutron capture. If such material is considered to be enriched in deuterium, the mass of deuterium in a solution of 5 g U-235 per liter (0.005 g/cc) appears to always exceed 0.1 % of the fissile mass, and the two conditions in §71.53(a)(2) cannot both be satisfied.
- 3. Limits on Total Mass of Fissile Material per Consi~nment and Scope of the Emer~ency Rule.
The limits on the total mass of fissile material per consignment, specified in §71.53(a), apply to shipments of packages with no special moderating.material, and consequently appear to be beyond the scope of the emergency rule. Unless the NRC can clearly demonstrate an emergency need for imposing these limits, the formal process of prior public oomment appears to be applicable for such a rule change.
The examples described by B&W appear to consist of rather large quantities ( 10-20 kg) of very highly enriched (100%) fissile material in the presence of special moderators. No issues seemed to be addressed that deal with a small quantity of fissile material (comparable to that in the rule), either with or without the presence of special moderating material.
' . \
Comments to February 1997 Rule Cbam:e to 10 CFR Part 71
- 4. Limits on Total Mass of Fissile Material per Consignment.
The limits on total mass of fissile material appear to have three negative impacts that have not been justified as necessary to permit safe transport of small quantities of fissile material:
(1) Under the old rule, when a package was closed and prepared for shipment, a final determination could be made as to whether it qualified as fissile exempt. No further accounting of the fissile material was necessary for this purpose. Under the new rule, the small quantity of fissile material present in the package must be considered when a group of packages is prepared for consignment, even though these packages are not labeled as fissile. This appears to result in unnecessary accounting and record keeping in order not to inadvertently violate the rule.
(2) The limit on the total fissile mass can significantly reduce the number of packages that can be included in a fissile exempt shipment and result in increased costs, even though criticality is not an issue. For example, a 55-gallon (210-liter) drum with a fissile concentration of approximately 5 g per 10 liters would contain about 100 g of fissile material, and the shipment would be limited to at most a few drums (depending on the type of fissile and hydrogenous material). In the absence of special moderating materials, the concentration of fissile material in these packages is significantly below the subcritical limit even for an infinite package or array of packages.
(3) Determination of the actual fissile material will generally need to be much more accurate to satisfy the limit on total material per shipment. For example, in many cases the shipper has good justification that the fissile material concentration in a package is less than 5 g in any 10 liter volume. On the other hand, determining that the concentration is actually 1 g or 2 g per 10 liters might be significantly more difficult. As shown above, merely using the upper allowable limit can overly restrict the number of packages in the consignment.
DOCKET NUMBER p DOCKETED PROPOSEDAULE_~~~-
~BCo1-PJ
( [qlFR 5107)
- 97 FEB -5 P4 :03 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 71 OFFICE C, SFCRE r1 RY DOCKETING &f srrw:cE RIN: 3150-AF58 r"] * ~ t I t LJhl~t *-* 1 Fissile Material Shipments and Exemptions AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Comnission.
ACTION: Final rule .
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Coomission (NRC) is amending its regulations regarding the shipment of exempt quantities of fissile material and the shipment of fissile material under a general license. This emergency final rule restricts the use of beryl l ium and other special moderating materials (i.e .. graphite and deuteriLJ11) in the shipment of fissile materials and consigns quantity limits on fissile exempt shipments. These amendments are e necessary to correct a recently discovered defect in the current regulations which could permit. in special circumstances. nuclear criticality to occur in shipments of fissile materials which are permitted to take place without specific Corrmission approval. The regulatory defect is not indicative of unsafe fissile material shipment s in the past. Rather. it was identified by Babcock &Wilcox (B&W) during preparation for shipment of an unprecedented type of fissile material that could resu lt in nuclear criticality under current requirements. This unique material is produced as a waste product from processing of strategic material resulting from operations to
commercially downblend weapons -usable fissile material from the former Soviet Union . Although this rule is being issued as an immediately effective final rule . the Commission is requesti ng publ ic comment and will revise the rule if necessary .
d~ /0/ l99rt DATES : This final rule is effective on (insert the same date as the publication date in the Federal Register) . Conrnents must be received by
~ I~I I q '17 (insert a date 30 days after the publication date). If public comments require changes in the rule. timely notice will be published in the Federal Register .
ADDRESSES : Comments may be submitted either electronically or in written form . Ma il written comments to : U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Washington . DC 20555-0001 . Attention : Docketing and Service Branch. Hand deliver comments to : 11555 Rockville Pike. Rockville. MD between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm Federal workdays. For information on submitting comments electronically . see the discussion under Electronic Access in the Supplementary Information Section . Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC PuJlic Document Room. 2120 L Street NW . (Lower Level).
Washington. DC .
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT : Naiem S. Tanious. Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington. DC 20555-0001 . telephone (301) 415-6103. E-mail: INTERNET :NST@NRC .GOV SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On September 11, 1996, an NRC fuel cycle facility licensee, Babcock &
Wilcox, Naval Nuclear Fuel Division (B&W), notified NRC by telephone that it had discovered that the NRC and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations (10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453, respectively) on fissile exempt shipments do not provide adequate criticality safety for certain shipments of fissile material 1 (enriched uranium containing berylliun oxide.)
Specifically, B&W discovered through calculations, that a shipment, intended to be s;1ipped purs~Jnt to§ 71.53(d), containing large amounts of an exempt concentration of enriched uranium in the presence of beryllium, could result in a nuclear criticality2
- B&W indicated that a beryllium oxide-enriched uranium mixture 1NOuld be produced as a waste product from its processing of strategic material resulting from operations to commercially downblend weapons-usable fissile material fr001 the former Soviet Union. B&W promptly notified the NRC of its concern. provided its calculations to the NRC, and 1
Fissile material is defined in 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR Part 173 as:
plutonium-238, plutonium-239, plutonium-241, uranium-233. uranil.Jll-235, or any combination of these radionuclides. Packages used for shipment of materials containing these radionuclides must meet specific standards and operating limits designed to preclude nuclear criticality during transport. unless excepted by specific regulations (e.g., 10 CFR 71.53 or 49 CFR 173.453).
2 For transportation purposes. nuclear criticality means a condition in which an uncontrolled. self-sustaining and neutron-multiplying fission chain reaction occurs. Nuclear criticality is generally a concern when sufficient concentrations and masses of fissile material and neutron rooderating material exist together in a favorable configuration. The neutron moderating material cannot achieve criticality by itself in any concentration or configuration.
It can enhance the ability of fissile material to achieve criticality by slowing down neutrons or reflecting neutrons.
made C011TJ1itments not to make any such shipments. The NRC staff subsequently revie.ved and verified B&W's calculations and determined that expeditious revisions to NRC regulations are needed to correct the deficiency because an inadvertent nuclear criticality in the public domain could involve fatalities.
health effects from the resulting radiations. and extensive clean-up costs.
The criticality safety problem brought to NRC's attention with respect to§ 71.53 caused the NRC staff to review 10 CFR Part 71 to determine whether any other provisions of this Part might be similarly deficient. The general licenses in§§ 71.18 and 71.22 provide for criticality control by limiting the quantity of fissile material in a single package (i.e .. similar to the quantit:*-based fissile exefll)tiuns in 10 CFR 71.53). Section 1 1.18 also assigns a criticality transport index (pursuant to§ 71.4) to each package.
These sections were found to have deficiencies comparable to those discovered in§ 71.53 in that there are no restrictions placed on special moderating materials (i.e .. materials which would increase the nl.JTlber of neutrons available to cause fission as compared with ordinary water), and§ 71.22 has the additional deficiency of not limiting the total amount of fissile material in a conveyance. During the NRC staff's review, sections§ 71.20 and§ 71.24, e w'hich also provide general licenses, were found to be adequate in that the moderators of concern were excluded.
Packages for shipments made in accordance with a fissile material exemption in§ 71.53 or the general license in§ 71.18 or§ 71.22. are not required to be certified by NRC. The intent of§§ 71.53. 71.18, and 71.22 is that any materials packaged and shipped in accordance with the limits in these sections (and the other applicable sections of 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR Part 173) are incapable of an inadvertent criticality. The B&W analyses demonstrated that a deficiency exists in these requirements.
The NRC has already taken a number of actions to resolve the potential safety problem identified by B&W. First, the NRC obtained a cornnitment from B&W not to ship Be-U materials wtthout prior NRC authorization and confirmed this c0111Tiitment in a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) dated October 10, 1996.
Subsequently, the CAL was superseded by an inmediately effective Confirmatory Order Modifying License dated Deceni:ler 16, 1996, which imposed B&W's corrmitment as a legally binding license condition. The NRC had no reason to doubt B&W's earlier voluntary commitment because B&W had demonstrated its concern for safety by bringing the problem in the first place to the NRC's attention. HO\\'ever, the NRC staff also believed that, given the significance of this issue for public health and safety, the NRC needed to exercise its full authority to assure itself and the public that the one licensee knCJY.ni to be in a position to make potentially unsafe shipments was legally prevented from doing so pending completion of this rulemaking.
On December 5, 1996, NRC also issued NRC Information Notice 96-63 to all NRC licensees authorized to possess special nuclear material. The purpose of this information notice was to alert all such licensees to this problem so that any of them who might be in a position to make potentially unsafe shipments could take appropriate measures.
The NRC also brought this problem to the attention of the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).
DOT is a co-regulator of fissile material shipments and is currently revising its parallel regulations in 49 CFR Part 173 on an expedited basis. DOE makes many shipments of fissile exempt material each year.
Discussion The safety problem uncovered by the B &Wcalculations. and verified by the NRC, involves quantities, geometries. and concentrations of fissile materials and moderators which could result in criticality when shipped in cO!Tl)liance with sections of the regulations for which criticality analyses are not required. The current regulations (fissile exemptions in§ 71.53 and the general licenses in§§ 71.18 and 71.22) are based on the assumption that water is the only moderator which might be present in fissile exempt shipments.
These rules are assumed to provide inherent criticality safety without a need for shippers to perform separate analyses. However, some moderators (herein referred to as special moderating materials) can increase the number of neutrons available to cause fission as compared to ordinary water and result in the potential for criticality in shipments where these moderators are present. even though the shipments are in compliance with 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453.
Until recently, the presence of special moderating materials in significant quantities in NRC-regulated shipments of fissile exempt materials was not anticipated. However. certain international initiatives. including efforts of reduction in stockpiles of strategic material by processing for coomercial use, have resulted in the greater likelihood of inclusion of these materials in NRC regulated shipments. The materials proposed to be shipped by B&W. which prompted this final rule, resulted from such a source. A recent contract was awarded to B&W to process weapons-usable enriched uranium materials from the Republic of Kazakstan. The waste product of the processing, a uranium-beryllium filtercake. met the fissile exemption provisions in 10 CFR 71.53(d) and 49 CFR 173.453(d). However. B&W used a computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages. to demonstrate that if the packages were loaded for shipment into a sea-land container. and at the regulatory fissile exempt concentration limit. adequate confidence in nuclear criticality safety would not have been provided. NRC has verified through independent analyses that the concerns raised by the B&W analysis are valid and apply to other gecxnetries and moderating characteristics as well. To guard against inadvertent criticality, this final rule restricts shipments of fissile material with three special moderating materials: beryllium. graphite. and deuteriun.
Ha,.,ever. limiting beryllilffll, graphite. and deuterium to trace quantities would not completely eliminate the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt or generally licensed shipments. There is also a need to limit the quantity of material in a single consignment (the B&W criticality model calculations were performed using 200 an high infinite slab configuration).
The problem of a lack of control on the total amount of fissile exempt material in an exempt shipment, was originally identified during the revision process for the 1996 Edition of the International Atomic Energy Agency's
<IAEA's) "Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material." Safety Series No. 6, 1996. The problem was addressed in Safety Series No. 6, 1996, by adopting a consignment limit on the amount of fissile exempt material that a shipper could transport as a private carrier or deliver to a coomon carrier for shipment. The NRC cannot presently enforce a limit on the total quantity of fissile material in a COITIOOn carrier shipment because the regulations do not require a transport index for each package or require shipment by exclusive use. The latter would restrict the ability to use coornon carriers, vilile requiring a transport index would negate much of the advantage gained by the exemption. Consignment limits are enforceable and represent a practical operating limit that would prevent the potentially unsafe accumulation of fissile exempt materials during shipment.
Therefore, this final rule restricts special moderating materials and includes consignment limits on shipments of fissile materials under the provisicns of§§ 71.22 and 71.53. This final rule also restricts special moderating materials under the provisions of§ 71.18. Together these changes will eliminate the possibility of inadvertent criticality during shipments made in compliance with 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22, or 71.53. The NRC anticipates that DOT will issue parallel revisions to 49 CFR Part 173. Accordingly, NRC and DOT are coordinating the necessary revisions to 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR Part 173.
Compatibility with the IAEA Standards On September 9, 1996, the Board of Governors of the IAEA approved the 1996 revisions to Safety Series No. 6. .Among the changes in these revised IAEA regulations are that consignment limits and limits on the types of moderators were placed on the fissile ex~tions in paragraph 672 of Safety Series No. 6, 1996. The changes to 10 CFR Part 71 made by this rulemaking are generally compatible with the changes made to IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1996.
Future revisions to 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR Part 173 are planned by NRC and DOT. respectively, to bring them into general accord with other sections of IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1996.
One area in which this final rule for 10 CFR Part 71 is not compatible with IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1996, paragraph 672 is that graphite was added as a special rooderating material in the 1995 revisions to 10 CFR Part 71 (60 FR 50248), but does not appear in IAEA Safety Series No.-6, 1996. [Graphite is limited by the current general licenses in 10 CFR 71.20 and 71.24.J The NRC believes that it is appropriate to* continue to limit graphite (being a special moderating material) in domestic regulations for shipment of fissile material. Therefore. the revisions to the fissile exemptions in 10 CFR 71.53 and the general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 71.20 provide for exclusion of other than trace quantities of graphite.
Alternatives Considered To determine the appropriate amendments to 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22. and 71.53, the NRC staff considered the following three alternatives:
- 1. The No-Action Alternative. This alternative is not acceptable to the NRC. Shipments of fissile material (Be-U mixtures) meeting.the fissile material exeflf)tion requirements could be made in a configuration that does not maintain criticality safety during transport. Therefore, this alternative was not pursued.
- 2. Eliminate the fissile material exemption. This alternative is not acceptable to the NRC. Elimination of fissile material exemption, while
- 9
solving the criticality safety problem identified by B&W, would create other problems. Many packages. such as those containing lo.v-level radioactive waste materials (e.g .. ion-exchange resins), contain only trace concentrations of fissile nuclides, which are incidental to the overall radioactivity of the package contents, and criticality events are not credible for shipments of these packages. The§ 71.53 fissile material exemptions are applied for these shipments, and there is a continuing need to provide for this application.
Elimination of§ 71.53 would place an additional burden and cost on many shippers whose shipments posed no criticality safety concerns. Therefore, this alternative was not pursued.
- 3. ~evise the fissile material exemptions in§ 71.5° 1~J the gen~ral licensees in§§ 71.18 and 71.22 to exclude the presence of special moderating materials such as beryllium. deuterium and graphite in other than trace quantities. and place consignment limits on shipments. Together these changes solve the criticality safety problem identified by B&W and the related problem of the potential accumulation of an unsafe quantity of fissile materials in a shipment. Given the limited number of affected shipments and the small number of licensees involved, some additional costs on shippers may be expected e because they can no longer use the fissile material exemptions and general licenses for materials with berylliun, deuterillll and graphite in other than trace quantities. and because some shipments may have to be divided to meet the consignment limits. It keeps the exemption and general license provisions available for other shippers. This alternative was chosen by the NRC staff, and is the basis for the follo.-Jing specific changes in§§ 71.18, 71.22, and 71.53.
Changes in 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22, and 71.53 Section 71.18 The title of§ 71.18: General license: Fissile material. limited quantity per package, remains the same. Also paragraphs (a). (b). and (c) in
§ 71.18 remain the same. The old paragraph (d) in§ 71.18 is replaced by three new paragraphs: (d). (e), and Cf). The new paragraph (d) covers general licenses for packages containing no more than a type A quantity of radioactive e material where fissile material is mixed with substances having an average hydrogen density greater than water (defined in§ 71.20). The new paragraph (e) r~scricts the 1/2uantity of berylliu~. graphite. or hydrogenous materya1 enriched in deuterium in a package to no greater than 0.1% of the fissile material mass. The new paragraph (f) is a modification of the old paragraph (d) that includes a simplified formula for calculation of the minimun transport index.
Section 71.22 The title of§ 71.22: General License: Fissile material. limited quantity, controlled shipment, remains the same. Also paragraphs (a), (b).
and (c) in§ 71.22 remain the same. The old paragraph (d) is modified with the addition of a new table and accc:xl1)anying formula which restrict the mass of uranillTl-235 and other fissile material in a controlled shipment. The table gives both new limits of 290 g and 180 g for uranium-235 and other fissile materials. when these materials are mixed with substances having hydrogen density greater than water; the table also gives the old§ 71.22 limits for shipments of U-235 and other fissile material when mixed with substances having a hydrogen density less than or equal to water. The new paragraph (e) restricts the quantity of beryllium, graphite, or hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium in a package to no greater than 0.1% of the fissile material mass. Paragraph (f) is the same as old paragraph (e).
Section 71. 53 The title of§ 71.53 remains the same. The introductory paragraph restates the old§ 71.53 language that packages are exempted from the fissile material standards of§ 71.55 and§ 71.59; hawever. the same paragraph restricts these exempted packages to only situations when beryllium, graphite, or deutr"'iur11 is not present in 4uantities exceeding 0.1 % of t:*,e fissile material mass. A ne\,\I paragraph (a) is added which contains a formula and an accompanying table to limit individual consignment, but also includes the requirements in old paragraphs (a), (b)(l) and (2), and (d) . The remainder of§ 71.53 (paragraphs (b). Cc). and (d)) is essentially the same as the old
§ 71.53 (paragraphs (c). (f), and (e)).
Good Cause for Irrrnediate Adoption The Corrvnission is promulgating this emergency final rule because the problem of regulatory safety limits over quantities and concentrations of fissile material and moderators, which has been demonstrated to permit criticality in at least one proposed shipment, is an important safety issue meriting irrmediate corrective action. An accidental nuclear criticality in the public domain 1r.0uld very likely involve fatalities. health effects from the resulting radiations, and extensive clean-up costs.
Shipments of fissile exempt material are normally made without any associated criticality analysis because in the past it has been assumed that the regulations provide inherent criticality safety. However. B&W's contemplated shipment demonstrates that this assumption is not correct for all I
possible types of shipments. While the Corrmission expects that B&W's corrmitment. as expressed in the NRC's Confirmatory Order. not to undertake shipnents without the prior approval of the NRC, and the Information Notice issued to all licensees authorized to possess special nuclear material, will prevent an unsafe shipment from occurring pending revision of its rules, the Conmission does not track shipments by licensees made under the provisions of 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22, or 71.53. Moreover, the nature of the materials being imported and shipped domestically has recently changed due to initiatives with the States of the former Soviet Union to reduce weapons-usable material such as high-enriched uranium. The materials B&W had intended to ship were byproducts from processing this type of material. Shipments made under 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22 or 71.53 are made without specific NRC approval and the possibility exists that a licensee could unwittingly make an unsafe shipment in reliance upon the present rules. Thus, the Conmission must amend its rules quickly to prevent unsafe shipments from occurring.
For the reasons stated above. the Coomission finds good cause, pursuant to Section 553(b)(B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C.
553(b)(B)). to dispense with notice and prepromulgation public cooment as being impracticable and contrary to the public interest. Further. the Coomission finds, pursuant to Section 553(d)(3) of the APA (5 U.S.C.
553(d)(3)), that good cause exists for making these amendments irnnediately effective because the need to have these regulations in place outweighs the inconvenience. if any, to licensees w'ho may need to alter shipping plans.
Nevertheless. the Cornnission is providing a 30-day post-promulgation public cooment period during which interested persons are invited to submit their corrments to the COITlllission. Within a reasonable time after the end of the c0111T1ent period. the Conmission will publish a statement in the Federal Register containing an evaluation of the significant corrments received and any revisions of the rule to be made as a result of the corrments.
Electronic Access Cooments may be submitted electronically, in either ASCII text or WordPerfect format (version 5.1 or later). by calling the NRC Electronic Bulletin Board (BBS) on FedWorld. The bulletin board may be accessed using a personal computer. a modem, and one of the corrmonly available corrmunications software packages. or directly via Internet. Background documents on the rulemaking are also available, as practical, for dO'w'flloading and viewing on the bulletin board.
If using a personal computer and modem, the NRC rulemaking subsystem on FedWorld can be accessed directly by dialing the toll free nuni:Jer (800) 303-9672. Coomunication software parameters should be set as follOfJS: parity to none, data bits to 8. and stop bits to 1 (N,8,1). Using ANSI or VT-100 terminal emulation, the NRC rulemaking subsystem can then be accessed by selecting the "Rules Menu" option from the "NRC Main Menu." Users will find the "FedWorld Online User's Guides" particularly helpful. Many NRG subsystems and data bases also have a "Help/Information Center" option that is tailored to the particular subsystem.
The NRC subsystem on FedWorld can also be accessed by a direct dial phone nlJTlber for the main FedWorld BBS, (703) 321-3339, or by using Telnet via Internet: fedworld.gov. If using (703) 321-3339 to contact FedWorld, the NRC subsystem will be accessed from the main FedWorld menu by selecting the "Regulatory, Government Administration and State Systems," then selecting "Regulatory Information Mall." At that point, a menu will be displayed that has an option "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CDITITiission" that will take you to the NRG Online main menu. The NRC Online area also can be accessed directly by typing "/go nrc" at a FedWorld c01T1Tiand line. If you access NRC,from FedWorld's main menu. you may return to FedWorld by selecting the "Return to FedWorld" option from the NRG Online Main Menu. However, if you access NRC at FedWorld by using NRC's toll-free ntJTtber, you will have full access to all NRC systems, but you will not have access to the main FedWdrld system.
If you contact FedWorld using Telnet, you will see the NRC area and menus, including the Rules Menu. Although you will be able to download documents and leave messages. you will not be able to write cooments or upload files (comments). If you contact FedWorld using FTP, all files can be accessed and downloaded but uploads are not all~: all you will see is a list of files without descriptions (normal Gopher look). An index file listing all files within a subdirectory, with descriptions, is available.
There is a 15-minute time limit for FTP access.
Although FedWorld also can be accessed through the World Wide Web, like FTP. that roode only provides access for dOWT1loading files and does not display the NRC Rules Menu.
For more infonnfrtion on NRC bulletin boards call Mr. Arthur Davis.
Systems Integration and Development Branch, NRC, Washington. DC 20555-0001.
telephone (301) 415-5780; e-mail AXD3@nrc.gov.
Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability The COITfllission has determined. under the National Environmental Policy Act of l969. as amenden and the Coomission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51. that this rule is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, and therefore an environmental impact statement (EIS) is not required.
The Coomission*s "Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes." NUREG-0170, dated December 1977, is NRC's generic EIS, covering all types of radioactive material transportation by all roodes (road. rail, air, and water). The total limited quantity impacts were included in the overall transportation risk assessment in NUREG-0170 and found to be acceptable. The radiological safety impact estimates in this EIS clearly bound the il11)acts for limited quantity shipments of fissile material containing special rooderating materials.
This final rule affects only a small subset of the limited quantity shipments, i.e .. those that contain both fissile material and special moderating materials. NUREG-0170 does not specify the annual nuli:)er of limited quantity, fissile material shipments containing special moderating materials, but does estimate that 50,000 NRC-certified fissile material packages (used for larger quantities of, and/or more highly enriched, fissile materials) would be shipped in 1985. The number of shipments affected by this final rule is a small fraction of the NRC certified fissile package shipments because fissile materials containing special moderating materials are less corrmon than moderately enriched fissile materials.
The options available to licensees under this final rule include shipping the material using different ac:ininistrative controls (i.e., shipping it as a fissile material and not using the quantity-limited exemption/general license) or reducing the special moderating material concentration to specified limits. The NRC staff believes the first option may prove more economical because the increase in cost in making a single shipment under fissile material controls is less than that involved in reducing or removing the special moderating material. Under this option, the same number of shipments are made as before the rule change, but shipments of fissile materials containing special moderating material would be made in NRC certified packages. Under the latter option, the concentration of special moderating material might be reduced through additional processing, perhaps involving dilution or extraction. This option may involve additional transportation, either due to the increase in shipment volume due to dilution, or the transportation of extracted materials. Since the quantities of affected fissile materials are relatively small, staff believes the additional transportation would also be small.
The tvK> options provide the added nuclear criticality safety control the rule seeks, either through the use of NRC-certified packages. and the acininistrative controls associated with their use. or through the reduction of the concentration of special moderating materials to an acceptably 10\rJ level.
Thus, the ultimate environmental impact of the rule is beneficial 1n that criticality safety is increased.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement subject to requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget. approval number 3150-0008.
Public Protection Notification The NRC may not conduct or sponsor. and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid 0MB control number.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action is not a major rule and has verified this determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. Office of Management and Budget.
18 -
Backfit Analysis The NRC has determined that a backfit analysis is not required for this final rule because these amendments do not involve any provisions that would require backfits as defined in 10 CFR Part 50.109(a)(l).
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 71 Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Nuclear materiJ~s. Packagin~ and containers, R~rorting and recordkeeping requirements.
For the reasons set out in the prearri:)le and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 71.
PART 71--PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
- 1. The authority citation for Part 71 continues to read as follows:
AUTI-K)RITY: Secs. 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 930, 932, 933, 935, 948. 953, 954. as amended sec. 1701. 106 Stat. 2951, 2952. 2953 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2111. 2201. 2232. 2233. 2297f): secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242. as amended. 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846).
Section 71.97 also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295. 94 Stat. 789-790.
- 2. Section 71.18 is revised to read as fo 11 O\t/5::
§ 71.18 General license: Fissile material, lim1ted quantity per package.
(a) A general license is issued to any licensee of the Coomission to transport fissile material, or to deliver fissile material to a carrier for transport. without complying with the package standards of Subparts E and F of this part, if the material is shipped in accordance with this section.
(b) The general license applies only to a licensee who has a quality assurance program approved by the Corrmission as satisfying the provisions of Subpart Hof this part.
(~) i:xcept as provided *in paragr:1ph (d) of this section, this general license applies only when a package contains no more than a Type A quantity of radioactive material, including only one of the following:
(1) Up to 40 g of uranium-235; (2) Up to 30 g of uraniun-233; (3) Up to 25 g of the fissile radionuclides of plutonium, except that for encapsulated plutonium-beryllium neutron sources in special form, an A1 quantity of plutonium may be present: or (4) A combination of fissile radionuclides in which the sum of the ratios of the amount of each radionuclide to the corresponding maximllTI amounts in paragraphs (c)(l), (2), and (3) of this section does not exceed unity.
(d) For packages where fissile material is mixed with substances having an average hydrogen density greater than water, this general license applies only when a package contains no roore than a Type A quantity of radioactive material. including only one of the following:
(1) Up to 29 g of uranium-235:
(2) Up to 18 g of uranium-233; (3) Up to 18 g of fissile,radionuclides of plutonium. or (4) A combination of fissile radionuclides in which the sum of the ratios of the amount of each radionuclide to the corresponding maximun aroounts in paragraphs (d)(l). (2), and (3) of this section does not exceed unity.
Ce), Except for the beryllillTI contained within the special form plutonium-beryllium sources authorized in paragraph (c) of this section, this general license applies only when berylliun. graphite. or hydrogenous material
- enriched in deuteri.um is not present in quantities exceeding 0.1% of the fissile material mass.
(f)(l) Except as specified in paragraph (f)(2) of this section for encapsulated plutonium-beryllium sources. this general license applies only when, a package is labeled with a transport index not less than the number given by the following equation. where the package contains x grams of uranium-235, y grams of uraniLJTI-233. and z grams of the fissile radionuclides of plutonillll:
Minimum Transport Index= (0.25x + 0.33y + 0.4z).
(2) Pora package in which the only fissile material is in the form of encapsulated plutonium-beryllitJll neutron sources in special form. the transport index based on criticality considerations may be taken as 0.025 times the number of grams of the fissile radionuclides of plutonillTI.
(3) Packages which have a transport index greater than 10 are not authorized under the general license provisions of this part.
J
- 3. Section 71.22 is revised to read as foll0ws:
§ 71.22 General license: Fissile material. limited quantity, controlled shipment.
(a) A general license is issued to any licensee of the C001T1ission to transport fissile material, or to deliver fissile material to a carrier for transport, without complying with the package standards of Subparts E and F of this part. if limited material is shipped in accordance with this section.
Cb) The general license applies only to a licensee who has a quality assurance program approved by the Coomission as satisfying the provisions of Subpart Hof this part.
(c) This general license applies only when a package contains no more than a Type A quantity of radioactive material and no more than 400 g total of the fissile radionuclides of plutonium encapsulated as plutonium-beryllium neutron sources in special form.
(d) This general license applies only when:
(1) The mass of fissile radionuclides in the shipment is limited such that the grams of uranium-235 + grams of other fissile materials 1 X y where X and Y are the mass defined in the follOtling table: or PERMISSIBLE MASS LIMITS FOR SHIPMENTS Of FISSILE MATERIAL Fissile material mass (g) Fissile material mass (g)
Fissile material mixed with substances having mixed with substances a hydrogen density less than having a hydrogen density or equal to water greater than water Uranium-235(X) 500 290 Other fissile material(Y) 300 180 (2) the encapsulated plutonilHTI-beryllium neutron sources are in special form and the total mass of fissile radionuclides in the shipment does not exceed 2500 g.
(e) Except for the beryllium contained within the spec;al form plutonium-beryllium sources authorized in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section. this general license applies only when beryllium, graphite or hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium is not present in quantities exceeding 0.1% of the fissile material mass.
(f) This general license applies only when shipment of these packages is made under procedures specifically authorized by DOT, in accordance with 49 CFR Part 173 of its regulations, to prevent loading, transport. or storage of these packages with other fissile material shipments.
- 4. Section 71.53 is revised to read as follows:
§ 71.53 Fissile material exemptions.
Fissile materials meeting the requirements of one of the paragraphs in (a) through (d) of this section are exempt from fissile material classification and from the fissile material package standards of§§ 71.55 and 71.59, but are subject to all other requirements of this part. These exemptions apply only when beryllium, graphite, or hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium is not present in quantities exceeding 0.1 percent of the fissile material mass.
(a) Fissile material such that grams of uranium-235 + grams of other fissile materials 1 X y for an individual consignment, where X and Y are the mass limits defined in following table, CONSIGNMENT MASS LIMITS FOR EXEMPTIONS FROM THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PACKAGES CONTAINING FISSILE MATERIAL Fissile material mass Cg) Fissile material mass (g)
Fissile material mixed with substances having mixed with substances an average hydrogen density having an average hydrogen less than or equal to water density greater than water Uranium-235(X) 400 290 Other fissile material(Y) 250 180 provided that --
(1) Each package contains no more than 15 g of fissile material. For unpackaged material the mass limit of 15g applies to the conveyance; or (2) The fissile material consists of a homogeneous hydrogenous solution or mixture where the minimum ratio of hydrogen atoms to fissile radionuclide atoms CH/X) is 5200 and the maximum concentration of fissile radionuclides within a package is 5 g/liter: or (3) There is no more than 5g of fissile material in any 10 liter volume of material and the material is packaged so as to maintain this limit of fissile radionuclide concentration during normal transport.
Cb) Uranium enrichea 1n uranium-235 to a maximum of 1 percent by weight, and with total plutonium and uranium-233 content of up to 1 percent of the mass of uranium-235, provided that the fissile material is distributed horoogeneously throughout the package contents and does not form a lattice arrangement within the package.
Cc) Liquid solutions of uranyl nitrate enriched in uranium-235 to a maximum of 2 percent by v.1eight, with a total plutonium and uranium-233 content
- not exceeding 0.1 percent of the mass of uranium-235, and with a minimum nitrogen to uranium atomic ratio (N/U) of 2.
(d) Plutonium, less than 1 kg, of wtnch not more than 20 percent by mass may consist of plutonium-239. plutonium-241. or any combination of these radionuclides.
Dated at Rockville. Maryland. this ,'/' !f: day of February, 1997.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Coomission.
ission.
oucKE: r , 1u1;1 ER ,.,_
0 ROPOSED RUlE D CKlfED 6'--/FY<.. S7J6Cj J I'" -
- i [7590-01-P]
- 99 OCT 26 P3 :21 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 71 RIN: 3150-AFSS Fissile Material Shipments and Exemptions; Response to Comments and Request for Information AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule: Response to public comments and request for information.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) published on February 10, 1997; 62 FR 5907, an emergency final rule which amended its regulations regarding the shipment of exempt quantities of fissile material and the shipment of fissile material under a general license.
The NRC issued the emergency final rule without a notice of proposed rulemaking and the accompanying opportunity for public comment prior to the rule's finalization, because NRC found good cause to dispense with these steps as being impracticable and contrary to the public interest, as permitted under the Administrative Procedure Act. Notwithstanding the final status of the rule, NRC solicited public comments on the rule during a 30-day comment period following publication in accordance with the Commission's regulations. This notice contains the NRC response to public comments received on the rule. These comments essentially stated that the emergency rule, although needed for shipments with special moderators, caused an unnecessary economic burden to shippers of fissile material exempt and general licensed shipments that use water as the moderator. In order to quantify any unintended economic
impact caused by the emergency rule, the NRC is requesting information on the costs of implementing the emergency final rule ..
DATES: The final rule became effective February 1o, 1997. Comments on the costs associated with shipments of fissile material made under the fissile material exemption and
.1 /, o/lJ..brJ o general license provisions of Part 71 are requested by [insert date 75 days from date of publication].
ADDRESSES:* Gomments-on*the-costs associated*with*shipments of fissile material made under the fissile material exemption and general license provisions of Part 71 should be sent to:
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; Attn:
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. Hand deliver comments to 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD, between 7:30 am and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays.
- You *may also provide comments via the NRC's interactive rulemaking web site (http://ruleforum.llnl.gov). This site provides the availability to upload*comments as fi,les (any format) if your web browser supports that function. For information about the interactive rulemaking site, contact Ms. Carol Gallagher, (301) 415-5905; e-mail CAG@nrc.. gov.
- Certain documents related to the emergency final rule, including comments received by the NRC on the costs associated with shipments of fissile material made under the fissile material exemption and general license provisions of Part 71, may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW., (Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents also may be viewed and downloaded electronicallyvia the interactive rulemaking website established by NRC for the emergency final rule.
2
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Naiem S. Tanious, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6103, e-mail nst@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
--on*February 10; 1997; 62 FR*5907, the-NRC*published~an emergency-final rule to expeditiously correct a defect in its fissile material r~ulations, that was discovered 5 months I -
earlier by Babcock & Wilcox, Naval Nuclear Fuel Division (B&W). B&W, an NRC licensee; had notified the NRC by telephone on September 1'1, 1996, that it had discovered that the_ NRG and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)-regulations (10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453, respectively) on fissile exempt shipments did not provide adequate criticality safety for certain shipments of fissile material 1 (enriched uranium containing beryllium oxide.) .Specifically, B&W demonstrated through calculations that a shipment, containing large amounts of an exempt concentration of enriched uranium in the presence of beryllium, intended to be shipped pursuant to the then existing 10 CFR 71.53(d), could result in a nuclear critlcality.2 B&W 1
Fissile is defined in 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR Part 173 as: plutonium-238, plutonium-239, plutonium-241, uranium-233, uranlum-235, or any combination of these radionuclides.
Packages used for shipment of materials containing these radionuclides must meet specific standards and operating limits designed to preclude .nuctear criticality during transport, unless excepted by specific regulatior:is (e.g., 10 CFR 71.53 or 49 CFR 173.453).
2 For transportation purposes, nuclear criticality means a condition in which an uncontrolled, self-sustaining and neutron-multiplying fission chain reaction occurs. Nuclear criticality is generally a concern when sufficient concentrations and masses of fissile material and neutron moderating material exist together in a favorable'configuration. The neutron moderating material cannot achieve criticality by itself In any concentration or configuration. It can enhance the ability of fissile material to achieve criticality by slowing down neutrons or reflecting neutrons.
3
Indicated that a beryllium oxide-enriched uranium mixture would-be produced as a waste --
product from its processing of strategic material resulting from operations to commercially downblend weapons-usable fissile material from the former Soviet Union. B&W promptly
- notified the NRG of its concern, provided its calculations to the NRG, and made commitments not to make any such shipments. The NRG staff subsequently reviewed and verified B&W's calculations and determined that expeditious revisions to NRG regulations were needed to correct the deficiency because an inadvertent nuclear criticality in the public domain could involve fatalities, health effects from the resulting radiation exposures, and extensive cleanup costs .
- The NRG also brought this problem immediately to the attention of the DOT and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The DOT Is a coregulator of fissile material shipments, and the DOE makes many shipments of fissile exempt material each year. The NRG informed the DOT of its intent to issue an emergency final rule. The DOT decided to defer any rulemaking until DOT staff could review the public comments on the NRG's emergency final rule.
The criticality safety problem brought to NRG's attention with respect to § 71.53 caused the NRG staff to review Part 71 to determine whether any other provisions of this part might be similarly deficient. The general licenses in §§ 71.18 and 71.22 provide for criticality control by limiting the quantity of fissile material in a single package (i.e., similar to the quantity-based fissile exemptions in § 71.53). Section 71.18 (General license: Fissile material, limited quantity per package) also assigns a criticality transport index3 (pursuant to§ 71 .4) to each package.
3 Transport index is defined in 1O GFR Part 71 as: the dimensionless number (rounded to the next tenth) placed on the label of a package, to designate the degree of control to be exercised by the carrier during transportation. For a fissile material package, the transport index is considered to be the larger of two numbers: the first is for external radiation control and is calculated based on the maximum radiation level at one meter from the external surface of the package, and the second is for criticality control purposes and is calculated based on the allowable number of packages stacked together during transportation.
4
These sections were found to have deficiencies comparable to those discovered in § 71.53, where there were no restrictions placed on special moderating materials (i.e., materials which would increase the number of neutrons available to cause fission as compared with ordinary water. Section 71.22 (General license: Fissile material, limited quantity, controlled shipment) had the additional deficiency of not limiting the total amount of fissile material in a conveyance.
During the NRC staffs review, §§ 71.20 and 71.24, which also provide general licenses, were found to be adequate in that the moderators of concern were excluded.
Packages for shipments made in accordance with a fissile material exemption in § 71.53 or the general license in §-71.18-er § 71.22, are not-required to-be certified by the NRC. The intent of §§ 71.53, 71; 18, and 71.22, is that any ~aterials packaged and $hipped in accordance with the limits in these sections (and the other applicable sections of 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR Part 173) were inherently safe (incapable of an inadvertent criticality). The B&W analyses demonstrated that a deficiency existed in these requirements.
The safety problem uncovered by the B&W calculations, and verified by the NRC, involved quantities, geome~ies, and concentrations of fissile materials and moderators that could result in criticality when shipped in compliance with sections of the regulations for which criticality analyses are not required. FISSile exemptions in § *71.53 and the general licenses in
§§ 71.18 and 71.22, were originally based on the assumption that water is the only moderator that might be present in fissile exempt shipments. In these cases, these rules provide inherent criticality safety without a need for shippers to perform separate analyses. However, some moderators {herein referred to as special moderating materials) can increase the number of neutrons available to cause fission as compared to ordinary water and result in the potential for criticality in shipments where these moderators are present, even though the shipments are in compliance with 1o CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453.
5
When the issue was Identified to the NRC in* September_1996, the presence of special moderating materials In significant quantities in NRG-regulated shipments of fissile exempt materials had not been anticipated. However, certain international initiatives, including efforts -
to reduce stockpiles of strategic weapons material by processing for commercial use, have resulted in the greater likelihood of inclusion of these materials in NRC regulated shipments.
The materials proposed to be shipped by B&W resulted from such a source. B&W had been awarded a contract to process weapons-usable enriched uranium materials from the Republic of Kazakstan. The waste product of the processing, a uranium-beryllium filtercake, met the
-fissile exemption-provisions-in then existing 10-CF:R 7-1~53(d)-and 49 CFR 17-3.453(d)..-
However, B&W used a computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages to demonstrate that, if the packages were loaded for shipment into a sea-land*
container at the regulatory fissile exempt conc-::!:tration limit,* adequate confidence in nuclear criticality safety would not have been provided. NRC had verified through independent analyses that the concerns raised by the B&W _analysis were valid and apply to other geometries and moderating characteristics as well. To avoid inadvertent criticality, the NRC determined that it was necessary to restrict shipments of fissile material with three special moderating materials: beryllium, graphite, and deuterium.
However, the NRC concluded that limiting beryllium, graphite, and deuterium to trace quantities would not completely eliminate the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt or generally licensed shipments. There was also a need to limit the quantity of material in a single consignment (the B&W criticality model calculations were performed using 200-centimeter high infinite slab configuration). The problem of a lack of control on the total amount of fissile exempt material in an exempt shipment was originally identified during the revision process for the 1996 Edition of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) "Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material," Safety Requirement No. ST-1. The problem was addressed 6
in ST-1 by'adopting a consignment limit on the amount of fissile exempt material that a shipper could transport as a private carrier (400g for Uraniurn-235, and 250g for other fissile material),
or deliver to a common carrier for shipment. Before the emergency final rule, the NRC could not enforce a limit on the total quantity of fissile material in a common carrier shipment because the regulations did not require a transport index for each package or require shipment by exclusive use. The latter would restrict the ability to use common carriers, while requiring a transport index would negate much of the advantage gained by the exemption. Consignment limits are enforceable and represent a practical operating limit that would prevent the potentially
--r.- -unsafe accumulation of-fissile exempt materials-during shipment.
The NRC addressed these regulatory defects by issuing the emergency final rule in February 1997. The final rule amended §§ 71.18, 71.22, and 71.53 by restricting the quantity of fissile material in a shipment - if trace quantities of special moderating materials (i.e., beryllium, graphite, or deuterium) were present. The final rule also restricted the quantity of fissile material shipped under a general license or exempt shipment to a consignment limit of no greater than 400 grams.
The NRC issued the emergency final rule without a notice of proposed rulemaking and opportunity for public comment prior to finalization because the Commission found good cause for dispensing with these steps as being impracticable and contrary to the public interest under the good cause tests for omitting notice and comment 'of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B)). Notwithstanding the final status of the rule, the Commission solicited public comments on the final rule during a 30-day comment period following publication of the rule, in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.804(e). The Commission stated that it would publish a statement in the Federal Register containing an evaluation of the significant comments received and any revisions to the rule to be made as a result of the comments. The comment period ended on March 12, 1997. Following publication of the emergency rule and 7
receipt of public comments, the NRG staff sought to study the technical issues raised by the public comments, and to perform an independent evaluation of Part 71 regulations* relating to the fissile material exemption and general license limits. The NRG awarded a contract to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The results of the ORNL studywere published by NRG in July 1998 and noticed in the Federal Register on August 13, 1998. This notice responds to the comments received on the rule and the results of the ORNL study.
- 11. Discussion In developing the emergency final rule, NRG staff noted that the regulatory and technical
- bases for the fissile exemption and general license provisions of Part 71 were internally inconsistent and not thoroughly documented. Based on these regulatory/technical bases questions and the public comments received on the rule, the NRG issued a contract to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to: (1) perform an independent evaluation of Part 71 regulations relating to the fissile material exemption and general license limits; (2) review the technical Issues raised by public comments on the emergency final rule; (3) perform independent calculations of the minimum critical mass limits for different combinations of fissile material and moderating material; and (4) identify potential changes to the fissile material exemption and general license limits which may be warranted. The results of the ORNL study are contained in NURl;=G/CR-534~, Assessment and Recommendations for Rssile Material Packaging Exemptions and General Ucenses Within 10 CFR Part 71, issued July 1998.
4 Coples of NUREGS may be purchased from the Reproduction and Distribution Section, Office of the Chief Information Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Copies are also available from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161. A copy is also available for inspection and/or copying for a fee at the NRG Public Document Room, 2120 L street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.
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Publication of NUREG/CR-5342 was noticed in the Federal Register (63 FR 44777;
. August 13, 1998).
ORNt researched the historical bases for the fissile material exemption and general license regulations in Part 71 and discussed the impact of the emergency final rule's restrictions on NRC licensees. ORNL ~lso perfom,ed calculations of~ (k-effective) for various combinations of fissile material and moderating material, including beryllium, carbon, deuterium, silicon-dioxide, and water, to verify the accuracy of minimum critical mass values. These minimum critical mass values were applied to the regulatory structure contained in the current Part 71,-and revised-mass-limits for beth-the general-license.and exemption provisions to
- Part 71 were detem,ined. ORNL concluded, and NRG staff agreed, that the restrictions imposed by the emergency final rule on shipments with special moderating material were.
necessary to protect public health and safety; however, the restrictions are excessive for water-moderated shipments. Based on its new ~ff calculations, we also agree that: (1) the mass limits in the general license and exemption provisions could be safely increased and thereby provide greater flexibility to licensees shipping fissile radioactive material; and (2) additional revisions to Part 71 were appropriate to provide greater clarification and simplification of the regulations. We believe these changes will resolve the issues raised in the public comments on the emergency final rule, and provide greater usability to these Part 71 regulations.
Ill. Response to Comments on the Emergency Final Rule The NRG received eight letters commenting on the emergency final rule. Four were from NRC fuel-cycle licensees; one from a remediation and decommissioning company, one from DOE, one from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI); and one from a member of the public (same comments as DOE's). None of the commenters objected to the rule insofar as it 9
imposes restrictions on the shipments of fissile material when special moderati g materials (I.e.,
beryllium, graphite, or deuterium) are present. However,- all the commenters also belleved that the changes to Part 71 that imposed consignment limits when special moderating materials are not used, were too restrictive and imposed an unnecessary burden on licensees. Several commenters believed that the final rule would significantly increase the number of shipments and would increase licensee costs and paperwork burdens to transport the same quantity of fissile material. Some commenters indicated that the number of shipments of fissile material involving the presence of special moderators was only a small percentage of the total number of shipments invoMng fissile exempt and general license material which-occur each_year, and that the negative aspects of the rule for all shipments were not balanced by the accompanying increase in public health and safety. Some commenters requested that the consignment-limits be removed, others requested that the table after 10 CFR 71.53(a) be clarified to indicate that it applied only to shipments with special moderating material present. Overall, the commenters indicated that the final rule was excessively burdensome for a large number of shipments that do not contain special moderators and requested that further rulemaking be accomplished to address their concerns. Detailed discussion of the comments is presented below. Response to ,
this general comment is presented first, with responses to other specific comments presented later. Copies of the comment letters are available for public inspection and copying, for a fee, at the Commission's Public Document Room, located at 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level),
Washington, DC 20003-1527.
General Comment: All eight commenters objected to the imposition pf the 400-gram limit of fissile material per consignment when special moderating materials (i.e., beryllium, graphite, or deuterium) are not present. The commenters stated that the 400-gram limit was unnecessarily restrictive for the majority of shipments (I.e., water-moderated), and imposed a 10
. penalty on shippers for what had beenJ::.Qnsidered perfectly safe controls.under the old requirements without a justification being provided.-Two commenters stated !hat. this new limit would double or triple the number of separate shipments needed to transport the same amount
- of fissile material, and that this Increase in the number of' shipments of fissile material would cause a corresponding increase in probability of worker injuries and transportation accidents, and would increase licensee costs and paperwork burdens to ship the same amount of fissile material. Two commenters indicated that the rule will impose unnecessary accounting and recordkeeping requirements on licensees to assure compliance with the rule. These commenters also believe-that-shippers will new-need to-more-.aCGUrately determine the concentration of fissile material present in a package to assure compliance with this rule. One commenter was concerned that these negative aspects of the rule were not balanced by1the accompanying increase in public health and safety. One commenter stated that instead of globally restricting shipments which do not contain special moderating materials, the NRG should have identified a category of material descriptive of the special moderator-contajning material, and restricted only that category.
Response: The 400-gram limit of fissile material per consignment is essential to preclude an inadvertent criticality occurring during a transportation accident involving fissile material shipments with special moderators. However, the Commission agrees with the commenters that the 400-gram limit may have caused an unintended and unnecessary economic burden to licensees whose fissile material exempt and general licensed shipments use water as the moderator because the 400-gram consignment limit may be too restrictive, in some cases. The Commission will address these unintended economic impact issues in an upcoming rulemaking currently being developed to revise Part 71 to make it compatible with the 1996 IAEA standards. This rulemaking effort will more thoroughly examine these issues, however, the Commission has not, as yet, been able to obtain specific information regarding the 11
burden-claim made by the commenters. The staff is currently seeking specific information from the commenters to quantify this burden. The NRC needs this cost/benefit data from the fissile material shipping industry to quantify the unintended impact of the emergency rule. Therefore,
, the Commission is taking this opportunity to explicitly request this information from the commenters, the industry and the DOE.
The Commission had imposed the 400-gram consignment limit because of the regulatory latitude given to these fissile exempt and general license shippers. Shipments of exempt quantities of fissile material under § 71.53 occur without NRC prior review or imposition
- = -of any additional requirements on the quantity*eHissile-material-which may be.place<::J.on a conveyance. Therefore, the Commission Imposed a 400-gram limit on the amount of fissile material that could be shipped in a single package. This limit was intended to ensure that a nuclear criticality accident would be precluded under highly unlikely, but theoretically conceivable, circumstances by restricting the quantity of fissile material that could be inadvertently assembled to less than one-half that of a critical mass needed for criticality to occur. These circumstances could exist when exempt quantities of fissile material, from two different shippers, wind up on the same conveyance and t~at conveyance is subsequently involved in an accident.
Additionally, in the emergency final rule the Commission simplified the regulations to require that control be maintained over one parameter (e.g., the mass of the fissile material),
rather than controlling five separate parameters (e.g., the mass of fissile material, the fissile material concentration, moderation, reflection, and geometry (i.e., the spatial arrangement of the fissile material, moderating material, and any reflecting material)). This was accomplished by limiting the quantity of fissile material to less than one-half of a critical mass, while using bounding assumpt(ons for the other parameters. Therefore, the fissile material can be in any geometrical configuration or concentration, and water can be present in any density (i.e.,
12
moderating effectiveness and reflection) and the fissile material still remains subcritlcal. Further reductions in the mass limit were imposed if nuclides other than uranium 235 (e.g., uranium 233 or any isotope of plutonium) were present or If moderating materials with a-hydrogen density, greater than water (i.e., oil or plastic) were present.
Licensees desiring to ship fissile materials in quantities that do not meet the limits of the fissile material exemption, or the general license regulations, may use other provisions of
\
Part 71 to submit an application to the NRC tor approval of the design of a transportation package to ship the fissile material (e.g., Type A(F) or Type B(F) packages), or may use
--previously-approvedType-A(F) or B(F)-packages, -[Note, the_ use of-a -Y:ype B(F) package would also require a ltcensee to have a quality assurance program in place which meets the I
requirements of Part 71, Subpart H.]
Taken with the 0.1 percent limit on the presence of special moderating materials (i.e.,
beryllium, deuterium, or graphite), the final rule soughfto achieve a balanced approach with relaxation of controls over concentration, moderation, and reflection, while requiring greater control on the quantity of fissile mass, and assuming that prior NRC review and approval were not obtained.
The NRC has reviewed the factors which initiated the emergency final rulemaking, the ORNL evaluation, and public comments received on the emergency final rule, and concluded I
that the changes imposed by the emergency final rule were clearly warranted to protect public health and safety and the environment from an accidental criticality occurring during the transport of a special class of fissile material shipments (i.e., those with special moderators).
Although the Commission believes that the commenters may have valid concerns with respect to the unintended burden imposed by the emergency final rule on a large number of shipments that do not use special moderators, the staff has not been able to obtain specific information regarding the burden estimates. The Commission has decided to consider an additional rulemaklng revising the fissile exemptions and general license regulations of Part 71 to:
13
(1) address the concerns raised by public comments, (2) provide _greater clarity and simplicity to these Part 71 regulations; and (3) provide increased flexibility for licensees-who use these regulations. This rulemaking is scheduled to revise Part 71 to make it consistent with the IAEA transportation standards, and would be undertaken in coordination with the o*oT and the Agreement States.
Specific Comments
- - -CommentT One commenter stated that-the rule_will-double the number.of water-moderated shipments that will be needed to transport the same amount of fissile material. The commenter further stated that the increase in the number of shipments will increase the cost of shipping the material, incre?.~9 the chance of injury to workers due to Increased probability of loading accidents, and will increase the probability of highway accidents due to the increased number of transport vehicles on the road.
Response: The Commission agrees that there may be an increase in the number of water-moderated shipments. [See response to the general comment.] Although the staff, has not been able to quantify the cost, the Commission will consider the cos~ for fissile material shipments In the scheduled Part 71 rulemaking as part of the regulatory analysis.
Comment: One commenter stated that the term "unpackaged material* may be inadequate or misunderstood.
Response: The Commission agrees. The term *unpackaged material" is not currently .
defined in Part 71. In § 71.53(a)(1 ), the Commission considered imposing a 15-gram limit on fissile material in an individual package. For fissile material which is not contained in discrete packages (i.e., unpackaged material or bulk material), the 15-gram limit is instead applied to all 14
of theiissile material being transported on a specific conveyance. The Commission will address this issue in a future rulemaking.
Comment: One commenter stated that changes in the emergency final rule that are not .
directly associated with the special moderating materials (i.e., total mass per consignment),
may be needed, but these should be issued only after they go through the normal rulemaking review process.
Response: As stated in the emergency final rule (at 62 FR 5910), "[t]he Commission is
-*.,,. *. promulgating-this-emergency final-rule-because-.the*pr00lem-of-regulatory safety limits over .
quantities and concentrations of fissile material and moderators ... is an important safety issue meriting immediate corrective action. An accidental criticality in the public domain would' very
- likely involve fatalities, health. effects from the resulting radiation, and extensive cleanup costs."
Consequently, for this reason, and as described in the general comment above, the changes
/'
made to Part 71 in the emergency final rule were necessary and met the good cause test of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B)), to dispense with notice and prepromulgation public comment as being impracticable and contrary to the public interest.
Comment: One commenter stated that because this special moderators issue was known for more than 2 years, they failed to understand why an emergency action was needed at this time.
Response: The Commission disagrees. The NRC was unaware of the regulatory defect that existed in Part 71 until it was notified by B&W in September 1996. "\
Once the NRC became aware of the potential to affect public health and safety and the environment, the Commission deemed that prompt action was necessary to ensure that public health and safety and the environment remained protected; and hence the emergency final rule was issued.
15
\
Comment: One commenter stated that the emergency final rule. addressed only a small number of specialized shipments, the size of a large freight container, and that the final rule appeared to be too conservative for smaller packages.
Response: The Commission agrees in part. The emergency final rule was too restrictive for small packages with water as the moderator. The Commission will addreS$ this issue in a future rulemaking. Also, see response to general comment.
Comment: One commenter stated that the rulemaking failed to address the value and *
- impact of the-rule-change andthaMhe*rule does not-consider-the type.and number of-shipments that have been or will be impacted.
Response: The Commissiori' agrees in part. A separate regulatory analysis was. not prepared for the final rule because of its emergency nature. However, the Commission considered the values and impacts of the final rule in the discussion entitled "Alternatives Considered" on page 5909 of the Federal Register notice (62 FR 5907). The value of this rule was in preventing tt,e possibility of an accidental criticality from occurring in the public domain during the transport of fissile material. As stated earlier, an accidental criticality could result in fatalities or other adverse health effects and would require extensive cleanup efforts. The Commission did consider that a limited number of licensees possess quantities of fissile material which could be affected by this change in regulations. However, the emergency nature of this rulemaking did not allow time for the NRC to complete as thorough a review of the type and number of impacted shipments as would occur during normal rulemaking. The NRC wiU-address this issue in a future rulemaking. The NRC staff is currently attempting to collect cost/benefit data for this rulemaking. However, the NRC staff has had difficulty in collecting this data from affected licensees and shippers, and is working to obtain the necessary information.
The NRC is requesting comments on the costs associated with shipments of fissile material 16
made under the fissile material exemption and general license provisions of Part 71 Implementing the emergency final rule.
Comment: One commenter stated that the rationale for limiting the mass of special moderating material to only 0.1 percent of the fissile mass is not clear.
Response: The Commission's basis for using the 0.1 percent limit was that it was consistent with the limit contained in the 1996 IAEA standard ST-1. The NRC believed that give_n the emergency nature of the rulemaking and absent sufficient time to develop a national
-standard.the- use of- an international .consensusJechnical-standard was a reasonable --
- alternative. The NRC did depart from the standard established in ST-1 by including graphite in the list of special moderating material. The Commission will continue to impose limits on*the allowable fissile mass If special moderators are present; however, the Commission will solicit comment on the continued use of a consensus technical standard in a future rulemaking. This effort will be a major rulemaking which will revise Part 71 to make it compatible with the IAEA ST-1, to revise fissile material exempt and general license provisions, and to revise other Non-lAEA provisions.
Comment: One commenter stated that it is not clear from the wording of the rule whether the 0.1 percent limit applies to all of the deuterium present in a shipment of only to the quantity that exceeds the amount of naturally occurring deuterium.
Response: The Commission intended that the 0.1 percent limit apply to all of the deuterium* present in a shipment because the ability of deuterium to moderate neutrons is not ,
dependent upon whether the deuterium is natural or created via a man-made process. The
- NRC will clarify this ambiguity in the rule language as part of its planned revision of Part 71.
17
- Comment: One commenter stated that it Is not so much the average hydrogen density that Is important as it is the moderating effect of the material. The commenter suggested replacing "average hydrogen density greater than that of water,* with "moderating effect greater
\
tflan that of water.*
Response: The Commission agrees that moderating effectiveness is the parameter of concern. However, in the past, the concept of average hydrogen density has been substituted for moderator effectiveness, because the principal focus was on moderation by ordinary water.
The NRC believes this terminology, which had been widely used, is still appropriate and did not
-change-this approach-iA-the emergency-final.:11:Jle.* The NRC wll~address this-terminology issue in a future rulemaking.
Comment: One commenter stated that the use of absolute moderator limitations was too restrictive. The commenter believes that waste shipments from remediation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities often contain incidental quantities of special moderating materials (e.g., process materials, motors, charcoal filters, batteries, and pencils). The commenter suggested that the rule be revised to specify a quantitative limit only for those deformable materials that can form a homogenous or latticed mixture of fissile and moderating material. Further,. intact components, blocks, or articles would be considered exempt from consideration as special moderating materials. The commenter also recommended that the NRC ~ncourage the DOT to make equivalent or similar changes to 49 CFR Part 173.
Response: The Commission agrees that the original problem with beryllium and enriched uranium involved homogenous mixtures of these substances and that discrete articles,.
blocks, or components would be less effective as moderating agents. The Commission will address this issue of homogenous versus heterogeneous mixture in a future rulemaking.
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IV. Request for Cost Information As stated above, the NRC has received comments on the* emergency final rule which indicated that the rule had an unintended economic impact. NRC staff has attempted to solicit information on the costs associated with implementing the emergency final rule so as to quantify the unintended impact of the emergency final rule. However, staff has not been successful in obtaining this information. Consequently, th~ Commission is using this opportunity to explicitly request information from the public, industry, and the DOE on the costs
-. -- of shipments made under-the fissile .material-exemptioR-and general license- provisions of Part 71 prior to the emergency rule; and those costs and/or changes in costs resulting from implementation of the.emergency final rule. The Commission is requesting that comments be submitted to the NRC by [Insert date 75 days from date of publication].
V. Conclusion The NRC staff is in the process of developing a rulemaklng plan to revise Part 71 to make it compatible with the 1996 IAEA transportation standard ST-1, as well as to include other non-lAEA amendments. The staff intends to include in this rulemaking plan, proposed revisions to the fissile material exemption and general license limits, based on the ORNL recommendations.
As stated previously, the DOT deferred any rulemaklng on 49 CFR 173.453 until DOT staff could review the public comments received on the NRC's emergency final rule and review the NRC's study on the fissile exemptions contained in NUREG/CR-5342. The NR(? staff Is currently coordinating with the DOT the resolution of these issues and the development of the 19
rule~aking plan for the Part 71 revisions. In additio,1, NRC will coordinate the rulemaking plan with the Agreement States for issues that are a matter of*compatibility.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this cZD::fi., day of October, 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
'netteL\/ietti-O>ok,
~-,/~-~
Secretary for the Commission.
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