Text

PR-060,072,073,075 - 60FR42079 - Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste
	ML23151A708
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/15/1995
From:	Hoyle J; NRC/SECY
To:	;
References
	60FR42079, PR-060, PR-072, PR-073, PR-075
	Download: ML23151A708 (1)
	v • d • e

ADAMS Template: SECY-067 DOCUMENT DATE: 08/15/1995 TITLE: PR-060,072,073,075 - 60FR42079 - SAFEGUARDS FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL OR HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE CASE

REFERENCE:

PR-060,072,073,075 60FR42079 KEYWORD: RULEMAKING COMMENTS Document Sensitivity: Non-sensitive - SUNSI Review Complete

STATUS OF RULEMAKING PROPOSED RULE: PR-060,072,073,075 OPEN ITEM (Y/N) N RULE NAME: SAFEGUARDS FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL OR HIGH - LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE PROPOSED RULE FED REG CITE: 60FR42079 PROPOSED RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 08 / 15 / 95 NUMBER OF COMMENTS: 20 ORIGINAL DATE FOR COMMENTS: 11/13/95 EXTENSION DATE: I I FINAL RULE FED. REG. CITE: 63FR26955 FINAL RULE PUBLICATION DATE: 05 / 15 / 98 NOTES ON:

STATUS OF RULE :

HISTORY OF THE RULE PART AFFECTED: PR-060,072,073,075 RULE TITLE: SAFEGUARDS FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL OR HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE PROPOSED RULE PROPOSED RULE DATE PROPOSED RULE SECY PAPER: 95-104 SRM DATE: 0~/30 / 95 SIGNED BY SECRETARY: 08 / 08 / 95 FINAL RULE FINAL RULE DATE FINAL RULE SECY PAPER: 98-024 SRM DATE: 04/ 03 / 98 SIGNED BY SECRETARY: 05 / 11/98 STAFF CONTACTS ON THE RULE CONTACTl: JOHN TELFORD, RES MAIL STOP: T9-F33 PHONE: 415-6229 CONTACT2: SANDRA FRATTALI , RES MAIL STOP: T9-F31 PHONE : 415 - 6261

DOCKET NO . PR-060,072,073,075 (60FR42079 )

In the Matter of SAFEGUARDS FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL OR HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 08/10/95 08/08/95 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - PROPOSED RULE 11/03/95 10/27/95 COMMENT OF IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING LAB (ARVID M. JENSEN) ( 1) 11/13/95 11/08/95 COMMENT OF TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO (J.S. MARSHALL) ( 2) 11/13/95 11/08/95 COMMENT OF FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO (W.H. BOHLKE) ( 3) 11/13/95 11/10/95 COMMENT OF NORTHERN STATES POWER CO (MICHAEL D. WADLEY) ( 4) 11/13/95 11/07/95 COMMENT OF DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE (WILLIAM L. BERG, GENERAL MANAGER) ( 5) 11/13/95 11/09/95 COMMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE CO OF COLORADO (MARY J. FISHER) ( 6) 11/14/95 11/09/95 COMMENT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO (WALTER C. MARSH) ( 7) 11/14/95 11/13/95 COMMENT OF PORTLAND ~ENERAL ELECTRIC CO (C.P. YUNDT) ( 8) 11/14/95 11/13/95 COMMENT OF CAROLINA POWER &LIGHT CO (R.E. ROGAN) ( 9) 11/14/95 11/13/95 COMMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (THOMAS E. TIPTON) ( 10) 11/14/95 11/13/95 COMMENT OF YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO (JANE M. GRANT) ( 11) 11/15/95 11/09/95 COMMENT OF NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP *

(MARTIN J. MCCORMICK, JR.) ( 12) 11/15/95 11/13/95 COMMENT OF OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY, INC (SUSAN L. HIATT, DIRECTOR) ( 13) 11/17/95 11/13/95 COMMENT OF PECO ENERGY CO (G.A. HUNGER, JR.) ( 14)

DOCKET NO. PR-060,072,073,075 (60FR42079)

DATE DATE OF TITLE OR DOCKETED DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION Of DOCUMENT 11/17/95 11/13/95 COMMENT OF ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC (DWIGHT C. MIMS) ( 15) 11/21/95 11/13/95 COMMENT OF SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO (DAVE MOREY) ( 16) 11/22/95 11/08/95 COMMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (RICHARD E. SANDERSON) ( 17) 11/28/95 11/20/95 COMMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFC OF CIVILIAN RAD WASTE MGT (RONALD A. MILNER) ( 18) 12/13/95 12/08/95 COMMENT OF VIRGINIA POWER (M.L. BOWLING} ( 19) 12/19/95 12/14/95 COMMENT OF BOSTON EDISON CO (E.T. BOULETTE, SR VICE PRES-NUCLEAR} ( 20) 05/12/98 05/11/98 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE - FINAL RULE

DOCKETED

~tW&o1 -P]

"98 MAY 12 All :42 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Parts 60, 72, 73, 74 and 75 RIN: 3150 - AF32 Physical Protection for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to clarify physical protection requirements for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSls), monitored-retrievable storage (MRS) installations, and geologic repository operations areas (GROAs). These amendments codify standards for protecting spent fuel at the various storage sites licensed under the Commission's regulations.

~ I :L-,1 19 9 8' EFFECTIVE DATE: (IAeeFt 180 aeys after ptJblicatieA ef this fi"al rule i" the Fe~eral Register~

FOR FURTHEr. INFORMATION CONTACT: Priscilla A. Dwyer, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20::>55-0001 ,

telephone (301) 415-8110, e-mail PAD@NRC.GOV.

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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background.

On August 15, 1995 (60 FR 42079), the Commission published for public comment a proposed rule that would clarify its regulations on the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The proposed regulation would have applied to spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored at ISFSls, power reactors that have permanently ceased reactor operations, MRS installations, and the GROA. The proposed rule stated that the requirements for physically protecting this type of material lacked clarity in defining which regulations were to be applied at these sites. This resulted in a non-cohesive regulatory base .

The proposed rule would provi.de a set of performance-based requirements, consistent with current programs that are currently licensed and implemented at sites under a unified policy for physical protection.

The proposed rule also indicated that the Commission was studying the need for specific protection against the malevolent use of a vehicle at sites affected by the rule (this is discussed further under the "Protection Goal" heading). The rule also proposed a conforming amendment to 10 CFR Part 60 -- to require material control and accounting (MC&A) measures at the GROA that would be identical to that required of ISFSls under Part 72 . The proposed rule added a provision under 10 CFR Part 75 to clarify that if GROAs are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, then NRC's nuclear material accounting and control regulations for implementing the "Agreement between the United States and the IAEA for the App11cation of Safeguards in the United States" apply. Finally, the Commission requested specific comment on five questions regarding impacts of the proposed regulation on licensees.

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11. Summary and Analysis of Public Comments The proposed rule was subject to a 90-day public comment period which ended on November 13, 1995. Twenty letters of comment were received. Sources for these comments included a nuclear industry group [the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)]; one national laboratory; fifteen utilities involved in nuclear activities; two Federal agencies [the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy (DOE)]; and one citizen's group. Twelve letters of comment explicitly endorsed, either in total or in part, the views expressed by the NEI. Four letters of comment, in part, supported the general objectives of the proposed rulemaking.

Correspondence received from EPA indicated no comment. The comments have been grouped under the following general topics:

1. Protection Goal.

2. Basis for Requirements.

3. Required Level of Physical Protection.

4. Backfit and Regulatory Analysis.

5. Rule Language Specifics.

6. GROAs.

7. Staff-Generated Amendments.

8. Summary of Responses to Commission's Specific Questions.

1. Protection Goal.

Comment. C~mmenters noted that, although it was appropriate that a protection goal for spent fuel anJ high-level radioactive waste be defined, the protection goal needed to be less stringent than the codified design basis threat for radiological sabotage. It was fu~r stated that a 10 CFR Part 100 release, the unofficial criterion for determining radiological sabotage of power reactors, would be extremely difficult to realize with respect to spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The citizen's group commented that any protection goal developed for spent fuel should also counter the malevolent use of an airborne vehicle.

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Response. The NRC agrees that the establishment of a protection goal should be the first step in the development of any physical protection standards One issue that may have caused confusion m the proposed rule is that the assumptions for determining "radiological sabotage" differ between Part 72, "Licensing* Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," and Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Matenal." The differing assumptions are appropriate because "radiological sabotage," as used under Part 73, applies to a power reactor and implies the unofficial criterion of a Part 100 release for power reactors. "Radiological sabotage" as used under Part 72 applies to the storage of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste and is based on the consequences of a design basis accident as defined under Part 72. Although the same tern, is used under both 10 CFR Parts; it is based on different assumptions and results in different levels of required protection. The Commission agrees that this is confusing and that "radiological sabotage," as used for operating reactors, is not an appropriate protection level for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The Commission concludes that the protection goal is best characterized by the phrase: uprotection against the loss of control of the facility that could be sufficient to cause radiation exposure exceeding the dose as described in 10 CFR 72.106." The final rule has been modified accordingly.

With regard to protection against the malevolent use of a land-based vehicle, NRG has determined, based on the opinions of expert study and a peer review of findings, that there is no compelling justification for requiring a vehicle barrier as perimeter protection for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored under a Part 60 or Part 72 license. Inclusion of an airborne vehicle was assessed for possible inclusion into the protection goal for this rule.

However, protection against this type of threat has not yet been detem,ined appropriate at sites with greater potential consequences than spent fuel storage installations. Therefore, this type of requirement is not included within the protection goal for this final rule.

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2. Basis for Requirements.

Comment. Commenters frequently questioned the need for tying Part 72 requirements to Part 73. The commenters assumed that by involving Part 73 in the rulemaking, it was implied that the level of physical protection normally attributed to power reactors was being required.

Phraseology used in the proposed requirements, such as using the term "protected area," (PA) tended to further foster this impression.

Response. The Commission disagrees that placing requirements under Part 73 implies any association with the physical protection requirements for power reactors. It is noted that Part 73 provides, in one consolidated Part, all of the requirements for those facilities needing physical protection. This is one reason why an explicit requirement for the protection of spc,nt fuel and high-level radioactive waste is being added to Part.73. Part 73 includes more stringent requirements for power reactor and Category I fuel cycle facilities and much less stringent requirements for the protection of Category Ill facilities. Wrth regard to use of the term "protected area," the Commission has determined that the term is correctly used in review of its definition under 10 CFR 73.2. Nonetheless, the Commission has reviewed the physical protection terminology found in the final rule to ensure that it does not imply a different level of physical protection than intended .

3. Level of Physical Protection Needed.

Comment. Some commenters expressed the opinion that the level of physical protection described by the proposed amendments was unnecessary and overly burdensome. The industry group noted that what was truly needed was a level of physical protection comparable to "enhanced industrial security." Cited examples of this type of protection were: use of suitable fencing, locked access points, sufficient illumination, and periodic security patrols.

Other commenters questioned the need for some of the redundancy that was included in the proposed rule. One citizen's group believed that physical protection measures should be more stringent than those described in the proposed rule.

Response. The Commission believes that the appropnate level of physical protection for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste lies somewhere between industrial-grade security and the level that is required at operating power reactors. The Commission also notes that the nature of spent fuel and of its storage mechanisms offers unique advantages in protecting the material. This factor, along wrth revised consequence considerations, leads the Commission to conclude that physical protection at sites where spent fuel and high-le~el radioactive waste are stored under a 10 CFR Part 60 or 72 license can be more flexibly applied than previously proposed. Accordingly, the final rule has been revised to minimize redundancy and add flexibility. Specific changes are outlined in Section 111, "Summary of Specific Changes Made to the Proposed Rule as a Result of Public Comment.*

4. Backfit and Regulatory Analysis.

Comment. NEI and a few licensees commented that the proposed regulation imposes a generic backfit as defined under 10 CFR 50.109 and 72.62. The NRC asserted in the proposed rule that the amendments merely codified and standardized physical protection measures that, through license amendment. were already in place at existing sites. Hence, it was concluded that no back.flt was involved. Commenters further stated that, in terms of backfit requirements, the cost to implement the proposed rule was not justified based on the potential increase in protection that the rule would afford public health and safety.

Other commenters specifically responded to the Regulatory Analysis that accompanied the rule. These commenters expressed concern that certain provisions of the regulatory analysis could tum into de facto requirements.

Additionally, it was recommended that affected sites should be "grandfathered" under any final rulemaking. Accordingly, these sites would not be required to meet the provisions of th~

new physical protection rule because an adequate level of physical protection was already in place at the site, based on an NRG-approved physical protection plan.

Response. Under the proposed rule, the Commission stated that the backfrt rule in 10 CFR 50.109 did not apply because the amendments did not impose any additional 6

requirements on Part 50 licensees. Furthermore, the Commission notes that all references to Part 50 licensees are deleted in the final rule.

The Commission further stated that the backfitting requirements in 10 CFR 72.62 did not apply because the proposed amendments neither imposed nor modified procedures or organizations of ISFSls licensed under Part 72. The Commission considers these statements true based on their assessment of the proposed regulation and its intended implementation. However, on further review, the backfit rule in 10 CFR 72.62 may be applicable to one facility which has only one isolation zone exterior to the perimeter barrier. The NRC staff has identified alternative measures currently in place that provide an equivalent level of physical protection. The staff does not intend to require this facility to establish an interior isolation zone. Thus, no backfrt occurs due to the new rule. Because 10 CFR 72.62 does not cover reporting and recordkeeping requirements, the inclusion of 10 CFR 73.51 in 73.71 event reporting is not a backfit.

Wrth respect to grandfathering existing sites, the Commission believes that implementation of this final rule at these sites presents no undue burden to affected licensees and provides a minimum level of physical protection to adequately protect-the public health and safety.

Accordingly, there is no need for a grandfathering provision and no change has been made in the final rule in response to this comment. The Commission notes that the Regulatory Analysis for the final rule has been revised to reflect changes made in response to public comment and to eliminate ambiguities.

5. Rule Language Specifics.

Comment. A variety of comments were received regarding specific rule terminology. The suggestion was made that the term "protected area" be revised to "ISFSI controlled access area."

Response. As indicated previously in this notice, the use of the term "protected area," is consistent with its definition in 10 CFR 73.2. Furthennore, because it is the Commission's position that a site where spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste is stored be surrounded by 7

a fence, it Is not considered adequate to call the enclosure a controlled access area (CAA).

Under 10 CFR 73.2, the definition of a CAA requires only a demarcation of the area, not a fence.

Com_ment. Another commenter supported the Commission position that operating power reactor licensees that store spent fuel under a general license should have the option of using the physical protection measures of either 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5) or the proposed 10 CFR 73.51.

The commenter also questioned whether the requirements of 10 CFR 72.182, 72.184, and 72.186 apply to a general license, in addition to Subpart K. A related question requested clarification on how general license holders were to notify NRC regarding which option they would exercise.

Response. The Commission notes that a licensee having a Part 50 license does not fall within the scope of the final rule. The Commission believes it is premature to bring these licensees under the provisions of the final rule because continued protection for spent fuel in storage pools at Part 50 sites is currently under study by the NRC.

Comment. One commenter requested clarification on the specific exclusion of an exemption for ISFSls from the malevolent use of a vehicle threat within the design basis threat. The commenter indicated that it was not readily apparent and also a cumbersome process to determine the current exempt status of an ISFSI under present regulations.

Response. The Commission agrees and has revised the text of the rule to exclude reference to the design basis threat described under 10 CFR 73.1.

Comment. One commenter questioned whether the proposed rule would apply to a permanently shutdown power plant where spent fuel is stored and the plant is operating with a Part 50 possession-only license.

Response. A facility with a Part 50 license is not subject to the provisions of the final rule.

This revision to the final rule has been made because the Commission believes it is premature 8

" to include these licensees within the scope of the rule because continued protection for spent fuel in storage pools at Part 50 sites is currently under study by the NRC.

Comment. A commenter requested clarification on the need for back-up power for physical protection-related equipment.

Response. The Commission believes that affected licensees should riot be vulnerable to loss of offsite power. Thus, it is necessary for licensees to assure either continuous operation of required physical protection equipment during power failure or to demonstrate the ability to provide immediate compensation for such failures.

Comment. Required illumination levels, assessment techniques, required frequency of physical protection patrols, and searches before entry to the PA were all subjects of comment.

A commente~ suggested that illumination be provided only during periods of assessment and that the entire PA need not be illuminated to a level of 0.2 footcandle.

Response. The Commission agrees that illumination to a 0.2 footcandle level represents a large operating cost and may be difficult to achieve, given cask structure. This provision has been amended to more clearly indicate that, while illumination should be maintained during all periods of darkness, only an adequate level of illumination is required within the PA for the detection assessment means used. In addition, required performance capabilities regarding detection are clarified in the final rule by specifying the use of active intrusion detection equipment, as opposed to passive systems.

Comment. Some commenters noted that the frequency of patrols should coincide with watchmens' duty shift lengths, as opposed to once every eight hours as recommended in the proposed rule.

Response. The Commission does not agree that the frequency of patrols should coincide with duty shift lengths. However, the Commission agrees that some flexibility can be provided.

Accordingly, this provision of the final rule is revised to require daily random patrols, only.

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Comment. Licensees cited the burden of maintaining expensive and delicate explosives detection equipment to meet the proposed requirement for explosives searches conducted before entry to the PA. .

Response. The Commission agrees. To clarify this issue, the Commission has revised the proposed rule to require only a visual search for explosives. Because pedestrian and vehicular traffic is not expected to be high volume at facilities affected by the rule, this type of search is not considered an undue burden to affected licensees. Furthermore, the amount of explosives that may cause a radiological release is not easily concealed.

Comment. Other commenters noted redundant records retention requirements in 10 CFR 72.180 and 10 CFR 73.51 (c).

Response. This concern has been corrected in the final rule.

Comment. One commenter noted an apparent contradiction in the proposed regulation regarding use of deadly force in the protection of an ISFSI. The commenter had been advised by NRC staff that use of deadly force was not expected of members* of the security organization at ISFSls. The commenter reasoned that this was not consistent with the requirement to protect against radiological sabotage under the proposed rule.

Response. The issue involving the use of the term radiological sabotage has been resolved as discussed previously. Further, the Commission never intended that onsite physical protection personnel at an ISFSI would provide a response to a safeguards event other than calling for assistance from local law enforcement or other designated response force unless their timely response could not be ensured. The Commission also notes that 10 CFR 73.51 only calls for unarmed watchmen, not armed guards.

Comment. Commenters believe that the requirements for redundant al.arm monitoring stations and specified staffing levels for the primary alarm station are overfy burdensome and unnecessary.

Response. The Commission agrees that the requirement for redundant alarm stations is excessive. Regarding alarm monitoring, this provision is revised in the final rule to require, in the redundant location, only a summary indication that an alarm has been generated. This location need not necessarily be located onsite and could, for example, be a simple readout in a continually-staffed local law enforcement agency office. This is contingent on the assurance that communications with the local law enforcement agency or the designated response force can be maintained. Regarding required staffing levels of the primary alarm station, the Commission has deleted the specific requirement that the physical protection organization be comprised of at least two watchmen from the final rule. This deletion is contingent on the Commission's expectation that a human presence be maintained in the primary ala~ station at all times. To achieve this, the Commission clarifies its position that the primary alarm station must be located within the PA, be bullet-resisting, and be configured such that ac,Livities within the station are not visible from outside the PA. The intent of these measures is to ensure that a single act cannot destroy the capability of an onsite watchman to call for assistance. The final rule has been modified accordingly.

Comment. Finally, concerning the actual terminology and format of the proposed rule, commenters expressed support for its performance-based nature but rejected the set of provisions under 10 CFR 73.51(d) as being overly prescriptive .

Response. The Commission responds that the proposed regulation found in 10 CFR 73.51 (d) is needed to provide additional clarity in meeting the performance capabilities in 10 CFR 73.51(b) and notes that many of the physical protection measures described under 10 CFR 73.51(d) are relaxed in the final rule and are less prescriptive in a number of cases.

6. GROA.

Comment. Two comments were received from DOE on the amendments to Part 60 dealing with the geologic repository. The first commenter requested that it be emphasized in the "Statement of Considerationsa for the final rule that the requirement for physical protection of GROAs be applicable only during their operational phases and not after closure.

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Response. The Commission agrees with this observation and has clarified the exemption in the final rule to specifically exempt GROAs from the requirements of 10 CFR 73.51 after permanent closures.

Comment. The second commer,iter requested clarification on apparent conflicts in Part 60, "Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste in Geologic Repositories, 11 regarding the level of detail required of physical protection plans during the different phases of the certification process.

Response. The Commission notes that NUREG 1619, "Standard Review Plan for Physical Protection Plans for the Independent Storage of Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, 11 to be issued concurrently with the effective date of the final ,rule, will contain guidance in thi$ area.

7. NRG Staff-Generated Amendments.

Subsequent to publication of the proposed rule, a technical issue arose involving the cooling time of spent fuel as it relates to the degree of physical protection needed. Because a response to this issue continues to evolve within the NRG, the Commission believes it would be inappropriate to apply the provisions of the final rule at this time to a licensee holding a 10 GFR Part 50 license. Hence, licensees holding a 10 CFR Part 50 license are not within the scope of the final rule. Further, review indicated that there was some confusion pertaining to MC&A requirements for ISFSls. Specifically, the NRG staff asked if ISFSls were exempt from the requirements of 10 GFR 74.51 and, if not, why not. Specific MC&A requirements for ISFSls are found under Part 72. After consideration of the issue, for clarification, the NRG staff has included an amendment to 10 GFR Part 74 that specifically exempts ISFSls from 10 CFR 74.51 in the final rule.

8. Summary of Responses to Commission's Specific Questions.

Question 1. Would the proposed amendments impose any significant additional costs for safeguards of currently stored spent nuclear fuel beyond what is now incurred for that purpose?

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Summary of Responses. Five responses from nuclear utilities specifically addressed this issue. All indicated that the amendments, as proposed, would significantly increase costs.

Manpower-intensive measures, such as the requirement to maintain a minimum of two watchmen per shift, were most often cited as creating an undue burden. One licensee estimated costs of $1 to 2 million to implement, and a continuing cost increase of 30-50 percent. annually, to physical protection operations.

NRC Response. Licensees holding a 10 CFR Part 50 license are no longer within the scope of this rule. The final rule has been revised to minimize redundancy and add flexibility to its implementation. There should be no significant increase in cost to current licensees .

Question 2. Is there reason to expect the costs to future licensees to differ substantially from those of current licensees?

Summary of Responses. Four responses from nuclear utilities specifically addressed this issue. Three utilities cited both higher current and annual operating costs. One utility noted that, to the extent that current licensees have been required to commit to the practices recommended in the proposed rule in initial licensing, there is no anticipated difference in cost.

Response.

NRC Licensees holding a 10 CFR Part 50 license are no longer within the scope of this rule. The final rule has been amended to be more consistent with physical protection implemented at sites with currently-approved physical protection plans. Hence, there should be no significant increase in costs to future licensees.

Question 3. Are the cost estimates in Table Ill of the Draft Regulatory Analysis representative of current industry experience? Are there significant costs that have not been included in the table?

Summary of Responses. Three responses from nuclear utilities specifically addressed this issue. One respondent indicated that the cost estimates in Table Ill of the "Draft Regulatory Analysis" are sufficiently broad to address industry experience. However, the inclusion of a continual surveillance system is not covered and the respondent suggested that it should be a 13

separate line item. Another respondent indicated that the cost estimates appear to be comprehensive except they do not include construction and maintenance of physical protection office space, a records retention area, and alarm station(s).

NRC Response. The "Regulatory Analysis" has been revised to reflect public comment to include any omissions or changes made to the final rule.

Question 4. Are the costs justified by the benefits that would be afforded by the proposed amendments? Are there alternatives that would afford essentially the same benefits but be more cost-effective?

Summary of Responses. Three responses from nuclear utilities specifically addressed this issue. All three indicated that the costs were not justified by the benefits derived from the proposed rule. One respondent stated that the individual measures of 10 CFR 73.51(d) have merit, but, when taken in aggregate, they are not necessary to protect public health and safety.

This respondent further stated that redundancy in the proposed rule was not needed and the -

rulemaking should give affected licensees latitude in selecting and justifying the means of physical protection. Alternatives that were suggested involved the deletion of specific provisions of the proposed rule and also the restructuring of the rule so as to not group all ISFSls under one set of physical protection criteria.

NRC Response. The Commission has revised the requirements of the proposed rule to eliminate unnecessary redundancies, add flexibility in implementation, and reduce manpower-intensive measures while maintaining an adequate level of physical protection.

Question 5. Are the proposed amendments to 10 CFR 73.51 appropriate for an MRS or geologic repository operated by DOE?

Summary of Response. NEI was the only respondent to this issue. NEI noted that NRC should be mindful of the evolving nature of MRS installations and the geologic repository in the development of physical protection regulations for these sites.

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NRC Response. NRC staff continues to work closely with DOE staff in the development of the certification process for MRS installations and the GROA.

111. Summary of Specific Changes Made to the Proposed Rule as a Result of Public Comment Major changes made to the proposed rule include:

(1) The incorporation of a protection goal, and (2) Regarding required levels of physical protection, redundancies have been reduced, flexibility added, and manpower intensive measures minimized, for example -

Regarding alarm monitoring, the redundant alarm station need only provide a summary indication at a continually staffed focation;

Redundant records retention has been eliminated;

The required staffing level for the security organization has been eliminated and required siting and configuration of the primary alarm station clarified;

Hand-held equipment searches for explosives are replaced with visual searches; and

Illumination levels need only permit adequate assessment of the PA according to the assessment means used. Detection equipment must be

active in nature.

As discussed previously, the final rule does not apply to a licensee holding a 10 CFR Part 50 license.

A section-by-section comparison of the proposed and final rules follows.

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Part 60 - - Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Geologic Repositories.

1. Section 60.21, Content of application. This section is unchanged from the proposed rule.

2. Section 60.31, Construction authorization. This section is unchanged from the proposed rule.

3. Section 60.41, Standards for issuance of a license. This section is unchanged from the proposed rule.

4. Section 60.78, Material control and accounting records and reports. This section is unchanged from the proposed rule.

Part 72 - - Licensing Requirements for the Independent storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste

5. Section 72.24, Contents of application: Technical information. This section is unchanged from the proposed rule. The term "radiological sabotage" is based on Part 72 assumptions and not a Part 100 radiological release.

6. Section 72.180, Physical security plan. This section is unchanged from the proposed rule except for changing the title to Physical Protection Plan to be consistent with 10 CFR Part 73.

7. Section 72.212, Conditions of general license issued under §72.210. Revisions to this section have been deleted in their entirety.

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Part 73 - - Physical Protection of Plants and Materials

8. Section 73.1, Purpose and Scope. Paragraph {b)(6) is unchanged from the proposed rule.

9. Section 73.50, Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities. This section remains unchanged from the proposed rule.

10. Section 73.51, Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Paragraph (a), Applicability, has been revised to more precisely define the type of material affected by the rule and to eliminate 10 CFR Part 50 licensees from the provisions of the rule ..

Paragraph (b)(3), General Performance Objectives, has been revised to read: The physical protection system must be designed to protect against loss of control of the facility that could be sufficient to cause radiation exposure exceeding the dose as described in 10 CFR 72.106.

This revised statement describes a more appropriate protection goal that is consistent with Part 72. It also allows for a physical protection system less stringent than required to protect against radiological sabotage at operating power reactors .

The introductory text of paragraph (d) has been revised to more clearly indicate the Commission's intent that alternative measures may also be available for meeting the provisions of {d). For example, several questions arose during final rule development as to whether the use of a hardened and protected alarm station sited at an adjacent operating power reactor would meet the intent of paragraph (d)(3) to have a hardened alarm station within the PA of the ISFSI. Staff considers this to be an acceptable alternative measure for meeting this provision of the final rule.

In paragraph (d)(1 ), the last sentence has been deleted because it is no longer necessary due to the revision cited in the previous paragraph above.

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Paragraph (d)(2) has been revised to read: "Illumination must be sufficient to permit adequate assessment of unauthorized penetrations of or activities within the protected area."

This revision has been made to permit flexibility in illumination levels.

Paragraph (d)(3) has been revised to read: "The perimeter of the protected area must be subject to continual surveillance and be protected by an active intrusion alarm system that is capable of detecting penetration through the isolation zone and that is monitored in a continually staffed primary alarm station located within the protected area, and in one additional continually staffed location to ensure that a single act cannot destroy the capability of the onsite watchman to call for assistance. The primary alarm station must be located within the protected area; have bullet-resisting walls, doors, ceiling, and floor; and the interior of the station must not be visible from outside the protected area. A timely means for assessment must also be provided. Regarding alarm monitoring; the redundant location need only provide 0

a summary indication that an alarm has been generated. This clarifies the Commission's position that the necessary level of protection should ensure that a single act cannot destroy the capability of the onsite watchman to call for assistance.

Paragraph (d)(4} has been revised to reduce the frequency of patrol from "not less than 0

once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to "daily random patrols" with additional discussion provided in guidance issued to support the rule.

Paragraph (d}(S) has been revised to read: "A security organization with written procedures must be established. The security organization must include sufficient personnel per shift to provide for monitoring of detection systems and the conduct of surveillance, assessment, access control, and communications to assure adequate response. Members of the security organization must be trained, equipped, qualified and requalified to perform assigned job duties in accordance with Appendix B to Part 73, I.A, (1} (a) and (b); 8(1 )(a); and the applicable portions of II." This change eliminates a required staffing level and describes qualification and training levels for watchmen, only, as the primary members of the security organization.

18

Paragraph (d)(6} has been changed to require "timely" response from the designated response forces. If timely response cannot be provided, additional protective measures may be required, to include use of armed guards.

Paragraph (d)(?) has been deleted.

Paragraph (d)(8) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(7) and revised to read as follows: "A personnel identification system and a controlled lock S>!,Stem must be established and maintained to limit access to authorized individuals." This eliminates the unnecessary coupling of the identification system with the system used for key and lock control as requested by commenters.

Paragraph (d)(9) has been deleted. If a person is authorized access to the PA, properly identified, and subject to search, there is no need for the individual to be escorted.

Paragraph (d)(10) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(8). Regarding communications, the term "security organization" has been revised to "onsite security force members" to more precisely define communication channels.

Paragraph (d)(11) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(9) and revised to read as

follows: "All individuals, vehicles and hand-carried packages entering the protected area must be checked for proper authorization and visually searched for explosives before entry." This is permissible because the amount of explosives needed to cause a radiological release is not easily concealable.

Paragraph {d)(12) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(10). The text of this paragraph is unchanged from the proposed rule.

Paragraph (d)(13) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(11) and revised to read as follows: "All detection systems, surveillance/ assessment systems, and supporting subsystems including illumination systems must be tamper-indicating with line supervision and be maintained in operable condition. Timely compensatory measures must be taken after 19

discovery of inoperability to assure that the effectiveness of the physical protection system ,s not reduced "

Paragraph (d)(14) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(12) and remains unchanged from the proposed rule.

Paragraph (d)(15) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(13). This provision has been added to assure that duplication of records under §72.180 is not required. Paragraph (d)( 13)(ii) has been revised to read as follows: "Screening records of members of the security organization." Finally, the log of patrols must contain all patrols, not just routine patrols .

Paragraph (e) t.as been revised for clarity.

11. Section 73.71, Reporting of safeguards events, remains unchanged from the proposed rule.

Part 74 - - Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material.

12. In Section 74.51, Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear material, paragraph (a) has been revised to read as follows: "General performance objectives .

Each licensee who is authorized to possess five or more formula kilograms of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) and to use such material at any site, other than a nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, an irradiated fuel reprocessing plant, an operation involved with waste disposal, or an independent spent fuel storage facility licensed pursuant to Part 72 of this chapter, shall establish, implement, and maintain a Commission approved material control ana accounting (MC&A} system that will achieve the following objectives ... "

This paragraph specifically exempts Part 72 ISFSls from the requirements of 10 CFR 74.51.

20

Part 75 - - Safeguards on Nuclear Material - Implementation of US/IAEA Agreement.

13. Section 75.4, Definitions, remains unchanged from the proposed rule.

Criminal Penalties NRG notes that these final amendments are issued under Sections 161 b and i of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Therefore, violation of these regulations may subject a person to criminal sanctions under section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act.

Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion The Commission has determined that this final rule is the type of action described as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3)(i) and (iii). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement oor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this final rule.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget {0MB), approval numbers 3150-0002, 3150-0055, 3150-0123, and 3150-0132.

Public Protection Notification If an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

21

v Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a "Final Regulatory Analysis" for this final rule. The final analysis examines the benefits and alternatives considered by the Commission. The "Final Regulatory Analysis" is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document room, 2120 L Street NW (Lower Level), Washington DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Priscilla A. Dwyer, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

The "Final Regulatory Analysis" is available for viewing and downloading from the NRC's rulemaking bulletin board.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission certifies that this rule does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The final rule affects operators of ISFSls and DOE as the operator of the MRS and GROA. The affected licensees do not fall within the scope of the definition of "small entities" set forth in Section 601 (3) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or the NRC's size standards (10 CFR 2.810).

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, NRC has determined that this action is not a "major rule" and has verified this determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of 0MB.

22

Backfrt Analysis The Commission has determined that the backfit rule in 10 CFR 50.109 does not apply because this final rule does not impose new requirements on existing 10 CFR Part 50 licensees. The backfit rule in 10 CFR 72.62 may be applicable to one facility which has only one isolation zone exterior to the perimeter barrier. However, the NRC staff has identified alternative measures currently in place that provide an equivalent level of physical protection.

The staff does not intend to require this facility to establish an interior isolation zone. Thus, no backfit occurs due to the new rule. Because 10 CFR 72.62 does not cover reporting and recordkeeping requirements, the inclusion of 10 CFR 73.51 in 10 CFR 73.71 event reporting is not a backfit. Finally, the transfer of spent fuel from a reactor, licensed under 10 CFR Part 50 and subject to 10 CFR 73.55 physical protection requirements, to an ISFSI licensed under 10 CFR Part 72, and its associated physical protection provisions (e.g., 10 CFR 73.51) is not a backfit. A new license under 10 G,FR P1:1rt 72 is a matter of compliance with regulations. In all cases, transition from 10 CFR 73.55 to 73.51 is a relaxation of requirements and not a backfit.

List of Subjects 10 CFR Part 60 Criminal penalties, High-level waste, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Nuclear materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Waste treatment and disposal.

10 CFR Part 72 Manpower training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, Spent fuel.

10 CFR Part 73 Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Export, Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

23

10 CFR Part 74 Accounting, Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Material control and accounting, Nuclear materials, Packaging and containers, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeepmg requirements, Scientific equipment, Special nuclear material.

10 CFR Part 75 Criminal penalties, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C.

552 and 553 the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 60, 72, 73, 74, and 75.

PART 60 - DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC REPOSITORIES

1. The authority citation for Part 60 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 51, 53, 62, 63, 65, 81,161,182, 183, 68 Stat. 929,930,932,933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233); secs. 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5842, 5846); secs. 10 and 14, Pub. L.95-601, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 2021a and 5851}; sec. 102, Pub. L.91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 114, 121, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2213g, 2228, as amended (42 U.S.C.

10134, 10141) and Pub. L. 102-486, sec 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851).

2. In §60.21, paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4), and (c)(10) are revised to read as follows:

§60.21 contem ot application.

24

(b) ***

(3) A detailed plan to provide physical protection of high- level radioactive waste in accordance with §73.51 of this chapter. This plan must include the design for physical protection, the licensee's safeguards contingency plan, and security organization personnel training and qualification plan. The plan must list tests, inspections, audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such requirements.

(4) A description of the program to meet the requirements of §60 78.

(c) ,,,_

(10) A description of the program to be used to maintain the records described in

§§60. 71 and 60. 72.

3. In §60.31, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows:

§60,31 Construction authodzation .

(b) Common defense and security. That there is reasonable assurance that the activities proposed in the application will not be inimical to the common defen~ ana security .

4. In §60.41, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:

§60.41 Standards tor issuance of license.

25

(c) The issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common defense and secunty and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public.

5. A new §60.78 is added to read as follows*

§60. 78 Material control and accounting records and reports.

DOE shall implement a program of material control and accOL1nting (and accidental criticality reporting) that is the same as that specified in§§ 72.72, 72.74, 72.76, and 72.78 of this chapter.

PART 72 - LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

6. The authority citation for Part 72 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929,930,932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953, 954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L.86-373, 73 Stat. 688, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C 5841, 5842, 5846); Pub. L.95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 as amended by Pub. L. 102-486, sec. 7902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L.91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C.

4332); secs. 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 141, Pub. L 97-425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec. 148, Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10151, 10152, 10153, 10155, 10157.

10161, 10168).

Section 72.44(9) also issued under secs. 142(b) and 148(c), (d), Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-232, 1330-236 (42 U.S.C. 10162(b), 10168(c), (d)). Section 72.46 also issued under sec. 189, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134. Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C.

26

10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued under sec. 145(g), Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10165(g)). Subpart J also issued under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 2(19), 117(a), 141(h),

Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2224 (42 U.S.C. 10101, 10137(a), 10161(h)).

Subparts Kand Lare also issued under sec. 133, 98 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10153) and sec. 218(a), 96 Stat. 2252 (42 U.S.C. 10198).

7'. In §72.24, paragraph (o) is revised to read as follows:

§ 72,24 Contents of application: Technical information.

(o) A description of the detailed security measures for physical protection, including design features and the plans required by Subpart H. For an application from DOE for an ISFSI or MRS, DOE will provide a description of the physical protection plan for protection against radiological sabotage as required by Subpart H.

8. Section 72.180 is revised to read as follows:

§ 72,180 Physical protection plan.

The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow a detailed plan for physical protection as described in §73.51 of this chapter. The licensee shall retain a copy of the current plan as a record until the Commission terminates the license for which the procedures were developed and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain the superseded material for 3 years after each change or until termination of the license. The plan must describe how the applicant will meet the requirements of §73.51 of this chapter and provide physical protection during on-site transportation to and from the proposed ISFSI or MRS and include within the plan the design for physical protection, the licensee's safeguards contingency plan, and the security 27

organization personnel training and qualification plan. The plan must list tests, inspections, audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such requirements.

PART 73- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

9. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930,948, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245, sec. 1701, 106 Stat. 2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f).

Section 73.1 ah:,o issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97--425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C, 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L.99-399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169}.

10. In §73.1, paragraph (b)(6) is revised to read as follows:

§73, 1 Purpose and scope.

(b) *"'*

{6) This part prescribes requirements for the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored in either an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or a monitored retrievable storage {MRS) installation licensed under Part 72 of this chapter, or stored at the geologic repository operations area licensed under Part 60 of this chapter.

28

11. The introductory text of §73.50 is revised to read as follows:

§73.50 Reguirements for physical protection for licensed activities.

Each licensee who is not subject to §73.51, but who possesses, uses, or stores formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material that are not readily separable from other radioactive material and which have total external radiation dose rates in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any a~ssible surfaces without intervening shielding other than at a nuclear reactor facility licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, shall comply with the following:

12. A new §73.51 is added to read as follows:

§73.51 Regujrements for the physical protection of stored spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.

(a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of §§73.20, 73.50, or 73.67, the physical protection requirements of this section apply to each licensee that stores spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste pursuant to paragraphs (a){1 ){i), (ii), and (2) of this section. This includes -

(1) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored under a specific license issued pursuant to Part 72 of this Chapter:

(i) At an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or (ii) At a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installation; or (2) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at a geologic repository operations area {GROA) licensed pursuant to Part 60 of this Chapter; (b) General performance objectives.

(1) Each licensee subject to this section shall establish and maintain a physical protection system with the objective of providing high assurance that activities involving spent 29

nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste do not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety.

(2) To meet the general objective of paragraph (b)(1) of this section, each licensee subject to this section shall meet the following performance capabilities.

(i) Store spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste only within a protected area; (ii) Grant access to the protected area only to individuals who are authorized to enter the protected area; (iii) Detect and assess unauthorized penetration of, or activities within, the protected area; (iv) Provide timely communication to a designated response force whenever necessary; and (v) Manage the physical protection organization in a manner that maintains its effectiveness.

(3) The physical protection system must be designed to protect against loss of control of the facility that could be sufficient to cause a radiation exposure exceeding the dose as described in §72.106 of this Chapter.

(c) Plan retention. Each licensee subject to this section shall retain a copy of the effective physical protection plan as a record for 3 years or until termination of the license for which procedures were developed.

(d) Physical protection systems, components, and procedures. A licensee shall comply with the following provisions as methods acceptable to NRC for meeting the performance capabilities of §73.51(b)(2). The Commission may, on a specific basis and upon request or on its own initiative, authorize other alternative measures for the protection of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste subject to the requirements of this section, if after evaluation of the specific alternative measures, it finds reasonable assurance of compliance with the performance capabilities of paragraph {b)(2) of this section.

(1) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste must be stored only within a protected area so that access to this material requires passage through or penetration of two physical barriers, one barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and one barrier offering substantial penetration resistance. The physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area 30

must be as defined in §73.2. Isolation zones, typically 20 feet wide each, on both sides of this barrier, must be provided to facilitate assessment. The barrier offering substantial resistance to penetration may be provided by an approved storage cask or building walls such as those of a reactor or fuel storage building.

(2) Illumination must be sufficient to permit adequate assessment of unauthorized penetrations of or activities within the protected area.

(3) The perimeter of the protected area must be subject to continual surveillance and be protected by an active intrusion alarm system which is capable of detecting penetrations through the isolation zone and that is monitored in a continually staffeci primary alarm station and in one additional continually staffed location. The primary alarm station must be located within the protected area; have bullet-resisting walls, doors, ceiling, and floor; and the interior of the station must not be visible from outside the protected area. A timely means for assessment of alarms must also be provided. Regarding alarm monitoring, the redundant location need only provide a summary indication that an alarm has been generated.

(4} The protected area must be monitored by daily random patrols.

(5) A security organization with written procedures must be established. The security organization must include sufficient personnel per shift to provide for monitoring of detection systems and the conduct of surveillance, assessment, access control, and communications to assure adequate response. Members of the security organization must be trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to perform assigned job duties in accordance with Appendix B to

Part 73, ~ctions I.A, (1} (a) and (b), 8(1)(a), and the applicable portions of II.

(6) Documented liaison with a designated response force or local law enforcement agency (LLEA) must be established to permit timely response to unauthorized penetration or activities.

(7) A personnel identification system and a controlled lock system must be established and maintained to limit access to authorized individuals.

(8) Redundant communications capability must be provided between onsite security force members and designated response force or LLEA.

(9) All individuals, vehicles, and hand-carried packages entering the protected area must be checked for proper authorization and visually searched for explosives before entry.

31

l (10) Written response procedures must be established and maintained for addressing unauthorized penetration of, or activities within, the protected area including Category 5, "Procedures, of Appendix C to Part 73. The licensee shall retain a copy of response ft procedures as a record for 3 years or until termination of the license for which the procedures were developed. Copies of superseded material must be retained for 3 years after each change or until termination of the license.

(11) All detection systems, surveillance/assessment systems, and supporting subsystems, including illumination systems, must be tamper-indicating with line supervision and be maintained in operable condition. Timely compensatory measures must be taken after discovery of inoperability, to assure that the effectiveness of the security system is not reduced.

(12) The physical protection program must be reviewed once every 24 months by individuals independent of both physical protection program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the physical protection program. The physical protection program review must include an evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical protection system and a verification of the liaison established with the designated response force or LLEA.

{13) The following documentation must be retained as a record for 3 years after the record is made or until termination of the license. Duplicate records to those required under

§72.180 of Part 72 and §73. 71 of this Part need not be retained under the requirements of this section:

(i) A log of individuals granted access to the protected area; (ii) Screening records of members of the security organization;

{iii) A log of all patrols; (iv) A record of each alarm received, identifying the type of alarm, location, date and time when received, and disposition of the alarm; and (v) The physical protection program review reports.

(e) A licensee that operates a GROA is exempt from the requirements of this section for that GROA after permanent closure of the GROA.

13. In §73.71, paragraphs (b}(1} and (c) are revised to read as follows:

32

§73.71 Reporting of safeguards events (b)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.37,_ 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or 73.67 shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph l(a)(1) of Appendix G to this Part. Licensees subject to the provisions of §§73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or each licensee possessing strategic special nuclear material and subject to §73.67(d) shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraphs l(a)(2),

(a){3), (b), and {c) of Appendix G to this Part. Licensees subject to the provisions of §§73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, or 73.60 shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph l(d) of Appendix G to this Part.

{c) Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or each licensee possessing SSNM and subject to the provisions of §73.67(d) shall maintain a current log and record the safeguards events described in paragraphs II (a) and {b) of Appendix G to this Part within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of discovery by a licensee employee or member of the licensee's contract security organization. The licensee shall retain the log of events recorded under this section as a record for 3 years after the last entry is made in each log or until termination of the license.

Part 74 - MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

14. The authority citation for Part 74 continues to read as follows:

33

AUTHORITY. Secs. 53, 57, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 930,932,948,953,954, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2282, 2297f); secs. 201, as amended 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846).

15. In § 74.51, the introductory text of paragraph (a) is revised to read as follows:

§74.51 Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear material.

{a} General performance objectives. Each licensee who is aL'thorized to possess five or more formula kilograms of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM} and to use such material at any site, other than a nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, an irradiated fuel reprocessing plant, an operation involved with waste disposal, or an independent spent fuel storage facility licensed pursuant to Part 72 of this chapter shall establish, implement, and maintain a Commission-approved material control and accounting (MC&A) system that will achieve the following objectives:

PART 75-SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL- IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT

16. The authority citation for Part 75 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 63, 103, 104, 122, 161, 68 Stat. 930,932,936,937,939,948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2133, 2134, 2152, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841).

Section 75.4 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C.

10155, 10161).

34

17. In §75.4, paragraph (k)(5) is revised to read as follows:

§75.4 Definitions.

(k) . -

(5) Any location where the possession of more than 1 effective kilogram of nuclear material is licensed pursuant to Parts 40, 60, or 70 of this Chapter, or pursuant to an agreement state license.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of May, 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

L--

Hoyle,

~::r,:e;rary of the Commission.

35

DOCKETED US RC Boston Edison Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

95 DEC 19 P2 :51 cF,:- *r ,. , 1 ~. r.

OOC L : . -.

E,;1,,._ I! ..:

E. T . Boulette, PhD Sen ior Vice President - Nuclear Decemb er 14 , 1995 BECo Ltr. #95-l 25 Secretary DOCKET NUMBER PR U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission PROPOSED RULE £,a 11a,J:xtlS Washington , DC 20555

(~F~~19)@

Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35 Proposed Rule - Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel 60FR42079 Although Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station is not currently an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) or Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility, Boston Edison Company endorses the comments submitted by the Nuclear Energy Institute dated November 13, 1995, regarding the proposed rule on Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High Level Radioactive Waste . The proposed regulations are not commensurate with any potential threat to the public health and safety; therefore, applying protected area design basis threat and Part 73 safeguards criteria to an ISFSI would result in an excessive level of protection . We, therefore, concur with the NEI proposal to equate the regulatory burden commensurate with the safety significance.

~LtU'tk E. T. Boulette, PhD MTURap95/Prfuel cc: Mr. R. Eaton, Project Manager Division of Reactor Projects - 1/11 Mail Stop: 1401 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1 White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Senior Resident Inspector Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Acmowtedgect b veard ..rnrc *r rn95 ..."";

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO~

DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION D . . ,,,."'n1 Statistics Poctmartc o::-ta 1.a\1s \9.S: ft, -!J> ~ :-t>e.l))

Co')i : E~r-.e!*.,~o__.__ _ _ _ _ __

Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard DOCKETED Glen Allen, Virginia 23060 U NRC

95 OEC 13 P2 :44 December 8, 1995 OFFI CE rn~ Sl:. CRf-_TMrf OOC KE fl: G & c.l *VI ['.:.

tPfl.lCi.

1 DOCKET NUMBER PR

VIRGINIA POWER PROP~ RULE....................,~~.,s-~

( bOAe.."\-a.079') ~

Secretary Serial No. GL 95-052 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission NURPC Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Dear Sir:

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE SAFEGUARDS FOR SPENT NU CLEAR FUEL OR HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE Virginia Power has reviewed the proposed rule, Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste (60 FR 42079) , dated August 15, 1995. We concur with the comments separately submitted by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). In addition, we submit comments in Attachment 1 which address several of the questions identified in the Specific Considerations section of the rulemaking notice.

Should you have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours,

w~4 M. L. Bowling, Manager Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support Attachment cc: Mr. Thomas E. Tipton Nuclear Energy Institute 1776 I Street, N. W.

Suite 400 Washington, D. C. 20006-3708 l 4 199S ..

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ATTACHMENT 1 COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS

COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. Would the proposed amendments impose any significant additional costs for safeguards of currently stored spent nuclear fuel beyond what is now incurred for that purpose?

The costs associated with installing a continual surveillance system and maintaining a minimum of two watchmen per shift to monitor the system would be typical of the additional costs imposed by the proposed amendment beyond those now incurred. We consider these costs to be a significant continuing cost.

2. Is there reason to expect the costs to future licensees to differ substantially from those of current licensees?

To the extent that current licensees have been requested to commit to these practices in initial licensing, there is no anticipated difference in cost.

3. Are the cost estimates in Table Ill of the Draft Regulatory Analysis representative of current industry experience? Are there significant costs that have not been included in the table?

The cost estimate ranges given in Table Ill are sufficiently broad to address industry experience. However, the continual surveillance system is not and should be identified as a separate line item with appropriate ranges identified for facility and annual operating costs.

4. Are the costs justified by the benefits that would be afforded by the proposed amendments? Are there alternatives that would afford essentially the same benefits, but be more cost effective?

The individual protective measures specified in the new §73.51 paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(14) of the proposed rule each have merit. However, the aggregate of these measures, which constitutes the proposed requirement, is not necessary to provide assurance of an adequate level of protection for public health and safety. Therefore, the costs are not justified by a commensurate improvement in the level of protection for public health and safety.

While it is recognized that a reliable physical protection system must include a combination of features, an appropriate system design would not necessarily be enhanced by the utilization of multiple measures which functionally duplicate each other (e.g., a continuously monitored surveillance system in addition to an intrusion detection system). The proposed rule should allow applicants the latitude of selecting and justifying site-specific means by which safeguards for storage of spent nuclear fuel are suitably assured.

Department of Energy DOCKETED Washington, DC 20585 115 uc-c

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{NOV 2 0 1995 '95 --BEE -4 Pl2 :20 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Docketing and Services Branch Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Sir:

The U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) has reviewed the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR Parts 60, 72, 73, and 75, Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel for High-Level Radioactive Waste (60 FR 42079, August 15, 1995). Enclosed are OCRWM's comments that represent requests for clarification that we believe are necessary.

If you have any questions on this matter, please contact Mr. Chris Einberg ofmy staff at (202) 586-8869.

Sincerely, q~a- ~~

Ronald A. Milner, Director Office of Program Management and Integration Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

Enclosure:

Comments on NRC Rule on Safeguards for Repository High-Level Radioactive Waste cc:

R. Loux, State ofNevada R. Price, NV Legislative Committee, NV J. Meder, NV Legislative Counsel Bureau, NV D. Bechtel, Clark County, NV P. Niedzielski-Eichner, Nye County, NV B. Mettam, Inyo County, CA V. Poe, Mineral County, NV *NOV 3 0 1995 1 F. Mariani, White Pine County, NV H. Estes, Lander County, NV Acknowledged bV eafd .,_.._ __.nm1'

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S. Green, Eureka County, NV J. Hoffinan, Esmeralda County, NV J. Regan, Churchill County, NV L. Bradshaw, Nye County, NV J. Pitts, Lincoln County, NV W. Barnard, NWTRB, Washington, DC T. Burton, NV Indian Environmental Coalition, NV R. Holden, National Congress of American Indians J. Greeves, NRC J. Holonich, NRC J. Telford, NRC

ENCLOSURE COMMENTS ON NRC RULE ON SAFEGUARDS FOR REPOSITORY HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

COMMENTS ON NRC RULE ON SAFEGUARDS FOR REPOSITORY HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE Comment 1 Throughout the Supplementary Information to the proposed rule, as well as in the proposed rule itself, it is clear that the Commission's express intent is to address only the safeguarding of stored spent nuclear fuel and HLW at various facilities, including the GROA, and that the proposed rule is not applicable to the GROA once it is permanently closed. Indeed, in the Supplementary Information, the Commission has made it clear that for the GROA, its safeguards concern is expressly related to the operational phase of the surface facility, and that such safeguards will be deemed to be sufficient to protect against any acts against the underground facility during the period of operation. We also believe that the proposed language of Section 73 .51 is unambiguous in that it is applicable only to stored spent nuclear fuel and HLW. Nevertheless, to avoid any potential misinterpretation, however strained, DOE believes that it is important to add another clarification statement regarding the applicability of the rule to the GROA in the Supplementary Information accompanying the Final Rule.

We would suggest that in the discussion of the requirement for DOE to submit a detailed plan to provide physical protection for the storage of spent nuclear fuel and HLW at a GROA in accordance with Section 73 .51 , the Commission also state the following :

This physical protection plan is applicable only to GROA operations, and is not applicable to the GROA after permanent closure pursuant to Section 60.51 .

Comment2 We also note that under proposed Section 60.21(b)(3), DOE is to provide the detailed safeguards plan in its initial license application. However, we also note that Sections 60.21 and 60.24 are to be read together in that although the application is to be as complete as possible when submitted, DOE is nevertheless required to update the application to provide more detailed information for Commission review prior to its issuance of a license. Thus, the detailed plan would have to be complete at the operational stage under Section 60.41 (that is, prior to any receipt ofHLW on-site), and would not have to be complete at the construction authorization stage under Section 60.31 . This point also should be clarified in the Supplementary Information to the Final Rule.

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UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECT~

WASHINGTON, D.C . 20460 USNRC

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OFFICE oF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE Mr. John C. Hoyle Secretary of the Commission Nu clear Regulatory Commission Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Mr. Hoyle:

In accordance with its responsibilities under Section 309 of the Clean Air Act, the U.S. Environmental Protection Ag ency has reviewed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 10 CFR Part 60, 72, 73, and 75 Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste proposed rule, published in the Federal Register August 15, 1995, and has no comments.

We appreciate the opportunity to review the proposed rule.

If you have any questions, please call me on (202) 260-5053 or have your staff contact Ms. Susan Offerdal (202) 260-5059.

Sincere' / ; / j Richard E. Sanderson Director Office of Federal Activities

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Southern Nuclear Operating Company Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham , Alabama 35201 Telephone (205) 868-5131 DOCKETED Dave Morey usr:Pc

95 NOV .l.$oijlt_B1t?jr@ Nuclear Operating Company

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Vice President Farley Project the southern electnc system Docket Nos. 50-348 DOCKET NUMBER p PROPOSED RULE___.,g.,-,J.~ J.3-+-1-5' 50-364 (ic,oF~4.QD7'l) ~

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(60 Federal Register 42079 dated August 15, 1995) ~~ co

Dear Sir:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company (Southern Nuclear) has reviewed the notice of proposed rulemaking "Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste," published in the Federal Register on August 15, 1995. In accordance with this request, Southern Nuclear is in total agreement with the NEI comments which are to be provided to the NRC.

Respectfully submitted, Dave Morey DNM/JMG cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company R. D. Hill, Plant Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC

B. L. Siegel, Licensing Project Manager, NRR U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator T . M. Ross, Senior Resident Inspector

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-=::=-- ENTERGY DOCKETED USNRC Entergy Operations, Inc.

1448 S.R. 333 Russellville, AR 72801 Tel 501 858-5000

95 NOV 17 P5 :35 November 13, 1995 0CAN119504 Secretary U . S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Arkansas Nuclear One - Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6 Comments on Proposed Rule: Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste Gentlemen:

In response to your request for comments on the proposed rule to clarify safeguards requirements for spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive wastes stored at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSis), power reactors that have permanently ceased operations, etc. (60FR42079), the attached comments are forwarded for your consideration.

An ISFSI is scheduled to begin operation at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) during 1996 utilizing a general license issued pursuant to 10CFR72. Therefore, our comments are directed at those items in the proposed rule which could have an effect on safeguards at an ISFSI operating under a general license. For the proposed ISFSI at ANO, Entergy Operations agrees with the staff's assertion that the proposed rulemaking does not add any additional safeguards requirements for spent nuclear fuel storage under a general license.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact me.

Very truly yours, AJ~m~

Dwight C. Mims Director, Nuclear Safety DCM/jjd attachment mov 3l i995L

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DOCKt: ... 1, G i:;; S .::!VICE SECT ON OFFICE OF fHt S.:CRETARY OF THE co:!iMISSiON

U.S. NRC November 13, 1995 0CANI 19504 Page 2 cc: U . S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl-137 Washington, DC 20555 Mr. Leonard J. Callan Regional Administrator U . S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RegionIV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-8064 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Arkansas Nuclear One P.O. Box310 London, AR 72847 Mr. George Kalman NRR Project Manager Region IV/ANO-I & 2 U . S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRR Mail Stop 13-H-3 One White Flint North 115 5 5 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Attachment to 0CAN119504 Page 1 of2 COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE

1. On September 19, 1995, Mr. Jack W. Roe of the NRC staff sent a letter to Mr.

John P. Stetz of Centerior Energy. In this letter, the staff states that the requirements of Subpart K to 10CFR72 [concerning use of a general license for an independent spent fuel storage facility (ISFSI)], are considered to be "in addition to" other Part 72 requirements. The letter also identified several requirements of Part 72 that applied to a general licensee beyond those in Subpart K. The requirements of Subpart H (Physical Protection) were not discussed.

It appears from the proposed rule that the revised §72.180 does not apply to general licensees, since the proposed §72.212(b)(5) gives a general licensee the option of maintaining their physical security plan per §73 .51 or §73.55. In light of the letter discussed above, please clarify whether this requirement and the remaining requirements of Subpart H (§72.182, §72.184, and §72.186) also apply to general licensees "in addition to" the physical security requirements included in SubpartK.

2. The retention periods for the physical security plan included in the proposed

§72.180 are redundant to those in §73.5l(c). These requirements should only be included once.

3. The proposed §72.212(b)(l)(iv) discusses a new notification requirement to inform the NRC whether a general licensee will implement §73.51 or their approved physical security plan pursuant to §73.55. It is not clear how this notification should be made for persons that have already submitted the letter required by

§72.212(b)(l)(i), but have not yet begun use of the general license.

Additionally, the proposed §72.212(b)(l)(iv) contains the following typographical error which should be corrected as follows: "Notify the NRC as to whether they will implement §73 .51 or of this chapter Q!. their approved security plan ... "

4. The discussion in the background section for the proposed rule states that the proposed amendments do not require specific protection against the malevolent use of a vehicle. However, the existing and proposed §72.212(b)(5) provide requirements to use the same requirements and provisions set forth in the licensee's physical security plan pursuant to §73.55, with certain conditions and exceptions. Since §72.212 was promulgated, §73.55 has had sections (c)(7) -

(c)(l0) added which add requirements connected with vehicular threats. These sections of §73 .55 are not included as excepted sections under §72.212(b)(5)(v).

The wording of §73 . l(a) specifically exempts ISFSis from the radiological sabotage vehicular design basis threats included in §73 .l(a)(l)(i)(E) and

Attachment to 0CAN119504 Page 2 of2

§73. l(a)(l)(iii), which in tum renders §73.55(c)(7) - (10) not applicable for ISFSis. However, making this determination is a long and arduous process.

Clarification could be provided by listing §73.55(c)(7) - (10) as exempted provisions for ISFSis under a general license in §72.212(b}(5)(v).

Station Support Department OOC KC:TED USN RC - -----

PECO ENERGY PECO Energy Company Nuclear Group Headquarters 965 Chesterbrook Boulevard Wayne, PA 19087-5691

'95 NOV 17 P5 :34 November 13, 1995 Mr. John C. Hoyle Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, DC 20555-001

Subject:

Comments Concerning NRC Proposed Rule 10 CFR 60, 72, 73, and 75, "Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste" (60FR42079)

Dear Mr. Hoyle:

This letter is being submitted in response to the NRC's request for comments concerning the Proposed Rule 1o CFR 60, 72, 73, and 75, "Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste," published in the Federal Register (i.e., 60FR42079, dated August 15, 1995).

This proposed rule is intended to clarify safeguards requirements for the storage of spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste. This proposed rule would allow general licensees the option of implementing the proposed safeguards requirements for spent nuclear fuel stored in approved casks at operating power reactor sites. The NRC considers this proposed rule necessary to reduce the regulatory uncertainty regarding the safeguards requirements for the storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste without reducing the level of protection for public health and safety.

PECO Energy Company appreciates the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule. PECO Energy considers the proposed rule burdensome in that the level of safeguards proposed for a nuclear power plant is not in proportion to the risk or consequences of an intrusion or sabotage attempt at an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). We support the Nuclear Energy lnstitute's (NEl's) position and comments regarding this proposed rule. The recommendations provided by NEI improve the clarity of the proposed rule by distinguishing between an ISFSI and nuclear power facilities, as well as providing performance based protection requirements that allow facility owners/operators to meet those performance requirements in a flexible manner. The changes to the proposed rule recommended by NEI demonstrate a balanced approach considering the risk to health and safety of the public.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Very truly yours,

/): 6? 7/_d'/4 /r~*~

G. A. Hunger, Jr.

Director - Licensing

'NOV 3 o 1995* _

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PROPOSED ff I E . t t...0-, ::\9-)::\ ~15 DOC KETED November 13, 1995 Uooi=lu\-~o 7'f} @ USN RC COMMENTS OF OHIO CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENERGY, INC. ( "OCRE") '00 PNO'P 0$0 p 4 :31 RULE, "SAFEGUARDS FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL OR HIGH- LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE," 60 FED. REG. 42079 (AUGUST 15, 1995)

OFFICE OF SFCRfTARY DOCKE TING 6: ::.cR'./ICE OCRE believes that this proposed rule does not specify safegu ards r~ 1

1 mnts which are sufficiently stringent to prevent radiological sabotage.

For example, the proposed rule does not require protection against the malevolent use of a vehicle. OCRE believes that such protection should be required. The Oklahoma City bombing has demonstrated the reality and destructive potential of terrorism using vehicle bombs in the United States.

For the special case of the MRS, OCRE recommends that "malevolent use of a vehicle" include the malevolent use of aircraft. The MRS, which may become a reality with the passage of HR 1020 or the development of a private spent fuel storage facility as proposed by the Mescalero Apaches and a consortium of utilities, will result in the collection of large quantities of spent fuel in one location. This may present an attractive target for terrorists or hostile foreign governments. If defenses against land vehicles are hardened, then attack by air, through either bombing or a kamikaze attack, becomes more attractive. Although the use of aircraft does present logistical and financial challenges (in comparison with land vehicles), the tempting target of l arge quantities of spent fuel may provide sufficient motivation to overcome these challenges, particularly for well-financed terrorists or foreign governments. It is OCRE's position that a MRS should be under military guard to prevent radiological sabotage.

Respectfully submitted, Susan L. Hiatt Director, OCRE 8275 Munson Rd.

Mentor, OH 44060-2406 (216) 255-3158 E-mail: susan.hiatt@cleham.org

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U.S. NUCLEA9 li'"G '{ COMM SSIO DOCKETING & SERVICE SE:CTION OFFICE OF- THE:. S CRETARY OF THf Cv ..,S ON

November 14, 1995 NOTE TO: Emile Juli an Chief, Docketing FROM: Carol Gallagher RES, DRA

SUBJECT:

DOCKETING OF COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE ON SAFEGUARDS FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL Attached for docketing is a comment letter related to the Proposed Rule on Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel. This comment was received on our electronic bulletin board on November 13, 1995 at 9:27 p.m. The user logged on at time of receipt of the comment was Susan Hiatt, OCRE, (216) 255-3158.

Please send a copy of the docketed comment to John Telford (mail stop T9-F-33) for his records.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/ o attachment:

J. Tel ford S. Frattali

~NIAGARA N UMOHAWK DDCK[TEO USNE~c

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION , P.O. BOX 63 , LYCOMING, N.Y 13093/TEL. (315) 349-2660 FAX (315) 349-2605 MARTIN J. McCORMICK JR. P.E.

Vice President

95 Nov 15 P6 :oa Nuclear Safety Assessment and Support OFFICE OF .

DOCK[TiNG Sfr_RET.4 RY BR,/2}~iHER¥ /Cf November 9, 1995 Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Sir:

These comments are submitted on behalf of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, operator of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, in response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) request for information and comments concerning Safeguards/or Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste (60 Fed Reg. 42079-August 15, 1995).

Niagara Mohawk has reviewed the proposed rule as well as a draft of the prepared comments from NEI to be submitted to your office. We agree with the position taken by NEI in that the safeguards requirements for spent fuel "controlled access areas" do not, in our opinion, require the same level of protection as nuclear power plant "protected areas".

Niagara Mohawk is of the belief that the radiological consequences associated with sabotage attempts at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSis) is low with respect to sabotage committed at operating nuclear power plants. In our opinion, merely tying the ISFSI protection requirements of Part 72 to those of the Part 73 requirements for physical protection of the protected area of a Part 50 Licensed Nuclear Power Plant, would result in an over commitment of protection and resultant excessive financial burden on licensees.

Niagara Mohawk appreciates the opportunity to comment on this proposed rule.

Yours truly,

?f j.~*~ }-

Martin J. McCormick Jr.

Vice President Nuclear Safety Assessment & Support

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Telephone (508) 779-6711 YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY TWX 710-380-7619 DOCKETED llS RC 580 Main Street, Bolton, Massachusetts 01740-1398

95 NOV 14 P6 :23 November 13, 1995 FYC 95-021 John C. Hoyle Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Subject:

Proposed Rule: Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste (60FR42079, August 15, 1995)

Dear Mr. Hoyle:

Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the subject proposed rule regarding safeguards for spent fuel and high level waste storage. Yankee is the owner of the Yankee Nuclear Power Station, which is in the process of being decommissioned. Yankee's Nuclear Services Division also provides engineering and licensing services to other nuclear power facilities in the New England region.

In general, we support the comments submitted by the Nuclear Energy Institute on the subject proposed rulemaking. We also have additional comments to offer based on our experience with revising the Yankee physical security and safeguards program following permanent cessation of power operations to focus on the safe storage of spent fuel and our current involvement with decommissioning activities and interim storage facility planning.

Basis for the Proposed Rule Chan1e In a recent interview1 Chairman Jackson conveyed her definition of regulatory effectiveness by stating, in part, that regulatory effectiveness "is risk-informed, performance-based." We have reviewed the proposed rulemaking and have found no evidence in the Statements of Consideration that the proposed rule addresses risk. Secondly, while a performance-based approach is offered in proposed section 73.51(b)(2), the rule transitions into a very prescriptive rule in section 73.51(d) that defeats the purpose and benefits of a performance-based approach.

On the basis of eliminating such inconsistency, sections 73.51(d)(l) through (14) should be eliminated. Furthermore, it appears that the rule is being proposed out of a desire to end the practice of addressing safeguards on a case-by-case basis for facilities such as Part 50 facilities undergoing decommissioning. While that may be a legitimate reason, in part, there must be a 1

Nuclear Energy Overview, Nuclear Energy Institute, August 21, 1995.

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Letur, YAEC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commi&&ion November 13, 1995 Pag~2 health and safety reason or legal requirement for proposing the subject requirements. Therefore, we question the adequacy of the subject rulemaking as this proposed rulemaking neither identifies the health and safety basis and/or legal requirement for the proposed changes nor does it reflect the direction which is being sought by the Commission for regulatory effectiveness.

Desi&o Basis Threat As noted by NEI in its comment letter, the NRC has previously concluded in conjunction with the Part 72 final rule for independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSis)2 "that radiological sabotage, to be successful, would have to be carried out using large quantities of explosives ...

and that the consequences to public health and safety would be low because most of the resultant contamination would be localized to the storage site. Thus the condition to be protected against is protracted loss of control of the storage area." Given NRC's conclusion, we agree with NEI that the requirements in proposed section 72.212 are excessive. We agree with NEI that a more reasonable and cost-effective approach would be to provide ISFSis with a level of protection consistent with enhanced industrial security practices, i.e., suitable fencing, locked access points, sufficient illumination, and periodic security patrols.

As noted above for ISFSis, it would take large quantities of explosives to even create a situation in which there was a localized health and safety concern that might approach or exceed Part 100 dose reference values. We believe that a similar conclusion could be reached for Part 50 decommissioning facilities as spent fuel pool structures are physically and structurally robust, and the hazards associated with spent fuel diminish following permanent cessation of power operations, as reflected by the fact that fuel pool cooling becomes increasingly less necessary with time. For example, at the Yankee plant, if coolant is not provided to the spent fuel pool for whatever reason, operators have greater than 4 weeks available before action is required to maintain minimum pool water level or to re-establish cooling.

Given the performance criteria of proposed sections 73.51(a) and (b) and given the improbable nature of creating a radiological sabotage situation in which there could be a Part 100 release, the proposed requirements of section 73.51(d) are not justified. Requirements such as maintenance of a continuously staffed alarm station, and maintenance of such a station at redundant locations are extreme for a Part 50 decommissioning facility. Because (1) no spent fuel is being generated at a Part 50 decommissioning facility, (2) the spent fuel pool structure is physically and structurally robust, and (3) the existing radiological hazards diminish with time, we believe that, like an ISFSI, enhanced industrial security practices can provide the level of safeguards needed to protect the integrity of the pool.

2 55FR29188, July 18, 1990.

utur, YAEC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commi.J&ion November 13, 1995 Page3 Backfit Analysis NRC excuses itself from conducting a backfit analysis because it concludes in the Statements of Consideration that "the backfit rule in 10 CFR 50.109 does not apply to this proposed rule because these proposed amendments do not impose new requirements on existing 10 CFR Part 50 licensees." However, the subject proposed rulemaking would indeed impose new requirements on Part 50 facilities which are undergoing decommissioning. Based on our knowledge of facilities similar to Yankee, we are aware that not all programs will reflect the proposed requirements, yet each one has been reviewed and approved by NRC based on a plant-specific evaluation.

While a narrow reading of the 10 CFR 50.109 suggests that the protection of the backfit rule is afforded only to plants which are under construction or operating, the process represents a logical, reasonable approach to conducting business. The protection afforded by the backfit role is equally important for decommissioning facilities since there still exists the potential for NRC to impose requirements which result in unnecessary expenditure of monies during a time when there is no potential for future revenues (such as with plants under construction), and there are no revenues being generated (such as with operating plants). We suggest that the subject proposed rule is an example of such a situation, and that a backfit analysis should be conducted. If the Commission's reading of section 50.109 is interpreted as suggested in the past, i.e., narrowly construed to apply to only Part 50 operating licenses, then this argument is sufficient for the Commission to remedy the situation by revising the applicability statement of section 50.109 to include Part 50 facilities undergoing decommissioning.

As stated above, we strongly believe that the prescriptive criteria of proposed section 73.51(d)(l) through (14) should be eliminated because they have not been justified as being commensurate with any public health and safety issues. In addition, the Commission should clearly state in the Statements of Consideration that any differences between what has already been approved by NRC and the new rule are acceptable, and licensees of Part 50 decommissioning facilities and/or Part 72 ISFSis need not apply for exemptions. The Commission should also include a corresponding grandfathering provision in the language of the rule. If the Commission does not take such steps, decommissioning facilities will be backfitted into making changes that are not necessary or will be required to request exemptions for program elements which have already been reviewed and accepted by the NRC for the particular site. Furthermore, the prescriptiveness of proposed section 73.51(d) will continue to lend itself to the need for future exemptions as conditions change, thereby using limited NRC and licensee resources unnecessarily. We urge the Commission to limit this proposed rulemaking to the performance-based requirements of proposed sections 73.51(a) and (b).

Letur, YAEC to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiuion November 13, 1995 Page4 In summary, the proposed rulemaking should not proceed until the NRC has identified the health and safety basis for the subject proposed rulemaking and has correlated the proposed requirements with that basis. We would welcome and support further discussion between the industry and NRC on this matter.

Sincerely, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY e M. Grant, Manager latory & Industry Affairs

DOCKETED USNRC NUCLEAR ENE RGY INS T ITUTE

95 NOV 14 A1 1 :4 0 Thomas E. Tipton November 13, 1995 Mr. John C. Hoyle Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking -- Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste --

60 Fed. Reg. 42079 -- August 15, 1995, 10 CFR Parts 60, 72, 73, a nd 75 Notice of Opportunity for Public Comment ATTENTION: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Hoyle:

These comments are submitted on behalf of the nuclear power industry by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 1 in response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) request for information and comments concerning Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste (60 Fed. Reg. 42079 --

August 15, 1995).

The proposed rule modifications cover four parts of 10 CFR and include safeguards requirements for both NRC and DOE installations: independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSI), decommissioned power reactors, monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installations, and geologic repository operation areas (GROA). The comments provided herewith are primarily concerned with Parts 72 and 73 for ISFSI security and fall into three broad categories: backfitting/regulatory analysis; proposed requirements and bases; and recommendations.

1NEI is the organization responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEI's members include all utilities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel fabrication facilities, materials licensees, and other organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear energy issue.

lNDV 1 6' 1995

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Mr. John C. Hoyle November 13, 1995 Page 2 Backfitting/Regulatory Analysis The NRC states that the proposed changes are ... to clarify safeguards requirements for spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste stored at independent spent fuel storage installations.... In addition, because the_se proposed safeguards requirements would codify the existing regulatory practices, there would not be any additional burden placed on current licensees. ... The Commission has determined that the backfitting rule in 10 CFR 50.109 does not apply to this proposed rule because these proposed amendments do not impose new requirements on existing 10 CFR Part 50 licensees.

We disagree with the assumption that the proposed amendments neither impose nor modify requirements of those currently licensed to operate ISFSis. Currently, several approved licensing commitments at ISFSI sites are less restrictive and not as labor intensive- as those in the proposed rule and supporting Draft Regulatory Analysis. At several installations this rule would increase requirements beyond current commitments. Therefore, the backfitting rule does apply.

We also object to the "once approved -- always required" regulatory process that is attempting to institutionalize excessive safeguards requirements. For example, in the proposed rule, section 10 CFR 73.51, there are some prescriptive requirements, e.g., "a minimum of two watchman per shift" ... with ... "random patrols of a frequency not less than once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ." Yet, several other requirements lack specificity and could be interpreted so conservatively that there may be regulatory expectations that would push implementation features beyond reasonable licensing commitments.

Based on the knowledge that spent fuel casks are inherently secure and a 10 CFR Part 100 release from an ISFSI is considered highly improbable, the NRC proposed.

requirements are not commensurate with any potential threat to the public health and safety. Consequently, we believe that there is little or no value added from many of the existing practices for safeguarding stored spent fuel at ISFSis and most requirements in the proposed rule. Therefore, many of the itemized costs (Table III in the Draft Regulatory Analysis), that add up to several million dollars, are not justified.

Proposed requirements and bases We do not understand the basis for tying the ISFSI protection requirements of Part 72 to those of the Part 73 requirements for physical protection of the protected area (PA) of a power plant. We assert that there would be different actions and results from potential threat scenarios. Yet, if an ISFSI were not constructed within the

Mr. John C. Hoyle November 13, 1995 Page 3 current protected area (PA), the proposed rule would require establishment of a separate "protected area" with physical barriers, detection and surveillance systems, guards and access controls essentially the same as for the PA of a Part 50 licensed nuclear power plant.

For example, the proposed rule modifications would require a ... detection and surveillance system ... monitored in a continuously staffed alarm station ... and in one redundant location ... and supporting subsystems must be tamper-indicating with line supervision.... Yet, actions that could be taken by an intruder in an ISFSI controlled access area between security rounds are inconsequential. Therefore, it is adequate to provide this coverage with random security patrols. To require a "designated response force" (proposed§ 73.51(d)(6)) is contrary to the previous NRC exemption contained in§ 72.212(b)(s)(v) for interposing response personnel for ISFSI intrusions.

Finally, we note that the Draft Regulatory Analysis calculations are based upon a litany of specific ISFSI base characteristics, many we consider unnecessary, that although not detailed in the rule text would become implementation requirements nonetheless. While, on the other hand, some generalizations leave open the potential to varying implementation interpretations (e.g., "applicable parts of appendix B.").

Recommendations First, we propose that all current ISFSI licenses, whether site specific or general, be grandfathered, e.g., no new requirements. Current ISFSI licensees should also have the option of reducing commitments to a level commensurate with the risk to public health and safety.

Second, a more reasonable and cost-effective approach which should be reflected in the proposed rule modifications is to provide ISFSis with a level of protection consistent with enhanced industrial security practices, i.e., protection to consist of suitable fencing, locked access points, sufficient illumination and periodic security patrols. Intrusion detection and assessment devices and a posted guard force are not necessary to be able to preclude a "protracted loss of control" of an ISFSI. The application of the protected area design basis threat and Part 73 safeguards criteria to an ISFSI would result in excessive protection.

Third, to avoid inadvertently mixing the requirements and terminology of physical security plans for nuclear power plants (and pro~cted areas) with those of ISFSis, a term such as ISFSI controlled access area" should be used.

Mr. John C. Hoyle November 13, 1995 Page 4 The Enclosure includes comments concerning the specific wording of the proposed rule modifications. Individual licensee comment letters are expected to be the source of site-specific responses to several questions concerning the proposed rule amendments asked in the Specific Considerations section of the rulemaking notice.

Lastly, we acknowledge that public acceptance and political issues surrounding high-level radioactive waste make it difficult to establish regulations that only address the necessary technical concerns. Nonetheless, any NRC requirements, existing or proposed, not essential to counter the consequences of a potential, realistic threat should be eliminated.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule modifications.

Since our comments do not support the NRC proposals, and in view of the potential impact on the outcome of current initiatives to remove unnecessary regulatory burdens on utilities, we would welcome the opportunity to discuss industry considerations further with appropriate NRC personnel.

Sincerely,

~~Tif~

REE/rs Enclosure

Enclosure Specific Wording Recommendations on Proposed Rulemak.ing Concerning Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste We propose the following information or modifications (additions underlined, deletions by line through) to the applicable text or to proposed/existing regulations:

Proposed Rule Summary and Regulatory Approach:

In the Summary it states that this rule will ... clarify safeguards requirements for spent nuclear fuel or high high-level waste stored at ... power reactors that have permanently ceased operations. The same terminology is found in the Regulatory Approach section noting that ... the NRC staff has had to sort through the many safeguards requirements of Part 73 to choose appropriate safeguards requirements, and impose those requirements through license conditions. As a result of this experience, however, a set of principles has evolved that reflects both the nature of potential threats and the hazardous radioactive characteristics of the materials. Accordingly, the proposed amendments in§ 73.51 would codify safeguards requirements currently imposed on spent nuclear fuel storage licensees and would provide a consistent set of requirements for future licensing. ... These amendments would not apply to spent nuclear storage pools at operating nuclear power plants .

... there would not be any additional burden placed on current licensees.

For those companies with reactor plants that have permanent]y ceased reactor operations and now have a specific or general license to store spent fuel, the proposed rule would be applicable but confusing in context. For instance, Dairyland Power (LaCrosse Boiling Water Reactor) does not believe the proposed§ 73.51 requirements would pertain to their spent fuel pool condition. If it would pertain to them, it would add an unnecessary yet significant financial burden because they are not now required to have a perimeter intrusion detection system nor a redundant monitoring station for such a system.

1

10 CFR § 72.24 (o):

This section includes a description of the detailed security measures for physical protection, including design features and the plans required by Subpart H. For an application from DOE for an ISFSI or MRS, DOE will provide a description of the physical soeurity plan. protection program for protection against Padiologieal sabotagoany attempted theft or dispersal of high-level radioactive materials in transit to the ISFSI or MRS and similar physical security concerns as required by Subpart H of this part.

10 CFR § 72.182 Design for physical protection Delete the current section and substitute the following: In order to provide reasonable assurance that the physical protection program will be sufficient to protect the health and safety of the public, it must specify the criteria for physical protection design features of the :MRS or ISFSI controlled access area that meet the design bases as described in this Part.

10 CFR § 72.184 Safeguards contingency plan (a) The requirements of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats and Padiologieal sabotage any attempted theft or dispersal of high-level radioactive materials and similar physical security concerns must be as defined in §73.4O(b) of this chapter ....

10 CFR § 72.212:

(b): The general licensee shall:

(1) * *' *

(iv) Notify the NRC as to whether they will implement§ 73.51 OP of this ohapter section in their approved physical security planplU'suant to§ 73.55 of this ehapteP or other requirements. Then delete each reference to

"§73.51" in the remainder of this paragraph and substitute "this section."

(5): Protect the spent fuel against the design basis threat of radiologioal sabotage in aoeordanee with either§ 73.51 of this ohapto:P OF tho same provisions and requirements as a.Fe set forth in the lioonoee's physioa.l soouri.ty plan pUPsuant to§ 73.55 of this ohapter with the following additional oonditions and exooptions as follows:.

2

(i) The physical security organization and program for the facility must be modified as necessary to assure that activities conducted under this general licenso do not doo=roaoe tho offootivoneoo of tho pPoteotion of vital equipment in aoooPdanee with § 78.55 meet the requirements of thio ohaptoP subpart.

(ii) Storage of spent fuel must be within a protected area, in aeeordanee with

§ 78.55(e) ofthio ehaptoP or an ISFSI controlled access area, but need not be within a separate vital area. Existing protected areas may be expanded or new pPOtoeted ISFSI controlled access areas added for the purpose of storage of spent fuel in accordance with this general license.

(iii) For purposes of this general license, searches requited by§ 7a.55(d)(l) of this ehaptoP before admission to the ISFSI controlled access area a aow pPotoetod OPea may be performed by physical pat-down searches of persons in lieu of the use of firearms and explosives detection equipment.

(iv) The observational capability reql.l:iPed by§ 7a.55(h)(6) of this ehapte=r ao applied to a aow pFoteeted 0:Pea to detect and assess penetration or other security activities in the ISFSI controlled access area may be provided by a guard or watchman on periodic patrol in lieu of closed circuit television.

(v) For the purpose of this general license, the licensee that meets the requirements of§ 72.212 for ISFSI controlled access areas is exempt from protected area requirements§§ 78.55(h)(4)(iii)(iA..) and 78.55(h)(5)of this chapter.

10 CFR § 73.51:

Do not add this section to Part 73. Instead put necessary requirements into Subpart H for specific ISFSI licensee physical protection and/or in Section§ 72.212 for general licensees. Delete all reference to Part 73 in Part 72. Keep "ISFSI controlled access area" requirements separate from "protected area" requirements for Part 50 licensees.

(b): General performance objectives.

(1) Each licensee oubjeet to this oeetioa of a spent fuel facility except for current fuel pool facilities shall establish and maintain a physical protection program system with the objective of providing high assurance that activities.

involving special nuclear material or high-level radioactive materials do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.

(2) To meet the general objective of paragraph (b)(l), each licensee subject to this section shall meet the following performance capabilities:

(i) Store spent nuclear fuel or HLW only within a protected area (pursuant to Part 73), or ISFSI controlled access area (pursuant to Part 72);

3

(ii) Grant unescorted access to the pPoteeted aPoa ISFSI controlled access area only to individuals who are authorized to enter tho protected area of a nuclear power plant without escort; (iii) Detect and assess unauthorized penetration of or activities within the p:eotoeted ISFSI controlled access area; (iv) .. .

(v) .. .

(3) The physical protection system program must be designed to protect against Pad.iologieal sabotage any attempted theft or dispersal of ISFSI or MRS stored radioactive materials and the protection of the health and safety of the public.

(c) ...

(d) Physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures. To meet the performance capabilities of paragraph (b)(2) of this section, a physical protection system program. must include, but is not necessarily limited to, the measures specified in paragraphs (d)(l) through (d)(14) of this section. Tho Commission may reqllll'e alternate OP additional moaslll'os neeosoary to meet tho porloPmanee objectives of paragraph (b)(l) of this ooetion. Tho Commission may also authoriw other necessary proteetion meao'l:U'Oo. The Commission may authorize an applicant or licensee to provide measures for protection other than those required by this section if the applicant or licensee demonstrates that the measures have the same high assurance objective as specified in this section.

(1) Spent nuclear fuel or HLW must be stored only within 8.!1 protected ISFSI controlled access area so that access to this material requires passage through or penetration of two physical barriers, one barrier at the perimeter of the protected ISFSI controlled access area (fence or wall) and one barrier offering substantial penetration resistance (spent fuel container or wall around spent fuel pool). Some licensees may have one barrier that serves both purposes. If appropriate, ~he physical barrier at the perimeter of the pPotocted ISFSI controlled access area must be as defined in§ 73.2 the physical security plan. If appropriate, 1-!solation zones, typically 20 feet wide each, on both sides of this barrier must be provided to facilitate assessment.

The barrier offering substantial resistance to penetration may be provided by an approved storage cask or building walls such as those of a reactor or fuel storage building. Other suitable measures to provide the barrier may be acceptable, if approved by the NRC on a case by case basis.

(2) A means of illumination must be provided sufficient to peHB:it assessment of unauthoraed penetration of for the monitoring, observation and assessment of 0i'-8.ctivities within tho protoetod ISFSI controlled access area and associated isolation zones during periods of darkness.

(3) The po:runote:P of the pPotoctod ISFSI controlled access area must be subjoet to oontinual surv:oillanco and be protected by an intrusion detection system with provisions fo:p Podundant monitoring of the system. The 4

dotoetion and sU1"1eillanoe systems must bo monitoPod in a oontinuouoly staffed a.la.Pm station, not nooossarily located within tho protected a:rea, and in one Podundant looation monitored by random patrols. No other detection and assessment systems are required.

(4) Tho pPotooted aPea must be monitoPed by Pandom pat11olo of a &equoney not loss than oneo o'vo:ry 8 holll'sThe licensee shall provide for random patrols of the MRS or ISFSI controlled access area by a guard or watchman with communication equipment capable of calling for assistance from other guards or watchmen.

(5) A security organization, with written procedures, must be established to provide security for the MRS or ISFSI after radioactive material is stored in the facility. The licensee shall have a management system to provide for tho development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of security procedures. The security organization must include a minimum of two watchmen pol' shift; to provide fol' monitoring of deteetion and sU:P¥eillanoe systems and for communications with a designated Pesponse foree or loeal law enfoPeoment agencies (LLEP.*) other guards or watchmen in the event of detection of unauthorized penetration or activities. Members of the security organization shall be trained, equipped, and qualified to accomplish required tasks.in aceol'aaneo with the applicable provisions oLA..:ppendix B to this part.

(6) Documented liaison and communications with a designated 11esponso fopee el' LLEA must be established to permit their response to unauthorized penetration or activities in support of licensee personnel.

(7) Access authorization S§.croening must be conducted before granting an individual unescorted access to the pPoteetod ISFSI controlled access area:.--te-obtain information on which to base a deeision to pel'mi.t suoh aeoess.

Sol'eening should typically inelude a eriminal histo:ry cheek, a pl'evious employment oheok, and two personal referenoe ohooko. Personnel not allowed unescorted access to the ISFSI controlled access area must be escorted by personnel authorized unescorted access to the ISFSI controlled access area.

(8) A controlled personnel identification and lock system must be established (can be the same as used for a protected area) and maintained to limit access to the p11oteeted ISFSI controlled access area to individuals authorized unescorted access or escorted individuals who have been approved for such access.

(9) All escorted individuals to the pPoteotea ISFSI controlled access area must be under the constant escort of an individual who has been authorized unescorted access to the ppot,eeted ISFSI controlled access area.

(10) Redundant oCommunications capability must be provided between the security organization and designated response force security patrols and with LLEA.

(11) The licensee shall control personnel and vehicle access into the ISFSI controlled access area. All individuals, vehicles, and hand-carried packages entering the proteet,ed ISFSI controlled access area must be checked for proper authorization and searched for explosP1es unauthorized material 5

before allowed entry. All vehicles entering the ISFSI controlled access area shall be under the control of persons authorized to enter the ISFSI controlled access area.

(12) Written response procedures must be established and maintained for addressing unauthorized penetration of or activities within the protected ISFSI controlled access areaineluding category 5, Procedures, oL.A.._ppendix C to Pa:rt 78. The licensee shall retain a copy of the response procedures as a record for 3 years or until termination of the license for which the procedures were developed. Copies of superseded material must be retained for 3 years after each change or until termination of the license.

(13) .All detoetion end surr.~eillaneo oy:stema end suppo:Pti.ng suboy:otems must be tam.per indieatmg with line :1:lpernsion and be maintained in opeFable oonditionAppropriate G£ompensatory measures must be taken during extended periods. i.e .* greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , of inoperability of ISFSI protection features. Increased frequency of security patrols may be sufficient compensation depending on the situation.

(14) The security program must be reviewed onoo C:'t'eJ:y 24 months within one year from implementation and then as program changes would indicate the need. This review is accomplished by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. The security program review must include an evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical security system and a verification of the liaison established with the designated response force or LLEA.

(15) Tho follo:wing d.Documentation to support the program must be retained as a record for 3 years after the record is made or until termination of the license. Duplicate records to those required under § 73. 71 of this p0:Pt need not be retained under the requirements of this section. The documentation must address:

(i) A listing of individuals granted access to the ISFSI controlled access proteetcd area and the location of records to support their access authorization:

(iii) }... log of routine Periodic patrols- results: (iv) .,_A... reeoPd of oaeh alarm received identifying the typo of alarm, location, date end time when received, end disposition of tho alarme.nd

(@ Any security p,rogram review reports.

(e) 6

Rationale for the recommended wording changes:

1. General:

The following detailed rationale is predicated upon the recent industry-supported NRC philosophy to provide non-prescriptive regulation with performance-based criteria determined and demonstrated by the licensee for those areas that do not constitute an unreasonable or safety-significant risk to the health and safety of the public. Current spent fuel licensees do not seem to be consistent in their total safeguards packages for their facilities, whether under a general or specific license. The NRC should not lump all of these licensees into requiring the same features. Also these licensees need to be "grandfathered" in order to limit the back.fitting of requirements not m their current commitments and then be afforded the opportunity to eliminate unnecessary commitments.

2. Proposed Rule Regulatory Approach:

As noted above the regulatory approach can be confusing to personnel at power reactors that have permanently ceased reactor operations and are now spent fuel storage facility licensees. The expectation that these current licensees would not have more requirements imposed does not ring true to plants such as LaCrosse Boiling Water Reactor.

We also note that previous information provided a regulatory flavor that may have been forgotten in *~ .. sorting through the many safeguards requirements of Part 73 to choose appropriate safeguards requirements .... " In the responses to public comments in a Part 72 Final Rule (55 Fed. Reg. 29188 of July 18, 1990), it stated that *~-- the NRC concluded that radiological sabotage, to be successful, would have to be carried out using large quantities of explosives ... and that the consequences to public health and safety would be low because most of the resultant contamination would be localized to the storage site. Thus the condition to be protected against is protracted loss of control of the storage area. "

In reference to a classified safeguards study the NRC advised that *~ .. the general conclusions of the study could be extended to concrete storage systems because of the difficulty of using small arms, fire, or explosives to (1) create respirable particles and (2) cause those particles to be spread off site. These difficulties derive from both the inherent resistance to dispersal of the spent fuel and the massiveness of the storage casks required to provide both 7

shielding from radiation and protection of the spent fuel from earthquakes and tornado missiles, which are requirements that all design are required to meet."

In NUREG-0587, published in 1980 as a companion document to 10 CFR Part 72, the NRC stated: 'The long-lived and potentially biologically hazardous materials present in spent fuel are tightly bound up in the fuel materials and are not easily dispersible. The short-lived volatile nuclides, such as I-131, which could be released by the rupture of fuel assemblies due to accidents or other causes are no longer present in aged spent fuel."

3. 10 CFR § 72.24 (o):

Use of the term "physical protection program" in lieu of "physical security plan" avoids any licensee confusion that this relates to the physical security plan (PSP) for a nuclear power plant.

Although nuclear power plant security is predicated on the need to protect the public from exposure to radioactive material released by acts of sabotage, the phraseology to be used with ISFSI or l\IB,S protection is more appropriately only that which hazards the health and safety of the public. The phrase "theft or dispersal of high-level radioactive materials

... and similar physical security concerns" is more descriptive than "radiological sabotage."

4. 10 CFR § 72.182:

-

The current phraseology seems cumbersome. The proposed rewording provides for the same result with less prescription in keeping with the general rationale for performance-based regulation noted above.

5. 10 CFR § 72. 184:

Same rationale as in items 2 and 3 above.

6. 10 CFR § 73.51 (put necessary items in Part 72)

Move this section to Part 72 to keep ISFSI requirements separate from the protected area requirements of Part 73. There is no compelling reason to tie ISFSI or MRS physical security to the operating nuclear power plant safeguards requirements of Part 73. It is confusing to the licensee and results in excessive requirements. The potential result 8

of "intruder" action against a HLW storage facility (e.g., ISFSn is significantly different than that which could result at a nuclear power plant protected area.

Use the phrase "physical protection program" in lieu of "physical protection system" as more meaningful for an overall effort.

In addition to special nuclear material, it is necessary to include the term "high-level radioactive materials" in order to include expended fuel elements which are not categorized as special nuclear material.

We do not understand the basis for tying the ISFSI protection requirements of Part 72 to those of the Part 73 requirements for physical protection of the protected area of a power plant. We assert that there would be different actions and results from potential threat scenarios that could harm the health and safety of the public. There are specific requirements associated with the term "protected area" for nuclear power plants that could be confused if this same term is used herein for what is actually an '1SFSI controlled access area." Hence the recommended change.

There is proposed text where the Commission "may require alternate or additional measures to meet performance objectives" or requirements to comply with applicable provisions of appendix B" or Rimilar language.

This could be a way of bypassing further regulatory activity by using non-specific language that could be interpreted by an inspector to suit his or her preference. The lack of specificity in language may create expectations beyond current licensing commitments which allow for such things as less stringent personnel search and compensatory actions than required for reactor protected areas. We are not proposing more detailed language, only language not easily open to interpretation.

To be in consonance with the authority provided by the Commission in

§73.55(a), authorization needs to be included for an applicant or licensee to provide measures for protection other than those that would be required by final general performance objectives. This would allow the applicant or licensee the ability to demonstrate that equivalent measures would have the same high assurance objective as those actually needed and specified by the NRC.

We agree that sufficient illumination is necessary for the monitoring, observation and assessment of activities during periods of darkness.

However, the Draft Regulatory Analysis, Section 3.2, specifies a base set of characteristics to include the high light level (2.1 lux (0.2 footcandles))

9

used in protected areas. This is not a specified rule text requirement but seems to be an implied expectation or inspection criterion which would be unnecessary.

We should not automatically require continual surveillance and protection by an intrusion detection system when an adequate monitoring, observation and assessment of activities function is provided by security patrols. There should be no urgency to respond to an ISFSI controlled access area penetration or other activities because of the durability of the ISFSI encasements. Therefore, it is considered unnecessary to require a redundant monitoring system and a redundant location for said monitoring. The Central Alarm Station or licensee equivalent ISFSI security control station should suffice as the continuously-staffed alarm station (which is also an unnecessary requirement). Just because it was an accepted/approved practice in the past does not justify its continuation.

We recommend the NRC revisit what type of alertment system would actually be necessary to protect the health and safety of the public.

Rather than specifying a minimum random patrol frequency, the rule should allow flexibility for the licensee to use patrols on each shift (which could be 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or other shift length) as appropriate to the circumstances. The added information is to provide further expectations for the patrolling individual.

There is no obvious reason to require a minimum number of watchmen, either at the ISFSI controlled access area or at the ISFSI security control station. The security plan is the place to establish who and how this should be done. The assumptions in the Draft Regulatory Analysis, Section 3.2, presumes an unnecessary requirement of a minimum of two watchmen per shift.

7. Draft Regulatory Analysis

The Draft Regulatory Analysis has been written as a fait accompli using previous regulatory information without regard for the actual necessity of each requirement. It presumes that since some current ISFSI licensees already do these things that this makes them necessary. We disagree with that premise. The NRC has a program to review current regulation and if the regulation does not have a compelling reason to be imposed or continued for the health and safety of the public, elimination or reduction of potential or currently unnecessary requirements would be the appropriate action. The comments in this correspondence and those 10

provided individually to the NRC by licensees need to be looked at from that perspective.

There were two alternatives considered by the NRC: do nothing and use existing requirements, or codify existing regulatory practices by rulemaking. A third alternative, one not considered in the rulema.king package, is the one we recommend: look at existing regulatory practices in light of the current philosophy of general performance-based regulation and not perpetuate unnecessary safety/safeguards practices.

8. Back.fitting Analysis

No backfitting analysis was provided ... because these proposed amendments do not impose new requirements on existing Part 50 licensees .

... rt9r modify procedures or organizations of currently licensed ISFSis.

This is not in consonance with some of the information provided to NEI by several such licensees. Others state that although they do comply with most (but not all) of the proposed requirements, they acquiesced even though the requirements were considered excessive in order to get their ISFSis licensed and avoid serious economic consequences. As a minimum, current ISFSI licensees (specific or general) should be grandfathered to avoid any new requirements and then be allowed to decrease commitments as appropriate to a reasonable level of protection relative to necessary requirements in Part 72, independent of Part 73 requirements.

Table III of the Draft Regulatory Analysis provides an indication of the magnitude of the requirements by predicting annual operating costs for a "controlled access area" to be $732,400 with a 20 year lifetime facility cost of $8.5 million. If the ISFSI is in the operating plant's protected area the anticipated annual cost increase would only be $45,500 with a 20 year lifetime facility cost of $1.2 million. Neither of these cost calculations is trivial, but rather strongly suggest that a backfitting analysis would be appropriate to justify such an expenditure.

9. Barriers to protect against the malevolent use of vehicles.

SECY-95-104 of April 28, 1995 advises that the NRC is still evaluating the need for vehicle bomb protection at ISFSis. It also advises that ... the st,aff believes that the inherent nature of the spent nuclear fuel or HL W, along with the degree of protection provided by the approved storage means, provides adequate protection against the malevolent use of a vehicle. We agree with that assessment and therefore cannot fathom the 11

need for the myriad protection features delineated in the proposed regulation and supporting Draft Regulatory Analysis.

10. Emergency Action.

We have been advised that the worst potential level of contamination from such an event would not require an emergency action level higher than the Alert level. As such, we suggest regulatory restraint in delineating safeguards requirements 11 . Response to Question 5 posed in NRC Specific Considerations In formulating changes to 10 CFR § 73.51 (or more appropriately Part 72 as suggested in our comments) that will apply to a Department of Energy repository and central interim storage facility, NRC should be mindful of the evolving nature of these projects. Recent Congressional action on Energy and Water appropriations have slowed the current schedules for the repository. Furthermore, pending legislation in both Houses of Congress would require NRC to modify regulations concerning these projects. Should this legislation become enacted, NRC would probably have to revisit 73.51 (or more appropriately Part 72), along with other parts of 10 CFR to implement NRC obligations under this new legislation.

12

CP&L Carolina Power & Light Company PO Box 1551 411 Fayetteville Street Mall Raleigh NC 27602 November 13, 1995 File: X-X-0610 X-X-0709 Serial: NL&RAS-95-075 Secretary United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Sir:

Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) is submitting this letter in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (60 CFR 42079) "Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High Level Radioactive Waste," dated August 15, 1995, requesting comments on the proposed rule.

CP&L supports the industry position provided by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) on behalf of the nuclear power industry. In general, CP&L believes that the costs associated with the proposed rule for safeguarding stored spent nuclear fuel at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSI) are not justified. The proposed rule would require establishment of a separate, additional protected area with physical barriers, detection and surveillance systems, and access controls similar to those associated with nuclear power plant protected areas. The associated costs would be significant. A more reasonable and cost-effective approach would be to provide ISFSis with a level of protection consistent with accepted industrial security practices, that is, protection consisting of appropriate fencing, locked access points, illumination, and periodic patrols by a security force. This approach is predicated upon the inherently secure nature of spent fuel casks in an ISFSI.

If you require additional information, please contact Mr. Fred Emerson (Director, NEI Regulatory and INPO Affairs) at (919) 546-7573.

Sincerely,

~ ' ° i~

R. E. Rogan Manager Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Affairs PNM:ebc c: Mr. S. Callis Mr. J.P. Cowan Mr. G. Ellis Mr. F. A. Emerson Mr. A. Garrou 110V ff 1995 Mr. W. R. Hatcher vc rd .....:-"..................,,.... Q Mr. R. Kunita Mr. L. S. Rowell Mr. E. D. Schrull

U.S t, J .,C,AMISSIQC'-,,

co ECTION 0 TARY N

D Postmark o-* 1.~1 Gopie" Reco1 I Add1 Co 1es R

DOCKETED November 13, 1995 USNRC Portland General Electric Company Trojan Nuclear Plant *95 NOV~ 1 :04 71760 Columbia River Hwy . CPY-064-95 Rainier, Oregon 97048 (503) 556-3713 . OFFI CE OF ,s~ cRETARY TroJan Nuclear Plant OOCKE. T! HG & ~.~ RY IC E Docket 50-344 BRAN t.J1 License NPF-1 Mr. John C. Hoyle DOCKET NUMBER p Secretary PROPOSED AULE_lc.Q) :1~

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission <.. too~R....\-acn°'.) @

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Mr. Hoyle:

NRC Proposed Rule, "Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste" Request for Comments The attachment to this letter provides Portland General Electric Company's (PGE) comments on the proposed rule on Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste. In addition to these specific comments, PGE generally endorses the comments on this proposed rule submitted by the Nuclear Energy Institute.

PGE supports the general objectives of the proposed rules to better define the physical protection requirements for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored under a specific license issued pursuant to 10 CFR 72. While reviewing the proposed changes, PGE has developed several comments which are provided in the attachment to this letter. PGE encourages the NRC to consider these comments for incorporation and promulgation into the final rule.

If your have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. H.K. Chernoff of my staff at (503) 556-7480.

Sincerely, General Manager Plant Support and Technical Functions mov 1~ 19°S_

Acknowleuged by earcr ;,Ht1Htmmm1MmH'"lttt(1

U.S. NUCL EA r DOCKE. T 0,rll -

OFT C

CPY-064-95 November 13, 1995 Page2 of2 Attachment c: M. T. Masnik, NRC NRR L. J. Callan, NRC Region IV L. L. Howell, NRC Region IV R. A. Scarano, NRC Region IV D. Stewart-Smith, ODOE Document Control Desk

CPY-064-95 November 13, 1995 Page 1 of3 Portland General Electric Company Comments on Proposed Rule Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste General Comments Portland General Electric Company (PGE) supports the general objectives of the proposed amendments to better define the physical protection requirements for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored under a specific license issued pursuant to 10 CFR 72.

However, the proposed rule does not provide a specific design basis threat for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). Currently, the design basis threat defined in the regulations is that for an operating nuclear plant, found in 10 CFR 73 .1. This design basis threat is considered to be inappropriate for an ISFSI considering the different actions and results from potential threat scenarios that could harm the health and safety of the public. PGE recommends that 10 CFR 73 .51 contain a specific design basis threat which addresses the unique characteristics and security vulnerabilities of an ISFSI.

In addition, the proposed rule and associated supplementary information does not identify a requirement for standby power supplies. However, NUREG-1497, "Interim Licensing Criteria for Physical Protection of Certain Storage of Spent Fuel" identifies numerous types of security equipment typically provided with independent power sources. PGE does not consider standby power to be necessary for an ISFSI security system due to the ability to take appropriate compensatory measures in the event ofloss of normal power. The supplementary information and NUREG-1497 should be revised to clearly indicate that standby power sources are not required.

Specific Comments on Proposed Rule 10 CFR 73,51 Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste 73.5l{b)(3)

As noted above, an ISFSI specific design basis threat should be developed which addresses the unique characteristics and vulnerabilities of an ISFSI. This section should be revised to delineate this threat.

CPY-064-95 November 13, 1995 Page 2 of3

73. 51 (d)(2)

This section should be revised to indicate that illumination must be sufficient to perform assessment by either visual or equipment assisted means. This section should also be revised such that sufficient illumination for assessment purposes only be required for the protected area isolation zones. The rationale for this is that an intruder would have to pass through the lighted isolation zone, generating an alarm that would then be assessed. Since the assessment would take place in the isolation zone, there is no need to require specific lighting levels within the entire protected area. PGE suggests that the section be revised as follows:

"A means of illumination must be provided sufficient to permit visual and/or equipment assisted surveillance and assessment of intrusion detection alarms and activities within the protected area isolation zones."

73. 5 l(d)(3)

This section should also be revised to indicate that assessment/surveillance may be by either visual or equipment assisted means. In addition, the requirement for a redundant alarm station is overly burdensome relative to the benefit derived. A single alarm station that is continuously staffed and to which access is controlled is considered to provide adequate protection for an ISFSI since the required periodic patrols, which would be in communication with the alarm station, would be able to identify unauthorized activities and call for assistance if the need arises.

PGE suggests that the section be revised as follows:

"The protected area perimeter must be provided with intrusion detection and the security system must provide a capability for surveillance of the protected area perimeter for the purpose of alarm assessment and the detection of unauthorized activities. Alarm assessment and protected area perimeter surveillance may be equipment assisted, supported by security patrols, or by visual assessment."

"The intrusion detection system and equipment assisted surveillance system (if used) must be monitored in a continuously staffed alarm station, not necessarily located within the protected area, from which the patrols are dispatched and controlled. A redundant alarm station is not required."

73.5 l(d)(4)

For the reasons discussed above, this section should be revised to include the requirement that patrols have communication capability with the alarm station. Additionally, the frequency of

CPY-064-95 November 13, 1995 Page 3 of3 random patrols should be determined by the licensee based on specific site criteria ( e.g. shift duration). PGE suggests the section be revised as follows:

"The protected area must be monitored by random patrols equipped with communication equipment capable of communicating with other patrols (if any) and the alarm station."

73.5 l(d}(S}

The minimum number of watchmen should be determined by the licensee based on the site specific security system. The minimum staffing level would then be documented in the physical protection plan. In addition, this section should be revised to reflect that the required security force training will be commensurate with the task to be performed. The applicable training criteria will be documented in the licensee's physical protection plan.

PGE suggests the section be revised as follows:

"A security organization, with written procedures, must be established to provide for the ISFSI physical security. The security organization management will provide communication with the designated response force or local law enforcement agency (LLEA) and the development. revision. implementation, and enforcement of security procedures. Members of the security organization shall be trained. equipped. and qualified as appropriate with the task to be performed."

73.Sl(d}(l l}

This section should be revised to allow the licensee to determine the type of material to be searched for, based on the site specific security system. These material would be documented in the licensee's physical security plan. This section should also be revised to clarify that vehicles entering the protected area need not be escorted or disabled while under the control ofperson(s) authorized access to the protected area.

PGE suggests that this section be revised as follows:

"All individuals. vehicles, and hand-carried packages entering the protected area must be checked for proper authorization and searched for unauthorized material before entry.

Vehicles authorized to enter the protected area are not required to be escorted or disabled while in the protected area as long as the vehicle is under the control of person(s) authorized to enter the protected area.

DO KE TEO usi-mc Southern California Edison Company P. 0. BOX 128 SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92674-0128

95 NOV 14 P6 :2 4 WALTEA C. MARSH November 9, 1995 MANAGER OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY AFFAIRS U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Secretary Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Gentlemen:

Subject:

Comments on NRC Proposed Rulemaking on Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste, 10 CFR Parts 60, 72, 73, and 75, {60 FR 42079 of August 15, 1995)

Ed i son supports the comments on the proposed rule submitted by NEI. Edison emphatically disagrees with the regulatory basis for the proposed rule. In the Supplementary Information the NRC described a process for existing storage facilities that involved a 11 * *

sort through the many safeguards requirements of Part 73 to choose appropriate safeguards requirements. 11 The proposed rule would then 11 codify existing practice. 11 This would seem to 11 put the cart be fore the horse;" i.e., the specific requirements were selected before the performance standard of the rule was established.

The first step in the development of any rule on safeguards for spent fuel should be the establishment of the performance standard. An in-depth review of the actual radiological consequences following a sabotage event is needed.

Th i s would require, as a minimum, assessment of the design basis threat, pot ential for access to spent fuel or high-level radioactive waste, and impact of the design basis threat on the facility. Without such an evaluation Edison sees the existing rulemaking as being incomplete. Also, Edison sees ongoing evolution in the future in the NRC 1 s thinking on safeguards issues and feels there is need for further guidance in the form of regulatory guides and NUREGs wi t h appropriate feedback from utilities.

In the Summary and Regulatory Approach discussions of the rule it is indicated that the proposed rule will apply to " *** spent nuclear fuel .** at *** power reactors that have permanently ceased reactor operations." However, the new 73.51 is limited to 11 * *

spent nuclear fuel *** under a specific license issued pu rsuant to Part 72 of this chapter," i.e., an independent storage facility.

The applicability of the proposed rule should be clarified, particularly in the case of permanently shutdown reactors. This rule may add an unnecessary fi nancial burden to the shutdown plants which is not intended by the rule.

In response to the questions posed by the NRC in the proposed rule, Edison is not in a position to address them. It is Edison's estimation that the pro posed rule *.Joul d increase the cost of the dry cask storage faci 1ity that is currently under consideration for San Onofre.

Acknow1edgad by artJ '~ 111~ f ~

1 1995. _

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- - - - - .i-:~

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Docketing and Services Branch If you would like to discuss these comments with Edison, please contact Mr.

Jack Rainsberry at 714-368-7420.

Sincerely, cc: L. J. Callan, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV J. E. Dyer, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region IV K. E. Perkins, Jr., Director, Walnut Creek Field Office, NRC Region IV J. A. Sloan, NRC Sen ior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 & 3 M. B. Fields, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3

DOCKE TED 0 Public Service*

US RC 16805 WCR 19 1/2, Platteville, Colorado 3} 60/ 13 P4 :27 Public Service Company of Colorado November 9, 1995 Fort st. Vrain ISFSI P-95099 Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, o.c. 20555-0001 Docket No. 72-9

SUBJECT:

PROPOSED RULEMAKING COMMENTS FOR SAFEGUARDS FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL OR HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Dear Sirs:

Public Service Company of Colorado appreciates this opportunity to comment on a rulemaking action proposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

We support the concept of codifying a standard set of requirements for safeguarding stored spent nuclear fuel as outlined in the proposed rule "Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste" published on August 15, 1995, in the Federal Register, Volume 60, Number 157, beginning on page 42079. Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCo) believes this action will help establish consistency and simplify future licensing actions.

The Federal Register notice states, " [ B] ecause these proposed safeguards requirements would codify the existing regulatory practice there would not be any additional burden placed on current licensees." The backfit analysis also states that ". *

the backfitting requirements in 10 CFR 72. 62 do not apply because these proposed amendments neither impose new requirements nor modify procedures or organizations of currently licensed ISFSis. " This is not true in the case of the ISFSI owned and operated by PSCo, as detailed in the attachment. The proposed rule imposes new requirements and additional burdens not currently contained in our approved security plan that are estimated to result in $1 to $2 mi l lion to implement and an increase of JO% to 50% to the annual cost of operations.

rNOV 1~ 1995 .

Acknowledged by card....~...-n11mm1,, J..HW,

.0 LEA RfGULATORY COMMISSIOt--.

DOCKETING & SERVICE SECTION OFFfC Ci H*E SECRETARY Of T,1E COM1 '13SION Postri rk * -i ~ i.t- 11 Cop* s , '_ \ ______

Add'I Copies R ,5 Special Distribu I n~ ~ : i , . . -;tt.,.Q,* J

~ , : Y S>i?-,~

Specific comments on the proposed rule are discussed in the attachment included with this letter. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. M. H. Holmes at (303) 620-1701.

1~

Mary J. Fisher ISFSI Manager Fort st. Vrain Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation MJF:SSS / sss Attachment cc: Regional Administrator, Region IV Mr. Robert M. Quillin, Director Radiation Control Division Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment

PROPOSED RULEMAKING for Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive waste The comments that follow are based on Public Service Company of Colorado's (PSCo) experience as a previous operator of a nuclear power reactor and current operator of an Independent Spent Fuel storage Installation (ISFSI) that functions without support from

- programs regulated under 10CFR50 for a power reactor.

We support the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's work to standardize requirements for safeguarding stored spent nuclear fuel. PSCo believes this action will establish consistency and simplify future licen sing actions. Howe ver, we believe the proposed rule will impose significant additional costs for safeguards of currently stored spent nuclear fuel beyond what is presently incurred. Also, implementation costs are not justified by a need for the level of security imposed by the new rule.

As the operator of an ISFSI licensed to function without substantial support by a reactor facility, the performance objectives and the fourteen measures proposed under paragraph 73.51, titled "Requirements for the Physical Protection of Stored Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste" were compared with our experience. several requirements in the proposed rule seem to differ from those previously specified and approved by the NRC for ISFSI security. Spent nuclear fuel is typically self protecting (not readily separable and has an external dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at three feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding). Spent fuel is also stored in such a manner that inadvertent criticality due to an accident, operator error, equipment malfunction, or deliberate actions taken by unauthorized personnel is highly unlikely. Rules for safeguarding stored spent nuclear fuel should give credit for the inherent safety of dry storage technologies. As a result, we believe an ISFSI security program should be less complicated and less burdensome than the program described in the currently proposed rule.

Page 1 of 4

Proposed regulatory provisions that we feel are unnecessary or overly burdensome include:

A redundant alarm station. If a situation occurs that makes the primary alarm station unusable, continuous patrols at the ISFSI by security personnel capable of communicating with the designated response force or local law enforcement agency (LLEA) is a satisfactory alternative to a redundant alarm station. The requirement for redundant alarm stations would result in a large expenditure of labor dollars in order to staff a second alarm station and allow for patrols, tests, breaks, etc.

A perimeter intrusion detection system. These are prone to false alarms and interference by natural phenomena, costly to install, and difficult to maintain. Continuous monitoring of the ISFSI by closed circuit television combined with random frequent patrols is an adequate alternative.

Detailed searches for hand carried explosives. Containers used to store spent nuclear fuel are stout, thick walled vessels or vaults. Considering their na tural bulk and strength, a detailed search for explosives using detection equipment isn't necessary. We believe a visual search of personnel, their hand carried items, vehicles, and cargo would provide an adequate level of protection while avoiding the cost of detection equipment.

Background investigations for all personnel granted unescorted access. Although it may be prudent to screen security officers, expenditures required to screen other personnel will not result in a significant increase in the margin of safety.

If unauthorized activity by any individual is detected by a security officer monitoring closed circuit televisions, the response force or LLEA can be promptly notified to take appropriate action.

Tamper-indication and line supervision. Continuous monitoring of the ISFSI by closed circuit television combined with random frequent patrols is an adequate alternative to the added cost of this requirement.

A controlled personnel identification and lock system. We recommend granting flexibility to implement this requirement.

A "key card" type system that joins together an identification system with a lock system is not required for safety.

Adequate security is provided by a process that identifies the person requesting ISFSI access and assures that each individual is authorized to enter. At the same time, a lock and key system controlled under the security program could be maintained as a function independent of the identification and access verification process.

Page 2 of 4

If the proposed spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste safeguards rule is implemented as written, we are very concerned that the compliance cost will be excessive. If holders of existing ISFSI licenses are held accountable for enacting the standards as proposed in this rulemaking, it is our opinion that the cost to obtain and install equipment required by the revised regulation would be substantial. Based on experience gained while Fort st.

Vrain operated as a nuclear generating station, which included an NRC-approved Physical security Program with many of the elements in the proposed rule, we believe the cost to upgrade our existing ISFSI security program would be approximately $1 to $2 million, depending on the extent and complexity of required modifications.

Currently, the PSCo operated ISFSI requires only incidental support for security related maintenance activities. The additional staff needed to implement new requirements and to update additional files and records documenting compliance with each new or enhanced program will increase annual operating costs. If the proposed rule is implemented, we project annual security operation costs to maintain additional equipment and provide the staff needed to implement the additional requirements may increase 30% to 50% over existing annual costs of $340,000. The seven areas of particular concern include:

Install and maintain a perimeter intrusion detection system;

Maintain the isolation zone free of weeds, debris, and other obstructions;

Install and maintain computer systems;

Install and maintain an electronic key card system;

construct, equip, and maintain a redundant alarm station;

Perform background investigations for all personnel granted unescorted access;

Obtain and maintain equipment to conduct explosives searches.

Although some new staff requirements result in only an incremental cost increase, others would require part time staff or contracts with firms to provide maintenance or support services on demand.

At a minimum, we expect a clerk, an electronics technician, up to five additional security officers, and the full time assignment of a manager (compared to a manager whose security responsibilities are split with other duties) will be required to meet the proposed regulations.

Future licensees will encounter substantially higher costs if the proposed rule is implemented. To illustrate this point, the NRC's estimated annual cost for ISFSI security at a "high-cost facility" not supported by an associated reactor plant site is two times that Page 3 of 4

currently spent by PS Co. We believe the difference in annual costs is primarily due to the difference between the requirements specified in the proposed rule and those currently approved by the NRC for the PSCo ISFSI, an ISFSI security plan approved by the NRC approximately five years ago. Implementing the proposed rule would result in a considerable additional burden and new requirements above what is in our current NRC-approved ISFSI Physical Security Plan.

We're not able to comment on the overall representativeness of the cost analysis presented in Table III of the NRC's cost estimates discussed in the draft regulatory analysis because we did not attempt to perform independent calculations. The cost estimate appears to be comprehensive, except possibly in the following areas: we could not identify where the cost estimate included the cost to construct and maintain security office space, a records retention area, and alarm station(s).

If the proposed rule is implemented as written, and absent a clearly defined failure by a previously approved ISFSI security plan to provide adequate safeguards for stored spent nuclear fuel, we suggest that existing licensed facilities be specifically exempted from required compliance with the proposed rules once they become effective. This will prevent expenditures to modify security programs or add equipment at facilities where the NRC has previously determined that the security plan provides an adequate level of protection for the health and safety of the general public, workers, and the environment.

As previously stated, we support the concept of standardized regulations and efforts by the NRC to streamline the work needed to complete licensing actions. For this reason, we support the proposed rulemaking action. However, the proposed ISFSI security program as stated in the rulemaking appears to significantly over estimate the security needs of stored spent nuclear fuel and does not acknowledge the security inherent to dry spent fuel storage systems built to shield and contain spent fuel under a wide variety of postulated conditions.

Page 4 of 4

/o7 DAIRYLAND DOCKETED USNRC

~[f]@!#=I!? COOPERATIVE

3200EASTAVE . SO .

P. O . BOX 817

LA CROSSE, WISCONS IN 54602-0817 (608) 788-4000

9.5 NOV 13 P4 ~-WNo. (608) 787-1420 WILLIAM j... BERG General Manager November 7* 199 5a FF ICE OF S~CRETARY OOC KETliJG &. SERVICE In reply, please BR A, CH refer to LAC-13520 DOCKET NO. 50-409 DOCKET NUMBE PR PO ED U E.............-0: s~1s-Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (boFR..4,-ao79) (§)

Washington, DC 20555-0001 ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch

SUBJECT:

Dairyland Power Cooperative La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR)

Possession-Only License No. DPR-45 Comments on Proposed Amendments to Regulations Pertaining to Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste

REFERENCES:

(1) Federal Register Vol. 60, No. 157, August 15, 1995, pages 42079-42085.

These comments are submitted in response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) request for information and comments concerning Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste per Reference 1. In addition to our own specific comments, Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC) supports the NEI position with regard to this rulemaking.

This support is based on our participation in the development of the collective utility group position and following review of the NEI submittal letter to the NRC with regard to this rulemaking. Our specific comments are as follows:

The proposed rule summary states, "The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to clarify safeguards requirements for spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste stored at. ..power reactors that have permanently ceased reactor operations." Supplementary information has a similar statement in the 4th paragraph, page 42079. The Regulatory Approach section states, "Accordingly, the proposed amendments in 75.51 would codify safeguards requirements currently imposed on spent nuclear fuel storage licensees and would provide a consistent set of requirements for future licensing.... " This section goes on to state that, "These amendments would not apply to spent nuclear fuel storage pools at operating nuclear power plants. In rNOV 1W1995 Acknowle *g dby card ................................,

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Document Control Desk LAC-13520 Page2 November 7, 1995 addition, because these proposed safeguards requirements would codify the existing regulatory practice, there would not be any additional burden placed on the current licensee."

LACBWR is a permanently shutdown plant with spent fuel stored in a fuel pool and has accordingly been granted the status of Possession-Only Licensee (POL). It would seem from the Proposed Rule Summary and Supplemental Information (specifically the statements listed above) that it is the NRC's intention for this rule to apply to POL plants, although the specifics of the proposed new section, 10 CFR 73. 51, contradict these statements. The Commission should make it clear by specifying in the Supplemental Information section that "this rule would not apply to POL plants with fuel stored in spent nuclear fuel storage pools."

If it is the NRC's intention for this rule to apply to POL plants, then based on our current safeguards requirements, DPC strongly disagrees with the NRC's assumption that there wouldn't be any additional burden placed on current licensees to implement the requirements of this rule as proposed. Significant expenditures would be required by DPC to comply with the proposed rule, yet we fail to see a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety as a result of its implementation. We suggest a more in-depth regulatory analysis of the proposed rule prior to its implementation, specifically with regard to the provisions of the backfit rule.

Sincerely, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE WLB:WRG:dh Enclosure cc: Hub Miller, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III Morton Fairtile, Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

LAC-13520 Enclosure 1 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE NRC RELATIVE TO SAFEGUARDS FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL OR IIlGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

1. Would the proposed amendments impose any significant additional costs for safeguards of currently stored spent fuel beyond what is now incurred for that purpose?

RESPONSE

Current license commitments with regard to the safeguards of the spent fuel at our site don't require us to have a redundant detection and surveillance system monitoring station nor a perimeter intrusion detection system. The cost of installing and maintaining this equipment would be a significant financial burden to Dairyland Power Cooperative. Additional security force personnel would also be required for the redundant monitoring station.

2. Is there a reason to expect the costs to future licensees to differ substantially from those of current licensees?

RESPONSE

The proposed rule would require additional unnecessary capital investments and higher annual safeguards operating costs not currently required of licensees.

3. Are the costs justified by the benefits that would be afforded by the proposed amendments?

Are there alternatives that would afford essentially the same benefits but be more cost effective?

RESPONSE

The cost to Dairyland to implement the amendments as proposed far outweighs any benefits that would be afforded by the same. There are less onerous safeguards measures that would be sufficient for high assurance that the public would be protected.

r DOCKETED USNRC

'9'.5 NOV 13 P3 :18 Northern States Power Company Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant 1717 Wakonade Dr. East Welch, Minnesota 55089 OF FICE OF SECRETAR Y DOC KETING & StRV ICE November 10, 1995 BRANC H DOCKET NUMBER PROPO E RULE_bQ a. "'"75'

((cC)p~'--\-;;).079)

Secretary US Nuc l ear Regulatory Commi ss i on Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Washington , DC 20555 - 0001 Comments on Propo s ed Rule Changes - Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste (60 FR 42079 of August 15, 1995)

Northern States Power Company has reviewed the Federal Register notice of August 15, 1995 referenced above, and would like to offer comments as indicated in Attachment 1 to this letter.

If you have any questions, please direct them to David Axt at 612-388-1121 Extension 4880.

d~,dd)d2fk, Michael D Wadley (/'

Plant Manager Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant c: Regional Administrator - Region III, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, NRG NRR Project Manager, NRC J E Silberg - Comments to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from Northern States Power Company - November 10, 1995

,mv 1~ 1995 c\mowled., dby card ...............................,.

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Attachment 1 Comments to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from Northern States Power Company November 10, 1995

Subject:

Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste (60 FR 42079 of August 15, 1995)

Issue #1 : No Credible Target-Threat Association for ISFSls When considering basic security risk assessment methodology, a target must be credible before it can linked to a corresponding threat. With regards to sabotage, a target is unattractive unless the sabotage act can produce undesired consequences.

For nuclear power plants, these undesired consequences are codified as a 10 CFR, Part 100 release, resulting from radiological sabotage. On the other hand, sabotage scenarios and consequence analyses commissioned by the NRC and other organizations, to date, conclude that a Part 100 release from an ISFSI dry cask system is highly improbable and quantitatively not feasible.

In the NRC's Part 72 Proposed Rule Making of May 31 , 1989 it does, however, state that:

.. .consequence modeling assumptions more severe . .. are possible if unconstrained sabotage resources or protracted loss of control of the storage site are allowed.

Such an act, however, would require an enormous amount of time, tools, equipment and several saboteurs. Even if such a scenario were successfu lly carried out, the saboteur would still not achieve a Part 100 release. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that ISFSI casks should be afforded protection commensurate with the target sabotage consequences and threat (or lack thereof).

According to a former Sandia National Laboratories employee, who personally oversaw penetration tests of dry casks, there are two plausible sabotage scenarios which could breach an ISFSI cask (given unconstrained sabotage resources and a protracted time period). One scenario involves explosives; however, the particular explosive package is:

Extremely difficult to set-up

Would take a combined total of approximately 130 lbs of explosives & projectile

Must be positioned, leveled and aimed precisely

Must be fired from the optimum distance

Will miss a target the size of a standard cask about 80% of the time In the second scenario, the saboteur would need a specific type of military oxygen torch. This particular torch system is, however, accessible only to a distinct military organization, and it would require the saboteur to be exposed to the potential radiological release as well as the tremendous heat given off by the oxygen torch.

Nonetheless, the saboteur in both scenarios would still not achieve a Part 100 release.

Issue #2: Use of Deadly Force Contradiction Security Officers are justified in using deadly force in order to protect the public against radiological sabotage (Part 100 release) by the design basis threat. This is justifiable.

There is linkage between sabotage consequences and potential threats. On the other hand, NRC doctrine (verbally communicated) is that security personnel are not required to use deadly force in protecting an ISFSI cask. This would seem to indicate a Part 100 rel ease -- the basis for 10 CFR Part 73 security criteria -- is not feasible by sabotaging an ISFSI cask. This contradiction, in and of itself, would indicate that the application of Part 73 level security is duplicitous and indeed excessive.

Issue #3: NRC Security Inspection Burden NRC inspection efforts for nuclear reactor sites are manpower intensive. If ISFSI security licensing criteria parallel a nuclear site (1 O CFR Part 73) then, from an inspection standpoint, the licensing of an off-site ISFSI or an ISFSI in the owner controlled area (OCA) is analogous to creating several new nuclear power plants. Like most of the private sector, the NRC faces manpower cut-backs and shrinking resources. Notwithstanding the rational of Issues 1 and 2 above, how then will the NRC handle the increased inspection efforts imposed by the additional ISFSls?

Summary The absence of a credible target-threat combination for ISFSI dry cask systems ignores basic fundamental vulnerability assessment rationale. The proposed amendments to part 73.51 which specify safeguard requirements for ISFSls are categorically excessive. Dry casks cannot realistically be stolen, maligned or sabotaged in any way which would produce a 10 CFR Part 100 release. The correlation of reactor and ISFSI site security criteria is baseless and would therefore result in unnecessary licensee expenditures.

Responses to Specific Proposed Rule Questions

1. Would the proposed amendments impose any significant additional costs for safeguards of currently stored spent nuclear fuel beyond what is now incurred for that purpose?

Response: Yes. For ISFSls located outside of a licensee's owner controlled area (OCA), the licensee would need to provide two (2) watchpersons around the clock.

This is approximately 20,000 man-hours a year. Depending on the LLEA agreement, the licensee may also need to provide a dedicated response force which is appendix "B" trained and certified.

2. Is there reason to expect the costs to future licensees to differ substantially from those of current licensees?

Response: Yes, for those facilities which might be required to re-locate their ISFSls to outside their OCA. The costs would increase for reasons stated in question #1 above.

3. N/A.

4. Are the costs justified by the benefits that would be afforded by the proposed amendments? Are there alternatives that would afford essentially the same benefits, but be more cost effective?

Response: No, the costs are not justified; the benefits are excessive and unnecessary for those reasons stated in Issues 1, 2 & 3, above. Yes. One alternative would require that the NRC: (1) not lump all spent nuclear fuel storage facilities together, mandating one blanket set of security criteria, (2) develop physical protection criteri a which is tailored for the threat-target combination. For dry cask storage facilities, see the attached recommended ISFSI Physical Protection Alternatives.

5. N/A.

Attachment 1a ISFSI Ph sical Protection Alternatives

1. Two physical barriers: Two physical barriers: perimeter, The level of protection offered by protected area perimeter fence, nuisance fence with posted "No a protected area and isolation defined by 73.2, with isolation Trespassing" signs, with locked zone perimeter fence does not zone & the cask itself as second access. correspond with the target-threat barrier combination; the protection it does rovide is ne Ii ible

2. Illumination around protected Illumination just around the casks same as above area perimeter (along with intrusion detection &

CCT

3. Complete protected area see above same as above perimeter intrusion detection s stem t-:-4.___.R._a_n-do_m_p_a-tr_o_ls_n_o_t_le_s_s_t-ha_n_--+-_R_a-nd_o_m_p_a-tr-ol_s_o_n_ly_b_y_L_L_E_A_or--+-W-it_h_C_C_T_V_a_nd_d_e-te_c_t-io_n_s_y-st_e_m--1 every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months authorized security personnel. directly enveloping the casks, and no credible threat, deterrence value of atrols is ne Ii ible

5. Security organization; two No dedicated security organization Target-threat combination does watchpersons per shift for required, other than random not support costs associated with a monitorin detection e ui ment atrols or other securit ersonnel. dedicated securit or anization

6. Documented liaison with None N/A designated response force or LLEA

7. Specified screening before None N/A rantin unescorted access

8. Controlled ID & locks stem None N/A

9. Escorted individuals under None N/A constant escort

10. Redundant communications Not necessary. Target-threat combination does between security organization not support costs

& designated response force orLLEA

11. Searches of all hand-carried Not necessary With CCTV and detection system packages and vehicles directly enveloping the casks, and no credible threat, deterrence value of perimeter search is ne Ii ible

12. Written response procedures No safeguards response Target-threat combination for unauthorized penetration - procedures necessary. incongruent with Appendix C to

- including contingencies part 73 covered in A .C to art 73

13. All detection and surveillance None N/A systems must be tamper-indicating with line supervision -- with comp measures when necessa

14. Security program review At discretion of licensee Security program not sufficient every 24 months scope or importance to mandate ro ram review fre uenc

15. All documentation retained for At discretion of licensee Paperwork reduction. Not 3 ears necessa

FloridVfJ>C'P( tf~~ Company, P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

FPL USNRL

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95 NOV --t--r p5 :J4 NOV 8 1995 L-95-297 DOCKET NUMBER Mr. J.C. Hoyle PROPOSED AUL Secretary ('=,~ ff2 '+d-079)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch Re: Proposed Rule Concerning Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste (60 Fed. Reg. 42079)

Dear Mr. Hoyle:

These comments are submitted in response to the Federal Register notice, published August 15, 1995, proposing new regulations concerning safeguards for spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste (HLW). These comments are submitted on behalf of Florida Power & Light Company (FPL), a licensed operator of two nuclear power plant units in Dade County, Florida and two units in St. Lucie County, Florida. As noted below, FPL strongly supports the comments submitted by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) concerning this matter.

The Supplementary Information accompanying the proposed rule indicates that the purpose of the subject regulations is merely "to codify existing practice for the safeguarding of stored spent nuclear fuel or HLW," and that "because these proposed safeguards requirements would codify the existing regulatory practice, there would not be any additional burden placed on current licensees." Nevertheless, as the NEI comments indicate, several approved licensing arrangements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) sites are less restrictive and not as labor intensive as those provided in the proposed rule and the associated Draft Regulatory Analysis. At several ISFSis the proposed rule would increase regulatory requirements beyond current commitments. Present regulatory requirements, however, are adequate and - consistent with the stated intent of the NRC as presented in the Supplementary Information - additional regulatory burden is inappropriate. Accordingly, FPL emphasizes the following NEI comments directed at modifying the proposed rule so as to be consistent with the goal of codifying existing practice and avoiding the imposition of additional requirements:

Safeguards requirements for spent fuel "controlled access areas" should be separate from safeguards requirements for nuclear power plant "protected areas."

ISFSI protection requirements in Part 72 should not be tied to those of Part 73.

ISFSis should be provided with a level of protection consistent with enhanced industrial security practices.

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an FPL Group company

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The rulemaking should be revised consistent with a non-prescriptive, performance-based approach. Prescriptive requirements, such as those proposed for intrusion detection, staffing, and patrol frequency, are not warranted.

Additionally, as proposed, the rule would provide ISFSis established under the general license provisions of 10 C.F.R. part 72, Subpart K with the option of complying with current requirements. Specifically, as noted in the Supplementary Information:

The proposed amendment to § 72.212 would allow the licensee or applicant the option of either using § 73.51 for the storage of spent nuclear fuel under a general license QI continuing to use § 73.55 with the additional conditions and exceptions provided in § 72.212(b)(5).

(60 Fed. Reg. at 42081 (emphasis added).) FPL strongly supports this provision of the proposed regulation as an important aspect of avoiding additional burden on licensees. The final rule should make it clear that, for generally licensed ISFSis, compliance with 10 C.F .R. § 72.212(b)(5) as originally adopted (and currently effective) would continue to satisfy security requirements.

FPL appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed rule.

W. H. Bohlke Vice President, Engineering & Licensing WHB/MSD/spt

DOCKETED Log # TXX -95279 File # 10010 USNRC

'9.5 NOV 13 A1 1 :19 1UELECTRIC November 8, l~FIC E Gr SC: CRETARY OOCK ET lrtG & ~Er<YI CE Bt~ANCf-1 C. Lance Terry Gro11p Vice President, Nuclear Secretary, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission UMB Attn: Docketing and Service Branch .UL.____ a.:i~*15 Washington , DC 20555 (lc.oFR.~019)

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATI ON (CPSES)

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING REF : 1) 60 Fed. Reg. 42079, August 15, 1995

2) Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) letter from Mr. Thomas A. Tipton dated November 13 , 1995 to Secretary, Nuclear Regulatory Commission in response to 60 FR 42079 Gentlemen :

In Reference 1 the NRC requested information and comments concerning proposed rulemaking on Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High -Level Radioactive Waste . The proposed rulemaking would modify four parts of existing 10 CFR (Parts 60. 72, 73 and 75) and clarify safeguards requirements for both NRC and DOE installations as follows : independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSis), decommissioned power reactors, monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installations, and geologic repository operations areas (GROA) .

TU Electric endorses the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) comments contained i n Reference 2 regarding the proposed rulemaking . The NEI comments are primarily concerned with the proposed amendments to Parts 72 and 73 for IS FSI security . The NEI letter describes a number of concerns with the proposed rules and includes comments on the specific rule modification wording . TU Electric shares the NEI concerns and supports the NEI proposed changes to the specific rule modification wording .

Sincerely ,,

C ~r~

B* <f\1 v,.: Ew1 .. 0d

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LOCKHEED MARTIN OOC KE 0 Lockheed Idaho Technologies c~Ali,C P. 0. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, ID 83415 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

95 NOV - 3 P3 :19 October 27, 1995 OF FI CE or SECRETA RY DOC KET!,{~ & SERVICE BRANCH Secretary, U .S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch COMMENTS ON THE NRC PROPOSED RULE SAFEGUARDS FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL OR HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE (60 FR 42079) - AMJ-113-95
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The 10 CFR 73 .51 ( d) appears to takes no credit for self-protecting features of spent nuclear fuel as a highly radioactive material since the proposed rule imposes two barriers of protection in addition to continuous surveillance and an intrusion detection system. These requirements seem to be excessive. It is suggested that the requirements for the physical protection system take into consideration the self-protecting features of spent nuclear fuel and eliminate some of the components of the proposed physical protection system.
Sincerely, Arvid M . Jensen, irector Spent Fuels Program kc cc: Cheryl R. Koshuta, MS 3428 Arvid Jensen File V 1'611995 -
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DOCKET NlJABER DOCKETED PROPOSED RULE p (cf:) 3 , 1~ USN C
( b0r"R 49-D'19) [7950-01-P]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION *95 AUG 10 A11 :Q6
, r ,.... r- c 10 CFR Parts 60, 72, 73, and 75 . .. ., ...
I I I,. I RIN: 3150-AF32 Safeguards for Spent Nuclear Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACT ION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission {NRC) is proposing to amend its regulations to clarify safeguards requirements for spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste stored at independent spent fuel storage ins t allations, power reactors that have permanently ceased reactor operations, monitored retrievable storage installations, and geologic repository operations areas. This rule would allow general licensees the option of implementing the proposed safeguards requirements for spent nuclear fuel stored in approved casks at operating power reactor sites. This action is necessary to reduce the regulatory uncertainty regarding the safeguards requirements for the storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste without reducing the level of protection for public health and safety.
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DATES: Comment period expires {~Rsert a sate 90 days after p~bl;cation iA t~
Esderal Ragist~). Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch.
Hand deliver comments to 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7: 45 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.
Comments may be submitted electronically, in either ASCII text or Wordperfect format (version 5.1 or later), by calling the NRC Electronic
{ca f~ ~CYl'\
~~. ~\\f;f\5
Bulletin Board {BBS) on FEDWORLD. The bulletin board may be accessed using a personal computer, a modem, and one of the convnonly available convnunications software packages. Background documents on the rulemaking are also available for downloading and viewing on the bulletin board.
The NRC rulemaking subsystem on FEDWORLD can be accessed directly by dialing the toll free number: 1-800-303-9672. Convnunication software parameters should be set as follows: parity to none, data bits to 8, and stop bits to 1 (N,8,1). Using ANSI or VT-100 terminal emulation, the NRC rulemaking subsystem can then be accessed by selecting the "Rules Menu" option from the "NRC Main Menu." for further information about options available for NRC at FEDWORLD consult the "Help-Information Center" from the "NRC Main Menu." Users will find the "FEDWORLD Online User's Guides" particularly helpful. Many NRC subsystems and databases also have a "Help-Information Center" option that is tailored to the particular subsystem.
The NRC subsystem on FEDWORLD also can be accessed by a direct dial phone number for the main FEDWORLD BBS: 703-321-3339. If you access NRC this way, then you may return to FEDWORLD by selecting the "Return to FEDWORLD" option from the NRC Online Main Menu. However, if you access NRC at FEDWORLD by using NRC's toll-free number, then you will have full access to all NRC systems, but you will not have access to the main FEDWORLD system. For more information on NRC bulletin boards contact Mr. Arthur Davis, Systems Integration and Development Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Convnission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-5780; e-mail AXD3@nrc.gov.
Documents related to this rulemaking, including convnents received, may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level),
Washington, DC. These same documents may also be viewed and downloaded electronically via the Electronic Bulletin Board established by NRC for rulemaking as indicated above under the ADDRESSES heading.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. John L. Telford (301) 415-6229 or e-mail JLT@nrc.gov, or Dr. Sandra D. Frattali (301) 415-6261 or e-mail SDF@nrc.gov, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, or Ms. Priscilla A. Dwyer 2
(301) 415-8110 or e-mail PAD@nrc.gov, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connnission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The Convnission's regulations addressing the storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste (HLW}, 10 CFR Part 72, "Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," refer the applicant or licensee to " .*. applicable requirements of Part 73 ... 11 for requirements for physical protection.
However, Part 73 does not identify any safeguards requirements that are specific to the storage of spent nuclear fuel or HLW. In practice, the NRC has imposed specific safeguards requirements on affected facilities through license conditions using selected portions of 10 CFR 73.50 and 73.55 and interim licensing criteria as guidance.
The Co111T1ission's regulations for disposal of spent nuclear fuel or HLW by DOE at a geologic repository operations area {GROA) take a different
approach. Instead of specifying applicable requirements to protect the co111T1on defense and security, they call for DOE to certify that it will provide
" ... such safeguards as it requires at comparable surface facilities ... " of DOE. They also require DOE to describe a physical security plan for protection against radiological sabotage, but the contents of that plan are not specified.
The only physical protection requirements in NRC regulations that are specific to the storage of spent nuclear fuel are those that apply to spent nuclear fuel stored in certified casks under a general license at operating nuclear power reactors. These requirements are found in§ 72.212{b}(5}.
The Commission is proposing regulations *to codify existing practice for the safeguarding of stored spent nuclear fuel or HLW. The proposed amendments would provide a set of physical protection and material control and accounting 3
requirements directed at the storage of spent nuclear fuel or HLW, whether at an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI), a monitored retrievable storage installation (MRS), a power reactor that has permanently ceased reactor operations, or a geological repository. In addition, these proposed amendments are consistent with safeguards requirements for spent nuclear fuel storage under a general license at operating power reactors.
Because the proposed amendments codify the existing regulatory practice there would not be any additional burden placed upon current licensees.
These amendments would make minor changes to existing regulatory language to clarify the meaning of the requirements. These amendments would also make the requirements of 10 CFR Part 75 {pertaining to international safeguards) applicable to the GROA. This change is needed because the Terms of Reference, dated August 1, 1994, for the Subgroup on IAEA Safeguards in the U.S., part of the Subcofflllittee on International Safeguards and Monitorlng of the IAEA Steering Committee, states that NRC shall be the U.S. agency responsible for maintaining necessary regulations for implementing the US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement at NRC licensed or certified facilities, including the promulgation of regulations, incorporation of appropriate amendments in NRC licenses, and the issuance of such orders as may be necessary to assure compliance. These Terms of Reference regarding the agreement between the U.S.
and the IAEA are available for inspection in the NRC's public document room.
These proposed amendments do not require specific protection against the malevolent use of a vehicle. As stated in the final rule "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants" (59 FR 38889, August 1, 1994), the NRC staff, with contractor assistance, is studying this issue and attempting to quantify the-consequences of a vehicle bomb detonated in the vicinity of an ISFSI. The results of this study will assist the staff in making a determination as to whether vehicle bomb protection is needed for ISFSis. Also, if any significant safety issues are identified in this study, those issues would be resolved by an appropriate regulatory action, which could include rulemaking. In the interim, the staff believes that the 4
inherent nature of the spent nuclear fuel or HLW, along with the degree of protection provided by the approved storage means, provides adequate protection against the malevolent use of a vehicle.
Regulatory Approach The proposed requirements would amend 10 CFR Parts 60, 72, 73, and 75.
For Part 60, the Commission is proposing that the regulatory approach for safeguarding a GROA be the same as that which applies to spent nuclear fuel storage facilities licensed under Part 72. The basic reason for this proposal is that the GROA operations, at least insofar as they are expected to be conducted in surface facilities, appear to present the same kinds of potential risks that are characteristic of the storage of spent nuclear fuel. And the safeguards that would thus be required are deemed to be sufficient as well to protect against acts affecting the underground facility that might be *-i,nimical to the co1T111on defense and security. This regulatory approach is predicated on maintaining the physical integrity of the spent nuclear fuel rods. If their physical integrity is not maintained, additional license conditions might be found to be necessary and would then be incorporated in the liclnse ..
The current proposal represents a departure from the Comriifssion's prior position, as explained in the statement of considerations accompanying\its promulgation of 10 CFR Part 60 (46 FR 13971, 13975, February 25, 1981). The prior view was that "DOE, as a Federal agency operating under the Atomic Energy Act, has its own obligation to promote the co1T111on defense and security.
Indeed, DOE is responsible under the Atomic Energy Act for protection of materials and facilities far more sensitive from a safeguards standpoint than nuclear waste materials in a geologic repository. Therefore, the rule provides that a DOE certification that its repository operations area safeguards are equal to those at comparable DOE surface facilities shall constitute a rebuttable presumption on the que'stion of inimicality to the common defense and security."
5
Implementation of the current rule has proved to be difficult for two reasons. The first has been the identification of DOE surface facilities that are *comparable,* so that the protective measures are neither too burdensome nor too lax. The second reason concerns the indefiniteness of the *rebuttable presumption" language. Neither DOE nor the NRC staff nor any other potential party can be certain about the level of detail that might be necessary to support the certification or to rebut the presumption of noninimicality. It appears likely to the Commission that the specification of reasonable safeguards requirements, as it is here proposing, will enable DOE to discharge its common defense and security obligations more efficiently than would be the case under the existing language. And there would be 'the added benefit of ensuring that similar operations (i.e., at a GROA as well as at spent nuclear fuel storage facilities) are addressed in a consistent manner. Moreover, by defining the requirements more clearly in advance of the submission of a license application, opportunities for timely public review and corrment may be enhanced.
The proposed amendments would replace existing § 60.2l{b)(3) with a requirement for DOE to submit a detailed plan to provide physical protection for the storage Qf HLW at a GROA in accordance with a new§ 73.51. Also, the proposed amendment would replace existing § 60.2l(b}(4) with a requirement for DOE to comply with a new§ 60.78, which requires.DOE to provide a description of a program to meet the requirements of existing §§ 72.72, 72.74, 72.76, and 72.78. The rationale for these changes is, as discussed above, to ensure that the safeguards for similar facilities are addressed in a consistent manner. In addition, because these specific requirements are being provided, the general requirement for DOE to provide " ... such safeguards as it requires at comparable surface facilities ... " would also be removed from
§§ 60.31, 60.41, and 72.24(0), because it would not be needed. Also, all of the requirements of§ 73.51 would be applicable to surface operations including the entry points to the underground facility, and the earth cover together with the remoteness of the facility would provide additional protection of the public against a significant offsite release from the 6
underground facility. Therefore, only the more general performance objectives set out in paragraph 73.5l(b) would be applicable to the underground facility.
Surveillance and detection measures would be required for surface operations and access would be controlled at entry points to the underground facility; within the underground facility itself, however, no further measures would need to be implemented for purposes of this regulation.
An additional revision to Part 60 relates to the nuclear material control and accounting program that 1s referred to in§ 60.2l(c}(l0). To the extent that this program relates to safeguards issues, it is more properly addressed as wgeneral information" under§ 60.21(b) rather than as part of the Safety Analysis Report under§ 60.21(c). The proposed rule will accomplish this. However, existing§ 60.2l(c}(l0) has a broader purpose that does implicate safety issues. There is a need for DOE to describe the materials
,J,:
inventory and recordkeeping program that is designed to assure protection of public health and safety during operations of the GROA and after permanent closure. Such information is important, for example, for purposes of performance confirmation, potential retrieval, and archival documentation.
Section 60.2l(c} would accordingly be revised to reflect this focus.
The proposed amendment to§ 72.180 would provide requirements for the storage of spent nuclear fuel or HLW under a specific license by referring applicants to the same new section, § 73.51. The proposed amendment to
§ 72.212 would allow the licensee or applicant the option of either using
§ 73.51 for the storage of spent nuclear fuel under a general license or continuing to use§ 73.55 with the additional conditions and exceptions provided in§ 72.212(b)(5).
In licensing the storage of spent nuclear fuel or HLW at an ISFSI or a power reactor that has permanently ceased reactor operations, the NRC staff
- has had to sort through the many safeguards requirements of Part 73 to choose appropriate safeguards requirements, and impose those requirements through license conditions. As a result of this experience, however, a set of 7
principles has evolved that reflects both the nature of potential threats and the hazardous radioactive characteristics of the materials. Accordingly, the proposed amendments in§ 73.51 would codify safeguards requirements currently imposed on spent nuclear fuel storage licensees and would provide a consistent set of requirements for future licensing. Specifically, this new section would have the objective of ensuring that the following basic physical protection performance capabilities are met:
(1) Spent nuclear fuel or HLW is stored only within a protected area; (2) Only authorized individuals are granted access to the protected area; (3) Unauthorized penetrations of or activities within the protected area are detected and assessed; (4) Contnunicat1on with a designated response force, whenever necessary, is conducted in a timely fashion; and (5) The physical security organization is managed properly.
Thes~ amendments would not apply to spent nuclear fuel storage pools at operating nuclear power plants. In addition, because these proposed safeguards requirements would codify the existing regulatory practice, there would not be any additional burden placed on current licensees. Further, the industry would benefit from a reduction of current regulatory uncertainties.
The public would benefit from a greater level of assurance that appropriate safeguards requirements are being imposed on spent nuclear fuel and HLW storage licensees through public review and comment on the proposed rule. The DOE would benefit from the proposed amendments by having a clear statement of the safeguards measures the Commission plans to require at the GROA. Also, NRC would benefit as a result of a more efficient licensing process.
In addition, the current reporting requirements in § 73.71 would be amended to specifically include facilities that are subject to this rulemaking. However, because the amended reporting requirements are equivalent to current practice, no additional burden will be placed on current 8
licensees as a result of these amended reporting requirements.
Specific Considerations Conments with supporting rationale are particularly requested on the following questions:
1. Would the proposed amendments impose any significant additional costs for safeguards of currently stored spent nuclear fuel beyond what is now incurred for that purpose?
2. Is there reason to expect the costs to future licensees to differ substantially from those of current licensees?
3. Are the cost estimates in Table II~ of the Draft Regulatory Analysis representative of current industry experience? Are there significant costs that have not been included in the table?
4. Are the costs justified by the benefits that would be afforded by the proposed amendments? Are there alternatives that would aff~rd essentially the same benefits, but be more cost effective?
5. Are the proposed amendments in 10 CFR 73.51 appropriate for an MRS or geologic repository operated by the U.S. Department of Energy?
Criminal Penalties
- The Co111Tiission notes that these proposed amendments are issued under Sections 161b and i of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Therefore, violation of these regulations may subject a person to criminal sanctions under Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion The Connnission has determined that this regulation is the type of action described as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22 (c)(3){i) and (iii).
Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this propose rule.
9
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This proposed rule does not contain a new or amended information collection requirement that is subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval numbers 3150-0002, -0127, and -0132.
Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspects of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Information and Records Management Branch (T6F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0132), NEOB-10202, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.
Regulatory Analysis The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis for this proposed rule. The draft analysis examines the benefits and impacts of the alternatives considered by the Commission. The draft regulatory analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW.
(Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Dr. Sandra D. Frattali, Division of Regulatory Applications, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, 4I DC 20555-0001. The draft regulatory analysis also is available for viewing and downloading from the NRC's rulemaking bulletin board as discussed above under ADDRESSES.
Regulatory Flexibility Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission certifies that this rule, if adopted, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This proposed rule would affect operators of ISFSis, power reacto.rs that have permanently ceased 10
operation, and DOE as the operator of the MRS and GROA. The affected licensees do not fall within the scope of the definition of "small entities" set forth in Section 601(3) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or the Small Business Size Standards set out in regulations issued by the S~all Business ,
Administration Act, 13 CFR Part 121.
Backfit Analysis The Commission has determined that the backfit rule in 10 CFR 50.109 does not apply to this proposed rule because these proposed amendments do not impose new requirements on existing 10 CFR Part 50 licensees. Also, the backfitting requirements in 10 CFR 72.62 do not apply because these proposed amendments neither impose new requirements nor modify procedures or organizations of currently licensed ISFSis. Therefore, a backfit analysis was not prepared for this proposed rule.
List of Subjects 10 CFR Part 60 Crimina1 penalties, High-level waste, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Nuclear materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Waste treatment and disposal. 1 10 CFR Part 72 Manpower training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, Spent fuel.
10 CFR Part 73 Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Export, Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
11
10 CFR Part 75 Criminal penalties, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the Co11111ission is proposing to adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 60, 72, 73, and 75.
PART 60--DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC REPOSITORIES
1. The authority citation for Part 60 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Secs. 51, 53, 62, 63, 65, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233}; secs. 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5842, 5846); secs. 10 and 14, Pub. L.95-601, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C.
2021a and 5851}; sec. 102, Pub. L.91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332);
secs. 114, 121, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2213g, 2228, as amended (42 U.S.C.
10134, 10141} and Pub. L. 102-486, sec. 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851).
2. In§ 60.21, paragraphs (b){3), {b)(4), and (c){lO) are revised to read as follows:
§ 60.21 Content of application.
(b) * **
(3} A detailed plan to provide physical protection of high-level radioactive waste in accordance with§ 73.51 of this chapter. This plan must include the design for physical protection, the licensee's safeguards contingency plan, and security organization personnel training and qualification plan. The plan must list tests, inspections, audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such requirements.
12
(4) A description of the program to meet the requirements of§ 60.78.of this part.
(c) * * *
(10) A description of the program to be used to maintain the records described in§§ 60.71 and 60.72 of this part.
3. In§ 60.31, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows:
§ 60.31 Construction authorization.
(b) Co111111on defense and securjty. That there is reasonable assurance that the activities proposed in the application will not be inimical to the common defense and security.
4. In§ 60.41, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:
§ 60.41 Standards for issuance of a license.
(c) The issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common defense and security and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public.
5. A new§ 60.78 is added to read as follows:
§ 60.78 Material control and accounting records and reports.
DOE shall implement a program of material control and accounting (and accidental criticality reporting) that is the same as that specified _in
§§ 72.72, 72.74, 72.76, 72.78 of this chapter.
13
PART 72--LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
6. The authority citation for Part 72 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953, 954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L.86-373, 73 Stat. 688, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); Pub. L.95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 {42 U.S.C. 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L.91-190, 83 Stat. 853 {42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 141, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec. 148, Pub. L.
100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 {42 U.S.C. 10151, 10152, 10153, 10155, 10157, 10161, 10168).
Section 72.44(9) also issued under secs. 142{b} and 148(c), (d), Pub. L.
100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-232, 1330-236 (42 U.S.C. 10162{b), 10168(c),(d)).
Section 72.46 also issued under sec. 189, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10154). Section 72.96{d) also issued under sec. 145(g), Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C.
10165(9)). Subpart J also issued under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 2(19), ll7(a),
14l(h), Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2224 (42 U.S.C.
10101, 10137(a), 1016l(h)). Subparts Kand Lare also issued under sec. 133, 98 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10153) and sec. 218(a), 96 Stat. 2252 (42 U.S.C.
10198).
7. In§ 72.24, paragraph (o) is revised to read as follows:
§ 72.24 Contents of applications: Technical information.
(o) A description of the detailed security measures for physical protection, including design features and the plans required by Subpart H.
For an application from DOE for an ISFSI or MRS, DOE will provide a 14
description of the physical security plan for protection against radiological sabotage as required by Subpart H.
8. Section 72.180 is revised to read as follows:
§ 72.180 Physical security plan.
The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow a detailed plan for physical protection as described in§ 73.51 of this chapter. The licensee shall retain a copy of the current plan as a record until the Convnission terminates the license for which the procedures were developed and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain the superseded material for 3 years after each change or until termination of the license. This plan must describe how the applicant will meet the requirements of§ 73.51 and provide physical protection during on-site transportation to and from the propo~ed ISFSI or MRS including the design for physical protection, the license~ts safeguards contingency plan, and the security organization personnel training and qualification plan. The plan must list tests, inspections, audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such requirements.
9. In§ 72.212, paragraphs (b)(l) and (b}(5} are revised to read as follows:
§ 72.212 Conditions of general license issued under§ 72.210.
(b) * **
(1) ***
(iv) Notify the NRC as to whether they will implement§ 73.51 or their approved physical security plan pursuant to§ 73.55. If a licensee implements
§ 73.51, its approved physical security plan must be modified to clearly indicate that§ 73.51 will be followed for safeguarding spent nuclear fuel.
For those persons who have not begun use of the general license, this notice must be included in the 90-day letter required by (b)(l)(i) of this paragraph.
For those persons who have begun use of the general license, this notice must be provided no later than 30 days after implementation of§ 73.51 to the 15
appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Co1T111ission regional office listed in Appendix D to Part 20 of this chapter.
(5) Protect the spent nuclear fuel against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage in accordance with either§ 73.51 of this chapter or the same provisions and requirements as are set forth in the licensee's physical security plan pursuant to§ 73.55 of this chapter with the following additional conditions and exceptions.
PART 73-- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
10. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147, 94 Stat. 780 {42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 sec. 1701, 106 Stat. 2951, 2952, 2953
{42 u.s.c. 5841, 5844, 2297f).
Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section 73.37{f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).
Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L.99-399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 u.s.c. 2169).
11. In§ 73.1, paragraph (b){6) is revised to read as follows:
§73.1 Purpose and scope.
(b) ***
(6) This part prescribes requirements for the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste stored in either an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or a monitored retrievable storage installation {MRS) licensed under Part 72 of this chapter, or stored 16
at the geologic repository operations area licensed under Part 60 of this chapter.
12. The introductory text of§ 73.50 is revised to read as follows:
§ 73.50 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities.
Each licensee who is not subject to§ 73.51, but who possesses, uses, or stores formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material which is not readily separable from other radioactive material and which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding other than at a nuclear reactor facility licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter shall comply with the following:
13. A new§ 73.51 is added to read as follows:
§ 73.51 Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste.
(a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.50, or 73.67, the physical protection requirements of this section apply to each licensee who stores:
(1) Spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste (HLW) under a specific license issued pursuant to Part 72 of this chapter: .
(i) At an independent spent fuel storage installation {ISFSI);
{ii) At a monitored retrievable storage (MRS} installation; or (iii) At a nuclear power reactor that has permanently ceased reactor operations licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter; (2) Spent nuclear fuel or HLW at a geologic repository operations area (GROA) licensed pursuant to Part 60 of this chapter; or (3} Spent nuclear fuel under a general license issued pursuant to Part 72 of th.is chapter and has exercised the option provided by
§ 72.212(b)(5) to use the provisions of§ 73.51 for the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel.
17
(b) General performance objectives.
(1) Each licensee subject to this section shall establish and maintain a physical protection system with the objective of providing high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
(2) To meet the general objective of paragraph (b)(l), each licensee subject to this section shall meet the following performance capabilities:
(i) Store spent nuclear fuel or HLW only within a protected area; (ii) Grant access to the protected area only to individuals who are authorized to enter the protected area; (iii) Detect and assess unauthorized penetration of or activities within the protected area; (iv} Provide timely communication to a designated response force whenever the response force is called upon to act; and (v) Manage the physical security organization in a manner that maintains its effectiveness.
(3) The physical protection system must be designed to protect against radiological sabotage.
(c) Plan retention. Each licensee subject to this section shall retain a copy of the effective physical protection plan as a record for 3 years or until termination, of the license for which the procedures were developed.
Copies of superseded material must be retained for 3 years after each change or until termination of the license.
(d) Physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures.
To meet the performance capabilities of paragraph {b){2) of this section, a physical protection system must include, but is not necessarily limited to, the measures specified in paragraphs (d)(l) through (d)(l4) of this section.
The Convnission may require alternate or additional measures necessary to meet t~e performance objectives of paragraph (b)(l) of this section. 'The Convnission may also authorize other necessary protection measures.
(1) Spent nuclear fuel or HLW must be stored only within a protected area so that access to this material requires passage through or penetration of two physical barriers, one barrier at the perimeter of the protected area 18
and one barrier offering substantial penetration resistance. The physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area must be as defined in§ 73.2.
Isolation zones, typically 20 feet wide each, on both sides of this barrier must be provided to facilitate assessment. The barrier offering substantial resistance to penetration may be provided by an approved storage cask or building walls such as those of a reactor or fuel storage building. Other suitable measures to provide the barrier may be acceptable, if approved by the NRC on a case by case basis.
(2) A means of illumination must be provided sufficient to permit assessment of unauthorized penetration of or activities within the protected area and associated isolation zones.
(3) The perimeter of the protected area must be subject to continual surveillance and be protected by an intrusion detection system with provisions for redundant monitoring of the system. The detection and surveillanc~
systems must be monitored in a continuously-staffed alarm station, no~;-
necessarily located within the protected area, and in one redundant location.
(4) The protected area must be monitored by random patrols of a frequency not less than once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .
(5) A security organization, with written procedures, must be established. The security organization must include a minimum of two watchmen per shift to provide for monitoring of detection and surveillance systems and for conununications with a designated response force or local law enforpement agencies {LLEA) in the event of detection of unauthorized penetration or activities. Members of the security organization shall be trained, equipped, and qualified in accordance with the applicable provisions of Appendix B to this part.
(6) Documented liaison with a designated response force or LLEA must be established to permit response to unauthorized penetration or activities.
{7) Screening must be conducted before granting an individual unescorted access to the protected area to obtain information on which to base a decision to permit such access. Screening should typically include a criminal history check, a previous employment check, and two personal reference checks.
19
(8) A controlled personnel identification and lock system must be established and maintained to limit access to the protected area to individuals authorized unescorted access or escorted individuals who have been approved for such access.
(9) All escorted individuals to the protected area must be under the constant escort of an individual who has been authorized unescorted access to the protected area.
(10) Redundant corrmunications capability must be provided between the security organization and designated response force or LLEA.
(11) All individuals, vehicles, and hand-carried packages entering the protected area must be checked for proper authorization and searched for explosives before entry.
(12) Written response procedures must be established and maintained for addr~ssing unauthorized penetration of or activities within the protected area including Category 5, Procedures, of Appendix C to Part 73. The licensee shall retain a copy of the response procedures as a record for 3 years or until termination of the license for which the procedures were developed.
Copies of superseded material must be retained for 3 years after each change or until termination of the license.
(13) All detection and surveillance systems and supporting subsystems must be tamper-indicating with line supervision and be mai.ntained in operable condition. Compensatory measures must be taken during periods of inoperability. 4lt (14) The security program must be reviewed once every 24 months by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. The security program review must include an evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical security system and a verification of the liaison established with the designated response force or LLEA.
(15) The following documentation must be retained as a record for 3 years after the record is made or until termination of the license. Duplicate records to those required under§ 73.71 of this part need not be retained under the requirements of this section:
20
{i) A log of individuals granted access to the protected area;
{ii) Screening records of individuals granted unescorted access to the protected area;
{iii) A log of routine patrols; (iv) A record of each alarm received identifying the type of alarm, location, date and time when received, and disposition of the alarm; and (v) The security program review reports.
{e) Exception. The physical protection system for the underground facility of a geologic repository operations area must meet the performance capabilities of paragraph {b) of this section, but need not include the specific measures set out in paragraph (d) of this section provided that access is controlled at the underground facility entry points.
14. In§ 73.71, paragraphs (b){l) and (c)(l) are revised to read, as*
f O11 ows: :~ '\, '
§ 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events.
{b)(l) Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or 73.67 shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph
\
I(a)(l) of Appendix G to this part. Licensees subject to the provisions of
§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50,
' - . 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or each licensee possessing .
st~ategic special nuclear material (SSNM) and subject to§ 73.67(d) shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after the discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraphs I(a)(2), (a)(3), (b), and (c) of Appendix G to this part. Licensees subject to the provisions of §§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, or 73.60 shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph I!d) of Appendix G to this part.
(c)(i) Each licensee subject to the provisions of§§ 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or each licensee possessing SSNM and subject to the provisions of§ 73.67{d) shall maintain a current log and record the 21
safeguards events described in paragraphs II (a) and (b) of Appendix G to this part within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of discovery by a licensee employee or member of the licensee's contract security organization. The licensee shall retain the log of events recorded under this section as a record for 3 years after the last entry is made in each log or until termination of the license.
PART 75--SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL - IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT
15. The authority*citation for Part 75 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 63, 103, 104, 122, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 932, 936r 937, 939, ~48, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2133, 2134, 2152, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841).
Section 75.4 also issued ijnder secs. 135, 141, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat.
2232, 2241 (42 u.s.c. 10155, 10161).
16. In§ 75.4, paragraph (k)(5) is revised to read as follows:
§ 75.4 Definitions.
(k) ***
(5) Any location where the possession of more than-one effective -~
kilogram of nuclear material is licensed pursuant to Parts 40, 60, or 70 of this chapter, or pursuant to an Agreement State license.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this , 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Andrew ~ates, Acting Secretary of the Commission.
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ML23151A708

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