ML22242A260
| ML22242A260 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/2022 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-I/DORS/OB |
| To: | Exelon Generation Co |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20120A063 | List: |
| References | |
| EPID L-2022-OLL-0004 | |
| Download: ML22242A260 (16) | |
Text
Form 2.3-3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (JPMs)
Facility: Peach Bottom Exam Date: 5/23/22-5/27/22 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL A
S Y
3 S
B S
Y 3
S Weak K/A match. Discussed with site; JPM consists of manual control which matches K/A C
S Y
3 E
K/A mismatch initial plant conditions.
Include procedure to be used in initiating cue; site agreed to add procedure and change initial conditions D
S Y
3 S
E S
N 3
E Task standard D.1 is different from step 6, they need to be aligned. 55-65 scfm seems reasonable; station agreed to match F
S N
2 S
G S
N 2
E Importance rating is 3.2, not 3.3; station agreed to fix H
P Y
3 S
I P
N 3
S J
P N
3 E
Weak K/A match, random selection replacement yielded EA1.05, which is a match
Facility: Peach Bottom Exam Date: 5/23/22-5/27/22 1
JPM # or title 2
Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6
U/E/S 7
Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL K
P N
3 S
RO CO1 A
N 3
N 3
S RO EC A
N 3
E Steps 4, 5 needs more detail on what applicant sees; station agreed to add detail RO EP A
N 3
E Does step 5 require examiner cue? Cue sheet should not say that 2 agencies did not receive form if we are going to give them that during the course of the JPM; station agreed to add examiner cue to step 5 and removed info from cue SRO CO1 A
N 3
N 3
E Add dayshift to cue and JPM step 3 SRO EC A
N 3
N 3
N 3
E Page 5: classification needs to be corrected from CS6 to CA6, and add in a blank to record classification time. Page 6: wind speed needs to be corrected from 15 to 10. Station agreed to correct all.
Form 2.3-3 Instructions for Completing the JPM Table
- 1. Enter the JPM number and/or title.
- 2. Enter the type of JPM(S)imulator, (P)lant, or (A)dministrative.
- 3. Enter (Y)es or (N)o for an Alternate Path JPM.
- 4. Rate the level of difficulty (LOD) of each JPM using a scale of 1-5 (easy-difficult). A JPM containing less than two critical steps, a JPM that tests solely for recall or memorization, or a JPM that involves directly looking up a single correct answer is likely LOD = 1 (too easy). Conversely, a JPM with over 30 steps or a JPM that takes more than 45 minutes to complete is likely LOD = 5 (too difficult).
- 5. Check the appropriate block for each JPM error type, using the following criteria:
LOD = 1 or 5 is unsatisfactory (U).
REF: The JPM lacks required references, tools, or procedures (U).
IC: The JPM initial conditions are missing or the JPM lacks an adequate initial cue (U).
CUE: The JPM lacks adequate evaluator cues to allow the applicant to complete the task, or the evaluator cues are subjective or leading (U).
TSK: The JPM lacks a task standard or lacks completion criteria for a task standard (U).
CS: The JPM contains errors in designating critical steps, or the JPM lacks an adequate performance standard for a critical step (U).
TL: The JPM validation times are unreasonable, or a time-critical JPM lacks a completion time (U).
- 6. Mark the JPM as unsatisfactory (U), satisfactory (S), or needs enhancements (E). A JPM is (U) if it has one or more (U) errors as determined in step 5. Examples of enhancements include formatting, spelling, or other minor changes.
- 7. Briefly describe any JPM determined to be unsatisfactory (U) or needing enhancement (E). Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a satisfactory (S) resolution on this form.
Form 2.3-3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (Scenarios)
Facility: Peach Bottom Scenario: 1 Exam Date: 5/23/22-5/27/22 1
Scenario Event ID/Name:
2 Scenario event errors 3
U/E/S 4
Explanation Realism/
Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1
E Aligning HPCI for automatic operation performs similar actions to event 1 in scenario 2 to cycle HPCI steam supply valve; station agreed to replace scenario 1 event 1 2
E Add expected alarms that applicants were expected to see; station agreed to add 5
E In URO actions, it states that applicant may emergency stop RFPs as necessary. How likely is this?
Should we delay insertion of the emergency stop override, have it trigger off the mode switch in the next event? Site says it is possible they will stop an RFP due to concern of reactor water level going over +35 and Level 8 turbine trip. Site agreed to modify emergency stop push button override timing to be inserted with the two control rods drifting.
CT1 U
Invalid critical task, as normal scram is ineffective and ATWS actions are required. Site agreed to remove critical task.
Facility: Peach Bottom Scenario: 2 Exam Date: 5/23/22-5/27/22 1
Scenario Event ID/Name:
2 Scenario event errors 3
U/E/S 4
Explanation Realism/
Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1
E Too similar to event 1 in scenario 1, same valve is cycled. Station agreed to replace scenario 1 event 1.
3 E
This is also an event in scenario 4 (proposed spare). Station agreed to replace APRM failure in scenario 4 with a different failure/TS call.
8 E
Is having condensate pumps trip on mode switch too soon? Does not allow for level recovery post-scram. Site says that level will recover somewhat, but not tripping condensate pumps on mode switch would recover too much level and negatively impact scenario length.
CT2 E
Needs enhancement to be bounded by time. As written, if applicant goes below -
195 will fail critical task. Typically restore and maintain level implies level can go below critical level. Site stated that TRIPS were re-written such that they did not have to wait to -172 to blowdown.
Based on level drop rate, applicants should have no problem blowing down before -195 and applicants are trained in that manner.
Facility: Peach Bottom Scenario: 3 Exam Date: 5/23/22-5/27/22 1
Scenario Event ID/Name:
2 Scenario event errors 3
U/E/S 4
Explanation Realism/
Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1
S Can applicants get to 78% on recirc alone? Site confirms, no rod insertion necessary.
3 S
Minor typo in booth instructions-2SU0E vice 2SUE. Site agreed to fix.
5 S
Minor typo in booth instructions-is till under investigation vice is still. Site agreed to fix.
9 S
Minor typo in booth instructions-Initation of vice Initiation of. Site agreed to fix.
Form 2.3-3 Instructions for Completing the Scenario Table
- 1. For each scenario, enter the scenario event names and descriptions.
- 2. Review the individual events contained in each scenario, and identify and mark event errors:
The scenario guide event description is not realistic/credibleunsatisfactory (U).
The scenario guide event description lacks adequate crew/operator performance standardsneeds enhancement (E).
Facility: Peach Bottom Scenario: 4 Exam Date: 5/23/22-5/27/22 1
Scenario Event ID/Name:
2 Scenario event errors 3
U/E/S 4
Explanation Realism/
Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 3
E Replace APRM failure in either scenario 2 or 4. Site agreed to replace.
4 E
Event mentions effects of A RFP high vibrations as rising torus water temperature, lowering steam flow and generator loading. This description sounds like symptoms of SRV opening.
Site agreed to correct.
10 E
For URO actions, guide mentions that the URO verifies containment flooded vice reactor vessel flooded. Site agreed to correct to reactor vessel.
CT1 U
Invalid critical task as normal reactor scram is ineffective. Remove as critical task. Site agreed to remove.
The scenario guide event description lacks verifiable actions for a credited normal event, reactivity event instrument/component malfunction, or technical specification (TS) event (or a combination of these) (U).
The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates an event as a critical task (i.e., a noncritical task labeled as critical or a critical task labeled as noncritical). This includes critical tasks that do not meet the critical task criteria (i.e., the critical task does not have a measurable performance standard) (U).
The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates entry into TS actions when not required or does not designate entry into TS actions when required (U).
- 3. Based on the outcome in step 2, mark the scenario event as unsatisfactory (U), satisfactory (S), or needs enhancements (E). An event is (U) if it has one or more (U) errors as determined in step 2. Examples of enhancements include formatting, spelling, or other minor changes.
- 4. Briefly describe any scenario event determined to be unsatisfactory (U) or needing enhancement (E). Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario event is marked by a satisfactory (S) resolution on this form.
Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#
- 1.
LOK (F/H)
- 2.
LOD (1-5)
- 3. Psychometric Flaws
- 4. Job Content Flaws
- 5. K/A Use Flaws
- 6. Source (B/M/N)
- 7. Status (U/E/S)
- 8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.
Dist.
Partial Job Link Minutia
- /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level 1
H 3
X N
S K/A is for loss of core flow, stem conditions are a loss of RFP. After discussion with station, K/A is a match as this question is a failure of a runback 2
F 2
N S
3 F
3 B
S 4
H 3
M S
5 H
2 N
S Answer C not plausible for change in core flow.
Possibly for OT-104 for increased reactivity due to pressure increase. TSV 1 switch should fail open if the valve is to indicate closed. Stem questionably plausible with 2 TSV closed and power 65% steady.
Station will change stem to TSV 3 and 4 drift 80%
closed. C distracter is plausible because a recirc pump should trip on EOC-RPT 6
H 3
B S
Move reference to SE-10 to beginning of stem for better stem focus, station agreed 7
F 2
N S
8 F
2 B
S 9
F 2
B S
10 H
3 M
S 11 H
3 N
S 12 H
3 M
S 13 H
3 N
S How is it plausible that a drywell temp limit would be exceeded, as there is no drywell leak. Station agreed to add drywell temp and a small drywell steam leak to stem. For consistency, torus and drywell should both be capitalized or not, station agreed to fix.
14 H
4 B
S Capitalize ONLY. Is there a way to edit the graphs so there is no red? Applicants should know which side of the curve is safe. Site capitalized ONLY and edited
graphs to be black and white with no labeled SAFE and UNSAFE regions.
15 F
3 X
N S
Collection of T/F statements. Remove quotation mark from answer D. Station agreed to modify stem to add in failure of EDGs to start and modify distracters to correct T/F issue 16 H
3 N
S Does mode switch info need to be in stem? Does that feed the DFWC system logic? Second part of B and D answers not consistent. One says ONLY. Station stated that mode switch for this scenario is not required. One only in answer B because in low power mode, setpoint cannot be entered below 1 unless ATWS control mode is entered.
17 F
2 M
S Importance rating incorrect, should be 3.8 18 F
3 N
S 19 F
2 B
S 20 F
2 B
S 21 F
2 M
S 22 F
3 N
S Basis for A and C needs to be adjusted. That is not why the switch is taken to override. Design basis document states that they are prevented from starting to protect the EDG from overload. Station agreed to make A and C match wording in design basis document.
23 F
3 M
S 24 H
3 B
S 25 F
2 N
S 26 H
3 M
S Two different importance ratings listed, 3.8 is correct 27 H
4 N
S Modify stem conditions to make injection more plausible between CS and RHR shutoff head. Editorial change to last bullet: logic train fails to 0 psig Station agreed to modify A RHR logic train failing high, and lower stem pressure to make injection with RHR more plausible.
28 F
3 B
S Potential collection of T/F statements. Station stated that the system lineup dictates whether or not draining the RPV to the Torus is possible, so not a collection of T/F statements.
29 H
4 M
S Typo: Shudown cooling 30 F
3 B
S Weak K/A link. Station states K/A is linked due to failure for aux oil pump to start will prevent HPCI control logic from being able to control HPCI.
31 F
3 B
S Awkward wording, recommend removing reference to rated voltage. Station agreed to modify stem in reference to buses being powered by EDG vice 95%
rated voltage 32 F
2 B
S K/A 211000 A3.02 does not exist. Possibly A1.02?
Station agreed A1.02 is proper K/A, will correct documentation 33 H
3 B
S Importance rating should be 3.7 not 3.2 34 H
3 B
S K/A importance ratings are 4.2/4.4 35 H
4 B
S K/A importance rating 4.1 36 F
3 M
S Add per GP-2 to the stem. Station agreed to add.
37 H
4 X
B S
1/2 scram is not a credible distracter for the APRM system, recommend change to full scram. Center answers under headers. Station agreed to change C and D to full scram, and center.
38 H
4 N
S Per stem conditions, no NPSH violation is occurring, wrong keyed answer. Per what procedure to you trip RCIC? Why not lower flow instead? Station agreed to lower torus pressure to 2.5# and add T-102 as the controlling procedure. In this case, RCIC is not needed for ACC, because DFWC is in automatic, so RCIC is violating NPSH and should be tripped.
39 H
4 B
S 40 F
3 B
S Answer B borderline not credible. Students should know via system knowledge and time in the simulator that MSIV do not isolate causing plant trip on loss of one side of RPS. Station agreed to change B to Outboard Group I half isolation 41 H
3 N
S 42 F
1 N
S Too simplistic in single element, requires the most basic of system knowledge. Station agreed to replace question 43 F
3 N
S 44 F
3 N
S Add to B: building may become a high radiation area and access Adjust hydrogen percentage up to make answer D plausible. Station agreed to change
B to match A making the Turbine Building uninhabitable. Also agreed to adjust hydrogen level to 1%.
45 H
3 N
S Two K/As referenced in source documentation, 291008 is on the exam outline. Station stated question originally came from 262001 and was documenting that fact. Will adjust wording to accurately reflect. No issues with K/A 46 H
3 M
S 47 F
3 N
S Answer D not definitively incorrect, rods can still be scrammed. Station agreed to modify D to state all ability to insert control rods from the control room is lost 48 F
3 B
S 49 H
3 N
S 50 H
3 M
S 51 F
3 N
S 52 F
3 B
S 53 F
3 B
S 54 H
3 N
S 55 H
4 B
S 56 H
3 X
B S
K/A mismatch. Question does not address EOC-RPT, instead addresses ATWS/RPT. Station agreed to replace/rewrite question for EOC-RPT.
57 F
3 N
S 58 H
4 X
N S
K/A mismatch, question stem and actions required are not affected by high torus level, even though high torus level is mentioned in stem. Correct K/A and importance rating in source documentation, but K/A reference is incorrect. Station states this is not K/A mismatch because torus level is actually high and dictates which RHR graph is selected from T-102.
59 H
4 B
S Enhance stem to specifically ask about the response of the A RHR loop since that is the system with the S18 in override. Station agreed to modify.
60 H
3 B
S No correct answer as written, applicants cannot assume the bridge was moved. Rewrite stem to instead ask which of the following would cause a rod withdrawal block. K/A in source documentation and K/A reference importance rating do not match. 3.9 is correct. Station agreed to delete last bullet of stem about the rod withdrawal block alarm, and ask which of the following conditions would cause a rod block?
61 H
3 B
S 62 F
3 N
S Mismatch K/As and importance ratings between source documentation and K/A references, 241000 A3.01 3.2 is correct 63 F
3 M
S 64 F
3 B
S Match fonts for 1, 2, 3 bullets. C is more plausible as 1 and 3 ONLY. K/A references missing RO importance rating. Station agreed to change to 1 and 3 ONLY 65 F
3 N
S Reference the procedure requirement, i.e. conduct of operations for conservative decision making. Station agreed to add reference.
66 F
3 B
S 67 F
3 B
S Add Per OP-AA-103-102 to stem for clarity. Station agreed to add.
68 H
3 X
B S
Potential K/A mismatch. K/A pertains to radiological safety principles, not ALARA. Also add an equipment reference for operational validity. Station states that ALARA is part of radiological safety and dictated by licensed operators. Station also agreed to add equipment reference.
69 F
3 B
S 70 F
3 N
S Make question unit specific. Remove GF Question from above stem 71 F
3 N
S Remove GF Question from above stem 72 F
3 N
S Remove GF Question from above stem 73 H
3 B
S Remove GF Question from above stem 74 H
3 B
S Remove GF Question from above stem 75 F
3 N
S Remove GF Question from above stem
76 H
4 M
S 77 H
3 B
S Question timing may need to be altered slightly.
Station agreed to modify timing of last bullet to 1 minute after 1211 such that the main turbine would not have tripped yet. Question is not significantly modified. Station will change categorization of question to bank.
78 F
3 B
S 79 H
3 N
S Add in accordance with ON-125 to stem. Station agreed 80 F
3 N
S Change its to its. Station agreed 81 H
3 N
S 82 H
4 X
B S
Seems like direct cue to use HPCI, removing 2 possible answers. Applicants should know difference in strategy between SE-1 and SE-10, remove references to HPCI. Control room has been evacuated and control established at the ASD panels but no further action taken. HPCI And RCIC are available. Station agreed to remove references to HPCI, and state HPCI and RCIC are available.
83 H
3 N
S SRO importance rating missing from K/A references 84 F
3 B
S 85 H
3 B
S 86 H
3 N
E Add per GP-2 to stem 87 H
3 N
S 88 F
2 N
S 89 H
3 B
S Need to improve the wording of the answer. Implies have either 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to restore one component or be in mode 3. Actually have 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to restore and then if dont meet action E be in mode 3 in the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. So you have 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> total. Station states that the question is worded how the applicants are used to seeing it, so no changes will be made.
90 H
3 N
S Add per ON-127 to the stem
91 H
3 N
S Change to Alarm Response Card(s). Question appears too easy given initial conditions since HI-HI alarm is not in. Station agreed, and question modified.
92 H
3 N
S Add to stem required operator action per ON-115.
Station agreed 93 F
3 X
N S
Remove extra space between flow and is. B also correct, as all TS are still required to be entered. Re-word stem such that only D is correct. Station agreed to review and edit.
94 F
3 B
S 95 H
3 N
S 96 F
3 B
S If you know 3 is not required, easy to arrive at the correct answer. Something else plausible in the procedure as a 4th option or a changing of distracters.
Station agreed to review and edit.
97 F
1 N
S Obvious answer given the options. Only one of the options is equipment not installed in the plant. Station agreed to replace question.
98 H
3 N
S 99 F
3 B
S 100 F
3 B
S
Form 2.3-5 Instructions for Written Examination Review Worksheet Refer to ES-4.2 for the definitions of terms used in this worksheet for the written examination. Review each question (Q) as submitted and as subsequently revised and document the following in the associated worksheet columns:
- 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) from 1 (easy) to 5 (difficult); mark direct lookup questions (applicant can directly determine the answer from the provided reference) as LOD 1. A question is (U)nsatisfactory if it is LOD 1 or LOD 5.
- 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
Stem Focus: The stem lacks enough focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
Cues: The stem or one or more answer choices contains cues (e.g., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
T/F: All of the answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements. This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
Cred. Dist.: The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors require (E)nhancement, and more than one noncredible distractor in the same question results in an (U)satisfactory question.
Partial: One or more distractors are partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by the stem). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
- 4. Check the appropriate box if a job content flaw is identified:
Job Link: The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid knowledge or ability (K/A) but, as written, is not operational in content). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
Minutia: The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed-reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
- /Units: The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
Logic: The question requires backward or reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements. This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.
- 5. Check the first box if a K/A mismatch flaw exists. Check the second box if the question is flawed because it is written at the wrong license level. Either condition results in an (U)nsatisfactory question.
- 6. Enter the questions source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Verify that (M)odified questions meet the criteria of ES-4.2.
- 7. Based on the review performed in steps 2-5, mark the question as (U)nsatisfactory, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory.
- 8. Fully explain the reason for any (U) in column 7 (e.g., how the psychometric attributes are not being met).
Save the initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound question is marked by an (S) on this form.