ML21286A221

Amendment 29 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Table - Appendix G, Plant Nuclear Safety Operational Analysis

ML21286A221
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	10/04/2021
From:	Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML21286A574	List: ML21277A142 ML21286A195 ML21286A196 ML21286A197 ML21286A198 ML21286A199 ML21286A200 ML21286A201 ML21286A204 ML21286A205 ML21286A206 ML21286A210 ML21286A211 ML21286A212 ML21286A213 ML21286A216 ML21286A217 ML21286A218 ML21286A219 ML21286A220 ML21286A221 ML21286A222 ML21286A223 ML21286A224 ML21286A225 ML21286A226 ML21286A227 ML21286A229 ML21286A230 ML21286A231 ML21286A232 ML21286A233 ML21286A234 ML21286A235 ML21286A236 ML21286A237 ML21286A238 ML21286A239 ML21286A240 ML21286A241 ML21286A242 ML21286A243 ML21286A244 ML21286A245 ML21286A246 ML21286A247 ML21286A248 ML21286A249 ML21286A250 ML21286A252 ... further results
References
Download: ML21286A221 (2)

Text

BFN-16 Table G.O-1 (Sheet 1)

INTERPRETATION OF SYMBOLS USED IN EXAMPLE MATRIX ON FIGURE G.0-2 Event System or Action Symbol Meaning

6. Power Operation Power Level Control 1-2 It is essential that power level be 1-4 controlled during power operation to avoid unacceptable results 1-2 and 1-4.

13. Turbine Trip Reactor Protection 17 It is essential that the reactor System protection systems be capable of operating to achieve safety action 17 (scram).

13. Turbine Trip Reactor Protection SF It is essential that the reactor System protection system be in such a condition that the single-failure criterion is met.

13. Turbine Trip Reactor Protection dark The dark frame around the matrix System frame block indicates that this block around represents the most significant or block demanding condition from which at least one operational nuclear safety requirement for the system is derived. This matrix block would be referenced (using the block coordinates) in the operational nuclear safety requirements portion of the FSAR subsection describing the system.

6. Power Fuel 4L There is a limit on power level Operation based on the fuel that must be observed to satisfy the need for safety action 4 (power level control).

13. Turbine Trip Main Steam 18 It is essential that the main steam Relief Valves relief valves be capable of operating to achieve safety action 18 (pressure relief).

13. Turbine Trip Main Steam SF It is essential that the main steam Relief Valves relief valves be in such a condition that the single failure criterion is met.

13. Turbine Trip Control Rod 17 It is essential that the control Drive System rod drive system be capable of operating to achieve safety action 17 (scram).

13. Turbine Trip Control Rod SF It is essential that the control Drive System rod drive system be in such a condition that the single-failure criterion is met.

39. Loss-of-Coolant Core Spray 22 It is essential that the core spray Accident System system be capable of operating to achieve safety action 22 (core cooling).

39. Loss-of-Coolant Core Spray SF(S76) It is essential that the core spray Accident System system be in such a condition that the single-failure criterion is met. The (S76) indicates that the core spray system shares the obligation to satisfy the single-failure criterion with system 76 (LPCI).

BFN-16 Table G.O-1 (Cont'd)

(Sheet 2)

INTERPRETATION OF SYMBOLS USED IN EXAMPLE MATRIX ON FIGURE G.0-2 Event System or Action Symbol Meaning

39. Loss-of-Coolant Core Spray dark The dark frame around the matrix Accident System frame block indicates that this block around represents the most significant or block demanding condition from which at least one operational nuclear safety requirement for the system is derived. This matrix block would be referenced (using the block coordinates) in the operational nuclear safety requirements portion of the FSAR subsection describing the system.

39. Loss-of-Coolant Reactor Protection 17 It is essential that the reactor Accident System protection system be capable of operating to achieve safety action 17 (scram).

39. Loss-of-Coolant Reactor Protection SF It is essential that the reactor Accident System protection system be in such a condition that the single-failure criterion is met.

39. Loss-of-Coolant Control Rod Drive 17 It is essential that the control Accident System rod drive system be capable of operating to achieve safety action 17 (scram.)

39. Loss-of-Coolant Control Rod Drive SF It is essential that the control Accident System rod drive system be in such a condition that the single-failure criterion is met.

39. Loss-of-Coolant LPCI 22 It is essential that LPCI be capable Accident of operating to achieve safety action 22 (core cooling).

39. Loss-of-Coolant LPCI SF(S45) It is essential that LPCI be in Accident such a condition that the single-failure criterion is met. The (S45) indicates that LPCI shares the obligation to satisfy the single-failure criterion with system 45 (core spray system).

39. Loss-of-Coolant LPCI dark The dark frame around the matrix Accident frame block indicates that this block around represents the most significant or block demanding condition from which at least one operational nuclear safety requirement for the system is derived. This matrix block would be referenced (using the block coordinates) in the operational nuclear safety requirements portion of the FSAR subsection describing the system.

39. Loss-of-Coolant Standby AC 45-76SF It is essential that the standby Accident Power System AC power system be single failure proof relative to the system pair consisting of the core spray system (45) and LPCI (76).