ML21055A021
| ML21055A021 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/24/2021 |
| From: | Garmon D NRC/NRR/DRA/ARCB |
| To: | |
| Garmon-Candelaria D | |
| References | |
| Download: ML21055A021 (22) | |
Text
Update to Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process February 25, 2021 David Garmon Health Physicist NRR/DRA/ARCB ADAMS Accession No. ML21055A021
Agenda
- Meeting Preliminaries
- Principles of Good Regulation
- Background of Oversight Process
- Review of Recent Activity
- Review Proposed Updates
- Looking Forward
- Discussion 2
NRR Letter dated October 15, 2019: https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1926/ML19260E683 NRC Values: https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/values.html 3
Radiation Safety Cornerstones 4
5
Significance Determination Process
- How the NRC categorizes inspection findings
- Purposes
- Determine and Communicate Risk
- Guide inspection resources 6
7 Inspection Finding Process Licensee Response with Baseline NRC Inspection Issue of Concern Identified Issue Screening Significance Determination Significance and Enforcement Review Panel Final Significance Determination Follow On Activities Performance Deficiency (PD)
Identified (standard or requirement not met) 1)
Preliminary Significance Determination 2)
Regulatory Conference (optional)
More-than-Minor PD
= Inspection Finding 1)
Action Matrix Movement 2)
Supplemental Inspection 3)
Additional Communication with NRC WHITE
Documents we will be discussing
- 3. IMC 0308, Attachment 3, Appendix D - Technical Basis for Public Radiation Safety SDP
- 4. Draft documents available at: ML21049A364*
- 5. Active documents available at:
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/manual-chapter/
8
Review of recent activity
- Published draft revision to App D in 2018 (ML18178A100)
- Received comments from NEI (ML18264A305)
- Public meeting October 21, 2020 (https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?
do=details&Code=20201205)
Independence Clarity Openness Reliability Efficiency 9
Key Steps for Updating SDP 10 Develop New Guidance Engage External Stakeholders Internal Comment Period Internal Comment Resolution Engage External Stakeholders Apply Feedback Commission Involvement Openness + Independence
Proposed Updates
- Addition of guidance to help dispositioning transportation inspection findings
- Incorrect Packaging
- Emergency Response Information
- Incorporation of Part 37 into the SDP
- Additional basis information and miscellaneous revisions as reflected in draft documents Independence Clarity Openness Reliability Efficiency 11
Transportation 12 No Changes in this section of the SDP New process for dispositioning findings where incorrect packaging is used
Transportation 13 Clarification that failure should have potential to seriously hamper emergency response efforts
Part 37 14 Provides reasonable assurance of the security of category 1 or category 2 quantities of radioactive material by protecting these materials from theft or diversion Rule provides defense-in-depth and redundancy Power reactor-specific considerations
- RIS 2015-15 Oversight Experience
- Temporary Instruction Final Report (ML19106A157)
Cat.
1 or 2
Security zone/monitoring Access control processes 1
Material Detection 2
Part 37 Subpart A, B or C Finding?*
Green White Yellow Red Access by individual who is not Trustworthy and Reliable?
Actual Loss of Material?**
> Category 2?
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No
- Failures to conduct an investigation or notify the NRC when required by Part 37 shall be dispositioned IAW the NRC Enforcement Policy
- Consult with NRC Office of Investigations prior to dispositioning findings associated with actual cases of theft, diversion or sabotage of radioactive materials Deficient Security Zone?
Deficient Material Detection Capability?
Yes No No Initial Draft Part 37 SDP Diagram (1 of 2) 15
Final Draft Part 37 SDP Diagram (1 of 2) 16 Access Granted Failures to report or respond Clarify Ineffective Security Zone concept
Part 37 Subpart D Finding*
Preplanning and Coordination Issue?
Licensee demonstrates no impact on material security?
White Yellow Red Green Actual Loss of Material Material delivered to unlicensed entity?
Material Returned?
> Cat 2?
Physical Protection in Transit Issue?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No
- Failures to conduct an investigation or notify the NRC when required by Part 37 shall be dispositioned IAW the NRC Enforcement Policy No Yes Loss of Comms and Tracking?
License Verification Issue?
No Yes Initial Draft Part 37 SDP Diagram (2 of 2) 17
Draft Part 37 SDP Diagram (2 of 2) 18 Removed provision for licensee to demonstrate no impact on material security.
However, retained guidance for NRC consideration during SERP process Expanded types of violations that could result in White finding
Tabletop (Selected Examples) 19 Example Notes The inspectors identified a violation of 37.43(c)(2), for the licensee's failure to train radiation protection personnel that had access to and worked with Category 2 materials on the security program for Category 2 material.
The licensee satisfies the Part 37 Subpart B requirements through its Part 73 Access Authorization process. Per 73.56(n), the licensee conducts 24-month audits of its program, in lieu of the annual review required by 37.33(a). During the most recent audit, the licensee discovered that an adequate criminal history review had not been conducted on an individual prior to providing unescorted access to a room that contained category 2 material. The information that was not reviewed would have been relevant to the access approval determination.
Variations:
1.
The room was in a building that was in the Owner Controlled Area of the facility, outside of the Protected Area.
The licensee determined that the deficiency in the criminal history check would have precluded them from permitting the individual unescorted access, i.e., the individual could not have been declared to be trustworthy and reliable (or, the licensee did not supplement the non-compliant background investigation)
The licensee determined that the deficiency would not have precluded them from determining that the individual was trustworthy and reliable 2.
The room was in a building that was located within the Protected Area Licensee staff prepared a liner for shipment to a waste processor. The liner, containing spent resin, was determined to have a total activity of 1300 curies (including 40.9 curies of cobalt (Co-60) as indicated on the Uniform Low-Level Radioactive Waste Manifest (NRC Form 541). However, at the time the shipment was offered for transport, the licensee did not identify that the 40.9 curies of Co-60 exceeded the category 2 limit of 8.1 Ci.
Looking Ahead
- Continue providing updates and receiving external feedback through monthly ROP public meetings
- Staff decision on Commission interaction and development of communication tool (e.g., COMSECY, CA Note)
Independence Clarity Openness Reliability Efficiency February 2021 March 2021
~April-May 2021
- Public Meeting
- Final decision on Commission interaction
- Communicate with Commission 20
Discussion 21
Questions/Feedback Micheal Smith micheal.smith@nrc.gov David Garmon david.garmon@nrc.gov 22