ML20336A257
| ML20336A257 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/09/2020 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| Burkhart, L, ACRS | |
| References | |
| NRC-1142 | |
| Download: ML20336A257 (126) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Docket Number:
(n/a)
Location:
teleconference Date:
Friday, October 9, 2020 Work Order No.:
NRC-1142 Pages 1-81 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com 1
1 2
3 DISCLAIMER 4
5 6
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 7
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 8
9 10 The contents of this transcript of the 11 proceeding of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 12 Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 13 as reported herein, is a record of the discussions 14 recorded at the meeting.
15 16 This transcript has not been reviewed, 17 corrected, and edited, and it may contain 18 inaccuracies.
19 20 21 22 23
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
+ + + + +
3 679TH MEETING 4
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 5
(ACRS) 6
+ + + + +
7 INFORMATION SESSION ON THE 8
EXTERNAL HAZARDS CENTER OF EXPERTISE 9
+ + + + +
10 FRIDAY 11 OCTOBER 9, 2020 12
+ + + + +
13 The Advisory Committee met via Video 14 Teleconference, at 11:45 a.m. EDT, Matthew W. Sunseri, 15 Chairman, presiding.
16 COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
17 MATTHEW W. SUNSERI, Chairman 18 JOY L. REMPE, Vice Chairman 19 WALTER L. KIRCHNER, Member-at-large 20 RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member 21 DENNIS BLEY, Member 22 CHARLES H. BROWN, JR. Member 23 VESNA B. DIMITRIJEVIC, Member 24 JOSE MARCH-LEUBA, Member 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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2 DAVID A. PETTI, Member 1
PETER RICCARDELLA, Member 2
3 DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:
4 DEREK WIDMAYER 5
6 ALSO PRESENT:
7 LAUREL BAUER, NRR 8
BARBARA HAYES, NRR 10 DAVID HEESZEL, NRR 11 MICHAEL LEE, NRR 12 SCOTT MOORE, NRC 13 KEVIN QUINLAN, NRR 14 MICHELE SAMPSON, NRR 15 KENNETH SEE, NRR 16 WEIJUN WANG, NRR 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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3 CONTENTS 1
2 Call to Order..................
4 3
External Hazards Center of Expertise 5
4 Michele Sampson..............
5 5
Barbara Hayes...............
7 6
Michael Lee................ 28 7
Kenneth See................ 36 8
Kevin Quinlan............... 43 9
David Heeszel............... 46 10 Weijun Wang................ 49 11 Laurel Bauer
............... 52 12 Dam Safety Program
............... 67 13 Kenneth See................ 67 14 Closing Comments
................ 79 15 Barbara Hayes............... 79 16 Dennis Bley................ 80 17 Matthew Sunseri, Chairman......... 80 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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4 P R O C E E D I N G S 1
11:45 a.m.
2 CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: This is Matt Sunseri.
3 It's 11:45 Eastern Time. We will reconvene the 4
session.
5 I'll start with the roll call.
6 Ron Ballinger?
7 MEMBER BALLINGER: Here.
8 CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Dennis Bley?
9 MEMBER BLEY: Here.
10 CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Charles Brown?
11 MEMBER BROWN: Here.
12 CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Vesna Dimitrijevic?
13 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Here.
14 CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Jose March-Leuba?
15 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Here.
16 CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Walt Kirchner?
17 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Here.
18 CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Dave Petti?
19 (No response.)
20 Joy Rempe?
21 VICE CHAIRMAN REMPE: Here.
22 CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Pete Riccardella?
23 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Here.
24 CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: And myself.
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5 So, we have a quorum. I'm sure Dave will 1
join us when he's available.
2 At this point in time, we are going to 3
start our session, our information session, on 4
External Hazards Center of Expertise. And I'll ask 5
Dennis Bley if he has any opening comments.
6 MEMBER BLEY: Yes. Thank you very much, 7
Matt.
8 I'd like to welcome the folks from the 9
External Hazards Center of Expertise. We have been 10 looking forward to your presentation and learning more 11 about how the Center is organized and all the things 12 you do.
13 Barbara, when you go through your talk, 14 and the others as well, I would like it if you can 15 relate your role to how you interact with NRR for 16 reviews and, in particular, if you've started your 17 reviews on the SHINE operating license application.
18 And also, ahead of time, I'd like to 19 welcome Mike Lee back. He was with us for many, many 20 years, and a few of us were here when Mike was with 21 us.
22 Barbara, I turn it over to you at this 23 time.
24 MS. SAMPSON: Hi. Good morning. This is 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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6 Michele Sampson. I'm the Acting Director for NRR's 1
Division of Engineering and External Hazards, and I'll 2
just make a few brief remarks before turning it over 3
to Barbara.
4 The Division of Engineering and External 5
Hazards leads the review of natural and external 6
manmade hazards, including their potential impacts on 7
new and operating reactors. In support of our 8
licensing reviews, the staff has developed guidance 9
documents to facilitate the staff's review and to 10 assist applicants in developing their submittals 11 consistent with our principles of good regulation, 12 including openness, reliability, and efficiency.
13 We appreciate the opportunity to provide 14 a presentation on the External Hazards Center of 15 Expertise, or, as we refer to it, EHCOE. Today's 16 presentation will focus on the organizational 17 structure of EHCOE and highlight our programmatic 18 areas, rather than any specific safety review or 19 issue. We will provide a brief overview of EHCOE and, 20 then, focus in for a few minutes on each of our 21 technical areas. You will hear about the status of 22 our programs and the changes that we are embracing as 23 we become a more modern, risk-informed regulator.
24 With that, I'd like to thank you again for 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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7 the opportunity to make the presentation and turn the 1
discussion over to Barbara.
2 DR. HAYES: Thank you, Michele.
3 And good morning, everyone. I'm Barbara 4
Hayes, the Chief of the External Hazards Branch in the 5
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. I joined NRC in 6
2013 as a hydrologist. I have been the Branch Chief 7
for the External Hazards Branch in NRR for almost a 8
year now.
9 Next slide, please.
10 Thank you for the invitation today to come 11 and talk to you about the External Hazards Center of 12 Expertise. I understand you've had a very busy year 13 and that resulted in this presentation being pushed 14 back by quite a few months, and we're very glad to 15 finally have this opportunity.
16 I'll be starting by providing information 17 on the main focus of our talk today, EHCOE, who we 18 are, what we do and who we do it with, how we are 19 structured and why. I'll, then, pass the lead over to 20 several speakers from EHCOE who will briefly provide 21 information on their areas of technical expertise, as 22 well as the Process for Ongoing Assessment of Natural 23 Hazard Information and, also, information on the Dam 24 Safety Program. Those two programs are both led out 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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8 of EHCOE.
1 Our speakers today, other than me, will be 2
Mike Lee from EXHB, a senior hydrologist who will be 3
talking about hydrology; Kenneth See, EXHB, who is a 4
senior hydrologist also, and he is the technical lead 5
for the external manmade hazards technical team. And 6
he'll be discussing the manmade hazards reviews that 7
we do.
8 Kevin Quinlan, meteorologist in EXHB, also 9
the NRC point of contact for the National Weather 10 Service. Kevin is the informal or de facto technical 11 lead of the meteorological group, and he'll be 12 discussing work of the meteorologists in EHCOE.
13 Then, that will be passed to David 14 Heeszel, EXHB, a geophysicist and, also, serving as 15 the liaison for geology and seismology within EXHB.
16 And he'll be discussing the geological and seismologic 17 reviews and work that we have.
18 Finally, in terms of areas of expertise, 19 Weijun
- Wang, a
geotechnical engineer in the 20 Structural, Civil, and Geotechnical Engineering Branch 21 of NRR, will be discussing geotechnical engineering 22 work.
23 We'll, then, go to Laurel Bauer in EXHB, 24 a geologist, and she is the lead of the Process for 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 Ongoing Assessment of Natural Hazard Information.
1 And we'll close out with a
brief 2
discussion by Kenneth See, who is our NRC Dam Safety 3
Officer, and he'll be talking about the Dam Safety 4
Program.
5 MEMBER BLEY: Barbara?
6 DR. HAYES: Yes?
7 MEMBER BLEY: This is Dennis Bley.
8 Two things. One, I'm not conversant with 9
all the acronyms in your organization. I can guess at 10 the ones you said, but, from now on, if you could tell 11 us what they mean, I'd appreciate it.
12 And two, when were you chartered. It 13 seems as if the people in your Branch now have come 14 from many different places. Are you going to tell us 15 some of that? And if not, if you could give us a 16 short summary, that would be nice.
17 DR. HAYES: Yes, Dennis, actually, that 18 really is the focal point of my presentation, is how 19 we are set up and how we function. And my apologies, 20 EXHB I'll probably say again because that's the 21 External Hazards Branch within NRR. I will try to 22 avoid using acronyms as much as possible.
23 So, next slide, please.
24 So, the ACRS, you know us already, but not 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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10 necessarily how we are organized. You're, no doubt, 1
familiar with some of the speakers today due to 2
previous technical presentations that we have made.
3 Some of our previous activities: combined 4
licenses, early site permits, design certifications is 5
probably the bulk of our interactions with ACRS. Our 6
post-Fukushima work is essentially closed out now, and 7
that really represents a change in our workflow to a 8
certain extent and our focus.
9 Right now, for current activities, we 10 provide a lot of support to operating reactors. We 11 provide support to the other business lines of NRR.
12 But what is a significant new is that we're providing 13 growing support to NMSS on a number of reviews.
14 Just in terms of how we do what we do, 15 both for those reviews that are under your purview as 16 well as other reviews, NRC staff reviews documented 17 safety evaluations and inspection reports. When 18 necessary, they receive a thorough review by this 19 Committee and the Commission prior to an adequate 20 protection regulatory finding.
21 Each licensee or applicant is responsible 22 for preparing their analysis of external hazards based 23 on their unique circumstances and presenting it to the 24 staff. The staff, then, conducts an independent, 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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11 thorough safety review of the submittal of the 1
material to ensure that reasonable assumptions have 2
been made, sound analyses have been performed 3
commensurate with potential hazards that may exist at 4
a site. When the staff identifies deficiencies in the 5
assumptions or analysis that could preclude a 6
reasonable assurance finding, the staff requires the 7
licensee or applicant to correct the deficiency.
8 Next slide, please.
9 So, Dennis, you had asked for a brief 10 history. One of the things that's key here is that 11 the staff that's in EHCOE share a history. In 2015 is 12 when SECY-15-0143, Project AIM and Centers for 13 Expertise, recommended the creation of a Center of 14 Expertise for external hazards evaluations. In 15 September 2016, staff issued a memorandum to the EDO 16 which documented EHCOE as a limited-scope COE, and it 17 provided the charter, the rules of engagement, and 18 several other documents such as a communication plan 19 and business case.
20 We were chartered as a limited-scope 21 because we were providing service primarily to NRO and 22 to NRR at the time. That is one of the things that 23 has changed, in that we are providing more review 24 support to NMSS for some of their activities.
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12 So, since it's formation in 2016, EHCOE 1
has changed substantially. And we recently drafted 2
revisions of our charter and for the rules of 3
engagement. The revised documents reflect current 4
organizational structure, the current principles and 5
practices, as well as the expansion of the workload to 6
cover activities in NMSS. It also reflects EHCOE's 7
movement towards NRC's transformation vision of 8
becoming a modern, risk-informed regulator.
9 The revised draft charter and the 10 engagement plan is consistent with the OEDO Procedure 11 0940, "Guidance for Identifying, Evaluating, and 12 Implementing a Center of Expertise." And both of 13 these documents are currently still considered draft, 14 but we are in the process of preparing to share them 15 with the EDO. Both of those documents are available 16 on our SharePoint site, which is not publicly 17 available, but is accessible to the ACRS.
18 So, we are a matrix organization. So, 19 it's worth spending a little bit of time talking about 20 what that means. A matrix organization is defined as 21 one that's got dual or multiple managerial 22 accountability and responsibility. Typically, there's 23 two chains of command, one along functional lines and 24 one along project lines. So, it's a hybrid 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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13 organizational structure that combines two chains of 1
command, typically. Usually, there's a line manager 2
or a functional manager, such as a Branch Chief, 3
taking care of routine tasks, and there are also 4
Project Managers that work separately. Such an 5
approach allows the balancing of employees' time and 6
knowledge between routine tasks and project work.
7 In terms of matrix organizations, there's 8
a scale over which the level of matrixing can be 9
described. And the way that we are structured, we 10 would be considered a weak matrix in that we basically 11 have strong functionality and supervision along your 12 traditional Branch Chief, first-line supervisor 13 approaches.
14 So, one of the things that also makes us 15 a matrixed approach is that we have what the EDO has 16 recently referred to as double-hatting. Staff, when 17 they go on rotations, which they have recently, have 18 been maintaining certain key EHCOE roles. We also 19 have staff that support particular initiatives that 20 are outside of external hazards analysis, and we also 21 have the Project Manager for the Dam Safety Program, 22 who is in a completely different Division and 23 interacts solely as his role as the Project Manager 24 providing support that one EHCOE program.
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14 Next slide, please.
1 So, who we are. EHCOE is matrixed within 2
NRR, but all 14 members and myself are considered 3
full-time members of EHCOE. We cover four of the five 4
disciplines that are covered by EHCOE, and we are 5
responsible for the Process for Ongoing Assessment of 6
Natural Hazard Information, as well as the Dam Safety 7
Program.
8 We also have the Project Manager Luissette 9
Candelario, who is actually moving the slides for us 10 today. We are also the point of contact for various 11 projects and relationships, such as with the National 12 Weather Service.
13 Next slide, please.
14 The other key Branch that's currently 15 involved right now would be the Structural, Civil, and 16 Geotechnical Engineering Branch. Joe Colaccino is the 17 Chief, and three of those members are actually working 18 as part of EHCOE doing geotechnical engineering, our 19 fifth discipline. We also have one staff member in 20 Joe's Branch that supports the manmade hazards 21 activities. So that we have a team of three people.
22 It's probably worth mentioning, the way 23 that BC concurrence responsibilities are is, when that 24 staff member in Joe's Branch actually has a review, 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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15 I'm the one who's responsible because manmade hazards 1
is part of EXHB's, my Branch's, responsibility.
2 So, the concurrence process goes along 3
with the actual technical area that's covered in 4
EHCOE. However, all of the usual supervision 5
processes are traditional Branch Chief, first-line 6
supervisor, you know, reviewing time and assigning 7
work.
8 What this does is this structure allows 9
staff to work together naturally at the technical 10 interfaces between different groups and to stay 11 integrated, regardless of what the structural changes 12 might be within Branches, which gets us to why.
13 Our matrix approach supports adequate 14 bench strength and preservation of critical skills and 15 knowledge management.
Workloads have changed 16 substantially, and so do the organizational structures 17 associated with the Divisions and the Branches. NRC 18 has had a great deal of movement in recent years in 19 preparation and implementation of the merger between 20 the Office of New Reactors and NRR, and also, the 21 creation of the Environmental COE over in NMSS.
22 And what is really the driver of our 23 successes and our vision? It's really the staff. Our 24 staff has highly specialized skills and those 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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16 represent a productive nexus that supports forward-1 thinking action, uses of lessons learned, preservation 2
of critical skills, and adequate bench strength. By 3
maintaining this nexus, we support NRC's principles of 4
good regulation -- independence, openness, efficiency, 5
clarity, and reliability.
6 Next slide, please.
7 We share a vision that supports the agency 8
mission and its visions of being a modern, risk-9 informed regulator. How we support this vision?
10 We're committed to optimizing the service 11 that we provide to all partners by ensuring access to 12 specialized skills needed to support NRC's public 13 health and safety mission.
14 We are committed to modernizing practices 15 by selectively adopting best practices from the public 16 and private sectors; evaluating and right-sizing 17 activities; considering the benefits and costs, risk 18 implications, both in terms of safety risk and 19 enterprise risk.
20 We ensure adequate bench strength through 21 a combination of internal and external resources.
22 We preserve skill sets critical to 23 supporting the agency's mission through knowledge 24 management activities and through sponsorship of in-25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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17 house training opportunities.
1 And we tailor safety reviews and 2
preparation of guidance documents to align with NRC's 3
risk-informed approach to regulation.
4 Next slide, please.
5 We share a process of change that supports 6
the agency mission and the agency vision of becoming 7
a modern, risk-informed regulator. This particular 8
slide represents how EHCOE aligns with the agencywide 9
transformation measures in SECY-20-0049.
10 Within these different areas, much of this 11 is a matter of cultural change, collaborative work 12 towards this culture change that we have been engaged 13 in in this last year that's reflected in our draft 14 engagement plan and our draft revised charter.
15 One of the key examples or areas where we 16 have worked together is related to the SharePoint 17 platform. We had a new version of SharePoint come out 18 that was issued a few months before the merger. This 19 is our primary collaborative IT platform, and we had 20 relied heavily on it for our collaborative work. The 21 functionality of the new platform was very 22 problematic. The structure, the architecture is quite 23 different, and finding files, et cetera, became quite 24 challenging.
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18 We developed as a
group a
common 1
organizational structure for these five technical 2
areas, and we have a complete new IT platform that's 3
amenable for better workflow and transparency, new 4
functionality that supports information-sharing on our 5
capabilities, and also, vets viable staff-generated 6
ideas.
7 Next slide, please.
8 So, I've only been with, in terms of our 9
focus on risk significance, I've only been with EHCOE 10 for less than a year. And actual reviews that I've 11 been involved in generally have not been made public 12 yet. But what I have personally experienced working 13 with staff is that staff's evaluation of risk 14 significance has generally enabled them to get to 15 reasonable assurance of adequate protection with less 16 RAIs and with quicker turnarounds with producing our 17 inputs for SERs.
18 How are we doing this? A lot of it is 19 actually discussions during Branch meetings and really 20 a focus on the principles of good regulation. In 21 terms of training as well, we've taken advantages of 22 classes that reflect this transformation related to 23 risk-informed regulation, data-driven decisionmaking, 24 and PRA. We'll have some examples that are discussed 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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19 a little bit later.
1 Next slide, please.
2 So, the basis for our reviews. We provide 3
technical reviews for LARs and for the operating fleet 4
and for license renewals. We're tapped for our 5
expertise by the Regions on emergent issues that arise 6
at the nuclear power plants, and we continue to 7
support licensing reviews related to conventional 8
large light water reactor.
9 We have an increased level of support to 10 NMSS, to the Division of Fuel Management of the 11 Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and 12 Waste Programs Branches.
13 We are reviewing two major projects 14 related to consolidated interim spent fuel facilities.
15 We've had some recent work related to the 16 probable maximum precipitation for Church Rock, as 17 well as a manmade hazards review for the Trojan Spent 18 Fuel Facility.
19 In terms of advanced reactors, our work in 20 this area has been relatively low because of the 21 reduced source term and where they are in their 22 process. Our current contribution right now is 23 focused on dose assessment, the RAMP, Radiation 24 Protection Computer Code Analysis and Maintenance 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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20 Program, as well as the Advanced Reactor Content of 1
Application Project, ARCAP, where we're providing 2
support to that in terms of the Chapter 2 content for 3
applications.
4 We have reviews related to the Kairos 5
Power Mechanistic Source Term Draft Topical Report 6
and, also, the Oklo Aurora Combined License Review.
7 MEMBER BLEY: Can you tell us more about 8
(telephonic interference)?
9 DR. HAYES: Excuse me?
10 MEMBER BLEY: Can you tell us a little bit 11 more about what you just said about Kairos and Oklo?
12 DR. HAYES: So, perhaps Kevin can speak a 13 little bit more about the Kairos. But, right now, 14 there's a Power Mechanistic Source Term Topical Report 15 that is under review. And I think there's been 16 initial meetings right now, but it's quite early.
17 The Oklo application for their Aurora 18 combined license has been reviewed. We did a review 19 of the license as it came in with a focus on seismic 20 issues. And at this point, we've done the acceptance 21 review and we will be having some later questions 22 regarding -- our analysis is going to occur a little 23 bit later on. They have a stepped approach, and I 24 think David Heeszel, who's involved in that, could 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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21 probably shed some light on it.
1 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. That sounds good.
2 On the Kairos one, I guess I haven't quite 3
connected in my had how you're involved with the 4
mechanistic source term. How does that fit within 5
your help on the reviews?
6 DR. HAYES: Well, first, I'm not sure that 7
we've actually received the application or if we're 8
still in pre-application space. But the area of our 9
interest is the ability to support dispersion --
10 MEMBER BLEY: Oh, okay.
11 DR. HAYES: -- of source term. And that's 12 one of the key areas that my meteorologists work in, 13 not just the hazards of precipitation and hurricane, 14 but also those dispersion of potential radionuclides.
15 MEMBER BLEY: Well, that's kind of 16 interesting. I can see why those people would end up 17 in this group. So, it doesn't really sound like it's 18 part of your charter, except you have the people now 19 who can do that.
20 DR. HAYES: That's right, and there are 21 some folks who -- I was just going to say that there's 22 also staff that are outside that we still interact 23 with because of the historic nature of what we've done 24 before. So, we still tap and have conversations with 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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22 folks, even if they're not directly part of EHCOE, 1
because of that sort of collaborative work. It is 2
multidisciplinary.
3 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. Thanks, Barbara. Go 4
ahead.
5 DR. HAYES: Next slide, please.
6 So, this is simply a list of the areas 7
that we actively work in.
8 Next slide, please.
9 So, this lays out what we do. We've got 10 the NRR business lines, sort of our traditional large 11 light water reactors, both new applications and LARs 12 and support for the operating fleet.
13 Advanced reactors, we're doing, as I 14 described, some guidance work, as well as actual 15 licensing reviews, and then, we're responsible for the 16 Process for Ongoing Assessment of Natural Hazard 17 Information, also under the operating reactor business 18 line.
19 For NMSS, we're doing work related to the 20 spent fuel storage reviews, decommissioning actions, 21 mill tailing inspections.
22 With our interactions, our partnering with 23 RES, we have a close partnership with them in terms of 24 the probabilistic evaluation of seismic and hydrologic 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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23 hazards.
1 Currently, we're quite active with 2
computer code development related to HABIT and 3
RADTRAN.
4 I think, Dennis, you had asked about how 5
we support or how we interact with them on specific 6
reviews. In general, our relationship is more of a 7
collaborative, forward-looking relationship in terms 8
of developing products that are going to support 9
future reviews.
10 In terms of actually assistance on any of 11 the reviews, that's pretty unique. And so, we have 12 had some of that. A lot of that has been because we 13 had somebody migrate from NRR or NRO over to RES and 14 having some special skill set that's going to support 15 that. In general, we do not regularly tap RES staff 16 for reviews.
17 We, however, collaborate very closely in 18 terms of reviewing documents that are under their 19 programs. For example, the Probabilistic Flood Hazard 20 Analysis, generally, all of those reports come to us 21 that are being generated and processed through that 22 program for our input. Those reports, typically, also 23 go to the Branches that are responsible in NRR for PRA 24 reviews.
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24 MEMBER BLEY: Let's pick one, just so I 1
understand this a little better. I wasn't aware quite 2
of your support in developing the tools. And I think 3
that's really interesting.
4 But we're about to pick up the review of 5
the SHINE facility. And when they come in, I don't 6
know if that comes through NRR or through NMSS, but 7
they would, then, request to do, say, the manmade 8
hazards part of their review?
9 DR. HAYES: That's correct, and actually, 10 that application has been received. We have gone 11 through acceptance review. We have draft RAIs, and 12 there are other portions of that process that I'm not 13 familiar with because it's outside of external 14 hazards.
15 In terms of, yes, it's definitely housed 16 within NRR. It's a non-power reactor. So, it's 17 definitely under our authority for the review.
18 And we do not have anybody within RES or 19 in NMSS that are directly supporting EHCOE reviews of 20 basically Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 related to primarily 21 the siting issues.
22 MEMBER BLEY: I didn't understand that 23 one. You do not have anyone?
24 DR. HAYES: No, to the best of my 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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25 knowledge, within EXHB, we are not using anyone from 1
RES, and typically, we would not do that. That's, as 2
I said before, very unique and unusual. And I did 3
check with Weijun before this, and there's no 4
particular support that's coming from RES for that 5
particular review. So, it's completely within NRR, 6
unless there's something else that's going on related 7
to fire protection or something that's outside of the 8
scope for EHCOE.
9 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. Well, I misunderstood 10 that from some interactions we had in the past. I 11 thought your folks did those reviews for NRR. But NRR 12 is doing it themselves?
13 DR. HAYES: Well, we are NRR. We are 14 housed in NRR. We are all part of NRR. And our 15 relationship with RES is more related to areas where 16 there's research that's ongoing for future 17 implementations, future changes.
18 MEMBER BLEY: So, within NRR, your folks 19 are participating, and just for that specific example, 20 for the review of SHINE?
21 DR. HAYES: Yes, absolutely.
22 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. I misunderstood you.
23 I apologize.
24 DR. HAYES: Yes, things have not changed 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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26 that much. It's just a matter of the organization.
1 EHCOE, basically, is an umbrella structure that keeps 2
the staff that do those sort of reviews together in a 3
way that really has done a good job of going through 4
the bumpy process of Branch changes, Division changes, 5
mergers, in order to have some continuity for the 6
folks who actually do the geotechnical reviews, who do 7
the geology and seismology reviews, and keep it as a 8
more cohesive, integrated group of reviewers within 9
the Branches.
10 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. Good.
11 DR. HAYES: And so, we are supporting and 12 our staff are the ones who supported all of those COLs 13 and ESPs in the past under different Branch names, 14 essentially. The Branch names have changed quite 15 frequently over the past three years, as we got ready 16 for the merger. And so, that's part of the story 17 really.
18 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. Well, that makes 19 sense, and that is what I understood before. So, go 20 ahead.
21 DR. HAYES: And we also do a fair amount 22 of international support activity. For, for example, 23 for NEA, the Working Group on External Events has had 24 us provide input on the high wind and tornado 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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27 questionnaire; also, right now, the Survey on Combined 1
External Hazards.
2 IAEA documents as well. We've had two 3
that we've reviewed this particular year. Again, 4
we're not the lead on these document reviews, but we 5
are definitely tapped for our expertise and provide 6
some pretty important background.
7 We also have folks who are responsible, 8
either as a point of contact, a member, or in some 9
cases the lead of some of the ANS and the ANSI 10 standards. Let's see, 216, 21, 34, so a lot of the 11 Chapter 2 for modeling design basis accidental 12 releases for nuclear facilities, criteria of 13 assessment of atmospheric effects on the ultimate heat 14 sink. I have a fairly long list of these.
15 We also have ongoing interactions with the 16 USGS related to the Earthquake Hazard Reduction 17 Program. One of our staff members recently provided 18 grant proposal review for them.
19 We also have interagency partnering 20 activities. For example, the NRC Dam Safety Program, 21 which Ken See will be talking about later. In 22 addition to managing our regulatory authority for the 23 dams under our
- purview, there's an important 24 interagency component of that activity in terms of 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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28 reporting out on status and, also, interacting with 1
other organizations like FEMA and USBR, Bureau of 2
Reclamation, that have responsibility for dams.
3 And also, another area where we have a lot 4
of interagency partnership activity relates to 5
training that we work with to produce sometimes and 6
participate in other times. So, for example, the 7
Probabilistic Flood Hazard Analysis Annual Workshop, 8
generally, we're a key sponsor. We recently had 9
training that was offered by USGS and NRC together 10 related to, I think, groundwater issues. So, these 11 interfaces are actually quite important and they are 12 an important part of our workload and maintaining 13 those critical skills.
14 That's about it. I'm going to hand it off 15 to Mike Lee right now. Are there any questions before 16 I do so?
17 MEMBER BLEY: No, I think you're fine to 18 go ahead.
19 DR. HAYES: Okay. Next slide.
20 Mike Lee.
21 DR. LEE: Okay. Hi. I'm Mike; I'm me.
22 I'm here today to talk briefly about the hydrology-23 related reviews recently performed by the EHCOE staff.
24 And before I proceed, I want to thank 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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29 Dennis for his kind introductory remarks, and I hope 1
I'm happy to be back.
2 (Laughter.)
3 I mean, it's like we're a team, please.
4 Go to the next slide. It looks like a 5
slide was dropped. All right.
6
- Anyway, the staff's recent review 7
activities in the area of hydrology have been driven 8
in large measure by two recent regulatory actions.
9 They include the ESP COLA reviews, for which there was 10 some earlier interactions with the Committee, as well 11 as the 50.54(f) Flood Hazard Reevaluation Reviews 12 performed in connection with the 2011 Near-Term Task 13 Force Recommendation 2.1.
14 From the staff's perspective, one of the 15 key takeaways from both sets of reviews is that not 16 all flood-causing mechanisms described in the SRP were 17 found to be significant for the purposes of flood-18 related decisionmaking. Based on the ESP COLA and 19 50.54(f) reviews, the staff found that local intense 20 precipitation, riverine-based floods, including dam 21 failures in many cases, and storm surge were important 22 or consequential to defining the external flood hazard 23 at the reactor sites evaluated.
24 Other flood-causing mechanisms listed in 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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30 the SRP, such as tsunamis, seiche, channel migration, 1
and flooding due to ice jams were, by and large, found 2
to be inconsequential to defining the external flood 3
hazard at the site.
4 MEMBER BLEY: Mike?
5 DR. LEE: Yes?
6 MEMBER BLEY: I don't think you're 7
presenting that as a general conclusion. It's for the 8
plants that you looked at, right?
9 DR. LEE: That's correct.
10 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
11 DR. LEE: That's for the cohort of 60 12 sites that we looked at.
13 MEMBER BLEY: Is that all the sites?
14 DR. LEE: Well, for the 50.54(f) reviews, 15 there were 60 sites and I forget how many units 16 exactly, but yes.
17 MEMBER BLEY: That's all of them? I'm kid 18 of surprised about the ice dams for a couple of the 19 plants, but that didn't turn up, huh?
20 DR. LEE: No. I mean, I can go back and 21 confirm, but my recollection is the short answer is 22 no.
23 MEMBER BLEY: Yes. The others make sense 24 to me. That one does surprise me because a few plants 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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31 up in the Midwest, way up north, had problems. Maybe 1
they're not there anymore.
2 We did receive the slide you're missing.
3 That slide just had a list of things you look at.
4 DR. LEE: Yes, yes.
5 That was just intended as background.
6 Those are the eight flood-causing mechanisms that are 7
listed in the SRP that EHCOE's generally, you know, 8
focused on.
9 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. Go ahead.
10 DR. LEE: All right. So, if I can go to 11 slide -- if I can go to the next slide, please?
12 (Dogs barking.)
13 All right. So, I am sorry, but, you know, 14 Peter's Principle: anything that can go wrong will go 15 wrong. Let me just ask for your indulgence for one 16 minute, please.
17 All right. So, you just heard me refer to 18 the term consequential. As noted in slide 16, the 19 concept evolved in connection with the staff's reviews 20 of the Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report submitted in 21 connection with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 22 2.1.
23 For the purposes of those reviews, 24 licensees were to identify those flood-causing 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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32 mechanisms that might exceed a site's current design 1
basis, based on an approved flood hazard analysis, 2
methods, and data. Moreover, upon review, it was 3
found that many of the operating sites were designed 4
to address one specific flood-causing mechanism.
5 That being said, what was learned from the 6
reviews is that not all flood-causing mechanisms were 7
equal by virtue of not only higher reported water 8
surface elevation, but also longer inundation 9
durations and flood recession times. To differentiate 10 between those flood-causing mechanisms that were 11 important to design decisionmaking, the staff used the 12 term "consequential" to risk-informing the review 13 process. So, as noted in this slide, we believe that 14 the consequential flood concept comports with the 15 Commission's views on risk-informed, performance-based 16 regulations.
17 Upon further study, we also found that the 18 consequential flood concept had some foundation in 19 both Part 50's definitions found in 50.2 concerning 20 the site-characteristic flood as well as the 21 hydrology-related chapter of the SRP.
22 In 2018, the staff began to turn its 23 attention to the update of the SRP. Then-Office-24 Director Fred Brown challenged us to think outside the 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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33 box and attempt to modernize the updating process. We 1
believe that the introduction of the consequential 2
flood concept to the SRP was the type of innovation or 3
transformation Fred was looking for.
4 Consequently, the definition was formally 5
introduced in a Federal Register notice issued for two 6
of the first Chapter 2.4 SRP updates, those 7
specifically bearing on channel migration and tsunami, 8
which were made available for comment in September 9
2018 as part of the ongoing SRP update process.
10 Slide 17, please.
11 In
- closing, slide 17 displays the 12 consequential flood definition that was proposed for 13 the SRP updates as part of the 2018 Federal Register 14 notice I just described. In the spirit of time 15 management and my barking dogs, I don't intend to 16 recite the definition we adopted, but I would note 17 that no public comments were received on this 18 proposal.
19 So, unless there are any questions I can 20 answer, I'll now turn over the presentation to Mr. Ken 21 See.
22 MEMBER BLEY: Mike?
23 DR. LEE: Yes?
24 MEMBER BLEY: Yes, before you leave --
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34 DR. LEE: Sure.
1 MEMBER BLEY: -- your last slide, you 2
didn't read the whole thing, but the last statement 3
about "Consequential flooding may occur for events 4
that are less severe" --
5 DR. LEE: Uh-hum.
6 MEMBER BLEY: -- can you say something 7
about that? Was that a surprise?
8 DR. LEE: Well, yes, because, unlike in 9
previous licensing reviews, I don't believe there was 10 a great emphasis placed on examining inundation times 11 that a site may be exposed to some kind of a flood.
12 And what we found is that you could have like a -- I 13 mean, this is just as a hypothetical -- for example, 14 you could have a thunderstorm, if you will, that kind 15 of blows over a site in the form of local intense 16 precipitation which may dump a lot of rain on the 17 power plant footprint and, then, quickly move off.
18 So, you don't have very high water surface elevations 19 accumulating onsite.
20 Whereas, you could have some riverine-21 based flood, for example, attributed to like a spring 22 thaw of snow and ice that may raise the water level to 23 levels higher than the design basis, and the 24 inundation time may be longer than you might expect 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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35 for that type of an event. Events that might be more 1
transient or like a
- tsunami, for
- example, 2
hypothetically, will dump a lot of water on a site, 3
but the amount of standing water that remains is there 4
for a shorter period of time.
5 So, I would kind of liken this to, in 6
optimization studies you have multiple solutions to a 7
problem on a response surface. So, you can kind of 8
imagine that, for each of the different flood-causing 9
mechanisms, you may have a different not only water 10 surface elevation, but inundation time and recession 11 time. And the consequential flood definition, if you 12 will, is the attempt to kind of capture the maxima of 13 the maxima. Does that make sense?
14 MEMBER BLEY: Yes. Did Prairie Island 15 have much to do with this evolution?
16 DR. LEE: No, frankly, it wasn't any 17 particular site. The concept, frankly, evolved from 18 the fact that the staff, after they did their 50.54(f) 19 reviews, had to write these letters back to the 20 licensees. We, more or less, reached closure on what 21 the appropriate or the new or the reevaluated flood 22 elevations might be.
23 And in the spirit of simplicity, it became 24 clear to us that not all flood-causing mechanisms were 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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36 driving the design decisionmaking. So, what we 1
attempted to do was try to encapsulate what we learned 2
from a particular site review and express it in terms 3
of the consequential flood.
4 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. Well, thank you very 5
much. This is something I don't think we've heard 6
much about. So, I appreciate it.
7 Go ahead.
8 DR. LEE: And again, I apologize for the 9
beasts.
10 (Laughter.)
11 Thank you.
12 Ken?
13 MR. SEE: Okay. Thanks, Mike.
14 I'm Ken See. I'm a Senior Hydrologist in 15 the External Hazards Branch, and I'll be talking about 16 manmade hazard reviews that are going on in EHCOE.
17 Next slide, please.
18 All right. I don't have any dogs here, so 19 it should be quiet.
20 At a high level, the review from manmade 21 hazards covers the following areas, and these are 22 outlined in the Standard Review Plan. Typically, our 23 review would include verifying information provided by 24 the licensee in the areas of locations and distances 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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37 to the following:
typically, transportation 1
facilities and routes, such as airports and airways; 2
roadways; railways; pipelines, and navigable bodies of 3
water. Also, the presence of military and industrial 4
facilities such as fixed manufacturing processing, 5
storage facilities, such as facilities that store 6
compressed gases, liquid hydrogen, liquid oxygen, and 7
propane, for example.
8 Once the location of these facilities has 9
been identified, we consider the following hazards and 10 their effects: toxic vapors or gases and their 11 potential for incapacitating personnel; overpressure 12 resulting from explosions or detonations involving 13 materials such as munitions, industrial explosives, 14 and explosive vapor clouds resulting from atmospheric 15 release of gases. And then, missile effects from 16 mechanical impacts such as aircraft, explosion debris, 17 and impacts from waterborne items such as a barge.
18 Next slide, please.
19 Okay. Currently, I believe the Committee 20 is up-to-speed on this. It started with you guys. We 21 are currently updating Reg Guide 1.91. Based upon the 22 expert evaluation team's report, which is on the slide 23 here, it was determined that the NRC needs to improve 24 several processes and practices in the area of 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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38 inspections, processing petitions, coordinating with 1
other agencies, and updating the pipeline analyses.
2 NRC staff outside of EHCOE are working to 3
implement these recommendations. Within EHCOE, we 4
have been given the task to update the Reg Guide 1.91.
5 So, it is being updated to address the issues that 6
have been identified in these documents.
7 Approaches to evaluating explosion hazards 8
have been updated from new research and methodologies.
9 The revision of this Guide will address the 10 shortcomings of the TNT equivalent methodology and 11 will also bring the guidance into agreement with 12 current industry practices.
13 There were six specific recommended 14 changes that I will briefly go through.
15 One is to provide clear guidance for 16 determining the mass
- release, including what 17 assumptions and methods are valid in determining the 18 values used.
19 The second, provide clear expectations for 20 detailed calculations that would be conducted if the 21 safe distance criteria is not met.
22 No. 3, address heat flux, which, according 23 to some experts, may be the controlling issue for 24 potential nuclear power plant impacts.
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39 No. 4, provide specific values for energy 1
equivalents for different chemicals and include 2
additional information on different classes of 3
chemicals.
4 Revert back to the value of 4500 5
kilojoules per kilogram as the heat of detonation for 6
TNT.
7 And then, incorporate some minor changes 8
that are in the equations, which is related to No. 5 9
as well.
10 So, as part of this update, if the 11 timeline permits, the staff may also add additional 12 methodologies to model the consequences from vapor 13 cloud explosions.
14 And some specific milestones for the 15 update are on this slide.
16 So, with that, if there are any questions, 17 I'll be happy to take them.
18 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. Ken, thanks very 19 much. You won't be surprised we're pleased to see 20 this and look forward to seeing the draft when it's 21 ready.
22 MR. SEE: Yes, sir.
23 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Ken, this is Pete 24 Riccardella. I have a question.
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40 All of the changes you just went through 1
appear to be addressing the consequences of such a 2
failure. Is there any consideration of addressing the 3
frequency or the probability of such failure?
4 MR. SEE: Everything's on the table. The 5
staff who are currently working on this are open to 6
-- you know, there's great debate going back and 7
forth. I've gone through a recent review where the 8
probabilistic alternative was used. We may add 9
emphasis and try to clarify.
10 I think No. 6, you know, it says, 11 "Incorporate minor changes to equations." What we're 12 really to aim there is, basically, to provide a 13 clearer technical basis for the equations and methods 14 that are in the document. And that may include the 15 methods that are currently discussed regarding 16 probabilistic methods.
17 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Okay.
18 MR. SEE: For example, like the frequency 19 of transportation of hazardous materials on a river, 20 or something like that, you know.
21 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Yes.
22 MR. SEE: Yes, but one thing I would just 23 want to point out overall is that this is a guidance 24 document. And in this area -- and you know this --
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41 there's a whole lot of equations and methods and 1
documents out there that licensees and applicants 2
could use.
3 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Yes.
4 MR. SEE: I mean, they're free. But this 5
update is clearly needed.
6 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Yes.
7 MR. SEE: But we may run into an issue 8
like this in the future where they've come in with 9
something that's out of the blue.
10 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Yes. Well, you refer 11 on this slide to the Indian Point review in April of 12 2020. As I recall, a big focus of that review -- in 13 fact, the main result -- was based on frequency, not 14 based on consequences.
15 MR. SEE: Well, we supported that 16 inspection, and the main issue I recall there was the 17 distance, and therefore, the time between the valve 18 stations where you can turn the pipeline off.
19 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Yes, yes. Well, that 20 would -- yes.
21 MR. SEE: But that review, the updated 22 analysis, the licensee showed that that wasn't really 23 relevant to the safety finding. I would refer you to 24 the Inspection Report, which is public.
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42 MEMBER BLEY: Yes, Pete, there were at 1
least two things here. There was a first quick 2
response report from the staff that leaned in the 3
direction you're talking, and then, there was a much 4
more thorough report later in the Inspection --
5 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Yes, yes, I was part 6
of that report.
7 MR. SEE: Because this was an ACRS report.
8 I'm sorry, I wasn't involved in it. I don't believe 9
I've seen that. The updates that we're pursuing are 10 based upon the expert evaluation team report and, 11 then, the periodic review.
12 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: As I said, I 13 participated in the expert evaluation team report.
14 MEMBER BLEY: The staff's report, you're 15 talking about?
16 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Yes.
17 MR. SEE: Okay.
18 MEMBER BLEY: Go ahead.
19 MR. SEE: Any other questions?
20 (No response.)
21 Okay. With that, I'm going to hand this 22 off to Kevin Quinlan, who is a meteorologist in the 23 External Hazards Branch as well.
24 Kevin, take over.
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43 MR. QUINLAN: Thank you, Ken.
1 Thank you for letting us discuss all these 2
issues today.
3 My name, as stated, is Kevin Quinlan, and 4
I am a meteorologist in the External Hazards Branch.
5 Next slide, please.
6 Meteorological assessments for new and 7
operating reactors generally include a review of the 8
regional climatology and the local meteorology. For 9
new reactor reviews, this includes precipitation, wind 10 speeds, and associated missiles from hurricanes and 11 tornados, as well as extreme temperature and humidity 12 statistics.
13 The Onsite Meteorological Measurements 14 Program is used to collect data as part of the 15 licensing of the plant for atmospheric dispersion and 16 transport purposes. It is also used for operating 17 plants as part of the Emergency Preparedness Program.
18 Guidance for how to set up and maintain an onsite 19 meteorological measurements program is provided in 20 Regulatory Guide 1.23.
21 Recently, small modular reactors and 22 advanced reactor applicants have proposed alternatives 23 to the existing guidance on onsite meteorological 24 measurements programs. These alternatives include 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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44 proposals to use data from local/national weather 1
service or Department of Energy meteorological towers.
2 Other advanced reactor design centers are considering 3
not having an onsite meteorological monitoring system 4
at all since they are not expected to have any 5
potential for atmospheric releases. SMR and advanced 6
reactor designs will present a new area of challenge 7
for NRC meteorological staff as the industry trends 8
continue to change.
9 Atmospheric dispersion focuses on accident 10 releases and routine releases to the exclusionary 11 boundary, low-population zone, the control room, and 12 any special receptors going out 50 miles from the 13 site. Generally, the atmospheric dispersion uses at 14 least two complete years of onsite meteorological data 15 from the monitoring program.
16 Next slide, please.
17 NRC meteorologists have been, and continue 18 to be, involved in applications for advanced reactor 19 and SMR applications. Staff recently completed a 20 Topical Report related to the exclusionary boundary 21 and low-population zone dispersion characteristics for 22 the NuScale SMR design, rather than using the PAVAN 23 model, to determine the EAB and LPZ x/Q models.
24 NuScale will develop the proprietary model that 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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45 implements the dispersion algorithm adjustments 1
provided in Reg Guide 1.194, which are generally used 2
for control room habitability.
3 Due to the smaller potential source term 4
associated with SMRs, the Clinch River early site 5
permit application employed a smaller EAB and site 6
boundary than us typical for a large light water 7
reactor.
8 EXHB meteorologists continue to work on 9
and support the reviews of any license amendment 10 requests, operating reactor licensing actions, and 11 alternative source term applications.
EXHB 12 meteorologists have also been working to support other 13 program officers such as NMSS and Research. Some of 14 this work has included technical analysis of extreme 15 precipitation as part of the Church Rock probable 16 maximum precipitation evaluation and atmospheric 17 dispersion input into the GEIS for advanced reactors 18 currently under development.
19 We are also actively working with the RAMP 20 program on a major update to the atmospheric 21 dispersion codes used for licensing actions. This 22 will include the consolidation of three codes, changes 23 how the meteorological data is input to the programs, 24 and includes an updated user-friendly interface.
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46 That's it for my portion of the 1
presentation. If there are no questions, I'll turn it 2
over to Dr. David Heeszel.
3 MEMBER BLEY: Thank you.
4 I think we can go ahead. David?
5 DR. HEESZEL: Thank you, Kevin.
6 My name is David Heeszel. I'm a 7
geophysicist in the External Hazards Branch.
8 Next slide, please.
9 The geology and seismology staff in EHCOE 10 focus their review on geologic and seismological 11 hazards at proposed nuclear facilities. Staff in the 12 group use a graded approach to their evaluations, 13 focusing on risk-significant hazards at the level of 14 detail in our reviews increasing with the decreasing 15 distance from the facility.
16 On a regional scale, the staff reviews 17 geologic and seismological information relevant to 18 defining the PSHA inputs, Probabilistic Seismic Hazard 19 Analysis inputs, including regional seismic source 20 characterization and ground motion models.
21 At a local scale, staff reviews the 22 geologic information related to the potential for 23 surface or near-surface deformation. Staff also 24 reviews the local seismic sources to ensure that they 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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47 are appropriately included in a PSHA. In addition, 1
staff reviews the site response used in determining 2
the site-specific safe shutdown earthquake, or SSE.
3 Next slide, please.
4 In addition to the geology and seismology 5
group's ongoing licensing activities, the staff are 6
involved in collaborative projects with the Office of 7
Research, the Process for Ongoing Assessment of 8
Natural Hazard Information of a new ground motion 9
model, and the development of a Volcanic Hazards 10 Regulatory Guide.
11 EHCOE staff are engaging with RES and the 12 United State Geological Survey in a five-year 13 interagency agreement to support Regulatory Guide 14 updates and, more broadly, the Process for Ongoing 15 Assessment of Natural Hazard Information efforts. The 16 interagency agreement has multiple elements, but is 17 broadly focused on all three elements of a PSHA -- the 18 seismic sources, the ground motion models, and the 19 site response. The research products that result from 20 this effort will inform future Regulatory Guide 21 updates.
22 The cooperative agreement also provides 23 EHCOE staff with access to hazard experts outside of 24 the agency that are able to assist in our ongoing 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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48 assessment of new information.
1 EHCOE staff, in collaboration with the 2
Office of Research, are reviewing the Next Generation 3
Attenuation East, or NGA-East, ground motion model for 4
approval for use in licensing applications. NGA-East 5
is a new ground motion model developed for Central and 6
Eastern North America. Staff is currently developing 7
an acceptance letter, and the Office of Research 8
published Research Information Letter 2020-11 that 9
provides a technical assessment of the model. Under 10 the agency's POANHI process, EHCOE staff are comparing 11 hazard results using the updated ground motion model 12 with those developed during the agency's Fukushima 13 response to ensure the staff has an up-to-date 14 understanding of hazard at regulated facilities.
15 Finally, EHCOE staff are in the process of 16 addressing public comments on the Volcanic Hazards 17 Regulatory Guide, which I believe you've been briefed 18 on. The Draft Reg Guide is focused on a risk-informed 19 process for assessing potential volcanic hazards at a 20 site. To this end, the Draft Guide provides a number 21 of off-ramps to potential applicants to ensure that an 22 assessment of potential volcanic hazards is not overly 23 burdensome, but is informed by the geologic and 24 tectonic setting and the Quaternary, which is the last 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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49 2.6 million years, volcanic history of the site.
1 If there are no questions, I will now turn 2
it off to Dr. Weijun Wang.
3 MEMBER BLEY: Dave, just a minute.
4 DR. HEESZEL: Sure.
5 MEMBER BLEY: Dennis Bley.
6 When do you expect -- I guess it still 7
remains a draft -- the final draft of that Reg Guide 8
to be finished, No. 1. And No. 2, have you got any 9
hints of any applications coming that are going to 10 require opinions?
11 DR. HEESZEL: Just one moment. Jenise is 12 getting me the answer.
13 Scheduled discussions for the release are 14 ongoing, but a revision will be available in three to 15 six months. In terms of applicability, as with any 16 guidance document, it's up to the applicant to 17 determine whether or not they're going to use it.
18 Volcanic hazards are more prevalent in regions of the 19 United States with volcanos. Sites at Idaho National 20 Lab are potential users of the Reg Guide.
21 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. Thanks.
22 Go ahead.
23 DR. WANG: Okay. Thank you, Dr. Heeszel.
24 Good afternoon. My name is Weijun Wang, 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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50 Senior Geotechnical Engineer at the NRC with 40 years 1
of working experience, including 14 years at the NRC.
2 I will give a very high-level briefing on 3
the role of geotechnical engineering in the external 4
hazards expertise.
5 Next slide, please.
6 The geotechnical engineering provides an 7
important link between the Site Suitability Evaluation 8
and the safety of the structure foundation design and 9
the construction for a nuclear facility.
10 First is to ensure a
phased site 11 investigation is performed to meet the need of a 12 specific application for a
specific site 13 characterization. The key here is specific site 14 because every site is different. That way, we will 15 make sure that the soil and rock engineering 16 properties are determined based on field and 17 laboratory testing.
18 Finally, we will make sure that the proper 19 soil-rock properties, including the site soil 20 profiles, are used in site seismic response and the 21 soil-structure interaction analysis.
22 Geotechnical engineers also evaluate the 23 foundation and the slope embankment suitability with 24 consideration of all anticipated loading conditions, 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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51 including seismic loading and the potential of 1
liquefaction caused by an earthquake, to ensure that 2
there is no adverse effect on the safety-related 3
structure because of the failure of the foundation or 4
slopes.
5 In addition, geotechnical engineering 6
reviews, also, to include the license amendment 7
requests and the site-specific inspection testing 8
analysis and acceptance criteria, as we have done for 9
the Vogel combined license application.
10 Next slide, please.
11 Okay. Now I will talk about some ongoing 12 activities in the geotechnical engineering area. We 13 are currently working on the development of the SRP 14 modernization for Section 2.5.4, "Suitability of 15 Subsurface Materials and Foundations," and 2.5.5, 16 "Slope Suitability."
17 Throughout this SRP, we provide guidance 18 for staff to focus on safety significance and 19 reasonable assurance when conducting application 20 reviews. We also provide the usual technical 21 consultation to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 22 Board regarding the suitability of a micropyro 23 foundation and the reliability of liquefaction 24 assessment for DOE facilities, based on the MOU 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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52 between the NRC and the Board.
1 In addition, we are also working on review 2
of the SHINE Medical Facility operation license 3
application and the consolidated interim facility for 4
spent fuel applications.
5 So, last in my presentation, if there's no 6
questions, I will turn it over to our geologist, 7
Laurel Bauer.
8 Thank you.
9 MS. BAUER: Thank you, Weijun.
10 And good afternoon.
11 I'm Laurel Bauer, and I'm a geologist in 12 the External Hazards Branch in NRR. I joined the NRC 13 in 2007 as a geologist in the Office of New Reactors.
14 I am presently the lead for the NRC's Process for 15 Ongoing Assessment of Natural Hazard Information, or 16 POANHI, a risk-informed approach to ensuring the 17 ongoing assessment of new information related to 18 natural hazards in the United States.
19 Today, I'm going to walk through the NRC's 20 implementation of POANHI. I'll provide you with some 21 background on the development and implementation of 22 the process and give you some information on the 23 framework and the key attributes.
24 Next slide, please.
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53 Following the 2011 accident at Fukushima 1
Daiichi, the NRC's post-Fukushima Near Term Task Force 2
in Recommendation 2.2 recommended that the NRC 3
initiate a rulemaking to require that licensees 4
confirm seismic and flooding hazards every 10 years.
5 It specifically recommended that licensees address any 6
new and significant information and, if necessary, 7
take actions that could include updating the design 8
basis for structures,
- systems, and components 9
important to safety to protect against the updated 10 hazards.
11 The staff assessed the recommendations and 12 concluded that the NRC can meet the intent of 13 Recommendation 2.2 using an approach other than 14 rulemaking. In developing SECY-15-0137, dated October 15 29th, 2015, the staff found that current practices to 16 assess new external hazard information are generally 17 effective, but identified a number of ways to enhance 18 existing processes. The staff also recognized that 19 there was no dedicated NRC process that systematically 20 identifies available new hazard information and 21 assesses its risk significance in a timely manner. As 22 a result, in SECY-15-0137, the staff proposed to 23 enhance its existing processes and develop associated 24 staff procedures.
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54 In Closure 2 to SECY-16-0144, dated 1
December 29th, 2016, it provided the Commission with 2
a comprehensive plan for developing and implementing 3
the enhanced process to ensure ongoing assessment of 4
new information and reconfirmation of natural hazards 5
consistent with Recommendation 2.2. The staff briefed 6
the ACRS in October 2016 on the staff recommendations 7
provided in Enclosure 2 to SECY-16-0144, and the 8
Commission approved the staff's implementation of the 9
enhanced assessment process.
10 Next slide, please.
11 MEMBER BLEY: Laurel?
12 MS. BAUER: Yes?
13 MEMBER BLEY: Dennis Bley.
14 I remember discussions some time ago --
15 MS. BAUER: Uh-hum.
16 MEMBER BLEY: -- where people thought you 17 really had to go through rulemaking to deal with this; 18 there was no way for staff to examine these things.
19 Can you summarize the arguments that got us out of 20 that knot?
21 MS. BAUER: So, there was quite a bit that 22 went into evaluating whether or not it was more 23 beneficial or not to go through the rulemaking 24 process. And in the end, the staff did determine, and 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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55 the Commission agreed, that we could do this. We felt 1
like we already had processes in place where we were 2
evaluating information, new information. We just 3
didn't have set guidelines for how to do that, how to 4
document it. And so, in weighing the burden of going 5
through rulemaking versus enhancing the processes that 6
we already had in place, we felt that the enhancement 7
process would be sufficient.
8 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Laurel, this is Walt 9
Kirchner.
10 A follow-on question to Dennis': in your 11 bullet there, every 10 years, if I remember correctly 12 from presentations by your colleagues, a lot of that 13 has already taken place, a reassessment, right, of the 14 seismic and flooding hazards?
15 MS. BAUER: For seismic and flooding.
16 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Has any plant had to 17 backfit to accommodate, has any plant had to change 18 its safe shutdown earthquake design limits or backfit 19 as a result of that assessment every 10 years?
20 MS. BAUER: I'm not aware of any backfit 21 that's been done, but I would ask Dr. David Heeszel.
22 I know he's been involved with some of the follow-on 23 seismic reviews.
24 DR. HEESZEL: Yes, this is David Heeszel.
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56 No plant has backfitted as a result of the 1
50.54(f) review.
2 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes. For flooding, 3
either? Have plants implemented changes to counter 4
flooding hazards since you embarked on this?
5 DR. LEE: Yes. This is Mike Lee. Yes.
6 Well, in the flooding area, there were 7
mitigating strategies that were proposed and reviewed 8
by the staff consistent with several guidance 9
documents put together by NEI. So, to address the 10 flood hazard reevaluation or the flood hazard, the 11 reevaluated flood hazard elevations and associated 12 events, the licensees performed assessments subsequent 13 to what the staff reviewed. And there was a lot of 14 dialog on that.
15 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes.
16 DR. LEE: And most of that dialog, though, 17 was performed by the Licensing Branch and not EHCOE.
18 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes, I can think of one 19 plant -- and I won't name it -- where I thought they 20 did adopt or adapt some mitigating measures for 21 floods. But I just wanted to check and see if anyone 22 had been impacted by reevaluation of seismic, and 23 then, had to actually make changes, physical changes, 24 to the plant.
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57 DR. HEESZEL: So, this is David Heeszel.
1 While the NRC did not pursue backfit for 2
any of the plants that were reviewed in the seismic 3
area, several plants did undertake voluntary changes 4
to improve their seismic readiness.
5 MEMBER RICCARDELLA:
This is Pete 6
Riccardella.
7 Weren't there a number of seismic margin 8
analyses and seismic PRAs that were done in response 9
to the new spectra?
10 DR. HEESZEL: Yes, there were 15 seismic 11 PRAs performed.
12 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: So, Walt, I think the 13 answer to your question is they didn't make changes to 14 their design basis, but they did look at the revised 15 spectra in seismic margins or PRAs.
16 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes.
17 MS. BAUER: Okay? Are you ready to move 18 on?
19 MEMBER BLEY: Yes.
20 MS. BAUER: Okay. Thank you.
21 So, this slide provides a timeline of the 22 staff activities to fully implement POANHI. The 23 staff, both staff in NRR and in Research, contracted 24 with the Idaho National Laboratories to develop a 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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58 Natural Hazards Information Digest, or NHID that I'll 1
refer to.
2 In January 2019, the Digest was rolled out 3
to the technical staff supporting POANHI in NRO and 4
Research. The staff held a public meeting in April 5
2019 to discuss POANHI and the NRC's implementation.
6 And in November 2019, the staff and NRR issued an 7
Office Instruction LIC-208, "Process for Ongoing 8
Assessment of Natural Hazards Information," and issued 9
a Final Commissioners' Assistant Note confirming the 10 full implementation of POANHI in response to 11 SRM-16-0144.
12 Next slide, please.
13 MEMBER BLEY: Laurel?
14 MS. BAUER: Yes?
15 MEMBER BLEY: Another question. I'm 16 guessing that it really helps in dealing with this, 17 having set up this Center of Expertise, that you're 18 tracking kind of large-scale things that could reflect 19 down on plants in these areas.
20 MS. BAUER: Uh-hum.
21 MEMBER BLEY: It seems possible that local 22 information could come up and the inspectors at the 23 plant could send back information that, hey, there's 24 something new that's evolved here --
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59 MS. BAUER: Absolutely.
1 MEMBER BLEY: -- before the 10 years is 2
up.
3 MS. BAUER: Uh-hum, 4
MEMBER BLEY: Is there some organized way 5
that you deal with that?
6 MS. BAUER: So, this is actually one of 7
the areas that we looked at when we were evaluating 8
the benefit of doing an every 10 years versus 9
enhancing the process that we already had in place to 10 look at hazards on an ongoing basis. It is that these 11 things do come up over time, and they may be every 10 12 years or every 20 years you might have something that 13 comes up, obviously, in the next month or so. And so, 14 this gives us a little more flexibility to deal with 15 those issues that would come up, maybe in inspection 16 space or some other licensing space.
17 And so, we do have interactions back and 18 forth with the inspection staff. And when we were 19 going through the process of developing our Office 20 Instruction, we worked with the inspection staff on 21 how those interactions would take place.
22 Does that help to answer a little bit?
23 MEMBER BLEY: It does. Thank you.
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60 that we're here. And so, yes, something could come up 1
where they would see it first and it would come to us, 2
and it works the other way as well, once we've 3
assessed new information.
4 MR. SEE: Hey, Laurel?
5 MS. BAUER: Yes?
6 MR. SEE: This is Ken. I just want to 7
speak specifically.
8 I mean, that has happened recently.
9 MS. BAUER: Right.
10 MR. SEE: For over the last two years, 11 Resident Inspectors have reached out and had 12 conversations with those concerning issues that they 13 have identified, because they do have local knowledge, 14 and that's very valuable.
15 MS. BAUER: Uh-hum. Absolutely.
16 MEMBER BLEY: That's great. Glad to hear 17 it.
18 MS. BAUER: Thank you, Ken.
19 Okay. The framework for addressing new 20 natural hazards information consists of three primary 21 components. We have knowledge-base activities, active 22 technical engagement and coordination, and assessment 23 activities.
24 The knowledge-base activities really 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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61 provide the foundation for the POANHI framework. And 1
this includes the Natural Hazards Information Digest 2
that I spoke of in the previous slide. The NHID 3
provides a digital infrastructure for use by the NRC 4
staff involved with natural hazard assessments to 5
compile and store natural hazards information related 6
to nuclear power plant sites. It organizes completed 7
licensing reviews and documented hazard assessments in 8
a clear, consistent, and logical manner. The Digest 9
is organized into five primary hazard areas, including 10 flooding hazards; seismic hazards; high winds, to 11 include tornado and hurricane; snow ice loads, and 12 extreme temperatures and humidity.
13 The NHID includes existing information 14 related to natural hazards that have been submitted by 15 licensees or developed by the staff as part of the 16 Recommendation 2.1 and 2.3 activities, new reactor 17 reviews, and the results from other regulatory 18 activities, such as individual plant examination of 19 external events or IPEEE.
20 The information contained in the Digest 21 provides staff with a baseline for considering new 22 natural hazards information and the potential effects 23 on licensed sites, so that new information is not 24 being evaluated in isolation.
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62 The staff will document the results of all 1
assessments and provide updates to the cumulative 2
information records contained in the NHID. These 3
updates will include a short summary of the new hazard 4
information and the staff's conclusions regarding 5
significance of the new hazard information from a 6
plant safety perspective.
7 In addition to supporting the activities 8
associated with the proposed framework, the Digest 9
also ensures that information is available and can be 10 used to support other agency activities in a timely 11 manner, including assisting the agency in responding 12 to emergent events associated with natural hazards by 13 promptly providing relevant information; engaging 14 external stakeholders, including responding to 15 allegations and petitions; evaluating natural hazard-16 related inspection findings under the NRC's 17 significance determination process for power reactors; 18 formulating and implementing research plans associated 19 with natural hazards, and updating regulatory and 20 staff guidance.
21 The second key component of the POANHI 22 framework is active technical engagement and 23 coordination. This involves leveraging and enhancing 24 ongoing interactions with a variety of stakeholders, 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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63 including internal and external organizations.
1 Internal and external stakeholders include the public; 2
industry; licensees and prospective applicants; 3
partner federal agencies; professional, technical, and 4
scientific organizations; academic research 5
institutions, and international counterparts.
6 The ongoing technical engagement and 7
coordination activities facilitate the identification 8
of new natural hazard information. The staff will 9
periodically coordinate and document the outcomes of 10 meetings during which NRC and its stakeholders will 11 review and discuss the evolution and knowledge, 12 example changes, and data models and methods related 13 to natural hazards.
14 The staff will continue to remain engaged 15 in the broader technical and scientific community, 16 which will ensure the staff are aware of, and are 17 contributors to, advances in data models and methods, 18 including opportunities for leveraging more 19 sophisticated models and refinements that may have an 20 impact on nuclear power plant sites.
21 Some examples of the coordination 22 activities that the staff is responsible for include 23 the NRC-DOE Natural Phenomena Hazards Meeting and the 24 Annual Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Research 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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64 Workshop.
1 The Natural Phenomena Hazards Meeting is 2
held every couple of years and provides a unique 3
opportunity for the NRC staff to engage in dialog with 4
DOE and industry regarding developments and natural 5
hazards information and its use in regulatory 6
activities.
7 In addition, the NRC hosts the Annual 8
Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Research 9
Workshop at the NRC Headquarters. The Workshop is 10 open to the public and brings together NRC staff, 11 federal agencies, industry, and other external 12 organizations involved in flood hazard assessment, 13 flood risk assessment, and flood protection and 14 mitigation research.
15 The NRC also actively participates in the 16 Advisory Committee on Water Information, and the staff 17 continues to support interagency agreements with 18 partner agencies, such as the U.S. Geological Survey, 19 to address issues related to natural hazards in the 20 United States.
21 The third component of the POANHI 22 framework is the staff assessment activities. The 23 overall objective of the assessment of hazard 24 significance is to determine if new information 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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65 related to natural hazards has the potential to 1
significantly affect the safety at a U.S. nuclear 2
power plant. The assessment of hazard information 3
includes the collection and aggregation of new hazard 4
information; a significance assessment; documentation; 5
referral to the appropriate regulatory program, as 6
necessary, and continued stakeholder interactions.
7 The assessment activities are intended to 8
require limited resources and use information 9
contained within the knowledge base as a starting 10 point to perform a limited-scope, quantitative or 11 qualitative assessment to determine if the new 12 information results in a change in hazard that is 13 potentially significant. The assessment will be 14 performed by subject matter experts in the External 15 Hazards Center of Expertise, augmented, as needed, by 16 staff from the Office of Research or other NRC 17 organizations.
18 The Division Director responsible for the 19 External Hazards Center of Expertise may, as needed, 20 convene a technical advisory committee to assess 21 hazard significance and to recommend appropriate next 22 steps to address the issue.
23 New hazard information determined to be 24 significant will, then, be referred to the appropriate 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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66 regulatory program office, and the staff will document 1
the results of the assessment in updates to the 2
cumulative information record within the Natural 3
Hazards Information Digest and in periodic reports to 4
be made publicly available.
5 Next slide, please.
6 So, this slide just provides a summary of 7
some of the key features of the POANHI process. The 8
POANHI activities are being led by a cross-agency team 9
from EHCOE, as well as from the Office of Research.
10 As part of its activities, the staff will collect new 11 information from the ongoing technical coordination 12 and engagement activities, as well as from other NRC 13 sources, operating experience, licensing experience, 14 and research activities.
15 When the staff identifies new hazard 16 information, it will assess that new information for 17 potential significance using a risk-informed approach 18 and in the context of previously accumulated hazard 19 information and past precedent of significance, rather 20 than in isolation. This assessment will evaluate the 21 change in the hazard represented by the aggregated 22 information and consider available risk insights to 23 determine whether the change in the hazard has a 24 potentially significant effect on plant safety. And 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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67 to the extent possible, POANHI will leverage existing 1
regulatory processes, existing research programs, and 2
cooperation with other federal agencies to achieve its 3
objectives in an effective and efficient manner.
4 Next slide.
5 And I won't go into a lot on this. Dr.
6 Heeszel previously spoke to the NRC's review of the 7
Next Generation Attenuation for Central and Eastern 8
North America Project, or NGA-East. And that is 9
currently the big review that we're doing using the 10 POANHI staff in both NRR and in Research.
11 Thank you. And if there are no questions, 12 I will turn the presentation back over to Dr. Kenneth 13 See to discuss the NRC's Dam Safety Program.
14 MR. SEE: Okay. Thank you, Laurel. Thank 15 you for promoting me to "doctor". I am not, unless 16 you want to five me an honorary.
17 MS. BAUER: I'm not, either. So, okay.
18 (Laughter.)
19 MR. SEE: An honorary degree, you know, 20 just email me a certificate. Thank you.
21 (Laughter.)
22 MEMBER BLEY: Hey, Ken?
23 MR. SEE: Yes, sir?
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68 have about 20 minutes left of the allotted time, but 1
we started late. So, if we need to go a little 2
longer, it's okay, but I think we'll probably finish 3
up.
4 But, before you get into all your 5
information, can you say anything about the Prairie 6
Island flood and things you learned about that? And 7
does that affect the other things we're sitting here 8
-- I think I recall, and I might not be right on this, 9
that there was some kind of issue. I don't know who 10 was controlling the upstream dam, but they were 11 thinking they had to dump a lot more water when 12 Prairie Island was kind of in extremis. Can you say 13 anything about how those interactions worked between 14 agencies when such issues come up? That would be 15 appreciated?
16 MR. SEE: I'm not familiar with the 17 Prairie Island incident off the top of my head. Maybe 18 you can --
19 MEMBER BLEY: Never mind then. Go ahead.
20 MR. SEE: I will look that up. Let me 21 take a little note here.
22 CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Dennis, was it Fort 23 Calhoun that you're thinking about?
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69 don't know why Prairie Island stuck in my head. Yes, 1
it was Fort Calhoun.
2 MEMBER KIRCHNER: It was Fort Calhoun.
3 MEMBER BLEY: Yes. Okay. Yes.
4 DR. LEE: This is Mike Lee.
5 I mean, I don't have any specific 6
recollection of the issue. We could certainly take 7
that as a takeaway from the meeting.
8 MR. SEE: Well, I can speak a bit to Fort 9
Calhoun. I was involved in that review. The big 10 picture, in the beginning of the Fukushima effort, 11 licensees went out and hired contractors, engineering 12 firms who could do flood analysis. And to get 13 information on the dams, they would go to the nearest 14 or appropriate Army Corps of Engineers District.
15 And they got kind of an inconsistent 16 response. Some Districts would cooperate and provide 17 the information on their dams and their riverine 18 system; whereas, others were adamant that the 19 information was sensitive and non-public.
20 So, this information, you know, the 21 licensees came back to the agency and said, "Hey, 22 we're not getting coordination across the board. Can 23 you reach out and help?" So, the agency reached out 24 to the Corps and got a better understanding of their 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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70 position.
1 The Corps, then, I believe it was the 2
Omaha District which was given the national program 3
lead, and they wanted to be consistent across the 4
Corps. So, it was decided, for those Districts that 5
had not given information, that they would work with 6
the Omaha District. So, in the end, the Army Corps of 7
Engineers did the analysis and provided the 8
information to the NRC. And then, we would provide 9
non-sensitive information to the licensee for them to 10 perhaps, you know, to further refine the modeling.
11 And Fort Calhoun was one of those stations.
12 The original analysis was not good for 13 Fort Calhoun, and we went around several times 14 iterating on modifying the program, doing different 15 sorts of analysis. But, at the end, they made a 16 business decision to close down. So, Fort Calhoun is 17 closed. So, that's my take on Fort Calhoun.
18 Any other questions?
19 MEMBER BLEY: All right. Go ahead.
20 MR. SEE: Okay. Next slide, please.
21 All right. Let me start with a little 22 history here. In 1972, Congress enacted the National 23 Dam Safety Act. This legislation required the Army 24 Corps to inspect certain non-federal dams based on 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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71 their size and storage. The legislation required the 1
Corps to report the inspection results to the states 2
and notify of any actions needed to ensure dam safety.
3 It also established a National Inventory of Dams.
4 In 1976, a report on these activities and 5
some proposed legislation to implement a Federal Dam 6
Safety Program were transmitted to Congress. However, 7
a lack of funding prevented execution of detailed dam 8
inspections.
9 In 1976, Teton Dam fails during the 10 initial filling. Blame on the collapse was on the 11 soil conditions and the soil used in the core and 12 cracking in the foundation that allowed water to seep 13 under and through the dam, which led to internal 14 erosion called "piping," and eventually caused the dam 15 to collapse.
16 This failure revitalized both government 17 and public concerns over dam safety. New legislation 18 for dam safety was also introduced.
19 In 1979, which is on this slide, President 20 Carter established a Federal Dam Safety Program when 21 he issued memorandum titled, "Federal Guidelines for 22 Dam Safety". The memorandum directed that each 23 federal agency having responsibility for design, 24 construction, operation, or regulation of dams 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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72 establish a Dam Safety Program.
1 The NRC began to develop its Dam Safety 2
Program. During this process, staff identified the 3
following legal authorities for the program. So, the 4
big one, the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, which I think 5
you've heard of; the Energy Reorganization Act of 6
1974, and the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control 7
Act of 1978.
8 At the time, the general regulatory 9
provisions of 10 CFR 30, Part 40, 50, and 70, were 10 thought to provide sufficient authority over 11 radiologically safety-related dams. 10 CFR, Part 40, 12 Appendix A, provides statutory authority over mill 13 tailing dams.
14 Next slide, please.
15 In 1991, the NRC established the NRC Dam 16 Safety Program in SECY-91-193, which outlines the 17 roles and responsibilities of the NRC Dam Safety 18 Officer and presents a program to the Commission to 19 implement and meet the federal guidelines on dam 20 safety.
21 In 1997, SECY-97-110 provided an update to 22 the Commission, informing them of the NRC's belief 23 that the agency full meets the federal guidelines. In 24 SRM-97-100, the Commission approved the Dam Safety 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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73 Program.
1 In 2006, the Dam Safety Act was amended.
2 This amended legislation requires the Corps to 3
maintain and update information on the National 4
Inventory of Dams in the United States, commonly 5
referred to as the NID, N-I-D. The National Inventory 6
of Dams is used to track information on U.S. water 7
control infrastructure, land use management, flood 8
plain management, and emergency action planning.
9 The NRC provides updates to the Corps on 10 an annual basis. This information is used by the 11 Corps to update the National Inventory of Dams and to 12 support FEMA's Biennial Report on Dam Safety to 13 Congress.
14 The Act also requires the Strategic Plan 15 for Dam Safety to be prepared by the Director of FEMA.
16 The NRC provides input to this Strategic Plan 17 approximately every five years. It's not every five 18 years. It kind of comes and goes.
19 Next slide, please.
20 All right. Based on analysis from OGC, 21 the NRC has regulatory authority over dams that, 22 should they fail, have radiological hazards or mill 23 tailing dams. That is, again, Part 40 where the 24 statutory authority exists.
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74 Excluded from NRC consideration are those 1
dams that may be onsite and associated with a licensed 2
facility, but not related to radiological safety.
3 In 2016, the NRC's then-Dam-Safety-Officer 4
asked attorneys in the Office of General Counsel 5
whether NRC's authority to regulate dams had changed 6
since the last legal analysis, which was in 1991. The 7
OGC's conclusion was that the legal analysis from 1991 8
remained valid.
9 Next slide, please.
10 As discussed in SECY-91-193, the NRC 11 entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the 12 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or FERC, to 13 provide technical assistance in developing this Dam 14 Safety Program. Today, FERC provides the staff to 15 carry out inspections of NRC-regulated dams. For 16 mostly budgetary reasons, and some technical reasons, 17 the NRC decided to use FERC in this role in lieu of 18 developing its own set of staff to carry out the 19 inspections.
20 Dams at the nuclear power plants under NRC 21 jurisdiction are inspected by NRC and FERC every two 22 years, and dams at uranium tail milling sites are 23 inspected every three years. These inspections are in 24 addition to those conducted by the licensee.
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75 These inspections are the primary method 1
to demonstrate continued compliance with the federal 2
guidelines. These inspections are coordinated with 3
the proper Doral PM for the plant; FERC, the Federal 4
Energy Regulatory Commission, and the licensee. Prior 5
to each inspection, the licensee is requested to 6
provide information such as the results of any 7
inspections performed by them; maintenance work and 8
surveillances performed since the last NRC inspection.
9 This may include instrumentation, monitoring, 10 settlement surveys, et cetera. The inspections 11 typically take four to five hours to complete. This 12 is the FERC inspector and the NRC staff go out and 13 walk down the structures.
14 Observations and recommendations that have 15 typically been reported are vegetation that's found 16 along the slopes of the dam -- obviously, a 17 geotechnical dam, not a concrete dam. If there's any 18 varmints and
- dens, recommend their removal.
19 Continuing monitoring any wet areas, which would 20 indicate minor seepage, and monitor and repair any 21 minor erosions.
22 I will say that the FERC inspectors speak 23 often about how impressed they are with the condition 24 of the NRC-regulated dams.
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76 Next slide, please.
1 So, this is a list of the dams that are 2
currently under NRC regulation. Seven out of eight 3
are power reactors. So, we're basically at eight dams 4
total. However, we started out with 65 dams at the 5
beginning of the program. This was quickly reduced to 6
34, based upon review by OGC. But recent closures of 7
several uranium mill tailing impoundments, and with 8
the addition of the State of Wyoming as an Agreement 9
Statement, the number of dams was reduced to eight.
10 That concludes my talk. If you have any 11 questions, I will be glad to answer them.
12 MEMBER BLEY: Yes, Ken, this is Dennis 13 Bley again.
14 Do you have any idea how many power plants 15 have upstream dams that are not NRC-regulated? And 16 for those cases -- well, none of them are NRC-17 operated, I guess, either. In cases where there 18 becomes an issue between the operator of the dam or 19 the regulator of the dam wanting to dump water, and 20 the plant's needs for it to be controlled more, how 21 are those conflicts resolved?
22 MR. SEE: That's an interesting question.
23 During the review of Fukushima, we put out an Interim 24 Staff Guidance document. I think it's JLD-ISG-2013-1.
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77 That's currently being -- it's going to be turned into 1
a Reg Guide. We're going to be working on that this 2
upcoming year.
3 There are thousands of dams upstream from 4
nuclear power plants. Most of them are very small.
5 You know, I'm talking like HOA impoundments. They 6
pose no threat to the nuclear facilities.
7 The big dams, the ones that we typically 8
are concerned with, are operated in accordance to 9
Congress' direction.
10 I know for Fort Calhoun there was 11 increased communication between the licensee and the 12 Army Corps of Engineers. The licensee was provided 13 access to the emergency action plans, and I believe 14 the Corps committed to notifying Fort Calhoun that 15 they were going to be releasing water. And they had 16 calculated how much water. I mean, they could flood 17 Fort Calhoun just by opening the gates wide open. The 18 dam did not have to fail. So, there was an emphasis 19 on communication.
20 But, as far as other sites, most of the 21 reviews showed that the sites could deal with the 22 flood. Cooper, which is downstream from Fort Calhoun, 23 has put in some mitigation and some flex and have made 24 commitments. I believe they're one of the sites that 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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78 has made commitments.
1 But the outcome of the Fukushima reviews 2
was that most of these sites could accommodate a 3
beyond-design-basis flood.
4 I hope that answers your question. I 5
would suggest you read that ISG. I think that would 6
be very informative.
7 MEMBER BLEY: Yes. Well, we've got it on 8
the transcript. So, could you say the numbers again, 9
so we make sure they're right in the transcript?
10 MR. SEE: Yes. That's JLD, which is 11 Japanese Lessons Learned Directorate, then 12
-ISG-2013-1.
13 And if you have any issues -- I wish I had 14 the ML number with me now, but it's a publicly-15 available document.
16 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. Great. Thanks, Ken.
17 We'll look at that. And I appreciate it. Thanks very 18 much for your presentation.
19 Any questions from other members?
20 (No response.)
21 MR. SEE: Okay. With that, I'm going to 22 turn it back over to Dr. Hayes, the Branch Chief.
23 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. Thank you.
24 MR. SEE: All right.
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79 DR. HAYES: Thank you very much, Ken.
1 For more information, I would go to our 2
SharePoint site. Again, it's not publicly-available, 3
but it is accessible to ACRS members. It shows our 4
areas of expertise and guidance related to reactor 5
reviews. There's a number of EHCOE briefs up there 6
that might be of interest to you on multi-hazard 7
siting reviews; knowledge management from the post-8 Fukushima work that we've done; EHCOE transformation; 9
external manmade hazards, POANHI, the Standard Review 10 Plan for changes associated with hydrology, and also, 11 the Dam Safety Program.
12 And the SharePoint, that also includes our 13 draft revised charter and our draft engagement plan.
14 In summary, our matrix structure today and 15 the transition that's underway towards a regulator are 16 reflected by the facts that we rely on past 17 operational experience. We focus on risk insights.
18 We ensure that reviews are risk-informed and 19 performance-based, and we embrace process improvements 20 and optimize regulatory reviews that way.
21 We also leverage technology and 22 collaborations. We utilize existing federal data and 23 databases. We have continued participation in 24 consensus standard development, engagement 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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80 internationally, and maintaining knowledgeable, agile 1
staff. And we also participate in knowledge 2
management transfer. These are the processes that we 3
have underway.
4 I would like to thank the Committee for 5
its time today, and EHCOE, our staff will, no doubt, 6
be interacting with you in terms of future reviews.
7 And
- now, are there any additional 8
questions on EHCOE?
9 MEMBER BLEY: Anything from other members?
10 (No response.)
11 Barbara, thank you so much. It was a 12 great overview of what all is in EHCOE, a really 13 fascinating organization right now.
And the 14 presenters were all very fine, and we appreciate the 15 talks. And we do look forward to interacting with the 16 folks from EHCOE as we continue our reviews in various 17 license applications.
18 Thank you so much.
19 At this time, I'll turn it back to our 20 Chairman, Matt.
21 And thank you, Matt, for bailing me out on 22 the flood. My brain went belly-up.
23 (Laughter.)
24 CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: No problem. I was in 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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81 Kansas at the time. So, it was quite familiar to me 1
as well.
2 I couldn't say it any better than what 3
Dennis said on how much we appreciate the thoroughness 4
and the quality of the presentation. It was excellent 5
and I learned so much about what you're doing. It's 6
quite impressive. So, we thank you very much for 7
that.
8 Okay. Committee, at this time, it is 9
almost 1:30. So, we were going to recess for lunch at 10 this time. We will take a break until 2:30 p.m.,
11 Eastern Time, at which time we will continue with 12 report preparation. And at that time, we'll take up 13 the report from Member March-Leuba and we'll look at 14 our response to the staff's response to the Arbonne 15 distribution letter. So, we'll have presentations on 16 that.
17 And I'll conclude now, and we'll see you 18 at 2:30.
19 Thank you.
20 (Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the session 21 recessed until 2:30 p.m. the same day.)
22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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External Hazards Center of Expertise Barbara D. Hayes, PhD, PE Branch Chief External Hazards Branch Division of Engineering and External Hazards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Barbara.Hayes@nrc.gov Presentation to the ACRS October 9, 2020
Agenda
- ECHOE
- Areas of Expertise
- Hydrology
- Man-Made Hazards
- Meteorology
- Geology/Seismology
- Geotechnical Engineering
- Process for Ongoing Assessment of Natural Hazards Information
- Dam Safety Program
- Closing Thoughts 2
Previous Activities COL and ESP Applications
- Most recently Clinch River ESP Design Certification Applications
- NuScale
- KHNP APR 1400 Fukushima-Related §50.54(f) Responses
- 63 Site-specific Seismic Hazard Reviews and 15 SPRA reviews
- Flood Hazard Reevaluation Reports
- LAR Reviews
- Shine Medical Isotope Facility OL Review
- Support for OKLO Aurora Review at INL
- Pre-Application Support for Potential UAMPS Application Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- ISP/WCS CISF Application Review
- Holtec CISF Application Review Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Current Activities 3
EHCOE - History Formed in NRO as limited scope COE following SECY-15-0143, Project Aim and Centers of Expertise Executive responsibility with the director of the Division of Engineering and External Hazards (DEX)
Matrixed organization within NRR Recent new Share Point site, draft revised charter, draft engagement plan 4
Click to add text
EHCOE Who we are
- External Hazards Branch (EXHB)
- Barbara Hayes, Chief
- 14 staff covering meteorology, hydrology, seismology, geology and external man-made hazards
- NRC Dam Safety Officer, Kenneth See
- POANHI POC, Laurel Bauer
- POCs for the National Weather Service and for the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology
- EHCOE Project Manager, Luissette Candelario 5
EHCOE Who we are Continued
Structural, Civil, and Geotech Engineering Branch (ESEB)
Joe Colaccino, Chief 3 ESEB staff members in EHCOE cover geotechnical engineering 1 ESEB staff member supports external man-made hazards activities managed by EXHB
Senior Technical Advisor on Nuclear Power Plant Siting, Cliff Munson
Dam Safety Project Manager -
NRR/DANU/UARL 6
Our Vision Enhance the NRCs ability to shift resources or work assignments to meet the demands of a changing environment, increase organization capacity without an increase in resources, and achieve more effective knowledge management and maintenance of critical skill sets.
MODERNIZE REGULATORY REVIEW PRACTICES ALIGN WITH NRCS RISK-INFORMED APPROACH TO REGULATION EVALUATE AND RIGHT-SIZE REVIEW ACTIVITIES ENSURE ADEQUATE BENCH STRENGTH PRESERVE CRITICAL SKILL SETS 7
EHCOE Transformation
- Dedicating resources to modernize our processes and work tools
- Collaborative culture change
- Revised EHCOE Charter and Engagement Plan Process Simplification
- Facilitate document production, staff collaboration, and document sharing
- Development and use of EHCOE Share Point site
- Creation of new internal tools for workflow and staff generated opportunities Technology Adoption
- Promoting staff rotations and training
- Promoting cross training and leadership opportunities Career Enhancement 8
EHCOE Transformation Continued...
- Commitment to Commissions Risk-Informed/Performance-Based Approach to Regulation
- Training by EHCOE Staff align with NRCs with transformation
- Transformative Examples
- Hydrology: Introduction of Consequential flood concept
- Geology: Focus primarily on geologic stability during quaternary period; avoid encyclopedic-based geology reviews Focus on Risk Significance 9
Regulatory Basis for EHCOE Reviews Primary Focus on Conventional Power Reactors Parts 50, 52, and 100 Support for Other NRC Programs Decommissioning, Waste Management, Mill Tailings(Parts 61, 63, 70, and 72)
Support Advanced Reactor Siting Partnering with DANU and NMSS 10
EHCOEs Focus
Potential Climatology-driven Hazards (snow loads, tornado and hurricane wind loads, etc.)
Atmospheric Dispersion of Radionuclides
Local Intense Precipitation and Associated Site Drainage
All Potential Flood-related Hazards (rivers, streams, dam failure, etc.)
Evaluation of the Safety-related Water supply
All Potential Coastal Hazards (storm surge, tsunami, etc.)
Groundwater Flow and Radionuclide Transport
Geologic Hazards (faulting, landslides, volcanism, Karst)
Potential for Ground Shaking (i.e.,
seismology and geophysics)
Stability of Subsurface Materials, Slopes, and Foundations (geotechnical engineering)
Potential Explosions and Releases of Toxic Chemicals from Nearby Industrial Facilities or Transportation Systems
Aircraft Crash Hazards
Radionuclide Contaminant Fate Transport in the Environment
Probabilistic Flood Hazard Analyses
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analyses 11
EHCOE What we do Review and Guidance support to NRR business lines Support to NMSS business lines Partnering Collaboration with RES International support Participate in National Consensus Standards Development (ANSI/ANS) interagency activities 12
Hydrology Review Activities within EHCOE Michael P. Lee, PhD Senior Hydrologist External Hazards Branch Division of Engineering and External Hazards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mike.Lee@nrc.gov Presentation to the ACRS October 9, 2020
Recent Lessons-Learned
- Part 52 Early Site Permits and Combined Operating License Applications
- 2012 §50.54(f) Information Request (Fukushima Accident)
... Flood Hazard Re-Evaluations Staff Reviews
- YES: LIP, Riverine/Dam Failure, Storm Surge
- NO: Tsunamis, Seiche, Channel Migration, and Ice Dams Not All Flood-Causing Mechanisms are Consequential to Defining the Design Basis 15
Definition of Consequential Flood Evolved from § 50.54(f) flood hazard re-evaluations Intent is to simplify staff reviews Focus only on flood-causing mechanisms defining flood threat Inconsequential flooding mechanisms not relevant to Comports with Commissions RI/PB regulatory approach Consistent with definition of site characteristic flood Part 50.2 (Definitions)
Focus of SRP Chapter 2.4 reviews Concept introduced as part of SRP update process September 28, 2018, Federal Register Notice Channel migration & tsunami section updates 16
Consequential Flood Definition
.... For Construction Permits, Operating Licenses, and COL applications, a term used to identify conditions in which the flood severity exceeds the capability of protection features (if available), including considerations for flood level, duration and/or associated effects, such that SSCs important-to-safety may be impacted. For ESP applications, the flood severity is expected to be in reference to the site characteristic flood.
Consequential flooding may occur for events that are less severe and with differing characteristics (e.g., shorter warning time) than the deterministically defined probable maximum events. (83 FR 49134) 17
Man-Made Hazard Review Activities within EHCOE Kenneth See, PE Senior Hydrologist External Hazards Branch Division of Engineering and External Hazards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Kenneth.See@nrc.gov Presentation to the ACRS October 9, 2020
Man-Made Hazards
Aircraft Crash Hazards (Airport Operations, Inflight Operations)
Transportation Accidents (Highway, Railway, Ship/Barge)
Pipeline and Industrial Facility Accidents 19
Man-Made Hazards Regulatory Guide 1.91:
Evaluations of Explosions Postulated To Occur on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants
Periodic Review (ML20134J125 )
Changes based on Report of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Expert Evaluation Team on Concerns Pertaining to Gas Transmission Lines Near the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant, April 8, 2020 (ML20100F635)
Revision Timetable Provide draft RG to RES for processing by March 2021 Issue Draft RG for Public Comment July 2021 20
Meteorology Review Activities within EHCOE Kevin R. Quinlan Meteorologist External Hazards Branch Division of Engineering and External Hazards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Kevin.Quinlan@nrc.gov Presentation to the ACRS October 9, 2020
Meteorology Areas of Expertise Regional Climatology and Local Meteorology Rain, Snow, Hurricanes, Tornados, Thunderstorms, Temperature/Humidity Extremes Onsite Meteorological Monitoring Wind Speed, Wind Direction, Temperature, Precipitation New considerations for SMR/Advanced Rx Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates Design-Basis Accidents, Routine Releases, Control Room Habitability 22
Recent Support Activities New Advanced and Operating Reactors Novel Approach to Dispersion Modeling by NuScale Short EAB/Site Boundary by Clinch River ESP LARs, Operating Reactor Applications, ASTs NMSS Church Rock PMP Evaluation Atmospheric Dispersion Input to GEIS for Advanced Reactors Office of Research RAMP Dispersion Code Updates NEA High Wind Survey 23
Geology/Seismology Review Activities within EHCOE David Heeszel, PhD Geophysicist & EXHB Geology/Seismology Liaison External Hazards Branch Division of Engineering and External Hazards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation David.Heeszel@nrc.gov Presentation to the ACRS October 9, 2020
Geology and Seismology Areas of Expertise Regional and Local Geologic and Seismological Hazards Geologic Characterization of Proposed Site/Regions Regional Seismological Information Important to PSHA
- Regional seismic sources
- Regional ground motion models Onsite Geologic and Seismic Hazards Onsite Geologic Hazards
- Seismic sources
- Ground motion model
- Site response 25
Geology and Seismology Ongoing Activities Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research USGS/RES Interagency Agreement to support Regulatory Guide Updates and POANHI Site Response SSHAC Level II Demonstration Project Collaboration on POANHI Activities Cross Cutting Issues NGA-East Review (new ground motion model for PSHA)
Currently under review for acceptance in licensing applications RIL 2020-11 provides review of technical adequacy of model Through POANHI staff is comparing NGA-East hazard with hazard determined currently accepted ground motion model Volcanic Hazard Regulatory Guide 26
Geotechnical Engineering Review Activities within EHCOE Weijun Wang, PhD, PE Senior Geotechnical Engineer Structural, Civil, and Geotech Engineering Branch Division of Engineering and External Hazards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Weijun.Wang@nrc.gov Presentation to the ACRS October 9, 2020
Geotechnical Engineering Areas of Expertise Determination of Subsurface Material Engineering Properties Phased site investigation for site characterization Necessary field and laboratory testing Soil and rock material and engineering properties determination for site seismic response, soil-structure interaction, foundation and slope stability analyses Foundation and Slope Stability Evaluations Evaluation of potential of liquefaction Stability under all natural and man-made loading conditions 28
Geotechnical Engineering Ongoing Activities
- Provided initial technical consultation to DNFSB based on MOU between NRC and DNFSB Technical Support to Other Agencies 29
Process for Ongoing Assessment of Natural Hazards Information (POANHI)
Laurel Bauer Geologist External Hazards Branch Division of Engineering and External Hazards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Laurel.Bauer@nrc.gov Presentation to the ACRS October 9, 2020
POANHI Background Post-Fukushima NTTF Recommendation 2.2 Advised rulemaking requiring that nuclear power plant licensees confirm seismic and flooding hazards every 10 years Staff Requirements Memorandum-SECY-15-0137 Recommended an approach other than rulemaking to ensure staff proactively and routinely aggregates and assesses new natural hazards information Staff Requirements Memorandum-SECY-16-0144 Provided a comprehensive plan for developing and implementing POANHI that included development and issuance of an Office Instruction and development of the Natural Hazards Information Digest (NHID) 31
POANHI Implementation RES/NRR staff worked with Idaho National Laboratories (INL) to develop the NHID NHID Demonstrated to NRC staff for implementation -
February 2019 Public Meeting to discuss POANHI implementation -
April 2019 Office Instruction LIC-208 "Process for the Ongoing Assessment of Natural Hazards Information" issued -
November 2019 32
POANHI Framework Knowledge Base Active Technical Engagement and Coordination Ongoing Assessment Activities 33
POANHI Attributes
Implementation by a cross-agency team
Aggregation and evaluation of new natural hazards information
Incorporation of risk insights into a determination of risk significance
Documentation of independent staff assessments related to new natural hazards information
Referral of potentially risk-significant issues to appropriate regulatory programs 34
Review of Next Generation Attenuation Models for central and eastern North America (NGA-East)
POANHI Current Activities 35
NRCs Dam Safety Program Kenneth See, PE NRC Dam Safety Officer External Hazards Branch Division of Engineering and External Hazards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Kenneth.See@nrc.gov Presentation to the ACRS October 9, 2020
Regulatory Authority President Carter established the federal dam safety program when he issued an implementing memorandum for "Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety," on October 4, 1979 The memorandum directed that each federal agency having responsibility for design, construction, operation, or regulation of dams establish a dam safety program The legal authority for the Commission, in the realm of dam safety, derives from:
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; and the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA) 37
Regulatory Authority SECY 91-193 establishes the NRC DSP and outlines the roles and responsibilities of the Dam Safety Officer Dam Safety Act of 2006 - Amended original Act Requires the Secretary of the Army to maintain and update information on the inventory of dams in the United States.
(National Inventory of Dams - NID)
Requires the strategic plan for dam safety prepared by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to establish performance measures, in addition to goals, priorities, and target dates, toward effectively administering the Act to improve dam safety 38
Regulatory Authority NRC has regulatory authority over:
uranium mill tailings dams storage-water-pond dams at in-situ leach mining facilities, and those dams integral to the operation of licensed facilities, or the possession and use of licensed material, that pose a radiological safety-related hazard should they fail.
39
Dam Inspection Program Memorandum of Understanding with FERC - 1992 FERC provides technical assistance to the NRC by inspecting dams under NRC jurisdiction In lieu of creating NRC inspector program Inspections are performed every 2 years (Power Reactors) 3 years (Uranuim Mills)
Ensure compliance with Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety 40
NRC Regulated Dams Uranium Mills (Inspected Every 3 Years)
Crow Butte (Nebraska)
Power Reactors (Inspected Every 2 Years)
North Anna (Virginia)
Shearon Harris (North Carolina)
McGuire (North Carolina)
Catawba (South Carolina)
Summer (South Carolina)
Farley (Alabama)
Comanche Peak (Texas) 41
Closing:
Learn More About ECHOE ECHOE SharePoint Site https://usnrc.sharepoint.com/teams/NRR-External-Hazards-Center-of-Expertise/
Information on our areas of expertise and guidance for reactor safety reviews EHCOE Briefs on our work Our Draft Revised Charter and Draft Engagement Plan 42
Thank You...
Questions ?
Abbreviations EHCOE ESP COLA HMR FHRR LIP PMP POANHI SRP RG PFHA PSHA SSE SPRA PSHA 44