Text

NRC-2018-000103 - Resp 5 - Interim, Agency Records Subject to Request Enclosed
	ML20294A098
Person / Time
Issue date:	11/06/2017
From:	Stephanie Blaney; NRC/OCIO/GEMSD/FLICB
To:	Lochbaum D; Union of Concerned Scientists
Shared Package
ML20294A094	List: ML20294A096; ML20294A097; ML20294A098; ML20294A099; ML20294A100; ML20294A101; ML20294A102; ML20294A103; ML20294A104; ML20294A105; ML20294A106; ML20294A107; ML20296A416;
References
	FOIA, FOIA-2018-0010, NRC-2018-000103
	Download: ML20294A098 (198)
	v • d • e

{{#Wiki_filter:(03-2017) REQUESTER:

/-~

NRC FORM 464 Part I

                \
                  .-~.,

_,,.a!IIEQf,(

J:

                                   ._of U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST FOIA I

RESPONSE

TYPE 2018-0010 [Z] INTERIM 11 RESPONSE NUMBER DATE: 5 FINAL I David Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists DESCRIPTION OF REQUESTED RECORDS:

                                                                                                                                                                                   ,I             11/06/2017 I

Records corresponding to items 26-29, 31-33, 35-37, 39-41, 50-51, and 55, as more fully described in the Comments Section, below PART I. -INFORMATION RELEASED You have the right to seek assistance from the NRC's FOIA Public Liaison. Contact information for the NRC's FOIA Public Liaison is available at bttps://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia/contact-foia. html [Z] Agency records subject to the request are already available on the Public NRG Website, in Public ADAMS or on microfiche in the NRC Public Document Room. [Z] Agency records subject to the request are enclosed. Records subject to the request that contain information originated by or of interest to another Federal agency have been referred to that agency (see comments section) for a disclosure determination and direct response to you. [Z] We are continuing to process your request. [Z] See Comments. PART I.A - FEES NO FEES AMOUNT* You will be billed by NRG for the amount listed. Due to our delayed response, you will Minimum fee threshold not met. II II You will receive a refund for the amount listed.

       *see Comments for details                   Fees waived.                                                                   not be charged fees.

PART I.B -- INFORMATION NOT LOCATED OR WITHHELD FROM DISCLOSURE We did not locate any agency records responsive to your request. Note: Agencies may treat three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records as not subject to the FOIA ("exclusions"). 5 U.S.C. 552(c) This is a standard notification given to all requesters: it should not be taken to mean that any excluded records do, or do not exist. [Z] We have withheld certain information pursuant to the FO!A exemptions described, and for the reasons stated, in Part IL Because this is an interim response to your request, you may not appeal at this time. We will notify you of your right to [Z] appeal any of the responses we have issued in response to your request when we issue our final determination. You may appeal this final determination within 90 calendar days of the date of this response by sending a letter or e-mail to the FOIA Officer. at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. D.C. 20555-0001, or FOIA.Resource@nrc.gov. Please be sure to include on your letter or email that it is a "FOIA Appeal." You have the right to seek dispute resolution services from the NRC's Public Liaison, or the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). Contact information for OGIS is available at https://ogi§.archives.gov/about-ogis/contact-information.htm PART I.C COMMENTS ( Use attached Comments continuation paae if required) This fifth interim response addresses 16 additional records described in your request. Although these records have been removed from ADAMS, because the NRC was able to locate them by the accession numbers during the processing of several FOTA requests seeking the same records within the past year, we have processed the records as described below. We have processed these records, taking into account the privacy waiver furnished by Lawrence Criscione. Please note that our response should not be construed as our concurrence with the way in which you describe some of the records. [continued on next page] Signature

Freedom of Information Act Officer or Deslanee Oigrtally &igned by Sitph&lnlil A. Sar,ey *

!Stephanie A. Blaney ON c*US. o.. u_s Go..-mment,o-u s NudDr R*gui.t!Qry eomnn:.,.m.()<.!"'NRC,P!V. cn*Slef:IMme: A. aaoey. o.tn34:..19t00300.t00.1 1.. 200001997 0.te:2017110610J}l 44.('/$t$J NRC Form 464 Part I (03-2017) Page 2 of 4

NRC FORM 464 Part I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA RESPONSE NUMBER I (03-2017) RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 2018-0010 11 5 I ACT (FOIA) REQUEST Continued

RESPONSE

TYPE 0 INTERIM FINAL REQUESTER: DATE: David Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists 11 11/06/2017 I PART I.C COMMENTS {Continued) ML16216A706 (item 26) is a copy of a FOIA appeal letter with enclosures. The letter itself is already publicly available as MLI 3189A005. Another copy of this letter, along with its enclosures, is enclosed with this response. ML16216A707 (item 27) consists of a June I 0, 2013 email from Mr. Criscione to various NRC staff and NTEU Chapter 208, which Mr. Criscione then forwarded to Chairman Macfarlane and her Legal Assistant on June 13, 2013. We have enclosed a redacted version of this record. Certain portions of the email have been redacted, and the attachment withheld in its entirety, on the basis of exemption 5, as it incorporates the deliberative process (DP) privilege. The portions of the email have been redacted to be consistent with the manner in which records responsive to FOIA-2015-0018/FOIA-2015-0019 were redacted; the attachment was previously denied in response to FOIA-2015-0020 (ML 15 l I 3A611, ML15111A230, and ML15006A221, respectively). Please note that since this content was previously withheld on the basis of exemption 5 and the DP privilege, the NRC revisited that content before determining to continue asserting exemption 5 and the DP privilege. ML16216A708 (item 28) is a June 13, 2013 letter from Patricia Hirsch to Mr. Criscione. ML16216A709 (item 29) is a copy of a May 24, 2013 email to various NRC officials, including the FOIA Officer at that time, attaching a letter, in which the sender raises concerns about the lack of a timely response to several pending FOIA appeals. Both records are enclosed. ML16216A711 (item 31) is a copy of a briefing package prepared by David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists, ahead of meetings scheduled with then-Chairman Bums and Commissioner Baran, which the Commission has confirmed was received. It is enclosed. ML16216A712 (item 32) consists of a March 29, 2013 email, transmitting to the Chairman and various NRC staff, including in the FOIA Office, a letter in which Mr. Criscione seeks to appeal the failure to respond timely to three FOIA requests (FOIA-2013-0126, 2013-0127, and 2013-0128) that he, or other third party individuals, had filed. This appeal letter included I 6 enclosures, many of which are already available to the public as noted below, or are enclosed herein: Enclosure I: Incoming request, FOIA-2013-0126 (ML13044A481) : Acknowledgment letter for FOIA-2013-0126 (enclosed) : Incoming request, FOIA-2012-0128 (ML12030A105) : Acknowledgment letter for FOIA-2012-0128 (ML12363A094) : Form 464 response to FOIA-2012-0128#1 (ML16216A712) : Incoming request, FOIA-2012-0325 (ML I2263A087) : President Obama's Memorandum on the FOIA (https://www.dol.gov/dol/foia/2009 FOIA_memo.pdt) : Attorney General Holder's Memorandum on the FOIA (https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/ legacy/2009/06/24/foia-memo-march2009.pdt) : List ofNRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of Jocassee Dam (this list has been attached to multiple documents that are publicly available, such as MLI 5 I 28A609 (starting at p54 ). 0: Incoming request, FOIA-2013-0127 (ML13044A486) 1: Acknowledgment letter for FOIA-2013-0127 (enclosed) 2: Acknowledgment letter for FOIA-2013-0034 (enclosed) 3: Incoming request, FOIA-2013-0008 (MLl2283A329) 4: Incoming request, FOIA-2013-0013 (MLl2290A070) 5: Incoming request, FOIA-2013-0128 (ML091170104) 6: Acknowledgment letter for FOIA-2013-0128 (enclosed) NRC Form 464 Part I (03-2017) Page 3 of 4

NRC FORM 464 Part I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA RESPONSE NUMBER I (03-2017) RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 2018-0010 11 5 I ACT (FOIA) REQUEST Continued RESPONSE TYPE 0 INTERIM FINAL REQUESTER: DATE: IDavid Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists lI 11/06/2017 I PART I.C COMMENTS (Continued) ML16216A713 (item 33) is a copy of a FOIA request, FOIA-2013-0262, to which the requester attached a copy of a page from the Commission's 2d Quarter Operating Plan FY-2013. The 2d Quarter Operating Plan was the subject of prior FOIA requests, FOIA-2013-0261 (and its appeal, FOIA-2013-0021 A) and FOIA-2016-0117. The Plan was denied in full pursuant to FOIA exemption 5. A copy of the FOIA request letter is enclosed with this response; however, the one-page attachment from the 2d Quarter Operating Plan FY-2013 (ML 13 I 49A079) (like the entire Operating Plan itself) continues to be withheld under FOIA exemption 5. ML I 6236A0 18 (item 35) is an email exchange between staff members in the Offices of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) and New Reactors (NRO), to which a red-lined draft of a "Style Sheet", including personal advice and recommendations about writing style by its author, was attached. This draft was not finalized, although it is similar to NUREG-1379, NRC Editorial Style Guide. It is also noted that the focus of the email exchange was a particular template NRO used to write reviews of post-Fukushima Recommendation 2.1 Flood Hazard Reevaluation Reports, which is different altogether from the red-lined draft the originating RES staff member had attached to his email. A copy of the email exchange is enclosed. ML16236A019 (item 36), which is described as 2014~Jan-9 mpg video of the flooding at St. Lucie, 043 MOV03976_ MPG and MLI 6236A02 I (item 37), which is described as 2014-May-27 and 2014-June-5 emails concerning the St. Lucie Jan 9 Reactor Auxiliary Building Flooding Video, are both enclosed. Since all but one of the email exchanges included in ML16237A004 (item 39) are already publicly available as a result of our processing ofFOIA-2013-0264, please refer to ML13226A261-ML13226A264, ML13123A204, and ML13226A259. We note that the redactions of personally identifiable information (PH) on the basis of exemption 6 were already applied in the emails as you requested them. We have enclosed the one additional email exchange that is not publicly available; the PII appearing in this record has been redacted under exemption 6. ML16237A005 (item 40) is also already publicly available as a result of our processing of FOIA-2013-0264; please refer to ML13226A259. ML16237A006 (item 4 I) is an April 11, 2013 letter from Mr. Criscione to then-EDO Bill Borchardt and then-Chief FOIA Officer Darren Ash, following up on a pending FOIA appeal, FOIA-2013-009A, including seven enclosures. The enclosures consist of: (1) an acknowledgment letter; (2) a Form 464 response package to 2013-0126 (which is already publicly available as ML13106A167), including an appendix listing the already publicly available redacted records responsive to the request; (3) ML13099A247 (as redacted); (4) ML13039A084 (as redacted); (5) ML13039A0086 (as redacted); (5) a copy of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACE)'s Engineer Manual, "General Design and Construction Considerations for Earth and Rock-Fill Dams," (which is publicly available at ACE's website) and a Continuing Education & Development, Inc. cover sheet for a program on this subject; (which is also publicly available at its website); and (7) an unredacted copy of the cross-section diagram of the Jocassee Dam. With the exception of enclosure 7, the pages of this record are enclosed. As for enclosure 7, this diagram has already been addressed in interim response 3 (relating to items 2 and 7 of your request, wherein it was redacted on the basis of exemption 7F. ML 16238A0l3 (item 50) and ML16238A014 (item 51) are copies of a NRC Form 183, Report of Security Incident/ InfractionNiolation, and an undated memorandum from Mary Jane Ross-Lee to Richard Correia concerning the subject "Report of Security Incident (Information Spill)." Both are enclosed. ML16242A344 (item 55) is a privacy waiver furnished by Mr. Criscione in conjunction with several third party FOIA requests submitted in the past year, which was subsequently revised and and later incorporated by reference in the privacy waiver he furnished with regard to your request. A copy is enclosed. NRC Form 464 Part I (03-2017) Page4 of 4

NRC FORM 464 Part II U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,..F..;.0..;.IA...;..._ _ _ _ _ _ _., 1 I (03-2017) 11 RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF ZOIS-OOOJ#S _ INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST DATE: 1 1110612011 PART II.A -- APPLICABLE EXEMPTIONS Records subject to the request are being withheld in their entirety or in part under the FOIA exemption(s) as indicated below (5 U.S.C. 552(b)). D Exemption 1: The withheld information is properly classified pursuant to an Executive Order protecting national security information. D Exemption 2: The withheld information relates solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of NRC. D Exemption 3: The withheld information is specifically exempted from public disclosure by the statute indicated. D Sections 141-145 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data (42 U.S.C. 2161-2165). D Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Unclassified Safeguards Information (42 U.S.C. 2167). 41 U.S.C. 4702(b), which prohibits the disclosure of contractor proposals, except when incorporated into the contract between the agency and the submitter of the proposal. Exemption 4: The withheld information is a trade secret or confidential commercial or financial information that is being withheld for the reason(s) indicated. The information is considered to be proprietary because it concerns a licensee's or applicant's physical protection or material control and accounting program for special nuclear material pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1). The information is considered to be another type or confidential business (proprietary) information. The information was submitted by a foreign source and received in confidence pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d)(2). [ { ] Exemption 5: The withheld information consists of interagency or intraagency records that are normally privileged in civil litigation. [{] Deliberative process privilege. D Attorney work product privilege. D Attorney-client privilege. 71

Exemption 6: The withheld information from a personnel, medical, or similar file, is exempted from public disclosure because its disclosure would result in a clear1y unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. [ { ] Exemption 7: The withheld information consists of records compiled for law enforcement purposes and is being withheld for the reason(s) indicated. D (A) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with an open enforcement proceeding. D (C) Disclosure could reasonably be eXPected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. (D) The information consists of names and other information the disclosure of which could reasonably be eXPected to reveal identities of confidential sources. (E) Disclosure would reveal techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or guidelines that could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law. [ { ] (F) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual. D Other I I PART 11.B -- DENYING OFFICIALS In accordance with 10 CFR 9.25(g) and 9.25(h) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, the official(s) listed below have made the determination to withhold certain information responsive to your request APPELLATE OFFICIAL DENYING OFFICIAL TITLE/OFFICE RECORDS DENIED EDD SECY IRochelle Bavol II Exec Asst to Secy to the Commission IIItem 33 I 0 IBernice C Ammon II Asst Gen Counsel for LC Leg & Spec Proj IIItem 27 I 0 IStephanie A. Blaney II FOIA Officer II 11ems 35, 39, and 4 l I0 Appeals must be made in writing within 90 calendar days of the date of this response by sending a letter or email to the FOIA Officer, at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, or FOIA.Resource@nrc.gov. Please be sure to include on your letter or email that it is a "FOIA Appeal." NRC Form 464 Part II (03-2017) Page 1 of 1

i

                                    --L.:      l Public Employees for          E  vlruaent  I     Respnslblllty 2000 P Street, NW* Suite 240

Washin11ton, D.C. 20036
202-265*PEER(7337t
lax: 202*265-4192 1-11111: lntoOpeer.01g
website: www.peer.org July 5, 2013 Ms. Donna L. Sealing FOIA/Privacy Act Officer Office of Infonnation Services U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 CC: Mr. Bill Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations Ms. Linda Kilgore, FOIA/Privacy Act Specialist RE: Appeal From Initial Decision; FOIA/PA-2013-00239

Dear Ms. Sealing:

Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER) hereby appeals the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) JW1e I 0, 2013 response to PEER's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted on May 7, 2013 and assigned reference number FOIAIPA-2013-00239 (see attachment A). PEER's FOIA request seeks records relating to the risk of inundation from dam failure to operating commercial nuclear reactors. Specifically, we requested the following eleven records:

MLI 01900305, Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures (Agency Response "Accession No. ML13039A086");
MLJ 00780084, Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam Risk Analysis (Agency Response "Accession No. ML13039A084");
ML09ll70104, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 And 3 - Non--concurrence on Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC September 26, 2008, Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Letter Dated August 15, 2008 Related to External Flooding (Agency Response "Accession No. MLJ 3106A 168");
MLI O1610083, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units I, 2, and 3, - External Flood Commitments (Agency Response "Accession No. ML101610083");

Field Offices: California

Florida
New England
New Jersey* Refuge Keeper
Rocky Mountain
Southwest
Tennessee
ML081640244, Information Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F) Related to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (TAC Nos. MD8224, MD8225, and MD8226) (Agency Response "Accession no.

MLI2363Al32");

ML081750106, Oconee, Units I, 2 and 3 -Response to 10 CFR 50.54(t) Request 1 (Agency Response "Accession No. MLI2363A129);
ML090570779, Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas September 26, 2008, Response to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam (Agency Response "Accession No. ML12363A133");
MLI I 1460063, Oconee Nuclear Site, Units I, 2, and 3. Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003, dated April 29,2011 (Agency Response "Accession No. MLl 3099A247");
MLI 10740482, Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures;
The 19- page letter from NRC employee Lawrence Criscione to the NRC Chairman dated September 18, 2012; and
The email dated September 18, 2012 from Lawrence Criscione to the NRC Chairman.

NRC acknowledged receipt of PEER's FOIA request ("request") in a letter dated May 7, 2013 (see attachment 8). NRC's partial response ("response"), dated June 10, 2013, includes one complete record, seven partial records, and a statement that three records ..will be addressed in a later response" (see attachment C}. PEER hereby appeals the withholding of responsive material for the following reasons:

l. NRC fails to provide adequate justification for withholding the material or a Vaughn index of the withheld records (or withheld portions)2;

2. NRC fails to satisfy the basic Exemption 7 thresholds;

3. NRC fails to satisfy the specific Exemption 7(F) threshold;

4. NRC fails to explain how a portion of a record could be "outside of scope" of PEER's request;

5. NRC fails to abide by statutory time limits;

6. NRC's previously disclosed records cannot be withheld; and

7. NRC fails to address segregability.

1 Original request listed "ML0S 1750 I 06." Upon review. PEER noticed a possible typo. The original request likely should have read "ML082l750106." However, PEER believes that the correct document was provided in the response. 2 References to "withheld records" are to mean any record withheld in full or in part. 2

1. NRC fails to inform the requester of the reason(s) for denial, justify its withholding, and provide itemized descriptions or a Vaugl,n index of the withheld records.3 As a fundamental matter, NRC withholds many pages of records without providing any context, explanation or description of the withheld infonnation. NRC has simply failed to meet its heavy burden to justify redacting the infonnation. A decision to deny a request must infonn the requester of the reasons for denial. See S U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) (requiring agencies to "immediately notify the [requester] of such detennination and the reasons therefor"). NRC's response is a boilerplate fonn that merely quotes the statutory language. Parroting the statutory language is not a justifiable "reason" for withholding records as it does not demonstrate how the records are properly exempt under FOIA.

Additionally, PEER's request clearly states: For any documents or portions of documents that you block release due to specific exemption(s) from the requirements of the [FOIA], please provide an index itemizing and describing the documents or portions of documents withheld. The index should, pursuant to the holding of Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 [1974]), provide a detailed justification for claiming a particular exemption that explains why each such exemption applies to the document or portion of a document withheld. Despite PEER's written request for descriptions of the withheld information and the statutory requirement to provide "reasons" for withholding infonnation, NRC makes no attempt to provide PEER with such information.

2. NRC fails to satisfy basic EJ:emption 7 threshold requirements because NRC's response fails to indicate its "law enforcement purpose" and fails to identify a law enforcement purpose for which the records were "compiled."4 3 Section 1 applies to all withheld records (or portions) 4 Section 2 applies to all records withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(F)

  - MLIOJ900305, Identification ofa Generic Extemal Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures (Agency Response "Accession No. ML13039A086");
 - ML\00780084, Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam Risk Analysis (Agency Response "Accession No. MLl3039A084");
 - ML091170I04, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units\, 2 and 3 - Non-concurrence on Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC September 26, 2008, Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Letter Dated August 15, 2008 Related lo Extemal Flooding (Agency Response "Accession No. ML13l06A168");
 - ML08 l 640244, Infonnation Request Pursuant to 10 CFR S0.S4(F) Related to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam at Oconee NllClear Station, Units !, 2, and 3 (TAC Nos. MD8224, MD822S, and MD8226) (Agency Response "Accession no. MLJ2363Al32");
 ~ ML081750106, Oconee, Units I, 2 and 3 - Response to 10 CFR50.54(f) Request (Agency Response "Accession No. MLl2363Al29");
 - ML090S70779, Oconee Nuclear Station Units I, 2, and 3, Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas September 26, 2008, Response lo External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam (Agency Response "Accession No. MLJ2363A 133"); and 3

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) ("Exemption 7"), NRC withholds portions of seven requested records. Exemption 7 allows an agency to withhold "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records" fit within one of Exemption Ts six subparts. 5 U.S.C. § 552(bX7)(A)-(F). Accordingly, as a preliminary matter, NRC "must meet the threshold requirements of Exemption 7 before withholding requested documents on the basis of any of its subparts." Pratt v_ Webster, 673 F.2d 408,416 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Exemption 7 threshold requirements involve two steps. First, an agency claiming Exemption 7 must demonstrate that the agency serves a "law enforcement purpose." See Schoenman v. FBI. 575 F. Supp. 2d 136, 163 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that agency "failed to establish" its law enforcement purpose and consequently failed to meet the Exemption 7 threshold requirement). Cf Pratt, 673 F.2d at 414 (stating that "law enforcement purpose" not only describes the type ofagency, but also functions as a condition on the use of the exemption) (internal quotes omitted). NRC's response fails to meet this threshold because the response makes no mention of the agency's "law enforcement purpose" let alone demonstrates that it has one. Even ifNRC could demonstrate a legitimate law enforcement purpose under Exemption 7(F), it would still be subject to a more rigorous standard when evaluating this threshold requirement. Tax Analysts v. IRS, 294 F.3d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2002). While an agency whose primary function is law enforcement must establish only a ..rational nexus" between the records it seeks to withhold and "its authority to enforce a statute or regulation," Abdelfauah v. US. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 186 (3d Cir. 2007), an agency with mixed functions is subject to a more "exacting standard" in showing the coMection between the withheld documents and its law enforcement functions. Tax Analysis, 294 F.3d at 77. Such an agency "must demonstrate that it had a purpose falling within its sphere of enforcement authority in compiling the particular document." Church of Scientology v. Department of the Army, 611 F.2d 738,748 (9th Cir. 1980). NRC has not demonstrated the fundamental requirement of Exemption 7 that it have a "law enforcement purpose," and therefore fails to meet its burden to justify redacting the information. It thus also cannot meet the heightened level of scrutiny applicable to mixed function agencies. Second, an agency claiming Exemption 7 must show that the records at issue were compiled to enforce a statute or regulation within its law enforcement purpose. See Birch v. USPS, 803 F.2d 1206, 1210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (explaining that threshold is met where the agency demonstrates that records were compiled pursuant to the enforcement of laws within the statutory authority of the agency) (emphasis added). NRC fails to satisfy this threshold requirement because it withholds information without any accompanying explanation as to how or why the infonnation was compiled to enforce a statute or regulation within its law enforcement purpose. See Anlonelli v. ATF, 555 F. Supp. 2d 16, 24 (D.D.C. 2008) (ruling in favor of plaintiff-requester where agency attempted to withhold information under Exemption 7 but failed to demonstrate that records were "complied for law enforcement purpose"); United Am. Fin. v. Polter, 531 F. Supp. 2d 29, 46 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that, as threshold matter, agency must explain that records were compiled for law enforcement purposes). Indeed, since

 - ML\ I 1460063, Oconee Nuclear Site, Units I, 2, and 3. Response to Continnatory Action Letter (CAL) 2     003, dated April 29, 2011 (Agency Response "Accession No. MLl3099A247).

4

NRC did not show that it had a law enforcement function, it would be hard to demonstrate that the sought records were specifically compiled for a law enforcement purpose. Some of the sought records are from NRC's research department, which, by its nature is not an enforcement body and thus any records from it cannot be compiled for law enforcement purposes. Other records appear to be Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ("NRR") records, not the Office of Investigations or Office of Inspector General (the NRC arms with plausible law enforcement functions). It is doubtful that the records at issue here were compiled for a specific law enforcement purpose since NRR has not been shown to have a law enforcement purpose to which the records specifically relate. Moreover, the theoretical threat posed to reactors by natural disasters or structural failures outside of NRC jurisdiction are beyond the scope of any law enforcement proceeding. In sum, to properly assert Exemption 7, NRC must provide a specific explanation as to the agency's law enforcement purpose and the specific law enforcement action for which the records were compiled. See Miller v. DOJ, 562 F. Supp. 2d 82, 118 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding Exemption 7 threshold cannot be satisfied when agency neither explains the ..manner and circumstances" under which the records were compiled nor links the records to a law enforcement purpose). For its failure to meet, or even address, any of the Exemption 7 threshold requirements, NRC fails to justify withholding under Exemption 7 and all of its subparts.

3. NRC fails to satisfy the specific thresholds of Exemption 7(F) because it never shows that disclosure "could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual."5 If it satisfies the Exemption 7 threshold requirements, an agency asserting subpart (F) then must demonstrate that disclosure of the records "could reasonably be expected to endanger life or physical safety of any individual." 5 U.S.C. § 552(bX7)(F). Neither NRC's response nor the records it produced even suggest that disclosure of the withheld records "could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual." Id.

For decades, agencies have been relying on the phrase "could reasonably be expected to endanger life or physical safety of any individual" to prevent disclosure of records containing information such as the names and identifying infonnation of witnesses, infonnants, government agents, non-law enforcement federal employees, local law enforcement personnel, and other third persons in connection with particular law enforcement matters. It is difficult to imagine how the records NRC withholds are similar to these examples. Even the NRC website acknowledges that 7(F) does not protect the types of records PEER requests. The website reads as follows: Exemption 7(F): Disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger life or physical security of any individual

Exemption has rarely been used by NRC
Records or infonnation compiled for law enforcement purposes the disclosure of which could endanger the life or physical safety of an individual or individuals,/or instance, where necessary to protect an individual (or group 5 Id. Section 3 applies to the same withheld re(;ords (or portions) listed in footnote 4.

5

of individuals) from possible /,arm by a requester w/10 l,as t/,reatened l1arm in tire past 6 (emphasis added) NRC's response fails to connect the withheld records with any "reasonably Dexpected" danger to the "life or physical safety of any individual." 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(F). NRC "does not need to identify [an endangered] individual by name," but the agency cannot simply "identify an individual only as being a member of a vast population." American Civil Liberties Union v. Dep'I of Defense, 453 F.2d 59, 80 (2d Cir. 2008). NRC even fails to make a conclusory statement asserting that disclosure is reasonably expected endangered individuals. Indeed, PEER guesses that NRC's withholding appears to be based on speculative, abstract and unsubstantiated fears that disclosing the infonnation will somehow aid in terrorist wrongdoing. This does not suffice to justify withholding the infonnation. Furthennore, failing to publicly acknowledge the risks of dam failure and reactor flood inundation risks due to natural hazards puts individuals more at risk ofhann. Because the issue has not been publically acknowledged, it is not getting the adequate level of attention to remedy the problems that may arise, putting the public more at risk.

4. NRC wrongfully withholds records as "outside of (the} scope" of PEER's request.7 NRC withholds portions of two records claiming that the redacted infonnation is ..outside of [the] scope" of PEER's request. Given the language in PEER's request, it is impossible for a record (or portion of a record) to be "outside of [thel scope." PEER's request seeks production of specific records in their entirety (see attachment A). PEER's request provides the "accession number" and title or brief description of each record. It is impossible for a portion of a document or record to "outside of [the I scope" of an entire record.

S. NRC fails to meet its statutory time limit.8 NRC's response fails to address three of the eleven records requested more than two months ago on May 7, 2013. NRC fails to meet the twenty*business day response time that FOIA imposes on agencies. FOIA states that agencies "shall make records promptly available" upon request. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3 )(A). Under FOIA 's administrative appeal provision, a requester may administratively appeal an agency's adverse determination (including agency's 6 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia/foia-request.html#appeals 7 Section 4 applies to the following records with redactions claimed to be "outside of scope"

 - ML0Sl640244, lnfonnation Request Pursuant to 10 CFR S0.54(F) Related to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (TAC Nos. MD8224, MD822S, and MD8226) (Agency Response "Accession no. ML12363A132") (Outside of Scope redaction of page 3); and
 - ML090S70779, Oconee Nuclear Station Units I, 2, and 3, Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas September 26, 2008, Response to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam (Agency Response "Accession No. MLl2363A133") (Outside of Scope, redaction of page 5).

1 Section 5 applies to the three records to which NRC has yet to address:

 - ML110740482, Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures;
 - The 19- page Jetter from NRC employee Lawrence Criscione to the NRC Chainnandated September 18, 2012; and
 - The email dated September 18, 2012 from Lawrence Criscione to the NRC Chainnan.

6

failure to address requested records). 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2). PEER appeals NRC's constructive denial of these records.

6. NRC wrongfully withholds records previously made public:.9 Under FOIA, release to one is release to all. NARA. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157,174 (2004)

(explaining that "once there is disclosure, the infonnation belongs to the general public"). Since filing its request, PEER learned that the NRC fully released record "ML101900305" (Agency Response "Accession No. ML13039A086") in response to a previous FOIA request to another organization. Compare record "ML IO 1900305, Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures" (Agency Response "Accession No. ML13039A086") with

**ML I 3066A429, Email from F. Ferrante, NRR to J. Mitman, NRR on NRR Submittal to GW -

External Flooding Issue (Dam Failures)." Record ML13066A429, the latter, was released to Greenpeace's Jim Riccio on February 6, 2013 in response to FOIA 2012-0325 and remains available on NRC's public website. PEER requests record ML101900305 (Agency Response "Accession No. ML13039A086"), but NRC provides PEER with a redacted version. Although the documents appear slightly different, ML13066A429 is an unredacted version of MLI 01900305 (Agency Response ..Accession No. ML13039A086"), the memorandum PEER requests but that NRC fails to produce in fulI. 10 This record should be fully produced.

7. NRC fails to address segregability. 11 NRC's response fails to make any mention of segregability. FOIA requires that "(aJny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such a record after deletion of the portions which are exempt." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (sentence immediately following exemptions). "The segregability requirement applies to all ... documents and all.,

FOIA Exemptions. Judicial Watch, Inc. V DOJ, 432 F.3d 366,371 (D.C. Cir. 2005). When responding to FOIA requests, agencies are to detennine and explain to the requester whether "any intelligible portion of the contested" redactions can be "segregated for release." Mays 11. DEA, 234 F.3d 1324, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Agencies are required to address segregability "with reasonable specificity" and cannot make assumptions as to the value of withheld information to the requester, no matter how seemingly insignificant the redacted portions may be in the eyes of the agency. Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Group Ltd. V United States, 534 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Furthennore, an agency cannot rely on conclusory assertions to satisfy the segregability requirement. The agency must demonstrate that all reasonably segregable, nonexempt infonnation is properly disclosed. United Am. Fin., Inc. v. Potter, 531 F. Supp. 2d 9 Section 6 applies to record ML IO I 900305, Identification of II Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures (Agency Response "Accession No. ML13039A086"). 10 The only differences are:

l. the first page (i.e. the email from Ferrante to Mitman);

2. the missing July 19, 2010 date at the top of the second page; and

3. the fact that every page is offset by about five lines due to the added da1e to the final version.

From an infonnation standpoint, all the information redacted from MLl3039A036 lo PEER was provided to Greenpeace in MLl3066A429. 11 Section 7 applies to all withheld records. 7

29, 41 (D.D.C. 2008). Without any explanation or discussion of segregability, the responsive records appear to contain arbitrarily deleted swaths of infonnation. Missing Attachment NRC produced 33 pages of record ML081750106, Oconee, Units I, 2 and 3 -Response to IO CFR 50.54(f) Request (Agency Response "Accession No. ML12363A129"). Record ML081750106 should contain four attachments (see attachment D at page 1: "Attachment 4 is a listing of regulatory commitments."), but NRC's production includes only three of the attachments. The final page of the record is a cover sheet for "attachment 4." It is not clear from the production whether attachment 4 was provided, and just did not contain any more information than is there, or whether it was omitted from the production. lf it was omitted, NRC fails to cite a FOIA exemption for the missing attachment. NRC appears to be withholding a requested record without justification. NRC is required to clearly mark all redacted portions (all partially disclosed records) so that the claimed exemption, amount of information, and location of information is readily apparent to the requester. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (paragraph immediately following exemptions). If NRC mistakenly omitted "attachment 4" from production, PEER requests that NRC produce the missing pages at this time. IfNRC is withholding "attachment 4.. pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(F), PEER appeals the withholding. Fee Waiver Finally, PEER appeals NRC's assessment of our fee waiver request as "non-excepted" and appeals the assertions that "although your justification for fee waiver is not adequate, it is unlikely that you will incur any fees" and ..your request for a fee waiver is moot." (see attachment C). NRC failed to explain how PEER's fee waiver was not adequate. PEER believes that its justification is adequate and fee waiver should be granted. The request explains that PEER, a 50l(c)(3) non-profit and tax exempt organization, meets the statutory requirements for a fee waiver. The request dedicates three pages of text to address all eight fee waiver factors listed in 10 CFR 9.41. The request clearly demonstrates that disclosure of the infonnation is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not in the commercial interest of the requester. (see attachment A). Conclusion In his January 21, 2009 memo, President Barack Obama declared the following policy for the Executive Branch:

        "The Freedom of lnfonnation Act should be administered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, opeMess prevails. The Government should not keep information confidential merely because public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears.

8

Nondisclosure should never be based on an effort to protect the personal interests of Government officials at the expense of those they are supposed to serve ... All agencies should adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure, in order to renew their commitment to the principles embodied in FOIA, and to usher in a new era of open Government. The preswnption of disclosure should be applied to all decisions involving FO IA." NRC's claim that the records PEER requests are exempt from full disclosure falls short of meeting the requirements for any FOIA exemption, including 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)_ Consequently, PEER maintains that NRC fails to adequately or properly respond to its FOIA request and is in violation of the Freedom of lnfonnation Act for wrongfully withholding properly requested records. Thank you for the consideration of this appeal.

  .  '/ ,

Sincexly~--- 1

.-~

JjA". ~ Kathryn Douglass Staff Counsel Enclosed Attachments: A. PEER's Original Request B. NRC's Acknowledgement Letter C. NRC's Response D. NRC' s Production of Requested Record ML08I750106 9

Attachment A 4 pages (not including this cover page)

FOIA Resource From: Kit Douglass <kdouglas@peer.org> Sent: Tuesday, May 07, 2013 1:00 PM To: FOIA Resource

Subject:

FOIA request U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission FOIA/Privacy Officer Mailstop: T-5 F09 Washington, DC 20555-0001 May7,20l3 RE: Freedom of Information Act Request VIA EMAIL

Dear FOIA Officer:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, as amended, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER) requests infonnation in the possession of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regarding the risk of inundation from dam failure to operating commercial nuclear reactors. Specifically, we request the following:

l. MLI 10740482, Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures;

2. ML l O1900305, Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures;

3. MLl 00780084, Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam Risk Analysisi

4. ML091 l 70 I 04, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 And 3 - Non-concurrence on Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC September 26, 2008, Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Letter Dated August 1S, 2008 Related to External Flooding; S. ML101610083, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, - External Flood Commitments;

6. ML081640244, Infonnation Request Pursuant to IO CFR 50.54(F) Related to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units l, 2, and 3 (TAC Nos.

MD8224, MD8225, and MD8226);

7. ML08I750106, Oconee, Units I, 2 and 3 - Response to 10 CFR S0.54(f) Request;

8. ML090570779, Oconee Nuclear Station Units l, 2, and 3, Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas September 26, 2008, Response to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam;

9. ML09 l l 70104, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 And 3 - Non-concurrence on Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC September 26, 2008, Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Letter Dated August 15, 2008 Related to External Flooding; I0. ML I 11460063, Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3. Response to Confinnatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003, dated April 29,201 l;

11. The l 9. page letter from NRC employee Lawrence Criscione to the NRC Chairman dated September 18, 2012;and

12. The email dated September 18. 2012 from Lawrence Criscione to the NRC Cbainnan.

PEER requests that all records be provided electronically, preferably via ADAMS, so there should be no duplication necessary. In a January 21, 2009 memo, President Barack Obama declared the following policy for the Executive Branch:

         ..The Freedom of lnfonnation Act should be administered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails. The Government should not keep information confidential merely because public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or because ofspecula1ive or abstract fears. Nondisclosure should never be based on an effort to protect the personal interests ofGovemment officials at the expense of those they are supposed to serve... All agencies should adopt a presumplion in favor of disclosure, in order to renew their commitment to the principles embodied in FOIA, and to usher in a new era or open Government. The presumption of disclosure should be applied to all decisions involving FOIA."

For any documents or portions of documents that you block release due to specific exemption(s) from the requirements of the Freedom of lnfonnation Act, please provide an index itemizing and describing the documents or portions of documents withheld. The index should, pursuant to the holding of Vaughn v. Rosen (484 F.2d 820 [D.C. Cir. J973] gm_,. denied, 415 U.S. 977 [ 19741), provide a detailed justification for claiming a particular exemption that explains why each such exemption applies to the document or portion of a document withheld. PEER requests that all fees be waived because "disclosure of the infonnation is in the public interest ... and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester" (5 U.S.C. 552 (a) (4XA)). We address the eight factors laid out in IO CFR 9. 4 J to c!early demonstrate that disclosure of the infonnation is in the pub Iic interest because it is Iikel y to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the govemmenl and is nol primarily in lhe commercial inte~sl of the requester, as follows: (!) Purpose for which the requester intends to use the requested information; PEER seeks the requested infonnation solely to contribute to and help shape lhe public debate concerning the NRC's role in the regulation of the nuclear industry. The informalion provided by the NRC will be analyzed to evaluale the NRC's effectiveness for responding to Hooding concerns at the Oconee Nuclear Station and similarly vulnerable reactors. (2) Extent to which the requester wiff extract and analyze the substanri11e content of1he agency record; The requested information and the requesters' analysis of the NRC's response to flooding concerns at Oconee and other sites will greatly contribute to the public's understanding of the Commission's role in regulating the nuclear industry. The requested documents detail the NRC's knowledge of these inundation risks as well as its response to those risks. As such, these documents are the most meaningfal indices of how this vital public agency is addressing this e,;tremely serious issue. (3) Nature oflhe specific activity or research in which /he agency records will be used and the specific qualifications the requester possesses to ulilize information/or the intended use in such a way that ii will contribute to public understanding; PEER is national alliance of local state and federal resource professionals. PEER's environmental work is solely directed by the needs of its members. As a consequence, we have the distinct honor of serving resource professionals who daily cast profiles in courage in cubicles across the country. Public employees are a unique force working for environmental enforcement. In the ever-changing tide of pol itica I leadership, these front-I ine employees stand as defenders of the public interest within their agencies and as the first line of defense against the e,;ploitation and pollution of our 2

environment. Their unmatched technical knowledge, long-tenn service and proven experiences make these professionals a credible voice for meaningful refonn. PEER is working with government scientists, engineers and other agency specialists to obtain and analyze what we believe are important agency documents which should- but have not yet- ,cached the public domain.

4) The likely impact on the public's understanding of the subject as compared to the level ofpublic understanding of the subject before disclosure; The vast majority of the documents PEER is requesting have not yet been released outside the NRC and thus the public has little idea of their content. With the context provided-by PEER, these documents would help the public understand in a new. far more detailed way -

The extent of flood inundation risks to American reactors -what reactors are at what level of risk; What has the NRC done about known risks - especially severe risks whose existence has been known for years; and The options available for minimizing or eliminating these risks. These issues are important planks in a larger public debate about the safety and reliability of nuclear-generated power and the professionalism and judgment e"ercised by the key regulatory agency. (5) The size and nature of the public to whose understanding a contribution will be made; The bulk of the requested document consists of a fonnal screening evaluation conducted by a federal regulator (i.e. the NRC) on a potentially serious public safety concern (i.e. the vulnerability of nuclear power plants to flooding due to the failure of upstream darns). Thus, the most directly affected segment of the public will be those living within the evacuation zones of at-risk reactors. Since it is our understanding that the portion of at-risk reactors may be as large as one-third of the nation's nuclear capacity, several to tens of millions of the American public will be vitally concerned with the information contained in the requested documents. Given the potential magnitude of worst-case-scenario consequences outJined in the requested documents, it would not be an exaggeration to say that an U.S. residents will have their understanding of the vulnerabilities outlined within these documents heightened. (6) Intended means of dissemination lo the general public; PEER intends to provide the requested infonnation to the general public through - Release to the news media; Posting on the PEER web page which draws between 1,000 and 10,000 viewers per day; and Publication in PEER's newsletter that has a circulation of approximately 20,000, including 1,500 environmental journalists. Through these methods, PEER generates an average of 1.5 mainstream news articles per day. Moreover, PEER bas repeatedly demonstrated the ability to generate nationwide news coverage concerning activities occurring within federal agencies, such as the NRC. In addition, this topic -without the benefit of all the documents PEER is requesting - has already been the subject of national media coverage. We would anticipate even greater coverage once the requested documents are disclosed. 3

(7) Public access to information will be providedfree ofcharge; and As indicated above. the requested documents will be available to the general public without charge and in the most accessible manner possible. (8) PEER has no commercial or private interest in the agency records sought. Disclosure is in no way connected with any commercial interest of the requestors in that PEER is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public interest organization concerned with upholding the public trust through responsible management of our nation's resources and with supporting professional integrity within public land management and pollution control agencies. To that end, PEER is designated as a tax-exempt organi:zation under section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue code. As detailed above, these documents concern the activities of a federal agency, the NRC; will contribute significantly to public understanding of this agency's operations and activities; and the requester has no commercial interest in their release. Unquestionably, the public interest strongly militates for their full disclosure. If you have any questions about this FOIA request, please contact me at (202) 265-PEER. I look forward to receiving the agency's final response within 20 working days. Sincerely, Kathryn Douglass Staff Counsel Public Employees for Environmental Responsibi)ity (PEER) 2000 P Street, NW Suite 240 Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 265-7337; Fax: (202) 265-4192 Website: www.peer.org 4

Attachment B 1 page (not including this cover page)

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O.C. 20S5S-0001 May 7, 2013 FOIA/PA-2013-00239 Kathryn Douglass Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility 2000 P Street. NW, Suite 240 Washington, DC 20036

Dear Requester:

We received your Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act (FOIA/PA) request on May 7, 2013. Your request has been assigned the following reference number that you should use in any future communications with us about your request: FOIA/PA-2013-00239 To ensure the most equitable treatment possible of all requesters, the NRC processes requests on a first-in, first-out basis, using a multiple track system based upon the estimated time it will take to process the request. Based on your description of the records you are seeking, we estimate completion of your request will take more than 20 working days. We will advise you of any change in the estimated time to complete your request. Due to the unexpected events in Japan in March 2011, the NRC is processing a larger than normal volume of FOIA requests including some that have qualified for expedited processing and have therefore been placed at the front of the queue. We are doing our best to process all requests in a timely manner but our response times are being affected. We appreciate your understanding. For purposes of assessing fees in accordance with our regulations (10 CFR 9.33), we have placed your request in the following category: Non-Excepted. If applicable, you will be charged appropriate fees for: Search and Duplication of Records. Although your justification for a fee waiver is not adequate, it is unlikely that you will incur any fees. Therefore, your request for a fee waiver is moot. The following person is the FOIA/PA Specialist who has been assigned responsibility for your request: Linda Kilgore at 301--415-5775. If you have questions on any matters concerning your FOIAJPA request please feel free to contact the assigned FOIA/PA Specialist or me at (301) 415*7169. Sincerely, ISi Donna L. Sealing FOIA/Privacy Act Officer Office of Information Services

Enclosures:

Incoming Request

Attachment C 3 pages (not including this cover page)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COW.USION FOIM'A RESPONSE NUMBER RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) I PRIVACY ACT(PA)REQUEST RESPONSE TYPE D FtNAL (Z}PARTIAL REQUESTER DATE Kit Douglass JUN 1 9 HI PART I. - INFORMATION RELEASED Requested No additional agency records subjed to the request have been located. r::AAPPEN01Cii""7 records are available through another public distribution program. See Comments section. Agency records subject to the request that are identified in the listed appendices are already available for 0 ~__J public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room. APPENDICES

1 Agency records subject to the request that are identified in the listed appendices are being made available for

_ public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room. Document Room. 11555 Rockville Pike, Rodtville. MD 20852-2738. Enclosed ls information on how you may obtain access lo and the charges for cxipying records located at the NRC Public APPENDICES l_ l Agency records subject to the request are enclosed. referred lo that agency (see comments section) for a disclosure determination and direct response to you. Records subject lo the request that contain information originated by or of interest to another Federal agency have been 0 'Ne are continuing to proce51; your request. See Comments. PART I.A - FEES A~"'1' sl D You will be billed by NRC for the amount listed. D None. Minimum fee threshold not met.

Se~e_co_mme--n,-,~

lotdol1il1 D You will receive a refund for the amount listed. D Fees waived. PART 1.8 - INFORMATION NOT LOCATED OR WITHHELD FROM DISCLOSURE No agency records subjed to the request have been locatecl. For y0\lr information, Congress excluded three discrete calegories of law enforcemenl and national securi\y records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requlrements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist. 0 Certain information in the requested records is being withheld from disclosure pursuant to the exemptions described in end for the reasons stated in Part II. 0 This determination may be appealed within 30 days by writing to lhe FOIA/PA Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Clearly state on the envelope and in the letter that it is a "FOIA/PA Appeal." PART I.C COMMENTS ( Use attached Comments eonttnuatlon page If required) The incoming FOIA request will he available in ADAMS at ML 13127A29S. Records with an ML accession number arc available in the NRC Library at www.nrc.gov/reading-nn/adams.html. For assistance in obtaining any public records, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) at 1-800-397-4209 or by e-mail al PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. Items I. 11 and 12 of your request wil I be addressed in a later response. Please note that items 4 and 9 of your request are duplicates. ,. 1 I JURE

FIOIEEOOU OF IHF"OO f-' Donna L. Sealing

NRC FORM 464 P*rt II U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COI.WISSION FOIA/PA DATE (H0111 RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 2013-0239 JUNtOHI ACT (FOIA) / PRIVACY ACT (PA) REQUEST PART II.A - APPLICABLE EXEMPTIONS l~Pl'ENOICES I Records subject to the reque1t lhel are de&Qlb9d In the endoIed Ap11endices are being withheld in !heir entirety or in part under the Exemplion No.(s} of the PA and/or the FOIA as Indicated below (5 U.S.C. 552a and/or 5 U.S.C. 552(b)). D Exemplion 1: The withheld informallon i& property clasallied pu111uant lo Bi:ecutiv8 Onfer 12958. Exemption 2: The withheld information relales solely to the lnlemal personnel rules and pracllces of NRC. Exempllon 3: "The withheld lnformalior, is specifically e~emptec:l lrom public discJosu,e by statute incliceted. Sections 141-145 of lhe A!omlc Energy Acl, which prohibits lhe disclosure ,:,f Restllcled Data or Formelly Restlic:led Data (42 U.S.C. 2161-2165). Section-147 of the Atomic; Energy ACI, which prohibits the dbdos11re of Unclalsified Safeguards lnformatron (42 U.S.C. 2167}. 41 U.S.C .* Section 253b, subsection (m)(1 ), prohibits the disdosure of contraCIOI' proposal$ in the posse&Sion and control of an execulille agency to ;iny per.on under secdon 552 ofTitle 5, U.S.C. (the FOIA), except when incorporated lnto the contrad between the llgency and the submitter of the proposal. 0 Exemption 4: The wlthheld information is a trade secret or commerclsl or financial lnfofTYlalion that is being withheld for the reason(s} Indicated. 0 The information Is considered to be confidential business (proprietary} lnlonna!lon. The information is considered to be propnelary because It concel11$ a Hcensae's or applicant's physk:al prolection or material oonlrol and accounting program for apeclal n11cleer malerial pUl'luanl lo 10 CFR 2.390(d){1 ). 0 The lnlormallon was submitted by a foreign source and 111<:E:ived in confidenoe purauant lo 10 CFR 2.390(d)(2). 0 Disclosure wll harm an ldenOliable private or gowmmantal lntarHI. Exemption 5: The wllhheld infonnetion conSisls of lnteragency OJ intraaaenc:y records that are not available through discovery during litigation. App!ltable prlvileges: OeHberatlve process: Dt1cl0511f8 of predeclsional information would tend lo inhibit 1119 open and frank exdlange of ideas essential to Ille deliberallw process. \Nhare records are withheld In their entirety. the lads are inextricably inlertwined with lhe predeclsional Information. There also are no reesonably &egregable faclual portions because the release of Ille facts would permit an indirecl inquiry into lhe predecisional process ofthe agency. 0 Attorney worll-producl privilege. {Documents prepared by an attorney in contemplation of ~Hgation) O Attomey-d!ent pltvilege. (Conlldential communications between an attorney and his/her dienl) Exempllon 6; The withheld information is exampled from public dlsclo&ure because its disclosure would te&ull in a clearly unwarranted D invasion of personal privaey. 0 E,cemption 7: The withheld Information consists of records COITlpiled for law enforcement purposes and is being wilhheld for the reasor,{s) indicaled. (A) Disclosure could reasonably be expeded to interfere with an enforcement proceeding (e.g., it would reveal lhe sc;ope, direction, and locus of enforcement affom, end thU6 could pouibly aftow recipients to take action to shield pote11tial wrong doing or a violalior, or NRC requirements from Investigators). (C} Disclosure could constitule an unwarranted Invasion of personal pnvacy. (0) The inlonnation consists of names of individ~ls and Other lnfonnalion the disdcsure of which could reasonably be expected to reveal idenUlies of cunfidenllal soLKoes. 0 (E) Disclosure would ,e,..al techniques and proc:edu,es for law anforcernenl investigations or prosecutions, or guidelines that could reasonably be expected to nsk circumvenllon of the law. It] (f') Oisdosare could reasonably be expected lo endanger Che Hie or physical safety of an individual. OTHER (Spedfy) I PART 11.B - DENYING OFFICIALS Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.25(g~ 9.25(h), and/or 9.65(b) Of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, it has been determine-Cl that the information withhelo is exempt from production or disclOsure, and !fiat its production or disclosure is contrary to the public interest. The person responsible for lhe denial are those officials identified below as denying officials and the FOINPA Officer for any denials that may be appealed to the Executive Director for Operatlon5 (EDO). APPELLATE OFFICIAL DENYING OFFICIAL TITLE/OFFICE RECORDS DENIED E0O SECY IG Victor McCree Regional Administrator See Appendix A-8 0 D Eric J. Leeds Director, NRR See Appendix A-1,3,5,6,7 0 D Appeal must be made in writing within 30 days of receipt of this response. Appeals should be mailed to the FOIA/Privacy Act Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, for action by lhe appropriate appellate official(s). You should clearly state on tile envelope and letter that it is a "FOIA/PA Appeal:' NRC FORM 464 PIii'! II {lt-2011)

Re: FOIA-2013-0239 APPENDIX A RECORDS ALREADY AVAILABLE IN THE PDR NO. ACCESSION NO. DATE DESCRIPTIONl(PAGE COUNT) 1 ML13039A086 07/19/10 Memorandum to Benjamin Beasley, RES from Lois James, NRR,

Subject:

Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures (9 pages) Exemption 7F 2 ML13039A084 03/15/10 Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam (15 pages) Exemption 7F 3 ML13106A168 04/27/09 Non-Concurrence Process on Evaluation of Duke September 26, 2008 Response Related to External Flooding at Oconee (19 pages) Exemption 7F 4 ML101610083 06/03/10 Oconee Nuclear Station - External Flood Commitments {5 pages) 5 ML12363A132 08/15/08 Information Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(1) Related to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (5 pages) Exemption 7F 6 ML12363A129 09/26/08 Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3- Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request (33 pages) Exemption 7F 7 ML12363A133 04/30/09 Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolina September 26, 2008, Response to 10 CFR 50.554{f}, Letter (5 pages) Exemption 7F 8 ML13099A247 04/29/11 Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, 3, Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003 (16 pages) Exemption 7F

Attachment D (pages 2 - 32 omitted) 2 pages (not including this cover page)

~Dulre DIIVE &U'JrR Jib P1"ide,,t tc7Energy._ 0.:-Nur.le*rll*I.;.,. Oll!f liteti, ColJM,ffwl tHiOIVPJ7flrJO Rarllener H/rllnf Sfntt11, $C 29611 16**115*4410 86f--H5420I tu d*llllllf@v'IIQf~,nim September 26,2008

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Dc?eument Control Desk Wa~hington. D. C. 20555-0001

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Ocom,c Nuclear Sile, Units 1. 2, and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License, DPR-38, DPR-47, arid DPR-55; Doc::kel Numbers 50-269, S0-270, and S0*287 Response to t OCFR SO.S4(f) Request

Reference:

NRC Letter from Joseph 0. Glitter to Dave Baxter, "INFORMATION REQUEST PURSUANT TO 10 CFR S0.54(f) RELATED TO EXTERNAL FLOODING, INCLUDING FAIT.URE OF THE JOCASSBB DAM, AT OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNJTS I, 2, AND 3, {TA' NOS. MD8224, MD822S, MD8226)". dated August 15, 2008

 * 'Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC*(Duke) hereby provides our n:sponse to the reft~nced letter re(ll!ived on August 15, 2008. This letter requested infonnation be provided 10 the NRC pU!$uant lo the provision.s of 10 CFR 50.54(f) regarding c:xlemal flood i::onRquences al the Oconee site re11uJtiog from a failure oC-the .Jocusee dam. The letter focused on three specific questions to be addressed in writing within 45 calendar d1ys.following its receipt.
  .Attac:hmcnl l provides general information related to the design, consliuction, and operation of the Jocusee Project along with a discussion oflhe Oconee external tloodine licensing buis histoI)'. Attaehment 2 provides the Duke response to lhe three specific questions pqscd in the Augusc IS letter. Attai::hment 3 discusses c::um:nt and plilDlled actions, while Anachmcnt 4 is a listing of regulatory comrnitment:i being  made: as a resull ofthis response,

AITACH~ENT 4 REGULATORY COMMITMENTS

Criscione, Lawrence From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Thursday, June 13. 2013 10:30 AM To: Macfarlane, Allison Cc: Vrahoretis. Susan

Subject:

Your Reputation Attachments: POP for Dam Related FOIA Releases.doc Chairman Macfarlane, IL- - - - -- - - - - - ------------------- ---:--/As ;6115) far as the public is concerned, these individuals are nameless bureaucrats. Yours is the name on the letter . Any redactions applied to it

will be assumed to have been made with your blessing. Any delay in the release of that letter !which is already 7 months overdue) will be assumed to have come from your indecision. These things might not be fair, but they are some of the costs which come with the burdens and privileges of leadership. You have a duty to keep the American public openly informed about potential liabilities to their health and safety from commercial nuclear reactor plants You also have a duty to safeguard sensitive information that might be damaging to the security of our nation's reactor plants. Sometimes these duties might conflict. b)!.51 Hopefully you recognize that t he above information is vitally important for the American public to make an Informed decision as to whether or not the risks posed to nuclear reactor plants b y upstream dam failures is being adequately evaluated and addressed. And hopefully you recognize that this Information should be shared with the American public. There are some within NRR and RES who agree with me that the above information should be shared with the public. However, there are some who disagree. These people claim that the above three items could be helpful to terrorists. If we must withhold any and aU information that might be helpful to a terrorist, then we will fatally impact our ability to be an open and transparent regulator. A terrorist wishing to fly a plane into the Empire State Building would find the flight schedules posted on Southwest Airline's website to be beneficial in determining the optimum plane to hi-jack for their mission, but hopefully you recognize it as ludicrous for the FAA to demand that Southwest Airlines pull down their flight schedules. A line must be drawn somewhere. With regard to nuclear reactor plants, a line has been drawn. It was drawn with Sections 141-145 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data 142 U.S.C. 2161-2165). And it was drawn with Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Unclassified Safeguards Information 142 U.S.C. 2167) . The above three items (i.e. dam failure probabilities, specifics of nuclear power events caused by dam fatlure, and flood elevations resulting from dam failure) fall outside of that line. That is, there is no legal requirement for withholding the above three items from the American public.

It is my position that some personnel in NRR, RES and NSIR are caving in to what President Obama termed "speculative or obstroct fears" in his January 21, 2009 memo on the freedom of Information Act. That is, they are allowing speculative or abstract fears regarding terrorist targeting concerns of dams to prevent the NRC from openly sharing with the American public grave safety concerns regarding the vulnerability of NRC regulated nuclear reactor plants to dam failures from natural disasters. It is your decision as to how my 2012-09-18 letter to you is redacted. I believe you have no legal requirement to redact anything from it and, under the Freedom of Information Act and under President Obama's inauguration day memo on the FOIA, you have an ob!lgation to release the letter unredacted. Whatever decision you make will reflect on your personal reputation and will have no bearing on the reputations of the nameless (i.e. nameless to the public) bureaucrats in NRR, RES, NSIR and OGC who advised you. If you would like to meet with me to discuss these matters, I am open to meet with you any time this week or next. Very respectfully, Larry Criscione Reliability & Risk Engineer RES/ORA/OEGIB From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Monday, June 10, 2013 9:35 AM To: Monninger, John; Correia, Richard; Beasley, Benjamin Cc: Kim, Grace; Pearson, Laura; Rothschild, Trip; Donnell, Tremaine; Albert, Michelle; Hirsch, Pat; Wilson, George; Boska, John; Ammon, Bernice; Kilgore, Linda; Cook, Christopher; Coe, Doug; Kauffman, John; NTEU, Chapter 208; Sullivan, Randy; Ferrante, Fernando; Mitman, Jeffrey; ODonneU, Edward; Perkins, Richard subject:!(b)(5) I Rich/John, (b ) I do not expect my input to have much weight on your decisions. But tor what it's worth, my opinion on how to address my outstanding appeals is to follow the President 's (i.e. January 21. 2009) and Attorney General's (i.e. March 19. 2009) guidance that "The Freedom of Information Act should be administered with o clear presumption: In the face ofdoubt, openness prevails" and, recognizing the doubt inherent by the necessity of requiring!(bJt5J Llet openness prevail and release the documents l seek without redaction. The purpose of this email, however, is not to suggest to ou how to handle current! (b)lSI ~ - but rather to provide you my input regarding ...rb_1<_s 1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __, In its wisdom, Congress provided within the freedom of Information Act a solution for the withholdlng of informatioh which the NRC believes to be useful to enemies of the United States. That solution is Exemption 3: (3) speofically exempted from disclosure by s tatute (other than section 552b of this title), if that statute-(A) (i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or (ii) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; and (BJ if enacted after the dare of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, specifically cites to this paragraph.

What Congress intended for the NRC to do with regard to udam failure probabilities, specifics of nuclear power events caused by dam failure, and flood elevations resulting from dam failure" was NOT for mid level public servants (e.g. Boska and Wilson) to subjectively decide that this important information (i.e. important for the public to assess the risks associated with their local nuclear power plant) cannot be released to the public, but rather for the NRC to come to the Congress with the request for a specific statute authorizing the withholding of the supposed security sensitive information . Then, through open legislative processes, for the Congress to decide the merits of withholding the security sensitive information against the benefits from having open access to this important SAFElY related information. Congress would undoubtedly put some restriction on the withholding of the information (e.g. very specifically defining what falls under the statute, clear criminal penalties for the unauthorized release of the information) which would ensure that it is well understood as to precisely what must be withheld under the statute and by whose authority. My suggesting for going forward is for the NRC to petition Congress to provide an "Exemption 3 statute" regarding (1) Dam failure probabilities, (2) Specifics of nuclear power events caused by dam failure, and (3) Flood elevations resulting from dam failure. If the NRC is unwilling to do t his, then I believe we must ask ourselves "why?". If this information truly affects public safety and security, then it deserves a specific statute. If we are unwilling to request a statute, it might be because the real reason we are withholding this information is "because public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears" . My other suggestion going forward ls to require portion marking on all documents designated Official Use Only" or some other designation limiting public disclosure. It is unfair to the NRC staff to have to sort through OUO documents and, individually with fractured guidance (see ML12313A059 for examples) decide what is and what is not DUO. Rather what should be occurring is the person designating the document DUO should portion mark each paragraph which contains OUO and each paragraph which does not contain any OUO. Documents should be designated so that it is precisely clear to the reader what parngraphs cannot be released and what paragraphs are fully releasable. I am available to!ib ..._)_ ! (5J_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ if you believe my input would be beneficial. V/r, Larry Lawrence S Cnsc1one Rcllab1 lity & Ris~ l::nginw RESIDRAIOEGIB C:hur(h Street Bu1l!lmg Mall Stop :?A07 (]01}2,1-7(,0] 3

(b)(5) UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, 0 .C. 20555.0001 OFFICE Of THE GENERAL COUNSEL June 13, 2013 Lawrence S. Criscione Sent electronically to LSCriscione@hotmail.com

Dear Mr. Criscione:

Thank you for your recent correspondence. The General Counsel referred your letter, dated May 24, 2013, to me for a response. I am the Assistant General Counsel for the division within the Office of the General Counsel that is responsible for providing legal advice on the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). We appreciate hearing your concerns regarding the agency's obligations under FOIA and with regard to your FOIA requests and appeals. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission {NRC) and the NRC's Office of the General Counsel take very seriously the agency's responsibilities under FOIA. We strive to respond to FOIA requests and appeals within the prescribed time limits, and to promote the principles of transparency and openness in response to FOIA requests and appeals. The NRC as a whole is putting forth significant efforts to respond to the many related FOIA requests and appeals that you have submitted, and this requires coordinating among multiple offices within the NRC to ensure that we are taking a consistent approach. If you need any additional information, please contact me or the member of my staff most familiar with this matter, MicheHe Albert, at 301-415-1607 Sincerely,

                                                     --{Jaffi---9(?1_._J/__

Patricia K. Hirsch cc: Allison M. Macfarlane, Chairman Hubert T. Bell, Inspector General Margaret M. Doane, General Counsel Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary of the Commission R. William Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations Darren Ash, Chief Freedom of Information Act Officer James Flanagan, Director of the Office of lnfonnation Services Donna Sealing, FOIA/Prlvacy Act Officer

Criscione, Lawrence From: Lawrence Criscione <lscriscione@hotmail.com> Sent: Friday, May 24, 2013 2:24 AM To: CHAIRMAN Resource; Bell, Hubert; Doane, Margaret; Vietti-Cook, Annette; Borchardt. Bill; Ash, Darren; Sealing, Donna; Zobler. Marian; Grodin, Maryann; Lee, David; Vrahoretis, Susan; FOIA Resource Cc: Billie Garde; Scott Hodes; Louis Clark; jruch@peer.org; Dave Lochbaum; Jim Riccio; paul@t imes.org; Tom Zeller; Carl Stelzer; Paul Blanch; Kay Drey; Joe Carson; Sullivan, Randy; clerner@osc.gov; cmcmullen@osc.gov; Galloway, Melanie; Ferrante, Fernando; Mitman, Jeffrey; Perkins, Richard; Bensi, Michelle; Philip, Jacob; Sancaktar, Selim; NTEU, Chapter 208; tomd@whistl eblower.org; sshepherd@cliffordgarde.com; kdouglas@peer.org

Subject:

Inquiry Regarding Overdue FOJA Appeals 2013-004A, 006A, 009A, OlOA. 011A & 013A Attachments: Inquiry for FOIA Appeal 2013-004A, 006A, 009A, 010A, 011A and 013A.pdf

Dear Dr. Macfarlane,

Mr. Bell, Ms. Doane, Ms. Vietti-Cook, Mr. Borchardt, Mr. Ash and Ms. Sealing: The NRC has not been living up to its legal obligations under the Freedom of Information Act. All of you have a role in ensuring the NRC staff meets it obligations under the FOIA so please do not ignore the attached letter by merely panning it off to the Inspector General as a so-called "allegation". I know you are busy individuals who have much more on your plate than my concerns, but the Freedom of Information Act is federal law and this issue is worthy of review by someone on your staff. If you or any of your staff would like to discuss these matters with me, I would welcome the opportunity to schedule an "open door" meeting. V/r, Larry Criscione 573-230-3959 "If responsibility is rightfully yours, no evasion, or ignorance, or passing the blame can shift the burden to someone else." From: Jsuiscione@hotmail.com To: donna.sealing@nrc.gov; bill.borchardt@nrc.gov; darren.ash@nrc.gov CC: bpgarde@cliffordgarde.com; sshepherd@cliffordgarde.com; louisc@whistleblower.org; linda.kilgore@nrc.gov; gerald.mcclellan@nrc.gov; laura.pearson@nrc.gov; paul@times.org; dlochbaum@ucsusa.org; tom@huffingtonpost.com

Subject:

RE: ln.quiry Regarding FOIA Appeals 2013-004A, OOSA, 006A & 007A Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2013 16:31:01 -0400

Donna, Thank you for the reply below and for the release of MLlOI730329 earlier today.

! am in the process of looking for an attorney to assist me in my attempts to get the following documents released in their entirety:

ML081640244
ML090570779
ML091170104
ML100780084
ML101610083
ML101900305
ML110740482
ML111460063
My 2012-09-18 letter to the NRC Chairman
My 2012-09-18 email to the NRC Chairman The above documents were provided by me to several congressional offices in 2012 in failed attempts to get the NRC Chairman and our oversight committees interested in questioning the NRC's effectiveness in addressing the flooding issues posed by Jocassee Dam. I am currently being investigated by the Office of the Inspector General to determine if enough evidence exists to indict me for felony charges under 18 USC §1030 for providing the above "Official Use Only" documents ta Congressional staffers. It is unfathomable to me that the NRC's OlG would threaten me with a felony indictment while engaging in the protected activity of bringing safety concerns to members of Congress just because the documents delivered were designated "Official Use Only" by mid-level staffers in NRR - but that is the position where I currently find myself.

I have significant concerns with the commitment the NRC has to Open Government. I would like the NRC to formally admit that the documents listed above should be publicly released (formally admit by either releasing these documents via a FOIA request or voluntarily}. If I cannot get the NRC to release the above listed documents publicly, then I intend to have a federaT°judge rule that these documents should be publicly released. I believe that, to a large extent, the NRC has beer "stonewalling" on this issue. t believe that the documents listed above were inappropriately marked "Officral Use Only" and withheld from the public for years. I believe these documents were then inappropriately deliye~ and withheld when requested by Paul Koberstein under FOIA 2012-0106, FOIA 2012-0127 and FOIA 2012-.0128. Similarly, I believe that Dave Lochbaum (FOIA 2013-0008) and Tom Zeller (FOIA 2013-0013) have experienced inappropriate delays. Based on your assurance in the email below that Appeals 2013-004A, OOSA and 006A are in process, I will forgo filing a Federal suit until May 13, 2013. ** I recognize that the FOlA staff has limited control over what is released and its timeliness and I appreciate the efforts being made by your staff to respond to requests in a timely manner. But I can no longer accept continued tardiness on the part of the Office of the General Counsel, the Office of Chairman, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the Office of the Inspector General. Open Government is part of our mission and dedicating resources to review and release documents is something we must do. Again, based on your assurances below, I am willing to wait until May 13, 2013 before filing a suit in Federal District Court in accordance with the appeals process outlined in 10 CFR §9.29(c). Please, however, do not delay in processing my appeals. I currently meet the requirements to continue to federal court (20 working days) and am agreeing to delay that step in an attempt to be agreeable. Please also attempt to be agreeable 2

with me and have my appeals processed as quickly as possible and not arbitrarily wait until May 13th. I am far from the only person interested in these documents and NRR should have been releasing them all along. Thank you, Larry From: Donna.Sealing@nrc.gov To: lscriscione@hotmail.com; Bill.Borchardt@nrc.gov; Darren.Ash@nrc.gov CC: bpgarde@cliffordgarde.com; sshepherd@cliffordgarde.com; louisc@whistleblower.org; Linda. Kilgore@nrc.gov; Gerald.McClellan@nrc.gov; Laura.Pearson@nrc.gov Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2013 15:15:36 -0400

Subject:

RE: Inquiry Regarding FOIA Appeals 2013-004A, OOSA, 006A & 007A Good Afternoon Mr. Criscione, I would like to provide you an update on the status of your FOIA appeals: 2013-004A- the records are being re-reviewed by the program office. We anticipate receiving them today or Monday. Following our review and action the records will be sent to OGG for concurrence. 2013-00SA - the records have been re-reviewed by the program office and OGG. Further coordination is ongoing. 2013-006A - the records have been re-reviewed by the program office and OGC. Further coordination is ongoing. 2013-007A- Complete. The response was sent to you today_ Please know that the FOIA office is processing your appeals as quickly as possible. Donna Sealing From: Lawrence Criscione [mailto: lscriscione@hotmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, April 03, 2013 12:38 AM To: Borchardt, Bill; Sealing, Donna; Ash, Darren Cc: Billie Garde; sshepherd@cliffordgarde.com; Louis Clark; Kilgore, Linda; McOellan, Gerald

Subject:

Inquiry Regarding FOIA Appeals 2013-004A, 00SA, 006A & 007A Please see the attached letter. It has been 26 working days since the NRC acknowledged receipt of FOIA Appeals 2013-004A, 2013-00SA, 2013-006A and 2013-007A. To my knowledge, I have neither received a response to these appeals nor received notice that the NRC would need longer than 20 working days to provide a response. The next step in the process provided in 10 CFR §9.29(c) is to sue in Federal District Court in order to obtain the requested documents in an unredacted form. I intend to retain an attorney and file a lawsuit in Federal District Court. Please confirm for me that the NRC has neither responded to the FOIA Appeals mentioned above nor provided me notice that you require more 3

than 20 working days due to exceptional circumstances. If you have either responded to these FOIA Appeals or sent me notice of exceptional circumstances, then please provide me those letters via email. Thank you, Larry Criscione 573-230-3959 4

Friday, May 24, 2013 1412 Dial Court Springfield, ll 62704 Allison Macfarlane, Chairman Hubert Bell, Inspector General Margaret Doane, General Counsel Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary of the Commission Bill Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations (EDO) Darren Ash, Chief Freedom of Information Act Officer Donna Sealing, FOIA/Privacy Act Officer United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Overdue FOIA Appeals 2013-004A, 2013-00GA, 2013-009A, 2013~010A, 2013-0llA, and 2013-0BA

Dear Dr. Macfarlane,

Mr. Bell, Ms. Doane, Ms. Vietti-Cook, Mr. Borchardt, Mr. Ash and Ms. Sealing: As of today the NRC is overdue on providing me a response to six separate freedom of Information Act appeals encompassing 13 specific documents and, in the case of appeal FOIA 20l3-013A, an as yet unspecified amount of correspondence between the NRC and other federal agen~es. On February 23, 2013 I submitted appeals for the following FOIA requests:

FOIA 2013-0107 regarding ML081640244, ML082750106, ML090570779,"ML091380424, ML092020480
FOIA 2013-0109 regarding ML110740482 On February 26, 2013 the NRC assigned the following tracking numbers to my appeals:
FOIA 2013-004A for the appeal for FOIA request 2013-0107
FOIA 2013-00GA for the appeal for FOIA request 2013-0109 As of today, I have been waiting over twelve weeks (63 working days) for a response.

On March 29, 2013 I submitted appeals for the following FOIA requests:

FOIA 2013-0126 regarding ML111460063, ML100780084, ML101610083, ML101900305
FOIA 2013-0127 regarding my 19-page 2012-09-18 letter and email to the NRC Chairman
FOIA 2013-0128 regarding Ml091170104 That same day, the NRC assigned the following tracking numbers to my appeals:
FOIA 2013-009A for the appeal for FOIA request 2013-0126
FOIA 2013-0lOA for the appeal for FOIA request 2013-0127
FOIA 2013--0llA for the appeal for FOlA request 2013-0128 As of today, I have been waiting nine weeks (45 working days) for a response.

On April 25, 2.013 I submitted an appeal for the following FOIA request: FOIA 2013-0129 regarding correspondence between the NRC and other federal agencies concerning the redactions made to the Gl-204 Screening Analysis Report That same day, the NRC assigned my appeal the following tracking number: FOIA 2013-0BA for the appeal for FOIA request 2013-0129 Per 10 CFR §9.29(c) the NRC was supposed to provide me a response within 20 working days. As of today it has been 21 working days (over four weeks) and yet I have not received a response. Under e,cceptional circumstances, the NRC is allowed to take 30 working days to answer my appeals. I have not heard from the NRC invoking any exceptional circumstances and I do not believe any exceptional circumstances apply. On April 5, 2013 I received the following updates from the NRC concerning some of my appeals:

FD/A 2013-004A - the records ore being re-reviewed by the program office. We anticipate receiving them today or lv1onday [April 8, 2013). Following our review and action the records will be sent to OGC for concurrence.
FD/A 2013-006A - the records have been re-reviewed by the program office and the Office of General Counsel (OGC). Further coordination is ongoing.

It has now been seven weeks (35 working days) since I received the update above, yet I have not had my appeal answered. Why is the NRC's Office of the General Counsel stonewalling my attempts to get records through the FOIA appeals process? It is the job of the NRC's General Counsel to advise the agency on following the law, not on how to skirt our legally mandated requirements. Today, I have reached the point where, under the NRC's regulations and pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, my next step is to sue in federal court to obtain unredacted copies of the following documents:

ML081640244, Information Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F) Related to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (TAC Nos.

MD8224, MD8225, and rv108226)

M LOB2750106, Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Response to 10 CFR 50.54(/) Request
ML090570779, Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas September 26, 2008, Response to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam
ML091380424, Oconee Nuclear Station, Slides for Closing rvleeting May ll, 2009 with Duke on the Oconee Flooding Issue
ML092020480, Oconee, Units 1, 2, & 3, Final 60-Day Response to Reference 2
ML110740482, Analysis Report far the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites Fallowing Upstream Dom Failures
ML111460063, Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3. Response to Confirmatory Action letter (CAL) 2-10-003, doted April 29, 2011
Ml100780084, Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dom Risk Analysis
ML101610083, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, - External Flood Commitments
ML101900305, Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due ta Potential Dam Failures
ML091170104, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 And 3- Non-concurrence on Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, UC September 26, 2008, Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Letter Dated August 15, 2008 Related to External Flooding
ML12312A402, my 19-page 2012-09-18 letter to the NRC Chairman
my 2012-09-18 email to the NRC Chairman
all written correspondence and the notes of any phone calls or meetings between the NRC and other federal agencies (OHS, FERC USACE, lVA, and FEMA) concerning the redactions which were done to ML112430114 to enable it to be released publicly as ML113500495 On April 23, 2013 I met with a FOIA attorney, Scott Hodes, regarding the feasibility of suing the NRC in order to obtain the release of unredacted versions of the documents above. After reviewing my appeals, he informed me that I had a strong case in terms of getting the requested documents released without redactions. But he also informed me that it was unlikely I would be found to be "Entitled" to recovery of attorney's fees since I am a mere private citizen. And he estimated his fees at between

$3,000 and $9,000. Last year, my wife endured $193,000 in medical treatments combating breast cancer. Although I am only liable for a fraction of that, I am in no way flush with cash. $3,000 is twice the amount my wife would like to spend on a new sofa- something we've put off due to medical bills. $9,000 is the estimate we received for a new roof. How do you think my wife feels about me spending $3k to $9k on a FOIA lawsuit in the name of Open Government and the greater public good? How do you think she feels about me suing the NRC- my employer whom I rely on for healthcare? We have kids in private high school, college and medical school who require our money. I am sure you have calculated that, like most Americans, I can ill afford to squander my meager resources on a FOIA lawsuit. And, although I might have a strong case, since I am unwilling to spend the money pursuing it, you have nothing to fear from your abuse of federal law. But that does not make it right. You have a duty under the Freedom of Information Act to promptly either release unredacted versions of the documents requested or to provide the rationale for the exemptions you have cited as the bases for your redactions. In September 2012 I provided ten of the documents listed above (ML081640244, ML090570779, ML091170104, ML100780084, ML101610083, Mll01900305, ML110740482, ML111460063, my 19-page 2012-09-18 letter, and my 2012-09-18 email to the Chairman) to the US Special Counsel and to the staffs of about two d1;,zen members of Congress. Since these ten documents are considered by the NRC to contain "Official Use Only- Security-Related Information" I am currently being investigated by the NRC's Office of the Inspector General to determine if there is evidence which warrants charging me with a federal felony 1 for gathering these documents and releasing them outside of the agency. ' 18 USC§ 1030, The Computer fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 as modified by the USA PATRIOT Act

It should be noted that, according to the NRC, "Official Use Only" is on unofficial administrative marking that has no legal import, and only serves os an alert that the document should be reviewed before release in response to o FOIA request or other public disclosure and it is not indicio of any national security c/assification. 2 Yet the NRC's Office of the Jnspector General is nonetheless seeking who in the US Congress released the ten "Official Use Only" documents mentioned above to Green Peace. "Transparency" is not merely a word in the NRC's mission statement; "Transparency" is a vital ingredient for the credible regulation of our nation's national nuclear enterprise. Jt is important to me that the NRC recognizes the documents I gave to the Congressional staffers - and which subsequently ended up on a public web-page of the Huffington Post-were documents which should have always been available to the public. It is important to me that the NRC recognizes that our correspondence with licensees concerning significant safety hazards (e.g. a "Fukushima-style" accident in South Carolina due to a catastrophic dam failure) is something the American public should have been made aware of. For that reason, I have requested these documents under the Freedom of Information Act and, when I received redacted versions of the documents, I have filed appeals. The NRC has a duty to ensure truly security sensitive information does not inadvertently get disclosed to the public. In this letter I am not writing you to appeal your decision to make redactions to the information you released to me under my FOIA requests. I am writing to you to criticize your stonewalling. By law, you have a right to exempt from release material which you believe is exempted under the freedom of Information Act. And by NRC regulations, I have a right to administratively appeat your decisions and. within 20 working days, either be provided the documents sought or be notified of the denial, explaining the exemptions relied upon and how the exemption5 apply to the agency records withheld. 3 I am writing you to bring it to your attention that the NRC has not, within the time frame prescribed by the Freedom of Information Act and our own regulations, provided me an explanation for the exemptions applied to my Freedom of Information Act requests. There are some who will claim that the time frames prescribed by the Freedom of Information Act are unrealistic. There is certainly some truth to this when one considers large FOIA requests. However, exceptional circumstances do not apply to my FOIA requests or their appeals since the number of documents requested are within a reasonable scope to be located and reviewed within the 20 working days prescribed in the Freedom of Information Act. There is no reason that my appeals have not yet been closed. Consider the following: FOIA Appeal 2013-004A: This appeal was submitted 63 working days ago and entails five documents. Two of the documents (ML081640244 and ML090570779) are correspondence from the NRC to Duke Energy. ML081640244 was released as ML12363A132 and had partial redactions in four paragraphs. ML090570779 was released as ML12363Al33 and had full or partial redactions in seven paragraphs. Two of the documents (ML082750106 and ML092020480} are correspondence from Duke Energy to the NRC. Although Duke Energy requested that this correspondence be withheld per 10 CFR § 2.390, none of the redactions in these documents pertained to proprietary information (Exemption 4) but rather all the redactions concerned information thought to be security 2 November 15, 2012 response from the NRC to the Union of Concerned Scientists denying FOIA request 2013-0034. 3 10 CFR § 9.29

related. Therefore, the decision to release this information on appeal did not need to be re-confirmed with Duke Energy since it was already determined that none of the redactions contained proprietary information. ML082750106 was released as ML12363A129 and had five paragraphs redacted. ML092020480 was released as ML12363Al3~ and had redactions in three paragraphs. One of the documents (M L091380424) is a slide show presented by Duke Energy to the NRC. As they do with all their correspondence, Duke Energy requested that the slide show be withheld per 10 CFR § 2.390. And as with the correspondence, the NRC did not find anything in the slide show that was proprietary. All the exemptions concerned information thought to be security related (i.e. Exemption 7(fl was the only exemption claimed). ML091380424 was released as lv'iL12363Al34 and had redactions on seven of the slides. For all the redactions mentioned in the paragraphs above, Exemption 7(f) was claimed. So appeal FOIA 2013-004A concerned just one exemption applied to five documents in 2.5 separate places. Had the NRC been willing to take the time to review just one redaction every working day, we would have only taken 25 worklng days to process my appeal; as of today it has been 62 working days. It is not a lack of manpower or time which has caused FOIA 2013-004A to be 8 weeks overdue; it is a lack of respect at the N RC for the legal requirements of the Freedom of Information Act. FOIA Appeal 2013-006A: This appeal was submitted 63 working days ago and entails one document: ML110740482, the initially-routed version of the Analysis Report for the Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites Folfowing Upstream Dam Failures which was authored by Richard Perkins, Shelby Bensi, Jake Philip and Selim Sancaktar. The minimally-revised final version ofthis report (ML112430114) was released publicly as ML113500495 in March 2012. and was released under FOIA request 2012-0106 to Paul Koberstein on July 2, 2012 as ML12188A239. Whether or not this report could be released publicly was the subject of multiple meeting in 2011 and 2012. The redacted version released in March 2012 was the result of a decision by several NRC offices as well as other federal agencies and much thought and analysis was placed into it. It contains redactions on 15 pages. Assuming it takes a month to arrange a two day meeting with the concerned parties {e.g. TVA, FERC, OHS, USACE) and then an hour to discuss each redacted page, the NRC could have easily met our 30 working day time limit for processing appeal FOIA 2013-006A. It is not a lack of manpower or time which has caused FOIA 2013-006A to be 8 weeks overdue; it is a lack of respect at the NRC for the Freedom of Information Act. FOIA Appeal 2013-009A: This appeal was submitted 45 working days ago and entails four documents (Mllll460063, ML100780084, ML101610083, and ML101900305). Two of the documents (ML111460063 and ML101610083} are correspondence from Duke Energy to the NRC. As they do with all their correspondence, Duke Energy requested that ML111460063 and ML101610083 be withheld per 10 CFR § 2.390. ML111460063 was requested by Paul Koberstein (FOIA 2012-0128) on January 27, 2012. (333 working days ago), by Jim Riccio (FOIA 2012-0325) on September 18, 2012 (171 working days ago), by Carl Stelzer (FOIA 2.013-01161 on February 11, 2013 (73 working days ago) and by myself on February 12, 2013 (71 working days ago). ML111460063 is only 16 pages long but still

has not yet been reviewed and released_ Although Duke Energy needs to review this document before its release, the NRC has had at least a full quarter to have Duke Energy perform this review. Why, in over 14 weeks, has the NRC not been able to coordinate with Duke Energy to review these 16 pages? It is due to a lack of respect at the NRC for the time limits prescribed in the Freedom of Information Act. ML101610083 was released as ML13051A896 in response to FOIA 2013-0113 by Joe Carson. It had two paragraphs redacted. Both redactions were under Exemption 7(f). As with all the documents thus far that Duke Energy has claimed to be proprietary, Exemption 4 was not used for any of the redactions. Appeal 2013-009A has been open for nine weeks, yet in nine weeks the NRC has been unable to review these two paragraphs. One of the documents (ML1007800841 is a NRC generic failure rate evaluation for Jocassee Dam risk analysis prepared by Jim Vail, Fernando Ferrante and Jeff Mitman. This document was released as Mll303~A084 to Paul Blanch under FOIA 2013-0110. This redacted document contained only one redaction: a figure detailing a generic cross section of Jocassee Dam. This same figure was presented in a March 25, 2013 Duke Energy slide show that was made publicly available on the NRC's website as ML13084A022. I pointed this out to the NRC in an April 11, 2013 update to FOIA 2013-009A and. instead of releasing ML100780084 without redactions, the NRC removed ML13084A02f- I take it by NRR's removal of ML13084A022 that the NRC has decided the redacted figure from ML100780084 was a necessary redaction of security related information. Yet, despite this reaffirmation of our redaction (a redaction we felt so confident in that we removed ML13084A022 from the public domain). FOIA 2013-009A remains open. One of the documents (ML101900305) is an internal NRC memo identifying a generic external flooding issue due to potential dam failures. This document was released to Kay Drey under FOIA 2013~0133 as ML13039A086 and contained redactions in two paragraphs. A virtually identical document was released to Jim Riccio under rDIA 2012*0325 with no redactions. So, the processing of appeal FOIA 2013-009A involves the review of five redacted paragraphs encompassing just one FOIA exemption (Exemption 7(f)) and 16 pages of an as yet unreviewed document. Yet in nine weeks the NRC has not yet been able to process FOIA 2013-009A. 1t is not a lack of manpower or time which has caused FOIA 2013-009A to be 5 weeks overdue; it is a lack of respect at the NRC for the Freedom of Information Act. FOIA Appeal 2013-0lOA: This appeal was submitted 45 working days ago and involves two documents which are both in the possession of the NRC Chairman: my 19-page 2012-09-18 letter and the email to which it was attached. My letter was originally requested by Dave Lochbaum on October 9, 2012 (F01A 2013-0008) and by Tom Zeller on October 15, 2012 (FOIA 2013-0013). Tom Zeller requested expedited processing since at the time he was preparing a story on the NRC's handling of the Oconee flooding concerns. After 152 working days, Mr. Zeller has yet to receive the letter through the NRC's FOIA process, although he was able to obtain it through other channels. On February 13, 2013 I requested my 19-page letter and the accompanying email when I noticed that it had not yet been released to Zeller and Lochbaum. At the time, Dave's request was 18 weeks old. It has now been more than 32 weeks since Dave made his request and 14 weeks since my request (156 and 72 working days respectively). That is, after waiting 32 weeks for a

19-page letter, Mr. Lochbaum has still not received even a redacted copy. There is no e><cuse for this. The NRC Chairman is, for some reason, stonewalling Mr. Zeller and Mr. Lochbaum. If the Chairman's office had reviewed a mere one page a day, we could have met our legally required 20 working day limit for releasing the letter under the FOIA. FOIA Appeal 2013-0llA: This appeal was submitted 45 working days ago and involves one document: ML091170104, the Non-Concurrence submitted by Melanie Galloway on the NRC's response to Duke Energy's 2008-09-26 letter. On April 16, 2013 I received a redacted copy of Ms. Galloway's request; the version I received had redactions in 3 paragraphs and Exemption 7(f) was used for all redactions. So, once again, only one e><emption to review applied to just three paragraphs - yet this appeal is 25 working days overdue. It is not a lack of manpower or time which has caused FOIA 2013-0llA to be 5 weeks overdue; it is a lack of respect at the NRC for the Freedom of Information Act. FOIA Appeal 2013-013A: This appeal was submitted 21 working days ago and involves correspondence between the NRC and other federal agencies regarding the Generic Issue 204 screening analysis report. The N RC informed me in February 2013 that it was going to cost me

        $112.72 to pay for four hours of search fees in order to locate the documents requested. I agreed to pay these fees on March 13, 2013. It has been more than ten weeks (52 working days) since I agreed to pay for the documents requested and I have still not received them. I estimate that the FOIA package consists of less than ten emails. If the N~C took four hours to find the 10 emails and then reviewed one email a week for the past ten weeks, I would have my requested documents by now. Can the NRC not find the time to review1qne email a week? It is not a lack of manpower or time which has caused FOIA 2013-013A to go overdue; it is a lack of respect at the NRC for the Freedom of Information Act.

Again, although I do not agree with the supposed security concerns surrounding the documents I have requested, this letter is not about security. It is about straight-forward FOIA requests taking unacceptably long times to be answered. It is about the NRC having a lack of respect for our commitments under the Freedom of Information Act. It is about the office of the NRC Chairman stonewalling on the release of a letter which, after 8 months, she still does not know how to address. In the President's 2009-01-21 memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act he states: The Freedom of Information Act should be administered with o clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails. There is obviously much doubt at the NRC regarding the redactions appealed under FOIA 2013-004A, 2013-00GA, 2013-009A, 2013-0l0A, 2013-0llA and 2013--013A. If there was not a great amount of doubt, then these FOIA appeals would not be, respectively, 63, 63, 45, 45, 45 and 21 working days old. As shown in the indented paragraphs above, these appeals are not overdue because of lack of resources or time; these appeals are overdue solely either because of doubt regarding whether the material should be withheld or because of nefarious stonewalling. If the NRC did not doubt the basis for the redactions, then the appeals could have easily been dosed by now. But our President has given us a simple solution: In the face of doubt, openness prevails. I urge you to take the President's direction to heart, and release in their entirety all the documents discussed above. It is what the President expects you to do. Please do not require me to sue the NRC in order for you to perform your legal obligations under the Freedom of Information Act; it is not right that you place that financial burden upon myself

and my family in order to force the release of documents which should have all along been publically available. If you do not wish to release unredacted versions of the documents, then at least please follow the law and meet your time obligations under the Freedom of Information Act for providing me explanations for the FOIA exemptions applied to justify the redactions. The time limits prescribed in the Freedom of Information Act have also been incorporated into the NRC's regulations. Should we not be setting an example for our licensees by following our own regulations? I am writing those addressed on this letter in the hopes that you will take this information to heart and ensure the agency lives up to our legal obligations under the Freedom of Information Act. Please do not pass this letter off to the NRC's Office of the Inspector General as yet another allegation. If I have an allegation to make, I will submit an OSC Form 12 to the United States Office of the Special Counsel. Although I Hve in Springfield, IL, I work in Rockville, MD and thus requested of you that you please do not send documents to my home in Springfield, IL as I will not get them in a timely manner. Other than the Office of the Inspector General, the NRC has thus far done well at following that request. If you have actually already responded to my FOIA Appeals through the US mail, then please send me the responses via email so that I have an electronic record of them. Please continue to send all written correspondence to me via email at LSCri~c1onc@hotmail.com. If your processes will not allow you to do this, then please contact me via phone or email and I will come by the FOIA desk to pick up the correspondence. Very respectfully, Lawrence S. Criscione, PE (573) 230*3959 Cc: Billie Garde, Clifford & Garde lryll Robbins-Umel, National Treasury Employees Union Scott Hodes, attorney Louis Clark, Government Accountability Project Jeff Ruch, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility David lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists Jim Riccio, Green Peace Paul Koberstein, Cascadia Times Tom Zeller, Huffington Post Carl Stelzer, reporter Paul Blanch, consultant Kay Drey, citizen Joe Carson, citizen Randy Sullivan, steward Carolyn Lerner, US Special Counsel Catherine McMullen, US Office of Special Counsel

Unionof d *

ucsusa.org Two Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138-3780 t 617.547.5552 f 617.864.9405

[ Concerne Scientists 18251< Srreer NW, Suite 800, Washington, DC 20006-1232 t 202.223.6133 f 202.223.6162 2397 Shattuck Avenue, Suite 203, Berkeley, CA 94704-1567 t 510.843.1872 f 510.843.3785 One North LaSnllc Street, Suire 1904, Chicago, 11. 60602-4064 t 312.578.1750 f 312.578.l 751 MARCH 13, 2015 MATERIALS FOR MEETINGS WITH CHAIRMAN STEPHEN G. BURNS AND COMMISSIONER JEFF BARAN DAVID LOCHB,AUM DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR SAFETY PROJECT

AGENDA <D Lying to the American Public about Nuclear Safety @ Improperly Withholding Information from the Public Lessons from Fort Calhoun © UCS Annual Report on the NRC and Nuclear Plant Safety February 26, 20 IS Page 2

Lying to the American Public about Nuclear Safety

Background

On April 19, 2011, the NRC staff conducted the an nual assessment meeting for the Oconee nuclear station in Seneca, South Carolina (ML l 111707829). The first of two bullets on slide 2 of the NRC staff's slideshow indicated that a purpose of the meeting was to provide:

       *    "A public.forum for discussion of the licensee's performance in 2010" With Slide 15, the NRC staff summarized a yellow and a white finding by NRC inspectors during 2010.

But at a public meeting conducted 5 weeks after :flooding caused three reactor meltdowns at Fukushima, the NRC staff fai led to me ntion to the p ublic that it had issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (MLJ 2363A086) to Duke on June 22, 2010, req uiring the company to take 15 measures to better protect the three reactors at Oconee from meltdown from flooding damage should the upriver Jocassee Dam fail. The NRC staff had a tremendous opportunity to inform the public that, nine months prior to Fukushima, the NRC had identified similar flood protection vulnerabilities at Oconee and had taken steps to ensure those vulnerabilities were addressed . In fact, several of the 15 measures had already been implemented while several others were far down the road to implementation. But instead the NRC staff opted to play "duck and cover" and lie to the public. The stated purpose of the meeting was to discuss licensee performance in 2010. The licensee's performance in 2010 prompted the NRC to issue a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) in June 2010. CALs are rarely issued - the NRC staff issued more white findings in 2010 than CALs. The NRC staff chose to discuss its white finding at Oconee but remain silent about its CAL. That incredibly poor judgment by the NRC staff undermined my trust and confidence in the agency. I now find it harder to believe it whe n the NRC staff says some condition is okay or that a problem has been resolved. Given the staff's demonstrated propensity for hiding relevant information from the public and instead providing the public with a distorted, misleading version of nuclear plant safety, how can UCS and the public trust this agency to tell the whole truth and not just selective sub-truths? February 26, 20 IS Page 3

Improperly Withholding Information from the Public

Background

In October 2004, the NRC staff sought and obtained Commission permission to withhold all incoming documents from licensees about fire protection and emergency planning (ML042310663). Since then, the NRC deve loped guidance documents and revised regulations (10 CFR 2.390 in 2008) for licensees to ask NRC to withhold all or portions of docwne nts they submit that contain sensitive security information. Despite this process being available for years, the NRC staff continues to withhold incoming fire protection and emergency planning documents, even when licensees do not request such withholding. Many of the withheld documents involved license amendment requests. By improperly withholding these documents, the NRC staff deprived the public of rights under federal regulations to contest requested actions. The NRC staff has been handling submissions of Updated Safety Analysis Reports (USAR) oddly. Some USARs are placed into public ADAMS in their entirety (e.g., Beaver Valley Unjt 2 at ML14339A408, Byron and Braidwood at ML1436A393, and Watts Bar Unit 2 at ML14155A256). Some USARs are withheld from public ADAMS in their entirety (e.g., Diablo Canyon per NRC memo at ML14022A l 20). The NRC staff has told the Senate EPW staff, the NRC OIG staff, and me three different stories last fall on why USARs may or may not be publicly available. The USARs are key licensing documents, perhaps the single most important licensing document in exi stence. The USARs are heavily relied upon by licensees and NRC staff in prepari ng, reviewing, and approving operating license amendments. By i mproperly deprivi ng the public of access to these vital documents, the NRC staff is unfairly impeding the public's ability to participate in licensing proceedings in a meaningful way. T hat so many USARs are publicly available in ADAMS strongly suggests there is no legitimate reason for withholding the other USARs. UCS and others frequently request NRC Communication Plans via the Freedom of Information Act. The NRC staff typically provides the requested plans with onl y personal privacy information (i.e., home telephone numbers) redacted (e.g., Salem/Hope Creek Safety Concious Work Environment issues at ML060620540, Oconee flood protection 50.54 letter at ML12326A389, I.ndian Point CST pipe leak at ML l 10030931, Seabrook concrete degradation at ML14 16 LA638, Davis-Besse concrete degradation at ML14171A271, etc.). But the NRC staff has also provided plans with all information, except page numbers, redacted contending the withheld information was "deliberative process" (Diablo Canyon seismic re-analysis at MLl 5033A280). The NRC staff is playing games. The issues at Indian Point and Seabrook involved aging issues at a time when the reactors were seeking operating license renewals. The NRC staff provided essentially unredacted Commu nicati.on Pl ans. February 26, 20 IS Page 4

But the NRC staff redacted virtually the entire Communications Plan for Diablo Canyon's seismic issues. True, the seismic issues are cunently being monitored by the State and the NRC within an operating license re newal application proceeding, but again that was also the case at Indian Point and Seabrook. UCS Recommendation UCS wrote to the NRC Chairman last November aski ng that the Commission reverse the policy of blanket withholding all incoming fire protection and emergency planning records. UCS wrote to the NRC Inspector General asking that OIG investigate whether the agency violated federal regulations by approving licensi ng requests about fire protection and emergency planning while denying the public access to the underlying documents. The NRC should suspend issuing all operating licenses and approving alJ amendments to operating licenses until the agency has made publicly available all the documents it has been improperly withholding the past decade. Withholding license amendment requests and USARs deprived the public its rights under federal regulations to participate in these licensing actions in a meaningful way. By improperly withholding these documents, the NRC staff is essentially giving its licensees uncontested proceedings and transforming purportedly open processes into closed, secret negotiations between the NRC staff and licensees. The NRC cannot contest the "cozy" label by being "cozy" with licensees and denying the public its legal rights. NOTE: UCS does not challenge the fact that certain information needs to be withheld. When information satisfies one or more of the criteria for withholding, then by all means withhold it. But when information does not meet any of the criteria for withholding, then don't withhold it. NOTE: UCS also recognizes that given the sheer volume of docume nts handled by the NRC staff, there will be occasional mistakes made withholding some that should not be and disclosing others that should be. UCS 's concerns are not with the exceptions to the rule. UCS's concern is when the rule is mis-applied allowing many documents to be handled improperly . February 26, 20 IS Page S

Lessons from Fort Calhoun

Background

Fort Calhoun restarted in December 2013 following a 30-month outage to fix many longstanding safety problems. It marked the 52 nd time that a U.S. reactor remafoed shut down longer than a year to correct safety problems. Fort Calhoun 's outage bega11 in Apri l 20 1 I , about a month after Fukushima. The NRC formed a task force to extract lessons leamable from Fukushima and cutTently has a range of activities underway to implement those lessons. The NRC did nothing to forma lly extract lessons learnable from Fort Calhoun. Many of the safety problems that had to be fixed before NRC allowed Fort Calhoun to restart existed since 1996 or before. Why had all the licensee's testing and NRC's inspections missed these safety problems? Four times since the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) was initiated, the NRC staff retuned Fort Calhoun to Action Matrix Column 1. Each time, the many safety problems that were finally fixed in 201 1-2013 had existed but were overlooked. Twice since the ROP was initiated, the NRC staff returned Fort Calhoun to Action Matrix Column 2 from Column 3. Each time, the many safety problems that were finally fixed in 201 1-2013 had existed but were overlooked. UCS Recommendation The NRC should formally evaluate Fort Calhoun's year-plus outage to identify lessons that enhance the effectiveness of its oversight efforts. For example, the evaluation could take the safety issues o n the NRC staff's Confirmatory Action Letter and reported to the NRC via Licensee Event Reports (LERs) from 20 10 to 2014 and identify the NRC inspection procedures that examined these areas. These applicable inspection procedures could then be assessed to see whether changes in what gets examined or how it gets examined could have detected these problems. Similarly, the evaluation might identify changes to the process used by the NRC staff to return Fort CaJhoun to Action Matrix Columns 1 and 2 despite numerous safety problems that kept the reactor shut down for safety problems for 30 month. These might have been missed opportunities to have detected and corrected at least some of the many safety problems sooner. Reference Document UCS Issue Brief " No More Fukushimas; No More Fort Calhouns," February 20 15. February 26, 20 IS Page 6

UCS Annual Report on the NRC and Nuclear Plant Safety

Background

UCS initiated a series of ann.ual reports on the NRC and nuclear power plant safety in March 201 1. Each report summarizes the events the prior year that prompted the NRC to dispatch special inspection teams (SlTs) or augmented inspection teams (AlTs). Each report s ummarizes positive outcomes achieved by the NRC the prior year as well as negative outcomes. This year's report noted that both the number and the severity of events triggering SITs/AITs continues a declining trend a nd acknowledges that NRC's efforts very likely factored in these positive trends. This year's report commends the NRC for undertaking two pro-active measures: the Reactor Oversig ht Process self-assessments and the Knowledge Management Program. This year's report criticizes the NRC for improperly withholding documents from the public that denied meaningful participation in NRC's regulatory decision-making processes, for tolerating safety culture metrics that it found unacceptable when observed at nuclear plant sites and for subjecting two NRC engineers to recurring investigations because they voiced safety concerns. UCS Recommendation The NRC instituted its Lessons Learned Program a decade ago. SECY-14-0 IO I (ML14175A780) is the most recent annual report on that program. It is a well-intended program gone terribly awry. A total of merely seven items were presented to the Lessons-Learned Oversight Board between August 2013 and May 2014. That list included only two reports from the NRC's Office of the Inspector General (OIG), no reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), none from the US Congress, and none from any external entity other than one classified, non-public DOE report. It's virtually impossible to drnw meaningful insights about trends and emerging problem areas from such paltry inputs. To be effective, the NRC's Lessons Learned Program must consider more inputs. For example, all OIG reports and GAO should be entered into the program. Materials from external organizations should be reviewed for possible inclusion in the program. The proliferation of inputs to the Lessons Learned Program would not require a linear increase in the full-time equivalents needed to implement the program. The NRC staff responds to OIG and GAO reports. Thus, the additional work load for the Lessons Learned Program would be to monitor the findings and recommendations from the inputs seeking to identify common themes and whether a problem found here might also exist the re. Reference Documents UCS report dated M arch 2015, "The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2014: Tarnished Gold Standard." February 26, 20 IS Page 7

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 April 25, 2011 Mr. T. Preston Gillespie, Jr. Site Vice President Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672

SUBJECT:

PUBLIC MEETING

SUMMARY

- - OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ... DOCKET NOS. 50-269, 50-270 AND 50-287

Dear Mr. Gillespie:

This refers to the meeting conducted on April 19, 2011. in Seneca, SC. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and the NRC's annual assessment of plant safety performance for the period of January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2010. The major topics addressed were the NRC's assessment program and the results of the assessment. A listing of meeting attendees and information presented during the meeting are enclosed. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRG Public Document Room (PDR) or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRG Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Should you have any questions concerning this meeting, please contact me at (404) 997-4607. Sincerely, IRA/ Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees

2. Powerpoint Presentation cc w/encls: (See page 2)

Oconee Annual Public cetiog April l , 2011 AM* AFF~~no I?., rJ'

     /_. cZ.
"')

(J Enclosure 1

2 Oconee Annual Public eeting ril 19 2011 FFfI.lATIO Enclosure 1

3 Oconee nnual Public Meetin pril I , 2011 NAME AF ILLATI Enclosure 1

N

J CJ) 0 uC w

2 tl Purpose of Today's Meeting

A public forum for discussion of the licensee's performance in 2010
Address the performance issues identified in the annual assessment letter 2 Protecting People and the Environment Enclosure 2

14 tl Oconee Assessment Results January - December 31, 20 0 Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 were in the Degraded Cornerstone Column for all four quarters due to a Yellow Finding (Units 1, 2, and 3) and a White Finding (Units 2 and 3). 14 Protecting People and the Environment Enclosure 2

15

ti Safety Significant Findings or Pis
Yellow Violation of TS 3.10.1 for SSF reactor coolant makeup subsystem inoperable for greater than allowed by technical specifications

{Units 1, 2, and 3)

White Violation of Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for a failure to promptly identify and correct an adverse condition affecting operability of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 standby shutdown facility

{Units 2 and 3) 15 Protecting People and the Environment Enclosure 2

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 June 22, 2010 CAL 2*10*003 Mr. Davio A. Baxter Site Vice President Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672

SUBJECT:

CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER ~OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 COMMITMENTS TO ADDRESS EXTERNAL FLOODING CONCERNS (TAC NOS. ME3065, ME3066, AND ME3067)

Dear Mr. Baxter:

This fetter confirms commitments made by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (the licensee) in your June 3, 2010, letter. Specifically, the June 3, 2010, letter listed compensatory measures the licensee will implement at the Oconee Site and Jocassee Dam to mitigate potential external flooding hazards resulting from a potential failure of the Jocassee Dam. The compensatory measures listed in the enclosure shall remain in place until final resolution of the inundation of the Oconee site from the failure of the Jocassee Dam has been determined by the licensee and agreed upon by the l:J.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and all modifications are made to mitigate the inundation. The compensatory measures and implementation dates are set forth in the enclosure to this letter. In addition to implementing the compensatory measures, pursuant to my telephone conversation with Mr. Bill Pitesa of your company on June 22, 2010, you shall submit to the NRC by August 2, 2010, all documentation necessary to demonstrate to the NRC that the inundation of the Oconee site resulting from the failure of the Jocassee Dam has been bounded. Also, you shall submit by November 30, 2010, a list of all modifications necessary to adequately mitigate the Inundation, and shall make all necessary modifications by November 30, 201 1, Pursuant to Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, you are required to:

1) Notify me immediately If your understanding differs from that set forth above;

2) Notify me if for any reason you cannot complete the actions within the specified schedule and advise me in writing of your modified schedule in advance of the change; and

3) Notify me in writing when you have completed the actions addressed In this Confirmatory Action Letter.

B-3

DEC 2 Issuance of this Confirmatory Action Letter does not preclude issuance of an Order formalizing the above commitments or requiring other actions on the part of the licensee; nor does it preclude the NRC from taking enforcement action for violations of NRC requirements that may have prompted the issuance of this letter. In addition, failure to take the actions addressed In this Confirmatory Action Letter may result in enforcement action. This Confirmatory Action Letter will remain in effect until the NRC has concluded that all modifications necessary to adequately mitigate the inundation of the Oconee site from the failure of the Jocassee Dam has been completed. Sincerely, IRA/ Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55

Enclosure:

Compensatory Measures cc w/encl: (See next page)

COMPENSATORY MEASURES NUMBER COMPENSATORY MEASURES IMPLEMENTATION STATUS 1 Perform flooding studies using the Hydrologic Engineering Complete Center - River Complete Analysis System (HEC-RAS) model for comparison with previous DAMBRK models to more accurately represent anticipated flood heights in the west yard followina a postulated failure of the Jocassee Dam. 2 Maintain plans, procedures (Jocassee and Oconee) and Implemented guidance documents implemented (Oconee\ to address m!atioo :' oostula~d ~ l(bJ(?)(F) *vo;; j:'c ~'~" nd are cons1s1em I w1 curren perspectwes gamed o owing the HEC-RAS sensitivity studies and the subsequent 2D inundation studies. To the extent practical, the mitigation strategy is similar to

existing extensive plant damage scenario (8.5.b) equipment, methods and criteria.

3 Duke Energy Hydro Generation will create a guidance Implemented document to consolidate river management and storm management processes. (Includes the Jocassee Development and the Keowee Development.) 4 Maintain a dam safety inspection program that includes: Implemented (1) weekly dam safety inspections of the Jocassee Dam by Duke Energy personnel, (2) dam safety inspections following any 2-inch or greater rainfall or felt seismic event, (3) annual dam safety inspections by Duke Energy, (4) annual dam safety inspections by FERC representatives, (5) five year safety inspections by FERC approved consultants. and (6) five year underwater inspections. 5 Maintain a monitoring program that includes: {1) continuous Implemented remote monitoring from the Hydro Central Operating Center in Charlotte, NC, (2) monthly monitoring of observation wells, (3) weekly monitoring of seepage monitoring points, and (4) annual surveys of displacement monuments. 6 Assign an Oconee engineer as Jocassee Dam co~tact to Implemented heighten awareness of Jocassee status. 7 Install ammeters and voltmeters on Keowee spillway gates Complete for eoulpment condition monitoring. 8 Ensure forebay and tailrace level alarms are provided for Complete Jocassee to support timely detection of a developing dam failure . 9 Add a storage building adjacent to the Jocassee spillway to Complete house the backup spillway gate operating equipment (e.g., compressor and air wrench). Enclosure

JIO 2 NUMBER COMPENSATORY MEASURES IMPLEMENTATION STATUS 10 Obtain and stage a portable generator and electric drive Complete motor near the Jocassee spillway gates to serve as a second set of backuo soillwav aate ooeratina eouioment. 11 Conduct Jocassee Dam failure Table Top Exercise with 06/30/2010 Oconee participation to exercise and improve response procedures. 12 Instrument and alarm selected seepage monitoring locations 08/31/2010 for timely detection of dearadina conditions. 13 Provide additional video monitoring of Jocassee Dam (e.g., 08/31/2010

         . dam toe, abutments, and groin areas) for timely assessment of degrading conditions.

14 Obtain and stage a second set of equipment (including a 11/30/2010 B.5.b-type pump) for implementation of the external flood mitigation guidance. 15 Conduct Jocassee Dam/Oconee Emergency Response 12/31/2010 Organization Drill to exercise and improve response procedures. NOTES:

1. The word "complete" is used in the status column if the commitment regards a specific one-time equipment-related or analysis-related action that has been completed .

2. The word "implemented" is used in the status column if the commitment describes an on-going action that has been implemented.

Enclosure

POLICY ISSUE (Notation Vote) October 19, 2004 SECY-04-0191 FOR: The Commissioners FROM: Luis A. Reyes Executive Director for Operations /RA/

SUBJECT:

WITHHOLDING SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION CONCERNING NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE PURPOSE: To obtain Commission approval of guidance to be issued t,o the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff, power reactor licensees, and othier agency stakeholders for withholding sensitive unclassified (nonsafeguards) information from public disclosure.

SUMMARY

In a staff requirements memorandum dated May 7 , 2004, the Commission directed the NRC staff to develop guidance to ensure information that could reasonably be expected to be useful to potential adversaries is withheld from public disclosure. In determining whether information should be withheld or released , the NRC staff must attemp1t to appropriately balance our desire to maintain the openness of NRC's regulatory processes with the need to protect the public from possible terrorist threats. This paper provides for Commission review and approval the NRC staff's proposed approach for determining the appropriate handling of information and more specific guidance for withholding or releasing information about nuclear power reactors (Attachment 1). CONTACTS: William D. Reckley, NRR/IRT 301-415-1323 Margie Kotzalas, NRR/IRT 301-415-2737

Subject Discussion and/or typical controls Test Program (Initial and lnservice Uncontrolled Inspections and Testing) Accident Analysis Uncontrolled - Accident analyses typically included in licensing-related correspondence involve conservative models to demonstrate a plant's ability to respond to design basis transients (i.e ., nonsecurity related events), and is not treated as sensitive . Technical Specifications (including Uncontrolled Bases) Quality Assurance Uncontrolled Fire Protection Incoming documents are initially profiled as nonpublic - staff will review for release upon request. Most information related to fire protection will not need to be designated as sensitive . Drawings showing details such as the specific location of equipment, doorways, stairways, etc. are to be withheld under 10 CFR 2.390. Emergency Planning Incoming documents are initially profiled as nonpublic - staff will review for release upon request. Most information related to emergency planning will not need to be designated as sensitive . Special attention is needed to determine if information relates to the response by a licensee or government agency to a terrorist attack. Note that some State and local governments consider parts of their emergency plans to be sensitive. Security Information related to security programs at nuclear reactors is generally designated as SGI and is protected in a manner similar to classified confidential information . Security-related information within the inspection program and reactor oversight process is withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390. Risk-Informed Decisionmaking Uncontrolled - exceptions include information related to (e.g., documents related to risk- security activities (e.g. , vulnerability assessments) and informed licensing actions, information related to uncorrected configurations or accident sequence precursor conditions that could be useful to an adversary. Special (ASP) analyses, significance attention should be applied to this area and information determination process (SOP) should be withheld if it describes a vulnerability or plant-notebooks, design certifications) specific weakness that is more helpful to an adversary than are the insights provided in open source literature. Detailed computer models have been and will continue to be withheld from public disclosure.

I ' '

Beaver Valley Power Station FENOC' P.O. Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Eric A. Larson. 724-682-5234 Site Vice President Fax : 724-643-8069

                                                                                                      ,J November 24, 2014 L-14-360                                                               10 CFR 50.71(e) 10 CFR 50.54(a) 10 CFR 54.37(b}

A TIN :. Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-001

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 Submittal of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Revision 21 In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71{e), the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) is hereby submitting to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS), Unit No. 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Revision 21 in CD-ROM format. This submittal reflects facility and procedure changes implemented between November 2, 2012 (the end of Refueling Outage 16), and May 23, 2014 (the end of Refueling Outage 17), along with several changes implemented after Refueling Outage 17. In accordance with NRG guidance for electro(1ic submissions, Attachment 1 provides a listing of the document components that comprise the enclosed CD-ROM. In addition to the UFSAR, the CD-ROM includes the BVPS, Unit No. 2 Licensing Requirements Manual, Revision 81 , and the Technical Specification Bases, Revision 27. The Technical Specification Bases are submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 5.5.10.d, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54{a), FENOC is hereby submitting a copy of the current revision of the FENOC Quality Assurance Program Manual (QAPM). The QAPM, Revision 19, is included in the enclosed CD-ROM. Attachment 2 includes a summary of information removed from the BVPS , Unit No. 2 UFSAR in accordance with Appendix A to Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 98-03, "Guidelines for Updating Final Safety Analysis Reports ," Revision 1.

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 L-14-360 Page2 FENOC conducted a review of BVPS, Unit No. 2 plant changes for 10 CFR 54.37(b) applicability. No components were determined to meet the criteria for newly identified components as clarified by Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS} 2007-16, Revision 1, "Implementation of the Requirements of 10 CFR 54.34(b} for Holders of Renewed Licenses." There are no regulatory commitment changes to be submitted in accordance with NEI 99-04, "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes." This certifies, to the best of my judgment and belief, that Revision 21 of the BVPS, Unit No. 2 UFSAR accurately presents changes made since the previous submittal that are necessary to reflect information and analysis submitted to the Commission or pursuant to Commission requirements. This letter contains no new regulatory commitments. If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Mr. Thomas A. Lentz, Manager - Fleet Licensing, at 330-315-6810. Sincerely, Eric A. Larson Attachments:

1. Document Components on CD-ROM

2. Information Removed from the BVPS, Unit No. 2 UFSAR

Enclosures:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 UFSAR, Licensing Requirements Manual, Technical Specification Bases, and QAPM (on CD-ROM) cc: NRC Region I Administrator NRC Resident Inspector NRC Project Manager Director BRP/DEP (without Enclosures) Site BRP/DEP Representative (without Enclosures)

Rr§t' ~f <sf5t8, tl~fe~fe'dJ~ag~nPa ge s

                                                           ;pwbjjo!AlJAM&)AMS Byron/Braidwood Nuc:lear Stations Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)

Revision 15 December 2014 Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66 Facil~tyOperating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-n NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-454, STN 50-455, and 72-68 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-456, STN 50-457, and 72-73

I

                                  'rfw(}'(if>7ma7unreBaOOel~sEjff dtlf>~ ~!A~ ,...                    b l i c ADAMS Attachment 1 to be withheld from Public Disclosure Un,der 10 CFR 2 390. When separated from this Enclosure, this letter is decontrolled.

II!fil Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Sprin9 City, Tennesseu 37381-2000 May 30, 2014 10 CFR 50.4 10 CFR 50.34(b) 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Docket No. 50-391

Subject:

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN]j- UNIT 2- FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (FSAR), AMENDN!ENT 112

References:

1. TVA letter to NRC dated February 13, 2014, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) - Unit 2 - Final Safety Analysi:s Report (FSAR), Amendment 111"

2. TVA letter to NRC dated May 8. 2014, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN)

Unit 2 - lnservice Test (ISTI Program/Preservice Test (PST) Program" This letter transmits WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 112 (A112), which reflects changes made since the issuance of Amendment 111 on Februa1ry 13, 2014 (Reference 1). contains a summary listing of FSAR sectio1ns and corresponding Unit 2 change package numbers associated with the A 112 FSAR changes. FSAR A112 is contained on the enclosed Optical Stora!ge Media (OSM #1) (Attachment 1). The FSAR contains security-related information identifi1~d by the designation "Security-0 Related Information -Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390. TVA hereby requests this information be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.390. A redacted version of the FSAR is cont ained on OSM #2 (Attachment 2), which is suitable for public disclosure. contains a listing of the FSAR pages that h1ave been redacted. Enclosure 3 lists the files and file sizes on the security-related OSM (OS'M #1 ). and Enclosure 4 lists the files and file sizes on the publicly available OSM (OSM #2). In regard to Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER), Appendix HH Open Items, the following can be stated to address three open Items:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 May 30, 2014 For Open Item No. 1, involving power assisted cable pullls. WBN Unit 2 construction has not made nor will not be making any such power assisted cable pulls in the completion of WBN Unit 2 . A 112 addresses Open Item No. 35, involving Ccimponent Cooling System (CCS ), and Open Item No. 91. mvolving Feedwater Purity. In addition. FSAR Change Package 2- 112-10 addresses a clarification to the 1ST Program code of record as committed to in Reference 2. Attachment 3 provides replacement disks for Amendment 111 provided in Reference 1. During the course of Amendment 112 preparation, it was discovered that the discs containing the Amendment 111 files previously provided by Reference 1 d id not contain Section 6 ,2 ,6. Enclosures 5 and 6 have been updated to reflect this addition for file sizes related to the security-related and the pubficly available OSMs for Ami~ndment 111 . There are no new commitments made tn this letter. This letter does not close any "Generic Communications." If you have any questions. 1Please contact Gordon Arent at (423) 365-2004. I declare under the penalty of perJury that the foregoing 11s true and correct. Executed on the 30th day of May, 2014. Respectful!~ / ,f<-0.~t<t* Raymond A. Hruby, Jr. General Manager, Technical Services Watts Bar Unit 2

Enclosures:

1. WBN Unit 2 FSAR A 112. "Summary Listing of A 112 FSAR Changes" 2 . WBN Unit 2 FSAR A 112,

summary of Redacted Pa ges" 1

3. WBN Unit 2 FSAR A 112 , "List of files and file sizes 01n the security-related OSM (OSM #1)"

4. WBN Unit 2 FSAR A 112. "List of files and file sizes 01n the publicly available OSM (OSM #2)"

Attachments:

1. OSM #1 : WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 1 2 - Secmicy-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390

2. OSM #2: WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 112 - Publ icly Available Version

3. OSM #1 : WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 11 1

Security-Related Information - Withhold Under 10 CFR 2 ,390 OSM #2: WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 111 - Publiicly Available Version cc: See Page 3

June 23, 2014 MEMORANDUM TO: Michael T. Markley, Chief Plant Licensing IV-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Peter J. Bamford, Project Manager IRA! Plant Licensing IV-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - REVIEW OF FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPOHT UPDATE, REVISION 21 (TAC NOS. MF2945 AND MF2946) This memorandum documents the in-office review of Revisi on 21 to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Update for Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP), Units 1 and 2, dated September 16, 2013 (not publicly available). The FSAR Update was submitted by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E, the licensee), in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.71 (e). PG&E follows the guidanc,e of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 98-03, Revision 1, "Guidelines for Updating Final Saf13ty Analysis Reports," and NEI 99-04, Revision 0, "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes." The time requirements for FSAR submittals are stated in 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4). Revisions must be filed annually or 6 months after each refueling outage provided the interval between successive updates does not exceed 24 months. In its letter dated December 8, 1997, the licensee requested an exemption from the time requirements stated in 10 CFR 50.71 (e)(4) for DCPP, Units 1 and 2. As discussed in the licensee's exem1Ption request, DCPP, Units 1 and 2, have a common FSAR. The rule would require FSAR upda1tes within 6 months of each refueling outage, resulting in required FSAR updates every 12 months. As such, the licensee requested an exemption to allow the updates of the FSAR to be submitted within 6 months after each DCPP, Unit 2, refueling outage, but not to exceed 24 months from the last update. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff approved the exemption in a letter dated March 12, 1998 (ADAMS Accession No. ML022400141 ). DCPP, Unit 2, completed its last refueling outage on March 23, 2013. The previous update of the DCPP FSAR, Revision 20, was submiUed on November 16, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11332A1811). Therefore, the September 16, 2013, submittal date for Revision 21 of the DCPP FSAR meets the requirements approved in the exemption since the submittal was within 6 months of the last DCPP, Unit 2, refueling outage and does not exceed 24 months from the last FSAR update. As stated in the licensee's letter dated September 16, 2013, Revision 21 of the DCPP FSAR contains changes to reflect the plant configuration as of March 23, 2013. This meets the requirement in 10 CFR 50.71 (e)(4) which states that the revisions must reflect all changes up to a maximum of 6 months prior to the date of filing.

M. Markley Amendments Revision 21 covered changes to the FSAR Update during the period June 6, 2011, through September 16, 2013. Each of the license amendments issued during the period were reviewed for impacts on the FSAR Update and included Amendment Nos. 211/213 through 216/218 (for Units 1 and 2, respectively). The following three amendments were identified which resulted in impacts on the FSAR Update:

Amendment Nos. 211/213, dated March 29, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120790338), modified FSAR Update Sections 8.1.4.3, "Regulatory Guides," and 8.3.1.1.13.1, "Diesel Generator Unit Description," to identify an exception to Revision O of Regulatory Guide 1.9, "Application and Testing of Safety-Related Diesel Generators in Nuclear Power Plants";
Amendment Nos. 212/214, dated October 31 , 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120300114), modified FSAR Update Sections 15.2.7.3, "Results," and 15.2.16, "References," to adopt a new analysis methodology for establishing the reduced power range neutron flux high setpoint for one inoperable main steam safety valve; and
Amendment Nos. 214/216, dated January 9, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12345A379), modified FSAR Update Section 4.3.2.2, "Power Distribution," to allow the use of the Best Estimate Analyzer for the Core Operations-Nuclear (BEACON) Power Distribution Monitoring System methodology,. as described in Westinghouse Electric Company LLC's WCAP-12472-P-A, Addendum 1-A, "BEACON Core Monitoring and Operation Support System," January 2000.

The FSAR Update changes for Amendment Nos. 211/213 were not apparent in Revision 21 . The licensee had reorganized the FSAR Update, removing the numbered Sections 8.1.4.3 and 8.3.1.1.13.1. However, the licensee included the amendment's language in Section 8.3.1.1.6.3.13, "Safety Guide 9, March 1971 - Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies," and Section 8.3.1.1.6.1.13, "Safety Guide 9, March 1971 - Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies." With the inclusion of this exception in these two sections, the NRC staff concludes that the FSAR Update is consistent with the updates stated in Amendment Nos. 211/213. Inspection Reports The inspection reports (IR) for the appropriate period were reviewed. The first, IR 2012004, involved a non-cited violation of Appendix B, Criteria V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," after PG&E failed to promptly evaluate the operability of plant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) after a newly discovered local fault line. The IR, dated February 14, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML120450843), indicated a need to update the FSAR Update with the new seismic information. The second, IR 2011005, dated November 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12318A385), involved a Severity Level IV violation where the licensee failed to update the FSAR Update with information describing how plant SSCs meet 10 CFR Part 50,

ML13155A238), documented an event in which the licensee identified an unanalyzed condition due to a nonconservative change In the FSAR Update Chapter 15, "Accident Analyses ," which would have resulted in a higher received radiological dose received by control room operators during an accident, but would not exceed General Design Criteria 19. The LER described the corrective actions taken to address the event and NRG staff confirmed that Revision 21 of the FSAR Update incorporated the corrective actions described in the LER. The NRC staffs sampling review of the FSAR Update, Revision 21 included the applicable amendments, IRs, and LERs . The staff did not find any commitments to modify the FSAR Update in its review. Based on the review , the staff concludes that the FSAR Update, Revision 21 was submitted consistent with the requirements in 10 CFR 50 .71(e). Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323 DISTRIBUTION: PUBLIC LPL4-1 R/F RidsNrrDorlLpl4-1 Resource RidsNrrLAJBurkhardt Resource RidsNrrPMDiabloCanyon Resource RidsRgn4MailCenter Resou rce ADAMS Accession No. ML14022A120 OFFICE NRRIDORL/LPL4-2/PM N RRIDORL/LPL4-1 IPM NRRIDORULPL4-1/LA NRRIDORL/LPL4-1/BC NRR/DORL/LPL4 -1 /PM NAME MOrenak PBamford JBurkhardl MMarkley PBamford DATE 6117114 6/17114 6/17/14 6/23/14 6/23/14

             '61 I ICIAE  use 0142 I     81 1l4RIT I l<ELA i 26 :UfiiPMQJ,Otf COMMUNICATIONS PLAN Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant Steam Generators Replacement Inspection January 2014 Point Of

Contact:

Atif Shaikh, RIii 630-829-9824 G OALS

Be prepared to answer public questions on the steam generators replacement inspection
Be prepared to answer internal questions on the steam generators replacement inspection KEY MESSAGES The NRC's oversight of the steam generator replacement process at Davis-Besse is comprehensive to ensure the safety of the plant and the public.

Inspections started on December 2, 2013, and these inspections will continue through the actual replacement installation work beginning in February 2014 the post installation tests performed by the licensee, and the plant's subsequent return to power. The results of this NRC inspection will be documented in a publically available report that will be issued by the NRC within 45 days of the conclusion of this inspection . NRC inspectors will conduct direct observations along with reviews of records, calculations, and procedures to provide adequate assurance that the plant modifications associated with the replacement steam generators meet applicable regulatory requirements. Inspections will be conducted by a team of inspectors with expertise in metallurgy, structural design, heavy loads, radiatiol) protection, security, and other relevant areas. NRC inspectors will review the licensee's evaluation of relevant steam generator replacements operating experience (OpEx) to determine whether the licensee has adequately evaluated the OpEx potentially relevant to the Davis-Besse steam generators repla~ement. NRC inspectors will ensure that any safety concerns identified during the inspection are adequately addressed by the licensee. The NRC staff invited the public to listen in via conference call to its initial inspection planning meeting with the licensee during which the licensee provided a presentation and NRC staff answered questions from the public. That presentation remains available to the public in the NRC's ADAMS document system (ML No. 13078A249) via the NRC public web site. QFFICIOI la!0iija§Uljf DESI 'Alifl;f fU!t!itl*~i, IUPORMt~siTIOJI

NRC staff also discussed inspection plans with the public during the last end-of-cycle meeting near the plant and provided information in a meeting with local government officials. In addition, the NRC staff also plans to conduct a webinar to answer questions from the public related to the replacement steam generators at Davis-Besse. BACKGROUND Davis-Besse is a Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) designed plant. It is a two loop plant and has two steam generators. The original steam generators are B&W designed once-through steam generators (OTSGs). The new replacement steam generators are also B&W designed OTSGs. There are two basic types of steam generators used in the United States: recirculating steam generators (RSGs) and OTSGs. RSGs have tubes that are shaped like an inverted "U" while OTSGs have straight tubes. There are currently 59 units in the U.S. with RSGs and 6 units with OTSGs. All steam generators are designed to limit the possibility of tube-to-tube contact since such a condition can result in the tubes rubbing against each other and leading to tube thinning. The thinning of the tube wall due to the interaction of two structures (e.g., tube-to-tube or tube-to-support) is commonly referred to as tube wear. In Early 2012, the licensee for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3, which has recirculating steam generators, detected hundreds of tubes with wear attributed to tube-to-tube contact caused by a fluid-elastic instability. Some of these indications were significant including one that leaked during normal operation and led to the plant shutting down. These indications occurred after approximately 20 months of operation. In total, eight tubes were found that did not meet the structural integrity performance criteria specified in the plant's technical specifications. The steam generators at San Onofre were designed and fabricated by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI). In early 2010, Three Mile Island, Unit 1 (TMl-1), completed the replacement of both its original OTSGs with new OTSGs that were fabricated by AREVA (France). The first inservice inspection of the TMl- 1 replacement steam generators took place in fall 2011 . During these inspections at TMl- 1, the licensee detected several tubes with indications. A more detailed in_ vestigation led the licensee to conclude that these indications were a result of tube wear due to tube-to-tube contact. In fall of 2013 the licensee for TMl-1 conducted their second inservice inspection of the replacement steam generators. The licensee reviewed their testing data and concluded that tube-to-tube wear was progressing slowly "as predicted" based on first cycle wear data from fall of 2011. In spring 2006, Oconee, Unit 3 conducted the first inservice inspection of the replacement OTSGs that were installed in 2004. The inservice inspection results revealed widespread wear degradation of the tubing at tube support plant (TSP) locations. Oconee, Units 1 and 2, have also experienced this widespread tube wear degradation at TSP locations following the first cycle of operation since installation in 2004. In spring of 2012 the licensee for Oconee, Unit 3 also detected wear attributed to tube-to-tube contact in the replacement OTSGs. The Oconee replacement OTSGs were designed and fabricated by B&W Canada and are similar to the design of the Davis-Besse replacement OTSGs.

                 .... QFEICI t 6 Wit erttV      e1etm1 I I *RELA, LO IUP0RMsf.,18N               2

              .J- iliFIGIP 1 I 155 AMI X a SFGI 1B'IY RS: tlil 1141 Ulti!!ttlllU The licensees for Oconee and TM I evaluated the severity of the tube-to-tube wear indications in their replacement steam generators. These evaluations concluded that the wear indications did not compromise tube integrity (i.e ., the tubes could still perform their intended function consistent with their original design and licensing basis). In addition, this tube-to-tube contact did not involve high energy fluid-elastic instability such as that experienced at SONGS. NRC staff reviewed the licensees' evaluations and did not identify any safety issues that would affect plant restart.

Q&As FOR DAVIS-BESSE STEAM GENERATORS REPLACEMENT

1. Will this be a like for like replacement?

No, this will not be a like for like replacement. Although the replacement steam generators (SGs) are manufactured by the same vendor as the original SGs, there are some differences in the design of these replacement SGs. Hence, the licensee is required to perform an evaluation consistent with Section 50.59 of Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations (1 O CFR) for the proposed modifications associated with the replacement SGs .1

2. What are the differences between the old and new steam generators?

The differences between the original SGs and the replacement SGs all relate to physical design aspects such as the material, component dimensions , number of tubes per generator, etc. The required design and safety functions of the SG remain the same. The NRC staff will be reviewing the 50 .59 analyses supporting the design changes to ensure that plant safety is not impacted by the changes and to evaluate licensee's conclusions regarding whether NRC approval is needed for the changes.

3. Can you explain the 50.59 process?

The 50.59 process involves implementation of the requirements set forth in 10 CFR 50 .59, a federal regulation . Essentially, whenever a licensee decides to implement a physical change to its facility or change how the facility is operated, used or controlled , including changes to safety analyses or documentation (e .g., a calculation , evaluation , methodology), then the 50.59 regulation allows a licensee to implement that change without prior NRC approval only if the change meets criteria pertaining to the safety implications of the proposed change. Generally, if a change would place the plant outside of the safety boundaries established by the NRC and reflected in the plant's licensing basis (e .g., NRC regulations , licensing documents, and plant safety ana lyses report), then prior NRC approval would be needed .

4. Can you explain the license amendment process?.

In general , the license amendment application revi~w process has 5 steps : 1) Conducting an acceptance review to determine if there is sufficient technical information for the NRC staff to begin a detailed technical review of the application ; 2) Publishing a Federal Register notice that describes the application and gives members of the public an opportunity to comment on the proposed determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration (NSHC) and request permission to be a party in a hearing ; 3) Conducting a technical review to determine the safety of, and the environmental impacts of, the proposed amendment, including, if needed, sending requests for additional information (RAls) to obtain additiona l information needed to make an informed regulatory decision ;

4) Completing the NRC staffs safety evaluation (SE), which provides the technical, OFFICIO I. WIE 8Ub¥ oecam, ""l!tJll,l!!8 IUPOFUUIJ!t 11014 3

(1L?M:5t 2JJ Ctf/1/~ Qf PCI ft Is I !&Ii Otllslf &liiUAllil/ Ails ft iEEi' ltlFOPM CIIOt I safety, and legal basis for the NRC's decision on the amendment application: and 5) If the amendment is approved, issuing the amendment and publishing a Federal Register notice that indicates when the amendment issued and whether the NRC staff made a final NSHC determination.

5. How do 50.59 analyses and license amendments assure safety?

Both processes provide assurance that changes at operating reactors are not made until the safety significance of the change is considered. As noted above, the 50.59 process can lead to a determination that a 50.90 license amendment application. and thus prior NRC approv*aI. is required .

6. What changes would require a license amendment?

If a proposed change is not consistent with a technical specification or places the plant outside of the safety boundaries established in the plant's licensing basis, then the change would require a license amendment.

7. Why not require a license amendment for the whole replacement?

NRC inspectors review samples of licensee 50.59 evaluations and decisions during the SG replacement inspections. If the Agency determines that a license amendment is required, the Agency can take appropriate enforcement action.

8. Are any license amendments needed for the SG replacements at Davis-Besse?

Davis-Besse submitted a license amendment request for Technical Specifications (TS) changes related to the replacement steam generators. *The NRC staff is currently reviewing this amendment request.

9. Have any concerns been raised regarding the steam generator replacement?

A request for hearing and petition to intervene on the Technical Specification (TS) license amendment request was filed in May 2013. The petitioners challenged the 10 CFR 50.59 analyses on the steam generators replacement. contending that the steam generator replacement activities required an additional license amendment request. On August 12, 2013, the Atomic Safety Licensing Board (ASLB) denied the petition, The ASLB ruled that petitioners cannot challenge 10 CFR 50.59 analyses done to support steam generator replacement activities in a proceeding on a license amendment request to change TS related to operation with the new steam generators replacement. The ASLB also ruled that a ~hallenge to adequacy of 10 CFR 50.59 analyses for replacement of the steam generators can only be made by filing a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.

10. Will the NRC staff conduct an inspection concerning the steam generator replacement activities?

Yes. The NRC staff will inspect the licensee's SG replacement activities during inspections which began on December 2, 2013. During the inspection, the NRC staff will review10 CFR 50.59 analyses done to support the steam generator replacement, as well as monitor steam generator replacement activities. An inspection report will be issued to document the results of the NRC staff's review. _, OFS:CICI 'l&S SUL: UCC,t,;JFUY 1 ~EL:ltlliB ltlEAiDP0IION 4

_ 1tffj/!/l:1t :[Iv e/t/fj ~ ornc1 or , Iii em:Y secORifv-RELA 1215 11.re~NIA, ION

11. Will the NRC's review of the new steam generators/50.59 evaluations be complete before the plant can start up with the new steam generators?

It is the licensee's responsibility to ensure changes associated with the new steam generators are thoroughly evaluated and are safe and implemented appropriately . While the NRC staff will complete its inspection review as expeditiously as possible, we can't guarantee we will reach final conclusions prior to plant restart. The NRC staff will take the time it needs to do a thorough and rigorous inspection and to arrive at supportable conclusions. However, if at any time the NRC staff concludes that the changes are not safe, the NRC would take appropriate enforcement action, including ensuring the plant stays in or is placed in a safe condition.

12. Will there be an NRC inspection report for the DB steam generators? Will the inspection results be publicly available before restart?

The inspection results for the SG replacement inspection will be documented in a publicly available NRC inspection report which will be issued within 45 days after the completion of the inspection. The NRC inspection is extensive and includes evaluation of licensee activities that occur throughout the replacement outage and subsequent startup. Hence, the inspection report will not be available prior to startup.

13. Has the NRC incorporated lessons learned from previous SG replacements in inspections for the Davis-Besse replacements?

Recent operating experience at facilities where SGs have been replaced is being incorporated (or was incorporated) into the inspection effort for the Davis-Besse SG replacements. Region Ill staff closely coordinates with NRC headquarters to identify areas for a rigorous review of 50.59 evaluations. For the Davis-Besse steam generator replacement inspection, the NRC will be reviewing the licensees' evaluation of previous operating experience, key design differences between original and replacement steam generators, and if they exist, design change challenges discussed between the licensee and its vendor.

14. Has Davis-Besse licensee reviewed the SONGS or other SG replacement operating experience such as at TMl-1 and Oconee Unit 3 in preparation for their steam generator replacements?

Yes, Davis-Besse described in a public meeting how they have considered the SONGS, TMI , and Oconee SG tube degradation operating experience in their steam generator design and replacement activities. The NRC inspectors will review this information and the 50.59 evaluations supporting these design modifications as part of the SG replacement inspection activities.

15. Are these new steam generators considered an experimental design?

No, these new replacement SGs are not considered an experimental design. They are similar in basic design to the original SGs. There is also operating experience available regarding replacemeAt steam generators of a similar design as those being installed at Davis-Besse. The NRC inspectors will be reviewing the licensee's evaluation of the operating experience available as it pertains to the specific design.

                -   OFFIOI.IIL ~OE o,~tV      6$qbl<l¥1( RE!t:t:liiC IIIF8AM11:flirt         5

   -         9Fflihf.L  USE OIQLf      5266:CI I I fU!l3f1iJiliiit :e:soe::* lilill

16. What are the main differences between the steam generators at Davis-Besse and SONGS?

The Davis-Besse and SONGS SGs are different designs.

The steam generators at SONGS are recirculating steam generator design. They are designed for a Combustion Engineering plant which requires larger steam

generators, averaging close to 9,000 tubes per steam generator. The SONGS SGs were manufactured by MHI and are one of the largest steam generators used in the industry. The SONGS replacement SGs were modeled for vibration using MHl's proprietary modeling code.
The Davis-Besse Steam generators are a completely different design from SONGS in that they are once through steam generators (they do not have a U-bend tube region, instead they consist of straight tubes) and were manufactured by B&W Canada. The Davis-Besse replacement SGs were modeled for vibration using an industry accepted EPRI modeling code.

17. Will DB cut a hole in the shield building for these replacement ste am generators?

What impact will that cutting and opening process have on the existing shield building cracking? In order to remove the old steam generators and install the new steam generators, the licensee will cut another hole in the reinforced concrete shield building. The hole will be located entirely within the boundaries of a previous hole that was cut for replacement of the reactor pressure vessel closure head, and hence will be in new concrete that was poured in 2012. Thus, the licensee does not expect there to be any impact on previously identified cracking in the older portions of the shield building wall.

            ..,    05519ft1k ltl&i 8ULY ., OECt91".I' i5 FtliibOISD ttl50RM/i¥1014             6

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 1600 E lAMA~ BLVD ARLINGTON TX 76011~ 511 September 11, 2014 MEMORANDUM TO: Wayne Walker. Chief Division of Reactor Projects, Branch A FROM: Multiple Addressees. as listed below

SUBJECT:

COMMUNICATIONS PLAN - DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TOPICS OF INTEREST The purpose of this memo is to transmit and request comments/c:oncurrence on the enclosed Communications Plan for Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). The enclosed document is based on several iterations of infonnal communication plans. Q&~ documents, and responses to congressional questions developed primarily by Region IV. NR.R, OPA. and OCA over the last several years. This communication plan describes the methods and resources tlhat NRC staff will use to communicate with internal and external stakeholders regarding t~1e DCPP seismic history and ongoing seismic evaluations being conducted in response to the ,Japan LeS-sons Learned Near-Term Task Force recommendations. Additionally, as applicable to current issues of interest to DCPP stakeholders, this communications plan integrates key me*ssages related to spent fuel/dry cask storage and waste confidence issues (primarily by r,eferencing other active . communication plans). This revision also incorporates Q&As for the most recent issues c>f concern including the licensee's AB-1632 Report to the State of California and the *se'fll.-ell Report." Once finalized, the Communications Plan will be posted on the OEOO Communications website for use by the communications team and more broadly across tho agency as necessary. Most of those on concurrence have each provided significant inp1Jt to iterations of this document (or documents from which this Plan was developed). As such, we* are requesting your review/comments/concurrence In the next few daya (due by icoe, Monday, September 16). Please forward your comments/concurrence on the document to Theresa Buchanan (Jheresa.Buchanan@nrc.gov and/or ph: (817) 200-1503) of my s,taff. The concurrence block noted on the next page will be used to do1cument your concurrence on the enclosed Communications Plan.

Enclosure:

As stated

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION (b)(5) Page 1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITl\'E INTERNAL INFORMATION

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIYE INTERNAL INFORMATION (b)(S) Page 2 OFFICIAL USE ONbY 8EN81Tlv-E INTERNAL INFORMATION

OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITl'IE INTERNAL INFORMATION (b)(S) OfflCIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION-

OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITPJE INTERNAL INFORMATION (b}(5) -OFFICIAL JJSE ON* Y - $EN$1IIYE INTERNAL IN,-ORMATION l filfeWeffl~ ffl B1 an ft> ~~sRAfifft%dBgt005 d

                                     ~lo..slrue-d~-e . ~ ~y expen.se.s .)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITl\'E INTERNAL INFORMATION (b)(S) Page 65 OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITJYE INTERNAL INFORMATION

r, Paul Gunter Jim Rictiu

                                    )     [     r Tirn Judson I
                                                              ~          Ir 0 11 vc Luthlmum I     Lutas Hixson Bey(111d Nuclear    Grecnp~ce       Nuclear ln rornmtfon and Lin ion of Cunccmecl   wwi.v,Flnf0rnwble.c,)n1 Resource Service             Scie!ltlsts Nove mber 19, 20 14 Dr. Allison M . Macfarlane, Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-000 I

Dear C hainnan Macfarlane:

On behalf of the Freedom of Information Team, I respectfully ask the Commission to revisit and revise the information withholding policies approved in Staff Require ments Memo randum (SRM) dated November 9, 2004, for SECY-04-019 1 dated October 19, 2004. In response to the tragic events of 9/ l l, the NRC staff proposed a framework for withholding information fro m the public that mi ght be useful to adversaries attempting radiological sabotage at NRC-licensed facilities. The Commission approved 1the staff' s proposal. In the second paragraph of the SRM, lhe Commission directed that "the staff sho uld move expeditiously lo complete the necessary determinations and restore public access to the appropriate documents." Since that time, the NRC and Lhe nuclear industry have developed a syste m for withbolding the proper information. For example, the NRC released Regulatory l ssue Summary RIS-05-026, "Control of Sensitive Unclassified Nonsafeguards Tnfo1rmation Related to Nuclear Power Reactors;" RJS-05-03 1, Control of Secmity-Related Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards lnformation Handled by Individuals, Firms, and Entities Subject to NRC Regulation of the Use of Source, Byproduct, and Special Nuclear Materia l;" RTS-07-04, "Personally Identifiable lnfo1matiot1 Submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; aud R IS- 12-03, " Rei ntegratfon of Security into the Reactor Oversig ht Program Assessment Progra m." The NRC also re vised IOCFR 2.390 to clarify what information must be withheld. The nuclear industry and the NRC have operating experience using this system. Today, there is a common understanding of what info rmation needs to be withheld along with the appropriate means for withholdfog it. It is now time to restore public access to the appropriate documents while retaining necessary protection against inappropriate di sclosures. Specifically, we ask Lbat the framework in Attachmen1r l to SECY-04-019 1 profiling all incoming documents from plant owners about Jire p:roltecUon and emergency planning as no npublic be reversed. All incoming documents about fire protection and e mergency planning should be profiled as public.

Plant owners now have clarity from the NRC regarding the nature and context of information that must be withheld from the public. Plant owners now also have an established and well-used process for submitting docurnents containing such information to the NRC so that the information is appropriately withheld. Thus, documents about fire protection or emergency planning containing sensitive information will be submiued by plant owners per 10 CPR 2.390 and collaleral processes, obviating the need for blanket withholding of all fire protection and emergency planning documents. We look forward to the NRC restoring public access LO appropriate fire protection and emergency planning information. Sincerely, David Lochbaum Director, Nuclear Safety Project Union of Concerned Scientists POBoxl5316 Chattanooga, TN 37415 423-468-9272, office dlochbaum @ucsusa.org NuvembcJ' 19. 2014 Page 2

[ Unionof Concerne Scientists d *

ucsusa.org Two Brattle. qua re, Cambridge, MA 02138-3780 t 617.547.5552 f ()) 7.864.940S 1825 Sll'eel , uite 00, Wu hington,
20006-1232 t 202.223.6133 f 202.223.6162 2397. hattuck ,\venue. u ite 203, Berkeley, CA 4704-1567 t 510.843.1872 f SJ0.843.3785 t nl.' orth LnS~II trcl"t, Suite 190 , hlcngo, IL 60602- 4064 t 312,578,1750 r J J2 ,578 .175 1 December J7, 20 14 Hubert Bell , rnspector General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wa hington, DC 20555-000 1

Dear Mr. Bell:

On behalf of the Union of Concerned Sc.ientists, 1 re *pe tful1y ask the Office of the Inspector General to investigate whel'her lhe Nuclear R gulatory Commjssion vioLaled federal statu tes and/or federal regulaUons with the information wilhholding policy approved in Staff Regui:rement. Memorandum (SRM) dated November 9, 2004, for B Y 0191 dat d October 19. 2004. Among other things, the policy authorized the NRC staff to withhold ail documents it re eived from plant owners involving fire protectioa and emergency planning. In the text on page 7 f the attachment. to ECY-04-0 I9I , Lhe N RC staff recognized that most of these incorning fire protection and emergency planni11g records would not likely contain sensitive information that needed withholding from Lbe public. Yet the NRC taff r commended, and a majoiity of the Com mis *ion appr ved, withholding th se in oming records. Earlier this y ar, 1 ubmitled r que ts und r the Freedom of lnformation Act for fire protection and emergency pl-inning records daled O tober 1, 2004, or later that wer n already publicly available. The fire protection records provided to me in response t my FOlA requests are mostly contained in tbe October 3, 2014, folder in the NRC's Agen *ywide Document Access and Managem nt Sy tem (ADAMS). No documents were withheld in their entirety by the NR when respond.ing to rny FOIA requests. And 1 have not yet located a si ngle redaction in any of the fire protection records released by th NRC staff in respon

to my FOIA requests. 1 Thu , ther wa , no justifiable basis for withholding these records from the public.

1 om* \1 r lhe emergency planning rec r<l~ r *lea~e<l in response l my FOIA requ 'Sl:- hmJ 1\!lephonc numbers and similar information redacted, but Lhose redactions represented considerably less than one percent of the material iJ1 tb

do *uments.

Pr Irued on IOO'ru po<c.con,umt!l' r<'<'ycled pnpcr

But even if the tragic events of 9/ 11 wa.iTanted en-or on the side of caution , a policy decision cannot trump or negate federal statutes and regulations. This policy with regard to fire protecti n and emergency planning records seems to have authoriz cl practice that violate federal statutes and regulations. Several examples that strongly suggest that NR violated federal statutes a.i1d regula tions are summarized in the following tabl e. Table 1: Some of the Fire Protection Records Withheld by the NRC Date ADAMS Document Docwnent Made Comment ML Date Public The NRC npproved 1l1e exemption Re ponse ro NRC reques1 for on 09/27/2006. The upproval nddi tion:il information (ML062 l 60387) wa made public ML060300439 regarding tire suppression OJ/1 3/2006 10/03/2014 on 10/02/2006. Lack of access to exemption request 11 Turk *y the ex *mption requeRl prevente,d r Point Units 3 and 4 ~ignificantly impaired the puhlic's

                                                                        ,,billty lo oooose iL The NRC approved the exemption Response to NRC request for                              on 09/27/2006. The approval aJditionaJ i nformntion                                  (ML062160387) wus made puhli ML0620 IO 140 regarding fire suppression        07/12/2006   10/03/2014  on I0/02/2006, Lack of acce~s to exempti on request at Turkey                             the 1.:xemption roqucsl prevented tlr Point Units 3 und 4                                      , ignificallll)" imp,1ircd the public's ability Lo oooose it.

The NRC issu *J tbe umcnJmcnt 111 04/25/2007. The amendment (MLU7 I 16043 1) was made public Li cnsc am~ndmenL request on 05/1712007. N tice of the for fire protection pending amendment was published Ml..063200100 11/1 5/2006 10/03/20 14 r quirements at Browns Ferry in the Fedeml Reg isll' I' on Unit I. 2, and 3 04/05/2007. Lack of acces to the ameudtnent reque t p.reventeJ or

                                                                        , ignificantly impaired the public's ability to oooose it.

The NRC issu d lice nse amendment on 09/16/2009. The amenJment (ML082280465) was Supplement to Jlcen e made public on 09/24/2008, Notice am ndme11 t reque, t for 1 of lhe pending amemlmenls was ML082590007 deviation from fire protection 09/05/2008 10/03/2014 publi hed in the Federa l Regi ter on requirement , at South Tex.is 08/25/2009. Lack of access to the Project* Uni ts l nnd 2 tlev i1:1ti on rcque~t 11reventecl or significantly impaired the public's abi lity LO {)J)J)O~C il. The NRC issued lijcense amendments on 09/16/2009. The Resp msc t > NR r *quti~l fur H111CIIUllll!nt (ML082280465) Wl.lS additional information made public on 09/24/2008. Nol'icc regarding roqu , ted dev imi on of Lh

pending amendments was ML093350537 11/20/2009 10/03/2014 fro m fire prolection publi shed in the Fed *ml Regi.~ter on regulalions al Soulh Tex.as 08/25/2009. Luck of access to Lhe Projec1 Units 1 und 2 deviation request pn.wcntccl or significantly impaired the public'

ibillty to oooose iL Dec mber 17, 20 14 Pagc2

Table 1: Some of the Fire Protection Records Withheld by the NRC Date ADAMS Document Document Made Comment ML Date Public The NRC approved the exempti n 011 0'.V I 1/20 I0. The approval Request for exemption rrom (MLl00340670) was made public ML090570050 fire proto *tion regulati ns al 02/18/2009 10/03/2014 on 03/ 12/20 JO . Lack of access lo PitzP,1trick the c mption rcques1 prcvcnl ed r ignificant ly impaired the public's ability ro ODDOSe it. The NRC approved the exemption R sponse to NRC request for on 03/11/2010. The approval additional information (MLl00340670) was made public ML090960214 regar<li11g fire protection 03/30/2009 10/03/2014 011 03/1 2/20!0. Lack of nccess to reguhition exemption re4ucst thee empti@ request prevented or at FitzPatrick significantly impaired the public's ability LO OflDO Se il. Licensee event report (LER) While LER" do not constitl1le ML09 I 320440 for deficiencies ill Appendix R 0S/l l/Z00 9 I0/0 / 3 2014 Ileen ing action requests (e.g ., fire respon se plnn at Point llcensc amendm nts, exemption~, 1 - - - - - - t _B_e_ac_h_U _ n_i_t _l _ _ _ _ _ _i - - - - - - - - - 1 deviations. etc. , tl1ey describe vio lations of regulatory requirements. either hardware or proces ' related. When avai.lable, LERs could be cited by the public Licensee event report (LER) in opposing liccn,<,;ing request~ for n rn-comp li ance manual involving hw*dwure a11d prnces,~ ML103570032 12/22/20!0 l0/03/2014 actions in fire response plans *hange~. By withho lding all fire at M nlicello pr le ti n L Rs, the NRC significantly hampered the public'. ability Lo evaluate lire protection program udequa y und ontesl perceived shortcomings. The NRC prepared it~ finding of oo

                                                                             . ig11ificant hazards for the FedcraJ Register on 02/25/2010. The uotice (MLl00560391J was made publi License amendment reque t to                                 on 03/ 15/20 l 0. The NRC is"ued the ML093641067 use tirc-re~lstive ulectrk,d            12/16/2009   10/03/20 14 amendmcnL on 09/30/20 I0. The ca ble at Wolf r ek                                          nmendmenl (ML102560498 wa made public 11 I0/01/20l0. Lack f ncc;ess to the amendmen t reque. t prevented or significantly impaired the public's ability to oppose it.

By withholding license amendment requests, the NRC seems to have violated 10 CFR

50. 1, N tice f r pubUc omment; State consultation. Even wllen th agen y publi hes notices about the request in the Federal Reg ister, withholding the underlying request rendered that opportunity for public comment meaningless. The public lacked viable means to contest secret" request .

De ember 17, 20 14

10 CFR 50.91 also provides opportunities for States to u-eview proposed licensing actions and comment on or oppose them. The NRC's information withholding policy may also ha ve infringed on States' abil ities to conduct their cons1L1Jtation function. We request. that OTG's investigation also determine whether the NRC's policy adversely affected the States' role in licensing actions. The NRC's information withholding policy would also seem to violate the spirit if not the letter of the Administrative Procedure Act. This federal statute requires agencies like the NRC lo provide for public parlit:ipation in rulemaking processes. While the fire protection and emergency planning records withheld by the NRC 1rnay not directly in volve rulemaking, there most ce1tainly is an indirect nexus. When plant owners requested exemptions from NRC's regulations promulgated via a public rulemaking process, the NRC depri ved the public or its d ght to contest how the APA-compJjant requirements were applied lo the licensed nuclear facjlities in their communities. And when the NRC pursued rulemaking, as ids and will be doi n.g regarding emergency planning in response to both Fukushima's lessons and numerous reactor decommissionings, the NRC's withholding of the past decade's worth of emerge Dey planning records essentially turned the APA-compliance rnlemakin.gs into a mockery of meanjngfuJ publjc participation. An oft-cited adage states that "information is power." The NRC's inforn,ation withJ10Jding practice rendered the public powerless to participate in the agen,cy's rulemaking proceedings. Along with several otheT NGO representatives, 1 met with the NRC staff about document classification and info rmation redaction policies on October 7. 201 4, in a public ,neeting attended by some members of the 010 staff. We followed up with a letter to Chainmu, Macfarlane dated November 19, 2014, requesting the Commission to reverse the policy for withholding all incoming records involving fo:e protect1io11 and emergency planning. We have reason to belief the information withholdi ng policy will be changed in the near funire. While we are hopeful th.at the NRC staff will soon ceas,e blanket withholding of incoming fire protection and emergency planning records, that wi ll solve only pan of the problem. We respectfully request that OIG investigate the policy to address the remainder of the problem. Even if lhe information withholding policy was justifiable, policy cannot violate federal statmes and regulations. Thus, Lbe policy adopted by the NRC in late 2004 should not have resulted in requests for license ao1endments, deviati ons, and exemptions of fire protection regulatory requirements being withheld from the public. December 17, 20 14 Pnge4

The information withholding policy adopted by the NRC in late 2004 attempted to better protect the public's safety. ln applying the policy, the NRC undermined the public ' s rights. Thus, the NRC's good intentions were offset by the uniJ1tended consequences. The OTG's investigation would identify those consequences as well as factors that could have or should have enabled maximum benefits Lo be derived with minimal consequences. The report on tbe OlG's investigation can help the NRC stalt'f implement process fi xes that better maintain the delicate balance between the legitimate need to withhold some information and the public's right to know the rest of the information. Sincerely. David Lochbaum Director, Nuclear Safety Project Union of Concerned Scienrists PO Box 153 16 Chattanooga, TN 37415 423-468-9272, office dlochbaum @ucsusa.org Dect:mber 17, 2014 Pagc5

[ C~~ce~ned Scientists ISSUE BRIEF No Morie Fukushimas; No Morie Fort Calhouns HIGHLIGHTS Two significant nuclear power safety events occurred in the spring of 2011. 0/1 I\J'rif II, 2()1 f, /IJ)('/'clltl/'.~ ii/1111 On March 11, an earthquake and the tsunami it spawned caused the me ltdown of dawn tlw r*l'm*ror ar the ~'m*r Ca//mun three reactors at the Fukush ima Daiichi nuclear plant in .Jap an. Less than a month later, on Apr.ii 9, operators shut down the reactor al the Fort Calhoun nuclear 1111rl<'m plant in Nebraska for a routme pl1111t in Nebraska for a routine re fu eling outage. But myriad i:afe1y problems dis-reji1e/i11gou1,we. &11 myriad safety covered during the outage- m any dating back to when the p hu1t was constructed 1inrlr/e111.1 tli~rc11*crcd during thC' 011t<.1!JC!- in the late 1960s and earl)* 1970s-preve11ted the reactor from rest,trting for two rJ1a11y daH'11,~ had, to wlwn tlic J'lunr 111,1.~ and u ha lf years. ranstnictcd in the law IIJ60s <1nd car(y Following the first even;t, t he U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 1970s-prevcntt'd lhe ri!,1cwr) iwn which oversees the safety of the nation's nuclear power plants, formed a task force that examined the Fukushima accident and identified mo re than 30 lessons that 1*esturth1gfar two ,md ,1 h11/fye1tr.1. T/w could reduce vulnerabilities in the United States. The NRC ordered plant owners U.S. Nud,,,,,. Reg11hirary <.\1171111is.1i1111 to implement specific safety upgrades and is pursuing additional measures to (NJ~<.:), w/1ich 01'<'rsces thi' 11atin11's 1111dcar further reduce vulnernbilitics. pawer plants, n&'ed.< to determine how its Followi ng the second event, the NRC made no such effort to examine the Fort insp,xwrs 11nJ thu plant 01v11er missed-or Calhoun situation. It foiled to identify lessons d1at would enable it to detect safety dismi.1s('d 1111111erc,11s la11gsr1111dh1g safety violations sooner and correct them before t hey could accumulate to epidemic f'rn/,/en,s fn1* yc*,irs di'spitc rhaus,tnd8 of proportions requiring years t o fix-or worse, contribute to an American Fukushima. Fort Calhoun received iits first operating license in 1973, and the NRC reli-hours of inspections. It should appoint ,, censed the plant in 2003 to c:ontinue operating for .is long as 20 more years. Jaskjim:e to recommend cha11ges to Neither of these licensing efforts, nor the tens of thousands of hours the NRC the NRCs 111.1pcc11,111 mu/ 111*c1:o;ig/11 spent inspecting Fort Calhouu, led the agency to discover any of these many 1*]T,.J/'fs am/ t/ic11 imph*111c11t these safety problems. c:lumges as q11ickly as possil,/e For t,vo weeks;,. June JOll,fluv,/i'rl,{m* tlie J\Jissour/ River tw neJ Nfbraska's Fort Calhoun ttut'iear power pla11t rnw 11111.,1,rnd. The pion/ ha,/ alreod,v b,*an shut dnwn [01* mynod .,o[t,cy i oblm1,- 111a11,v dari11g l>ork to its con.,tr*u,*cia11 in th,* lati! IY6Us um/ early 1970s.

Fort Calhoun's shutdown was not an isolated inciden t: The fact that there have been 52 year-plus outages demon-its tw*o-and-a-h alf-ycar ouluge mnrke d th e fifty-second time u s trates thnt U.S. reactor

often operate while vio lating U.S. reactor re mained shut down for longer than a yea r so the num erous afery requirem ents. These *afety violi1tions not owner co uld correct acCLunuJated safety problems see the only make reactors more vulnerable to acc idems, but aJso table). In each of th e cases, the reac tor had been operating make t he m more likely to experien ce a Fukushima-scale w ith serious s:ifcty problems prior to the shutdown- problems disa. ter in the eve nt of an accident.

that made an accident more likely. Moreove r. the$e 52 outages By clo ing the gap between wh at its safe ty regulations have cost ratcpnyc rs a11d s hare holders billion. or dollnrs. require :rnd what .S. pla nt owners actua ll y do, the NR The NR 's g al of preve11ting a Fuku hi111a- cale accident wou ld not only pre e nt another Fort Calh ou n, it would al:-0 in this couutry must be accompanied by the goal of preventing s treng-then its post-Fukushima reforms. And because ye,tr-anoth r p ro lMgcd afNy outage like thnl nr loort Calh oun. plus nuti1ge f'o1* sa f'c Ly fix s arc cos Lly, preventing a no ther Date Date Outage Date Date Outage Outage Outage Length Outage Outage Length Reactor Began Ended (years) Reactor Began Ended (years) Ferm i Un it 1 10/5/66 7/18/70 3.8 Surry Unlt 2 9/10/88 9/19/89 1.0 Palisades 8/ 11/73 10/1/7 4 1.1 P<1lo Verde Unt l 1 3/5/89 7/5/90 1.3 BrOWl\5 Ferry L/ 1\ll 2 3/22/75 9/10/76 1.5 Calvert Cliffs Utlll 2 3/17/89 5/11/91 2.1 Browns Ferry Urnl 1 3/22/75 9/24/76 1,5 Ca lvert Cliffs Uhll l 5/5/89 10/4/90 1.4 Surry Unit 2 2/4/79 8/19/80 1.5 F1tzPatricl< 11/27/91 l/23/93 1.2 T11ree Mile ls laMd U111t I 2/17/79 10/9/85 6.6 Bru 1 sw1ck Urul 2 4/21/92 5/15/93 1.1 1 urkey Point Unit 3 2/ 11/81 4/11/82 J.2 8runsw1c:k Unll I '1/21/92 2/11/94 1.8 Sc1n Onofre Unit 7 2/26/82 11/28/84 2.8 South Texas Pro1ect 2/3/93 S/22/94 1.3 Nine Mile Point Unil 1 3/20/82 7/5/83 1.3 Unit 2 Indian Point Unrl 3 3/25/82 6/8/83 1.2 Soulh Texas Pro1ec:t Ul\ll 1 2/4/93 2/25/94 1.1 OysLet Creek 2/12/83 11/1/84 1.7 Indian Point Unit 3 2/27/93 7/2/95 2.3 St. Lucie Unit 1 2/26/83 5/16/84 1.2 Sequoya !, Unit 1 3/2/93 4/20/94 1.1 Browf'IS Ferry Unit 3 9/7/83 11/28/84 1.2 f:errn1 Unit 2 12/25/93 1/18/95 1.1 Pllgnrn 12/10/83 12/30/84 1.1 Maine Yankee 1/14/95 1/ 18/96 1.0 Peacl1 BotLom Unit 2 4/28/84 7/13/85 1,2 Salern Unit 1 5/16/95 4/20/98 2.9 Fort St. Vra1n 6/13/84 4/11/86 1.8 Salem Unit 2 6/7/95 8/30/97 2.2 Browns Ferry Unit 2 9/15/84 5/24/91 6.7 lvltllstone Unit 2 2/20/96 5/11/9 3.2 Browns Ferry Unit 3 3/9/85 11/19/95 10.7 Mlllst ne Unit 3 3/30/96 7/1/98 2.3 Browns Ferry UM 1 3/19/85 6/12/07 22.2 Crystal River Unit 3 9/2/96 2/6/98 1.4 Davis-Besse 6/9/85 12/24/86 1.5 Clinton 9/5/95 5/27/99 2.7 Sequoyah Untt 2 8/22/85 5/13/88 2.7 LaSulle County Unit 2 9/20/96 4/11/99 2.6 SeQuoyah Unit 1 8/22/85 11/10/88 3.2 LaSalle CoU r'tY Unit 1 9/22/96 8/13/98 1,9 Rahcho Seco 12/26/85 4/11/88 2,3 D.C. Cook Unit 2 9/9/97 6/25/00 2.8 Ptlgrirn 4/11/86 6/15/89 3,2 D.C. Cook U111t l 9/9/97 12/21/00 3.3 Peach Botton\ Urol 2 3/31/87 5/22/89 2.1 Davi!>-Bes5e 2/16/02 3/16/04 2.1 Peach Boll.ortl Unit 3 3/31/87 12/ 11/89 2.7 For Call,oun 4/9/11 12/21/13 2.7 Nine Mile Point unit 1 12/19/87 8/12/90 2.6 SOlJRCE. UPDATED f'flt)M I.UC'flEll\llM JU06 2 l/N 10 OF CO CE R N ED SCI ENTJSTS

safety problems reported by Fort Calhoun's owner during These year-plus outages [ demonstrate that U.S. reactors often operate the prolonged ou tage included: Inadequate flood protection. NRC inspectors had already determined in 2010 that measures designed to while violating safety requirements.

                                                                                      ]                 protect salfety equipment in the auxiliary building and at the intake structure from external flooding hnd not been adequately implemented as specified by the original safety studies. Workers identified additional deficiencies during the* outage (Bannister 2011a). Furthermore, when the plant's. owner replaced the original security system in Fort Cal houn would save ratepayers and shareholders money.

1985, it left portions of the old system in place. Although Preventing financial meltdowns and avoiding reactor melt-the owner scaled the intake structure's walJs up to the downs is a goal too good to pass up. calculated flooding level to protect vital cooling water Just ns it did for Pukushima, the N RC must formally pumps ins ide, it fai led to seal areas where the old security examine the Fort Calhoun c,1se, identify the lessons that system's c:ables penetrated the intake structure. As a should be learned, and make appropriate changes to its over-result, t he safety-related water pumps could have been sight process to reduce the likelihood tlrnt safety problems damaged by flooding (_Bannister 201lb). remain undetected- and uncorrected- for months or years. Missing safety syst em parts. Fort Calhoun's owner in-stalled 32 :seismically quali fied General Electric electrical Safety Problems at Fort Ca1h0lm relays in s:afety syst ems at the plant. Workers tested sev-en of these re lays and three failed the tests. Workers then Tn a presentation to the NRC on March 27, 2013, Fort Calhoun's discovered rhc cause was a missing part. Further inquiries owner reported that 20,000 tasks had been completed between concluded that the relays were most likely missing this November 2012 and February 2013 and h,1d npproximntely 5,000 other tasks to do before it could restart the reactor pan when they were installed during the plant's original construction (Cortopassi 2013a). (OPPD 2013). While many of these tasks involved preventive maintenance and routine inspections, some entailed Inadequate earthquake protection. Wor kers found correcti.llg serious safety problems. that transmitters used to monitor reactor cooling water When a safety problem's severity rises above a fairly high pressure had been installed on an instrument rack that threshold, the plant owner must report it to the NRC. The was not designed to adequately protect them from In A/,,rcl, 201,l, (,',,rr Cnllwt,n's nwnc, 1*cportcd rhat it hail rvmplu1ed 20,000 tfL,h rl'q11in-d by tlrl' NllC tr4nrl' rlt,* r*caaor cuuld b,* rc.,tart,*d b11t Mill l1t1d ,1ppm.,*11H<1tely 5,000 lllore to Jo. /form* ofth,* w.,ks ,,nt.11/eJ r01*recti11g serwus saji:ty pr.1/,/ems. No More Fukushimas; No Mori.! Fort Calhouns 3

movement during an earthquake. The owner informed tbis piping foiled to comply with the piping code and the NRC that, "During a seismic event, rhe excessive L11e1*efore was not properly l[uali fi cd (Cortop,1ssi 20 12). weight of these instrument racks could cause the racks Improperly grounded reactor protection system. to fail," resulting in a reactor cooling water leak that Workers discovered that the voltage in the reactor could not be isolawd, increasing the risk of 11ut:Jear protection system- which detects unsafe conditions core d.1111age (Banni~tcr 2012a). and initiates at1Wmntic safety system actions- was ncnrly Vulnerability to high-speed debris. In the event of 10 times higher than the design allowed. As ,1 result, the n tornado, debris propelled by high winds can disable systc~m might not i11itiate the automalic responses lhe eSSl*ntial safety equipment. Wol'l,ers identified 11umero11s plonl's safety studie~ ass1 1111cd would h:1ppcn. tLvcn potential sources of such debris, including removable worse, this unacceptahle condition had been previously hatches 011 the intake strucrme, the exhaust stack for the identified and reported multiple times since 1993 but ste:rn1-driven auxilinry feed water pump, the vent stnck nevcir corrected (Reinharr 2011). and fill line for tl1e emergency diesel generator'~ foel oil tanks, the cable pull boxes for the raw water pumps, and [ the exhaust stacks for the emergency diesel generator:-; l1Vorkers discovered that (Cortopassi 20136). some ofthe support beams Overloaded backup power source. Workers discovered that, in a situation where one of the two e.mcrge11cy diesel for the containment generators was unavailable, more equipment would he structure were not c:onnected to the remaining emergency diesel generator than th,tt genenltor could supply <luring certain types properly designed to ] of accidents. The system designed to disconnect non-essential equipment from the emergency diesel generator handle the weight they during an accident would not pe-rform properly du1-illg s11pported. these type:;. of :;iccidents, and rhe overloaded generator could fail to function (Bannister 2012b). Safoty pumps operated outside vendor limits. Work-Inadequately tested backup power source. In 1990, ers determi11ed that, since l996, the motors for the co111-workct's revi~ed ,I test procedure for the emergency diesel po11,~nt cooli11gwatC'r (CCW) pumps had been operating generators and no longer checked whether the plant's 11nd1?r conditions b!.!yond those recommended by the fuel oil transfer purnps would automatically start and manufacturer. The CCW system supplies cooling water send fut!! from the on$ite storage rank to the generntors. to r~::ictor component~ that could i:ontai 11 radioncti\'e This check required by the reactor's operating license, water (for example, reactor coobm pump lube oil and had not been performed for nearly a quarter of a century seal coolers, containment air cooling units, spent fuel (B:mnistcr 2012c), pool heat exchanger). M()tors operated outside the Overloaded support beam. Workers discovered that manufacturer's limits could faiJ during an accident some of the support beams for the containment structure (Barrnister 2012e). were not propel'ly designed ro h:c1ndlc rhc weight they This, lisr summarizes on ly a handful of tJ1e safety prob-supported (Bannister 2012d). lem~ l hM eluded detE!ction and correction at Fort Calhoun i nadequate piping qualific.itions. Workers discovered for years, subjecting the surrounding population to undue that chemical n.nd volume control system (CVCS) piping elevated risk. The plant's problems covered a rnnge of enbri~ had not been pror,erly qualified for the stresses ir could nee ring discipli11es: e!cctritul, metlu,nical, civil, und instru-experience during its lifetime. A 111011g other factors, the ment and controls. They fell into several major safety areas, qualific,1tion was required to consider fatigue cycles- including fire protection, flood protection, and seism.it that i~. the numlwr of times the water carried by the pip- design. In other words, rhe problems were prngrammatic ing goes from ambient temperature to reactor operating and pervasive, not isolated to a single plant department temperature and back again. These temperuture changes The most recent of rhese problems dated to 1996. and t:LlllSt'. the metul pipe walls to cxp11nd and shrink, which many daited hack to when the plant wa~ uriginnlly built. Thus, wears the piping out faster. Examination of rwo-inch- there were dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of opportunities diameter socker-welded fitting-sin the eves found tba1 for workers uod NRC i11spectors to detect them before 2010. 4 l/N ION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

s,*nio,* exec11tiws from 1/w Fon C,1/houn ,,ram brh*f~d NRC srnffand c<1nrmit.<io,w1*s sc*wral times Untl11d/11gl1er.. i11 ./1111e 201.l) before rheywel'e '11/owed en restart rht n..)m*{<H: 1 The NRC's Reactor Oversight Process inspectors' findings, then places the reactor into one of five Action Matrix columns. Wl1en the safety performance of a In May 1997 the Government Accountability Office (GAO, reactor falls wiithin the expected regime, the reactor is placed then called the General Accounting Office) issued a report in Column 1 arnd the NHC conduct~ only a baseline numbel' titled Nuclear Re1.,rulation: Preventi11.1; Problem Plants Requires of inspections. As ~afety performance declines, the ROP man-More .Effective NRC Action (GAO 1997) . At the time, both dates supplemental NRC inspections. If safety performance reacrors at New J ersey's Salem nuclenr pl:rntwerc mired in declines too m uch and a reactor falls into Column 5, the ROP year-plus outages and the NRC had identified 43 problems will trigger H slbutdown until the owner fixes tbe problems. the owner had to correct before it could safely restart either The ROP Action Matrix for Fort Calhoun from the fourth unit. The GAO report stated that the NRC knew about 38 of quarter of200,0 (whe n the ROP program began) to the third the 43 problems before the Salem reactors were shut down, quarter of 2014-is shown in the figure on p. 6. The NRG moved and it knew about one of these problems for more than six years Fort Calhoun from Column l into Column 2 in the third prior to the shutdown. The GAO also documented that the NRC quarter of 2002, but later concluded that safety performance was aware of unresolved safety problems nt the Millstone plant in Connecticut and the Cooper plant in Nebraska. These find ings prompted the GAO to conclude: [ There were dozens, and "NRC has not taken aggressive enforcement action to force the licensees to fix their long-standing safety sometimes hundreds, of problems on a timely basis. opportunities for workers "NRC allowed safety problems to persist because it was confident that redundant design features kept plants and 1VRC inspectors to inherently safe." dete4r:t safety problems In response to criticism from the GAO and others, the at Fort Calhoun-NRC replaced its safety moniroring programs in April 2000 with its Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). The ROP evaluates a reactor's safety performance by combining 17 performance indicators (submitted quarterly by plant owners) with NRC opportunities that were missed.

No More Fukushima~; No Morr.:, FortCalhouns 5

The NRC's ROP Action Matrix for F<>rt Calhoun, 2000- 2014 2000 04 2001 01 ~ 2001 02 2001 03 2001 04 2002 01 2002 Q2 ~ 2002 03 2002 Q4 2003 Ql 2003 02 Ir-2003 03 ~ 2003 Q4 II-- 2004 Ql 2004 02 ~ 2004 03 2004 04 ~ 2005 Ql 2005 Q2 2005 Q3 ~ 2005 04 2006 Ql - 2006 02 2006 Q3 1, 2006 04 ~ 2007 01 2007 Q2 2007 Q3 2007 04 I&- 2008 01 ~ 2008 02 2008 03 2008 04 ~ 2009 01 2009 Q2 2009 03 2009 Q4 2010 01 2010 02 ~ 2010 03 20 10 04 ~ 2011 01 2011 02 .~ 2011 03 20ll 04 . 2012 01 2012 02 2012 03 ~ 2012 04 2013 01 ~ 2013 02 . 2013 Q3 2013 04 201'101 2014 02 "' 2014 03 0 2 3 4 5 ROP Colwnn As a nuclear power plant's safety performance declines, the NRG moves it from Column 1 to Column 5 in th<' Reactor Oversight Prornss Action Matrix. The NRC repeatedly moved Fort Calhoun. back and fort/1 in the matrix for over a decade until the agency decided the plant's problems were serious enough (Column S) to warrant a shutdown. SC'>l/RCE NRC N,P 6 UN 10 OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

NRC Cnmmi.s.,im1er W'11iam C. n.,1e11dorff(/efl) speak., with NI/C Senior Rrsidem r11.spe,:rnr .lnhn Kirkland a/mm repafrs nreded al fort Calhoun while 1<111ri111 I/tr ['Inn, tl11ri11g Its Jl/-11w11t/1 outa.~*r . had improved and returned the reactor to Column 1. This or radiation re.lease. At Fukushima, multiple problems caused happened again in the fourth quarter of2003 and the third three reactors to melt down: the reactors lost off-site powe1~ quarter of 2004. the backup generators located in the basements. were damaged The NRC moved Port Calhoun into Column 3 in the when the basements flooded, floodwater disabled banks of second quarter of 2007 and the fourth quarter of 2007, but b~tteries that backed up the backup generators, and workers each time returned the plant to Column 2. When the NRC could not deploy portable pumps and generators in time. again nwvcd Fol't Calhoun into Column 3 in the second The 1986 Chernobyl and 1979 Three Mile Island accidents quarter of 2010, however, the plant subsequently slipped also occurred when numerous things went wrong. into Column 4 and then into Column 5. [ Thus, the ROP utterly failed to recognize the depth and breadth of the safety problems at Fort Calhoun until the third Quite simply, the people quarter of 2011. As noted above, all the safety problems sum- ofNebraska faced unduly nmrized here existeJ at Fort Calhoun since at least 1996. They existed when the NRC returned Fort Calhoun from Column 2 high risk for over a decade

to Column l on four occasions and when it returned Fort because the NRC did not Calhoun from Column 3 to Column 2 011 two occasions. These problems were so serious th:it Port Calhoun could accurately evaluate safety not safely resume operation under N RC ru Jes until each one was corrected, yet it had operated for over a decade with nil levelrs at Fort Calhoun. of them. Quite simply, the people of Nebraska faced unduly high risk for over a decade because the NRC did not accu- Conversely, there have been cases where many things rately evaluate safety levels at Fort Calhoun. The ROP has went wrong a111d disaster was averted. For example, in 2002. clearly not fixed the problems identified by the GAO in 1997. workers at the Davis-Besse reactor in Ohio discovered that corrosion had ,caused a pineapple-sized hole in the reactor head, lcavingo,nly a th in steel cladding to contain the high-Preventing Another Fort Calhoun- pressure coolant. Once the reactor was shut down, workers and an American Fukushima discovered additionnl serious safety problems. Despite oper-ating with numerous safety problems, Dnvis-13esse nvoided A key nuclear safety principle is "defense in depth." Reactors disaster because not all of its defense-in-depth barriers are designed so that no single problem will lead to a meltdown were compromised. No More Fukushima~; No Mori.! FortCalhouns 7

Nevertheless. a reactor operating with. pre-existing safety Bannister, D.J. 20l2e. Licrmsee event report 2012-006, revision 0,for problems is more vulne *able to lisasrer when anoth er *11fety l'he Fen-I Ca /hmm St<11/on. Or11:il111, NP.: Omah u PL1hli

Puwcr istrkt.

JLtne 25. Online at http//pbadtrpws. nrc.gov/ docs/ MLl21 7/ problem a.rise*. Fort Cal houn, befo re its rl*actor was shu t down, MLI21 7/!A293.pdj: was more li ke ly to experience a Fukushima-scale accident Bunnister, D,J. 20Ua. Licensee event report 2011-003, revision 2.for because it was already operating with mu ltiple prf.:!-cxisting l'he Fort Calhoun Stilt ion. Omaha. NE: OmaJ1t1 l'11blk l'owcr Di *trict. safety problems. Pre-existin g- problem:, undermined fense in March I. Online at IHtp j/pbadnpws.nrc.gov/ doC!!/ML1206/ depth by reducing the number of things that must go wrong ML/20611\224.pdf Banni~t r, n..r. 2011b. llcc11sce event repo,*t 20ll- 003, l'Cvisinn. 3. fo r to trnnsform. near-miss into a nightmare. the Fort C,1/houn Station. Omaha, NE: Omah a Puhlic Power District. If the R effort to preven t an American Ft1kush inu1 is [) *c mber 17, On li11 nt littp //pl!adupws.11rc.gov/ rlocs/ M l, JIJ.'i/ to be successful, it must augment that with an effort to prevent ML113530555.pdj: a11 lh c 1* 1rn l'L Cn lhoun. Thl' N R re ponded to rukushima ,y Conupas~ i. L.P. 201:lu. Licensee e11e11 1 repurt* 2013

008, revision 0,fur fom1ing a task force th.it e an1ined rlic: ricc id ent ,rnd made more the Fort Calhoun Station. Omaha, NE: Omaba Public Powe r District.

June 7. 0 11l i11c at hccp j/pbadupws.nrc.gov/ doc s/MLJ31S/ than 30 recommendations to better manage nuclear power ML13r8AJ38.pdf. phrnt risks. It is now in the process of impl ementing those Cortopassi, L.P. 201.,b. Licensee event report 2013 -009. revi io11 O,for recommendations. 1h For-t Calhoun Sta1io11. Omaha. NE: Omnha "Public Powe,* Disrrict. The NRC similarly needs to respond to Fort Calhoun by Jun e 14. Onlin e at www.nrc.gov/ site-help/ searc/1.cf,n?q~MLJ3J68A.376 . forming n task forc:e to determin how the age ncy and the plant 'orrnp,18s i. L.P. 2012. Uco11sl'C! ewn l repor12012 -016. revision U,for 0W11er mis ed-or dismissed- numerous longstanding safety the Fort 'alhoun Station. Omaha, NE: Omah a Pub lic Power Di trict. Septc111bcr 17. Online ilt http//pl,adupws.rm:.gc,v/ docs/ ML1226/ problems for years despite thousands of hours of.inspections. ML12262A317.pdf The ta. k fOl'Ce s h uld rec:ommcnJ changes th at will improve Government Accounting ffice (GAO). 1997. Nuclear n*gu lation: th e effectiveness and reli abili ty of the RC's insrcction and P,,,wntmgproblem plants rcquircs mor.* ejfcctiveNRC actio11, ove rsi rht e ffo rts. The RC then needs to implement th ese Washl !(ton, DC. May. Online at www.gao.go1,;p,-oducts/ RCE:D- 97*145.

  *hnngc.-:- as qui kly as possible.

Lochbaum. D. 2006. Wa lking a nuclear tightrope: Unleamed lessons of yl.!ar-plus reacto,* outages. am br idge. MA: Union of .,mcC'1'JWd REFERENCES Scientists. September. On line .it www.ucs11sa.or,1Vnuclear power/ 13n11nister, 11,.1. 2012n. f,i *ens e event report 2012-010, revision 0,j'or 111a/1i11g, 11uc/ea1'-pow r*safcr/ w/1r1,is-rcspo11siblc/w11/ki11g-u*nttc /eor* the Fort Calhou.n Station. O!llaha, NE: Oma ha Public Power District. tightrope.htrn/lt.V0Yn5c8o670 , Allglll, l 3, Online nr http://pbadtr)1W ,/ll'C,gov/ doC'~/ MLU21/ Nuclem* Regulatory Commissio11 (NRC). o J:ite. l{ P historical perfor . ML12219A0JO.pdf: 111once from previous 4uarter~. Rockvi lle, ID. On line at www.nrc, Bonni *ter, U..J. 201 ~b. Lh'l!Mee wc/11 ,*epon 2012 -0 11, rt*vi';.ion 0.for g l'/ NRR/ OVERSJGI111/J\SS1','SS/ prevqtr.11tml. the Fo,-t Ca!h01m Station. Omaha, NE: Oma ha Puhlic Powe r District, Om. ha Pu blic Po~wr TJi trict (OPP D) , 2013, fl ri Ca //10u11 Sl/ltion driving August 6. 0 11 1i11c al li11p j/pbad11pws.11r,.guv/ doc

ML1 222/

through restart. Omah:i, E: Omaha Public Power Dist rict. March 27. ML12220A167.p If: 01ililll: a1 /rup~j/n lum ~w *bsenrch2.11rc.go1,jwcl,.'frn1*d ,2/rnolr1.j.<p? Bannister, D..J. 2012c. Licensee event report 2012-005, revision U.for Accessio11Nu111ber=MC.13093A 473.

       /'he Port alhow1 Station. 0111  ha , NF.: On111 h:i Puhli

Power [)istri t. lldi1h31*t .* I.A. 2011. Uce11sel' t:l'l.'111 report 2011 -002. ,w/,w'on /.for 1/i,.,

Apri l 23. On line ath l1p //pbadupws.nrc.gov/ docs/ ML/225/ P'orr Calhoun Starion. Omn ha, NE: Omohn Puhlic Power District. ML /22.S0A /89.pdf ,July 27. Online t http://pbadupws.11rc.gov/ docs/ MLll.20/ Bannister. D..J. 2012d. Ucensee event report 2012-014, revision 0.for ML112081990.pdf. the For/ Calhoun Station. Omaha, NE: Omaha Public Pow~r Olstrltt.

       ~eptember 10. Online at http;l/pbad11pws.nrc.go11/ docs/M L1225/

ML12255A03/J.pdf [ Unio111of *

Concerned Scientists FINI) T I IIH JJUCUMTINT ON LINE: www.ucsusa .org / NoMoreFtCa lhoun s file Univn of<.:.1111c!!t"1ed St'ienti.~ts puls ,*igorous. i11depc11dml .~rienn: tu wu, k tu .wl\*,: our pld1wt's must pressing problt't11.~. Joining with citiz-111.i uaos.~

1h11 cm111rrv. "'" combim* tech11ic,1/ cmalv.~i~ m1d <?jJl!c*tiw advocacy ro cretl/t' inm111uli1'1!, Y,1'/lt"tirn/ .~o/ution~'fm* ,1 h ,a/th.v, .~afe. anJ s11stai1111blef11turc NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS WASH I NGTON, DC, OFFICE WEST COAST OFFICE MIDWEST OFFICE

 'I 1*11 ll runlt*s411nr1*                           I H2;; I< SI           W, S111i1* HOO                                      ,mo 12lli St., Suitt* ,110                 ( llll* N, l,.1S~ l1 t* SI,, SIII I ,. I 0 un1l,ridg-e, M t12l3k-37Hll                         ash 1111,l'\on. D ;ml)oo u. 2.                                         Oakln,ud, I'/\ IJ 116ll7*-WS7                 likaJ,.*o, IL 60/11)2-40M I'h111w \r,171 ~47 ~~52                             l' htJllC' (2112) 2::' II It~                                               l'IHJIII': (510) Kol] 11'472              l'h()lll (.,I.!) ~711 l7SI) l*'n * (1,17) H(,*1 *9*10:i                        fin'< * (21ll)      2~.,   r,Jnl                                            V~\ (:ill)/ ll-1.,-37R~                   f/,n.: (:l l:l) !iii! 1751 "1tu. www.1.1csusa.or9                            0     11 fUN I t.:-0 t IN Hfl.YC..:LtLJ l'l\l'Lff l !HI\U \ ~.tH , 1'>\kLI'. lill.NLU INI{                  ,c FEBRUARY 2015 lNhJN ol*, 1l>NLl:..IU\IFIJ .s *Lf,:--. 11~1'~

Unionof d * * [ Concerne Scientists EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The NRC: and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in2014 Tarnished Gold Standard OUR FIFT H ANNUAL REPORT CARD The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) often claims to represent the gold

                 '/'ht* N t<<' ojl,*11 d,1i111., lo b1* 1Ii(' gold      standard for nuclear power plant safety regulation and oversight (Macfarlane
           .*:t,mdardfnr nud<'m p,,w,*r planr (aj;*1y                   2013; Magwood 2013). Ample evidence, including the summaries of positive outcomes achieved by the N RC in this series of annual reports, suggests much regulation and 01 *crs1,v;lit. 1m1'/e 1*1*1de11ec validity to these claims. One cannot count the number of nuclear disasters averted suggests nwrh 1*alidity IV lh<'st' doims.

by the NRC's effective regulatory performance, but one can generally count on 011t' ,w11w1 .:uw11 th<' ,iumht't uf nudttar the NRC to be an effective regulator. The NRC has done much to earn the gold

           .!i.1,1.,tcrs i1l't!rtt'd /,y t/w NI/C's <'.fJi*,*tiv<'      standard label.

reg11/arnrv perfnrmonce, bt/11111c Chapter 4 of this report describes how the NRC conducted two extensive c,Wgt'nerally cowH 011 t/1e NRC reassessments of its reactor ,oversight process- not in response to an accident tu be an .-/Ji,c1/1*1' r<'gttlcllor. demonstrating its inadeqLtacy or to criticism suggesting an inadequacy, but as a proactive measure aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the existing process. Chapter 4 also describes how a decade ago the NRC recognized H111 thl' NUC's xold stondarrl is it had an aging work force a.nd developed formal programs to retain as much 1ctrnis/1cd. For 1/ic p,1.,1 decade, they hm*e tribal knowledge as possible before its retirees hit the golf courses and beaches l>t:<'11 i111p11Jpl'rly withlwJ.li11g Jocu111e11ts in their golden years. Such proactive actions enable the NRC to retain the gold

              ,t/>,mt .,of1'ty prnb/('111.,, h,1v,* .rnl')t'Ctt'd       standard label.

engi1W('1'S who 1*oicl'rl safi'(V ClllH'l'rllS to Chapters 2 and 3 of this report describe how the number and severity of near misses at nuclear power plants have been steadily declining siJ1ce 2010 repeated i11ves1ig,l1iC111s af alleged (Table 1, p. 2), again consiste nt with the NRC being an effective regulator. liut w1.rnb.~t,mtiated wrnng,lvi11g. ,md

       /r,11*,, /,,,,*11 11.,illx 11C111w1ijiin11 ,wsw,*r /.wys to gr,1,//.: .,tt111d,1rdiz11d t(*.,t< 11d111111isrcn*il
                         ,*ia its reactor o,*er.1igh1 proces,;
                /Jtlw Nl?C inr/y ;., the gn/.J M,111d,11*cl, ii   11111.,1 rt'.1t11r,* th, * /n.,lcr ,111tf /'l"t'vc11t th<!

tt.1rnisll from rrcwTi11g The M/11.stmw l'nw,' r SIii/ton in \Vnte.rfimi, CT, wl,/rh r.rpori,*11ced rwo sdf-i11flic1ed near miss('.~ "' 201 I when ren*nt mui11te11a11ce and modifi ,:arion~ inlrndm'<!d prabl,,111.s t/oat n*du~cd .Mjety margin.<.

TAB LE 1. Near Mi ses 2010 to 2014 Total Number Near Near Near Near Near of Near Misses in Misses in Misses in Misses in Misses in Reactor Misses 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 1 Arkansas N1,1clear One Unit l 2 1 I 2 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 2 l 1

 -  3 4

Braidwood Unit 1 Braidwood Unit 2 Browns Ferry Unit 1 2 2 l 1 1 1 5 l I 6 Browns Ferry Unit 2 1 I 7 Browns Ferry Unit 3 1 1 8 Brunswick Unit 1 1 l Brunswick Unit 2 9 2 1 1 10 Byron Unit 1 1 1

 ~                                        -

11 Byron Unit 2 2 I I 12 Callaway 1 1 13 Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 2 1 1 14 Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 2 1 1 15 Catawba Unit 1 3 I I 1 16 Catawba Unit 2

 ,__                                            1         1 17     Clinton                                1                                                     1 c-*

18 Columbia

                                         ,__   3 3
                                                                                               - --         ~

19 Cooper 1 1 20 Crystal River Unit 3 1 l 21 Davis-Besse l *1 n Diablo Canyon Unit 2 1 1 23 Farley Unit 1 1 1 24 Farley Unit 2 2 1 1

        --                               1-         ~

25 Fermi Unit 2 1 l 26 Fort Calhoun 4 1 2 1 27 Grand Gulf 1 l 28 H.B. Robinson 2 2 29 Joseph M. Farley Unit 2 1 1 30 LaSalle Unit 1 1 1

 -31 32 LaSalle Unit 2 Millstone Unit 2                      2 1

I I 1 33 Millstone Unit 3 2 2 2 UNIO OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

TABLE 1 Ncnr Mi s s 2010 to 2014 (continued) Total Number Near Neat* Near Near Near of Near Misses in Misses in Misses in Misses in Misses in Reactor Misses 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 34 North Anna Unit 1 1 1 35 36

         -North Anna Unit 2 Oconee Unit 1 l

l 1 1 37 Oconee Unit 2 1 l 38 Oconee Unit 3 1 1 39 Oyster Creek 1 I 40 Palisades 3 2 7 41 Palo Verde Unit l 1 l 42 Palo Verde Unit 2 1 1 43 Palo Verde Unit 3

                                       -           1                                                   l 44      Perry                                    2                                1                 1 45      Pilgrim                                 2                                 2 4ti     River Bend                               2                                                   I                               1 47      San Onofre Unit 2                        1                                                   l 48      San Onofre Unit 3                        1                                                   1 49      Shearon Harris                           2
                                                                                             -        1 I

so Surry Unit 1 1 I 51 Susquehanna Unit 2 I I 52 Turkey Point Unit 3 1 I 53 Wolf Creek 4 1 1 2 The overall number of near misses co11tim1es to decline t!ach year, as does the number ofaffecred sites and the severity of events. SOURCE UCS But Chapter 5 reveals the gold *tandard to be tarnished. how the N R hns been using nonuniform answer keys 111 For the past decade, the NRC has been improperly withholding grade Stand ardized tests administered via it reactor over-documents, including many about afety problems. By doing sight proce s (Table 2, p. 4), yielding numerical outcome less so, the NRC dc1 rived the public oflcga l rights for regulatory predi ctab le th ,m Auctuating gold prices. By improper ly wi th - decision-making and painted a mi sleading picture of nuclear holding many safety problem reports and jiggling the grading safety. hapter 5 also describes how two NRC engineers who of other safety problems, the improving treads may be more did their duties nnd voiced safety concerns were ~ubj ected fobricati 111 than foc t. lf th e re rru ly is th e gold ~tondard ro repeated investigations of alleged but un substanti ated of nuclear regulators, it mu st restore the luster by removing wrongdoing, *e1Jding a very clear message throughout the this tarnish nnd prevent.ing it rrom recurring. ng ncy thot "sil ence is gold en." P'in ally, chapter 5 ex µlain ~ The NR.C and Nuclear Power Pla,it Safety in 2014 .:;

TABLE 2 Seven Corn erstone of the Renctor Oversight Proce Initiating Conditions that. if not properly con rolled, require the plant's eme rgency eq uipment to m a1n ta1n safety, Events Problen,s In this cornerstone Include imp roper con1ro l over cornb1,1stlb le materials or welding actlVllles, causing an eleva ted risk o f fire: degradation of p1p1ng, raising the risk that 1t wi ll ruptu re: and 1mprop r sizing of fuses, 1*a1s1ng he risk t hat the plant will lose elec trica l power. Mitigating Emergency equipment designed to limit the impact of Initiating even s. Problems In this cornerstone Include Systems ineffective maintenance of an emergency diesel generator, degrading the ab ility to provide emerg ncy power to respond to a loss of ottslte power. inadequate repa ir of a problem with a pump 1n the emergency reactor-co1e cool1r,g sys tem. redL1c1ng lhe reliabili ty o f coo ling cluring an accident. and non-conserva 1ve ca libra tion o an au1oma ic temper.,tu 1*e set poin t or an emergency venrilat1on system, delay ing It& startu p longer than sa fety s udles assume. Barrie1r Integrity tv1u lt1ple forms of con tainment preventing the release of r dioact1ve material Into the enviro1 ment. Problems in this cornerstone include foreign ma erial 1n the reactor vessel. wh ich ca n damage Fuel assemblies, corrosion of the reactor vessel head: and ma lf unction or valves 1n piping that passes through co ntainment wal ls, Emergency Measures intend ed to protect the public 1f a reactor releases s1gn1flca11L amounts of radioactive material. Preparedness Problems 1n tl11s corne rstone inc lucle emergency sirens with in 10 m iles o f the plant that fail Lo work, and underestnnation of the seventy of plan t cond1 l ions during a simulated or actual accident, delaying protective measures. Pub lic Radiation Desi n features nd adm1111slrallve controls thi.lt llrni public exposure Lo rad1at1on Problems in this Safety cornerstone include improper cali bration of a rad1ar 1on detector that monitors a pathway for the release o l polenlially co11tam1nated air or w, l er to LI i!:! env1ronrne1ll, Occupational DeslrJn features nd c.1dm1n1st1 at1ve con tro ls Lh ot limit he exposure o r plant workers to r die ion Probl ms Radiation Safety in t hi s cornerstone lnclude failu re to su rvey an area p roperly for sou rces of radiati on, cc:1L1sing worke rs to 1ece1ve u11plarmed ex posures: arid incompl!:!te accounl111g of 1r1d1v1duals ' rad1atio 11 exposurld. Security Protection against sabotage hat aims to release rad ioactive material into the environment. w l1ich can include gates. guards, and guns. After 9/71. the NRC reduced the d1scl1ss1on of his corner one 1n the public arena Th e NRC's Reaction Oversight Proce sfeatures seven cornerstones of reactor safety to help inspectors detect problems before they become more serious.

   ,OUH E W WW N/IC.C.Ol//1lfACI ON.\/CJN IM fIN Ci/~WCRSICHf/R01> Df~CN/flf/QN,/ lfr,/1

[ Unionof Concerne d Scientists

FINDTltfS r>OCL' MENTll l,INE: www.ucsusa.org/NRC2014 rite Union ofConcr:rnt!cl Scientists puts r'iJ;01'tlt1s. indeprnclcml scfonn tu work tu .~p/11i: our planet's must pressi1tK prublems.Joiningwit/1 c:itiuns ucrvss 1'111 l'otintrv, 1w combirl<' tr.>dmict1I wwly.~i~ mid cff<.!c*tiw 11dvoC11cy ro ,r1:tttc imwvutiPe, pl'Cll'tic,1/ .~v/11ticm~'f01* ,1 healthy, saft>, a11J ,11.~tainablc* future NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS WASHI NGTON, OC, OFFICE WEST COAST OFFICE MIDWEST OFFICE

 ' l\1>11 llll\l tit* .~ (j l tlll'I'                      IH2;; I{ SI.         W, Siilh* 800                                   500 1.llh St ., :,iuiu* ,110         <Inv N, I ~,s~l!I.' Si,, S11l 1<* 1110,1 C,1ml>ridg-e, !\IA 0213K -.\7Hll                         Washi111,l'!n11 , DC .:rnooo 1132                                    Oaklt~11d, CA IJ<161l7 087         Chicu~o. IL li0/10140M I'hulic (r>l 7) ~-l i'-5!i52                             !'IIIJllC' (2 02) 22J (11,~.1                                        l1hu11t': (!il(J) IH.1 1872          l'htmc* (.ll.!) 57!H7SO l"nJi* (617) X(i *l -9405                                fin" * (202) 22 ,, f>ln.?                                            F':1 * (!ill)) ll-1,, -J7Hli         J?:1,: (312 ) S7~ 1751
 \1r 1tu. www.ucsusa.org                                  0      l1 1U N at.:O UN KEL'IC.:UW l'l\l'Lk l ~ 11\U \. l'..t1bTAkLh

fM.SEU INk." MARCH 2015 llNI ON lW 1*u NC lllN !'!. U o!! *1p, ~ l l~f~

March 29, 2013 1412 Dia! Court Springfield, ll 62704 Allison Macfarlane, Chairman Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary of the Commission BiU Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations (EDO) Darren Ash, Chief Freedom of Information Act Officer United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555*0001

SUBJECT:

Appeal for refusal to release documents requested under FOIA/PA Requests 2013-0126, 2013-0127, and 2013-0128

Dear Dr. Macfarlane,

Ms. Vietti-Cook, Mr. Borchardt and Mr. Ash: This letter is an appeal for FOIA/PA 2013-0126 and FO!A/PA 2013-0127 which is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR §9.2S(j): If the NRC does not respond to a request within the 20 working-day period, or within the extended periods described in paragraph (b) of this section, the requester may treat that delay as a denial of the request and immediately appeal as provided in§ 9.29(a) or sue in a Federal District Court as noted in§ 9.29(c}. On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 I requested five records from the NRC:

ML103490330, Oconee Nuclear Site, Units l , 2, and 3. Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action letter (CAL) 2-10-003, dated Nov. 29, 2010
ML111460063, Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3. Response to Confirmatory Action Letter

{CAL) 2-10-003, dated April 29, 2011

ML100780084, Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam Risk Analysis
ML101610083, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, - External Flood Commitments
Ml101900305, Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures My incoming FOIA request is included as Enclosure 1.

On February 13, 2013 I was sent an Acknowledgement letter informing me it would take longer than 20 days for me to receive my response and informing me that the NRC was assigning tracking number 2013-0126 to my request. As of the date ofthis letter, it has been 44 days since FOIA/PA 2013-0126 was received by the NRC. I have included the NRC's 2013-02-13 acknowledgement letter to me as . Please note that the records I have requested all fall within the scope of FOIA 2012-0128 (ML12030A105) which was submitted by Paul Koberstein on January 27, 2012 and received by the NRC on January 30, 2012. I have included Mr. Koberstein's incoming request as Enclosure 3 and the NRC's acknowledgement letter to him as Enclosure 4. So, although my FOIA request (2013-0126) is "only" 44 days old, the NRC has had Mr. Koberstein's request for 425 days and to my knowledge has still not released all the requested records. The only record of response that I can find to Mr. Koberstein's

January 27, 2012 request is a December 4, 2012 partial response (Ml12363A094) which I have included as Enclosure 5. In his Ja~ry_2 ~.,_2009 Memorandum on the freedom of Information Act, President Obama stated: In responding to requests under the FOIA, eKecutive branch agencies should act promptly and in a spirit af cooperation, recognizing that s11ch agencies ore servants of the public. I realize that the NRC's FOIA office is understaffed, but taking 44 days to provide five documents - for which they were given the ADAMS Accession numbers - is not acceptable. It is not living up to the President's expectation. Additionally, the documents! requested (two letters of response by a licensee to a Confirmatory Action Letter, a letter from a licensee specifying commitments to address a significant safety concern, a technical evaluaUon on the prob.ability of dam failures, and a memorandum proposing a Generic Issue on flooding due to dam failures) are documents which should have always been public. In his January 21, 2009 Memorandum, President Obama stated:

         ... agencies should toke affirmative steps to make information public. They should not wait for specific requests from the public. All agencies should use modern technology to inform citizens about what is known and done by their Government. Disclosure should be timely.

When the President states "what is known and done by their Government I am sure you recognize, as I do, that he would consider the five documents requested in FOIA 2013-0126 to fall under that category, The documents I requested are clearly documents which should have been made public without waiting "for specific requests from the public." Of the records I have requested, one(~! 10]490330) has been released in ADAMS in response to FOIA/PA 2013-0116 by Carl Stelzer. Although I have not been formally informed of the release of Mll03490330 by the NRC's FO!A office, since I am now aware that it is publicly available in ADAMS, I can consider it as provided under FOIA 2013-0126 and do not need a hardcopy sent to me. I am stil! awaiting the release of the following documents:

Mlll1460063
ML100780084
ML101610083
Ml101900305 A redacted version of ML100780084 (Ml13039A084) was released in ADAMS in response to FOIA/PA 2013-0110 by Paul Blanch, a redacted version of ML101610083 (ML130S1A896) was released in ADAMS in response to FOIA/PA 2013-0113 by Joe Carson, .and a redacted version of MU01900305 (ML13039AQ86) was released in ADAMS in response to FOIA/PA 2013-0133 by Kay Drey.

I do not agree with the redactions the NRC's Office of Nudear Reactor Regulation (NRR) applied to the documents released to Mr. Blanch, Mr. Carson and Ms. Orey. I believe NRR is abusing the scope of FOIA Exemption 7(F). FOIA Exemption 7(F) is meant to protect law enforcement informants. By broadly categorizing protection against sabotage as falling -under Exemption 7(F}, NRR is bypassing the legislative checks and balances which were meant to occur as part of the Freedom of Information Act. There is a process for redacting information which the NRC believes is useful to saboteurs. That process is to mark 2

the documents as classified materials or as Safeguards. If neither of these designations legitimately applies, then the process is to go to the US Congress and ask for a new statutory designation for which NRR can use FOIA Exemption 3. Abusing Exemption 7(f) is not what the President expects NRR to do: The Freedom of Information Act shaufd be administered with a cfea, presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails. The Government should not keep information confidential merely because public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears. I recognize that the way we have handled the Jocassee/Oconee issue is embarrassing. I recognize that it is embarrassing for us to admit that the original licensing for Oconee Station failed to take into account the probability of flooding due to a failure of Jocassee Dam. I recognize it is embarrassing for us to admit that the flood wall around Oconee is undersized and we have known about it since early 1994 yet have not been able to get Duke Energy to correct it. I recognize that it is embarrassing that it took over two years to route an Information Notice and a Generic Issue on flooding due to upstream dam failures. But, as the President stated, "The Government should not keep information confidential merely because public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears." With regard to "speculative or abstract fears", withholding from the public- for over six years- the significant safety liability which Jocassee Dam poses to the three reactors at Oconee Nuclear Station because of vague concerns about terrorism and sabotage is giving into "speculative or abstract fears". None of the information redacted from the documents provided to Mr. Blanch, Mr. Carson and Ms. Drey contain any reference to security matters. The weak points in the dam's construction - if there are any - are not revealed. The physical security of the dam - if there is any - is not discussed. AU that is revealed by the redacted material is the severe SAFETY liability posed to the public by a failure of Jocassee Dam. It is the President's expectation that "In the face of doubt, openness prevails". I have much doubt about NRR's speculative and abstract fears regarding sabotage of Jocassee Dam and I expect openness to prevail. Maybe there is a legitimate security threat to Jocassee Dam, but the information redacted from the documents does nothing to make that security threat worse yet it does plenty to keep the public from being informed "about what is known and done by their Government." I expect to receive unredacted versions of Ml100780084, Ml101610083, and ML101900305 as part of FOIA/PA request 2013-0126. If the NRC does not intend to send me unredacted versions of these three documents and if the NRC instead intends to provide me the redacted versions which were provided to Mr. Blanch, Mr. Carson and Ms. Drey, then I expect you to formally tell me in a FOIA response so that I can pursue the release of the requested documents in accordance wlth 10 CFR §2.29(c). 10 (FR §9.:tCJ(L,I Also, I expect to receive an unredacted version of Mllll460063 which to my knowledge has never been publicly released by the NRC in either an unredacted or a redacted form since being requested by Paul Koberstein 425 days ago, since being requested by Jim Riccio 191 days ago (ML12263A087}, and since being requested by me 45 days ago. I have included Mr. Riccio's request as Enclosure 6. I recognize that, to the NRC, Paul Koberstein's and Jim Riccio's requests might seem daunting-especially given that emails fall under the documents they seek- but to delay formal correspondence between the NRC and a licensee for 425 days and 191 days respectively is unsatisfactory. The NRC should release ALL correspondence with licensees prior to getting a FOIA request for it. lf parts of the correspondence must be withheld, then it should be redacted - but a few sensitive sentences should 3

not cause an entire piece of correspondence to be withheld. That is what the Attorney General alludes to in his March 19, 2009 Memorandum:

          "... agencies should readily and systematically post information online in advance of any public request. Providing mare information online reduces the need for individualized requests and may help reduce existing backlags. When information not previously disclosed is requested, agencies should make it a priority to respond in a timely manner. Timely disclosure of information is an essential component of transparency. Long delays should not be viewed as an inevitable and insurmountable consequence of high demand."

I have included the President's memo as Enclosure 7 and the Attorney General's memo as Enclosure 8 since, apparently, there are some offices within the NRC that didn't get the memo. Also enclosed with this letter (Enclosure 9) is a five page list of documents relating to the flooding hazard which Jocassee Dam poses to the three reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Station. This list was originally included in a 2012-10-15 letter to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs and in a 2012-11-14 letter to the Senate Committee on the Environment & Public Works. There are 101 documents listed on Enclosure 9. On the list I highlighted thirteen documents which were originally stamped "Official Use Only- Security-Related Information" or some similar designation which prevented them from being shared with the public. All thirteen of these documents were released under the Freedom of Information Act with no redactions, which brings into question why they were originally stamped as needing to be withheld from the public. Was it "because pubfic officials might be embarrassed by disclosure"? Was it "because errors and failures might be revealed"? Or was it "because of speculative or abstract fears'? Also contained on Enclosure 9 are fifteen documents which were marked "Official Use Only- Security-Related Information" but have since been released with redactions claiming Exemption 7(F). Even if the redactions implemented in response to FOIA Exemption 7(F) were in fact necessary, under the President's and Attorney General's guidance these documents should have still been voluntarily shared in a redacted form prior to the submittal of a FOIA request. Additionally, there are six documents listed which I could not find electronically, and sixty documents which are internally in ADAMS but, despite Mr. Koberstein's and Mr. Riccio's requests, are still non-public. Note that these non-public documents consist of formal correspondence between the NRC and a licensee on a significant safety concern, internal NRC format memos, internal NRC analysis reports, Power Point presentations, etc. It is my position that we should not wait for Freedom of Information Act requests to release these documents; we should follow the President's and Attorney General's guidance and take "affirmative steps to make information public by posting these documents "online in advance of any public request in order to "use modern technology to inform citizens about what is known and done by their Government. It is impossible for the public to ask for documents on an issue when they do not even know that the issue exists. By designating the flooding hazard posed by Jocassee Dam as "Security-Related Information", the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) was able to successfully keep this issue from public scrutiny for over five years - until the March 2012 public release of the highly redacted screening report for Gl-204 by the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) brought this issue to the attention of intervener groups. Once these groups realized this issue existed, they desired information on it. Was lt right for the NRC to keep this important safety concern from the public for so long? Is that what President Obama expects of us? I do not profess to be able to read the President's mind. But I do profess to be able to read and understand English. And the memo the President released on his 4

inauguration day regarding the Freedom of lnformatlon Act is verv concisely and clearly written in plain English. The President expects Open Government. If there is truly a security concern with some of the information regarding the Jocassee/Oconee issue, then the President expects us to specifically withhold those pieces of sensitive information that might enable terrorists to defeat our security defenses. But I do not believe the President expected us to withhold. in its entirety, a significant safety issue from the American people for over half a decade. In addition to the five documents requested under FOIA 2013-0126, on Tuesday, February 12, 2013 I also requested the following documents:

A 2012-09-18 email which! had sent to NRC Chairman Allison Macfarlane, US Special Counsel Carolyn Lerner, NRC Inspector General Hubert Bell, Deputy Inspector General David Lee, NRC General Counsel Marian Zobler, and NRC Nuclear Security and Incident Response Office Director Jim Wiggins (the subject of the email was "Inadequately Sized Flood Woll at Oconee Nuclear Station Could Lead to Fukushima 5cenorio in the Event of a Failure of the lake lacassee Dam")
A letter dated 2012-09-18 to NRC Chairman Macfarlane which was attached to the email mentioned above (the email attachment containing the letter was entitled "Jocossee Dam Failure Concerns.pd!')

My incoming FOIA request is included as Enclosure 10. On February 13, 2013 I was 5ent an Acknowledgement Letter informing me it would take longer than 20 days for me to receive my response and informing me that the NRC was assigning tracking number 2013-0127 to my request. As of the date of this letter, it has been 44 days since FOIA/PA 2013-012 7 was received by the NRC. I have included the NRC's 2013-02-13 acknowledgement letter to me as 1. l was hoping my 2012-09-18 letter to the NRC Chairman would lead to a discussion on the way the agency has handled concerns regarding flood protection at the Oconee Nuclear Station, not just from a safety and security perspective but also from the perspective of transparency and Open Government. Instead, the only response that I received from the Chairman's office was an email from her legal counsel informing me that the Chairman had referred my letter to the Inspector General. On January 17, 2013 I met with two Special Agents from the NRC's Office of the Inspector General who interrogated me under oath for several hours to assess whether there exists adequate evidence to indict me with a federal felonv1 for induding in my letter to the Chairman information which I had obtained from accessing the NRC's internal Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS) and for failing to designate my letter as "Official Use Only - Security-Related Information". This criminal investigation is occurring even though:

My 2012-09-18 letter was not sent outside the federal government. All the people to whom I sent it were either NRC employees, Congressional staffers, or the US Special Counsel. As a licensed Professional Engineer and as a federal servant it is my belief that I have a duty (as well as a right2) to report to Congressional oversight committees when I do not believe the 1 18 USC §1030, The Computer fraud ?and Abuse Act of 1984 as modified by the USA PATRIOT Act 1 The !-!oyd-L.iFollett~ Act of 1912 was codified as 5 USC §7211- Employees' right to petition Congress: The right of employees ... to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a committee or t.llember thereof, moy not be interfered with or denied.

5

management at my agency is adequately addressing significant safety concerns despite being internally forewarned of shortcomings for several years. 3

None of the information contained in the letter was classified as Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data i42 use §2161-2165} nor was any of it designated as Unclassified Safeguards Information (43 use §2167).
Although some of the documents were marked as "Official Use Only- Security-Related Information", according to the NRC's FOIA office this marking is "an unofficial administrative marking that has no legal import" and is "not indicio of any national security cfassificotion" (see Enclosure 12). Furthermore, the "Official Use Only - Security-Related Information" documents from which I quoted were not portion marked and therefore it is impossible to tell what parts of the documents were considered non-public by the NRR personnel who marked the documents.

From my reading of the relevant guidance (10 eFR §2.3904 , NRC MD 12.6,5 SECY-04-0191,6 a policy statement,' and several conflicting 8 announcements posted on internal NRC intranet pages} it is my assessment that the material contained in my letter to the Chairman is nothing the NRC is required to withhold from the public. On October 9, 2012 Dave Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists requested my 2012-09-18 letter to the NRC Chairman. Mr. Lochbaum's request was registered by the NRC as FOIA 2013-0008 {Ml12283A329). It is included as Enclosure 13. On October 15, 2012 Tom Zeller of the Huffington Post requested my 2012-09-18 letter to the NRC Chairman. Mr. Zeller's request was registered by the NRC as FOIA 2013-0013 (ML12290A070). It is included as Enclosure 14. Mr. Zeller also requested "expedited processing" for his request. 3 There are some who have told me my first duty is to attempt to internally address my concerns through my chain of command. However, there are plenty of technical experts within NRR who had been cittempting to internally Jddr~_;, this concern lor ~E'vN<1I ye,1Vi (e.g. Melanie GcJlloway, Jeff Mitman, Fernando Ferrante). I failed to see how I could have internally prevailed where they had not and chose instead to appeal to the Chairman and our Congressional oversight. It has been my experience from other issues je.g. the 2003-10-21 unrecognize_d~.!E Leactor shutdown ;;t ,Callaway Plant} that the NRC's internal concerns resolution processes do not function adequately, and those processes had already been unsuccessfully used by NRR personnel attempting to address this issue (e.g. ML091170104 - Galloway's non-public NCP form, Mll 10260443 - Mitman's non-public NCP form). 4 .!....OJ;f R §2 .390, Public inspection, exemptions, requ~ts for withholding. 5 Management Directive 12.6, NRC Sensitive Unclassified Information Security Program (Ml04170Q!i03} 6 SECY-04-0191, Withholding Sensitive Unclassified Information Concerning Nuclear Power Reactors from Public Disclosure (ML04231(2!!.f,]) 1 NRC Policy for Handling, Marking, and Protecting Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information {Ml052.99014b) 8 On-October 26, 2012 I wrote an 8 page email to my union representation advising them of the poor condition of the guidance for Official Use Only information. Management Directive 12.6 is from 1999 (i.e. two years prior to the drastic information handling changes resulting from the 2001-09-11 attacks) and is woefully out of date as evidenced by the need to sort through conflicting guidance in SECY papers, policy statements and intranet announcements to resolve significant questions. I also wrote a two page email on October 25, 2012 to NRC Facilities Security (the program owner for MD 12.6) detailing some of this conflicting guidance. Both these emails were captured in internal NRC ADAMS as ML12313A059. These emails had been meant to point out a problem in the hopes of reaching a dialogue to produce solutions; they were not merely meant to be finger pointing. However, thus far no dialogue has ensued and instead the NRC has labeled ML12313A059 as "Allegation Material". As typical of the so-call~d "allegations" which others have submitted to the Inspector General in my name, no one investigating it has yet engaged me to discuss it. Since my Office Director and mv Union President have been unreceptive to mv concerns, I do not expect you to engage me to address them either. But if anyone is interested, my concerns regarding the marking and handling of SUNSI are provided in ML12313A059. 6

Admittedly, my 2012-09-18 letter to Or. Macfarlane was long (19 pages plus a two page enclosure). But the NRC has had my request for 45 days, Mr. Zeller's "expedited processing" request for 134 days, and Mr. Lochbaum's request for 140 days. It is ludicrous that it would take 140 days for the NRC to determine what parts of my 2012-09-18 letter can be released to the American public. Hopefully you recognize, as I do, that taking 140 days to respond to FOIA 2013-0008 is not living up to the President's and Attorney General's ideals of Open Government: "When information not previously disclosed is requested, agencies should make it a priority to respond in a timely manner. Timely disclosure of information is an essential component of transparency. Long delays should not be viewed as an inevitable and insurmo11ntable consequence of high demand." I ask that you consider the Attorney General's memo and, with regard to my, Mr. Lochbaum's and Mr. Zeller's requests, "make it a priority to respond in a timely manner. And please remember: The Freedom of Information Act should be administered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails. The Government should not keep information confidential merely because public officials m ight be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or because of speculative or abstract fears. I also made a third request under the Freedom of Informat ion Act on February 12, 2013: Ml091170104, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 And 3- Non-concurrence on Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC September 26, 2008, Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commiss.ion Letter Dated August 15, 2008 Related to External Flooding I have included this request as Enclosure 15. On February 13, 2013 the NRC recorded this request as FOIA 2013-0128; I have included the NRC's acknowledgement letter as Enclosure 16. Ms. Galloway's Non-Concurrence Form falls within the scope of both Paul Koberstein's January 27, 2012 request and Jim Riccio's September 18, 2012 request. So, although I have "only" been waiting 45 days, Mr. Koberstein has been waiting 425 days and Mr. Riccio 191 days - for a 19 page document. Most of Ms. Galloway's Non-Concurrence Form is stamped "Official Use Only- Security-Related Information" despite not addressing any security related topics. Everything in her Non-Concurrence is a safety concern, not a security concern. On page 17 of her Non-Concurrence Form, it is denoted that Ms. Galloway "Wants NCP Form Non-Pub!ic". It is unclear why this block was checked. Was it checked becaus.e in April 2009 Ms. Galloway was embarrassed by having the fortitude and independence to, without the benefit of the example of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident (this was two years prior to that flooding-induced accident), stand apart from the rest of her management in NRR and insist that the flood risks posed by Jocassee Dam to the reactors at Oconee was a credible threat that needed to be rigorously vetted and addressed? Or was it checked because Ms. Galloway was aware of NRR's designation of this topic as a "Security-Related" issue and so, as part of the N RR management team (she was a Deputy Division Director), felt she could not check the block for "Wants NCP Form Public" because that could imply she was disagreeing with the "Security-Related" designation of the Jocassee/Oconee issue? These are not rhetorical questions. These are questions you need to answer as part of processing this appeal. Why is the Non-Concurrence Form of a Deputy Division Director on a letter to a licensee concerning a serious safety issue - yet 7

containing no discussion of security vulnerabilities - being withheld from the public? Is it "because public officials might be embarrassed by disclosure"? Is it "because errors and failures might be revealed"? Or is it "because of speculative or abstract fears"? Again, this is an appeal of a de-facto decision by the NRC to withhold from release the following documents:

1. ML111460063, which was requested under FOIA 2013-0126

2. ML100780084, which was requested under FOIA 2013-0126

3. ML101610083, which was requested under FOIA 2013-0126

4. ML101900305, which was requested under FOIA 2013-0126

5. my 2012-09-18 email to the NRC Chairman, which was requested under FOIA 2013-0127

6. my 2012-09-18 letter to the NRC Chairman, which was requested under FOIA 2013-0127

7. ML091170104, which was requested under FOIA 2013-0128 If I do not receive unredacted versions of these seven requested documents by May 13, 2013, then I intend to continue the appeal process in accordance with 10 CFR §9.29(c). So please conform to the President's and Attorney General's desires-for the clear presumption of openness prevailing in the face of doubt and for the timely processing of FOIA requests/appeals-by immediately releasing the documents I have requested.

Although I live in Springfield, IL, I work in Rockville, MO. Please do not send documents to my home in Springfield, IL as I will not get them in a timely manner. Please send all written correspondence to me via email at LSCrisdone@hotmail.com. If your processes will not allow you to do this, then please contact me via phone or ema\l and I wlll come by the FOIA desk to pick up the correspondence. Very respectfully, Lawrence S. Criscione, PE (573) 230-3959 Enclosures (16) Cc: Billie Garde, Esq., Clifford & Garde Louis Clark, The Government Accountability Project Paul Koberstein, Cascadia Times Kay Drey, Beyond Nuclear Cart Stelzer, reporter Paul Blanch, consultant Joe Carson, Affiliation of Christian Engineers Jim Riccio, Greenpeace David Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists Tom Zeller, Huffington Post A major flaw in our system of government, and even ;n industry, is the latitude to do less than is necessary. Too often officials are willing ta accept and adapt ta situations they know to be wrong. The tendency is to downplay problems instead of actively trying to correct them, -Admiral Rickover, 1982 8

Enclosure 2 of FOIA Appeal for Requests 2013-0126, 0127 & 0128 Ur!TLD STATES

                          \!l 1CLE/\R REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON O.C. ]0555-0001 February 13, 2013 FOIA/PA-2013-00126 Lawrence Criscione 1412 Dial Court Springfield, IL 62704

01..._*n CZ~ --

                                                                                              ..: .. 2°t~ - O.<<]L

_F_o_IA_R_e_so_u_r_c_e____________________ ___.*.*. . Gilil~ I

                                                                                                           -.-fa*-
                                                                                                             ~ r
                                                                                                                          ~      3--.._
                                                                                                                 .t,.i...,,_,L.(-------

From: Lawrence Criscione < lscriscione@hot mail.com > jl l iM J*..d ' * ~ -~ :' - - -'1. {c_(, v,t; 7 Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2013 10:32 PM ~ s ... " ~J,,-- (:)()() &' To: Sealing, Donna; FOIA Resource * * --

Cc: tomd@whistleblower org; Billie Garde; sshepherd@cliffordgarde.com; Dave Lochbaum; Tom Zeller. jruch@peer.org; kdouglas@peer.org; Louis Clark; cmcmullen@osc.gov; clerner@osc.gov; Michal Freedhoff; Houlihan Bill FOJA Request for November 15. 2012 submissions of FOIA 201Hl008/13 and January 25, 2013 "Referral Package" mentioned in ML13149A079 Ms. Sealing:

Please process this email as a Freedom of Information Act request. ML13149A079, "Second Quarter Operating Plan FY-2013", contains a 23*page table which stretches from page 12 to page 34. The table does not have a t it le but appears to be a listing of all open FOIA requests in the offices of the Commission (although this might not be the case since FOIA request 2013-0127 and FOIA appeal 2013-0l0A are not on the list). On page 25 of the table there are two entries for FOIA 2013-0008. One of the entries shows that FOIA 2013-0008 was received by the NRC on October 10, 2012 and provided to the SECY/Commission that same day. The entry further shows that the SECY completed t he processing of FOIA 2013-0008 on October 26, 2012 and provided their final submittal to the FOIA office on November 15, 2012. FOIA 2013-0008 is the tracking number which the NRC assigned to the October 9, 2012 (ML12283A329) FOIA request from Dave lochbaum in which he requested one document: Letter doted September 18, 2012, from NRC staffer Lawrence Criscione to NRC Chairman Alison Macfarlane about nuclear plant vulnerabilities to flooding. I have not seen the acknowledgement letter which we provided to Mr. Lochbaum, but I assume that - like all our acknowledgement letters in the past two years - we took advantage of the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan to allot ourselves an extra 10 working days to process Dave's FOIA. Note that the SECY completed the FOIA request by October 26, 2012 ( 12 working days after receiving it) so the legally mandated 20 working day window could have easily been met. But assuming we gave ourselves the extra 10 working days, the 30 day window for processing Dave's FOIA would have expired on November 21, 2012. Since the SECY submitted the requested document t o the FOIA office by November 15, 2012, this should have allowed plenty of time to get Mr. Lochbaum his requested document within the legally required time frame prescribed in the Freedom of Information Act. As with most FOIA's at the NRC, the 20 & 30 working day windows came and went without any documents being provided. Then, after waiting 17 weeks, on February 6, 2013 we provided Mr. Lochbaum a partial response to his FOIA request (Ml13039A087). This "partial response" did not contain the one and only document requested by Mr. Lochbaum, but instead contained t hree documents whfch had been released by NRR under previous FOIA requests and two other NRR documents w hlch had been sent to the Chairman in the same email that had transmitted the requested letter. Since t he SECY had completed the processing of the

2012-09-18 letter to the Chairman on October 26, 2012, it is not understood why this letter was not included in the first partial response sent to Mr. Lochbaum. On February 20, 2013 we sent Dave a second partial response IML13051A897) and on April 9, 2013 we sent him a third (ML13099A248). As with the first partial response, the one and only document he had actually requested (i.e. the 2012-09-18 letter to the N RC Chairman) was not included despite it having been processed by the SECY by October 26, 2012. In fact, after nearly nine months (167 working days) we have still not provided Mr. Lochbaum the sole document he requested under FOIA 2013-0008. On page 26 of the table in Ml13149A079, there is an entry for FOIA 2013-0013 showing that it was received by the NRC on October 16, 2012 and provided to the Commission SECY that same day. The entry further shows that the SECY completed the processing of FOIA 2013-0013 on October 26, 2012 and provided their final submittal to the FOIA office on November 15, 2012. FOIA 2013-0013 is the tracking number which the NRC assigned to the October 16, 2012 {Mll2290A070) FOIA request by Tom Zeller in which he requested two documents: The September lB~ ZOJZ email and letter from Lawrence Criscione to Chairman Macfarlane regarding the Lake Jacassee Dam and the threat to Oconee Nuclear Station. At the time, Mr. Zeller was working on an article regarding the NRC's handling of the flooding concerns which a catastrophic failure of the Lake Jocassee Dam poses to the three reactors of the Oconee Nuclear Station and he thusly requested e,cpedited processing of his request. I am unaware of whether or not we formally denied Tom's request for e,cpedited processing, but we certainly did not honor it. After 162 working days, we have still not provided Mr. Zeller the two documents for which he requested e,cpedited processing. On February 27, 2013 (ML13064A211) we provided Mr. Zeller a "partial response" which contained a listing of seven records which had already been released to others under separate FOIA requests. None of the documents provided had been specifically requested under FOIA 2012-0013 and the two documents which Mr. Zeller had requested were absent* despite having been provided to the NRC's FOIA office by the SECY on October 26, 2012. On April 18, 2013 (ML131060026) we provided Mr. Zeller with a second partial response which again did not contain either of the two documents specifically requested under FOIA 2013-0013. On page 25 of the table in ML13149A079, there is an entry showing that FOIA 2013-0008 was referred from the NRC FOIA Office back to the SECY on January 25, 2013. This was just over one week after my very confrontational January 17. 2013 interrogation by two special agents of the NRC's Office of the Inspector General regarding to whom in Congress I copied my 2012-09-18 letter and whether or not my actions constituted a federal felony under 18 USC§ 1030. The entry further shows that the "Referral Package" was sent to the SECY/Commission on February 1, 2013, was due back to the FOIA office on February 8, 2013, but after having the referral over 18 weeks has yet to be processed by the Office of the Chairman. Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC§ 552) and NRC regulations (10 CFR § 9.25) I request that within 20 working days the NRC either provide me the following documents or provide me an e,cplanation as to what exemptions authorize their withholding:

1. Any and all correspondence, emails, memos and notes regarding the Office of the Chairman's November 15, 2012 submittal of FOIA package 2013-0008 and 2013-0013 to the NRC FOIA Office, including the versions of the 2012-09-18 email and letter which were submitted (please refer to the entries regarding incoming FOIA requests for 2013-0008 and 2013-0013 on pages 25 and 26 of M Ll3149A079).

2. Any and all correspondence, emails, memos and notes regarding the "Referral Package" of FOIA 2013-0008 which was received from the FOIA Office on January 25, 2013 and sent to the SECY/Commission on February l, 2013 (please refer to the last entry on the table of p. 25 of ML13149A079).

Although expedited processing might be justified, I am not requesting any special treatment of this FOIA request. All I ask is that you follow federal law and our own NRC regulations and either provide me unredacted versions of the requested documents within 20 working days (i.e. by July 10, 2013) or provide me with an explanation as to why the requested documents cannot be provided. I realize that the NRC is blanketly extending all FOIA requests due to the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami that occurred in Japan, butt hardly think that issue will legitimately prevent you from meeting the 20 working day allotment for this request. I do not intend to pay any fees to obtain the documents above. I believe I have aptly described what I am seeking and your search time should be minimal. Additionally, the information requested pertains to three apparently high profile and contentious FOIA requests and at least one FOIA appeal and thus these documents should be readily obtained by the involved parties. Describe the purpose for which you Intend to use the requested Information. Like Mr. Lochbaum and Mr. Zeller, I two have an outstanding FOIA request for my 2012-09-18 email and letter to the NRC Chairman {FOIA 2013-0127). My request (February 13, 2013) is nearly four months old and the appeal of that request (FOIA 2013-0l0A submitted on March 29, 2013) is 51 working days old, yet I still have not received the two documents I requested. I need the documents requested in items 1 and 2 above so that r might use them in a law suit I am preparing concerning some of my overdue FOIA appeals and so that I might use them in filling out an OSC Form 12 regarding the NRC's blatant violation of the time commitments prescribed in the Freedom of Information Act. Explain the extent to which you will extrad and analyze the substantive content of the requested records. I will thoroughly read every word of every document you provide me so that I might understand the NRC's rationale for not following its legally required time commitments under the FOIA and its own regulations with regard to its processing of FOIA 2013-0008, 2013-0013, 2013-0127 and 2013-0l0A. Describe the nature of the specific adivlty or research In which you will use the requested records and the specific qualifications you possess to utilize information for the Intended purpose In such a way that It will contribute to public understanding. I hold a Professional Engineer's (PE) license in the State of Iowa in the Nuclear Engineering Branch. I am a former NRC licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and was formerly a Prospective Nuclear Engineer Officer (PNEO) in the US Navy's submarine force. I am a Risk Professional and current work as a Risk & Reliability Engineer in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES). I intend to use these documents to gain an understanding of what, if anything, is preventing the NRC from meeting its legally required time commitments for processing FOIA 2013-0008, 2013-0013, 2013-0127 and 2013-0l0A. I will share my findings with Mr. lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists, Mr. Zeller of the Huffington Post, Mr. Ruch of Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, Mr. Devine of the Government Accountabrlity Project and with 3

any other member of the public, member of the press, or member of a public watchdog group who expresses interest in the matter. Describe the Hkely impact on the public's understanding of the subjed, compared to the level of public understanding of the subject before disclosure of the requested information. I think that when the public realizes why the NRC is violating their Freedom of Information Act required time commitments, they will have a better understanding that the NRC's Office of the Chairman has been keeping important information from them in order to protect her image. Describe the size and nature of the public segment whose understanding will be increased by disclosing the requested information. Possibly a dozen individuals due to my efforts. Describe the means by which you Intend to disseminate the requested information to the general public. I do not intend to directly disseminate the requested information to the general public. I intend file an OSC Form 12 and to file a lawsuit in FOIA court. I intend to share the documents pertaining to my OSC disclosure and lawsuit with Mr. Zeller, Mr. Lochbaum, and anyone else interested. Indicate whether you will provide public access to the requested information free of charge or in return for an access or publication fee. I do not intend to provide the public any access to the requested information either free or for a fee. I intend for the NRC to disseminate this information free of charge by making it publicly available in ADAMS. Describe any commercial or private Interest that you or any other party may have in the requested records. I have no commercial interest in these records. My private interest is I am a believer in Open Government and am being harassed by the NRC's Office of the Inspector General for providing "Official Use Only - Security* Related Information" to Congressional staffers and the US Special Counsel. There are some within the NRC who might claim this FOIA request contains "allegations". This email is merely a request for documents under the Freedom of Information Act. Although I believe the NRC Office of the Chairman has been stonewalling the release of my 2012-09-18 letter to the Chairman, the intent of this email is not to make that allegation. The purpose of this FOIA request is to obtain documents to refine my understanding of why my 2012-09-18 letter has not yet been released. Once I believe I have a sufficient understanding of why the NRC is disregarding the Freedom of Information Act time limits with regard to FOIA 2013-0008, 2013-0013, 2013-0127 and 2013-0l0A, I intend to make an allegation to the US Office of the Special Counsel via an OSC Form 12 disclosure. Please process this email as a request under the Freedom of Information Act and do not waste the taxpayers' money by submitting yet another allegation to the Office of the Inspector General. I work in Rockville, MO and make it home to Illinois infrequently. Please correspond with me via email regarding this matter or call/text me at 573-230-3959. If there are documents you must provide to me as hardcopies, please contact me by phone or email and I will come by the FOIA desk to pick them up. I will pay whatever fees are required to obtain the requested document.

V/r, Larry Criscione 573-230-3959 5

1l

(I) C > 0 Q.

         ~
         'O E

Q) X c; C co 0 0 B 15 co 1': E a. a e e E

a. 0

!2 E Q) 0 E "'

Q)

  ~       e.

IL Q) 5 0

Criscione, Lawrence From: Cook, Christopher Sent: Monday, August 22, 2016 7:35 AM To: Criscione, Lawrence; Salley, MarkHenry; Peters, Sean Cc: Rive1ra-Varona, Aida; Harvey, Brad; Correia, Richard

Subject:

RE: response: Style Sheet for JLD Flooding Review Documents Attachments: .-------------------, R2.l_SA_Template_FINAL_ML13218A150.pdf The 66-page red lined draft is withheld in full under exS.

Larry, The file you attached is a draft job aid that Mark McBride created (he called it a Style Sheet), but he did not finish it before he retired. No one has worked on the job aid since he retired.

Our staff assessment template is ML13218A150 (attached) and was completed in September 2013. Please note that the template is a non-public document in ADAMS. Since 2014, we have issued approximately 22 staff assessments. Over the years, our staff assessments have evolved as a result of Commission direction and as we have tried to improve our products. For example, all staff assessments issued in 2016 were written after issuance of an Interim Staff Letter (ISR) to the licensee (for example, here's Salem Generating Station's ISR Letter: ML15244B266}. In 2013 and when the template was finished, the concept of an ISR did not exist. Therefore, if you compare our most recent staff assessment to the template, you will see that our staff assessments generally follow the 2013 template. However, we also evolved as the process changed in response to Commission direction plus we're always trying to improve. In summary, the best guidance I can provide is a reference to our most recent staff assessments plus the attached 2013 template.

Regards, Chris From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Friday, August 19, 2016 12:56 PM To: Cook, Christopher <Christopher.Cook@nrc.gov>; Salley, MarkHenry <MarkHenry.Salley@nrc.gov>; Peters, Sean

<Sean.Pet ers@nrc.gov> Cc: Rivera-Varona, Aida <Aida.Rivera-Varona@nrc.gov>; Harvey, Brad <Brad.Harvey@nrc.gov>; Correia, Richard <Richard.Correia@nrc.gov> Subje ct: RE: response: Style Sheet for JLD Flooding Review Documents

Chris, I got the document from an NRO colleague who received it from Mark McBride in 2015.

I'm reviewing the Chairman's response to the Office of Special Counsel's referral regarding my disclosure on the NRC's handling of flooding hazards. The flooding reviews are being conducted as "staff assessments vice as "safety evaluations". Safety evaluations are handled under LIC-101. I'm trying to determine what the guidance is for "staff assessments". The purpose of my questions to you are two-fold:

1. To find out if the attached document is the only guidance there is for conducting staff assessments and.

if there is other guidance, to find out where it is at so I can review it.

2. To find a clean copy of the attached document so that I can reference it in my comments on the Chairman's response to the Office of Special Counsel.

So, that being said:

Do you know of any guidance your staff uses when conducting their staff assessments of the flooding reviews (other than the attached document)?
Do you know if the attached version is in ADAMS and-if not-can you tell me who the current document owner is and where I can find the latest version of the document?

Thanks, Larry 573-230-3959 From: Cook, Christopher Sent: Friday, August 19, 2016 12:32 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence <Lawrence.Criscione@nrc.gov>; Salley, MarkHenry <MarkHenry.Salley@nrc.gov>; Peters, Sean

<Sean.Peters@nrc.gov> Cc: Rivera-Varona, Aida <Aida.Rivera-Varona@nrc.gov>; Harvey, Brad <Brad.Harvey@nrc.gov>

Subject:

response: Style Sheet for JLD Flooding Review Document s

Larry, Where did you find this document? I think it was produced as a job aid for my branch and it lives out on the JLD SharePt site, but I'm not sure. Can you also let me know the purpose for your question?

I'm also trying to understand the nexus between your 3 questions, our other ORA activities (primarily in DRA/FXHAB), and what you're trying to accomplish. I've included Mark Salley and Sean Peters in case they prefer to respond instead.

Thanks, Chris Christopher B. Cook, Ph.D., P.E.

Chief, Hydrology and Meteorology Branch 1 US NRC, Office of New Reactors (301) 415-6397 Christopher.Cook@nrc.gov From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Friday, August 19, 201611:47 AM To: Cook, Christop her <Christopher.Cook@nrc.gov> Cc: Rivera-Varona, Aida <Aida.Rivera-Varona@nrc.gov>; Harvey, Brad <Brad.Harvey@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Style Sheet for JLD Flooding Review Documents

Chris, I was told Aida is out sick today and it looks like she is on vacation next week. Mark McBride has apparently retired.

I am attempting to find the guidance used by the NRC staff to conduct the "Staff Assessments" of the flooding reviews. I just spoke with Brad Harvey and he doesn't think we have any such guidance-other than the out-of-date style guide attached to this email.

Do you know of any guidance that your staff uses when conducting their staff assessments of the flooding reviews? Do you know if the attached document is in ADAMS? 1f not, can you tell me who the current document owner is and where I can find the latest version of the document? Thank you, Larry Lawrence S. Criscione 573-230-3959 From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Friday, August 19, 2016 11:18 AM To: Rivera-Varona, Aida <Aida.Rivera-Varona@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Style Sheet for JLD Flooding Review Documents

Aida, The person listed as the owner of the attached document (Mark McBride) no longer works for the NRC but he was in your branch. Do you know where the attached document is located? Is it in ADAMS? Is it possible for me to get the most current revision (i.e. one without unaccepted changes)?

I am trying to find guidance on conducting Staff Assessments. Other than this document, where is the guidance for conducting a Staff Assessment?

Thanks, Larry Lawrence S. Criscione Reliability & Risk Engineer RES/DRA/HFRB Tl0-844 (573) 230-3959

From: Dean, Bill Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2014 10:46 AM To: Heinly, Justin; Werkheiser, David; Dodson, Douglas; Perry, Neil; Rich, Sarah; Rutenkroger, Scott Cc: Nieh, Ho; Scott, Michael; Lorson, Raymond; Trapp, James; Lew, David; Bower, Fred; McKinley, Raymond; Schroeder, Daniel; Burritt, Arthur; Dentel, Glenn; Powell, Raymond; DeFrancisco, Anne; Warnek, Nicole; Greives, Jonathan; Schmidt, Wayne; Cahill, Christopher; Cook, William; Daun, Travis; Bickett, Brice

Subject:

FW: St. Lucie Jan 9 Reactor Auxiliary Building Flooding Video So in reflecting on this video and the chronology of an actual recent St. Lucie flooding event described below (I am sure that Jon is having some flashbacks from the Susquehanna event a few years ago seeing the water pour out of electrical boxes) that happened earlier this year during a massive rainstorm, I cant help but think about how you have recently identified vulnerabilities at your sites related to flooding protection that have helped to preclude such an event from occurring. Thanks for being vigilant and finding these vulnerable areas so they could be addressed before the incipient event occurs. That would be too late to find out the problem exists. BILL From: McCree, Victor Sent: Tuesday, May 27, 2014 1:33 PM To: Johnson, Michael Cc: Leeds, Eric; Dean, Bill; Pederson, Cynthia; Dapas, Marc

Subject:

St. Lucie Jan 9 Reactor Auxiliary Building Flooding Video

Mike, Attached, as we discussed, is the video of the St. Lucie Auxiliary Building Flooding event on January 9, 2014. We are completing the SDP on this event and it is likely to be greater-than-green. As I shared during your last Direct Reports meeting, flooding vulnerabilities remain a concern to me..

Heres a synopsis of what occurred at St. Lucie: o On January 9th, St. Lucie experienced a severe 5-hr rain event between 1400 and 1900, during which

       ~7 inches of rain fell in the area.

o At 1803 hrs, the licensee declared a UE based on HU1 Natural or Destructive Phenomena Affecting Protected Area and, HU1.5 Visual sightings by station personnel that water levels are approaching storm drain system capacity. o At 1630 Unit 1 entered the AOP for aux building flooding. Storm water was entering the -0.5 ft elevation of the reactor auxiliary building through a conduit that was connected to an electrical box (see gray electrical box in the video). This water intrusion created in 1-2 inches of water on -0.5 ft elevation (~50,000 gal) for several hours. o The licensee was able to manage this flooding by periodically cycling remotely operated drain valves that allowed the water to go to the safeguards room (ECCS) sump [note: this action was not included in their flood mitigation procedure]. Storm water stopped leaking from the conduit at ~ 2100 hrs. o Portable pumps were installed in both units condenser pits to remove the water. The B.5.b pump was used to remove water from the Unit 1 condenser pit which had more water to remove. o The licensee determined that flood waters entered the RAB through degraded or missing conduit seals in the open condenser pits. Although water in these pits normally drain to through storm drains to overflow basins south of the plant, the storm water drains backed up, allowing storm water to flood the open condenser pits and enter the Aux Building. [Note: these degraded and missing penetration seals were not identified during the Fukushima walkdowns]. o The licensee removed blockage that allowed the basins to drain to the South overflow basin; established a flow path from the south overflow basin to the retention pond; licensee cleaned out the 36 inch pipe connecting the two. The licensee also opened up a gate valve that drained down the retention pond to the intake. More to come. Vic

-----Original Message-----

From: Boska, John .<,,.J~o~h_n_.B_o_s_k_ To: Colleen Payne (b){6) a ----=------. ; Pascarelli, Robert <Robert.Pascarelli@nrc.gov> Sent: Mon, Mar 25, 20 13 8:04 am

Subject:

RE: Duke Energy meeting Colleen, we receive such a high volume of requests that we do not have the time to communicate with individuals on t hese items. We have established an email listserver for each of the power reactors, and if you sign up for the listserver, you will be emailed a copy of all the public documents we issue for Oconee Nuclear Station. The listserver is automated, I cannot add people or remove them or even see who is on the list. If you want to sign up, please go to http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/listserverfplants-by-region.html and sign up for Oconee. The meeting notice for 3/25/13 was issued on the listserver on 3/18/13 and was placed on the NRG web site on 3/19/13. I will add your name to the security list for today's meeting (although it is not a requirement, any member of the public can attend, they just have to register with security when they get here), Attaltl1~ are the s!T es for today's meeting. Copies will be available at the meeting. Please call my cell phon~ ( after you pass through security and I will ensure an escort brings you to the meeting room. John Boska Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 301-415-2901 email: john.boska@nrc.gov From: Colleen Payne [m=a= '-'- i l=toc..,,l.(,_ 6)__ (6...,

                                                     ) _______          n Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2013 10:05 AM To: Pascarelli, Robert; Boska, John Subject : Re: Duke Energy meeting John and Robert, Could you please keep me informed, I thought from last meetings, correspondence and my request that I was clear on receiving all current, future meetings re: Lake Jocasse/Oconee/Duke Energy & NRC. I receive daily updates and continually monitor N RC site, however, somehow I missed the upcoming 3/25 meeting re flooding issues/Duke/NRG.

Thank you, Colleen Payne

-----Original Message--..,   --....

From: Colleen Payne '4!b)(6 ) ~ To: robert.pascarelli <robert.pascarelli@nrc.gov>; john.boska <iohn .boska@nrc.gov> Sent: Sat. Mar 23, 2013 9 :56 am

Subject:

Re: Duke Energy meeting Good morning John and Robert, Is Monday's, 3/25 meeting re: "to discuss the licensee's flooding hazard reevaluation report for the three Oconee units .. . a rescheduled or new meeting? I was not made aware nor was this posted until just recently-within past few days. I will be .attending this meeting, please add my name to security list. Thank you, Colleen Payne !(b)(6) !

-----Original Message--...    --....

From: Colleen Payne ~... (6_)(_6)_ _ _ _ _ _ _..., To: Robert.Pascarelli <Robert.Pascarelli@nrc.gov> Sent: Mon, Mar 11, 2013 2:36 pm

Subject:

Re: Duke Energy meeting Bob,

Yes, that is correct. Thank you. I just received notice from John Boska, 3/19 meeting has been rescheduled to 4/9. Colleen

Original Message-----

From: Pascarelli, Robert <Robert.Pascarelli To: Colleen Payne < (b (6 Sent: Mon, Mar 11, - -- - - p-m_ _ _ ___,

Subject:

RE: Duke Energy meeting

Colleen, I believe that you are referring to the April 16-18 industry meeting in Columbia, SC. It is an industry-sponsored meeting that the Office of New Reactors (NRO) has been invited to speak at for the last few years. Due to budget restrictions, NRO is not planning to attend this year.

Bob Pascarelli From: Colleen Payne [m ""'=a=il=td..,rb_)(_5l_ _ __ _ _ ____, Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 4:43 PM To: Pascarelli, Robert

Subject:

Re: Duke Energy meeting

Bob, Do you know who will be speaking at the SMR Conference April 16-177 I was registered for that event, but will not be able to attend.

Thank you, Colleen

Original Message-----

From: Pascarelli, Robert <Robert.Pascarelli@nrc.gov> To: Colleen Payne l(b)(6) I Sent: Thu, Mar 7, 2013 2:29 pm

Subject:

RE: Duke Energy meeting

Colleen, It's possible that the meeting could occur as late as May. We coordinate resources with our Region II office to ensure that we can conduct all of the site meetings within a few months following the issuance of the annual assessment letters. I'll let you know as soon as we have a tentative date. Have a nice day.

Bob From: Colleen Payne['""m""'ai=l=to'-'-!(_61_16_1 _ _ _ _ _ _ __. Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 2:14 PM To: Pascarelli, Robert

Subject:

Re: Duke Energy meeting Bob Thank you for this information. Any chance of scheduling assessment meeting in May? I would like to attend and mid-May would work for me. (smile, I am joking - but doesn't hurt to ask) Colleen

Original Message-----

From: Pascarelli, Robert <Robert.Pascarelli To: Colleen Payne ...._ _________. ( )(6

Sent: Thu, Mar 7, 2013 10:35 am

Subject:

RE: Duke Energy meeting Ms. Payne, It was a pleasure to speak with you on Tuesday afternoon and I look forward to seeing you on March 1gm_ Another meeting that you may be interested in is the annual end-of-cycle assessment meeting that is held in the Oconee visitor's center. Although we have not finalized a date, our annual meeting will most likely occur in the early April timeframe. I encourage you to consider attending if you are in the area. Additionally, please feel free to contact myself or John Boska if you have any questions or concerns. Have a great day! Bob Pascarelli, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licens1ng Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation From: Colleen Payne ..,_ (m a:::'-i"":l 7 td :i;(,..; b),;,, (6.;.,

                                               ) ,...,..,,,....,..,..,..- - - ---'

Sent: Thursday, March 07, 2013 9:52 AM To: Pascarelli, Robert

Subject:

Duke Energy meeting

Bob, Just a quick note to thank your for your time on Tuesday, March 5 during and after Duke meeting.

I appreciate you taking the time to discuss some of the concerns regarding NRC's position regarding Oconee site. I look forward to seeing you on the 19th - or rescheduled date. Have a good rest of week, Colleen

April 11, 2013 1412 Dial Court Springfield, IL 62704 Bill Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations (EDO) Darren Ash, Chief Freedom of Information Act Officer United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Update to FOIA Appeal 2013-009A

Dear Mr. Borchardt and Mr. Ash:

This letter is an update to a FOIA appeal the NRC acknowledged on March 29, 2013 concerning FOIA/PA 2013-0126. The NRC's acknowledgment letter to that appeal is included as Enclosure 1. Today {2013-04-11), I received a response to FOIA 2013-0126, which I have included as Enclosure 2. Note that this response has come 40 working days after my initial request and 9 working days after I submitted an appeal in accordance with 10 CFR §9.25. On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 I requested five records from the NRC:

1. ML103490330, Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3. Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003, dated Nov. 29, 2010

2. ML111460063, Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3. Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003, dated April 29, 2011

3. ML100780084, Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam Risk Analysis

4. ML101610083, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, - External Flood Commitments

5. ML101900305, Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures My incoming FOIA request can be found in ADAMS as ML13044A487.

Today, I was provided the following documents in your response to FOIA 2013-0126:

1. ML103490330 (released without redactions so not part of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A)

2. ML13099A247 instead of ML111460063 (included with this appeal as Enclosure 3)

3. ML13039A084 instead of ML100780084 (included with this appeal as Enclosure 4)

4. ML101610083 (released without redactions so can be removed from FOIA Appeal 2013-009A)

5. ML13039A086 instead of ML101900305 (included with this appeal as Enclosure 5)

For the records denied, Exemp*tion 7F of the Freedom of Information Act is claimed. I disagree with this decision and in this letter am providing you the reasons for that disagreement so that, if you chose, you can take this information into account when evaluating FOIA Appeal 2013-009A. I see nothing in the records requested which indicate they were compiled for law enforcement purposes nor do I see anything which would indicate to me that disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual. It appears to me that the NRC is using Exemption 7F as a means to withhold information which it believes may be beneficial to terrorists or saboteurs yet none of the information withheld pertains to security processes or hardware. The information withheld

merely pertains to the nuclear safety hazards which deficiencies in the Oconee Station's flooding defenses pose to the American public. These safety risks are present due to the risks of natural disasters and latent engineering/construction flaws and have nothing specifically pertaining to terrorist activities. As a specific example, consider ML100780084, the Generic Failure Rate Evaluation of Jocassee Dam Risk Analysis, submitted by James Vail, Fernando Ferrante, and Jeff Mitman on March 15, 2010. This document was a formal write up of analyses done by NRR in 2007 /2008 to support Region !l's efforts to get Duke Energy to address safety concerns regarding flooding protection at Oconee. In this document, the Reliabi lity & Risk Analysts at NRR estimated the failure frequency of the Lake Jocassee Dam to be 2.8E-4/yr which equates to a 1 in 3600 chance of falling in any given year. Given that the catastrophic failure of the Lake Jocassee Dam would likely lead to a meltdown of the three reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Station, the dam failure rate calculated by Vail, Ferrante & Mitman suggests that the probability of a nuclear accident at Oconee Nuclear Station is ten times what it is at a typical US reactor plant. This is the type of important information which President Obama e.xpects us to share with the American public (see the President's 2009-01-19 memo on Open Government). Yet the NRC did not share this information with the public. Instead, we stamped the Vail et. al. analysis as "Official Use Only -Security-Related Information" and for years never publicly mentioned its existence. Then, in response to a FOIA request by Dave Lochbaum, we released a redacted version of this supposed "Security-Related" report as ML13039A084. The only redaction in this 15 page report was a figure on page 1 showing the generic construction of Jocassee Dam - a figure very similar to what one can find in any Civil Engineering text book. I have included similar publicly available figures as Enclosure 6. Despite the fact that this figure did not provide any insight to terrorists, it apparently kept this important report from the public for nearly three years. On March 25, 2013 I attended a public meeting with Duke Energy in which this very same figure was presented by Duke Energy as a slide (see Enclosure 7). The slide show from this meeting was forwarded to me by Jim Riccio of Greenpeace and was posted by the NRC on their public website (ML13084A022). So this supposedly "Security-Related" figure, which caused NRR to keep the Vail et. al. analysis from the public for nearly three years and which NRR had redact from Dave Lochbaum's FOIA response in February 2013, was by March 2013 being emailed by NRR to Greenpeace and being posted by NRR on the world-wide web. The world-wide web gets that name for a reason: it is truly world-wide. Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the host of other countries which sponsor terrorist activity against the United States have access to this world-wide web. So why can NRR email this generic drawing to Greenpeace and post it on the web for our enemies to see yet must redact it from the version of the Vail et. al. analysis that it sent to David Lochbaum, Tom Zeller and Paul Blanch in response to their separate FOIA requests? Is this figure "Security-Related" or not? If it is, why are we sharing it on tlhe world-wide web? If it is not, why did we keep the Vail et. al. report from the public for nearly three years and why do we still refuse to release it in its entirety? These are rhetorical questions. Please do not delay answering FOIA Appeal 2013-009A due to these questions. I merely wish to point out to you some inconsistencies in your control of information in the event you would like to consider those inconsistencies while addressing FOIA Appeal 2013-009A. Additionally, information redacted from the documents supplied to me today has already been publicly release to Greenpeace in our 2013-02-06 partial response (M L130520858) to FOIA 2012-0325 (ML12263A087).

Under FOIA Appeal 2013-009A, please release the following three records to me with no redactions.

ML111460063, Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3. Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003, dated April 29, 2011
ML100780084, Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam Risk Analysis
ML101900305, Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures Again, this letter is an update to FOIA Appeal 2013-009A in response to documents I received today from the NRC. The information I received came in response to FOIA Request 2013-0126 and not FOIA Appeal 20013-009A. I expect FOIA Appeal 2013-009A to be answered within 30 working days from March 29, 2013 (i.e. by May 10, 2013). I am providing the information in this letter for you to consider if you so choose.

Although I live in Springfield, IL, I work in Rockville, MD. Please do not send documents to my home in Springfield, IL as I will not get t hem in a timely manner. Please send all written correspondence to me via email at LSCriscione@hotmail.com . If your processes will not allow you to do this, then please contact me via phone or email and I wil l come by the FOIA desk to pick up the correspondence. Very respectfully,

  ,:-:w~ s* l,-..-.,. ,
      ,J Lawrence S. Criscione, PE (573) 230-3959 Enclosures (7)

Cc: Billie Garde, Esq., Clifford & Garde Louis Clark, The Government Accountability Project Fernando Ferrante, NRC/NRR/DRA Jeff Mitman, NRC/NRR/DRA Dave Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists Jim Riccio, Greenpeace Tom Zeller, Huffington Post Paul Blanch, consultant

Enclosure 1 of Update to FOIA 2013I009A UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O.C. 20555- 0001 March 29, 2013 FOIA/PA-2013-00009A FOIA/PA-2013-00126 FOIA/PA-2013-0001 0A FOIA/PA-2013-00127 FOIA/PA-2013-00011 A FOIA/PA-2013-00128 Lawrence Criscione 1412 Dial Court Springfield, IL 62704

Dear Requester:

We have logged your March 29, 2013 correspondences as appeals for Lack of Response to you under FOIA/PA-2013-00126, FOIA/PA-2013-00127 and FOIA/PA-2013-00128. Your appeals have been assigned the following reference numbers that you should use in any future communications with us about your appeals: FOIA/PA-2013-00009A, FOIA/PA-2013-0001 0A, and FOIA/PA-2013-00011 A. The following person is the FOIA/PA Specialist who has been assigned responsibility for your appeals: Linda Kilgore at 301-415-5775. If you have questions on any matters concerning your FOIA/PA appeals, please feel free to contact the FOIA/PA SpeciaUst assigned to your appeals or me. I can be reached at 301 -415-7169. Sincerely,

                                           /SI Donna L. Sealing FOIA/Privacy Act Officer Office of Information Services

Enclosure:

Incoming Request

Enclosure 2 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA/PA RESPONSE NUMBER RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF 2013-0126 INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) / PRIVACY ACT(PA)REQUEST

RESPONSE

TYPE [Zj FINAL PARTIAL REQUESTER OATE Lawrence Criscione APft 11 2013 PART I. - INFORMATION RELEASED D No additional agency records subject to the request have been located. D Requested records are available through another public distribution program. See Comments section Agency records subject to the request that are Identified in the listed appendices are already available for I pubhc inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room. I. APPENO!ccs I

         ;::::::::;:::;::::::::::::====,

Agency records subject to the request that are Identified in the listed appendices are being made available for

                                       . public inspection and copying at the NRC Public Document Room.

Document Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MO 20852-2738. Enclosed is Information on how you may obtain access to and the charges for copying records located at the NRC Public _ _ __ ......,I Agency records subject to the request are enclosed. I APPENOICES referred to that agency (see comments section) for a disclosure determination and direct response to you. Records subject to the request that contain information originated by or of interest to another Federal agency have been See Comments. We are continuing to process your request. PART I.A -- FEES I D AMOUNT* You will be billed by NRC for the amount listed. [Z] None. Minimum fee threshold not met sI

See ccmments for details D You will receive a refund for the amount listed. D Fees waived.

PART I.B - INFORMATION NOT LOCATED OR WITHHELD FROM DISCLOSURE No agency records subject to the request have been located. For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010). This response Is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This Is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excruded records do, or do no~ exist. 0 Certain Information in the requested records is being withheld from disclosure pursuant to the exemptions described In and for the reasons stated in Part 11. 0 This determination may be appealed within 30 days by writing to the FOIA/PA Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Clear1y state on the envelope and In the letter that It is a "FOIA/PA Appeal." PART I.C COMMENTS ( Use attached Comments continuation page If required) The incoming FOIA request will be available in ADAMS at MLI 3044A487. SIGN U ~ ~ AN~lp~A!=T OFFICER D nrn I.;. Sealing - ~-j NRC FORM 464 Part 1 (10-2012)

Enclosure 2 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A NRC FORM 464 Part II U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA/PA DATE (4-2011) RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 2013-0126 APft 1 1 2013 ACT (FOIA) / PRIVACY ACT (PA) REQUEST PART II.A** APPLICABLE EXEMPTIONS l~PPENOICES Records subject to the request tha1 are described In the enclosed Appendices are being wl1hheld in their entirely or In part under the I

                     . Exemption No.(s) ol 1he PA and/or the FOIA as Indicated below (5 U.S.C. 552a and/or 5 U.S.C. 552(b)).

Exemption 1: The withheld informaUon Is properly classified pursuan1 to Executive Order 12958. Exemption 2: The withheld lnlorma1lon relates solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of NRC. Exemption 3: The withheld information is specifically exempted from public disclosure by statute indicated. Sections 141-145 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Restricted Data or Former1y Restricted Data (42 U.S.C. 2161-2165). Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act. which prohibits the disclosure of Unclassified Safeguards Information (42 U.S.C. 2167). 41 U.S.C.* Section 253b, subsection (m)(1 ), prohibits the disclosure of contractor proposals In the possession and control of an executive agency to any person under section 552 ol TIiie 5, U.S.C. (the FOIA). except when incorporated into the contract between the agency and the submitter of the proposal D Exemption 4 : The wlthheld information Is a trade secret or commercial or financial Information that Is being withheld for the reason(s) Indicated. D The information is considered to be confidential business (proprietary) information. The Information Is considered to be proprietary because It concerns a licensee's or applicanrs physical protection or material control and accounting program for special nuclear material pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1). D The Information was submitted by a foreign source and received In confidence pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d)(2). D Disclosure will harm an identifiable private or governmental interest. Exemption 5: The withheld Information consists of interagency or intraagency records that are not available through discovery during lltlgatlon. Applicable privileges: Deliberative process: Disclosure of predecisional Information would tend to inhibit the open and frank exchange of ideas essential lo the deliberative process. 1/vhere records are withheld in their entirety, the facts are inextricably intertwined with the predecisional Information. There also are no reasonably segregable faeluaf portions because the release of the facts would permit an indirect inquiry into the predecisional process of the agency. D Attorney work-product privilege. (Documents prepared by an attorney in contemplation of litigation) D Attorney-client privilege. (Confidential communications between an attorney and his/her client) Exemption 6: The withheld information Is exempted from public dlselosure because Its disclosure would result in a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, f7l Exemption 7: The withheld Information consists of records compiled for law enforcement purposes and is being wtthheld for the reason(s) l.!..J indicated. (A) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to Interfere with an enforcement proceeding (e.g .* It would reveal the scope, direction. and focus of enforcement efforts, and thus could possibly allow recipients to take action to shield potential wrong doing or a violation of NRC requirements from investigators). (C) Disclosure could constitute an unwarranted Invasion of personal privacy. (D) The information consists of names of Individuals and other Information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to reveal ldentaies of oonfidenlial sources. D (E) Disclosure would reveal techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions. or guidelines that could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law. [Z] (F) Disclosure could reasonably be expected lo endanger the life or physical safety of an individual. OTHER (Specify) I PART 11,B ** DENYING OFFICIALS Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.25(g), 9.25(h), and/or 9.65(b) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, It has been determined that the information withheld is exempt from production or disclosure, and !Fiat its production or disclosure is contrary to the public interest. The person responsible for the denial are those officials identified below as denying officials and the FOIA/PA Officer for any denials that may be appealed to the Executive Director for Operations (EDO). DENYING OFFICIAL TITLE/OFFICE RECORDS DENIED APPELLATE OFFICIAL 1-- - - - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - - - - - - - +~E_DO -'-il SECY .L!2..._ Victor McCrcc )Regional Administrator, Region II Sec Appendices A2 IZ] IO 0 Eric J Leeds !office Director, NRR Sec Appendix A3, AS 0 D D I DI Appeal must be made in writing within 30 days of receipt of this response. Appeals should be mailed to the FOIA/Privacy Act Officer, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Wa*shington, DC 20555-0001 , for action by the appropriate appellate officlal(s). You should clearfy state on the envelope and letter that it is a "FOIAIPA Appeal." NRC FORM 464 Part II (4-2011)

Enclosure 2 of Update t o FOIA 2013-009A Re: FOIA-2013-0126 APPENDIX A RECORDS ALREADY AVAILABLE IN THE PDR NO. ACCESSION NO. DATE DESCRIPTION/CPAGE COUNT)

1. ML103490330 11/29/10 Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2 and 3, Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter 2-10-003 (7 Pages) 2 ML13099A247 04/29/ 11 Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, 3, Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003 (16 pages) Exemption 7F

3. ML13039A084 03/15/10 Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam (15 pages) Exemption 7F

4. ML101610083 06/03/10 Oconee Nuclear Station - External Flood Commitments (5 pages)

5. ML13039A086 07 /19/10 Memorandum to Benjamin Beasley, RES from Lois James, NRR,

Subject:

Identification of a Generic External Flooding Issue Due to Potential Dam Failures (9 pages) Exemption 7F

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A ' ~Duke T. PRESTON GILLESPIE, JR. Vice President

 ,&Energy,. .                                                                        Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy ONO JVP I 7800 Rochester Hwy.

Seneca, SC 29672 April 29, 2011 864-873-4478 864-873-4208 fa~ T.Glllesp/e@duke-energy.com Mr. Victor McCrea, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License, DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 Docket Numbers 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003

References:

1. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter from Luis A. Reyes to Dave Baxter (Duke Energy), "Confirmatory Action Letter - Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Commitments to Address External Flooding Concerns (TAC Nos. ME3065, ME3066, and ME3067)" dated June 22, 2010

2. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter from Eric Leeds to Preston Gillespie (Duke Energy), "Staff Assessment of Duke's Response to Confirmatory Action Letter Regarding Duke's Commitments to Address E~ernal Flooding Concerns at the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (ONS) (TAC Nos. ME3065, ME3066, and ME3067)"

dated January 28, 2011

3. Duke Energy letter from T. Preston Gillespie to Luis Reyes (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), "Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003" dated November 29, 201 O

4. Duke Energy letter from Dave Baxter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Oconee External Flood Interim Actions" dated January 15, 201 o The purpose of this letter is to respond to the NRC's request, as noted in the Confirmatory Action Letter dated June 22, 201 O(Reference 1), for a list of all modifications necessary to adequately protect the Oconee site from the impact of a postulated failure of the Jocassee Dam.

www. duke-ener8f. com

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Victor Mccree Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 29, 2011 Page 2 Duke Energy agreed to provide this list and the associated implementation dates by April 30, 2011 (Reference 3). In Reference 2, the NRC found that the documentation previously supplied by Duke Energy provided sufficient justification that the parameters and analysis used to evaluate the inundation of the Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) site, resulting from the postulated failure of the Jocassee Dam, were bounded. The Information provided by Duke Energy was in response to one of the NRC's requests in Reference 1. Attachment 1 is a proposed strategy for mitigating the external flood impacts from a postulated failure of the Jocassee Dam. Calculations supporting this strategy are in progress and have not been finalized. Attachment 2 is a description of proposed site modifications necessary to implement the mitigation strategy. During design and implementation of these modifications, the actions required by Reference 1 will remain in place. Also, periodic independent assessments and emergency response organization drills of the interim actions will be conducted to verify continued viability. Design of the modifications is in progress and details may change as the process continues. The capability to provide adequate protection of the Oconee units and the spent fuel from a postulated failure of the Jocassee dam will be documented within the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). Duke Energy will submit the design of the Intake Dike Diversion Wall and the Intake Dike Tie Section modification (discussed in Attachment 2) to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Duke Energy will also submit any License Amendment Requests (LARs) to the NRC that are necessitated by the power block flood wall modification. The modifications identified in will be completed within a time frame of thirty (30) months plus FERC and NRC LAR review and approval time.

Duke Energy is committed to an orderly and thorough approach to resolution of the external flood mitigation issues at ONS so that the dates provided above and completion of the related modifications can be achieved. Duke Energy is proceeding, consistent with Its corporate governance requirements, to obtain necessary internal approvals to fund the Implementation of these commitments. Additionally, Duke Energy must undergo additional land acquisitions for relocation of the 100 kV (Fant) line towers.

Since this letter contains security sensitive information, Duke Energy hereby requests the NRC withhold the letter and its attachments from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1), "Public Inspections, exemptions, requests for withholding.* If you have questions concerning this matter, please contact Bob Meixell, Oconee Regulatory Compliance, at 864-873-3279.

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Victor Mccree Nuclear Regulatory Commission Aprll 29, 2011 Page3 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on April 29, 2011 . Sincerely, rr~,,c.ca 4plC T. Preston Gillesple, Jr. Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Attachments: - Jocassee Dam Failure Flood Mitigation Strategy - Description of Modifications

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A d)(1) Victor Mccree Nuclear Regulatory Commission April 29, 2011 Page4 cc: Mr. Joseph G. Giitter, Director Division of Operating Reactor Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8 E1A Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. John Stang, Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8 G9A Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Andy Sabisch Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Site Susan E. Jenkins, Manager Radioactive & Infectious Waste Management Division of Waste Management SC Dept. of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, SC 29201

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A ATTACHMENT 1 JOCASSEE DAM FAILURE FLOOD MITIGATION STRATEGY

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Withhold from Publlc Olsclosu Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 1 - Jocassee Dam Failure Flood Mitigation Strategy Page 2 Jocassee Dam Failure Flood Mitigation Strategy The strategy proposed within this attachment will continue to ensure adequate protection of the Oconee units and spent fuel in the unlikely occurrence of a Jocassee Dam failure. This strategy is provided based on the following Initial Oconee site conditions:

All three units are at power operation
Unit 1&2 and Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pools (SFP) heat rates are consistent with that associated with all three units at power operation (no full core offload)
Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) is not dewatered
The Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) is available
I(b)(7)(F)
Credited Systems, Structures, and Components are in normal alignments When the Oconee site is not within these initial conditions or associated mitigation systems are unavailable, appropriate compensatory measures will be taken based on the insight provided through the 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) program, as applicable.

Furthermore, the mitigation strategy assumes the following:

The Jocassee Dam failure does not occur concunrent with design basis accidents, design events, or transients.
The Jocassee Dam failure does not occur concurrent with an earthquake.
The occurrence of a single failure, as well as the failure of a control rod to fully insert, is not assumed.
Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) to mitigate a Jocassee Dam failure are not required to be QA~1.

UFSAR Section 2.4.2.2 documents the Flood Design Considerations for both the Keowee and Jocassee Reservoirs. The dams and other hydraulic structures were designed with adequate freeboard and structural safety factors to safely accommodate the effects of Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP). UFSAR Section 2.4.4 documents that Jocassee has been designed to the same seismic input conditions as Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS). Flooding due to the potential failure of the Jocassee Dam or Keowee Dam was not addressed and was considered to be beyond design basis. Thus, the current ONS licensing basis defines protection from external flooding caused by a Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) applicable to ONS which was analyzed based on the PMP. This basis satisfied General Design Criterion 2 of the UFSAR (Section 3.1.2). Criterion 2 of the UFSAR Imposes design criteria on select (designated as Essential) SSCs associated with the forces and conditions associated with natural phenomena. As such, natural phenomena events are not design basis events at Oconee, instead they impose design criteria

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Wrthho,"""1.\1!!lJ"'VII Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 1 - Jocassee Dam Failure Flood Mitigation Strategy Page 3 on SSCs identified for mitigation of accidents. As was the original site design for flooding conditions, these design criteria are to remain within the constraints of the PMF applicable to ONS which was analyzed based on the PMP. Therefore, the original PMF analysis will remain as the flood design criteria for the Essential SSCs. A Jocassee Dam failure can subject the Oconee Nuclear Site to adverse conditions beyond the plant design basis. Specifically, the postulated failure of the Jocassee Dam could result In a loss of off-site and emergency power, loss of external water sources and Inundation of a majority of the station's SSCs. As described and accepted within Reference 1, compensatory measures are in place to mitigate these potential adverse consequences. Modifications are planned and discussed In Attachment 2 to improve the capability to maintain the three Oconee units as well as both SFPs in a condition that adequately protects the fuel. Upon completion of these modifications and implementation of the mitigation strategy within station procedures and processes, the compensatory measures described within Reference 1 will no longer be required. Flood barriers will be designed to protect the credited SS'),l,lil.-l!, . ~'"-"-"w....>LLI,\ Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building and the SSF, and the surrounding ard (b)(7)(F) followin the power source for p ant sys1ems. protected power source would also allow the SSF to be owered without startin the SSF diesel enerator thus * * (b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(F) '---- -----:=----:--::------:-:-:-----.,.,..----:--:------------=-----__,..-.11 Thus, mitigation of the Jocassee Dam failure would be limited by the loss of external water sources to ONS. The water inventory trapped in the CCW system piping system would be the credited source of water for core decay heat removal and SFP makeup. The planned modifications have been assumed to be implemented in the mitigation strategy for establishing and maintaining the three Oconee units as well as both SFPs in a condition that adequately protects the fuel. The mitigation strategy for this scenario has been subdlvid'ed into the following phases:

    **    Phase 1: Reactor shutdown and establishment of Mode 3

Phase 2: Initiation of Natural Circulation Cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to 250°F
Phase 3: Maintain RCS at S250°F

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A n. Withhold from Pu-....._,--""-- vn.....w_..-......,w.1* (d){1) Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 1 - Jocassee Dam Failure Flood Mitigation Strategy Page4 Phase 1: Reactor shutdown and establishment of Mode 3 (b)(7)(F)

.____________________,!Actions are taken to establish the flood protective features, such as Isolating Turbine Building and yard drain flowpaths and closing flood barrier access openings.

Following notification, the ONS Switchyards are assumed to remain L-------~- avaiiabIe to each unit's startup transformer which provides power to normal and emergency systems. The operators will take actions to shutdown the reactor(s) and establish Mode 3 with T_ and RCS pressure at approximately 525°F and 2155 psig respectively, using normal plant systems. Operator actions will be undertaken to begin boration of the RCS for cold shutdown conditions. Normal secondary plant systems will remain in operation during this phase. The operators will take actions to disable the Essential Siphon Vacuum System and vent it to prevent reverse siphon flow from the CCW inlet piping back to the Intake Canal when it is lost. The emergency CCW discharge flow path will be disabled by operators to prevent any loss of CCW. Actions will be taken to isolate the High Pressure Service Water {HPSW) outside of the flood protected area to ensure its capability to provide cooling water to the High Pressure Injection (HPI) pump motors. Phase 2: Initiation of Natural Circulation Cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System to 250°F (b)(7)(F) results In a momentary loss of power to ea are lost due to the loss of ower to the sta .__ _______________________ (b)(7)(F)

                                                                                              ,... The SSF is normally powered from Unit 2's MFB, but it is load shed. Operator action wlll be taken to restore power to the SSF from Unit 2's MFB. Following reset of the load shed, power for the SSF would be provided from Unit 2's MFB to minimize any usage of the CCW inventory for SSF diesel operation.

The rising flood water in the ONS Intake Canal is postulated to result in failure of the Lake Keowee impoundment including the Intake canal. This requires the shutdown of the Low Pressure Servie:e Water (LPSW) pumps to conserve water inventory in the CCW piping.

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A etter Wlthhold from Public Dlsdosure Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 1 -Jocassee Dam Failure Flood Mitigation Strategy Page 5 Heat removal from the Spent Fuel Cooling system is normally provided by the Recirculated Cooling Water (RCW) system. Following the overtopplng of the Keowee Dam, the loss of CCW flow results in a loss of RCW cooling. This leaves the Units 1 & 2 shared SFP and the Unit 3 SFP without cooling. The SFP will eventually heat up to the point of boiling. When boiling occurs, the SFP level will decrease. Makeup to the SFP would be initiated from available sources including the water contained within the CCW buried piping to maintaln a sufficient water level above the spent fuel stored in the pools. The shutdown of the LPSW pumps results in a loss of cooling to such items as the Reactor Building, HPI pumps, the Component Cooling System, the motor-driven EFW pumps, and the Low Pressure Injection coo'lers. With the shutdown of the CCW and LPSW systems, environmental conditions within the plant would be established as needed by the use of temporary equipment and operation of necessary existing and temporary ventilation systems. The temporary equipment will be powered from a 4160VAC electrical bus tha1 receives power from CT5. The HP1 pumps can continue to operate because backup cooling is provided from the HPSW system via the Elevated Water Storage Tank (EWST}. Power to an HPSW pump would be restored and the pump would be operated to replenish the EWST to maintain cooling water to the HPI pump motor coolers. The HPI system operates to maintain pressurizer level at the desired setpoint. A loss of normal secondary systems is experienced due to the temporary loss of power to the main feeder buses. Decay heat removal would initially be maintained by the EFW System. The motor-driven EFW pumps must be secured due to the loss of LPSW cooling. The turbine-driven EFW pump does not require LPSW for cooling and is therefore allowed to continue to operate to feed the SGs. The loss of condenser cooling will result in the SGs being steamed to atmosphere using the Atmospheric Dump Valves which results in depletion of the condensate Inventory. Upon a loss of normal RCS letdown capability a cooldown is initiated. Since RCPs cannot be operated based on a loss of cooling and power to the pumps, a natural circulation cooldown must be performed. Oepressurization of the RCS would be accomplished by means of the Power Operated Relief Valve and/or auxiliary spray. Core decay heat removal would eventually be transferred to the SSF Auxiliary Service Water (ASW) system to utilize the trapped water inventory in the CCW piping. With the use of tlhe SSF ASW system, valve alignments would be made to maximize the available trapped water inventory in the CCW piping to the SSF ASW pump suction. This would be accomplished by cross-connecting the CCW inlet and discharge piping between all three units.

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A This letter conntlll:Ml&Curily nsll In nnation Withhold from Public Disclosure un 10CFR .3 d)(1) Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Jocassee Dam Failure Flood Mitigation Strategy Page6 When the cooldown has been completed, the operating HPI pump would be stopped. The SSF ASW system would continue to supply the steam generators (SGs) to maintain decay heat removal. Phase 3: Maintain RCS at S250°F Core decay heat removal will be maintained by natural circulation of the RCS with the SSF ASW system providing decay heat removal by means of SG feeding and steaming through the ADVs. The HPI system will be operated as needed to maintain RCS water level within an acceptable band. Pressurizer heaters will be operated as necessary to maintain RCS pressure. Water level In the SFP will be maintained at a sufficient level above the spent fuel stored in the pools. The suction source for the SSF ASW system and the SFP makeup system is the water inventory trapped In the CCW piping.

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A ATTACHMENT 2. DESCRIPTION OF MODIFICATIONS

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Wi oldrrnn._.,,.,., Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Description of Modifications Page 2 Based on the mitigation strategy discussed within Attachment 1, the following table Identifies proposed modifications to mitigate site flooding following the postulated failure of the Jocassee Dam. Specifically, modifications will be required to protect the required SSCs to meet the mitigation strategy and provide a dedicated flood protected power supply following a postulated Jocassee Dam failure. Protection of the credited SSCs including the Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building, SSF, and the surrounding yard (including CT5 Substation) will be accomplished with flood barriers and associated infr st (b)(7)(F) No Category Description 1 (b)(7)(F) (b)(7)(F) ~ (b)(7)(F) ,-- 1A

1B CT5 Substation Modify CTS Substation to supply the standby bus and a new recovery eauipment bus. 2 Protect Required Protect required SSCa and the surrounding yard due SSCs and the to Keowee lmpoundment failures and rising waters In Surrounding Yard the tallrace area 2A Power Block Flood Wall Install a new flood wall located on the east side of the Oconee site. 28 Intake Dike Diversion Install a new diversion wall along the northern side of the Wall ONS intake dike 2C Turbine Building Drain Install barriers to minimize flood waters from entering Into Isolation the Turbine Building from rising waters in the tailrace area 20 Yard Drain Isolation Install barriers to minimize flood waters from entering the site 3 SFP Makeup Utilizes stored water Inventory for makeup to the S.FP 3A SSF Service Water SSF ASW minimum flow line diverted to outside SSF for Discharge Flow Path transfer to SFP 38 SFP Level Install new SFP level Instrumentation rated for post-flood Instrumentation conditions

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A tter co

s security se
In Withhold from Public o_,.,,ouu...,,,,iler 10CF Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attachment 2 - Description of Modifications Page3 Description of Modifications:

1-Dedlcated, Flood Protected Power In order to ensure an adequate dedicated power path to the Oconee site after a Jocassee Dam failure, the following modifications are required: (b)(7)(F) 1B - CT5 Substation L------------------------' (b)(7)(F) r-,::~~~~l I The Jocassee Dam failure requires modification of the CT5 Substation to add multiple power paths for mitigation. The Initial function of the CT5 Substation will be to provide emergency power to loads required to mitigate the Jocassee Dam failure from the Oconee Standby Buses. Isolation for CT5 to the Standby Bus power path will be provided by a new breaker in the CT5 Substation. A secondary function of the CT5 Substation will be to provide an additional power path to temporary loads used for mitigation. These loads will be powered by a new recovery equipment bus designed for the CTS Substation. This bus wlll provide power to portable distribution tra1ilers at voltage levels of 4160V, 600V, 480V, 208V, and 120V for these temporary loads. Isolation/protection of this bus will be provided by a new breaker. Individual loads wlll be isolated/protected by load-specific fusible gang switches on the load side of this bus. General Design Parameters: Loading of CT5 transformer does not exceed the 12/16/20MVA rating consistent with UFSAR Section 8.2.1.4. 2-Protect Required SSCa and the Surrounding Yard In order to prevent flood waters from flowing Into the site from the Keowee impoundment failure and from rising waters In the tallrace area, the following modifications are required:

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A (1) Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Description of Modifications Page4 2A - Power Block Flood Wall The new Power Block flood Wall will envelope the eastern side and the southern end of the ONS protected area. The wall is comprised of 3 sections: The Discharge Diversion Section, The East Wall, and the Intake Dike Tie Section. The wall will have at least one vehicular access and one personnel access located at the north road crossing, each of which will have flood protection capability. General Design Parameters: Classification: Class 3, consistent with UFSAR Section 3.2.1 .1.3 Design Loadings: Dead + Wind (UFSAR Section 3.3.2.4) or Dead + Hydrodynamic (Flood) (Reference 2) Additional Design Considerations: General erosion; flood scour; debris; leakage from access gates, expansion joints, and unidentified locations (details to be determined); site drainage; and soil exploration and characterization. Interactions of non-seismic SSCs with seismic SSCs will be addressed. Discharge Diversion Section (approximately 300 ft long) 7 Wall Height: Top Elev.1.-l(b_l(__l(F_)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ . Protection Height Margin: Approximately 2 ft. Wall Thickness: Material dependent Design Codes: Similar to UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 Design Methodology: UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 East wall Section (approximately 2000 ft. long) 7 Wall Height: Top Etev. lL-(b_l(_)_(F_)- - - - - - -- - -~ Protection Height Margin: Approximately 2 ft. Wall Thickness: Material dependent Design Codes: Similar to UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 Design Methodology: UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 Access Barriers: Vehicular access closure is planned to be a gate (sliding or hinged, possibly designed with some mechanical sealing devices), or stop logs (concrete or steel), similar to standard flood gates or other similar barriers.

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Withho*.....,_.,,=......,61 Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Description of Modifications Pages Intake Dike Tie Section (approximately 160 ft. long) 1 7 Wall Height: Top Elev. l(b)( l(F) ~apering to zero height Protection Height Margin: Approximately 2 ft. Wall Thickness: Material dependent. Wall ls planned to be a combination of Power Block. Wall transitioning to an embankment (compacted fill) wall tied to the existing Intake Canal Dike embankment. Design Codes: Similar to UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 Design Methodology: UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 28 - Intake Dike Diversion Wall This wall will prevent the rising waters on Lake Keowee, more specifically the Oconee Intake Canal, from flowing over the northern crest of the dike and directly into the yard. The wall will be located on the northern side of the dike crest, going from the northeast comer of the dike to the northwest comer of the dike where it will tie to higher ground. One access gate is planned for the exist~ng roadway connecting the western portion of the nuclear site to the crest of the dike. Design parameters for the Intake Dike Diversion Wall are described below: General Design Parameters Classification: Class 3, consistent with UFSAR Section 3.2.1.1.3 Design Loadings: Dead + Wind (UFSAR Section 3.3.2.4) or Dead + Hydrodynamic (Flood) (Reference 2) Additional Design Considerations: General erosion; flood scour, debris; leakage from access gates, expansion joints, and unidentified locations (details to be detennined); and soil exploration and characterization. Interactions of non-seismic SSCs with seismic SSCs will be addressed. 7 Wall Height: Top Elev.l{bl( l(F) Protection Height MargL.i-n:_,A...p-p-ro_x..,. im _a....,.te _,l,y"""2..,.ft Wall Thickness: Material dependent Design Codes: Similar to UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 Design Methodology: UFSAR Section 3.8.5.4.3 Access Barriers: Vehicular access closure Is planned to be a gate or stop logs similar to standard flood gates or other similar barriers.

Enclosure 3 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A This tette11,1:9~1S-S411Catify'le* W h Id 1) Nuclear Regulatory Comm sion - Description of Modifications Page6 2C - Turbine Building Drain Isolation The free-flowing capability of the Turbine Building drain will be restricted during the site external flood by a flood gate or other similar barrier to minimize water flowing into the Turbine Building from the flooded tallrace area. Design parameters are described below: Classification: Class 3, consistent with UFSAR Section 3.2.1.1.3 Design Loadings: Dead + Hydrodynamic (Flood) (Reference 2) Design Code: Sluice gate or valve, standard to be determined 2D - Yard Drain Isolation This modification adds. a flood gate or other similar barrier to minimize the amount of water entering the flood protected area via the yard drains. Design parameters are described below: Classification: Class 3, consistent with UFSAR Section 3.2.1.1.3 Design Loadings: Dead + Hydrodynamic (Flood) (Reference 2) Design Code: Sluice gate or valve, standard to be determined 3-SFP Makeup In order to provide makeup to the Spent Fuel Pools after a Jocassee Dam failure, the following modifications are required: 3A - SSF Service Water Discharge Flow Path The capability to remove water from the CCW pipe by means of the SSF ASW Minimum Flow Line will be added for collection and transfer to the Units 1 & 2 shared SFP and the Unit 3 SFP. 38 - SFP Level !nstrumentatlon SFP level instrumentation will be designed to monitor the SFP level to ensure proper level ls maintained during SFP boiling conditions.

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter

           ~U.S.NRCUNITED STATES NUCLEAR. I\EGm.ATORY COMMISSION Protecting People and the Environment Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam March 15, 2010 Probabilistic Risk Assessment {PRA) Analyst:            James Vail, Reliability and Risk Analyst, NRR/DRA/APOB Probabilistic Risk As~essment (PRA) Analyst:            Fernando Ferranle, Reliability and Risk Analyst, NRR/ORA/APOB Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Analyst:            Jeff Mitman, Senior Reliability and Risk Analyst, NRR/DRAIAPOB Peer Reviewer:                                          Steven A. Laur, Senior Technical Advisor NRR/DRA

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter GENERIC FAILURE RATE EVALUATION FOR JOCASSEE DAM BY DIVISION OF RISK ASSESSMENT'S PRA OPERATIONAL SUPPORT BRANCH The following documents a generic dam failure rate analysis applicable to the Jocassee Dam performed by the PRA Operational Support Branch (APOB) of the Division of Risk Assessment (DRA) in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation {NRR). The analysis, technical justifications, and databases used in support of the calculations for the derived value are briefly discussed. Portions of this evaluation were initially performed in 2007 but not formally documented at that time. Approach The approach used in deriving a generic failure rate value applicable to the Jocassee Dam included: (I) an evaluation of the physical characteristics and description o1 the dam, (ii) an assessment of the overall U.S. dam population for those with similar features to the Jocassee Dam, (iii) a study of U.S. dam perfonnance information for failure events that may be applicable to this subset of the overall population, and (iv) a calculation of a point estimate, as well as consideration of the uncertainty involved, for the failure rate given the observed failure events and the observed time period (in dam-years), Jocassee Dam Description The Jocassee Dam is located In northwest South Carolina, forming a reservoir (Lake Jocassee) with a 7565-acre surface area, a water volume of 1,160,298 acre-feet, and a total drainage area of 147 sq-miles at full pond (1,110 feet elevation above mean sea level). The reservoir was created in 1973 with the construction of the dam. The Jocassee Dam is an embankment dam with an earthen core and rockfilled and random rockfilled zones (see Figure 1). (b)(7)(F)

                       ...§fNSITl1/Efl'qPORMATION- OFFICIAL O ~ Y 1

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter The dam is 385 feet in height (1,125 crest elevation above mean sea level) and 1,825 feet in length and, along with two homogeneous earthfill dikes and a reinforced concrete spillway, is part of a hydroelectric station and pumped storage project. The underground powerhouse generating units receive water from two cylindrical intake towers through eight openings. The water is channeled from the intake towers to four hydro turbines by two bifurcated power tunnels which are constructed through the bedrock of the east abutment. Two gates 33 feet in height and 38 feet in width control the outflow of the spillway. Databases The staff used two databases to obtain information about the population of dams in the US: the National Inventory of Dams (NID}, maintained by the US Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Performance of Dams Program (NPDP), developed by the Department of CMI and Environmental Engineering at Stanford University. The NIO database-contains data describing multiple attributes such as dimensions, type, impoundment characteristics, etc. The NPDP database contains a collection of dam incident reports searchable by various parameters including dam type, incident type, and consequences. Failure Events Table 1 lists the applicable dam failures initially derived from the NPOP database. To choose these 13 failures, the analysts used criteria based on the previously discussed dam characteristics (i.e., dam type and height). However, due to the ambiguity in the classificatfon of. the dam type (i.e., based on material composition) between and within the NIO and NPDP databases, as well as the lack of information to establish an exact link with the Jocassee Dam characteristics for every data point, the staff considered both rockfill dams and mixed-rockfill dams (i.e., those classified exclusively as rockfill dams as well as mixed dam types that include rockfill in their categorization). It should be noted that the NPDP database does not list any failures post-2006 and at least two well-known large dam failures in the U.S. are not included: the Big Bay Dam in Mississippi (March 2004) and the Taum Sauk Rese,voir (December 2005) in Missouri. While the Big Bay Dam was an earthen dam (i.e., excluded based on dam type). the Taum Sauk Reservoir consisted of a concrete-faced rockfill dam approximately 100 feet in height and was, therefore, included in the current analysis. Additionally, the list was screened to take into consideration (i) failure events observed between 1900 and 2005, and (ii) failure events observed between 1940 and 2005; under the assumption that events prior to these construction periods could produce different results representative of distinct design practices. In part, this choice was due to the lack of information on the exact construction date of several dams in the database. The staff expended an extensive effort to determine th~ construction completion date for several dams for which the information was missing in the NPOP database (this information is included in Table 1). Several failures listed in Table 1 have (or are assumed to have) occurred within a few years of either the start or completion of construction (e.g., the Lower Hell Hole Dam and the Frenchman Dam failures). Based op the information available and the estimated completion dates, the staff screened out such failures since the occurrence of the events was assumed to be related to the construction phase and, therefore, not applicable to a mature dam such as Jocassee. Finally, the analysts chose to include the Dresser No. 4 Dam failure, because they deemed this dam to be similar to the Jocassee Dam in composition (i.e., a large mixed earthJill-rockfill dam), SFI\IS!JIUE 11413'0~MPiTION OFFICIAL USE ot*LY..

                                          .       2

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter despite the fact that it is listed as a tailings dam (i.e., a dam theoretically built under lower standards of quality and maintenanc~)- Therefore, the final list of failures of dams similar to, and therefore applicable to, the Jocassee Dam includes 6 failures occurring between 1900 and 2005. These six failures are highlighted in Table 1. The staff included these failures based on the following criteria: (i) rockfill or mixed-rockfill dam type, (ii) dam height above 50 feet. (iii) failure occurring after 1900, and (iv} no failures during or within a few years of completion of construction. Note that if failures occurring prior to-1940 are screened, then only 4 events remain: (1) Taum Sauk, (2) Dresser No.4 Dam, (3) Skagway, *and (4) Kem Brothers Reservoir. It should be noted that there are 1 to 3 failures of dams bullt between 1940 and 2005 depending on whether the entries with unknown construction dates are excluded or not, respectively (in similar fashion, there are 3 to 5 failures for dams constructed between 1900*2005 excluding or not entries with unknown construction dates, respectively). Total Dam-years Calculation . To calculate the dam failure rate, the staff needed to obtain the total number of dam.years of both failed and non-failed dams. The analysts extracted a subset of dams from the NID database based on a set of parameters to narrow the US population of dams to those reflecting the characteristics of the Jocassee Dam discussed above, i.e., large rockfill dams. They assumed that dams above 50 feet in height appropriately reflect design practices and structural characteristics of larger dams such as Jocassee. This height criterion was consistent with the large dam definition (WCD, 2000) established by the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) which ~defines a large dam as a dam with a height of 15m or more from the foundation." If dams are between 5*15 meters high and have a reservoir volume of more than 3 million cubic meters, ICOLD also classified such dams as large. Hence, the staff used this definition as a screening criterion. The dams considered for calculation of the total dam-years were those in the NID database that were categorized exclusively as 'Rocl<fill' dams (i.e., those listed under the 'ER' abbreviation, intended to correspond to rockfill dams for NID cataloguing purposes). The staff included the dam-year contributions from SkagwaY- and the replacement for the failed Frenchman Dam, while those from Kern Brothers Reservoir, Dresser No. 4 Dam, Penn Forest, and the failed Frenchman Dam were not included. This was because the staff judges that including the dam-year contribution from these specific dams would not significantly impacl the resulting dam-year total. The staff calculated the final result using the difference between the last year in the available data (2005) and either 1900 or 1940. For the 1900-2005 period, the staff" obtained a total of 21,490 dam-years; while for 1940-.2005 the result was 13,889.dam~ years. See Appendix A for a tabulation of the dams and the associated dam-years. 3

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter. SENSlllVE INFORM;t(fl61* OFFIGIAt-USE.QNl.¥ a e ..: m1a IS 0 am f'I Tbl11'fll'tfd a1 ure events appl'bltthJ 1 1ca e o e ocassee Dam Incident Completion Heignl Dam Name Year Year(Esl) i~rtType j-

Dam Type .(ft} .. OesCllptlon From NPDP Dl!tabase (Except Taum Sau~);;'

Taum Sauk Dvertopped due to over-pumping of niservoir. !ndependent ana~is 2005 1963 Overtopping Rockfill 94 indicated sewral root causes (e.g., lad of mon~oring, spillway). Dresser No.4 EarthRockfill ,. ' 1975 Unknown Piping 105 Catastrophic failure thai created abreach 300 feet 'Mde in the lellee. Dam /Tailings Inflow Food

Skagway 1965 1925 Rockfill 79 The dam lai~d curing aftood in 1965.

Hyijrologic Event Dam failed du'ing construction. Overtopped by 100 leet -washing Hell Hole 1964 1964 Nol Known Rockfill 410 out most or tlie fill. Concrete Earth Penn Forest 1960 1gsc Piping 151 Partial failJre. Sin'<hole occurred in ups1ream slope of dam. Rockf*II Frenchman *

Inflow Flood
Runoff from r,etti'lg snow, Adike section was overtoppad early 1952 1951 Hydrologic Event Rocknll 63 morning April 15, 1952. Later lhat day, dam breached.

Da:11 Ker.: Brothers 1949 Unknown Selllement Earth Roddill 54 Failure due to excessive settlement of fill. Reservoir Blowou1 fa:.ure under concrete spillway weir struclure during period lake Francis 1899

1sgg Piping Earth -~0Ckfill 79 of heavy spil~ay How. Spillway failure thought lo be due to piping in soft saturated fcundation.

Foundat~n slide during oonstruction (at 120 feet). Height raised to Lafayette !928 1928 Emoankment Slide Earth Rockfill 132 170 feet in 1932. Not sure if this is ronsidered afailure. Manitou 1924 1917 Seepage Earth Rodmll . 123 Partial fa~ure Wc!S disintegrating and c:onve~ed into gra~el fill. Failure by µiiing through abutment;* undermined by passage of water Lyman 1915 1912 Piping Earth Rockfill 76.4 under cap of lava rock which Hanked dam and exlended beneath spillway. Man pM of dam uninjured. Foundation $;ide during rons1ruclion {al 120 feet). Height raised to Lower Olay 1916 1897 Spillway Earth Rod(fill 154 170 fool in 1932. Not sure if !his is oonsldered afailure. Failure by piping through abutment; undermined by passage ol waler under cap of ,aw ~ck which Hanked dam and exlended beneath Blad\ Rock 1909 1908 Piping Earth Rockfill 70 spillway. PortKl" of spillway dropped 7feel; some fill at soulh end washed ou:. Mair, part of dam uninjured. SQl!Sl+II" IHF9RMMION -OfFlel:~L USE Ol'ftV 4

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter SEtSl'flVE-+NroBMAilObl--t>Fr iCIAL U~E ONLY Generic Point Es1imate of the Dam Failure Rate The staff calculated the point estimate by dividing the number of applicable dam failures (see Table 1 above) by the total applicable dam-years (derived as described previously). Assuming a 1900-2005 range for the year of occurrence of the failure events and the dam-year estimatfon {based on completion year), the analysts obtained a failure rate of 2.SE-4 per dam-year. When considering a 1940-2005 range, the staff obtained a result of 2.9E-4 per dam-year. Because the.NID database does not give information regarding the quality of design, construction and/or maintenance, and the NPDP database does not consistently supply information on the dam health (i.e. , is It well maintained?) at: time of failure, the staff could not derive failure rates for above or below average built and maintained dams. This lack of information precluded the staff from making any judgment as to whether Jocassee is or is not an above average designed, constructed and maintained dam deserving of a failure frequency different than an average failure frequency. Additionally, the staff recognizes that ambiguity and lack of complete information with respect to dam type, construction completion data, and dam Incident reporting, may result ln variations In the failure rate estimation. Therefore. the staff performed a simple sensitivity study In order to evaluate the changes due t,o screening failure events and cul*Off year criteria. The results are shown 1n Table 2 for an assumed number of failures and clearly Indicated that the results exhibit small variations for the period cut-off selected (1900-2005 and 1940-2005) and the number of failures considered (6 and 4, respectively). Additionally, the extent of the variation in the point estimate is shown for other number of failures and cut-off years based on the subset of dams selected. The table illustrates that the order-of-magnitude failure frequency estimate does not change significantly if the number of failures is increased or decreased slightly. Table 2: Failure Rate Sensitivity Analysis ASSUMED NUMBER OF FAILURES CUT- DAM-OFF YEARS #DAMS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ALL 25137 484 4.0E-05 8.0E-05 1.2E-04 1.6E-04 2.0E-04 2.4E-04 2.8E-04 1900 21490 466 4.7E-05 9.3E-05 1.4E-04 1.9E-04 2.3E-04 2.8E-04 3.3E-04 1910 19778 449 5.1E-05 1.0E-04 1.SE-04 2.0E-04 2.SE-04 3.0E-04 3,SE-04 1920 18389 434 5.4E-05 1.1 E-04 1.6E-04 2.2E-04 2.7E-04 3.3E-04 3.8E-04 1930 16475 410 6.1E-05 1.2E-04 1.8E-04 2.4E-04 3.0E-04 3.6E-04 4.2E-04 1940 13889 373 7.2E-05 1.4E-04 2.2E-04 2.9E-04 4.3E-04 5.0E-04 1950 12269 346 8.2E-05 1.6E-04 2.4E-04 3.JE-04 4.9E-04 5.7E-04 1960 8453 270 1.2E-04 2.4E-04 3.SE-04 4.7E-04 7.1E-04 8.3E-04 1970 3242 143 1980 1339 82 1990 381 36 FAILURE RATE GIVEN # NUMBER OF FAILURES AND CUTOFF YEAR 5

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter Bayesian Estimate of the Dam Failure Rate To evaluate the dam failure rate uncertainty, the staff conducted a Bayesian analysis of the failure rate for the 1900-2005 period via a Bayesian analysis approach (Atwood et al, 2003). 1n this approach, a prior distribution was assumed from the number of failures and dam-years for all large dams {according to the !COLD definition) identified in the NID and NPOP databases, Failures identified as 'infantile failures' in NPDP were excluded and only dams built since 1900 according to NID were used for total dam-year calculation. Under these assumptions, the total number of failures for all large dams for 1900-2005 was 84 with a total of 260,960 dam-years. This corresponds to a point estimate of the failure rate equivalent to 3.2E-4/dam-year. A distribution was fitted around this mean. The number of dam failure events was modeled as a Poisson distribution for which its conjugate prior was assumed to follow a Gamma distribution (i.e .. the conjugate prior in a Gamma-Poisson model). The staff, based on judgment, chose a Gamma distribution with the point estimate obtained from the large dam failure rate above and a 51h percentile corresponding to 1E-5/dam-year. With these assumptions, the staff obtained a prior Gamma distribution with parameters a= 0.8333 and~= 2589, which has a 5th percentile equivalent to 1E-5/dam-year and a 95th percentile corresponding to 1E-3/dam-year. The staff updated this prior distribution with the data used to obtain the large rockfill dam point estimate (e.g., 6 failures in 21,490 dam~years) to calculate the posterior distribution. The resulting posterior has a mean of 2.BE-4/dam-year, a 51~ percentile of 1.3E-4/dam-years, and a 9511' percentile of 4.8E-4/dam-years (with parameters a = 6.8333 and 13 .= 24,079). Figure 2 shows both the generic large dam prior and the posterior specific to rockfill dams, Conclusions The staff estimated generic dam failure rates for large rockfill dams, which it considers applicable to the Jocassee Dam, as 2.BE-4/dam-year. Given the nature of the qata and the assumptions involved in narrowing the applicable failure events and subset of the U.S. dam population comparable to this specific dam, the staff performed a Bayesian analysis. Using available data on the domestic inventory of dams and dam failures, the range obtained varies between 1.3E-4/dam-year and 4.SE-4/dam-year (51h - 95th percentile) around a mean of 2.SE-4/dam-year. . A literature review performed by the authors for statistical studies of dam failures appears to corroborate this conclusion. Such studies were found in Baecher et al [ 1980}, Martz and Bryson (1982), Donnelly (1994), ICOLD (1995}, Foster (2000a}, and Foster et al {2000b}.

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter SENSII1V~ INFGRMATIQ~,j -OFFICIAL U ~ Figure 2: Failure Rate Probability Distributions Used in Bayesian Updating 0000,.------,-----.------,-----.---~ 4500~

                                                                 ---* Prior 4000                                  1-     Posterior I

I

                    ];, 3500    I
                    *-UJ        
                     ~ 3000 \
                                  \
                   -:.c
                    .~2500         \
                                     \
                                       \

112000 \ e a.. 1500 1000 ~,. sool I o~----'------'-----'-==----...J 2 *s a 10 Failure Rate (per dam-years)* x 1o"" References Baecher, G. B., M. E. Pate, and R. De Neufville (1980), "Risk of Dam Failure in Benefit-Cost Analysis," Water Resource Research, 16(3), 449-456. Martz, H.F., and M.C. Bryson (1982), "Predicting Low-Probability/High-Consequence Events," Proceedings of the Workshop on Low-Probability/High-Consequence Risk Analysis, June 15-17, 1982, Arlington, Virginia. Donnely, R. (1994), Nlssues in Dam Safety, ACRES International Innovations Autumn Edition": http://www. hatch. com_ cn/H atchenergy/ In naval ions/ autumn 2004/featu re. ht mI ICOLD (1995), "Dam Failures Statistical Analysis," Bulletin 99, International Commission on Large Dams. WCD (2000), ~oams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making - overview," The Report of the World Commission on Dams. Foster M, Fell R, Spannagle M (2000a), "The statistics of embankment dam failures and accidents," Canadian Geotechnical Journal, 37, 1000-1024. Foster M, Fell R, Spannagle M (2000b) "A method for assessing the relative likelihood of failure of embankment dams by piping." Canadian Geotechnica/ Journal, 37, 1025-1061

                     -sENSI flve-tNf:OS:MAT10N Or"EIG+At USE ONl.¥ 7

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter C.L. Atwood, J.L. LaChance, H.F. Martz, O.J. Anderson, M. Englehardt, D. Whitehead, and T. Wheeler (2003), *Handbook of Parameter Estimation for Probabilistic Risk Assessment." NUREG/CR-6823, US NRC. SENSIMVE IN~MATION

OE~t USE ONl:JA.

8

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter Appendix A* Dam-Year Tabulation CAooaM :1000 01!\MOtm\lJ,,Uf;Vv,.KE C.-.01"110 :2000

     ~EN RE'.CRe.ATIONAI..              t.At<e-                           ~014"'11        ,we l OLCI NILS vi~ A,f'[O,S,                                            CM 14n          191l9             !-7             2Q9          °"         22 MElROSi: P.'VEN:UE                                                    CA.01*00        1W,~              !:17              1:12       7          J~

DE~~5 ~Cl i CM13ra-,. 181H 90 1-UI fl ~f!:

                    ~TA""1~rT.,N::,GS!l!CA"pr:-.,,rr------------t----;tN;:;;,!a,OCo"";;---f--;,-:;;,g;,r--f---,.a;;--t--;,fi,5,~1,---+-':'0--t---;,.~---j
*                       ,,i,                                              CNJ,1:)91:1     113%1            li'f       100 QOO            ,B         1.111 Cli.01~1:.'      *'il96           ~7               '1/2          ~          U
     !I.F-.Ali..M'CO                                                      crun-:i11        ,ij98,           1n              :JC(I        §          (11 IU l~I.S C.R.E:.!:.K H~r l.L"..e>t 0AM                               ,',1(00".l'B-l   !Rl!IIR          !!3              11:1'."!    O         Hn Crl,l,SE GULCH                                                       CDMJal'i         1'iMi           1-00          U*50            O      I  1 io Slac1,                                                               ..Q°o:n:2~       1a5           ~ 1                  Mil        rn         120
    ~d ~ U,                                                               A.ZDC224        1Qg&            ,oo                ,-,.I)     t!J'        130 HUCKU1:IJE.R.MY CRfeK DAM                                            AA016l2         1ffi            ,,11         2J~2             10          1~,o SE:E ~N-t"l'ONRB                                                     CA.ll,JGO        t~               ~                :!43        It         ~~1 Bill Cl!: F'VLTPIJ CON"f                                             CA0'391         ,'004             16               220        1,          ~~,

1 ROU'!'IJ) CANYON RI! C,Q,,gu7a 19~ 9fl .!'36 11 17;1 J;.MESlo,.,,.r._,tAl"l,ES. C"Jl,Ol2~S 1994 :roo 12,tDO 1i 1M MA.C:::l<S CR.EEK Ii nillN 19!iJ :52-,5, -4:l!IB 12 1'J:CI R:'ED 000 TAIL. O,I,,~ M!l0:.'1)1 1"11,D n:;, ?4.U.7 1} :roe LAhlGT'l!Y CAD1 50 191!12 ~ 62!1. \l 21~ SAN'.:!$ kl\.L !W mri.y tlJ:~O'UNDME',lil't' DAM 01*!0:Ul:39 1Bi2 1l1 i :100 1l 2~ H-ECT2' CAlli13A16 ,rao, IU :212 1i! , ... e SiV-0~.r*.. ~"',CE SPIUWAY ~ ~~3 1lil'l,l' n5. 2~ 1{,0 H 2~~ JACILVCClflPTA._INGD,U,!~ NU005Ji 1800 11 3.UO 15 33.fl P'AO e.CVEi=ti:-1.0'N l'O"'ltl C,..W SC00:679 !i9D iD fl~ 11:i ~5'1 MCCOYICOVF ...,.rnx:;'9 STO FAC 1.u t-N10l0i ,89~ 1'0 ~,,Q~ 1~ )86 HCl~l!S'l'AlitETA.U~ CAL11,0,S ,avo ti!9 0 IS :3,i,, PLVMOt.rTHUH C.M1tH '"'9 E,~ 1.B.1 ~8 ~7

   ~'ff'I..M::E                                                          c:AQ:;22:1       1009             11           3,100           1'!1       ~1.)

REC! 000-W~TE~ SUPPL.Y ~ t<<DQ240 19118 r:;, 6~ Uli ~2EI OCIYE C".AHY'Otil c.A01;2U 1gl!'l 1!11!1 .. 1~ UI 4~~ NEW Sr>iiCE.R:Mugcw CAo:122~ 11H!'3- llli1 ,~9,000 10 ~a, M1 51 !"IL'!,~ S.fQIJIUr.1 ~IS'lonl,i;ir; Sll1,1d~*fl W~MI HlflU ~D 1Zti 00(, 11

   .-NTE,,1,QPE.                                                          CA0\213         19~ r             5,7             I~          11 STE"vt::NOT                                                            CA.ot)01        1~9'              ro             1:J[I         IB B,a,,a,SJI.M MEADOW                                                    CA.01::11)       HIB--B         nr             HJ.tC*          Ii p RA~ F ~RO                                                           C-.OUl9'3        liill:l5         58              44:)        :20 JA'fN~ & I.AKE                                                          C1J.01201       1~es              m            ~     n5      :20 PN'ILL,0-N-C:R.EE.~&TIR:18,SITE UI                                     Ni;,.£!;2l0l     )"ie~            9{l         is211,2         'i!O CACI 1n:i       I Eli!! 5       tCQ           ,e_ore          iei IH~D l,IIOU'ff ;..IN FUS                                               ~2~             18!~            liO           , l~           20          "'

CCM,',ROS FIES CA01L4D 1Q-B!:1 tt*o 696 ZO m TlUi.BUCO CP,01:241 1iM ICIB 1311 11 m

   -rERAOR. L."IY:.                                                      N<               10~             19J         ,oa M            21 CIAArfETT, CITYut-.                     CRJ=EI( Hf.SER\JO ~         . KSO 009 1:1 1'ii fl.l        70-         2'4JJoDCt       22

12 AN011.t\fo' ~l:EM.AllTOfU CA.CUN 19;8::, 80 142 W DI!, l~J 21'1 J5.J,2&(1 :].2 C.A.Ct1.20!il 1iii,B.2 b~ ~ J3J2 23 Fl.AT fllOCKCREfk.SfT£ 1

   ~E.RLO C:OEN VJ                                                              CAOtJ17          1i&1             lil-7          4130          ~
   ~dGLM:~~

6QL.QMCIN G-U!.UH SP!LlWAY CIOUM l'l(,SlO,l lM:i' t'891 rn3 l bS i5<<i lt.600

21 1*

CDMAL RIYf~W:ii ii:CS SSTE 2 l)Ali,il. TX0471H! Hf81 l'5i 19,0:l~ 2.-i I :ST,-,_N~i;.Y A R flES C:Mm::90 Ht'l1 1~ Hil:l :Iii '" 1.00'1' LAS LL.A.l,A~ C'.M-1:217 U~1 8& l.15-0 24 A,KOIJlJl7 Hl91 115 ll,~00 :2.- 1 ""' 1,,C!OOOB'il' 1-i)tl1 :l"8 1:;m90'.J :24 L..AH1Z30 1~1"1 &1 fl.SO :;,5 1\M CAOrnu 1~0 ~ sa6 :2!. 1 '1t'GI C.U CAMDNIJA. CR OB DEER GJliN10~Dil

  ~~11,ilSVtLLE:- ll'IM                                                   KYfl2102        iW              HIQ          11,'i(:(I      1~          1 ,~ ..

A"PLEWIA.Te. 0ROD!'.124 1M.'l 20 M 30(1 1, 1'))13-WW'IIIOll\ilGFtOC.i,, CA.Cl-1134: WTGI ';,':i ~:,O t'fl. i:;1,..AT TOPi.t*NE-41'~ WPl;J1.)INOIME.NT Af.Ql)Hli 1'91~ '1~ l:;.. :i!'-ll, SES.S1E WN ~JlOUNIJlillt:N .I\LO,,i15 Uil7'il ~ 00 i:lfi :2~ ou;,Rrz GAOU41!1 1W~ 1o.:I U1 1) n SAFE SHu NI IMI-IOUNCl~E:tl/J PAM T.u.91l 1'377 D 1:100 H LCS AI\GfL£:S RES. CM1081 1'Gl77 13(, i0.000 :11'1 PH::LEEl'J .llFWl2(11 1'97';" 1ij(] 11CJ.00D :2fl 9

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter SE~4SITl~NFORMA:TION- OFFICiAL tJSc--oNL:( UTT\.E 81.UI; IIUN ~MM'l7 liH 60Q n.ooo 2111 , IIO SUNFL0WER , 111 19715 50 42U 211 T, r1t t10Ll'MI CAOU:.111 Ulll 1DJ :il50 29 1.rll

    ~ISSIO" Vie.ID L.,1,1(~                                                                                  Cl,01132              1111                  IT.I                 4,30a                  211                  I.SOD M!W lAl<I! IIARDWH&All                                                                                   Cl,01114              U76                   Ill                   1.97D                 2&                  1,1'>>

WILi.~ L, JoSS \179 M6 !illl.000 1l'l uao l'OIID a 1876 66 18 ~o \,IM F0AE5TU&AD()lf/S 1!il5i 60 111' '3G 1.8'24 LI\IE 0,11( RU CHllllllo 1171 1111, UDO ~* Uk JI; ..,.,COi~.. \i,1'1,00,"t 1173 ** 1,=0 J2 :i!'. 1U lCAl.¥1:: SP11.1,WA.V 6CD2117 1"51 .J 1M ,,,n lll '34' ::U.!!CII-

  ,!I:~                                                                                                      CAQftRM                ,,Q,r                W"                      ?llili             "                   i,79:J 1.AC:AAW                                                                                                   Pi          1"1       197                   6111               1..-..zoo               Ji4                    1,a;u
   ~~ISM. C~E:Elii;                                                                                          CAOOn                 '1J7\                 111:li              2,34~                   :)l                ::i!,IHH lUIAt.lEFI                                                                                                            05        197,                  J;11                1000                    :14                 .:1118:.

INI.NlTO*..,i t.DO 1i , 14'<4 1,100 ;M ;i! 829 FtOWi'\Y CMG90a 1117" 1182 3 .J0ll )Ii: i,(jG,S

  ,l)l)h'JJIEDRO                                                                                             CA,Ql);:!'0           ~en                   ~                2.IDO,DOD                  )it                ;u,sr MURAAV                                                                                                     CH>1"6l               it7                   55.                    117                  ~                  ::t032
  ~"'1.Q\l'U:DE-                                                                                             CHX11a&               11il7C                87                      l31l                l!i                3,081
  ~tfrHD""1' t-tou~                                                                                          ~                     11i11:)                15                 38411                   3~                  ~.1ot L v~ ltiOFDM.lrl B'l"PAs;s                                                                                 ~0011)1               !07Ci                 111:                    2'110              :3-5                ::!. 1:11 W1bi' 51.........,.                                                                                        ,\l.Wa&e,             1111...,             1117 7               4,~0                  1!i                  :3 H2 c:111;(0N                                                                                                  a1J1J111e             1&10                 1-1,                 2 mn                    ~                  ').2Dl S.MI i!,n,n                                                                                                AZOIXIZi!             \971:l               ,ao                  a.aoD                  '3S                 :L24:i' lE~ll"u\t.                                                                                                 ~                     111119                 ~                     .._.                36                  :).111 tl11Vf:l...,_..t,..i..u..-n                                                                                OFCUi;M.~1             11116111             111                  41'JOO                 ~                   J.l14 11-IG t:PIEf.K                                                                                             CADIHI~               IOl!il:i             12U-                 7,~                    .10                 :;u~g.

W"C0CI CREU l'i'.Yl;IDOSIJ, l'llilCli't 183 l&.1a,, 1B 3,38i LOPEZ c~OiU,Bt 1989 118 52.500 36 ~.422 WtDI= CAN"l"DJif 1"981 84 'II 4DD n ;i,4!tt covon Ct.l!lEk itee ~ 3 Sl!t 17 91 49& 9LIULIIT R£S 1-ciel!I 124 2:2'0 '3.t' 3;533 EAU Goll. ! "I 1'I se.GGO 17 ,,;70 3,AN'TAY~UCAr.h'OlJ CA.00100 1"8:i: l:Sl :!fil!I 31 .3,Ml WALNUT CN-NON CAOOBU9 1flm l81 2.5t0 :17 3 &44 OIL Vi\1,,1,.!I!! CAt:loQ4:3. 1961!i 222 n,,oo 31 ::!I u, IJl!ll.ERAI: JOT SiPRt~S LAKE CAOum, \{1(11? 511 )7 JI :311!;1 SWAN CM3018! ltft'1 ~ ~50 38 3 151

~:Et -. -.

 '1.lt.L91DERA...c:tt                                                                                        CA.01:oar              llil81               II)                     21D                an                  ~.1'~

I -P,.,...,..-,L;;;.,._-.,,-.,.-_-_-_-_-_-.._-_-_-:_-_-_-_-_-_-:._-_-_-_-_.....+-_-.;;.;;F"~oo~==i~.;,#:::~;::~~:;;~"'1t1::::+::::~t;t::::~;:::l~:"':i-.,,;?:":..___-++_-_--;-;[~:::::::t:::::i~:~;;;;;.;;-_-_l uo, VCORP AIJNGS t9B? ne 309 ~ 4.023

 *o&tre~                                                                                                                           too1                  ,is                a1,ooa                  '38                 * .oa1 C.DI"\ C1Hk                                                                                                                       1'!1187              2"16                 1."00                  Jt                  4 OP:i I-ICMESTMt: PR.DJEi;.;.l                                                                                                          1ilil8               215                 4~.a,c                     8               JI 1:J.r F=Ol,l~ha Wi!I ililla,11'1                                                                                  Ci\QQl!le             ,_                    6                   4.a:m                  ~g                  *. HB iiAWK!'tE'                                                                                                  C,j4,Cm~:li.2'        IIM                   l'8                    140-                4:!I               -4'.iF"IS lG        I                                                                                             C,iqig72!5            1116&                 Bl                     180                 ~g                  4.!-54 Mlt:Swll'n                                                                                                               ~        IIM&                  1111               \0.aotl                 ~                  ~.283
 ~IIIIDl"I t..a                                                                                              A2000ll(I             196a                 1.00                 I.M,                   :39                _. :l.J' a.rutZJ.. v 1/.Al.t:E"V N. FOttl{ OF POUND D~M CAIJEltl~!i Vil\1QSOi 1-.

IIHl'!i-11s 1:U s:i.noo I Ull

                                                                                                                                                                                                    ~a
                                                                                                                                                                                                    !Y
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       .-_j,.,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       *11.*UO
 ~N JCAC:WIN RES                                                                                            CAOD8~3                l&IO!J.             2:1illll              'J.CDB                10                  ,111 . .,

LO'tNER HE.Lt 1"10l.E C..\0085? lfll& 41D 2'0fl.... DO 38 Jl.48Ai L~ :.Al:IEH:l I'll&!:. EiU 300 40 Pl!I W.tt,301M HIii:! !;i:;t '1.9DO 1110 4 1518 CAD10$0 llliS 151 :i.610 4'0 1111111ml' REBA C::A.OlllM:2 191,5, 1~ 2111110 .-io 1 .ci.o-o ccoon, n1a5- 1E- 1.1!135 *o 11i.1M n LQW All.ING$ ..., QDtJll18 OR031Bl~ WVOl!:2.3 IIIIM 1'i100 1Ms B1

                                                                                                                                                       ,.-111 18b 12.QIXI 12m
                                                                                                                                                                                                   -40
                                                                                                                                                                                                   .i!D
                                                                                                                                                                                                  ..o
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       ,i11_ 72a, "I. 71a
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       ....aos
                                                          -SENSITIVE uqreRMATIO~j                                                                   0fi'FICl1%:l U!S[ 0NU 10

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter

  ~:~~-~-~~~~~                                                    ... ilt                                                                          ~

BMI...,.""'"' CACllll13

                                                                       ,~
                                                                          .~""..... '. i1\91~
                                                                                              ~

20> l -~

                                                                                                              ~.OOII
                                                                                                                              . @i C,j.:JKIMl;,'.f f'.
                                                                                                                                                  ~liiw,...~
-~

FALLC.~'EK OR.fJO:N:17 12fi.DOO 1RONCA~','Otll LLIWD~R!0:111 CitiOOOf

                                                          ..,,..,..,,a ,....

C,l,OOIIIO .... ",., 11H 231

.!ii.JOO 111.333

                                                                                                                                      ***o            "'""

15.1,:11

                                                                                                                                       ,o
                                                                                    ...... .. ""** .,.,"** ,.~,
    ..-C:t,;\.                                                                                                                                        !H'8,
                                                          """"'63
                                                                               *911*              390         Gll,400 Ei11,t~
                                   .,                     C        1,                               10 5,110 CA00118                                                  ,0
                                                          \f~1'81t13                                M            u*o                                  un SR!'N'TWOQO PM*                                       CMDa~t                                                                                       !i_,o!li
                                                  .       wA0011,                                   IO            120                                  5,41M C
                                   .,                     """""' ....                                           1,..0                                  &,,o!!i V~1B702 C,A{J[)l,jjl
                                                                                                    ..,.           :ze S.~llll
                                                                                                                                                       !:!.5'P'1 s.1,1 SENoI0R.          VON o.....

C,,01018

                                                                                                  ,,,          . 73
                                                                                                                 ,159 u,;o
                                                                                                                                   ..,,, ,u......

F:Sr!POHD ""OOl>I'

  .TUR:E~
    "'1!'EL0..                                            C,,00007 C>,001!?

CMD172 OROOWQ- ........,,_,... ...

                                                                               ,i,e.,

m Ill 440 50.5(10 11.Sffl

                                                                                                              ""'-000
                                                                                                              ,,1,mo e.,.-.1 LAQSON REG                                    ~,,,.

OAODlll1fi CAfl01'2 ,, . ."'" *- .,-.,"~>?I 5.IOS

                                                                                                                                                      .5,11,U'
                                                                                                                                                       !1,ll!ill C:ULc.e-11C                                           CAOa1111m            11:111.3                           310                                  a 0:111
    &l."NOn IWISHQIEE*

WA~OClo.efK oiJMSI.AIIE,,... c.AKI: S'l'\ll"SDIII DAM

                                  ,K_t M0lll084 0          s 11113 1,o)
                                                                                  !llll IIICIJ 1m 51 w

71 73 6.210

                                                                                                                .... ***~
                                                                                                                  ,oo no Ur3
                                                                                                                                                       !,11;,
                                                                                                                                                       ~.m 1,11::r I 200 WIST                                                                                            15            ]<<I                 42              621]

l C'1NFR .S:UNSET DEi t:.lD11fi.1 ,i.::i 116 31 *1 e,J?!:i TAUt.li SAUit P, UPPE~ !olO~D 1111!! <,')50 *2 1,361

   \4,\Tatal\S CREEK                                      CA001'4              ,1111,               ~           1-                          ,2         !.409 LIIOl'I Ldi"l"'11C..ll'J LOON LNCE Vll.!AiPAM:I'\

CAl3G88 C,1,0Dl20 CNlClnl IIN!J

                                                                                   \IIU UHl2 ID2 IOI ne JUDD JUDO 1IIOO
                                                                                                                                       .,   42
                                                                                                                                            *l e,m UIJ U3&

un f'AIJI Vl~OINIA RANCH w.!RKL* CAlM SRES E CAOClll42 C,l,(IQ!fa

                                                                                  ,IIU 11113
                                                                                   , .. 3 IH 1SZ 115
                                                                                                  ,r, 141 DI tlCIO IOO 411.1111 42
                                                                                                                                            *2
                                                                                                                                            *2
                                                                                                                                            *l 1119 a.a,,

6.103

*~*

CA"'1'FAAW&S'I CA!lem1 18"3 11& 104,Sllll 4) 1,145 v..cs,01 ; JOHN W ,.LANMAQ!R.111 CAM IHJ 11113

                                                                                                  -~,1,
                                                                                                  )!ll        1*5.TOC 230.00C ne                .,

I.Jar 11112 UT! I 01R 110, IJ 1, 43 Ul5 sosci,,i,,-,, 1-UGHLAHDCREEI\ IG4< CNl"'28 1B4'~

                                                                               , .. 2 HIii.i
                                                                                                    !Iii 15 912 31
                                                                                                                ,.~Q,
                                                                                                                                       .,u  43         U51 7Dln
   ;.YTUl.lkl                                                                      IHI            IIIU          27M                         *J         1011       I C:All0886                IB4'2           ,oc             46                       43          1,130
                                                                                   ,au                                                                            '

I CIIQ81,l0 , ...2 12*

                                                                                                   ,10 IIDDD HI                   .,   *1         J.173 7'11
                                  ~                       OROOll\1             1912               145          26.IIOO                      43         T.2!i8
'                                 s                       C~DaJl               111152             l!ll
                                                                                                                .,,o IUIW                         43 T,llll
                    ;~                                          0214           , ..2              110 m

43 I u,a Cl\00907 ,1112 )~ll(la 43

                                                           -om
                                                                                      ....        lllO          1.1110                      CJ         1.431
                                                                                  '"'              ,.=
                                                                                ,, ,               ..                                                  ,.75 C:,wUl2'             1.. ,                               Ill CANVLLLi;                                              CMIOIM                                                                                       1.1,e CA,[]o,*a                                                                                               '
   ~Rf~                                                                                                           t..                                  1.9:J B.l:il"IANV FO~CBA.Y oEE~~H ROSEMOl'III C-3
                                                                                   !91' 11*           *'""

22400

...

11:11 U,1:11

                                                                                                                                                        /li,lil:J i

C

                                                                   "                              m 1.IMI
                                                                                                                                                       ,.,:ut-FRENC"°".t..lrt mc:eow CAQOD:12
                                                           *-06>

111111

                                                                                   ,so, 5UH

.llllO

                                                                                                                                          ..            1.11!13 PNJ0:&11                 1111!'         200           3,1180                                  l.r;tJ

~S CIIOOffll p

21D VJ.010

                                                                                                                                                        .,,,e 1.11, 190',              711         1io.aeo                                             I CAOOm                   191'            211          86.060                                  1.11158 LEWISS~ll1-t l!IANTit. .MiffA D8 BIG DALTCM-llla ON,\                       Al.01.0 CA0111S CM11il 111&,
                                                                                   ,ee:i t960            . ... **
                                                                                                  ,00 1*

1.670.)00 1;3 4* 1,003 1041 I.Di3 WILLIA.U., lAKl CMQMII ttllO H 3110 4; 11:18 LlnLE OA.LTOIi! DB. CICKBDN 111Ll MP!L0Ji,J'f CA0'1!o* CAOOlll5 CA0(!11!10

                                                                                   >tN!O t!IBO           .."", .** .**

ll 2lol 4; 4. 8,Ui13

                                                                                                                                                       *.22*

1,21> A.SM CREE~

   ...iEWS.l WHA.LEHOC:IC.

I Wi,-.iiMCITttPOOL UTll0010 Cl\00158 c,-vum CMDM3 llll!O

                                                                                      ... ..."',,J ne           12.:l:50 8,891 O,Ml2 1:i!J,00[],
                                                                                                                                     .****             !I.JUii 0.3113 lio.tDa
                                                                                                                                                      * ** ~J
                                                                                                                                      ****             1,498 CAtlD191 B~t:AH'tDN e*

IU-TTLl:l!IWl:fc..-N CilaWS!i~

                                                                               "°'                              ,.,,.
                                                                                                                ~ .... 11:110                    I     !,61115
'  BE!..L CAN'YCN                                         CA.00149 CA(ltll1*

19;; 37.1:10 i.*oo .**., !.!it, Ul> I.Ill MJ001!1112 li'-'00 &..12llil c..caos, lt!A 10 ei.nB CAD11'50 liil!i:!'3 1:11!,flJaian~ DHR 't.A~E SAN tJ.AR!CO-S. CMXH19 Mma:,e C~HII CA(ltll~ 1...

                                                                                  ,  ...... ,.,.,,  n m

1 ~-* .,.," 81!1T'tll

                                                                                                                                                      .f!.90' 00,1 M',OOLE:FE:LDKd
                                       -SstJSlTP,'E ,r,,jFORMtrflON - DfF'ICIAL 0SE"Gr~L¥---..

11

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter

~;i;~;i~itJ~;ft!:Wit~~~~?: ~~~

WrdDliWll'ri

     """1,nM                                                   """"'"

CAOOUJ q*~l-\) r**,.

                                                                              ~~~~

.--~,, '.",)~;---,

j~hf1 ~~.. ~;*=-} *.;**:aos1. 3B,

                                                                                                                  *'1£ ~ *
                                                                                                                           ~.;.;;a.f_ .l~UI, 1:!i.00&
                                                                                                                             ,,:uni
                                                                                                                                                - -u.ni...-~
                                                                                                                                                                              * ,.~-
                                                                                                                                                                              *~'-

i.11t5 1111_1!&1

     ........                                                  CAOOJ01                ,111!11 CA01ai,1 lUN~O,.~.
                                                               'J ....119D1       "                                          *.GD:

ltHI Al,, OtAfl='ih'

                                                               .,....,.               IEl!l7 11151                                                                                         ,gi_:w,     I MRD'fOSECO
                                                               """"'31<                                     "**                 "l' 1El!if                                                                                        ljl_,MIJ
     ~LCIJIIYot,,I PL~V                                                                                                                                                                           111.-IFM c-.i 111,5                                     '""                                               , ,,

WAS 10.CIOD I P-JIIA.Dhit: CN!WOf 1" IUiOD ,; NI.CJI/IIEN,0 c,..., Ul~J' 310= L.A~RNl:.W<E

                                                                                                          . "'                                                                     9.1111-1
                                                                                                                                                                                  ; nq:

c,,a1C"'I* OOfl

     !IOIJJ*t CNIOtl~                tl!iD Tl~f 9'l'CAMCMI:                                                                                             13
     ~f.9 UONaTOIV!Gt:4
     ~LN01 c,...,~,w.
                                                                  ~5~
                                                                                      ,~11, Ul51l
                                                                                                                                    >re
                                                                                                                                    ~   .~  ,

f.llU'"P

                                                                                                                                                                                  *=*
                                                                                                                                                                                   '9,.IU!li
                                                                -~.......

I 111.58 10.IJ.2* Pl,fl:CAI!!!~ 2!:.1!!1 "'Q.C.7J

    .LION'!MWER'II                                             CCDIJ3l7                               11.2                                                                       -.DU:i C011612*                                                                                                          10,U't

('l,,fl:ARV'JA..lFt' 1t11:JIK::JWITE '""' Ul'l,I> "'"' 1?:Ji5DC!

                                                                                                                                                                                 ,o 2'1 BEVNIS tREFK                                              ~                     111,                    ;1                     m                                  IQ        11un
~*o*"""'                                                                             1f!ii6, 1!Ni5 70                 H~ "'                                 "

IC

                                                                                                                                                                                  ,a 3=11
                                                                                                                                                                                 ,c.ltl
                                                                                                             ,1                     m                                            ~,.4i!1 F.L WCH J CHES:ili*iO 19"*

1965

                                                                                      ,vs~                   **                 a....
                                                                                                                                              '               ""                 ~au,
                                                                '11!-.tWTJ B1Nri,...l'ICl'lr.i.,,.                                                                          110                             ~
                                                                                                                                                                       "'so      10,.!!,11, iUCK'rPfM
    ""-"M~ONS'TM:i.l:l 900.lBI c,,o11717 111'!1,!,       140 foll l07,0C, 2g,                                .,         IU71
                                                                                                                                                                                  ~a.1:21 C',All(&:!J           19"4                   ;,i                    Iii                                ,1        10.m
                                                                                                                                                                                 ,:,n*

AICtw!.D50N CAWtilol 116< INl !~ PHIIION' C,AN'fCIN OETltlTION UPP!A $10 ... c,.~vo~ """"'°'

                                                               ~aooer 1...

1... "' 411 ,, 11 *o.rrei

                                                                                                                                                                                 !fUM GNt~FY ~ES
    \IEH:MllJON      w'Ai\.P.-.-
                                                                            '        ....             11U 181
                                                                                                                                ,.11-0 115,000                                ",,.,        ,0.1111
                                                                                                                                                                                  ,a.11a PETEftS 1U6"                                      U.IIIIOD                                           10.91111 u

f'RENC~N~ E.A-tiL.i! FtOCIIC Gfl:EEN VERCVCiD JAIW!:~.JlfNil'lt\N c,...., 1111!il UileiJ 1m 1!Ni3 113 201 03 21.(IICI 26< 11.-130

                                                                                                                                      .                                11
                                                                                                                                                                       '1 11 I

I Uc..11 11.CMl:.I U,l;s!, 1U91 CR'fSil~ DEB-Ell

                                                               ...._                 1.. ,
                                                                                      ,u2                                           ,,.                             ".,     I    '!1,l"'Q
                                                                                                            "                                 I                                  11,M s1.mw NESER'VCtFil                                         CIIIXll:J:i            t!il.li.i!
                                                                                                        "03"                      .,. 16
                                                                                                                                                             .,"                 11 )4£ 5CHIYllN POWPDND lfJ\NCH cAo11Mi
                                                               ._._0GB    .       "'"

UHi2 1!:llfi,tl

                                                                                                     ,        .                   2..
                                                                                                                              .. ooc:

n:,w 11.4:52 Lo.eflll_. r.w..t.,.t.:QMf.5

                                                               """"""'               18!11
                                                                                                        "".                       ""'                                           11.~

NlfCEL C/UHfA1. t!il:51 11113 JtiCtr;EY CAOJOO!I 1.., U.iH11 AZWz,~ nn, LiL'tlHIIIIIICII 1'51 B!Ui 1.MS

   ~AlDCIU!:i;Pi                                               CAeUJil'I
                                                                                                            "                                                    .               urn MIWI.£ CAll:(l(U~

llli:LL£n C'A.FNMA,rr..., DlflOEA'ICrlREEi Mf0d011!1 CAOQ~l 1,01 uo

                                                                                                                              ,1;1.:zlU 10
                                                                                                                                    .                        .. I!              ,,...,

n1t1 nt!D PE~Oll'i' IWlRL ~ ~E:IUI REf'USF. OiUA-WHIT~ (Ml< ~RAf,ilc;r1 ,'"" ... "'** )10 " 1l.040

                                                                                                                                                                                 ,,10,ill STOCII.TCN l;;;ftEEI\
                                                               ~.NU!IK
                                                                                  "'"                                             :1111
                                                                                                                                                                                 ,11~11 AUS.T~IAN
                                                                                     '""              Ul!li                    4UOLI 1.-n 2..

CAOOI"' 91 :i'6:,)

  !ERO'W ~llf::,&.~SON c.-.ccr.i11g S"(PHO~IC.ANVOl'lil                                                                                                                                                          1:.'    )2lj u :1ia1

-~- Ut-~,SiOIG!iiR..,.a

                                                               """""'"             ,                                                21
                                                                                       ...            JD
                                                               'IICODJ33 QUCE"4S C.REE:K                                                                                                                                                               11-UI
                                                               ~-'ICC:r.:17                                                                                                      *2'.4&-3
                                                               ~IHl2 r.A&H1::i C,.C0512           .......

1l l'Ci<>

]J'M"A UflAg, 1i2' 12.MloJ SI],=

1ii!,1:l!O ' I LA ~El<IWlJ"'

                                                                 ~-7              11iMUI                                                                                        t;.:,n1 57 F~l..lllil*

SCOTTS fl.AT 1 40.00C U,&:1,41

  ~;JI;) MCXIN'T It.IN CNIII
                                                               ,,,._no,,,               ... ",.

tlllo,ilOO 12.lllil'li W:i P'Vi.U\O~ CONHCFl:t-t'K RE'CTQRC:Rli:EM CA001Dc

                                                               &l(lC011 CACO~;ii 10<*

J' .......

                                                                                                                                                                 ."    M
                                                                                                                                                                                ,i"*

1:St."'1:11

                                                                                                                                                                                 ,,;,.l,r11 1:t.111 mt C11.!:::1ttm C:REE;'K
                               *                               ""°"'""
                                                               ~00~

hCODl11 CAO'I01e 18'1 11-43

                                                                                     ,'!Ml..

11

                                                                                                     "'n
                                                                                                         ,,                    11" 1:2u,oo
                                                                                                                                       **~

u;** ll',l 1 U.3H

                                                                                                                                                                                -::...:36 OIUHC.E C:OV.,,..,. Rl;:St-tf\lOJH:

i0hOYALLEY TJC;I.MPI;

   , l"LJ,.,.E LAkf. o,w .,, iNPil.~ r,:n;L::I
                                                                ==1D N'CDOUI!'

IJ9C M:.;IXl:J,llli

                                                                                  , .. 1 1"

110

                                                                                                     ,;o i:,,

11l.46fi 6'.100 .. ll.~2 t::1.$1'1!' 13.l!i:Ul 1:JIUM : CALA\/f"-' m 1'40

                                                                                  ,a.a                .

11 ,20

11.71!;

Br CAOOOII~ -~.515 tl,824 C"A:IUJH! 111'10 91) 11 13.IH C,,W1:,S HJY ;o IM iii f3.H::. II

                                                                                                                                                                                ,.. gJ*

1111:i!ll B:i R-i!:& \llll9 ms

                                                                                                                               ~. t:l(I                                         '1,41)11 1,1111  i,,
  'W[lLIJWW.1'10:,-        MAIN                                                                                                               I                                               I l)AAlli                                                                                      llii.100
                                                                                                                                                        "                       1,4.2.t\l "SEl,q3ff1VE INFORMATIOP~                            OFFlelA:L USE mR:y 12

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter

 *> ~'.-~~'~;:il.~5~~,~ry-~-;t~t~:~-y~1~ :-~;~f~

IUJrilClolO DEl cti:;:VJtO

  &UHStT N PSHil'
                                                        ~.r.i!,~-~ -*..-.~

CNlOJ!t C.0001:W

                                                                           $~!~
                                                        "~---t' ..** .,.... .,.,.,
                                                                             *Ill
                                                                             ,111:11
                                                                                        ~"8DJ.J.
                                                                                        **tto111         ~-1
                                                                                                       * ":'1ceb1......
                                                                                        ,::trt,j: *.-,.? _ij_s*./
                                                                                                                           '!'~;;.'~

~i~,l,

,=rar.-:r

                                                                                                                                               ! IDal (iini:i'*~
                                                                                                                                               '>';J;ffllll : ..,

1,U1117

                                                                                                                                                     **.:tM
                                                           -*-**"""""'° ,.,.. ,                                                      .,

Blm"EJilJIElD CAl)OOIO n 000 1id :l!I

                                                                              ,m C "" nLtH!:N PAR!(                                                                              Ill!              :HI                              1.11.41&

Q"l!!UUNl/_l)l,~t

                                                                             ,                    to             :!,tao                               \-4.56.S MAHt8NS
  &.ul C'.IABRl'Sl NO i Gl,.ACIE"R I.AK! NDR'T""'

IJNIVIIIAOI.Jt,ID:sm-N IITIIIIOIII 11.31 1911 I.. 10 112.0DO 4Ui3

                                                                                                                ,.11110            .

1 ,112" f ,11* i*.m

                                                                                                                                                     , ... R~6.

c~,~~v ""' *CA0016B 10 !GO n,

                                                                                                                                   ...19             14 BSM 1!',,TONWABJiDe                                           CA00201           1&)1                13                                  69              1 .163:

WESTV~t.lV

                                                                              "'"'                             13,DDO                                ,&.G3'2'
                                                                                                                                                     ,fi,ai, Al~Ol!"'1                                                                                     110 Elfji                                                        °"""'"'                                                                                  l6 ,1a
                                                                                                                                                     ,s.2,t1-TYCr.lAKF QLWLAADAM                 "'""""

KSIJ'79f,4 ""' 11Hlli 10 m ,~.~,a

                                                                                                                                                     , ,:180 STEVENS                                                   "'"""'"

CA00118J iel~

                                                                              \ll'                "

130 """ 10

                                                                                                                                        ,.rD         "*-

QUADAL.UflE ~m 3.4&D ,1u2e

  ~G!IWEll                                                  CMOl90           1931               2M               111'19                  m           TUIO a,0l,IOl,.,ETC,....,,ON                                   CAllll0ll8                          190                                                  15.~,
                                                                                                                                        "r!
                                                                              !933                17                                                 ,sn:.

CMC2111 \933

                                                                                                ""'           :!!>:ODO
                                                                                                                                        ",.          Ul.lat CMICITI 1932                                                      1J SWNICZY LAKE CAOll153 CMICII..         ,.,,
                                                                              \9)\                S5             """  32 101                 1 15.11'1 1!.85l 11021
  !IAl.l Sl'IIINllS
  .,.CCCA!IIN LOIWER CAIIOm CMICIIZI 1931 llllj) 331
                                                                                                 ...        141.900 s;.              "  1, 11.IDD
                                                                                                                                                     *e.111 GfUZ2.I.. Y FELT LO.KE
  ..._tlnl.C.-llafll
  &RAND,-;.""'

C0016'i CAllOI 0 OR00116 c,,ooa,1

                                                                              \9)0
                                                                              !OlO
                                                                              >9:lll
                                                                              \9lll IS 11 15 91 181
                                                                                                                   ,900.

l> 15 lo 15 ro 11.l!iD IU!o

                                                                                                                                                     ,e ..

1e,1111, CIC. 1.AF~VFTI'f CAll01U 1129 'll .250 Ji IUSt Of.UNCCLO.ME CADIIM' 184!8 50 ).131 ,11.cm11 w\ilr. CCV0RFUli.l TH01o11'80Nc""i~ e~cos~o-~ CADCleO CA!l0613 CAOOtN CAOOSll CAll019" ma 1~1 1128 11:21 1921

                                                                                                 .50 6,2 m

HSD 210 1113,0llO t8.M2 n" n 17 1e 1g~ 11,11; IUIO 11,938 U,01~ C~I 1121' 110 zoa re e~~TotE C.-.01:12115 n; M.uw "*° 18:11 !6 $.18D 19 " '7 11,20 111

-~*

CUllR~.LAKE II.ACK ROQ\ CR CADDHO CADOl8l COODIIIIB., 111211 l9l!i lD7 Sl

                                                                                                              !D.100 UlQ JD              IO 19
                                                                                                                                                      \1.,D?

t1.01

                                                                              ""'                 19                                  IO TH0M"5CN DIX RN'E,tDA,,t IRlllGEl'Qjll CAIIO+I!

KVODl16 CAlllllM 11Zi

                                                                             ,,1.             m ti 113 T.Dto IJD,500 "1,100               ., ID OD
                                                                                                                                                     ".&tr 17.141' 11,m
                                                                                                 *.~

CAmctlC ,112 ENCINO

                                                                                                "'              1.71!1 "e,             '1.809

n*o~E CAN'fQN

 ~NOl!:RiO..,

EL DORAllO FOREB/1,Y C...00003 CADIJOO!i c;ADOO,ft

                                                                             ,en
                                                                             ,,1:J, 11ii11ZJ         10!

Ill ID,112 SDD m 11

                                                                                                                                      ~
                                                                                                                                                     ,1,na
                                                                                                                                                     ,1.1n

11.D"°

                                                                                                                                                       ,. JI\

C=INCW~ll:tf CAOOIJ11 I'/ Ci\li'l1118

                                                        *u
                                                           ~J1H 111122              11           ,*u,o
                                                                                                                   ...                               lEl,2h
                                                                                                                                                     ,e,31111.
                                                                                              *,.,..~                                .

9,w.ii=e~ Ul:i!IJ 5ANP"8LO CA.001156 1111~0 U19l '8.319 i,.zaoo,::11 1U60 ,e.111117!5 IOX ELDlifl CREE" C""TFIELD LmllXl!ill ,&111! 50 511 19 ,a.too MAI"! liilJY.Wllf:R~'i Cl\00... 1911!!1

                                                                                                .,            11,:112'                               Ul.ti03 o,....,,~Qlt                                               Off:110049        191111
                                                                                              ,.,            . . jll]Q 11                1&,141111 i:;;u,i;:MFVt.3n                                           coi:in.a 19,3                           10:UIXI
                                                                                                                                  .,                 ,,a111i
                                                                                               ...... .'-...°'.,..~

Q\OIJ""4 ,1,2 SI ,a8'21 SAND CANYON

                                                                                              ,.,,.                                                  ,.022 L

MOREN:~ CA001rn 1112 U11::li 11, .. lllG

                                                                                                                                  .,91               Ul1H 1!il,1
                                                           ~*
\t1\UfY. lME                                                                                                    l!l.1lf                              ,11,JD'llo w...,

1DH 5'.ICiW 19.:MJ:I 5i'iW1,U,,.Lfwi'K.E 1910 \1,Ma c- i;A0Q1l!i2' 1910 11UlilJ. HILUUC,E c:,,.,.. l;AllOOII 1910

                                                                                              ,.,,            11.llilJ o    1110                              11.m REL1EP.

CRANE Y~l STOA CA,BD:li31 19IO -~.41U-

                                                                                                                                                   ~,.n, 19.lll STANl~LAUS Fl MAAJE, LME
                                                           '-"ICIIIII 1II08

MD 17D "91 18,U-15 1111.112 WRINA WIOl<W<,u.lCE

~L.NIILE
- - ENl.l~KIE C/\QQ'll1 IIIOII 1901 1007
                                                                                                ,,,a ill..:1,711 1,744 25'
                                                                                                                                   ****      I I

m,.ll51 20.11HI 20.11114 20,1~:i!

I

                                                                                                                    .*~
*ERWIN, LO.KE                                              CA,Wl!o1                                            2.11D             100                .20,41!1 BEAAYW.N RE5                                               ....00,11 1110i
                                                                                                **                   **          '""                :1IJ,H2       ;
""IEC..0"'1' UfS"BLA FOREIIAY MEADOW I.AME CA00170 CAOD54;m          ,,

1!il0l 04

i11!1D

                                                                                                                                 ,w
                                                                                                                               ,,""    ..           20,lf2

i'0,7M

i!'O.l&il!i ESTATE3, \,OJ 93 20.~

~MINAL c,.,o,.,,s HOii'           1Clo~           29,MO
                                                                                                                  ...            ,w                 11.0,,
~rNer
          ""~

BEA.i:-'ttY'ER O\M1~r VA'l5f,O,,I. CAOC)'tH t!IO~ tlll(I-:) L{l(I~ 1.215 ll!i.11119

                                                                                                                              ,.,,o,
                                                                                                                                        .           i1115 n 2eo

11.:116 21 49e TOR1:-S ~

11:11!:AR GLILC.li A.11URH!'N(llr~ FFl:EY. u\l(e CMJOB!!il Alll(lOOT wo,,2

1.tllil&

UIS! 1P1es 161l' 16'13 ' . 01 d-lU, 13

1. 1.41J Sf2 lllt:i

                                                                                                               ~.075
                                                                                                                                        .           nri'IP
                                                                                                                                                    ,, 700
                                                                                                                                                    ~1    a,
                                                                                                                                                    '1 9211 27! Ql&

RED ROCK ~O 1 F'OFIE!ITL.AKE SL.AO.'IT CACIOS10 CA00&9D CA001'r1

                                                                            <tl1 1.ag, Ile e,
                                                                                                             '10.DIJO
                                                                                                                  *21         "',,,

11J ~11,1 1211> SE!iiJ SITPJE lf.JfORMA'floN Or-FICIA:l USE ONL¥- 13

Enclosure 4 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter SENSfflv'ElNFOF<MA.TION- OFFICiAt: USE m4L~ _:,_*;: ~:\:i~f?::E\~f\:I~-::'.;:_*::::'.ti; f~~:} -;~~<I (i;:~ ~I:i".5*'.~ ::¥: C~Wf-Ll RE!mfFlVIOM: (:AM046 lflM 60 ns us 22.ll!IO

 'VO5eLf1TE.. L,,t,IC.E f't-WJ~Ni;lli; c;,o-       ,. ,      5!1  8,101   117  22,014.

IPENSERL.At(E """"'

                                                      ""3001l 1110 11171.'1 FORDVC::l.'LN<e
                                                      """"'6'     11!11:1, PILARC'1'QS C::.MXl=t8D
                                                      ~i21 1111 l!IJERl'                                             CMOIIII     11!.0     53    6::IID 155  2l,G NOTR:E DA..e                                                               s,    120 LOWER STE'HL'!'

c C.iJn22, C.H>1~56 - Sl!JRji!Y DAU ~*- CIJJllGO PA,01(',111 llil2 3.0.i,

                                    -!::icNS If ivE INFORMA:CION-OF~

14

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A July 19, 2010 MEMORANDUM TO: Benjamin Beasley, Chief Operating Experience and Generic Issues Branch Division of Risk Analysis Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research FROM: Lois James, Chief /RA/ Probabilistic Risk Assessment Operational Support Branch Division of Risk Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

IDENTIFICATION OF A GENERIC EXTERNAL FLOODING ISSUE DUE TO POTENTIAL DAM FAILURES INTRODUCTION The NRC's primary function is to license and regulate the safe use of radioactive materials for civilian purposes to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety and the environment. In performing this function, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) identified during a recent review of a regulatory action associated with an operating nuclear power plant (NPP) a higher than expected potential for both the external flooding hazard due to a potential dam failure and its associated consequences to the public health and safety and the environment. Based on these findings, the Division of Risk Assessment (DRA) and the Division of Engineering (DE) at the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) began evaluating the potential implications of these findings to other operating NPP sites by: (i) evaluating the extent to which this hazard has been considered in the past via US NRC's regulatory framework (e.g., 10 CFR 50, Regulatory Guides, Standard Review Plan), (ii) examining current design flood bases regarding dam-related external flooding issues, (iii) interacting with other federal agencies involved in oversight and risk assessment of dams, and (iv) considering whether this additional knowledge may translate into an increase in risk when compared to the previous understanding of this issue. TECHNICAL ISSUE External flooding considerations involve a series of hydrological and non-hydrological factors that may impact a NPP site. Hydrological factors include site-specific extreme phenomena characteristics (e.g., high tides, severe storms, wave action) potentially causing flooding, while non-hydrological events include seismic activity and other causes. In both cases, there is a potential hazard due to the effect of hydrological and non-hydrological phenomena on man-made structures such as dams, levees, and dikes as contributors to flooding. Available guidance on dams from entities such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERG),

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A US Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), and the US Army Corps of Engineers (USAGE) indicate mechanisms that may trigger the uncontrolled release of the reservoir impounded by a dam. These generally include (i) overtopping of a dam due to severe precipitation-induced flooding, (ii) seismically-induced failures, (iii) breaches caused by internal erosion/piping phenomena, (iv) operational errors or mechanical failures, and (iv) combinations of these various mechanisms. Failures other than severe storm and seismic events can be grouped into a subset often referred to as "sunny-day" failures, which can occur during normal operations (e.g., internal erosion and operational failures). Guidance from USBR clearly indicates that these "sunny day" failures may be higher contributors to risk when compared to low-frequency extreme events such as severe storms and earthquakes (USBR, 2010). Additionally, when compared to severe weather events, "sunny day" failures may provide less warning time for mitigating actions to take place. From discussions with these multiple agencies involved in dam risk assessment, it was concluded that the current state-of-art has evolved sufficiently to provide better risk estimates of such contributors. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK The regulatory requirements for issues related to external flooding are found in Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 (CFR. 1971), where the General Design Criteria (GDC) is described. The GDC was developed to establish minimum requirements for the principal design criteria (i.e., set of necessary requirements to ensure public health and safety) for NPP sites similar to those already licensed. The General Design Criteria 2 (GDC 2) explicitly discusses considerations on the appropriate design bases for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety expected to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as flooding. In some cases where the license for a specific reactor site was issued prior to the development of GDC 2, licensees have used criteria similar to GDC 2 to cover natural phenomena considerations in their original license submittals. GDC 2 states that:

      "The design bases far these SSCs shall reflect: (1) Appropriate consideration of the most severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported far the site and the surrounding area, with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated, (2) appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenomena, and (3) the importance of the safety functions to be performed."

In terms of regulatory guidance, four Standard Review Plans (SRPs) in NUREG-0800 (ML0D3740388, ML062260222, ML070730405) and Regulatory Guide 1.59, "Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants," (ML003740388) include specific guidance on external flooding at NPPs due to potential dam failures. The guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.59 explicitly covers hydrologic and seismic-induced dam failures, as well as considerations for combinations of lesser events. Upon review by NRR staff of the above references, it has been concluded that existing NRC requirements and guidance is ambiguous on whether certain failure mechanisms such as internal erosion or operational errors should be explicitly considered, which have commonly not been the focus of safety analyses performed for operating sites. In part, an assessment of the risk contribution due to Msunny day" failures may have not been consistently performed due to a lack of understanding of its impact on the safety margins of existing NPP sites. Further guidance can be developed with additional understanding of the actual contribution to NPP risk due to "sunny day" failures individually and in combination with other mechanisms. 2

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A CURRENT DESIGN FLOOD BASES A detailed analysis of dam-related flooding potential and its consequences in the licensing of operating NPPs is limited in the available documentation, which consists primarily of the Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs) and the Individual Plant Examinations for External Events . (IPEEEs) for individual sites. lt is clear however, that emphasis has been placed on the use of conservative screening assumptions to eliminate this flooding hazard from further consideration based on either bounding characteristics of other flooding phenomena, low initiating event frequency and/or sufficient advance warning in case a dam failure does occur. In multiple FSARs and IPEEEs, dam failures are described as "not credible" (Fort Calhoun Station, Cooper Nuclear Station), "highly unlikely" (McGuire Nuclear Station), or "extremely unlikely" (Arkansas Nuclear One, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant) by taking into account individual or combinations of severe events hydrologic and seismic events. From a preliminary review, at least four sites have considered quantitative dam failure rate: Oconee Nuclear Station (South Carolina), Cooper Nuclear Station (Nebraska), Fort Calhoun Station (Nebraska), and H.B. Robinson (South Carolina). All four sites considered failure rates in the range between 5 x 1o*5/year and 1 x 1o-5/year. Flooding requirements are considered for a number of sites, including the use of sandbagging and other mitigative actions which assume ample lead time for implementation. However, a preliminary review of the IPEEEs indicates that, since dam failures were excluded from consideration in most FSARs, its risk contribution has not been addressed to date. RISK SIGNIFICANCE Due to the limited risk considerations available, NRR further evaluated the dam failure rates considered in the subset of IPEEEs mentioned above. As there were few reliable dam failure data sources when most estimates where derived, it was found that these analyses relied mainly on an estimate published in NUREG/CR-5042, "Evaluation of External Hazards to Nuclear Power Plants in the United States" (ML062260222). In turn, the data source for the dam failure estimate in NUREG/CR-5042 is "NSAC-60 Oconee PRA: A Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Oconee Unit 3" (NSAC/EPRI, 1984). Upon detailed review by NRR staff, it was concluded that the failure frequency value used for large dams in this publication was incorrectly underestimated by an order of magnitude which propagated to the other analyses (e.g., IPEEEs). This large difference was in part due to a commingling of different types of large dam population data and a restricted choice of failure data. From this observation and the fact that most external flooding screening analysis were based on combinations of severe phenomena to screen out this initiating event without significant consideration of the ~sunny day" dam failure mechanisms, NRR staff performed two additional actions: (i) examined current NPP vulnerabilities to dam failure hazards and performed a qualitative assessment of sites more or less Hkely to be impacted based on available information (mostly FSAR and IPEEE information), and (ii) estimated a generic dam failure rate calculation based on the most up-to-date historical data for the specific subset of embankment dams which the NSAC-60 study was intended for (i.e., large rockfill dams). In the first effort, a study was produced that resulted in a coarse screening and ranking of sites more vulnerable to this hazard (due to both upstream and downstream dam failures). U.S. commercial nuclear reactors are located in 65 sites adjacent to streams, lakes/reservoirs, or coastal areas. A number of information sources were used to ascertain the location of dams and the corresponding impact to NPPs based on distance to the site and reservoir volume 3

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A impounded. Due to the lack of more up-to-date independent information, this study had to primarily consider design bases flooding elevation, historical flooding records, and flood routing results available from FSARs and IPEEEs submitted by licensees. From the 65 sites available, 45 sites were considered to be less vulnerable to potential dam fa/lures while 20 sites were considered to have a higher vulnerability. Of the remaining 20 sites, a qualitative assessment was applied to evaluate sites which could have high, medium, or low Impact due to a dam failure (see Table 1). Particular challenges observed are: (i) lack of independent up-to-date assessments of dam breach analysis and subsequent flood elevations at a site, (Ii) the extensive use of theoretical upper bounds used to approximate the frequency of extreme events such as severe storms and earthquakes (e.g., events with frequencies of 1 in 10,000 years or less), (iii) the complexity Involved in evaluating flood routing at specific watersheds, including estimating dam breach size and time for the corresponding flood wave to impact a site, and (iv) the effectiveness of the flooding protection barriers and site response due to uncertainties in the information above. The scope of this study was preliminary in nature and could greatly benefit from additional short term analysis to evaluate the overall risk at individual sites, since it is recognized that not all dam failures may be sufficiently large to impact a NPP and that significant distances between a site and the impounding structure(s) may attenuate the flood wave and increase the response time available. However it also provided an overview of the generic nature of this issue with a defined subset for further focused analyses. In the second effort, a generic dam failure rate analysis applicable to a large rockfill dam of modern construction was performed to assess a point estimate and a range that can be supported by available historical data, along the lines of those performed in a subset of IPEEE submittals (ML100780084). Input information included (I) an assessment of the overall US dam population for those with features corresponding to a large rockfill dam, and (ii) a study of U.S. dam performance information for failure events that may be applicable to this subset of the overall population. The best available databases were used to obtain the total number of dam-years for large dams and documented failures, which also provided insights into limitations and challenges involved In deriving failure rates using this approach. A point estimate calculation produced a value of 2.8 x 104 /dam-year, providing a further check on the estimate previously used in the industry. Simple sensitivity analysis Indicates that significantly lower estimates cannot be reasonably supported by the use of historical data alone. Hence, while limitations in historical data represent a challenge to ascertain a more precise estimate, it is clear that screening this hazard exclusively via this methodology is not justified. Additionally, a Bayesian updatin9 analysis with the subset of dam-years and failures corresponding to rockfill dams was performed using an assumed prior distribution for large dams. This resulted in a posterior distribution with a mean of 2.8 x 104 /dam-year, a 5th percentile of 1.3 x 10"4/dam-year, and a 95lh percentile of 4.8 x 104 /dam-year (i.e., a narrow distribution around the mean value). Additionally, a literature review of similar published statistical studies of dam failures corroborated the conclusion that a generic dam failure rate for large dams is in the order of magnitude of 1 in 10,000 dam-years. From these two efforts, NRR staff has concluded that (i) there is an increase in the estimated frequency of a potential dam failure of an order of magnitude from the additional preliminary analysis performed, (ii) prior estimates used in the industry underestimated dam failure rates, (iii) multiple sites can be affected by the impact of dam failures, and (iv) the overall risk to NPP sites may not have been fully addressed due to inconsistencies in identifying and appropriately addressing significant failure modes for dams. 4

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A RECENT EXPERIENCE On April 28, 2006, NRC staff identified a performance deficiency involving the Oconee Nuclear Station (CNS) maintenance activities associated with the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) to facilitate installation of tern ora electrical ower cables. The im ortance of this find in is that (b)(7)(F) ONS was issued operating licenses in 1973 (Units 1 and 2) and 1974 (Unit 3), prior to the publication of significant regulation (e.g., GOC 2) and guidance on external flooding hazards applicable to most of the industry. The licensing basis of ONS did not originally evaluate the consequences of a failure of the Jocassee Dam in the plant design flooding analysis. Flooding protection for the SSF was later added as a risk assessment enhancement obtained via insights the IPEEE submittal for ONS. However, after interactions with licensee, it was established that the original elevation (5 feet) to which the SSF flood protection was designed for would be exceeded based on more recent studies. These studies indicate that approximately 18.5 feet of waler could occur at the sitel(b){7)(F} !after a breach of Jocassee Dam. In this case, the licensee has indicated that a loss of the switchyard, loss of the emergency power supply (hydro units), los ** *

ML0827 1 (b}(?}(F)

(b)(7}(F) (b)(?)(F) ence, based on the varying plant configurations and the loss of the mitigating equipment listed above, the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) given a dam failure for ONS could be as high as 1. Given that ONS had originally used the NSAC*60 study which incorrectly derived a dam failure rate an order of magnitude tower than the NRR analysis indicates, additional reviews, analysis, and actions are expected to affect the licensee on this issue. Additionally, an NRC inspection on March 2010 at the Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) identified an apparent violation for failure to maintain adequate procedures for flood protection at the site, as stated in its licensing basis (ML101670034 ). Since FCS is located in close proximity to the Missouri River, and its base plant elevation (1004 feet mean seal level (MSL)) is not far above the normal river levels, NRR is currently evaluating the flooding licensing basis with respect to severe precipitation events. Current NRC assessments of external flooding vulnerabilities indicates that all normal plant equipment fails when floods reach 1010 MSL, and that essential safety*related components fail between 1010 MSL and 1014 MSL. Review of flooding extrapolation updates performed by USAGE for the FCS region indicate an increase in potential elevation for floods with a return period of up to 500 years, not previously considered by the licensee (ML101670034). FCS is also located downstream from several large dams, and its IPEEE su mitt t tates that failure of the lar r m wo I use a floo wave that would reach the site (bl(7)(F) Based on the increase in estimated flood levels, the use of NSAC*60 dam failure rates, and the recent experience with flood routing analysis in the ONS dam failure studies; a potential for an increase in risk due to this hazard is also expected at the FCS site (attenuated only by the distance to the set of dams located upstream). Furthermore, the original FSAR and IPEEE submittals for Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) formed the basis for the external flooding analysis performed at FCS. As indicated above, CNS {which is further downstream from FCS) has also used NSAC-60 as a basis and screened this hazard as "not credible." 5

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Since additional information is limited for other sites, there is a potential that additional regional flooding studies and improvement in the state-of-art assessments of the impact of dam failures at NPP sites may also Indicate an overall change in risk not previously considered in other original studies, applying to more than the facilities identified above. RECOMENDATION NRC's primary function Is to license and regulate the safe use of radioactive materials for civilian purposes to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety and the environment. Considering the existing regulatory framework, the safety significance of the issue, the risk increase considerations, and the generic implications provided; the recent information and experience with dam-related external flooding vulnerabilities indicates an issue that needs to be properly addressed to support NRC's mission. Under these considerations, we recommend that you initiate expeditious action to examine the dam-related external flooding issue under your Generic Issue Program. NRR/DE and NRR/DRA will maintain interaction with your staff. as needed, during the resolution process, and initiate appropriate action in accordance with the findings from the final resolution of this generic issue. If you have any questions, your staff may contact George Wilson (301-415-1711), Lois James (301-415-3306) or Meena Khanna (301415-2150). REFERENCES Baxter, Dave, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, letter to Joseph G. Giiter, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 26, 2008, ADAMS Accession No. ML082750106. Nuclear Safety Analysis Center/Electric Power Research Institute, "NSAC-60 Oconee PRA: A Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Oconee Unit 3," Palo Alto, CA, 1984. US Bureau of Reclamation, "Dam Safety Risk Analysis Best Practices Training Manual," Version 2.0, U.S. Department of the Interior, Technical Service Center, Denver, CO, 2010. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, "Criterion 2--Design bases for protection against natural phenomena,~ Part 50, Appendix A, Chapter I, Title 10, "Energy." U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Design Basis Floods For Nuclear Power Plants," Regulatory Guide 1.59, Rev. 2, 1977, Agencywide Document Access and Management System {ADAMS) Accession No. ML003740388. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Evaluation of External Hazards to Nuclear Power Plants in the United States," NUREG/CR-5042, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, December 1987, ADAMS Accession No. Ml062260222. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) on Streams and Riverst NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3, Rev. 4, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. ML070730405. 6

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Floods,R NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2, Rev. 4, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. ML070100647. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Potential Dam Failures.ft NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Chapter 2, Section 2.4.4, Rev. 3, 2007, ADAMS Accession No. ML070730417. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam," March 15, 2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML100780084. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "EA-10-084, Fort Calhoun Station, Failure to Maintain External Flooding Procedures: May 27 2010, ADAMS Accession No. ML101670034. 7

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A OFF -RELATED INf= Table 1. Qualitative preliminary assessment of dam hazard vulnerabilities for operating NPPs Site Name State Area Body of Water s:creening Arkansas Nuclear AR Stream Arkansas River HIGH Fort Calhoun NE Stream Missouri River HIGH Catawba River/ Lake McGuire NC Stream/ Lake HIGH Nonnan Oconee SC Stream/ Lake Keowee River/ Keowee Lake HIGH South Texas TX Lake Cooling Pond HIGH Watts Bar TN Stream Tennessee River HIGH Beaver Valley PA Stream Ohio River MEDIUM Browns Ferry AL Stream Tennessee River MEDIUM Columbia WA Stream Columbia River MEDIUM Cooper NE Stream Missouri River MEDIUM Peach Bottom PA Stream Susquehanna River MEDIUM H.B. Robinson SC Lake Lake Robinson MEDIUM Tennessee River/ Sequoyah TN Stream/ Lake MEDIUM Chickamauga Lake Three Mile Island PA Stream Susquehanna River MEDIUM Vermont Yankee VT Stream Connecticut River MEDIUM Hope Creek/Salem DE Stream Delaware River LOW Indian Point NY Stream Hudson River LOW Prairie Island MN Stream Mississippi River LOW Surry VA Stream James River LOW Waterford LA Stream Mississippi River LOW 8

Enclosure 5 of Update to FOIA 2013-009A Table 1. Qualitative preliminary assessment of dam hazard vulnerabilities for operating NPPs I Site Name State Area Body of Water ~creening Arkansas Nuclear AR Stream Arkansas River HIGH Fort Calhoun NE Stream Missouri River HIGH Catawba River! Lake McGuire NC Stream/ Lake HIGH Norman Oconee SC Stream! Lake Keowee River! Keowee Lake HIGH South Texas TX Lake Cooling Pond HIGH Watts Bar TN Stream Tennessee River HIGH Beaver Valley PA Stream Ohio River MEDIUM Browns Ferry AL Stream Tennessee River MEDIUM Columbia WA Stream Columbia River MEDIUM Cooper NE Stream Missouri River MEDIUM Peach Bottom PA Stream Susquehanna River MEDIUM H.B. Robinson SC Lake Lake Robinson MEDIUM Tennessee River/ Sequoyah TN Stream/ Lake MEDIUM Chickamauga Lake Three Mile Island PA Stream Susquehanna River MEDIUM Vermont Yankee VT Stream Connecticut River MEDIUM Hope Creek/Salem DE Stream Delaware River LOW Indian Point NY Stream Hudson River LOW Prairie Island MN Stream Mississippi River LOW Surry VA Stream James River LOW Waterford LA Stream Mississippi River LOW Accession Number* ML101900305 OFFICE NRR/DRAIAPOS NRR/DEIEMCB NRR/DE/EEEB NRR/DRNAPOB NAME FFerrante MKhanna GWilson Wames DATE 7/912010 711512010 7112/2010 7/1912010 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 9

Enclosure 6 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter Design and Construction of Earth and Rock-Fill Dams Course No: G07-001 Credit: 7 PDH Gilbert Gedeon, P .E. 9.Jacom Continuing Education and Development, Inc. 9 Greyridge Farm Court Stony Point, NY 10980 P: (877) 322-5800 F: (877) 322-4774 info@cedengineering .com

Enclosure 6 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Updat e Letter m EM 111 0-2-2300 30 July 2004 US Army Corps of Engineers ENGINEERING AND DESIGN General Design and Construction Considerations for Earth and Rock-Fill Dams ENGINEER MANUAL

Enclosure 6 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter EM 1110-2-2300 30 Jul 04 IHCLIHEO 011: VERTICAL OIIAIH IF! LAYER (f') SOIL

a. Homogeneous dam with internal drainage on impervious founcla tion

                          #4'151 IIOC,,r

b. Central core dam on impervious foundation

                          **,_if ftQel(

c. Inclined core dam on impervious foundation LEGENO M

IMPl!AVIOUS P
Pu,v,ous ft, IIANOOM F " Sl:LIECT PIEftVtOUS

                                                                                                     .. A ... 1:9111*-.i..

US a UPST!ltl:AM LZZZ7 SOIL

d. Homogeneous dam with internal drainage on pervious foundation IIOCO:

e. central core dam on pervious foundation uJ' ,...r~111v,ou::

IILAN<<ET-,

                             ....                                           RELIEF *ELLS LZllJ SOIL f,     Dam with upstream impervious zone on pervirus foundation Figure 2-1. Types of earth dam sections 2-4. Basic Requirements

a. Criteria. The following criteria must be met to ensure satisfactory earth and rock-till stmctures:

(I) The embankment, foundation, and abutments must be stable under all conditions of constmction and reservoir operation including seismic. 2-5

Enclosure 6 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter EM 1110-2-2300 30 Jul 04 FILTER ZONES AS NEEDED BETWEEN CORE AND ROCK FILL ~ND BETWEEN EARTH FOUNDATION AND ROCK FILL TOP OF SOUHO ROCK

a. DAM WITH INCLINED IMPERVIOUS ZONE M - IMPERVIOUS RKF : ROCK FILL FILTER ZONES AS NEEDED BETWEEN CORE AND ROCK Fill. AND BETWEEN EARm FOUNDATION ANO ROCK Fill.

Rl<F

b. DAM WITH CENTRAL CORE Figure 2-2. Two types of rock-fill dams (2) Seepage through the embankment, foundation, and abutments must be collected and controlled to prevent excessive uplift pressures. piping. sloughing, removal of material by solution. or erosion of material by loss into cracks, joints, and cavities. In addition, the purpose of the project may impose a limitation on the allowable quantity of seepage. The design should consider seepage control measures such as foundation cutoffs, adequate and nonbrittle impervious zones, transition zones, drainage blankets, upstream impervious blankets, and relief wells.

(3) Frccboard must be sufficient to prevent ovcrtopping by waves and include an allowance for the normal settlement of the fi:mndation and embankment as \veil as f<.1r seismic etlects where applicable. (4) Spillway and outlet capacity must be sufficient to prevent overtopping of the embankment.

h. Special attention. Special attention should be given to pQssible development of pore pressures in foundations, particularly in stratified compressible materials, including varved clays. I ligh pore pressures may be induced in the frmndation, beyond the toes of the embankment where the weight of the dam produces little or no vertical loading. Thus, the strengths of foundation soils outside of the embankment may drop below their original in situ shear strengths. When this type of foundation condition exists, instrumentation should be installed during construction (sec Chapter I0).

2-6

..... wm .i:,. 03: t_ UP$T~ 00w.. nAEAM

-~

C: ... 0

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        ~0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ~

W~JlllhllYIIII HIIGl"IT

UO P' N w

IP"ll."-Wll."I 0****1111 .-1.00111 .,_ IJlO.I 0 0

l:C.IN I A 11 ON "'001.-

                       'i: L IIH,0
                       ~                                                                IANOI
                                     -~..;::::-__ ----------- ---,1S-
                                              ' - ll~COMOa<, U                                                          I CAlllll'fH rH.I, FOUNDATION MIITUUA&.: QUUllt                                   **ClfM 01ft PILL. (CL~Y, ll'L,.T 0 SAND,                                                                                               *OCIIIC ,-ILL
                                                                                  *1111o1ivu** IOU"-Dl.ft**                         I0*111.jllv.-'1'1Dt1 TllllaNC:M*

HO Tl! 80WlillTfllllA...,. lllllL 11 P 'lllllli.t.l TC !IIIEL I IYI A,*TI.S1-.1i1

                               **t1115UAt S ~N       F'0U"l0111,'f10N NOT :lt40¥V ...
                                                                                                    **   PROMPTON OAM,1...-,c;l(AWAXIIN Rl\111;:R. PA,
                                                                                                                                                                                       **        0
                                                                                                                                                                                                     ~
                                                                                                                                                                                                       .          '""     U,0 ,T 1--1 *~*- OF          DAM IQ' ..._J II I                                                                                                                 m MAX POOL EL 12BI,.                                                                                                                                                  ~
                                                                                                                    ~

r *

SPtLLWA"4 CREIT' EL. 1231& :a.-,. I 2 n

0 J, V, C: (D 2'-4,. AtP.RAP ON 12"" BEDOtNG 1** ST()NE FACING O'l 0

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                "T1 TOE: 0TONF-0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                )>
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               "C flECENT ALLUVIU'llrill                                                                                                                                                                                          "C IGAA11£L.LY SANO) l 10*

(D ru N IMPERVIOUS IFIL.L [,A,.OV CLAY! z.** G.AA.VEL. ORAlN

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ....0w I

OX TOP OF AOC

                                                                                                                                                                                                           ~                                    0 I,. ALAMO D*ML~1LO. WILj.lAMI IOYIUI, ARljtON" 100      0            100       200 FT           ~
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                )>

C "C c.. ru

,-+

(D Figure 7-1. Typical embankment sections, earth dams (Prompton and Alamo Dams) r (D

,-+

(D

VP5TRE ..M 00-ST"l!AM

                                                                                                                                                                           ..,..,. ** ._u.,. w*i *~,     . t&I, * ,
                                                                                                                                ~
                                                                                                                              '/ *71"' ~ .!.1llC
                                                                                                                        - I7      '"""'\"C
                                                                                                                                         \ 11' I ON   f-lu \       "AHC.,OIMI n1,.1.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       -=-
                                                                                                                           ~J  u.,1      \\~          -     ------

,=

~

- - t;..-.;..- ...r-

                                                               ,-cJ,JNDA1 I Gait i*  j ,..k      IJn*IClfON '""'"c"                          P"lt1u*1        **L*U uuo
                                              """00,..                                                                                                                                               ~

U,U'l:1111'1/I "IN MM

IQ IN FT

                                                                                        ** !o!ILFDR_Q DAM, REl'tJBLICAij RIVER, P:t,M UPSTREAM                                                                                                                                                                                                                 oow"n"E""

m

n 0 V, 2..'"'Uioli HAl,JM ,-COl. 1i111***t.11u.. t"l!l:1111.,.T * , . . ll'T ..., C: (D IANOOW h!IATC*11i.L: DlC:OM.-GII.I) O'l IOClll t*U*. TY eAMO * *1111--.ltfl.L. I 0

                                                                                                                                                                                     *t:Ll:C:'T IIMPUIWIOU9: tN~UUI.Allll lic=. *1L T
                                                                                                                                                            .::::::I*               OP- '-O'fll' P .. 4  ,-$C I f'I'                                    "T1 0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         )>

j 1r'\Lil

                  .. ~

u,oo, ,.., * .,.._, RL~*~*~*v I

                                                                                 *<><*S11'7,..__,____                 t---.....:...=-~0    '   _.J,,2!~--
                                                                                                                                                                 ----&---- ---- - -?------S~
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        "C "C

(D Ii ~

I "'ff':"."'n~ - ru ll'$lllllli4 L.lil1.*1,1t*CH1,.Qf1U 1101" C liCPIIII.H

                                                                                                              ~ ...... .
                                                                                                              **ou
                                                                                                                      ~                                                                                                                                  N
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         ....0w m
                                                                                        \,, ii'. KEf:1111 S~OTT QA~. '!'t,r!_l<IN l'IIVEA, _N_. !;_.,

IO ac::a: 0

IO 100 110 n s: c,., - o'? c.. N 0 0

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         \D
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         )>

C I c~

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            -w "C

c.. ..... ru ui Figure 7-2. Typical embankment sections, earth dams (Milford and W. Kerr Scott Dams) 00

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            ~0           .....

(D r (D (D

..... wm a, UPSTllll!'.AM DOWNSTREAM 03: t_

                           .:2.._ DI       11 Gi"    .~~~~~ ~~~l. tL_ JZO C: ...

0

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               ~0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  ~

flOil;; JIii 1'"111-,'- Moll 'J A ... OIIIIIIIPl*UC. \l'QI..C *HI C u,. *...,o a

1 Ill" & G i:a.ow.1"1111 1"1' ... Alll .. Y,1,111 H.I.MIT , .aoa P'l' N S.,11.~WA'f C'IIIIS'T ,U,. n.c.1 .... w 0 0 J

"~'

I.I 1.0.,.1: i,01111 ov1*11,10 1111oc.:1t.

                                                                                 *V--/

1/ I.D'N .. P"G .. O'VCIIIIS*l*D ,u:ic N. fl,._NIJ,01111111 fllOG!'I I.ON* IZ,t* Lt.,.T',,

                                                                      ----                                                              - £_'"::_"'e OlltG,tNAjL *ROUNO
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  '1*
                           .. iE.-. 1141:f'C D fllOC ll 1,fllo1f11PC.D fO *I:.& TMlt~ll:D "'0Ctilli 11;,f S'-,.11,i1illllllil ¥         IJTIN. Pl:"Jl'0"'11o11IU) fll lNIH 1H IC Lh*U Tl *Hl'llla SCALI:
                    **uc. ...n .. v .-11111 ,e Tufu:o lll'OuNO.& no~

IIIIIIOC IC. * *

NCOuw 'f r::*I.D 14 D H 100 H ALIF.

m

UP5TRE"M DOWH$TRE""' n UII..O

                                                       ~      MAI U.AtJM .,,COL U.                    1989-                                                                                                                                                            0 V,

C: U,I ,1 (D

                                                                                                                                                                                         ... ,l.:IIIMUM HC ** H1'

R0CM !'*LL *.a.lAL T O'l 0

{~..~ "T1

          .                                                                                      /                 /.                              \

0

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       )>
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      "C "C
                                                                                                            /1,11 M 11111or:111.          /       )*._.,                                                                                                                                               (D l' ..,._,. 111:1 /                ,._     ..,..,

ru i* l. * .. r11111o 111

                                                                                            ,L../ -      ----                                                               ------...-                                                 --~-

N 0 I-' wI T * ._ IHl,I 0 tt:,.c~ ~

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     '°" ~             ~
                                                                                                                                                                                                    -=-

100 ,oo zoo T

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       )>
                                                                                                               ~. COUGAR OAM, $OUTH fORK MCl':ENZIE RIVER, OREG.                                                                                                       C "C

a. ru

,-+

(D Figure 7-3. Embankment sections, rock-fill dams (New Hogan and Cougar Dams) r (D

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       ,-+
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       ,-+

(D

Enclosure 6 of FOIA Appeal 2013-009A Update Letter EM 1110-2-2300 30 Jul 04

    .z                                               ..
    "'C
                                                                   ...C.
    !;;                                               :it           :i:

if 0 0

                ~                                  !
                ,                                                 *z
                                                ~i 0

0 i z a

                                                                                                                            ,i     u J

a ll .J .

~"

0 0 0

                                                                                                                                                   .t J

J 0

J

                                                                                                              . "** ". :11.'Ill:. .-

r u, 0 1 2

        'I!
                     "                                                                                        . ..: ...o'" .,.,
                                                                                                               '!                 0
                                                                                                                                  ~
                                                                                                                                                              ,i u,
                                                                                                              =                    I 0                  E c:>                                              ,,,*

0 2.J Ill

                                                            ,i u

0 . . i~

                                                                                                                                  ....",,,.," .,o.,,."".. **.

0

C

CD Ill 0 t 0 u

m

                                    ......                                                               *.." 'i" .,..... ....

C 0 I C z 0 II. ! ; -'" ... - .- . c:

                                                                                                                                                  "o z

Q

                                                                                                                                                                       ." C
                                                                                                                                                                               'ti C

m C 0 s*

                                                           *z ii            ~

z -i -o .... ::; 0

Z:.J 11:* -

0 0 Ill DI Ill C

                                                                                                                                 !:c . :; ."

C 0 u C

                                                                                                        .... """ .,.....""o* .......... .

0 0 I

                                                          ""'z                                        ".",.              "'

0 .... ;., . NO 0 Ill u:::

I

                                                                                                                                                                      .       :t:
                                                                                                      *:                                                                        C
                                                                                                         ., . *. "z cu 'i
                                                          .J                                                                                     ul z               "
                                                                                                                                                             ~        C        s::.
                                                                                                                                                                              ,0 IL                                                                     ZQ 00 u
                                                                                                      "* ., :~

2,_

                                                                                                                        . \,II".....,: :ii      .",        u     .,;

i~j z

z: r: -., s

                                                          ~                                         . ., ..             C o- ~-
                                                                                                                                                 ,c,u,                          E C

I :: =~ ~ c..1 o!.

                                                                                                                                                            =                   Ill
                                                                                                                                                                               'ti
                                                                                                    '"o 0z                      ~~             !~                             'tr 0
                            .--                                                                    ............~f. ;~.... :: :.J~: .~
                                                                                                                                <1111,ic

ita,.

                                                                                                                                               '311*

Ill!: l I: .:,,: u e

-~

0:a; o

z,o

                  *         ;!                                                                     !i ...                                      z*                               ,i c& IIIIZ
            ~~,

C

                   ~                                                                                                                                                            0 0
                                           "..,                                                 00{D(!)(g)                                                                     :;:::

u

                                                                                                                               .z                          .                    CD
                                           *                                                     "...,z *,.*           0
                                                                                                                               .C
                                                                                                                                              *z 0

H . 0 z

                                                                                                                                                                              - "'C CD E
                  !I,                                                                                                                                                           C fil i

Ill

                                                                                                                                                                               .Q
            !i                                                                      .                                                                                           E I

w

l a:

a. ...:::,CD

, DI ii:

7-7

,, -~:--1 wm J,. 03: t_ Notes: -~ C: . . 0-

                                                                                                                                                                                              ~0 1} Phased crest raise with parapet to maintain traflk flow on                                                                                                                               ~

crest during construction. . *,*-. * * - ~ N w

                                                                                                                                      *-**.1. **
                                                                                                                                                                        .,_                      0

2) Wall details to be adapted to existing embankment 0 geometry and zoning. Impervious, filter, slope prot~tion, and other critical clements to be extended upward as necessary.

                                                                                           'L Raised Crest Parapet Wall ....
                                    '-.~-,-
                                  * * *:;*.*: I (see Detail)          '\

I I

                                                                                                          ,.. Roadway Surface
                           /'*.::1:.
                           *.,*:.)**.:*:J Phase II          /                   Phase I 0rigi11.aI Cre~t               l Raising                               Raising                                                               : -~ r:~. -:~t~~:~~i+/-p
                                                                                                                                                                         /
                                                                                                                                                     .,.,           r""                               m
                                                                         'f.Original Crest                                                         ....:-/*".,.
                                                                                                                                                                                                      ~

n 0 V, C: (D Existing Embankment , 01 0

(D ru N

                                                                                                                                                                                                      ....0w I

0

Notto Scale ~ )> C "C c.. ru

,-+

(D Figure F-4. Embankment raising with parapet wall r (D

                                                                                                                                                                                                      ,-+
                                                                                                                                                                                                      ,-+

(D

Extended Emb

                              -.--*               Raised Crest

_;;(

                                                                                                                        / ...

Zones

                                                                                                                                                                 .ent 7' to 12' typical Rocldill
                                                                                                .,,,,. ...        ,                                          , Steeper Slope On
                                                                                                                                                         ./i'  Raising Section
                                                                                                                                                       /
                              .l    Origi~l Crest Rockfill
                                                                                                                                                     /
                                                                                                                  \        \\             Ir:___ - - -
                                                                                                           '          .                    I
                                                                                                             '                           I
                                                                                                               ',                      /
                                                                                                                   ' '-...1.:...:_J I
                                * (50, Impervious
                        , Vto\~          Earth or iomEarthor Core
                   '$'\0f .*.            Rockfill 1&'~0~,0                .ockfill
                                                                                                                                            ~~~~-
                                                                                                                                               ~'-" q. *.                                              m
                                                                                                                                                                                                       ~

n

l. Temporary removal of top ofcum:nt dam to expose internal zones. Limit length of removal 0 V,

based on ability to close in case of flood event. ..., C:

2. Extend internal embankment zones to height and width necessary. (D

3. Upper slopes typically steepened using high strength outer shell material such as rockfill. O'l

                     .4. Add upstream slope protection if necesslllY,                                                                                                                                  0 "T1 0
                                                                                                                                                                                                       )>
                                                                                                                                                                                                      ""C
                                                                                                                                                                                                      ""C (D

ru N m ....0w Not~~cale s: I 0

                                                                                                                                                                                               ......  ~

Figure F-5. Embankment crest raising c,,, - )> o'? c.. N C ,, c~

                                                                                                                                                                                          -w
                                                                                                                                                                                                      ""C c..

00 ru ui ~0 (D r (D (D

,, wm

0) 03:

t_ Rcinforc,

-~

C: ... 0

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   ~0 Backfil                                                                                                                                                               ~

Roadway Surfac, N w 0 0

                                                                            .. :---- ..,. ~-~ ::* .:~*7..;~'.-_,.:*::_:*-_. _:*~-.. x-;,-: *'-:.,-, -,. . .-: --

10,o 11 i Reinforcing Elements ' --Fil / Transition Zone

                                                                                '                                                                                            Dra" f_                                                                                                         Drain Extension Slope ProjectioQ                                                I
                                 ,*                                                                                                                         I~--/ \ l.._

Temporary Reduction in Crest Elevation

                                                                         /
                                                                    /                                                                                                                         Downstream Upstream                                                 Impervious                                                                                          Earth or Rock-fill Earth or Rock-fill                                              Core                                                                                                  Zone Zone                     /
                                                             /
                                                /_,,,,'                                                                                                      Chimney Drain                                                                      m
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ~
                                    .---,f'*.                                                                 /                                                                                                                            n 0

V, C: (D O'l 0

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           "T1 0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           )>
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          "C "C

(D Not~So,ale ru N

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ....0w Figure F-6. Embankment raising with mechanically stabilized earth raising                                                                                                                                                                 I 0
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ~
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           )>

C "C c.. ru

,-+

(D r (D

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ,-+
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ,-+

(D

                                 ,--                              r-* Min 10' to 15' Roller Cmnpacted Concrete or Soil Cement         .....

10' to 15' Rocldill Original Crest Tem.l!Q_rary Reduction Transition in crest elevation

Rockfill

                                        ,  -~,§;>           Core
                                                                         --~,,

8

                                                                                !i!1 Earth or Rockfill m
                                                                                                                                                                ~

n 0 V, C: (D O'l 0

                                                                                                                                                                ' T1 0
                                                                                                                                                                )>
                                                                                                                                                               "C "C

(D ru

                                                                                                                            ~ot~ S9ale                          N m       ....0w Figure F-7. Embankment raising with modified fills                                                                                                  -

s: c,., - o'? c.. N 0

                                                                                                                                                                ~
                                                                                                                                                                )>

C I ,, c~

                                                                                                                                                   -w "C

c.. 00 ru .:,. ~0 (D r (D (D

,, wm 01,1 .tended 03: t_ 1bankment

                                                                             ,nes C: ...

0

                                                                                                                          ~0
                                                                                                                             ~
                                                                                                                             ~

RaisedCre: N w 0 0 Greater Than 15' Original Crest Tem~ Reduction in crest elevation

*\

Ex:isting Upstream Earth Ex:isting or Rockfill Core lxisting m wn.stream ~ orRoekfill n 0 V, C: (D O'l 0

                                                                                                                                  "T1 0
                                                                                                                                  )>
                                                                                                                                 "C "C

(D ru N 0 I-' wI Ndt1o Seale 0

                                                                                                                                  ~
                                                                                                                                  )>

Figure F-8. Downstream raising of embankment dam C "C c.. ru (D r (D (D

I a.Duke Jocassee Dam i _!r~~ E:!n~e~~~1l~¥~ ~~ ,l:! re "O a. (b)(7)(F) Low Erodibility Classification

                                       -------=----7 0

r-, Cl.I V, 0 u C: LJ.J 18 For Information Only

NRC NRC FORM FORM 183 ,.µ.n ~Eo11t

-~

183 REG U.S. NUCLEAR U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY REGULATORY COMMISSION COMMISSION 109-2012) (09-2012) ~Ci, #J"'

                            ~                      0 NRCM NRCMDD112.1 2.1             .:
                         .~- .~~~
                         ,c
                         ~     *...
                                             ~>  ,

D Q C

REPORT REPORT OF SECURITY SECURITY INCIDENT/INFRACTIONNIOLATION INCIDENTIINFRACTIONNIOLATION (,

                             .,.,.')
                                     ........   ~o~

TO: TO: FROM; (DIVISION/OFFICE FROM: (DIVISION/OFFICE IN WHICH WHICH INFRACTION INFRACTION OCCURRED) OCCURRED) Division Division of Facilities Facilities and Security Security DRA/RES DRA IRES NAME(S) NAME(S) OF PERSON PERSON ACKNOWLEDGING ACKNOWLEDGING RESPONSIBILITY RESPONSIBILITY TITLE TITLE Risk and Risk and Reliability Engineer Reliability Engineer Lawrence Criscione Lawrence Criscione INCIDENT 0 INFRACTION VIOLATION TYPE TYPE OF SECURITY SECURITY REPORT; REPORT: INCIDENT INFRACTION VIOLATION D DATE OF OCCURRANCE: DATE OCCURRANCE: 9/ I 8/2012 9/18/2012 DATE REPORTED: DATE REPORTED: 9/ 20/2012 9/20/2012 HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION OF MATERIAL HIGHEST CLASSIFICATION MATERIAL INVOLVED: INVOLVED: [Z] SUNSI SUNSI SGI I CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL I SECRET SECRET I TOP SECRET TOP SECRET WAS RESTRICTED WAS RESTRICTED DATA DATA INVOLVED? INVOLVED? DYES YES 0[{] NO NO D N/A NIA REASON OR CAUSE REASON CAUSE FOR INFRACTION INFRACTION A RESIDRA RES/DRA staff staff sent sent an email email to Chairman Macfarlane an Chairman Macfarlane andd others wi thi n the others within the agency agency andand outside the agency. outside the agency. Those Those on distribution distribution outside outside the Lhe agency agency include include the the U.S. U.S. Office Office ofof Special Special Counsel Counsel and and House House and and Senate Senate oversight committee members oversight committee members and and staff. staff. The The email email and both attachments and both attachments contain contain sensi ti ve information sensitive inform ation (SUNSI) (SUNS!) but but were were not no t properly properly marked. marked. The The reason reason for nol properly for not properly marking the information marking information is unknown unknown. . DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENTINCIDENT AND ANO ASSOCIATED ASSOCIATED MANAGEMENT MANAGE MENT DIRECTIVES DIRECTIVES SECTI SECTION ON INVOLVED: INVOLVED: ensitive information Sensitive information (SUNS!) (SUNSI) was was not not appropriately appropriately labeledlabeled or marked and or marked was transmitted and was transmitted outside outside the agency to the agency lo other other federal fcc.leral government government entities.enti ties. The The email message does email message does notnot appear appear toto have been sent have been sent to to anyone anyone outside outside thethe federal federal government. government. Neither Neither the the email email nor the attached nor the attached letter leucr waswas marked marked as containing containing sensitive information. Management sensitive information. Ma nagement Directive Directive sections sections involved involved arc are MD MD 12.1 section section V, V, "infractions "Infractions and and Violations Violations" .. and Part IT and Part of MD 12.6, 11ofMD 12.6, "Protection "Protection and and Control Control ofof Sensitive Sensitive Unclassified Unclassified Information." Information.'* IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN: (See Page ACTION TAKEN: Page 2 for suggested disciplinary for suggested disciplinary action.) action.) T he transmittal The transmittal outside outside the the agency agency of of sensitive sensitive information information (SUNS witho ut proper (SUNS I) without proper markings markings was was reported reported to the the Division Division of of Facilities and Facilities and Security Security on 9/20/2012 9/20/2012. . Additional Additional corrective corrective actions actions areare under under consideration consideration. . CORRECTION CORRECTION MEASURESMEASURES TAKEN TAKEN PENDING PENDING LONG TERM RESOLUTION: LONG TERM RESOLUTION: lone yet None yel identi lied. identified. RC FORM NRC FORM 183 (09-2012) (09-20121 SUBMIT SUBMIT

o.~f='.ICl,&,I,. Uii ONLY iiNSITIVa INTERNAL INFORMATION UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 MEMORANDUM TO: Richard P. Correia, Director Division of Risk Analysis Office of Nuclea: R~ylatory Research

                                                         ,2, -~

FROM: "~ Mary JaJ:11': ~ / / ~*/ . ~ Division of R,a ies and Security Office of Ac:frflinistration

SUBJECT:

REPORT OF SECURITY INCIDENT (INFORMATION SPILL) On September 20, 2012, the Division of Facilities and Security (DFS) notified the Computer Security Office, Policy Standards and Training of the subject infraction (see attached NRC Form 183 "Report of Security lncidentllnfractionMolation,*trom Benjamin Beasley and emails detailing this incident) which occurred September 18, 2012. DFS staff concluded that since this incident does not involve protection of classified information, a security infraction did not occur. Instead, this report will be identified as a security incident for failure to follow applicable Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information (SUNS!) guidelines. To prevent recurrence of additional incidents involving the inadvertent release of SUNSI documents, the person or individuals responsible for the security incident must review the SUNS! guidance located on the NRC internal web at ::JJ.;, /1www ,:-:t,'., :3 r-~;__;;;::.::.'r£~~-- Once the SUNSI training has been completed, send a confirmation email to the Facilities Security Branch indicating that the person(s) responsible for the incident has completed thelr review and understands the information. Please be advised that no infraction will be issued for the subject incident. DFS has noted corrective measures are implemented to prevent recurrence. This memorandum closes this incident.

Enclosures:

1. NRC Form 183 "Report of Security lncident/lnfractionNiolation," (September 27, 2012)

2. Email detailing this incident CONTACT: Daniel Cardenas, ADM/DFS (301) 415-6184 OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION EXHIBIT 3

VERIFICATION OF IDENTITY AND SWORN AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION I, _ Lawrence S. Criscione_, hereby affirm my identity. I understand that penalties for false statements may be imposed upon me pursuant to 18 U.S.C . 1001 , and that pursuant to 5 U.S.C.552a(i)(3), any person who knowingly and willfully requests or obtains any record concerning an individual from an agency under false pretenses shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined not more than $5,000. I also authorize the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to release to the FOIA requesters in FOIA-2016-0607, FOIA-2016-0664, and FOIA-2016-0665 and any other FOIA requests seeking access to records that I have placed into ADAMS during the time period, July 19-August 29, 2016, if there may be other requests, the records that I placed in ADAMS for the express purpose that they could be referenced in public comments concerning an NRC report. These records are: ML16195A368, ML16195A369, ML16201A086, ML16201A093, ML16201A095, ML16201A100, ML16202A536, ML16202A537, ML16202A538, ML16204A001 , ML16204A002, ML16216A702, ML16216A703, ML16216A704, ML16216A705, ML16216A706, ML16216A707, ML16216A708. ML16216A709, ML16216A710, ML16216A711 , ML16216A712, ML16216A713, ML16232A001 , ML16236A018, ML16236A019, ML16236A021 , ML16236A230, ML16237A004, ML16237A005, ML16237A006, ML16237A007, ML16238A005, ML16238A006, ML16238A007, ML16238A008, ML16238A009, ML16238A010, ML16238A011 , ML16238A013, ML16238A014, ML16239A085, ML16242A333, ML16242A343, ML16242A344 and any other records associated with O IG Case 13-001 , OIG Case 13-005 or OSC File No. D1-15-5254 or in ADAMS package ML16195A365. I also authorize the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to place the agency's FOIA response, and any released records including my personally identifiable information (Pit) or other information in which I may have privacy interests, in public ADAMS. I, _Lawrence S. Criscione_ , declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. [SIGNATURE}

                                               ~         /
        /_ J   l~

I ~ '

                                                         \              C           ' s (" I l ..

[PRINTED NAME]

            '1*
         /' .                  I
                                         -i                   ('.-
                                                                   ,. f

[DATE OF BIRTH]

                 .;f-....:,...,:::.=.....e-_-',-------'L Executed on: --'-/-'                                    =-(,/-* '---""-' _o_ /.. .(-_

L/ I.. ' - '-I I}}

ML20294A098

Text

RESPONSE

RESPONSE

Dear Ms. Sealing:

Subject:

Dear FOIA Officer:

Dear Requester:

Enclosures:

Subject:

Subject:

Reference:

Subject:

Dear Mr. Criscione:

Subject:

Dear Dr. Macfarlane,

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

SUBJECT:

Dear Dr. Macfarlane,

Background

Background

Background

Background

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

Dear Mr. Gillespie:

Enclosures:

SUBJECT:

Dear Mr. Baxter:

Enclosure:

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

SUBJECT:

Enclosures:

Subject:

References:

Enclosures:

SUBJECT:

Contact:

SUBJECT:

Enclosure:

Dear C hainnan Macfarlane:

Dear Mr. Bell:

SUMMARY

SUBJECT:

Dear Dr. Macfarlane,

Dear Requester:

Enclosures:

Dear Requester:

Enclosures:

Dear Requester:

Enclosures:

Dear Mr. Lochbaum:

Enclosure:

Dear Requester:

Enclosures:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

Subject:

SUBJECT:

Dear Mr. Borchardt and Mr. Ash:

Dear Requester:

Enclosure:

RESPONSE

Subject:

Subject: