ML20248D626
| ML20248D626 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 07/28/1989 |
| From: | Wilson B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Kingsley O TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8908110095 | |
| Download: ML20248D626 (2) | |
Text
C C/NL/
JUL 2 81989 Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.
Senior Vice President, Nuclear Power Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
Dear Mr. Kingsley:
SUBJECT:
FEMA FINAL REPORT ON THE SEQUOYAH EXERCISE OF DECEMBER 14-15, 1988 Enclosed is a copy of the report by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant emergency response exercise conducted on I
December 14-15, 1988.
As indicated in the report, FEMA identified no i
deficiencies. However,17 areas requiring corrective action were identified by FEMA during the exercise, as well as an additional 41 areas recommended for improvement.
We encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA.
Resolution of these items should be completed prior'to the next full-scale emergency preparedness exercise.
We also encourege you to work closely with the State and counties in the development of a scenario for the next full-scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the referenced items were identified.
Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.
Sincerely, l
Bruce A. Wilson, Assistant Director for Inspection Programs TVA Projects Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatieri.
Enclosure:
FEMA Final Report cc w/ enc 1:
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F. L. Moreadith, Vice President, a. Nuclear Engineering M.20.' Medford, Vice President'and Nuclear Technical Director
. County' Judge, Hamilton CountyL Courthouse Dr. Henry Myers Science Advisor J.~L. LaPoint,-Site Director Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Manager,. Nuclear. Licensing and' Regulatory Affairs-M. Burzynski', Acting Site Licensing Manager
. TVA Representative, Rockville Office General. Counsel,-TVA-State of Tennessee bec w/ enc 1:
S. D.-Ebneter, RII D. M. Crutchfield, NRR
.B. D. Liaw, NRR S. C. Black,'NRR R. C. Pierson, NRR' J. B. Brady, NRR/RII B.~B. Desai, NRR/RII J. Rutberg, OG'C NRC Resident Inspector NRC Document Control Desk R I:
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- JUN 2'O 1989-y
' Mr. Frank' J. Congel-
- Director, Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency _ Preparedness
. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- U.S.1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
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Dear Mr. Congel:
Enclosed is a copy _ of the final exercise report for the ' December 14-15, 1988, full _ participation joint exercise of' the offsite radiological emer-gency preparedness plans site-specific to the Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant. The -Sequoyah Plant is located. on the Tennessee River near Soddy.
Daisy -in! Hamilton County, Tennessee.. The ' State' of Tennessee and; Hamilton and. Bradley Counties, both located in the-10-mile plume emergency planning czone, fully participated in the~ exercise.
The exercise report was prepared by Region IV staff of the Federal Emer-
'gency Management Agency (FEMA).
There were no deficiencies identified
~
'during-this exercise.
There were, however, seventeen areas requiring-corrective action and several areas recommended f or improvement..
Based on the res'ults of this exercise, the State.of Tennessee and Hamilton and Bradley Counties ~ demonstrated the capability.to protect the health and safety of:the public in the~ event of a radiological emergency at the site.
Therefore, the 44 CFR 350 > approval granted on August 7,1980, will remain in effect.
' FEMA Region IV staff will furnish a copy of this final exercise report to the State of Tennessee. They will assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions.
If you should have any questions, please contact Mr. Craig S. Wingo, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-3026.
Sincerely, g, f Dennis H. Kwiatkowski Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs Enclosure i
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I SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE I
l Conducted on December 14-15, 1988 Exercise Report March 16, 1989 I
Utility:
Tennessee Valley Authority Plant Location:
Hamilton County, Near Chattanooga, Tennessee Participating State and Local Governments:
State of Tennessee I
Hamilton County Bradley County E
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l TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace I.
EXERCISE
SUMMARY
l II.
DETAILED DISCUSSION 2
I State of Tennessee 2
State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 2 Dose Assessment 3
Radio. Logical Monitoring Control Center (RMCC) 4 State Radiation Laboratory 5
Joint Information Center (JIC) 6 Field Coordinating Center (FCC) 8 Central Emergency Control Center /TVA (CECC) 9 Radiological Field Monitoring Team #1 9
I Radiological Field Monitoring Team #2 10 Radiological Field Monitoring Team #3 12 Radiological Field Monitoring Team #4 13 Bradlev County 15 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 15
)
Traffic Control 17 i
Shelter 17
)
Decontamination 18 Medical Suppor'c 18 f
l ItaJilton County 20 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 20 l
Schcol Evacuation 21 Outside Activities 22 i
1 I
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
I III.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF INADEQUACIES 24 IV.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT 27 V.
APPENDICES 32
)
i A.
Evaluator List and Assignments l
B.
Exercise Objectives and Scenario I
I I
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1 I.
EXERCISE
SUMMARY
I The full participation exercise of the off-site plans and l
preparedness programs of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant was conducted on December 14-15, 1988.
The ingestion pathway portion of the i
exercise was conducted on December 15, 1988.
The exercise was
)
evaluated by a team of 25 Federal evaluators representing five J
Federal agencies.
The evaluation was based on " Criteria for j
Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response j
l Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants",
i NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.
1.
The Sequoyah Plant, operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority, I
is located on the Tennessee River near Soddy-Daisy in Hamilton County.
The plant has two pressurized water reactors capable of producing a total of 1183 megawatts of electricity.
The State of Tennessee activated its Emergency Operations Center l
(EOC), Field Coordination Center (FCC), Joint Information Center i
(JIC), and Radiological Monitoring Control Center (RMCC).
Hamilton and Bradley Counties fully activated their EOC's and emergency response organizations.
The exercise included the following major participants:
Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA)
Tennessee Department of Health and Environment, I
Division of Radiological Health (DRH)
Hamilton County Emergency Management Agency Bradley County Emergency Management Agency Tennessee Valley Authority All exercise objectives were fully or partially met.
No NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 deficiencies were identified during the exercise.
Seventeen areas requiring corrective actions and reveral areas recommended for improvement were identified.
These matters are addressed further in Sections III and IV of this report.
Of special note in t'his exercise was the quality of the scenario.
This foundation document was sell developed to place maximum I
demands on participants and to generate unforeseen circumstances requiring substantial response organization versatility.
The developer of the document and those who approved it are commended.
I I
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g'.[
t II.
DETAILED DISCUSSION State of Tennessee State Emercency Ooerations Center (SEOC) - Nashville The State LOC is located in the Tennessee Emergency Management I
Agency (TEMA) headquarters in Nashville.
The facility is excellent in all respects and is served by an equally excellent communications system.
The degree and quality of participation, leadership and direction evidenced Tennessee's continued commitment to the radiological emergency preparedness effort.
TEMA staff proved to be very adaptable in coping with the unusually severe radiological events provided in the scenario.
Many unforeseen problems were surfaced and were addressed effectively.
The emergency public information function, as it is executed from the SEOC, is not well defined in the state plan.
Staff I
responsible for this program were not as well prepared as they could have been, had a more instructive operating document existed.
The primary activatior point for the Alert and Notification System is the State EOC.
Sirens were activated and I
the instructional message was broadcast within the FEMA 15-minute requirement.
Sur:erior Items:
1.
Excellent operating facilities, competency of leadership and the degree of participation on the part of numerous State and volunteer agencies.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Reauirina Cortective Actions:
None Areas R'3 commended for Inp_rovement; 1.
Map displays should be used to better depict shelter I
locations, evacuation routes, population by area, dimensions and projections of plume and dose rates l
within plume.
Wind direction and speed were not adequately disp 2ayed (difficult to view).
2.
State plan should be more specific relative to emergency public information.
Back-up data for filling I
in blanks on pre-scripted messages should be developed and available.
Emergency information staff members should receive additional training in performance of their duties.
I
e_
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I 3.
Messages used by agriculture representatives need to be updated.
Some information needs clarification, and some needs to be omitted.
For example, when suggesting protective measures for animals (lactating dairy cows),
I consideration should be given to all ~ nimals - goats included.
Ravines and culverts tre not appropriate natural shelters in whien to protect animals from the types of hazards anticipated following an incident at a fixed nuclear facility.
Message #92 advises livestock owners to take action to protect their livestock.
Such protection should be described.
I Dose Assessment DRH adequately demonstrated the ability to perform dose projections and to provide protective action recommendations for I
the plume exposure pathway.
Such recommendations were made after duly considering plant status-information, meteorological conditions, and limited field monitoring data.
Dose assessment at the SEOC requires close coordination with TVA under emergency conditions.
All objectives for dose projection and protective actions were achieved.
Current PAGs were used to assess sheltering and evacuation determinations.
Off-site monitoring data was provided to the DRH assessment team at the SEOC.
TVA developed recommendations for off-site protective actions which, if concurred in by the DRH assessment team, were recommended for implementation by the TEMA Director.
Based on potential plant radioiodine releases and the length of I
tima required to evacuate the population, State DRH personnel made the appropriate decision to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers and the generr.1 population within the 10-mile EPZ.
Demonstrations were condvetad of procedures for collection, transport, and ar,elysis cf samples of principal ingestion I
pathways:
milk, water, and produce.
The demonstrated capability included laboratory measurement and ane. lysis of the most impor: tant radioisotopes.
It is nocessary to have the derived intervention levelu for rLdioisotopa concentrations which produce the prescribed PAG dor.?E.
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l Superior Items:
1.
Good communication and professional techniques were demonstrated by dose assessment team members.
2.
The scenario provided exposures necessary to stress PAG's for large area evacuations and required major
(
decision making beyond the 10-mile EPZ and into the re-entry / recovery phase for ingestion pathway.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
1.
During the ingestion pathway exercisc the DRH Assessment team recognized problems with the flow I
of requested contamination information.
The day "2" and "3" events need to be summarized (i.e.,
provided as " canned" information) to better I
prepare participants for day "4" events and to serve as a basis for answers to non-rad dose assessment questions.
2.
Plume information, including direction of movement, should be better displayed and c, continuously updated.
Field monitoring data I
should also be conspicuously posted and routinely updated.
Radiological Monitorina Control Center (RMCC)
The primary function of the RMCC is to direct and control field monitoring teams in coordination with the State EOC in Nashville (DRH) and the licensee (TVA).
In addition, the RMCC staf.f was charged with collection of plant status and meteorology I
information in order that appropriate direction and control of field monitoring teams could be achieved.
Exceller
- coordination between TVA and RMCC staff was observed.
I-Information provided to RMCC staff by TVA was timely thereby enabling the RMCC coordinator to direct and control field teams in an exemplary manner.
The RMCC had excellent communications 91th the ECC (DRH) Nashville and with all field teams.
One field team's radio became inoperative but we.s exchanged during the exercise.
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As needed and requested, RMCC staff provided briefings to the FCC I
on radiological field team locations, wind data and off-site radiation levels.
Updating of status boards and maps in the RMCC was done efficiently and effectively.
Team locations were known at all times during the exercise.
The RMCC operated smoothly and effectively throughout both the plume exposure and ingestion exposure portions of the exercise.
RMCC coordinators were well trained and efficient in the performance of their duties.
The RMCC may require additional space in the event of a major emergency situation.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Innrovement:
1.
RMCC operating space is extremely small and would likely be inadequate in an actual emergency situation.
State Radiation Laboratory - Nashville The State Radiation Laboratory was staffed by the Tennessee I
Department of Health and Environment from their Laboratory Services Division in Nashville.
The laboratory staff was composed of two teams of three persons, each available for I
rotating shifts and 24-hour staffing.
All of the members had chemical backgrounds with some biological training; however, they had only minimal radiological training and no health physics I
experience.
The laboratory had good basic equipment, including a Nuclear Data 6700 Gamma counter, an Alfa-Beta Canberra 2404 automatic counter, a Packard Liquid Scintillation counter, and other smaller counting units.
The instruments were calibrated I
using National Bureau of Standards services and following ANSI
(
procedures.
The laboratory was active in cross-calibration studies with oak Ridge and TVA.
Quality assurance procedures I.
included written standard operating prcer.dures { SOPS) and good data logging and record keeping.
Samples of niik, n ter, soil, and vegetation products were received from the field by courier from Chattanooga.
The sampler were prepared for measurement, I
counted, and the resultant ecuputer output data transmitted to
{
the SEOC done aseessment tenm via phone.
f Overall, the staff was vell trained and espable.
The laboratory's capability to receive field samples, process them in the laboratory for radioactive measurement, and report the I.
resultant data to assist in dose assessment decisions was effectively demonstrated.
l I o
f Sunerior Items:
1.
Staff members were well trained and capable of measuring radioactivity in environmental samples.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
1.
Staff members need additional training in radiation control and health physics procedures.
I Added instrumentation, including gamma counters, 2.
is required to enable staff to handle a larger number of samples.
Joint Information Center (JIC)
I The Joint Information Center (JIC) was located at TVA's Building 1101 Missionary Place on Market Street in Chattanooga, Tennessee.
The JIC was declared operational following Site Area Emergency at 9:56 a.m.
The primary mission of the JIC is to provide a focal point at which media representatives can receive accurate and coordinated information for dissemination to the public.
The JIC carried out its mission in a professional, efficient, and timely manner.
Space, equipment, and working arrangements were above everage and facilitated the accomplishment of the JIC mission.
External communications were excellent and included satellite g
programming that permitted other response facilities to observe 5
press briefings.
However, Hamilton County phone numbers included l
in new.3 releases, when called, referred the caller to the JIC for local information.
This procedure proved to be inefficient for both the caller and personnel at the EOC.
(0.1.b.)
Six press briefings were conducted during the exercise.
Representatives of the utility, the State, and the risk counties l 5 (Hamilton and Bradley) bristed the media concerning details of I
'hn situation at the plant, including those measures being taken, g
or planned, for the protection of the public.
Coordinators g
cor.duc m.i a succinct preparatory meeting before each briefing.
Between brief3ngs, utility and government persennel were available to answer specific inquiries from the media.
Video tapes of previous press briefings were on hand for the use of I
I
f media representatives who had not been present at earlier I
briefings.
Sufficient press releases and information kits were also available to media briefing attendees.
The media work area was well equipped and provided space for interviews.
Superior Items:
1 The satellite programming that allowed other facilities to observe the press briefings.
2.
The enthusiasm and cooperation of all staffs (TVA, I
State, counties) in performing the mission of the JIC.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:
I 1.
G.l.b.
- Phone numbers in press releases to be used for obtaining information about Hamilton or Bradley Counties should be working numbers and not I
numbers that refer the caller to the JIC.
If the County PIO who provides information is located at the JIC, the number of the JIC should be given in the press release.
Areas Recommended for Improvement:
I 1.
It is recommended that careful attention be paid to a consistent message numbering system.
Early in the exercise a few messages were mis-numbered.
Then, on the second day of the exercise., the utility and the State used a different method of numbering messages.
2.
It is recommended that Emergency Classification Level signs and a "This is a Drill" sign be posted in the Media Briefing Auditoriums at all tiutes during the exercise.
3.
It is suggested that larger gret.hics be used in I
the Media Briefing Auditorium.
Most of the graphics utilized during briefings could not te seen clearly from distant points in the auditorium.
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Field Coordinating Center (FCC)
The FCC, located in the Tennessee Air National Guard Building at Lovell Field in Chattanooga, was activated promptly.
Eleven state agencies and the American Red Cross were represented.
The FCC Coordinator effectively managed the operation and at 9:17 a.m. conducted the first briefing concerning the Alert.
Throughout the exercise he conducted numerous briefings and promptly announced changes in the emergency classification level (ECL) and the weather.
Each agency gave a report of its activities at several briefings.
When information was received I
that indicated a change in the ECL was imminent the FCC Coordinator advised the staff to review procedures for the next ECL.
However, radiological information was not provided to the
.E FCC until late in the exercise.
Frcjected plume plots were g
received at 2:15 p.m. and 2:29 p.m.
No other radiological information was received at the FCC.
I The facility was adequate, although improvement in ventilation is needed.
The status board was kept current and large-scale maps of the 10- and 50-mile EPZs were posted.
Additional smaller-I scale aps, showing radiological monitoring points and sector designations, were available.
Maps showing evacuation routes were in the plan.
Department of Agriculture representatives had plotted the location of farms on large-scale county maps to I
enable them to better direct field teams to sampling locations.
The FCC was equipped with State agency radios: however, the I-Wildlife agency radio was barely functional, and the Tennessee Highway Patrol had to bring in their own radio because the one at the FCC was inoperable.
The Department of Agriculture representative used the plume plot during the second day of the exercise to select the farms from which samples would be taken.
Teams were dispatched at 11:00 I
a.m.
Suoarior Items:
1.
Development of large-scale county maps for field teams showiry the location of farms and directions to them.
j Deficiencies:
None Areas RecairingtCorrej;.tive Ac_tions:
None Areas Recommmiped.'lo_I_ Improvement:
1.
Assure that more radiological information is provided to the FCC.
I
I 2.
Provide adequate ventilation in the FCC.
3.
Correct problems with Wildlife agency and Highway Patrol radios.
I Central Emeraency Control Center /TVA (CECCl I
The State assigned one emergency management representative to the CECC to act in a liaison capacity.
This individual totally involved himself in the overall operation thereby enhancing I
communications and coordination between the State Emergency Director and the TVA Emergency Director.
The flow of technical information from the CECC to the State Health Department representatives located in the SEOC was outstanding.
Information was complete, accurate, and provided in timely fashion to the representatives of the Division.
I Radiological Health personnel at the SEOC were able to perform an independent assessment of emergency conditions in a rapid manner.
This ability greatly facilitated the coordinated development and implementation of appropriate protective actions.
Overall, the coordination and communication between representatives of the State and TVA were excellent.
This aided I
in the prompt mitigation of the consequences of the developing emergency conditions.
g deficiencies:
None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
None Radiological Field Monitoring _T.eam #1 The mobilization and activation of this field monitering team was g
adequately demonstrated.
At 9:45 a.m. teams vers alerted to 5
standby and took KI (nimulatse), per inst;untions prior to deployment.
A site Area Emercancy ves declared at 10:03 a.m.,
and to.ams were deployed for field monitoring.
Team #1 arrived at the first nonitoring site at 10:17 a.m.
Communications were demonstrated and determined to be exce.11ent, I
All nescages were clear, concise, prompt, and included "This in a j
l Drill" statenent when necetcary.
The radio battery ran down j
during early aiterncon necessitating the delivery of a replacement (with one hour lost).
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5
I Emergency worker exposure control was more than adequate.
KI was I
dispensed and taken as directed prior to leaving the RMCC.
Regular checks of the direct-reading dosimeters were performed, and the ambient radiation field was continuously monitored.
The team leader was very knowledgeable about this activity.
The ambient radiation monitoring in the field was well done and g
followed the SOPS defined in the plan.
All equipment was
{
g adequate, in good working order, calibrated, and regularly checked.
All measurements were transmitted promptly and accurately to the RMCC and were recorded on the data sheets.
I There was no confusion in finding the monitoring locations.
Maps and data sheets were excellent, and the team leader excelled at following the maps and SOP directions.
This team was not equipped with air monitoring equipment and was not employed in areas where air monitoring was required.
The other field teams handled this activity; however, this team I
exhibited adequate knowledge of air monitoring equipment and procedures.
I Ingestion exposure pathway sampling was condu::ted on December 15, 1988 (the simulated fourth day of this incident).
The team displayed adequate knowledge of all types of sampling although only milk samples were taken.
All sampling was done as I
prescribed in the plan and team SOP's.
The team detoured around radiation areas when proceeding to one farm and stopped short of the other farm when the radiation level increased.
I I
Deficiencies:
None 1
Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
1.
Provide a back-up battery for the radio.
f i
2.
Equip all teams with air monitoring equipment.
I i
Radip).ocical Field MorlitoIIDg Team #2, Generally, Field Team #2 members were capable and well equipped.
Communications were good, and the team was adequately equipped with dositneters.
KI was available, but the message with j
I instructions to take it was not received by the team; hence KI was not taken.
,( J. '. Q. f. )
Ambient radiation EOnitoring was demonstrated adequately but, initially, was conducted only at monitoring points and nct while the vehicle was in transit.
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4 4 -.-
Consequently, the team passed through the leading edge of the
- plume without detecting it.
The team was equipped for measuring radioiodine and particulate concentrations in air; however, no air samples were taken.
During the' ingestion pathway exercise, the team did not take a radiation survey meter.
(H.7.)
The team was directed to conduct simulated milk sampling at two dairies; however, no other sampling was requested or conducted.
The team located the dairies with no difficulty, but was not properly prepared in terms of procedures or equipment for actual milk. sampling.
(J.11.)
Simulated milk samples were returned to the RMCC and received there; however, there was no monitoring or decontamination of the personnel or vehicle.
(K.5.b.)
Superior Items:
1.-
Well-organized exercise.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Reauirina corrective Actions:
1.
J.10.f. - When instructions are given to take KI, verification should be made that the message was received.
2..
H.7.
- Sampling teams should have radiation survey instruments with them in contaminated areas.
Training, briefings, and checklists should be used to assure this.
3.
J.11.
The team was not properly prepared in terms of procedures or equipment for milk sampling.
The Department of Agriculture and i
Division of Radiological Health should jointly develop detailed procedures for milk sampling and fully demonstrate this.
~
4.
K.5.b.
- Personnel and vehicular monitoring and decontamination,of field teams should be demonstrated during the next exercise.
i Areas Recommended for Improvatgr_@
1.
Air pump should be recalibrates, 2.
Teams should conduct ambient radiction measurements continuously when in vicinity of plume, not just at monitoring points.
I I....
!I 1
5.
Air sampling should be conducted by each team for l
training and demonstration purposes.
More air sampling should be conducted during the exercise to provide adequate data on radiciodine and particulate concentrations in the plume.
Radiological Field Monitorina Team #3 Team members had a good knowledge of actual mobilization procedures.
Communications systems were excellent in the vehicle I
(primary system and two back-up radios).
Some messages were not reported as " drill" or " exercise" messages.
Additional training should be provided to assure this protocol is used.
Team members had adequate dosimetry, which was read regularly and reported to the dispatcher.
The team had KI in their kits and were familiar with the procedures for its use.
Members were also aware of maximum dose allowed without authorization.
The controller did not specify a reading in one location as R/hr, thereby putting the team in a high radiation exposure area.
The I'
previous reading was in mR/hr, hence the team presumed this reading to be in the same terms.
Team members were well trained to carry out t echnical field I
operations and did an excellent overall job.
The team did not take an airbcrne iodine sample or particulate
'ivity sample; therefore, these monitoring techniques were not oz. served.
The I
team had the proper instruments and was knowledgeable in these techniques; however, the RMCC never requested them to take the samples.
Team 3 had the appropriate equipment and demonstrated the proper procedures for collecting the milk sample requested by the RMCC.
The team located the farm promptly, and relevant functions and I
activities were implemented consistent with the SOPS.
Since the RMCC did not request soil and vegetation sanples, the team did not collect then, a hhougn they sppuently had this capability.
(J.11.)
S.npirJor it;ers:
1.
Fje]d Team 3 demonstrated excellent knowledge and competn.nce.
pq11gignoieg:
Kone Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:
1.
J.11. - Field teams should take a soil or vegetation sample during the next exercise.
I I
o Areas Recommended for Improvement:
1.
Actual mobilization of the teams should be demonstrated frequently for training purposes.
- 2..
Personnel should be trained in reporting messages as a " drill" or " exercise".
3.
Controllers should always clarify readings of mR/hr and R/hr to avoid excessive exposure control.
4.
Each field monitoring team should take airborne iodine and particulate activity samples for training purposes.
5.
Check points should be established for emergency workers returning from contaminated areas.
Monitoring of personnel and vehicles and decontamination as required should be conducted at these locations.
Radiological Field Monitorina Team #4 Team #4 was repositioned in Chattanooga for this exercise but had sufficient knowledge of actual mobilization procedure.
They could have arrived from Nashville within three hours.
Communication on Day #1 went very smoothly, using the MX 360 portable radio.
Two additional back-up systems were available in the Tennessee Public Service Commission vehicle.
Telephone communication was required and demonstrated on Day #2.
The RMCC did an excellent job of keeping the team briefed on current plant and meteorological conditions.
Included in these briefings was a statement that only a puff release of noble gases had occurred.
The team exercised good exposure control'and had all required i
dosimetry.
They did not take their KI according to SDP (J.10.f.)
and did not esturn to a designated check point for vehicle / personal contamination monitoring.
(K.5.b.)
l l
The team adequately demonstrated field radiological monitoring during mest of the exercise and had a leg sheet for recording most data.
However, they took only closed probe survey utter readings, and they did not use the RO2A ion chambar for exposure rates above 50 mR/hr.
(0.4.c.)
The Ludlum 12 was used for four different probes.
l
~
f i A single meter should be used that reads in both Survey meters had been calibrated within the la tmR/hr and cpm.
the "due" calibration data was not shown six months, but s
The team took two air samples (both simulated) broke at the beginning of the firrt sample and w The rotameter or replaced.
(I.9.)
as not repaired were counted with two different probes. Particulate and silver zeolite cartridges to which probe should be used for the iodine cThere was confusion as provide slots for count rates for the iodine cartridgsurve artridge.
The s o " 24 and samples were returned to the laboratory for analysie.
No air s.
(I.B.)
Ingestion Exposure Pathway samples only included t samples.
entire exercise. Good health physics practices were observed d wo milk vehicle for cransport to the Nashville LaboratoryThe samples were actual milk at this dairy, but the team stated theyThere was no the next day to collect a sample.
would return SupeIi2r_ Items:
1.
Ability of both teams to find all sampling locations.
Deficiencies:
None breas Recuirina Corrective Actions:
1.
J.10.f. - Know the SOPS for taking KI.
2.
contamination monitoring.K.5.b. - Stop at check points for vehicle sonal 3.
O.4.c. - Team did not take open and closed meter readings.
on this to assure RMCC communicates theProvide training by team m requirement.
4.
I.9. - Objective to measure iodine at 10-7 was not met because the rotameter broke and an uci/cc actual air sanple was not taken.
zeolite cartridge was not known.of the survey meter probe to me for this data needs revision.
The survey form 5.
I.B.
for analysis.- No air samples were delivered to the lab
1 l
o j...
A single meter should be used that reads in both mR/hr and cpm.
Survey meters had been calibrated within the last six months, but the "due" calibration data was not shown.
I The team took two air samples (both simulated).
The rotameter broke at the beginning of the first sample and was not repaired or replaced.
(I.9.)
Particulate and silver zeolite cartridges were counted with two different probes.
There was confusion as I
to which probe should be used for the iodine cartridge.
The survey form data sheet needs revision to correct " slot" 24 and provide slots for count rates for the iodine cartridge.
No air samples were returned to the laboratory for analysis.
(I.8.)
Ingestion Exposure Pathway samples only included two milk I
samples.
Good health physics practices were observed during this entire exercise.
The samples were not transferred to a TVA vehicle for transport to the Nashville Laboratory.
There was no actual milk at this dairy, but the team stated they would return I
the next day to collect a sample.
Superior Items:
1.
Ability of both teams to find all sampling locations.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Requirina Corrective Actions:
I 1.
J.10.f. - Know the SOPS for taking KI.
I 2.
K.5.b.
- Stop at check points for vehicle / personal contamination monitoring.
3.
O.4.c.
- Team did not take open and closed survey I
meter readings.
Provide training by team members on this to assure RMCC communicates the requirement.
4.
I.9. - Objective to measure iodine at 10-7 uci/cc was not met because the rotameter broke and an I
actual air sample was not taken.
The whereabouts of the survey meter probe to measure silver zeolite cartridge was not known.
The survey form for this data needs revision.
5.
I.8.
- No air samples were delivered to the lab for analysis.
- I
! I I
l lI J
Areas Recommended for Improvement:
I 1.
Additional training should be provided to insure that teams:
,g 5
(a)
Utilire the phrase, "This is a Drill", with radio communications.
(b)
Know when the ion chamber instrument must be used.
I 2.
More than milk samples should be collected at the
/-
next exercine.
Eaca team should at least collect a different sample.,
I 3.
A survey meter that reads in mR/hr and cpm should
]
be obtained so that no field conversion is necessary.
4.
A sing?e probe (pancake type) for both particulate J,
aM oilver u olite cartridge should be considered.
~
Bradlev County E
Emeraency ODerations Center (EOC)
The EOC is a spacious, well-lighted, adequately equipped l
facility, fully capable of supporting sustained response l
operations.
Wall maps were sufficient in number but did not I
depict evacuation routes, EPZ populations, or shelter locations.
This information was available, however, in the county plan.
Emergency classification levels were not clearly posted; they s
were included on the general events board.
Ample stocits of KI I
for emergency workers were on hand.
The county response organization adequately demonstrated the ability to activate, direct, and coordinate emergency activities.
The county director was effectively in control of all operations.
Frequent staff briefings were conducted with all EOC staff I
participating.
A 24-hour staffing capability was demonstrated by 7
presentation of a current staff roster.
Message control and distribution was coordinated and timely.
The EOC was well served 1
from a communication standpoint.
The TV link with the JIC was a l.
I-particularly effective means of exchanging information.
E I
~
E
I.
'I The county RADEF officer provided excellent situation reports I
during staff briefings; however, he experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining dose rate information.
I Emergency public instructions, originating at the State level, were appropriate and specific.
Bradley County did not conduct media briefings but had two information officers on duty for this purpose and for rumor control activities.
Bradley County did not adequately demoncerate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions I
for school children within the plume EPZ.
School personnel and EOC staff were generally familiar with basic procedures.
However, the county plan was not completely clear as to what protective actions were appropriate at each emergency I
classification level (ECL).
(J.9.)
Superior Items:
l I 1.
EOC facilities.
2.
Staff enthusiasm and knowledge of assigned duties.
3.
TV link between EOC and JIC was an excellent means of keeping all positions up-to-date on status of I
public releases.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:
I 1.
J.9.
- Rewrite county plan to clarify the protective actions appropriate to each ECL; develop checklists for EOC staff to use to ensure
~
that school children are adequately protected; and I
establish a system for verifying siren soundings that impact on schools.
Areas Recommended for Improvement:
1.
ECL noticeF should be posted prominently.
2.
A process should be developed for assuring timely availability of dose rate information to counties.
3.
Distribute " Emergency Information - Sequoyah y
Nuclear Plant" brochure to all school personnel, new students, and students who attend schools in the EPZ but who live outside the EPZ.
I I
~
I l
_________________________h
I LI l
Traffle Control 1
One road block was established for the exercise.
Perscnnel manning this road block were knowledgeable of their I
responsibilities and of the function and purpose of the dosimetry provided them.
They were able to communicate effectively with the EOC and sufficiently demonstrated a capability to carry out their assigned roles.
One Shelter Information Point and one Transportation Assistance Team (TAT) were evaluated.
Both had adequate communication and I
were knowledgeable of the functions and purpose of their dosimetry.
They also displayed adequate knowledge of their responsibilities.
The TAT team had the necessary items (chains, gas, etc.) to assist evacuees.
5 All emergency workers demonstrated their ability to continuously monitor and control exposure during the exercise.
I Superior Items:
1.
Enthusiasm and knowledge of traffic control personnel.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Recruirina Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
None Shelter A mass care shelter was established at Trewhitt School.
It was staffed by personnel from the American Red Cross, Bradley County Department of Human Services, Public Health Department, and I
Sheriff's Department.
The shelter had adequate space and facilities and was served by an ambulance.
Security was provided, and crisis counseling could have been arranged.
I Evacuee processing was effectively conducted with the following exceptions:
Paper was not placed on the floor for contaminated evacuees to walk on to the showers; insufficient precautions were I-taken to keep contaminated and uncontaminated evacuees separated; (K.5.b.) evacuees were monitored by nurses using CDV 700's; however, the probe was not protected with plastic bags and the bottoms of their feet were not monitored.
Deficiencies:
None I
I I
Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:
I 1.
K.5.b.
- Nob enough precaution was taken to keep contaminated and uncontaminated evacuees separated I'
after monitoring.
Paper was not placed on the floor from the monitoring area to the showers to keep from contaminating the facility.
Areas Recommended for Improvement:
1.
Monitor probes were not covered with plastic bags nor I
were the bottoms of evacuees feet monitored for contamination.
I Additional training is needed in proper monitoring 2.
pre :edures.
Decontamination A workers decontan nation center was activated at a local high d
I school.
Potentially-contaminated personnel were separated from
" clean" personnel.
Personnel were aware of proper procedures for removal and storage of contaminated clothing and personal items.
They were also well trained in decontamination procedures.
One I
vehicle was washed down but was not monitored.
(K.5.b.)
Deficiencies:
None Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:
1.
K.5.b. - Monitor vehicles after decontamination.
Areas Recommended for Improvement:
None I
Medical Sunnort I
The MS-1 medical drill for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant was conducted at the Bradley County Memorial Hospital in Cleveland, Tennessee on December 14, 1988.
The Bradley County Emergency I
Medical Services (EMS) unit simulated transport of the patient.
The patient was injured and contaminated on-site.
Bradley County EMS was called to transport the patient because the on-site ambulance experienced some mechanical difficulty.
At the hospital, the Bradley County EMS crew used appropriate procedures in monitoring, implementing contamination control I
procedures, and properly preparing the patient to be transported.
The survey meter used by the EMS was last calibrated in June 1986.
(H.10.)
I I
EMS personnel were thoroughly knowledgeable of their responsibilities and responded adequately to all questions asked by the evaluator.
The EMS unit communicated the necessary patient information to the hospital and thoroughly briefed the hospital receiving staff on the condition of the patient.
The physician went aboard the ambulance and examined the patient prior to admission to the hospital.
The hospital had adequate equipment, supplies, and personnel to medically care for and decontaminate the patient.
The staff at the hospital was knowledgeable of decontamination procedures, monitoring, and contamination control.
Nasal wipes, and blood and smear samples were taken.
After a final survey, the patient was transferred to another room.
Emergency workers used only direct-reading dosimeters with 0-200 mR range.
Film badges are on order.
There was excellent organizational and leadership involvement at the hospital.
The health physicist provided effective leadership in the emergency room.
There was good interaction among staff members in and outside of the emergency room.
Personnel were serious and professional.
This was reflected in the ten-minute setup of the hospital to receive the patient, clear designation of contaminated and clean areas, roping off of areas around the emergency room, effective security control, and the professional training program provided by the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency and the State Radiological Health office.
The Bradley County Memorial Hospital fully demonstrated its capability 'e I
care for a contaminated, injured patient.
Sunerior Items:
1.
Leadership, organization, and cooperation of emergency personnel in the EMS and hospital.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:
1.
H.10. - The CDV 760 survey meter used by the EMS crew had not been calibrated since June 1986.
All survey instruments should be calibrated on an annual basis.
(FEMA-REP-2 (Rev. 1) p. 6-4.)
Areas Recommended for Improvement:
1.
The Bradley County EMS and Bradley County Memorial Hospital should consummate their efforts to purchase lower-range dosimeters and TLD's to be used in the next medical drill.
e.
I i
2.
The lead Radiation Safety Officer at the hospital l
should assian more responsibility to another monitor to survey the EMS crew and ambulance.
This would release the EMS personnel earlier.
3.
There should be a written scenario for the medical drill.
The development of this scenario would require State and local coordination.
j Hamilton County Emeroency Operations Center (EOC)
Prompt activation and staffing of the Hamilton County EOC was demonstrated.
However, a pager system for key agency personnel would enhance the response time of local officials.
The Eoc is an excellent facility for emergency operations; however, feeding and housing of EOC personnel could not be I
accommodated.
Adequate space should be provided to serve a 24-hour continuous operation.
Management of the EOC was effectively demonstr.ited by the Deputy I
Director.
Briefings were conducted often and. tere concise; however, polling individual agencies during bri.efings could provide more detailed information for all EOC personnel.
Communications systems available in the Hamilton County EOC were excellent.
Primary and back-up systems existed to communicate with the State and all county field-based personnel.
Public information activities were coordinated with a Hamilton County Public Information Officer in the Joint Information Center (JIC).
The addition of a satellite system to broadcast live news conferences from the JIC to all EOC's was outstanding.
Superior Items:
1.
EOC facilities.
2.
Management by the Deputy Director.
3.
Communications.
4.
Satellite hook-up with JIC.
Deficiencies:
None Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:
None I
I
I..
I Areas Recommended for Improvement:
1.
Poll agencies during briefings in the EOC for additional information.
2.
Provide pagers for key EOC personnel as a means for reducing response time.
3.
Obtain additional space in the building where the EOC is located to house and feed EOC personnel during 24-hour operations.
School Evacuation A meeting was conducted with a representative from the Hamilton County School Superintendent's office and six area school principals.
All individuals were knowledgeable of the current plans and procedures for evacuating their respective schools.
A " paired school" system exists within the county.
This system I
calls for associating an " evacuating" school with a " host" school and is an excellent technique for reducing confusion.
I g
However, representatives from Soddy-Daisy Elementary, Soddy-Daisy g
High, Sequoyah Vocational, Brown High, Harrison Elementary, and Central High Schools were concerned with " leaks" to the media prior to evacuation orders being released.
Traffic jams created I
by parents attempting to pick up their children could greatly impair evacuation of the schools.
The principals were also concerned that the plan refers to " closing" schools "much like a snow day" and sending the children home during a Site Area Emergency.
Most of these children would be without parental supervision.
Deficiencies:
None i
Areas Reauiriner Corrective Actions:
None Areas Recommended for Improvement:
1.
Develop coordinated procedures to inform school I
officials prior to the release of information to the media concerning evacuation.
2.
Investigate the possibility of changing the plans and procedures which initiate the evacuation of schools.
I I
I
Outside Activities Objective 6, Emergency Worker exposure control and Objective 16, 1
use of KI, were adequately demonstrated.
The objectives are I
I combined because the dosimetry and KI are issued simultaneously f
in the dosimetry kit.
The Hamilton County RDO issues the dosimetry kits and the Hamilton County Depaty Director is responsible for the use of KI.
The County RDO is knowledgeable about dosimetry and exposure levels.
The Deputy Director is aware that the Tennescee Health Department authorizes the use of KI.
Distribution of the kits is mainly from the county I
communications vans located on either side of the Tennessee River.
The near-site population in sectors A1, B1, C1, and D1 also have KI available.
Outside activities included traffic and access control points, shelters, shelter information point, and emergency worker decontamination center.
At each location responders had dosimetry kits and generally demonstrated knowledge about KI, dosimetry, and exposure levels.
Objective 20 was adequately demonstrated.
The traffic and access control points were I
activated by two Hamilton County Sheriff's Deputies who understood well their responsibilities.
Objectives 21 and 22 involve the capability of the county to set I
up a reception center and congregate care center for evacuees.
Personnel at the Brainard Jr. High School adequately demonstrated both functions.
The American Red Cross Chapter is the designated I
shelter operator.
The Hamilton County Human Services nurses, the Johnson Montal Health Center, and the Chattanooga School System provide support services for the activation and staffing of the I
The Jr. High is designated to house and feed 600 shelter.
evacuees.
Objective 25 is to demonstrate the adequacy of a facility to decontaminate emergency workers and their equipment vehicles.
This objective was not met.
The Forestry Department I
did not demonstrate its ability to survey vehicles.
The Red Bank F.'re Department was concerned about the vehicle wash water running onto the field designated for parking vehicles.
Two Rad I
monitoring instruments, recently calibrated, were determined to be inoperative when the probes were held to the check source and gave no visible response.
The checks were made mid-way of a body survey.
The Fire Department personnel received no instructions when the dosimetry was issued.
(0.4.c.)
The school has one shower stall, and the paths to and from the shower were parallel.
(K.5.b.)
Radio amateurs were used at shalter information I
points / shelters and the emergency worker decontamination station.
Superior Items:
1.
The overall capability of the county.
Deficiencies:
None I
I
I Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:
1.
O.4.c.
- Provide training for decontamination personnel.
2.
K.5.b.
- Designate a better facility for personnel decontamination and demonstrate vehicle survey and decontamination operations.
Areas Recommended for Improvement:
None I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
I
6..,
i-III.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF INADEQUACIES Facility or EUEEG Correctivg Scheduled Activity Item Action Date of l
3 Comoletion j
Deficiencies
]
None 1
Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions JIC G.1.b.
Phone numbers in press releases to be used for obtaining information about Hamilton or Bradley Counties I
should be working numbers and not numbers that refer the caller to the JIC.
If the County FIO who provides information is located at i
the JIC, the number of the JIC should be given in the press release.
Radiological J.10.f.
When instructions are given Field to take KI, verification Monitoring should be made that the Team #2 message was received.
H.7.
Sampling teams should have radiation survey instruments with them in contaminated areas.
Training, briefings, and checklists should be used to assure this.
J.11.
The team was not properly prepared in terms of procedures or equipment for milk sampling.
The Department of Agriculture and Division of Radiological Health should jointly develop detailed procedures for milk sampling and fully demonstrate this.
I.
o..,
I i
i Facility or NUREG Corrective Scheduled Activity Item Action Date of C_o_mpletion Areas Recuirinci Corrective Actions (Continued)
Radiological K.5.b.
Personnel and vehicular Field monitoring and decontami-Monitoring nation of field teams I
Team #2 should be demonstrated (Con:inued) during the next exercise.
Radiological J.ll.
Field teams should take I
Field a soil or vegetation Monitoring sample during the next Team #3 exercise.
I Radiological J.10.f.
Know the SOPS for taking Field KI.
I Monitoring Team #4 K.5.b.
Stop at check points for vehicle / personal contami-nation monitoring.
O.4.c.
Team did not take open and closed survey meter I
readings.
Provide training by team members on this to assure RMCC communicates the requirement.
I.9.
Objective to measure iodine at 10-7 uci/cc was not met I
because the rotameter broke and an actual air sample was not taken.
The whereabouts I
of the survey meter probe to measure silver zeolite cartridge was not known.
I The survey form for this data needs revision.
I.8.
No air samples were I
delivered to the lab for analysis.
I I
I
.y-I...
I Facility or NUREG Corrective Scheduled I
Activity Item Action Date of Completion Areas Reauirinct Corrective Actions (Cqnf.inued) n Bradley J.9.
Rewrite county plan to
{
County clarify the protective act?ons appropriate to each I
ECL; develop checklists for EOC staff to use to ensure that school children are I
adequately protected; and establish a system for verifying si'_en soundings that impact on schools.
K.5.b.
Not enough precaution was taken to keep contaminated I
and uncontaminated evacuees separated after monitoring.
Paper was not placed on the j
I floor from the monitoring i
area to the showers to keep j
from contaminating the I
facility.
)
L 5.b.
Monitor vehicles after decontamination.
H.10.
The CDV 760 survey meter used by the EMS crew had not i
been calibrated since June
{
I 1986.
All survey instru-I ments should be calibrated on an annual basis.
(FEMA-REP-2 (Rev. 1) p. G-4.)
Hamilton O.4.c.
Provide training for County decontamination personnel.
K.5.b.
Designate a better facility for personnel decontamina-I tion and demonstrate vehicle survey and decontamination operations.
i I
l I
4
I.
I l
]
IV.
SUMMARY
LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement SEOC 1.
Map displays should be used to better l
depict shelter locations, evacuation i
I routes, population by area, dimensions i
and projections of plume and dose rates within plume.
Wind direction and speed I
were not adequately displayed (difficult to view).
I 2.
State plan should be more specific relative to emergency public information.
Back-up data for filling in blanks on pre-scripted messages I
should be developed and available.
Emergency information staff members should receive additional training in performance of their duties.
3.
Messages used by agriculture representatives need te be upd tad.
I Some information needs c, clarification, and some needs to be omitted.
For example, when suggesting protective I
measures for animals (lactating dairy cows), consideration should be given to all animals - goats included.
Ravines and culverts are not appropriate natural shelters in which to protect animals from the types of hazards I
I anticipated following an incident at a fixed nuclear facility.
I Message #92 advises livestock owners to take action to protect their livestock.
Such protection should be described.
I Dose Assessment 1.
During the ingestion pathway exercise the DRH Assessment team recognized I
problems with the flow of requested i
l contamination information.
The day "2" l
and "3" events need to be summarized I
(i.e., provided as " canned" information) to better prepare participants for day "4" events and to serve as a basis for I
answers to non-rad dose assessment questions.
I
m Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Innrovement Dose Assessment 2.
Plume information, including direction (Continued) of movement, should be better displayed and continuously updated.
Field
{
monitoring data should also be l
conspicuously posted and routinely l
I updated.
l l
i I
FMCC 1.
RMCC operating space is extremely small i
and would likely be inadequate in an l
actual emergency situation.
I I
State Radiation 1.
Staff members need additional training Laboratory in radiation control and health physics I
procedures.
2.
Added instrumentation, including gamma I
counters, is required to enable staff to handle a larger number of samples.
JIC 1.
It is recommended that careful attention be paid to a consistent message numbering system.
Early in the exercise l
I a few messages were mis-numbered.
- Then, on the second day of the exercise, the utility and the State used a different l
method of numbering messages.
j 2.
It is recommended that Emergency Classification Level signs and a "This I
is a Drill" sign be posted in the Media 1
Briefing Auditorium at all times during the exercise.
I 3.
It is suggested that larger graphics be used in the Media Briefing Auditorium.
I Most of the graphics utilized during briefings could not be seen clearly from distant points in the auditorium.
j I
1 FCC 1.
Assure that more radiological i
information is provided to the FCC.
I 2.
Provide adequate ventilation in the FCC.
l l
I-3.
Correct problems with Wildlife agency and Highway Patrol radios.
l l
l Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement Radiological 1.
Provide a back-up battery for the radio.
Field Monitoring I
Team #1 2.
Equip all teams with air monitoring equipment.
Radiological 1.
Air pump should be recalibrates.
Field Monitoring I
Team #2 2.
Teams should conduct ambient radiation measurements continuously when in vicinity of plume, not just at monitoring points.
i 3.
Air sampling should ba conducted by each team for training and demonstration I
purposes.
More air sampling should be conducted during the exercise to provide adequate data on radiciodine and particulate concentrations in the plume.
Radiological 1.
Actual mobilization of the teams should I
Field Monitoring be demonstrated frequently for training Team #3 purposes.
I 2.
Personnel should be trained in reporting messages as a " drill" or " exercise".
I 3.
Controllers should always clarify readings of mR/hr and R/hr to avoid excessive exposure control.
4.
Each field monitoring team should take airborne iodine and particulate activity samples for training purposes.
l 5.
Check points should be established for emergency workers returning from contaminated areas.
Monitoring of personnel and vehicles and decontamination as required should be conducted at these locations.
I I
I
I.
Facility or Areas Reco.tmended for Improvement Activity Radiological 1.
Additional training should be provided Field Monitoring to insure that teams:
I Team #4 (a)
Utilize the phrase, "This is a Drill", with radio communications.
(b)
Know when the ion chamber instrument must be used.
2.
More than milk samples should be collected at the text exercise.
Each team should at least collect a different I
sample.
3.
A survey meter that reads in mR/hr and cpm should be obtained so that no field conversion is necessary.
4.
A single probe (pancake type) for both particulate and silver zeolite cartridge should be considered.
I Bradley County 1.
ECL notices should be posted prominently.
2.
A process should be developed for assuring timely availability of dose rate information to counties.
3.
Distribute " Emergency Information -
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant" brochure to all I
school personnel, new students, and students who attend schools in the EPZ I
but who live outside the EPZ.
l 4.
Monitor probes were nut covered with plastic bags nor were the bottoms of evacuees feet monitored for contamination, l
5.
Additional training is needed in proper monitoring procedures.
6.
The Bradley County EMS and Bradley I
County Memorial Hospital should consummate their efforts to purchase lower-range dosimeters and TLD's to be used in the next medical drill.
,I
w_
's-
~31-1
.1 Facility or Areas Recommended for Improvement-Activity-i
,y Bradley County 7.
The'1ead Radiation Safety Officerfat the
]
'(Continued) -
hospital should assign more responsibility to another monitor to survey the EMS crew and ambulance.
This
'would release the EMS personnel earlier.
l 8.
There should'be a written scenario for the medical drill.
The development of this scenario would require State and local coordination.
Hamilton County, 1.
Poll agencies during briefings in the EOC for additional information.
2.
Provide pagers for key EOC personnel as a means-for reducing response time.
3.
Obtain additional space in the building where the EOC is located to house and feed EOC personnel during 24-hour-operations.
4.
Develop coordinated procedures to inform school officials prior to the release of information to the media concerning evacuation.
s 5.
Investigate the possibility of changing-the plans and procedures which initiate the evacuation of schools.
l l
l 4
)
l a
V.
APPENDICES A.
Evaluator List and Assignments B.
Exercise Objectives and Scenario I
I I
1 l
l l
I I
o---
1
I:
^
FEDERAL EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EXERCISE December 14-15, 1988 I
NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS DIVISION CHIEF Glenn C. Woodard (FEMA)
CHIEF EVALUATOR AND RAC IV CHAIRTRN John Heard (FEMA)
STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (SEOC) - NASHVILLE. TN Don Hammonds (FEMA)
I Elizabeth Post (USDA)
Chuck Wakamo (EPA)
Jon Richards (EPA)
STATE RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY - NASHVILLE, TN Walt Kisieleski (FEMA)
FIELD COORDINATING CENTER (FCC) - CHATTANOOGA, TN Larry Robertson (FEMA)
RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING CONTROL CENTER (RMCC) - CHATTANOOGA. TN Ray Boyett (FEMA)
JOINT INFORMATION CENTER (JIC) - CHATTANOOGA, TN I
Tom Hawkins (FEMA)
Jim Sutch (FEMA)
CENTRAL EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (CECC)
CHATTANOOGA, TN Bob Trojanowski (NRC)
RADIOLOGICAL FIELD MONITORING
{
Neil Gaeta (FEMA) 1 George Goforth (FEMA) 4 Caroline Herzenberg (FEMA)
Bill Knoerzer (FEMA)
Frank Wilson (FEMA)
Kevin Flynn (FEMA) l MEDICAL SERVICES (BRADLEY COUNTY)
Tom Carroll (FEMA)
Robert Perdue (FEMA)
TRANSPORTATION / FIELD ACTIVITIES Walt Lucas (DOT)
I.
l l
HAMILTON COUNTY (CHATTANOOGA, TN)
Bill McSwain (FEMA)
Al Hall (FEMA)
BRADLEY COUNTY (CLEVELAND, TN)
I Josh Moore (FEMA)
Al Lookabaugh (FEMA)
Linda Zander (FEMA)
I
h T(b i,*.-
l TENNESSEE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY l.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER l
MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE 3041 SIDCO ORIVE, P.O. BOX 41502 NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 372041502 (615) 252 3300 30 Sep 88 Mr. John Heard Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV I
1371 Peachtree Street, NE Suite 700 Atlanta, Georgia RE: State of Tennessee Objectives, 88 SQN Exercise I
Dear Mr. Heard:
Enclosed herewith is our official submittal of the Goals and Objectives of the State of Tennessee to be demonstrated during the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant exercise to be held Decen-I ber 14-15, 1988.
I If you have any
- comments, suggestions, or questions concerning these aims, please contact Matt McKnight or Jack Bixler in the FNF Planning Branch of TEMA.
Sincerely, et bLacy E Suiter I
Director.
Enclosure I
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1988 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT EXERCISE STATE OF TENNESSEE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES I
A full participation exercise will be conducted during the I
week of December 12, 1998 for the purpose of demonstrating an integrated radiological emergency response capability for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.
In addition to demonstrating the I
emergency response measures for the 10 mile plume exposure
- pathway, this exercise will place special emphasis upon the 50 mile ingestion pathway.
Both the State of Tennessee and the Tennessee Valley Author-ity have prepared separate lists of goals and objectives that pertain to their respective obligations.
However, both lists I
forth in the Multi-jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Res-reflect the necessary interactions of both entities as set ponse Plan for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.
The list of goals and objectives that will guide the State and local govern-ments are enumerated
- below, and have been written in accordance with Guidance Memorandum EX-3,
" Managing Pre-exercise Activities and Post-exercise Meetings".
I EXERCISE GOALS I
State and local government goals for this exercise are as follo,is:
1.
To allow state and local offsite personnel to test and practice their response capability in accordance with the SQN REP and REP implementing procedures to guide and I
protect the general public through the issuance of pro-tective action recommendations as appropriate.
2.
To ensure that deficiencies noted and recommended I
improvements have been corrected and/or implemented.
3.
To identify emergency response capabilities that are in l
need of improvement er revision.
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NUREG 0654 FEMA REP 1 REFERENCE GROUP A - CORE OBJECTIVES EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVELS (ECLs):
I D.3.4 1.
Demonstrate the ability of the Director of the State Emergency Operations Center to monitor and use emergency classification levels (ECLs) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities correspond-ing to each ECL.
The four ECLs are:
Notification of Unusual
- Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.
MOBILIZATION OF EMERGENCY PERSONNEL:
E.1, 2.
Demonstrate the ability of State and local E.2 Emergency Management Directors to fully alert,
- mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions.
DIRECTION AND CONTROL:
I A.1.d, 3.
Demonstrate the ability of State and local I
A.2.a Emergency Management DirectorE to
- direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities.
l COMMUNICATIONS:
I F
4.
Demonstrate the ability of the SEOC, FCC, (not F.1.f)
RMCC, and risk county EOCs to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, AND DISPLAYS:
G.3.a, 5.
Demonstrate the adequacy of all facilities I
I I
1
'and displays to support emergency operations.
- H. 2. 3 I
EMERGENCY WORKER EXPOSURE CONTROL:
I K.3.a.b 6.
Demonstrate the ability to continuously moni-tor and control emergency worker exposure.
FIELD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING:
l l
I.8, 7.
Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and i
I.11 procedures for determining field radiation i
measurements.
I.9 8.
Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and pro-I-
cedures for measurement of airborne radiciodine concentrations as low as 10-7 microcurie per cubic centimeter in the pres-ence of noble gases.
I-10 9.
Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses.
PLUME DOSE PROJECTION-I-10
- 10. Demonstrate the
- ability, within the plume I
public via plume exposure, based on plant and exposure
- pathway, to project dosage to the field data.
1 1
5 PLUME PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING:
J.10.m
- 11. Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate l
protective action decisions, based on projec-ted or actual
- dosage, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) protective action gui-delines (PAGs),
availability of adequate
- shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other I-relevant factors.
ALERT, NOTIFICATION, AND EMERGENCY INFORMATION:
1 I
E.6
- 12. Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the l
3 I
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public within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a
decision by appropriate State and/or local official (s).
E.5,
- 13. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the G.4.b formulation and dissemination of accurate I
information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification (A&N) has occurred.
G.3.a,
- 14. Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in G.4.a an accurate, coordinated, and timely manner.
I G.4.c
- 15. Demonstrate the ability to establish and oper-ate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion.
I GROUI B - SCENARIO-DEPENDENT OBJECTIVES I
USE OF h1 J.10.e.f
- 16. Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of potassium iodide (KI) to emergency workers and institutionalized I
- persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is
- made, if necessitated by radioiodine releases.
J.10.f
- 17. Demonstrate the ability to make the
- decision, if the State plan so specifies, to recommend I
the use of KI for the general public, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distri-bute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiciodine releases.
j IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS:
f J.9,
- 10. Demonstrate the equipment and resources 10.d.g necessary to implement appropriate protective J
I actions for the impacted plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent persons), special needs populations, handicapped persons, and I
institutionalized persons.
J.9,
- 19. Demonstrate the ability and resources I
I I
1
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J.10 9
'necessary to implement appropriate protective l
I actions for school children within the plume l
EPZ.
T_R%FFIC CONTROL:
I-J.10.j.k
- 20. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacu-ated and sheltered areas.
I RELOCATION CENTERS (REGISTRATION, MONITORING, CONGREGATE CARE, AND DECONTAMINATION):
J.12
- 21. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, I-facilities, equipment, and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees.
J.10.h
- 22. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equip-
- ment, and personnel for congregate care of evacuees.
I MEDICAL SERVICES (TRANSPORTATION AND FACILITIES):
L.4
- 23. Demonstrate the adequacy of
- vehicles, equip-I
- ment, procedures,and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured, or exposed individuals.
L.1
- 24. Demonstrate the adequacy of medical facili-
- ties, equipment procedures, and personnel for handling contaminated,
- injured, or exposed I
individuals.
DECONTAMINATION:
K.5.a.b
- 25. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equip-I
- ment, supplies, procedures, and personnel for decontamination of emergency
- workers, equip-ment, and vehicles, and for waste disposal.
4 I
OTHER OBJECTIVES I
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~
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l.,
l SUPPLEMENTARY ASSISTANCE (FEDERAL /OTHER):
i I
C.l.a.b
- 26. Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and to call upon Federal and other outside l
support agencies for assistance.
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INGESTION EXPOSUBE PATHWAY:
I I.8,
- 27. Demonstrate the appropriate use of equipment J.11 and procedures for collection and transport of samples of vegetation, food crops, milk, meat, I
poultry, water, and animal feeds (indigenous to the area and stored).
I C.3,
- 28. Demonstrate the appropriate laboratory J.11 operations and procedures for measuring and analyzing samples of vegetation, food crops, milk, meat, poultry, water, and animal feeds I
(indigenous to the area and stored).
I.10, J.11 29. Demonstrate the ability to project dosage to I
the public for ingestion pathway exposure and determine appropriate protective
- measures, based on field data, FDA PAGs, and other rele-vant factors.
J.9, J.11
- 30. Demonstrate the ability to implement both preventive and emergency protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards.
RECOVERY, RE-ENTRY, AND RELOCATION:
M.4
- 31. Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposure.
M.1
- 32. Demonstrate the ability to determine appro-priate measures for controlled re-entry and recovery based on estimated total population
M.1
- 33. Demonstrate the ability to implement appropriate measures for controlled re-entry and recovery.
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I TENNESSEE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF TENNESSEE 3041 SIDCO DRIVE. P.O. BOX 41502 I
NASHVILLE. TENNESSEE 372041502 (615) 252 3300 28 ocT 88 l
I Mr. John Heard Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV I
1371 Peachtree Street, NE Suite 700 Atlanta, Georgia RE: State of Tennessee Scenario--88 SON Exercise I
Dear Mr. Heard:
Enclosed herewith is our official submittal of the Offsite scenario to be demonstrated during the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant exercise to be held December 14-1-5, 1988.
- Also, a
I listing of the recommended Evaluator / Controller Points.
Every effort will be made to coordinate the field activities in order to keep the number of evaluators to a minimum As I
i soon as the schedule is
- complete, we will forward the information to you.
If you have any comments, suggestions, or questions concern ing these aims, please contact Matt McKnight or Jack Bixler in the FNF Planning Branch of TEMA.
9
- cerely, w
c or.
l Enclosure 1
I i
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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT 1988 FULL PARTICIPATION EXERCISE DECEMBER 14-15, 1988 I
OFFSITE RESPONSE NARRATIVE NOTE:
This exercise will extend over a
two (2) day I
period.
The events that occur in the postulated accident described in the plant scenario necessi-tate the activation ~
of the Tennessee I
Multi-jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Res-ponse Plan (MJRERP) for the Segouyah Nuclear Plant at approximately 0900 on December 14, 1988.
On the first
- day, the State and local governments will I
demonstrate their ability to effectively protect the public within the 10 mile EPZ from the affects of an accidental radiological release from the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant that exceeds EPA Protective I
Action Guides.
During the course of the second day i
(December 15, 1988),
players will perform tasks that wetid probably occur on the fourth day after I
the ons9t of an accidental release that results in a radioactive plume deposition beyond the 10 mile EPZ into the 50 mile IPZ.
Activities that would take place on days 2 and 3 will be simulated inso-I' far as actual sampling is concerned. However, field monitoring data, that theoretically would have been collected on the second and third days, will be I
inserted into the play on Day "Four" that will require the assessment team / decision makers to determine which evacuated areas are safe for reentry, and any areas outside the 10 mile EPZ that I
are unsafe for habitation and/or where restrictions on the consumption of human foods and/or animal feeds should be initiated.
Due to the severity of the postulated accident that drives the activities in this scenario, the time line may vary due to the fact that the plant Emer-I gency Action Levels (EAL) for declaring Emergency Classification Levels (ECL) are judgment calls, and the Site Emergency Director (SED) may elect to ele-I vate the ECL at an earlier time than indicated herein.
Controllers should study the insertion time of each control message, and be sure that the proper ECL is announced before introducing it into I
the play of the exercise.
DAY "ONE" 1
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- 14 DEC 88 I
0830-0900 EST ALERT PLANT CONDITIONS:
I Unit #1 is at 100% power.
- 1B-B Centrifugal Charg ing Pump (CCP) is tagged out for maintenance. The
.I pump is expected to return to service in another 8
hours.
I Unit #2 is in a refueling outage with fuel being loaded into the reactor.
The Primary Water Storage Tank (PWST) valve is tagged and disassembled for repair.
The exercise begins with a
postulated explosion from unknown sources that ruptures both the Refuel-ing Water Storage Tank (RWST) and Primary Water I
Storage Tank (PWST) on Unit
- 1.
The operators begin a normal shutdown.
An ALERT is declared by the Site Emergency Director (SED) based on confir-I med damage to olant equipment that affects plant safety and he notifies the Operations Duty Special-ist (ODS) at TVA's Central Emergency Control Center (CECC).
The ODS notifies the Tennessee Emergency I
Management Agency (TEMA) Operations Officer (TEMA
- 00) by ringdown telephone.
I STATE RESPONSE:
The State's offsite response begins when the TEMA 00 is notified by the ODS that an ALERT has been declared at the Plant.
After the call from the ODS I
is verified by a return call, the TEMA 00 notifies the Director of TEMA, and using the notification checklist extracted from Annex B of the SON MJRERP, and contained in TEliA Operations
- SOPS, notifies I
the appropriate agencies and personnel for this Emergency Classification Level (ECL).
The Director of TEMA reports to the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC),
if not already at that location, and may selectively man that facility.
Other discretionary actions that the Director may I
take are:
A.
Prompt Notification System (PNS):
I 2
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The PNS consists of 100 fixed sirens, that I
are capable of emitting a warning signal of at least 60 db throughout the entire 10 mile EPZ.
Actual or simulated activation of the PNS throughout this exercise is at the discre-tion of the Director of the SEOC.
If the I
system is activated at this point, it uma include the actual activatien of the sirens but will include notification to I
the EBS and NOAA radio networks to play the recorded
" Test Alert" tape that has been pre-distributed to all stations in the area.
(In a real event, the actual I
" Alert" tape would be broadcast.)
As noted previously, as events unfold in this scenario that would require public protec-I tive
- actions, the Director may choose to actually. activate the sirens in order to corroborate the effectiveness of the new siren installation, and confirm the capa-I bility of the EBS to broadcast information to the public in a timely manner.
I B.
Limited activation of the
l LOCAL RESPONSE:
The Cleveland /Bradley Co. and Chattanooga / Hamilton Co.
EM Directors notify the County Executives and Mayors of municipalities within the 10 mile EPZ and I
essential response staff and volunteers.
The County EOCs may be selectively manned at this time if the Directors so desire.
I 0900-0930 EST I
PLANT CONDITIONS:
Shutdown has continued normally for about 30 minu tes when a 60 gpm tube leak begins in the #1 Steam Generator (SG).
When the leak is recognized and I
identified the
- 1 SG is isolated.
Plant cooldown to cold shutdown is started.
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STATE RESPONSE:
I Contact between the CECC and the SEOC is maintain I
ed, and the Director of TEMA is continuously upd-ated on the situation by the CECC. He consults with DRH and other essential staif at the SEOC to assess the situation and determine if actions taken, inso-far as mobilization of personnel is concerned, are sufficient and if any protective actions for the public should be initiated.
The fact that no sig-
,E nificant release to the environment has occurred 3
will probably preclude any further actions other than continuing to mobilize, or place on
- standby, essential response personnel to ensure that they I
will be on hand or readily available should plant conditions worsen.
LOCAL RESPONSE:
The SEOC maintains contact with the Risk County EOCs and keeps the EM Directors apprised of condi-tions as they are reported to the SEOC.
Like the I
- SEOC, the local Directors continue to mobilize essential personnel and place others on standby status.
I 1000 EST SITE AREA EMERGFt* '
PLANT CONDITIONS:
As cooldown is continued, the SG tube leak increases until it reaches about 600 gpm.
A Site Area Emergency is declared based on primary leakage I
greater than makeup pump capacity.
Efforts to obtain makeup water to the primary system are unsuccessful with the Unit #1 RWST and PWST empty.
I STATE RESPONSE:
When SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared, the CECC will notify the SEOC Director of the upgrade in the ECL.
The SEOC Director will order the full activation of I
the SEOC, FCC, JIC, and RMCC if he has not done so.
The TEMA 00, using the notification checklist for i
this ECL will notify all persons, agencies, depart-
{
ments and/or organizations that have a role in the I
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O k*
response.
Those persons assigned to the SEOC and other ' State field EOCs will report immediately to their assigned post.
(In cases where an agency or department has numerous personnel involved in the response, contact will be made with a
designated individual who will initiate a pyramiding system of phone calls to notify all persons in their respec-tive organizations and place on
- standby, or instruct them to report to their assigned duty sta-tions.)
DRH and TVA field monitoring team members will be instructed to assemble at the RMCC for instruc-tions.
They will be dispatched from there to various locations as the situation requires.
When in place, the field monitoring teams will provide offsite monitoring data to the RMCC.
This data is provided to both the DRH assessment team at the SEOC and TVA's team at the
- CECC, and a joint assessment is made.
TVA will make recommendations for offsite protective actions for the public to the SEOC if justified by the assessment of the I
field monitoring data.
If these protective action recommendations are confirmed as being necessary by
Soon after being notified of the SITE AREA EMER-
- GENCY, the Director of TEMA will order the activation of the Prompt Notification System (PNS) sirens.
The EBS and NOAA radio networks, having been placed on standby status at the ALERT
- stage, will make announcements to the public as requested.
I The Tennessee Department of Agriculture (TDA) assesses the need for protecting dairy animals and milk processing plants.
TDA, in coordination with the JIC should release "get ready" instructions to the agricultural community.
The
- TWRA, USCG, and volunteers will provide notification to commercial and civilian river traffic, and the US Army Corps I
of Engineers will be requested to close the Watts Bar and Chickamauga Dam locks.
Those persons in parks and recreation areas along the river will be notified in the same manner as the river traffic.
Ingress into the EPZ will be restricted.
All State emergency response personnel, Emergency Service Coordinators (ESCs), and Public Information Officers (PIOS) assemble at the SEOC, JIC, FCC, and RMCC.
All field forces remain in place and on I
standby.
The
- JIC, through issuance of news releases and holding press conferences, keeps the public and the media informed of conditions at the plant and any other information concerning the 5
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- safety of the citizens in the area.
I LOCAL RESPONSE:
The Bradley and Hamilton County EM Directors are informed of the ECL upgrade.
They fully activate I
the county EOCs.
Department heads pre-position staff and equipment as required.
The Sheriffs notify and coordinate all necessary support person-nel and resources (municipal police, THP, fire, rescue squads, etc.).
Traffic Assist Teams (TATS) are notified and placed on standby.
School Super-intendents and their transportation staffs are I
notified.
The Chattanooga Area Regional Transit Authority (CARTA) is notified that buses may be required for evacuation of the general public.
Host county EM Directors are similarly notified and
- they, in turn, notify school principals, local ARC representatives, local Human Services Department personnel, and radiological screening and deconta-mination teams to be ready to open shelters on a
moments notice.
1000-1030 EST PLANT CONDITIONS:
An atmospheric relief valve on #1 SG fails fully open.
This results in a blowdown of the SG, and because of the tube leak, a loss of primary system inventory.
I STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE:
Deteriorating conditions, and the possibility of a
I core melt situation developing at the plant, should cause State and local officials to heighten the state-of-readiness by increasing the pace of mobil-ization and positioning response personnel and I
equipment at strategic locations in the field.
At this point, an evacuation of the "Near Site Area" (Sectors A-1, B-1, C-1, and D-1) could be ordered, based on the potential of major core damage.
Briefings will be held periodically at all EOCs in order to keep personnel apprised of conditions and I
give an opportunity for each to review the actions taken and determine if they are sufficient, or if further steps should be initiated to ensure the safety of the public should plant conditions con-I e
o tinue t.o deteriorate.
1100 EST GENERAL EMERGENCY PLANT CONDITIONS:
Plant conditions continue to deteriorate, and the probability of a
core melt situation developing, coupled with the SG tube leak and containment breach through the failed atmospheric relief valve, the SED declares a GENERAL EMERGENCY.
STATE RESPONSE:
The SEOC is notified of the ECL upgrade to GENERAL EMERGENCY and of the radiological release.
Due to the magnitude of the release, and the core melt situation in progress, TVA and DRH recommend to the Director of TEMA that the "Near Site Area" (Sectors A-1, B-1, C-1, and D-1) be evacuated immediately.
The Director notifies the Governor of the worsening situation and, coupled with the advice from TVA and DRH, requests that the Governor declare a. " State of Emergency".
The Governer ccncurs in the evaluation of the situation, makes the declaration of a " State of Emergency",
and orders the recommended evacu-ation.
DRH and TVA assess the need for further evacuation and/or sheltering downwind from the plant and continue to assess field monitoring results and make appropriate recommendations.
Pluma tracking commences and field teams are dis-patched to selected areas, continuing to report to the RMCC at 15 minute intervals.
TDA orders the sheltering of dairy animals within the "Near Site Area" and assesses the need for the same or other protective actions in other areas of the 10 mile EPZ.
l All State and local offsite responders are activ-ated and positioned at the FCC, County EOCs, and field locations.
The JIC continues to provide the media with inform-ation regarding conditions at the Plant, evacuation i
status, and other public information.
LOCAL RESPONSE:
7
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The Bradley and Hamilton County EM Directors proceed with implementing the evacuation plans for the affected sectors.
All local responders are I
activated or remain on standby.
The Sheriff dis-l patches personnel to man critical roadblocks, assist in an orderly evacuation along controlled routes, and provide security to the evacuated area.
I If additional personnel are required, the Sheriff l
will coordinate the request for, and assignment of the additional responders from other organizations I
(THP, municipal police, rescue squads, etc).
Traf-fic Assist Teams (TATS) will be dispatched to predetermined locations along the evacuation routes to assist motorists where necessary.
The County I-Road Departments, assisted by TDOT personnel and equipment, set up road barricades at predetermined locations in the affected area.
The American Red Cross (ARC) mans shelters as i
- needed, and begins : heir evacuee locator service.
The ARC staff is assisted by personnel of the I
Department of Human Services and other volunteer organizations in managing shelters.
Shelter Information Points (SIPS) are established at prede-termined points on the controlled evacuation routes to direct those evacuees needing assistance to the appropriate shelter.
The EMS simulates transport-ation of non-ambulatory evacuees in need of transportation and responds to any accident or incident requiring transportation of injured vic-tims.
I 1145-1215 EST PLANT CONDITIONS:
I Severe core damage is occurring resulting in a
major release to the atmosphere through the atmos-pheric release valve.
It is postulated that the I
reactor fuel will become uncovered, and about 30 percent fuel damage will occur.
I STATE RESPONSE:
When the Director of the SEOC is notified of core damage occuring and the probability of an increase in the radiation levels being released to the envi-
.I.
rons through the leaking safety
- valve, in all probability, after taking into consideration the current wind speed and direction, he will order the evacuation of the entire 10 mile EPZ on the east I
8
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side of the river if this action has not previously I
been ta' ken.
LOCAL RESPONSE:
Simultaneously with the extended evacuation, the I
local EM officials would dispatch additional per-sonnel to insure a smooth traffic
- flow, request assistance from the State and other agencies where I
required, review the system of roadblocks and secu-rity measures previously established and initiate actions to provide protection for the expanded Additional shelters would be opened in Brad-I ley,. Hamilton, and Meigs counties.
area.
1300-1330 EST PLANT CONDITIONS:
I Alignment is made to provide makeup water from Unit
- 2, and water is being pumped into the Unit #1 Reactor Coolant System (RCS).
While attempts are being made at the Plant to repair the malfunctioning equipment and stop the release, communications between'the CECC and SEOC and between the SEOC and local EOCs are maintained, with information and updates being shared by all responsible authorities.
The public and media are I
continuously given updates at the JIC.
The SEOC continues to coordinate with local EM officials in providing personnel and equipment support as required.
State and TVA Field Monitoring Teams I
continue plume tracking, and the monitoring data received is plotted and assessed by TVA and DRH in an attempt to determine the actual location of the I
plume footprint and any "hotspots" in the affected area.
1330-1400 EST Vessel inventory is restored and the core is covered.
1400-1430 EST The RCS is at atmospheric pressure with the core covered.
I 1430-1500 EST TERMINATION OF RELEASE II I
e I
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)
The failed open relief valve recloses, terminating the release.
i I
At this point, the Plant reports to the CECC that the release has been terminated.
The CECC, in turn, notifies the SEOC.
Recovery plans are for-mulated, and recovery begins at this time.
DRH and TVA begin post-accident sampling and field monitoring throughout the affected downwind sec-I tors.
Background
radiation measurements are performed to determine areas where safe reentry is possible.
I Field monitoring data indicates that plume deposi-tion occurred beyond the,1.0 mile EPZ and reached into Meigs and Rhea Counties.
TDA and DRH begin I
extensive. sampling of dairy farms and milk process-ing plants in the affected area and continue to assess the need for protective actions fc'. dairy cattle.
Additionally, samples of vegetation, soil, water, and crops are taken for laboratory analysis.
Following several hours of recovery operations
' Ii after cessation of the release, exercise activities are put on " hold" until 0800 the following day.
All workers are relieved of duty and essential com-munications and response functions are placed on
' standby until that time.
I DAY "TWO" (SIMULATED ACTIVITY):
All State and local EOCs will be staffed by essen I
tial personnel.
All roadblocks and security measu-res established at the beginning of the evacuation will be maintained by local officials.
The JIC I
will be operational to keep the public and media informed of any decisions to allow reentry and to disseminate any protective actions that should be initiated, maintained, or relaxed.
Field monitoring teams continue to track and define the "foceprint" of the plume.
Those areas that I
were not under the plume and were evacuated as a
precautionary measure will be given first priority for reentry.
If no contamination is detected the residents will be permitted to return to their I
homes.
Any area that is cleared for reentry will be described by specific geographic boundaries, and roadblocks will be relocated to prevent entry into those areas where entry is still prohibited.
Noti-10 I
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i fication to the public of the decision to allow reentry into certain areas will be disseminated through the JIC, announced over the
- EBS, and the information given out at appropriate shelters.
As tracking and plotting of the plume deposition more accurately defines areas that received no contamination, or that contamination is so low that I
they are now safe for habitation, reentry of those residents will be permitted.
i TDA and DRH sampling teams continue to take samples for laboratory analysis to determine the extent and degree of contamination.
Relying on the laboratory data provided, TDA will take steps to control human I
and animal feeds in those areas where analysis results indicate radiological levels are above acceptable standards for human or animal consump-tion.
l DAY "THREE" (SIMULATED ACTIVITY):
I Activities on the third day will essentially be the I
same as day two.
All State and local EOCs, includ-ing the
- JIC, would be staffed by essential personnel.
Field Monitoring Teams would continue to define the actual plume " footprint" and locate "hotspots" that are unsafe for habitation.
Any "hotspots" so iden-I tified will be posted to deny access.
Aress on the perimeter of the plume in which entry had pre-viously been prohibited that may have become safe through natural decay of radioactivity will be sur-
- veyed, and if determined to be safe, reentry will be permitted.
1 DAY "FOUR" 15 DEC 88 0800 EST Play of the exercise will resume with a briefing to all personnel at the SEOC, FCC, RMCC, JIC, local EOCs, and TVAs CECC.
In addition to a statement on I
current plant conditions, the briefing vill consist 4
of notjng PAGs initiated,
- relaxed, or rescinded I
during days one, two, and three; an in depth des-cription of those areas that have been cleared fo:
re-habitation and those where radiation levels ar9 still known to be a hazard; and will cover activi-ties that were simulated on days two and three, 1
including the location of the plume footprint, and l
11 I
us
.I, on the results of simulated laboratory tests of sam-ples taken.
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the I
sample collection and transport system; the ability of the state laboratory to analyze samples and relay the results to the proper authorities; and the capability of the assessment teams and decision I
- makers, environmental sample
- taking, transport-ation, and repositioned sample analysis will run concurrently on the second day of the exercise (Day "Four" in this scenario).
The sample collection procedures, transportation, and laboratory analysis will be conducted on a I
"real time" basis.
Field teams will collect milk samples and deliver them to the sample staging area at the state garage in the affected county.
The I
samples will then be picked up by a courier and taken to the sample collection point at the RMCC where samples from different counties will be acr'-
mulated for equal distribution to avail;ble I
laboratories.
In this demonstration, the sar ples will be taken by car to the state laboratory in Nashville.
Upon arrival of the samples, laboratory I
personnel will make an analysis, after which the controller will insert a simulated result.
These results will then be telephoned to the assessment team at the
- SEOC, thus completing the collection / transportation / analysis / result circuit.
The capabilities of the assessment / decision making I
process will be demonstrated during a compressed time situation running concurrently with the "real time" activities, i.e.,
the controller at the laboratory will have repositioned samples and pre-I determined analysis results that will be given to laboratory personnel upon completion of the sample tests.
This information will then be relayed by I
laboratory personnel to the assessment team at the SEOC at times specified by the controller.
- Thus, the decision makers will have sufficient inform-ation to arrive at the proper conclusion regarding PAGs for the public.
EXERCISE TERMINATION A definite time for termination of the exercise I
depends on several factors, not the least of which is the time required for movement of samples through the entire procedure of collection, tran-sport, and analysis.
Therefore, the exercise will 12 E
]
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e
?,,.
.s
not be terminated.until all tasks such as sample I
collection,' transport, analysis, assessment of ana-i lysis
- results, and PAG decision making is
)
completed.
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