ML20247N720

Advises of OGC Opinion in Licensing Issue & Enforcement Action.Gdc Legally Binding on Licensee in Absence of Approved Alternative Design Basis

ML20247N720
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	08/04/1988
From:	Lieberman J NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE)
To:	Davis A, Grace J, Russell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20247N685	List: IA-89-108, Discusses Evaluation of Loss of DHR Events for Escalated Enforcement ML20247N680 ML20247N720 ML20247N734 ML20247N774 ML20247N791 ML20247N823 ML20247N919
References
FOIA-89-108 EGM-88-07, EGM-88-104, EGM-88-7, NUDOCS 8904060304
Download: ML20247N720 (2)

Text

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MEMORANDUM FOR: William T. Russell, Regional Administrator, Region I j J. ?lelson Grace, Regional Administrator, Region II l A. Bes ;. Davis, Regional Administrator, Region III l

) Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region IV l John B. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region V j i

rROM: James Lieberman, Director i Office of Enforcement l

SUBJECT:

USE OF 10 CFR PART 50 APPENDIX A, GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA (GDC', AS THE BASIS FOR AN ENFORCEMENT ACTION Recently the Office of the General Counsel (0GC) rendered en opinion o,.

licensing issue and an enforcement action (Fermi EA 88-104) which has implications in the enforcement area. Specifically, it is OGC's opinion that the GDC are legally binding on a licensee in the absence of an approved alternative design basis. As background material, we have attached the Notice of Violation issued to Fermi as an enclosure.

In the past, we have not been pursuing violations based solely on the GDCs.

Flow, however, given OGC's legal position, broader use of the GDC may be appropriate.

b Clearly, in those cases where an apparent violation can be tied to an explicit NRC regulation (other than the GDC), the plant Technical Specifications, or plant procedures, the Notice of Violation should be constructed on such a basis. In those few cases where an explicit requirement does not exist, consideration should be given to use of the GDC. Of course, some of the GDC are more prescriptive than others, i.e., specifying particular numerical standards that must be achieved or system configuration requirements rather than broad performance standards. We should endeavor to use in enforcement actions only those GDC that include specific criteria in order to avoid protracted debate with the licensee about whether the GDC were met or not.

In summary, the GDC are legally binding on the licensee in the absence of an approved alternative method of compliance. Some of the GDC are more useful in an enforcement context as they are very specific as to the requirements to be met. With prior consultation with this office, GDC's can be used in Motices of Violation provided more specific plant requirements are not available.

A ur -

James Lieberman, Director

Enclosure:

As stated Office of Enforcement cc: L. Chandler, 0GC F. Miraglia, NRR 8904060304 090403 PDR FDIA UNNERST8? .108 PDH

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NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES l

Docket No. 50-341 The Detroit Edison Company . License No. NPF-43 Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant .EA 88-104 - l Unit 2 18, 1987 to March 31, 1988, and During NRC inspections conducted on Octoberviolations of NRC requirements were identified.

January 17 to April 26, 1988, In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR, Part 2, Appendix C (1988), the Nuclear Regulatory (camission proposes to impose civil penalties pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205.

The particular violations and associated civil penalties are set forth below:

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 56 requires, in part,

]( A. that each line that connects directly to the containment atmosphere and penetrates primary reactor containment shall be provided with containment isolation valves both inside and outside primary containment unless it can be demonstrated that the containment isolation provisions for a ,

specific class of lines, such as instrument lines, are acceptable on "

some other defined basis.

Contrary to the abcve, as of October 17, 1987, the containment isolation im configuration for the primary containment radiation monitoring (PCRM) system violated the requirements of General Design Criteria 56 in that containment isolation valves were not provided on the system lines both inside and outside primary containment and this configuration was not accepted on some other defined basis.

This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).

Civil Penalty - $100,000.

B.1, With the unit in Modes 1, 2, or 3, Technical Specification Limiting Condition fee Operation Action Statement 3 7.2.b.2 requires that if a Control Room Emergency Filtration System flowpath damper is inoperable for seven days, the unit be placed in HOT SHUTOOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN in the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Technical Specification 1.25 defines a system, subsystem, train, component, or device to be OPERABLE or-having OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified functions and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, electrical power, cooling or seal water, lubrication, or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, cot ponent, or device to perform its function (s) are also capable of performing their related support functions.

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