ML20247N774

Advises That Oct 1988 Rev to Enforcement Policy Was Extensively Rewritten to Provide Addl Examples of Violations to Distinguish More Clearly Between Severity Levels & Allow More Flexibility in Assigning Severity Levels

ML20247N774
Person / Time
Issue date:	11/16/1988
From:	Lieberman J NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE)
To:	Davis A, Ernst M, Russell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20247N685	List: IA-89-108, Discusses Evaluation of Loss of DHR Events for Escalated Enforcement ML20247N680 ML20247N720 ML20247N734 ML20247N774 ML20247N791 ML20247N823 ML20247N919
References
FOIA-89-108 EGM-88-09, EGM-88-9, NUDOCS 8904060322
Download: ML20247N774 (5)

Text

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o UNITED STATES g

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y p, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISClON r,

j WASHtNGTON, D. C. 20555 j

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NOV 161988 EGM 88-09 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Will(am T. Russell, Regional Administrator, RI Malcom L. Ernst, Acting Regional Administrator, RII A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator. RIII 1

Robert D. Martin, Regional Adtninistrator, RIV l

John B. Martin, Regional Administrator, RV James G. Portlow, Director, Office of Special Projects FROM:

James Lieberman, Ofrector j

Office of Enforcement j

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SUBJECT:

REVIEW BY THE OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT OF SAFEGUARDS 1

ENFORCEMENT PACKAGES SUBJECT TO THE REVISED POLICY In the October 1988 revision to the Enforcement Policy, Supplement III (Safeguards) was extensively rewritten to (1) provide additional examples of violations tn distinguish more clearly between the severity levels, and (2) allow mere flexibility in assigning severity levels to access control violations.

As a result of this, violations that may have been Severity Level III under the old policy may now t,e Severity Level IV, due to an analysis that includes factors such as ease of exploitation.

This new approach attaches some weight vulnerability (potential saboteur could have predicted the occurrence of th to whether the a pathway that would allow access to a controlled area (" identifiability"),

j and the likelihood of successful penetration (" ease of passage"). Each of these factors must be considered in assessing the severity level of access control violations in the future and the Region's recommendation should include a discussion of them.

Enclesure 1 provides additional guidance in the use of these terms in assessments of severity level.

Reg 16nal Enforcernent Coordinators should carefully review tM r.hanges to the policy and the Commission Paper which proposed the revision (SECY 88-226) and brief Regional safeguards staffs as necessary on the impac'c of these changes on their findings.

Until we have had some experience with the new policy, the Enforcement Coordinators are expected to advise OE of all violationt that would have been Severity Level III under the old policy but which are now considered Severity Level IV. These violations should be forwarded to OE for review (5-day concurrent.e) and should be accompanied by an analysis that describes the ease of exploitation factors and reasons why the violation should now be considered a Severity Level IV.

When we have had some experience in the application of the new policy, prior concurrence by OE will not be required and the Regions aay issue the Severity Level IVs at, they would issue other Motices of Violation at that level.

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V 161988 1

Multiple Addressees i i

if.there are any questions on this matter, call Dick Rosano (492-6/40).

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,& me' ames Lieberman, Director-ffice of Enforcement

Enclosure:

As Stated cc: ' J. M. Taylor, DEDRO D. J. Holcdy, Region I G. R. Jenkins, Region II J. A. Grobe, Region III G. Sanborn, Region IV A. D. Johnson, Region Y q

R. P. Rosano, OE

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J. H. Joyner, Region I W. E. Cline, Region'If B. C. Mallett, Region III B. Murray, Region IV J. L. Montgomery, Region V L. J. Chandler, OGC R. A. Erickson, NRR 7

B. Zalcman, OSP l

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NOV 161988 i

Hultiple Addressess [

If there are any questions on this matter, call Dick Rosano (492-0740).

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OriginalSinned By James Lieberman Jares Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement

Enclosure:

'As Stated

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cc:

J. M. Taylor, DEDRO D. J. Holody, Region I G. R. Jenkins, Region II J. A. Grobe, Region III G. Sanborn, Region IV A. D. Johnson, Region V J. H. Joyner, Region I

.W. E. Cline, Region II B. C. Hallett, Region III B. Nurray, Region IV l

J. L. Montgomery, Region V 4

L. J. Chandler, 000 R. A. Erickson, NRR B. Zatanan, OSP DISTRIBUTION:

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RRosano, OE Day Fi H.

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i Guidance on Applying Ease of Exploitation Factors to Considerations of Severity Level i

for Access Control Violations Identifiability, t, predictability, and ease of passage are the factors that must be considered in assessing significance and severity level for access control violations. Each must be considered separately, then the results of the analysis combined to determine the overall severity of the violation.

Identifiability i

This refers to the ease with which a person not authorized access to an area l

i could detect a path into that area that would allow him/her to enter.

Equipent/ facility violations:

If an opening is obstructed by ductwork or cables, hidden behind ceiling tiles, or below the water line (e g., at intake structures), it is less likely to be identified than an opening that is in plain sight.

Procedural violations: Opening all vital area doors when the computer system fails is more easily identifiable as a weakness than opening a single door, personnel v1olations: Assigning unar'hed individuals to compensatory posts is more easily identifiable as a weakness than assigning armed individuals with insufficient amunition.

Predictability This refers to the likelihood that a person not authorized access to an area could predict when the vulnerability would exist.

Equipment / facility violations: An opening in a barrier that has existed for a week is more predictable than is an opening that was discovered only moments af ter being. created.

I Procedural violations: A practice of assigning temporary keycards (that allow access to all vital areas) to an individual who leaves his/her keycard at home (including those not authorized access to the vital area) is easily f

predictable as a pathway into the vital area, Personnel violations: A guard who sleeps every time s/he goes on post (or a guard force working very long nours and prone to dozing) is more predictable than an isolated incident of sleeping.

Ease of Passage This refers to, among other things, the physical configuration of the vulnerability and whether the opening is such that it would allow an unauthorized individual to actually gain access to the area.

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Equipment / facility violations: An opening in'a wall that separates the i

vital area from the protected area is more easily exploited than a pipe 1

of the same diameter that is ten or twelve feet long, particularly if the pipe has several bends in it or'is otherwise impassable. Similarly, a pipe with continuous flushing or high pressure areas may be less exploitable thar a pipe that is free of physical or operational impediments.

(See Information Notice 86-83 for additional discussion of thic h etor.)

Procedural violations: Guards posted as compensatory measures at open

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i vital area doors who check individuals into the area with an up-to-date list but without checking their badges is a mere easily exploitable violation than a guard posted with en out-of-date authorization list who does check the badges.

-l Personnel violations:

An unarmed guard is a more easily exploitable f

vulnerability than is an armed guard who falls asleep.

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