ML20247L358

Proposed Tech Specs Re Limiting Condition for Operation & Surveillance Requirements for Control Rod Insertion Limits, Boron Control,Peak LHGR & Xenon Redistribution Multiplier

ML20247L358
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	09/14/1989
From:	YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20247L354	List: ML20247L348 ML20247L358
References
NUDOCS 8909220189
Download: ML20247L358 (26)

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ATTACEMENT 1 REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES w2mHg PDn u8 % F Di p ,

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' DEFINITIONS I

PURCE - PURGING I 1.32 PURGE or PURGING is the controlled process of discharging air or gas j l from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration,  !

or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is required to putify the confinement.

MEMBER (S) OF THE PUBLIC 1.33 MEMBER (S) 0F THE PUBLIC shall include all persons who are not occupationally associated with the plant. This category does not include employees of the utility, its contractors, or vendors. Also excluded from this category are persons who enter the site to service. equipment or to make deliveries. 'ihis category does include persons who use portions of the site for recreauvaal, occupational, or other purposes not associated with the production of electricity.

SITE BOUNDARY 1.34 The SITE BOUNDARY shall be that line beyond which the land is not owned, leased, or otherwise controlled by the licensee. Any area within the site boundary used for residential quarters or recreational purposes shall be considered to be beyond the site boundary for purposes of meeting gaseous 1 effluent dose specifications. (Realistic occupancy factors shall be applied at these locations for the purposes of dose calculations.)

SOLIDIFICATION 1.35 SOLIDIFICATION shall be the conversion of wet wastes int o a fonn that meets shipping and burial ground requirements.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT 1.36 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT - This report is the unit-specific document that provides the core operating limits for the current operating reload cycle. These cycle-specific operating limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 6.9.4. Plant operation within these operating limits is addressed in individual specifications.

YANKEE-ROWE 1-6 Amendment No. 80 4

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

- ' LIMITING' CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) 1; bi The' SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement.of Specification 3.1.1.1.1 is determined at least one per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and L . . . .

c.' A power distribution map is obtained from the incore detection system and Fq and'F N AH are verified to.

be within their limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

'd. The THERMAL POWER level is reduced'to 175% of RATED' THERMAL POWER within one hour and within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> the Power Range and Intermediate Power Range

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l Neutron Flux high trip setpoint is reduced to 1108% of the 75% of' allowable THERMAL POWER, or

e. The remainder of the rods in the group with the inoperable rod are aligned to within 18 inches of the inoperable rod within one hour while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion' limits as specified.in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT. The THERMAL POWER level' l shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.5 during subsequent' operation.

SURVEI11ANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.1.1 The position'of each control rod shall be determined.to be within the limit by verifying the individual rod positions at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

4.1.3.1.2 Each control rod not fully inserted shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 4 inches.in any one' direction at least once per 31' days.

4.1.3.1.3. The maximum reactivity insertion rate due to withdrawal of the highest worth control rod group shall be determined not to exceed 1.5 x 10-4 Ak/k per second at least once per 18 months.

3/4 1-24 YANKEE-ROWE Amendment No. 77, 122 9 a

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s REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSIEMS i

l CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITS LiliITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 4 3.1.3.5 The control groups shall be limited in physical insertion as specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*#.

ACTION:

With the control groups inserted beyond the above insertion limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, either:

a. Restore the control groups to within the 11m3.ts within two hours, or

b. Reduce THERMAL POWER within two hours to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the group position, or

c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.5' The position of each control group shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

• See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.2 and 3.10.4.

1. With Keff.11.0.

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i YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 1-28 Amendment No. 77

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YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 1-29 Amendment Nos. 43, 69, 77

J 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMIIS ,

PEAK LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE LI!iITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.1 The peak linear heat generation rate (LHCR) shall not exceed the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT during steady-state operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With the peak LEGR e:teeeding the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT:

a. Within 15 minutes reduce THERMAL POWER to not more than that fraction of the RATED THERMAL POWER as expressed below:

Fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER = Peak Ful Pw LHGR

b. Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> reduce the Power Range and Intermediate Power Range Neutron Flux high trip setpoint to 1108% of the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIR12iENTS 4.2.1.1 The peak LHGR shall be determined to be within the limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT using the incore detection system to obtain a power distribution map;

a. Prior to initial operation above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, and

b. At least once per 1,000 EFPH,

c. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

3/4 2-1 YANKEE-ROWE Amendment No. ##, 5#, 72, 85, 122 7 s m__________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _

', y.c ZQWER DISTRIBUTION' LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMElilS (Continued) 4.2.1.2 The below factors shall be included in the calculation of peak full' power LHGR:

a. Heatfluxpowerpeakingfactor,Fj,measuredusingtheincore detection system at a power.110%

b. The multiplier for xenon redistribution is a function of core lifetime l

specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT. In addition, if Control Rod Group C is inserted outside the operating band for 100% allowable power, allowable power may not be regained until power has been at'or below a reduced level defined below for at least twenty-four hours with Control Rod Group C within the operating band for 100% allowable power.

Reduced Power = Allowable fraction of full power times multiplier specified in the CORE OPERATING.

LIMITS REPORT Exceptions: 1. If the rods are inserted outside the operating band for 100% allowable power and power does not go below the reduced power calculated above, hold at the lowest attained power level for at least twenty-four hours with Control Rod Group C within the operating band for.

100% allowable power before returning to allowable power.

2. If the rods are inserted outside the operating band for.

100% allowable power and zero power is held for more than forty-eight hours, no reduced power level need be-held on the way to the allowable fraction of full power.

c. Shortened stack height factor, 1.009.

d. Measurement uncertainty:*

1. 1.05, when at least 17 incore detection system neutron detector thimbles are OPERABLE, or l

2. 1.068, when less than 17, and greater than or equal to 12, incore detection system neutron detector thimbles are OPERABLE.

3/4 2-2 YANKEE-ROW 2 Amendment No. 53, 53, 72, 77, 85, 100, 122 j .. .

EigurL3 2-1 This Figure Intentionally Blank l

l YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 2-4 Amendment No. 82, 88

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YANKEE-ROWE 3/4 2-7 Amendment No. 69, 77

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'3/4.13 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEPiS . '

BASES 3/4.1.1 BORATICN CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the' reactor.can be made l suberitical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently ]

suberitical to preclude inadvertent criticality.in the shutdown condition.

1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements are a function of the plant operating status. For critical conditions, minimum shutdown margins are limited by the Power Dependent Insertion Limits (PDIL) as specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT. For 470*F 1 Tavg, the requirement for a SHUTDOWN MARGIN is established by postulated steam line break considerations with ECCS and NRVs available and covers the requirements to preclude inadvertent. criticality.

For 330*F 1 Tavg < 470*F, the requirement for a SHUTDOWN MARGIN is.

l sufficient to preclude inadvertent criticality and covers the requirements of steam line breaks with automatic initiation of ECCS and NRVs blocked. With Tav < 330*F, the reactivity transients resulting from a steam line break coofdownareminimal. 5% Ak/k SHUTDOWN MARGIN (with all rods inserted) provides adequate protection to preclude criticality for all postulated accidents with the reactor vessel head in place.

To eliminate possible errors in the calculations of the initial reactivity of the core and the reactivity depletion rate, the predicted relation between fuel burnup and the boron concentration, necessary to maintain adequate control characteristics, must be adjusted (normalized) to accurately reflect actual core conditions. Normally, when full power is reached after each refueling, and with the control rod groups in the desired l ~. positions, the boron concentration is measured and the predicted steady-state

! curve is adjusted to this point. As power operation proceeds, the measured

l. boron concentration is compared with the predicted concentration and the slope of the curve relating burnup and reactivity is compared with that predicted.

This process of normalization should be completed after about 10% of the total core burnup. Thereaf ter, actual boron concentration can be compared with L prediction and the reactivity status of the core can be continuously evaluated, and any deviation would be thoroughly investigated and evaluated.

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YANKEE-ROWE B3/4 1~1 Amendment No. 81, 88, 112 l

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3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES The specifications of this section provide assurance of fuel integrity during Conditions I (Normal Operation) and II (Incidents of Moderate Frequency) events by: (a) maintaining the minimum DNBR in the core 2 1.30 during normal operation and in short term transients, and (b) limiting the fission gas release, fuel pellet temperature and cladding mechanical properties to within assumed design criteria.

3/4.2.1 PEAK LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE Limiting the peak Linear Heat Generator Rate (LHGR) during Condition I events provides assurance that the initial conditions assumed for t.he LOCA analyses are met and the ECCS acceptance criteria limit of 2200*F is not exceeded.

When operating at constant power, all rods out, with equilibrium xenon, power peaking in the Yankee Rowe core decreases monotonically as a function of cycle burnup. This has been verified by both calculation and measurement on Yankee cores and is in accord with the expected behavior in a core that does not contain burnable poison. The all-rods-out power peaking measured prior to exceeding 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading thus provides an "

upper bound on all-rods-out power peaking for the remainder of that cycle.

Thereafter the measured power peaking shall be checked every 1,000 equivalent full power hours and the latest measured value shall be used in the computation. The only effects which can increase peaking beyond this value would be control rod insertion and xenon transients and these are accounted for in calculating peak LHGR.

The core is stable with respect to xenon, and any xenon transients which may be excited are rapidly damped.

The xenon multiplier specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT was selected to conservatively account for transients which can result from control rod motion at full power.

The multiplicr is defined as the ratio of the maximum value of F due z to xenon induced top peaked power redistribution and the Fz of the nominal operating axial shape. This is consistent with the methodology used to derive the LHGR limits, which were generated based on the worst top-peaked axial power distribution. The minimum value of the multiplier is unity.

YANKEE-ROWE B3/4 2-1 Amendment No. 88

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3/4.2 POWER ~ DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

. BASES (Continued)

The limits on power level and control rod position following control rod insertion were selected to prevent exceeding the maximum allowable linear heat generation rate limits specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT within the first few hours following return to power af ter the insertion. With Yankee's highly damped core, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> hold allows sufficient time for the initial xenon maldistribution to accommodate itself to the new power distribution. The restriction on control rod location during these 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> assures that the return:to allowable fraction of full power will not cause additional redistribution due to rod motion.

After 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> at zero power, the average xenon concentration has decayed to about 20% of the full power concentration. Since the xenon l

concentrations are so low, an increase in power directly to maximum allowable l

power creates transient peaking well below the value imposed by the xenon

'r redistribution multiplier. Thus, any increase in power peaking due to this operation is below the value accounted for in the calculation of the LHGR.

These conclusions are based on plant tests and on calculations performed I l with the SIMULATE three dimensional nodal code used in the analysis of Core XI l (reference cycle) described in Proposed Change No. 115, dated March 29, 1974.

The Factors d, e, and f in Specification 4.2.1.2 will be combined l statistically as the " root-sum-square" of the individual parameters. This method for combining parameter uncertainties is valid due to the independence of the parameters involved. Factor d accounts for uncertainty in the power distribution measurement with the incore detection system. Factor e accounts for uncertainty in the calorimetric measurement for determining core power level. Factor f accounts for uncertainty in engineering and fabrication ,

I tolerances of the fuel. Together, these factors, when combined statistically, yield an uncertainty of 8.5% for less than 17 and greater than or equal to 12 j operating incore thimbles, and 7.1% for greater than or equal to 17 operating '

thimbles. This factor and Factors a, b,.c, and g will be combined multiplicatively to obtain peak LHGR values.

l 3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL EACTDB The limits on heat flux and enthalpy hot channel factors ensure that

1) the design limits on peak local power density and minimum DNBR are not exceeded, and 2) in the event of a LOCA the peak fuel clad temperature will not exceed the 2200'F ECCS acceptance criteria limit.

Each of these hot channel factors is measurable but will normally only be determined periodically as specified in Specifications 4.2.2.1 and 4.2.3.1. This periodic surveillance is sufficient to insure that the hot channel factor limits are maintained provided:

B3/4 2-2 YANKEE-ROWE Amendment No. 43, 88, 100, IZZ

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 6.9.4 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT l

6.9.4.1 The_ core operating limits shall be established and documented in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT before each relcad cycle or any remaining part of a reload cycle for the following:

a. Control rod insertion limits for Specification 3.1.3.5.

b. Peak linear heat generation rate for Specifications 3.2.1 and 4.2.1.1.

c. The xenon redistribution multiplier for Specification 4.2.1.2.

d. The reduced power multiplier for Specification 4.2.1.2.

l 6.9.4.2 The analytical methods used to determine the core operating limits shall be those previously reviewed and approved by the NRC:

a. XN-75-41, Volumes I, II, III and Supplements 1 through 7, "WREM-Based Generic PWR-ECCS Evaluation Model," Exxon Nuclear Corporation, as amended / supplemented by:

1. YAEC-1071, " Yankee Rowe Core XI Decay Heat Redistribution Factor During Shutdown Conditions," June 1974.

2. Proposed Change to Technical Specifications No. 125.

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3. Proposed Change to Technical Specifications No. 142.

4. XN-76-44, " Revised Nucleate Boiling Lockout for ENC-WREM-Based ECCS Evaluation Model," Exxon Nuclear Corporation l September 1976.

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5. YAEC-1125, " Method for Calculating End-of-Bypass Tirae for Yankee Rowe LOCA Analysis," March 1977.

6. YAEC-1131, " Method for Calculating Low Flow Film Boiling Coefficients for Yankee WREM-Based Generic PWR ECCS Evaluation Model," June 1977.

7. YAEC-1133, " Core Flood Rate Stabilization for Yankee WREM-Based Generic PWR ECCS Evaluation Model," July 1977.

8. Letter, " Yankee Rowe Core XIII LOCA Core Inlet Temperature and Accumulator Delay Sensitivity Analysis," and Errata, October 7 and October 11, 1977.

l l 9. XN-76-27, "WREM-Based Generic PWR ECCS Evaluation Model Update ENC-WREM-II," Exxon Nuclear Corporation, July 1976.

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10. YAEC-1131, Revision 1, " Application of a Lower Plenum Phase Separation Model to Yankee Rowe Large Break LOCA Analysis,"

March 1981.

YANKEE-ROWE 6-16 Amendment No. #5, 70, 80, 104

is ADMINISTRATIVE Q0NTROLS (Continued) j

11. Proposed Change to Technical Specification No. 178.  ;

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12. Letter, "LOCA Injection AP Penalty," dated August 16, 1985.

13.' Proposed Change to Technical Specifications No. 188.

14. Letter, "LOCA Reflood Heat Transfer Models," dated January 5, 1988. j l

15. Letter, "YAEC Response to NRC Review of Revised Reflood Heat {

Transfer Model for YNPS LOCA Analysis," dated May 2, 1989.

b. Reactor physics methods as described in Proposed Change to Technical Specification No. 115, as amended / supplemented by:

1. Proposed Change to Technical Specification No. 125.

2. Proposed Change to Technical Specification No. 145.

3. Proposed Change to Technical Specification No. 163.

4. Proposed Change to Technical Specification No. 178.

c. Transient analysis methods as described in Proposed Change to Technical Specification No. 115, as amended / supplemented by:

1. YAEC-1361, "YNPS Main Steam Line Break Analysis," May 1983.

2. YAEC-1398, "YNFS Main Steam Line Break Analysis, Addition of Boron Transport Model," February 1984.

6.9.4.3 The care operating limits shall be determined so that all applicable limits (e.g., fuel thermal-mechanical limits, core thermal-hydraulic limits, ECCS limits, nuclear limits such as shutdown margin, and transient and accident analysis limits) of the safety analysis are met.

6.9.4.4 The CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements thereto, shall be provided upon issuance, for each reload  ;

cycle, to the NRC Document Control Desk with copies to the Regional  !

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Administrator and Resident Inspector.

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I YANKEE-ROWE 5-17 Amendment No. 65, 70, 80, 104 J

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ATTACHMENT 2 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT i

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a n-Yankee Cycle 20 Core Operating Limits Report Revision 0 September 1989 Controlled Copy No. _

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Prepared by:

(Date)

Approved By:

R. J. Cacciapouti, Manager (Date)

Reactor Physics Group

- Approved By: 'l j

R. K. Sundaram, Manager (Date)

Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis Group i Approved By:

P. A. Bergeron, Manager (Date)

Transient Analysis Group Approved By:

B. C. Slifer, Director (Date)

Nuclear Engineering Department 4

l Yankee Atomic Electric Company Nuclcar Services Division 580 Main Street Bolton, Massachusetts 01740 7772R

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TABLE OF CONTENTS EaEn ~

LIST OF FIGURES................................................... iv 1.0" . INTRODUCTION......... .. ........................................ . I 2.0 CORE OPERATING LIMITS............................................. 2 S

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1 1,IST OF FIG.11RES Number- Titig Eage 1 Power Dependent Insertion Limit 3 2' Peak Linear Heat Generation Rate 4 3 Xenon Redistribution Multiplier 5 L

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4 Reduced Power Multiplier 6

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This report provides the cycle-specific limits for operation of the Yankee Nuclear Power Station through Cycle 20. It includes the limits'for control rod insertion and reactor power. In this report, Cycle 20 will frequently be referred to as the Present Cycle. If any of these'?Lmits are exceeded, the action will be taken as defined in the Technical Specifications.

This report has been prepared in accordance with the requirements.of Technical Specification 6.9.4. The core operating limits have been developed using'the NRC-approved methodologies listed in Technical Specification 6.9.4.

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4 2.0' C2RE OPERATING LIMITS i

These Present Cycle operating limits have been defined using NRC-approved methodologies. The Present Cycle must be. operated within the ,

b'ounds of these limits and all others specified in the Technical Specifications.

2.1 Power Denendent Insertion Limit (PDtJJ

. Figure 1 provides the PDIL.' The PDIL is based on the requirements of' the steam line break transient analysis and is also an importnnt consideration in the analysis of the loss of coolant flow and boron dilution transients, since it limits the minimum shutdown margin available.

2.2 Peak Linear Heat Generation Rate CLEGR)

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Figure 2 provides the allowable peak rod LHGR. Limiting the peak LHGR during Condition I events provides assurance that the initial conditions assumed for the LOCA analyses are met and the ECCS acceptance crAteria limits of 10CFR50.46 are not exceeded.

2.3 Xenon Redistribution Multiplier Figure 3 provides the xenon redistribution multiplier. The xenon multiplier was selected to conservatively account for the effect of xenon redistribution transients on LHGR which can result from control rod motion at full power.

2.4 Reduced Porer Multiplier .

Figure 4 provides the reduced power multiplier. This multiplier was l selected to prevent exceeding the allowable LEGR limits within the first few hours following return to power after control rod insertion outside the operating band for 100% allowable power as provided in Figure 1.

7772R

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.'P FIGURE 1 POWER DEPENDENT INSERTION LIMIT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.3.5 l

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FIGURE 3 MULTIPLIER FOR XENON REDISTRIBUTION VERSUS CYCLE BURNUP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.2.1.2 1.1 L

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