ML20247G652
| ML20247G652 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1989 |
| From: | William Cahill TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| TXX-89245, NUDOCS 8905310035 | |
| Download: ML20247G652 (4) | |
Text
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EE Log # TXX-89245 File # 907
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1UELECTRIC l
May 15, 1989 WHliam J. Cahul, Jr.
Esecutive Vice President U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C, 20555
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET N05. 50-445 AND 50-446 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING FSAR CHAPTER 7 Gentlemen:
In a telephone conference call on April 25, 1989, the NRC requested additional information pertaining to the CPSES design, as described in the CPSES FSAR Chapter 7 and SSER 12 open items. Attached are the NRC questions and TV Electric responses.
Sincerely, i
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William J.
till, Jr.
VPC/vid c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV
. Resident inspectors (3) 1 8905310035 890515 PDR ADOCK 05000445 A
PDC pt 1
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4(m North Olive c'veet LR 81 Dallas, Texas 75201
Attachment to TXX-89245 May 15, 1989 Page 1 of 3 NRC Question (1)
Confirm that fast acting current limiting fuses are not (also will not be) installed between the core cooling monitor and SPDS circuitry.
'TV Electric Response (1)
In SSER 12, the NRC referenced the TV Electric commitment to install fast acting fuses between non-1E and 1E interfaces of the CPSES Core Cooling Monitors (CCM) instrumentation and Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) as an interim fix until SPDS isolators were tested.
The isolators were subsequently tested and found acceptable.
On February 17, 1989, 10 Electric submitted to the NRC the CCM isolator test report.
The fast acting fuses have been removed, since the test results showed that the CCM isolators are qualified for their intended application.
NRC Question (2)
Need to identify / confirm for automatic and manual reactor trips which breaker trip devices (undervoltage and/or shunt trip devices) attendant to the reactor trip and the reactor trip bypass breakers are actuated.
TV Electric Response (2)
The Reactor Trip Breakers (RTB) 7.nd Bypass Reactor Trip Breakers undervoltage trip attachment (UVTA) and shui.i trip attachment (STA) are actuated a; follows on manual and auto trip.
Manual Trip (i.e. Reactor Trip /Close, Reactor Trip, or Safety injection)
- 1. RTBs
- a. STAS are energized
- b. UVTAs are deenergized
- 2. Bypass RTBs
- a. STAS are energized
- b. UVTAs are deenergized
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-Attachment-to TXX-89245 May 15, 1989 Page 2 of 3
-Automatic Trip (SSPS output)
- 1. RTBs
- a. STAS are' energized
- b. UVTAs are deenergized
- 2. Bypass RTBs
- a. STAS remain deenergized
- b. UVTAs are deenergized NRC Question (3)
Verification that information required by the ATWS rule on diversity has been compiled by the applicant and is available for review during a staff site audit in accordance with Temporary Instruction 2500/20.
TV Electric Response (3)
In-TXX-6769, dated October 9, 1987, TV Electric submitted to the NRC, the CPSES design for AMSAC.
In the submittal, TU Electric stated that AMSAC was diverse from the existing Reactor Trip System.
Design drawings and vendor technical manuals whicn are available on site, document the diverse elements of the two systems.
NRC Question (4)
Verify that TV Electric has compiled qualification / testing information relating to AMSAC isolators as required by Appendix A to the Safety Evaluation Report for WCAP-10858, "AMSAC Generic Design Package," and that this information is available for staff site audit' in accordance with Temporary Instruction 2500/20.
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Attachment to TXX-89245 i
i May 15, 1989 Page 3 of 3 i
TO Electric Response (4) i The AMSAC isolator requirements of Appendix A to the Safety Evaluation Report for WCAP-10858 have been met.
Vendor test data are available onsite or can be made available by the vendor upon request.
NRC Question (5) a.
Verification that the applicant has conducted a human-factors review of the continuous indication of the AMSAC bypass which is consistent with the plant's detailed control room design process.
b.
Verification that the applicant has conducted a human-factors review of the C-20 permissive signal operating bypass indication and annunciation which is consistent with the plant's detailed control room design process.
c.
Verification that the applicant has conducted a human-factors review of the AMSAC bypass controls and attendant indication / annunciation which is consistent with the plant's detailed control room design process.
d.
Verification that the applicant has conducted a human-factors review of the controls and indicators used for testing the AMSAC circuitry which is-consistent with the plant's detailed control room design process.
TV Electric Response (5)
The continuous indication for the AMSAC bypass has not undergone a post a.
installation human-factors review. A human-factors review consistent with the plant detailed control room design review (DCRDR) process, was conducted during the design of AMSAC.
b.
The discussion in item (a), also applies to the C-20 permissive signal operating bypass indication and annunciation.
c.
The discussion in item (a), also applies to the AMSAC bypass controls and attendant indication / annunciation.
d.
A human-f actors review of the controls and indicators used for testing the AMSAC circuitry was not performed.
Testing is a maintenance function and therefore, DCRDR does not apply.
However, when testing is being performed, the operator interfaces (i.e. indication that AMSAC is unavailable) have undergone a human-factors review as described in item (a) above.
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