ML20247F185
| ML20247F185 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1989 |
| From: | Frantz S FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO., NEWMAN & HOLTZINGER |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247F159 | List: |
| References | |
| OLA-4, NUDOCS 8909180102 | |
| Download: ML20247F185 (23) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8
SEP 12 PS :27 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD fh;w g.tb
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In the Matter of
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)
Dockets Nos. 50-250 OLA - 4 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
)
50-251 OLA - 4
)
.(Turkey Point Plant,
)
(P/T Limits)
Units.3 and 4)
)
)
LICENSEE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION OF INTERVENERS' CONTENTIONS Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 2.749, Florida Power & Light Company (FPL or Licensee) hereby files a motion for summary disposition of each of Interveners' contentions in the above captioned proceeding.
In support of this motion, Licensee h.ts attached " Licensee's-Statement Of Material Facts As To Which There Is No Genuine Issue To Be Heard With Respect To Interveners' Contentions" and the Affidavit of Stephen A. Collard on Contentions 2 and 3 dated September 11, 1989 (Collard Affidavit).
As discussed below, the Licensee contends that there is no genuine issue'.7f material fact regarding the matters set forth in the attached Statement and Affidavit, and that the Licensee is entitled to a decision in its favor as a matter of law..
I.
Background of This Proceeding By means of a letter dated September 21, 1988, from W.
F. Conway (FPL) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
8909180102 890911 PDR ADOCK 05000250 Q
PDR i
- c. FPL filed in accordance with 10 CFR S 50.90 an application for amendment to the operating licenses for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
The purpose of the application was to revise section 3.1.2 of the technical specifications contained in the operating licenses for Turkey Point by incorporating new pressure / temperature (P/T) limits fBr the reactor coolant eyctem.
These P/T limits are in the form of parametric curves which define the permissible operating envelope during reactor heat up, cool down, criticality and in service leak and hydrostatic testing.
In support of this application, FPL submitted a " Description of Amendment Request and Basis for No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination."
A notice of FPL's operating license amendment application was published in the Federal Register at 53 Fed. Reg.
40,988 (October 19, 1988).
In response to this notice, Joette Lorion and the Center for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc.
(collectively referred to herein as " Interveners") filed a
" Request for Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene" on November 17, 1988.
On January 10, 1989, the NRC issued the pressure / temperature operating license amendments for the Turkey Point units (Amendment No. 134 for Turkey Point Unit No. 3 and j
No. 128 for Turkey Point Unit No. 4).
To support issuance of these amendments, the NRC Staff also issued a Safety Evaluation which included a Final Determination of No Significant Hazards
L
. Consideration with respect to the pressure / temperature amendments.
The Interveners submitted " Petitioners' Amended Request for Hearing and Petitio.1 for Leave to Intervene" on February 17, 1989, which listed three contentions that Interveners proposed be admitted for litigation in this proceeding.
Following oral argument on March 21, 1989, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board issued a Memorandum and Order dated June 8, 1989 which rejected Contention 1 and accepted portions of Contentions 2 and 3.
On June 21, 1989, the Licensee served its first set of discovery requests on the Interveners.
On August 8, 1989, Interveners submitted its responses to Licensee's first set of discovery requests and served Interveners' discovery requests on the Licensee and the NRC staff.
The Licensee and NRC Staff each filed responses to these discovery requests on August 28, 1989.
On August 16, 1989, the Licensee served a follow-up discovery request on the Interveners.
Interveners submitted their response to the follow-up discovery request on September 8, 1989.
II.
Legal Standards for Summary Disposition Summary disposition of contentions in NRC proceedings is governed by 20 CFR S 2.749. 1/
1/
The standards for summary disposition under 10 CFR S 2.749 are similar to those standards for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Tennessee valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B, and 2B), ALAB-554, 10 NRC 15, 20 n.17 (1979); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753-54 (1977); Florida Power (continued...)
1 a
I
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.Under 10 CFR S 2.749(a), any party may move, with or without supporting affidavits, for a decision in its favor as to all or any part of the matters involved in the proceeding. 2/
Such a motion must be accompanied by "a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts as to which.
. there i
is no genuine issue to be heard."
10 CFR S 2.749(b).
Any other party may support or oppose the motion.
If a party opposes the motion, that party must file its own statement of the material facts as to which it contends there is a genuine issue to be heard.
Material facts are deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the opposing party.
Id.
Under 10 CFR S 2.749(b), when a motion for summary disposition is filed and is supported by affidavits, "a party opposing the motion may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his answer."
Instead, the opposing party's " answer by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this section must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of 1/(... continued) and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant Units, 3 and 4), LBP-85-29, 22 NRC 300, 310 (1985).
2/
We note in particular that NRC regulations permit the Board to grant summary dirgosition "as to all or any part of the matters involved in the proceeding."
10 CFR S 2.749(a).
If the Board identifies some icsues within a contention in this proceeding which must be tried, we request that the Board grant summary disposition as to the other issues.
- See, e,c.,
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-114, 16 NRC 1909 (1982)
(granting summary disposition with respect to some individual contentions and some issues w thin certain contentions).
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I fact."
Id. -Sag also Houston Lighting & Power'Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-629, 13 NRC'75,-77-78
' (1981); Duke-Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2),
I LBP-83-56, 18 NRC 421, 430 (1983).
In particular, "[t]he E
opposing party's facts must be material, substantial, not fanciful, or merely suspicious."
Florida Power and Light Co.
(Turkey Point Nuclear' Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP 27,-24.NRC 255, 257 (1986) (quoting Gulf States Utilities Co.
(River. Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-75-10, 1 NRC'246, 248
( 19'/ 5 ) (footnotes omitted)).
A party may also "not oppose a
- motion ~for summary disposition 'on the vague supposition that
-something may turn up' at hearings," id.; "nor may an opposing party rely upon general denials coupled with a claim that more information is needed for the party to evaluate the movant's
- analyses."
?lorida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and'4), LBP-86-27, 24 NRC 257 (1986)
(citing Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units'l and 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451, 455'(1980)).
In addition, because the regulations require an opposing party to file affidavits or other forms of evidence, it is frequently not enough for the opposing party to rely on quotations from or citations to published research because such quotations are not " evidence" absent an affidavit from the author.
Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-7, 19 NRC 432, 435-36 (1984)
(citing Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, S
______--____mm._--_.--_
- 2722 (1983)), reconsid. den. on other grounds, LBP-84-15, 19 NRC 837, 838 (1984). Furthermore, section 2.749(b) provides that
"(a]ffidavits shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."
10 CFR S 2.749(b).
If such an affidavit or other evidence is not filed by an opposing party, summary disposition shall be granted, if appropriate.
Id.
Pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.749(d), summary disposition is appropriates if the filings in the proceeding, depo-sitions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the statements of the parties and the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law.
The Commission has encouraged the use of the summary disposition procedure "so that evidentiary hearing time is not unnecessarily devoted to" issues where there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 457 (1981).
The Appeal Board has also endorsed the use of summary disposition as "an efficacious means of avoiding unnecessary and possibly time-consuming hearings on demonstrably insubstantial issues."
Houston Lighting and Power Co (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542, 550 (1980); Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-183, 7 AEC 222 228 (1974).
h-e-_-__s-,____
III. Discussion of content' ions The discussion of Contentions 2 and 3 presented below shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding Interveners' contentions in this proceeding and that Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition should be granted.
Interveners have presented no new evidence in response to the Licensee's discovery requests which could change this conclusion.
Furthermore, based upon Interveners' response to these requests, it appears that Interveners will not be relying on the testimony of any expert witnesses in support of their contentions in this proceeding. 3/
A.
Background
.The fracture toughness of a metal is primarily dependent upon its. chemical composition, temperature, and amount of neutron irradiation the metal has received.
The fracture toughness of a metal decreases with decreases in temperature, with increases in neutron irradiation, and with increases in copper and nickel content.
The purpose of P/T limits is to ensure that, during normal operation, a reactor vessel has sufficient fracture tcaghness such that the stresses induced by pressure will not exceed (with a substantial margin of safety) 3/
San Interveners' Responses to Licensee's First Set of Discovery Requests to the Center for Nuclear Responsibility and Joette Lorion (Aug. 8, 1989).
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i the fracture toughness of the reactor vessel given its temperature, neutron fluence and chemical composition. A/
In order to monitor and account for the changes in fracture toughness of a metal due to neutron irradiation, 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix H requires a reactor vessel to have a materials surveillance program.
The purpose of a surveillance program is to monitor changes in the fracture toughness of a metal due to neutron irradiation, and to provide input for use in calculating P/T limits.
Under the surveillance program, fracture toughness test data is obtained from material specimens in surveillance capsules, which are periodically withdrawn from the reactor vessel and tested. Specimens contain representative material from the reactor vessel including the shell forgings and the welds.
This test data is then used to calculate P/T limits for a reactor vessel.
Sen 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G.IV.A.2-5, Appendix H.I.
and H.III. 5/
P/T limits need to be periodically modified in order to account for increases in fluence and changes in fracture toughness. 6/
One measure of the fracture toughness of a reactor vessel is its Adjusted Reference Temperature (ART).
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, " Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials" (May 1988) (hereinafter " Regulatory 1/
Collard Affidavit at TT 7-16.
5/
Cen also Collard Affidavit at 15 6, 37.
E/
Collard Affidavit at T 18.
lL___
l
_9_
l Guide 1.99") contains an appropriate and conservative method for calculating ART.
Appendix G to the American Society for f
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code provides an appropriate procedure for calculating P/T limits for a reactor vessel given the ART for the vessel.
The calculation of the P/T limits for operation of Turkey Point up to 20 effective full power years (EFPY) was performed in conformance with the methodologies I
specified in Appendix G of the ASME Code and Regulatory Guide 1.99.
The methodologies used to calculate the P/T limits for Turkey Point contain a number of conservatism and a large margin of safety. 2/
B.
Contention 2 Contention 2 states as follows:
That the revised temperature / pressure limits that have been set for Turkey Point Unit 4 are non-conservative and will cause that reactor unit to exceed the requirements of General Design Criterion 31 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, which requires that the reactor coolant pressure boundary be designed with a sufficient margin to ensure that, when stressed under operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions, (1) the boundary behaves in a non-brittle manner and (2) the probability of a rapidly propagating fracture is minimized.
Petitioners contend that the new pressure / temperature limits could cause the reactor vessel to exceed these requirements because the Licensee has based its calculation of the predicted RTer for Unit 4 partly on sur-veillance capsule V test results from Turkey Point Unit 3 rather than predicting the RTc7 for Unit 4 based on Unit 4 capsule V surveillance capsule 2/
Collard Affidavit at 15 13-28.
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- data--a practice which is not scientific, not valid, and could cause the Unit 4 reactor to behave in a brittle manner which would make the chances of a pressure vessel failure and resultant i
meltdown more likely.
Petitioners contend that predictions of RTer and pressure / temperature limits derived from the shift in nil-ductility I
transfer should be based only on plant-specific i
Unit 4 data, especially in light of the fact that the only tests ever performed on Unit 4 weld specimens demonstrated that the weld material in the Unit 4 vessel was 30% more brittle than that of Unit 3.
Because Unit 4's weld material is more embrittled, Petitioners contend that the FPL Integrated Surveillance program does not meet the Requirements of 10 CFR Appendix G Parts V.A and V.B, and 10 CFR Appendix H, including Appendix H Parts IIC and IIIB.
Finally, Petitioners contend that the surveillance capsule V for Unit 4 should be tested to establish the new pressure /
temperature limits and should the testing indicate that the RTer for Unit 4 has passed the 300-degree Fahrenheit screening criterion set by the NRC, Unit 4 should be shut down until it is demon-strated that the Unit 4 reactor pressure vessel can maintain its integrity beyond this limit.
In admitting Contention 2, the Licensing Board excluded any issue pertaining to the 300'F screening criterion and the acceptance of the Turkey Point integrated surveillance program in 1985.
Additionally, the Board limited the scope of the Contention to the issue of whether " Licensee's conduct of the integrated surveillance test program at Turkey Point fails to meet the requirements of the program itself" and whether the
" difference of less than five percent in the operating time between the two units is significant." H/
In response to a discovery request, the Interveners identified the f;11owing bases j
l for this contention:
- 1) Unit 4 suffered from an I
E/
Memorandum and Order (June 8, 1989) at 17-19.
I l
i L.
overpressurization event while Unit 3 did not; 2) the capacity factors.for Units 3 and 4 were 14% and 45%, respectively, in 1987; 3) the units have had different extended outages; and
- 4) FPL entered into the integrated surveillance program even though the initial test results for Unit 4 did not agree with predictions.- The material facts regarding the issues raised by this contention and its bases, as limited by the Board, are not in dispute.
Each of these issues is addressed below.
The Turkey Point surveillance specimen capsules are 9
located near the inside vessel wall in the beltline region of the reactor vessel so that the neutron fluence received by these capsules is representative of the fluence received by the area of the reactor vessel which receives the greatest amount of fluence
-- the beltline region.
At the beginning of operation, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 each had eight reactor vessel surveillance capsules containing material specimens and dosimeters.
In each unit, five of the eight capsules contained material specimens of the shell forgings of the reactor vessel; the remaining three ccpsules in each unit contained material specimens of the shell j
forgings, the reactor welds, and material in the heat affected zone around the welds.
The welds are the critical material, because the welds are located in the beltline region and therefore receive the highest fluence and because the welds contain more copper and nickel than the shell forgings and therefore are more susceptible to neutroa radiation.
To date, 3 of the 6 capsules containing weld mate, rial have been removed and 1
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l tested (2 capsules from Unit 3 and 1 capsule from Unit 4).
Therefore, 3 capsules containing weld material remain in Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 2/
L In 1985, the NRC issued license amendments for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 authorizing the use of an integrated surveillance program. 12/ : The Turkey Point integrated surveillance program contains two primary provisions.
- First, because the shell forging _is not the critical material, specimens containing shell forging material are being held in standby and are not being removed from the reactor vessels and tested.
This provision will reduce radiation exposure to workers without resulting in the loss of any critical information.
Second, the
' integrated surveillance program provides for sharing of the results of the tests of the weld specimens from Units 3 and 4.
This provision will maximize the results of the tests of the surveillance capsules from the units. 11/
Appendix H.II.C.3 of 10 CFR Part 50 requires intecrated surveillance programs to include "a contingency plan to assure that the surveillance program for each reactor will not be jeopardized by operation at reduced power level or by an extended outage of another reactor from which data are expected."
The 2/
Collard Affidavit at 11 6, 37, 42.
1Q/
Sea Florida Power and Light Co. Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251, Turkey Point Unit Nos. 3 and 4, Amendment Nos. 112 and 106 (Apr. 22, 1985).
11/
Collard Affidavit at 11 6, 44-46.
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l l ' ' g purpose of this' requirement in Appendix H-is to ensure that surveillance test' data is available to support future projections of the effects of neutron irradiation on one reactor vessel in.
the-integrated program if another reactor in the program has an I
extended outage or period of low power operation. 12/
As discussed above, in admitting Contention 2, the Licensing Board
. questioned whether FPL should have-implemented its contingency plan under 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix H because of differences in the effective ~ full power years (EFPY) of operation between Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
The Turkey Point P/T limits were calculated for periods up-to 20 EFPY.
These limits would be unaffected by an extended outage or a period of low power operation of one Turkey Point unit, or by any differences in EFPY, capacity factor, or neutron fluence between'the two reactors occurring after 1985 (when the
. integrated surveillance. program was accepted by the NRC).
The P/T. limits for up to 20 EFPY are based upon test results from surveillance capsules that were removed from the Turkey Point reactor vessels in 1985 or earlier.
As is explained in the Collard Affidavit, these data are sufficient for predicting the 12/
Collard Affidavit at 1 35.
At Turkey Point, if one unit should go into an extended outage or operate at a reduced power level for an extended period of time, the contingency plan censists of having each reactor rely on its own surveillance capsules.
Collard Affidavit at 1 49.
In its Safety Evaluation to the amendments approving the Turkey Point integrated surveillance program, the NRC Staff accepted the appropriateness of Turkey Point's contingency plan.
Sta NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation (Apr. 22, 1985);
Collard Affidavit at 1 46.
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' fracture toughness of the Turkey Point reactor vessels and for calculating the P/T limits for Units 3 and 4 for up to 20 EFPY, If an extended outage or period of low power operation were to have occurred at one of the Turkey Point units after removal of these capsules in 1985, it could only affect the results of future tests of the remaining surveillance capsules in the reactor vessels and therefore could only affect the ability to make future predictions of tracture toughness beyond 20 EFPY.
4
..Such events could not affect the existing test data from capsules which have already been removed from the reactor vessels, and therefore could not affect the sufficiency of this data for calculating the P/T limits for up to 20 EFPY. 13/
In any event, operation of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 has been similar.
In particular, the neutron fluences on the reactor vessels of the units are very close, differing by less than 3%. 14]
In determining the effects of neutron irradiation, the total amount of neutron fluence (and not the rates or duration of accumulation) is what is important.
Therefore, as long as total fluences are comparable, historical information concerning individual outages and events is insignificant.
As is explained in the Collard Affidavit, differences of 3% are insignificant in determining whether the fluence on a capsule from one unit is sufficient to predict the fracture toughness of 13/
Collard Affidavit at is 51-58.
11/
Collard Affidavit at Table 5.
l
another unit participating in an' integrated surveillance program. 15/
Additionally, Table 5 of the Collard Affidavit presents data on the total EFPY and total capacity factors for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 throughout their lifetimes and during the years 1985 to 1988.
Although such factors are not directly relevant to fracture toughness of the reactor vessels, there is an indirect relationship between these factors and fluence end therefore an indirect relationship between these factors and fracture toughness.
As this table shows, the total EFPY and capacity factors for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 are similar during their lifetimes and during the period from 1985-88.
Furthermore, the current differences in EFPY and fluence are less than the differences in 1985 when the NRC accepted the integrated surveillance program.
As explained in the Col 2ard Affidavit, the differences in these data are not sufficient to call into question the use of surveillance capsules from one unit to help predict the fracture toughness of the other unit. 16/
In response to a discovery request, Interveners identified as a basis for Contention 2 that in 1987 Unit 3 had a capacity factor of 14% and Unit 4 had a capacity factor of 45%.
11/
As discussed above, the capacity factor of a reactor during any particular period is not significant in determining the 15/
Collard Affidavit at 15 59-63.
16/
Collard Affidavit at SS 64-66.
11/
The actual capacity factor for Unit 3 in 1987 was 15%.
Collard Affidavit at 5 68.
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validity of continued implementation of an integrated
/ surveillance program.
It is not unusual-for units to have different capacity factors from year to year.
What is.important, however, is the comparison between the total fluences of the two units.
As long as the total fluences for the units are comparable, the continued application of an integrated surveillance program for the units is appropriate.
Since the-
-' total fluences for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 are comparable, the differences in capacity factors during 1987 are of no importance. 1H/
In the same discovery response, Interveners also claimed as a basis for Contention 2 that Unit 4 had an overpressure event while Unit 3 did not.
Presumably, the Interveners are referring to two events that occurred at Unit 4 in 1981 in which the pressure in the reactor coolant system exceeded technical specification limits by approximately 700 psi and 325 psi, respectively.
These events occurred prior to NRC acceptance of the Turkey Point integrated surveillance program in 1985.
Therefore, these events are outside the scope of this proceeding because at most they could only pertain to NRC's acceptance of the integrated program, and not to implementation of the program. 12/
Accordingly, the Licensing Board should reject any issue pertaining to these events.
In any case, 11/
Collard Affidavit at 1 68.
12/
San Memorandum and Order (June 8, 1989) at 16-19.
_17 subsequent examination of the Unit 4 reactor vessel did not identify any defects.
Additionally, in a report issued in March 1984 (before the NRC accepted the Turkey Point integrated surveillance program), the NRC concluded that these events did not affect the structural integrity of the Unit 4 reactor vessel. 2D/
Finally, in Contention 2 itself, Interveners assert that the RTur for the surveillance capsules for Unit 4 is nigher than the RTs7 for the surveillance capsules for Unit 3, and that this difference affects the validity of the integrated surveillance program in determining the P/T limits for Unit 4. 21/
Interveners' assertion is based upon the results of surveillance capsule tests in 1975-1976, before acceptance of the integrated surveillance program in 1985.
Therefore, this assertion is outside the scope of this proceeding because at most it pertains to the acceptability of the integrated surveillance program at Turkey Point in 1985, and not to implementation of the 2H/
Collard Affidavit at 1 69.
21/
In Contention 2, the Interveners have also argued that an additional surveillance capsule from Unit 4 should now be removed and tested to provide additional data points for use in calculating RTm>r.
Such an action would be inconsistent with the schedule in the Turkey Point integrated surveillance program and would violate the Technical Specifications for Turkey Point.
Additionally, such an action would have the effect of depriving Turkey Point of its only standby surveillance capsule containing weld material.
As a result, 7trkey Point would not have a capsule available in the future to perform additional testing if events should warrant it.
Ene Collard Affidavit at i 75 n.17.
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- integrated program. 12/
Thus, the Licensing Board should reject l
any issue pertaining to the difference in the RTc7 for the Unit'3 L
and the Unit 4 capsules tested in 1975-76.
In any event, the difference in RTer for the surveillance capsules for Units 3land 4 does not affect the validity of the Turkey Point integrated surveillance program or the use of the results of the program in calculating the P/T limits for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
Given the similarity in fluence on and chemical composition of the l
welds for the reactor vessels for Surkey Point Units 3 and 4, it is unlikely that this difference in RTc7 for the test capsules reflects any real and significant difference in the fracture toughness of the welds.
Instead, there are several possible explanations for this difference, including scatter in test data, the fact that the Unit 4 weld specimen has a different flux lot number than the Unit 4 weld, and the very conservative manner in which the RTc7 for the Unit 4 capsule was determined.
In any case, all of the surveillance capsule data, including the capsule test data from Unit 4, were used to calculate the Turkey Point P/T limits, thereby ensuring their conservatism. 23/
As discussed above, use of the results of the integrated surveillance program is appropriate for calculating the P/T limits for both Units 3 and 4.
For the purpose of litigation, however, FPL also performed a calculation to 22/
See Memorandum and order (June 8, 1989) at 18.
23/
Collard Affidavit at 11 41, 43.
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' determine the'inipact on the P/T limits for Unit 4 if the results of the integrated surveillance program had not been utilized.-
In performing this calculation, FPL utilized the methodology in' NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99.
Figure 3 of the Collard Affidavit shows the results of the calculation of the hypothetical P/T limits for Unit 4 and the P/T limits based upon the results of
'the integrated surveillance program.
As this figure depicts, the hypothetical P/T limits for Unit 4 and the P/T limits based on the results of the integrated surveillance program are almost f
identical. 21/
Therefore, even if it is assumed.
... that the results of the integrated surveillance program should not have been used to calculate the P/T limits for Unit 4, the impact on the P/T limits for Unit 4 would be insignificant.
i In sum, FPL has sufficient capsule data to calculate the P/T limits for Turkey Point for up to 20 EFPY.
Any extended j
- outage or period of low power operation could only affect the ability to make predictions beyond 20 EFPY and not the validity of the P/T limit calculations up to 20 EFPY.
In any event, the operating histories of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, throughout their lifetime and since the NRC's acceptance of the integrated surveillance program in 1985, have been very similar and do not cast doubt upon the continued utilization of the integrated surveillance program, or indicate a need for implementation of j
the contingency plan.
Since there is no dispute regarding these j
i 21/
Collard Affidavit at is 71-74.
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. material. facts, Licensee is entitled to summary disposition'of
- Contention 2.
C.
contention _1 Contention 3 states as follows:
That the revised pressure / temperature limits that have been set for Units 3 and 4 are non-conservative and will not meet the requirements of General Design Criterion 31 of Appendix A to'10 CFR Part 50Lwhich
-requires that.the reactor coolant pressure boundary be designed with sufficient margin to ensure that, when stressed under operating, maintenance, testing, and
-postulated accident conditions, (1) the boundary behaves in a non-brittle manner, and (2) the probability of a rapidly propagating fracture is minimized.
Petitioners contend that the sufficient safety margin required by GDC 31 does not exist because the P/T limits for Units 3 and 4 were not based on the taost. limiting value of RTrn as required by 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G and H, for reactor vessel welds because the percentage of copper that was used in the RTmn calculation is non-conservative in that it is lower than the percentage of copper ~that was used in previous surveillance test reportn and lower than the percentage of copper quoted.in many of the earlier FPL documents.
Petitioners contend that the use of this non-conservative estimate of copper content means that the adjusted RTmn is unrealistically low and that the current revised P/T limits are not restrictive enough to ensure that an adequate margin of safety against brittle fracture of the reactor vessel exists.
This increases the possibility that the reactor vesse [ sic) for Unit 4 will behave in a brittle manner-resulting in a fracture of the vessel and subsequent meltdown of the reactor core.
Petitioners further contend that if a more conservative and accurate estimate of copper content was used to calculate the RTme, the P/T limits would be more restrictive and that in fact, there is a possibility that it could be discovered that the NRC screening criterion of 300-degree Fahrenheit has been reached and the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 would have to be shut down because they do not meet the fracture toughness requirement of 10.CFR Part 50 Appendix G.
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' In admitting Contention 3, the Licensing Board limited the scope of Contention 3 to "the issue of whether the correct copper j
i content was used in predict.f ag the RTgg of the weld materials."
The Licensing Board also excluded any issue pertaining to the 300'F screening criterion and whether the upper-shelf energy of the Turkey Point test specimens meets the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G. 25/
The material facts regarding the issues raised by this Contention are not in dispute.
The bases for Contention 3 allege that "[i]n their prediction of RTmn, FPL assumed a copper content of.26, while many earlier documents on Turkey Point assumed a copper content of.30 or above."
This allegation is incorrect. 2E/
In calculating the Adjusted Reference Temperature (ART) for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, FPL used the methodology contained in Regulatory Guide 1.99.
Regulatory Guide 1.99 identifies two alternative methods for determining the chemistry factor used in calculating the ART.
The Regulatory Guide states that the copper and nickel content of the material is to be used in calculating the chemistry factc.t then surveillance capsule test data is not available.
On the other hand, when two or more credible surveillance capsule data points are available, the surveillance test data are to be used in calculating the 15/
Memorandum and Order (June 8, 1989) at 24.
25/
Collard Affidavit at 5 29.
v i
- I chemistry. factor.. With respect to the P/T limits, FPL determined the chemistry factor for purposes of calculating the ART based upon the rannits of surveillance test data from its NRC approved integrated surveillance program.
Thus, FPL did not use any value for copper and nickel content in calculating the chemistry factor and ART for the welds and cutrent P/T limits for Turkey Point Units 5 and 4. 21/
Since there is no dispute'regarding these material facts, Licensee is entitled to summary disposition of Contention 3.
IV.
Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Licensee contends that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the Interveners' contentions, and that the Licensee is entitled to a l
I 21/
Collard Affidavit at 11 29-31.
It may be noted that Interveners are correct in asserting that, at one time, FPL used a value of 0.30% and hif.ter for the copper content of
.the Turkey Point reactor vessel welds for purposes of determining the P/T limits at Turkey Point for up to 10 EFPY.
However, this value was based upon only five data points.
FPL subsequently obtained substantial amounts of additional datt and, based upon 51 total data points, determined thh: the best estimate of the copper content of l
the Turkey Point welds is 0.26%.
Collard Affidavit at 11 32-34.
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-decision-in its-favor as-~a matter of law.-
Accordingly, Licensee's motion for summary disposition of:these. contentions-
.shouid be, granted.
Respectfully st.bmitted,-
l W Harolo F. Reis
/
. Steven.P. Frantz Kenneth C.-Manne Newman &-Holtzinger, P.C.
1615 L Street, N.W.
Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 955-6600 Co-Counsel.-
' John-T.: Butler Steel, Hector & Davis 4000; Southeast Financial Center
. Miami, Florida 33131 (305).577-2800 September. 11, 1989
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