ML20247E595
| ML20247E595 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1989 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8905260302 | |
| Download: ML20247E595 (5) | |
Text
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P.O. HOX 3318.2 011AHLOTTE, N.C. 28242 HALH. TUCKER TELerniowz vies rusanoen (704) 073-4531 notaanv ouvn wu May 19, 1989 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention: Document Control Desk
Subject:
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-413, -414/89-07 Reply to a Notice of Violation Gentlemen:
Please find attached a reply to violation No. 413, 414/89-07-03 which was transmitted per Alan R. Herdt's, NRC Region II, Notice of Violation dated April 20, 1989. This violation concerned failure to follow procedures on (3) occasions resulting in safety injections.
Wry truly yours, g4 H. B. Tucker WRC45/lcs Attachment ec:
Mr. S. D. Ebneter Regional Administrator, Region II U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia-30323 Mr. W.
- 2. Orders NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station 1
1 1
.8905260302 890519 PDR ADOCK 05000413
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4 DUKE POWER COMPANY REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION DOCKET NO. 50-413, 414/89-07-03 ITEM NO. 2 Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities refer-enced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.
IP/0/A/3890/01, Controlling Procedure for Troubleshooting and Corrective Maintenance, requi:ss the maintenance technician to determine specific limitations for anticipated work to be performed and to determine the effect of planned activities on plant operations.
Contrary to the above, on February 21, 1989, maintenance technicians failed to adequately perform this step in that the effects of placing an electrical jumper between terminal points F-11 and F-12, as shown on electrical drawing CNEE 0270-01.03, were not adequately evaluated which resulted in an inadventant main steam isolation valve closure, a reactor trip, and safety injection.
RESPONSE
1.
Admission or Denial of Violationn Duke Power Company admits the violation 2.
Reasons for Violation if Admitted 1
Management deficiency and lack of attention to detail in assessment of required actions. A policy did not exist to require independent assessment of actions to be taken under troubleshooting procedures.
The technicians did not carefully evaluate the consequences of making the jumper sel.ction.
3.
Corrective Actions Taken and Results Achieved A procedure change was made to IP/0/A/3890/01 that requires a.
independent assessment of planned actions.
b.
The involved technicians have been counseled on the proper way to evaluate planned corrective actions. The incident was discussed with all crews with emphasis placed on carefully considering the effects of using jumpers for troubleshooting activities.
c.
A guideline for independent verification has been developed which outlines the need for an independent assessment of planned actions in troubleshooting activities.
4.
Corrective Actions to be taken to avoid further Violations Actions taken in Section 3 above ensure avoidance of future violations.
5.
Date of Full Compliance Duke Power Company is now in full compliance
r 4
DUKE POWER COMPANY REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION DOCKET NO. 50-413, 414/89-07-03 ITEM NO. 3 Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be-established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities refer-enced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.
Operations Management Procedure 1-8, Authority and Responsibility of Licensed Operators, section 7.2.B requires that the Operator at the Controls (OATC) be knowledgeable of unit status at all times.
Contrary to the above, on February 21, 1989, the OATC was not knowledgeable of the unit status in that at 1:20 p.m. the OATC initiated steps to reduce reactor plant temperature, however, failed to recognize the ensuing excessive cooldown rate which resulted in a safety injection six minutes later.
RESPONSE
1.
Admission or Denial of Violationn Duke Power Company admits the violation 2.
Reasons for Violation if Admitted Operator error, the operator did not close steam dumps in time.
Unit 2 was in Mode 3 recovering from a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. (SI) that occurred earlier in the day. Unit 2 was also in Tech Spec 3.0.3 due to sequencer timer problems on both Diesel Generators. Numerous other activities and problems were being encountered that the operators were dealing with. Per procedure the unit was being cooled down at 10 F/ hour.
The operator throttled open the steam dumps in manual to achieve the required 10 F for that.particular hour.
(We had one more degree to go to satisfy the 10 F for that particular hour). Since exit from Tech Spec 3.0.3 was imminent, the shift made the decision to not reduce NC pressure by approximately 300 psig in order to block the low steam line pressure SI.
During the next 6 minutes the unit went from 800 psig steam pressure to 725 psig and the feed valves to the steam generators automatically opened to maintain levels. The combination of dumping steam and feeding the stcam generators caused the cooldown rate to significantly increase and the operator did not get the steam dumps closed in tims to prevent reaching the low steam line pressure SI.
3.
Corrective Actions Taken and Results Achieved a.
This incident has been discussed with the operators involved with emphasis on being aware of plant status at all times.
b.
This incident was covered at the Shift Supervisor's Meeting on l
March 3, 1989, and again on April 14, 1989.
c.
The unit was stabilized and returned to service shortly thereafter.
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4.
Corrective Actions'to be taken to avoid further Violations
'The Unit Shutdown procedure will be changed.to require the low pressurizer pressure and low steam pressurs safety injection signals be blocked prior to reducing steam pressure to less than 875 psig.
5.
Date of Full Compliance Duke Power Company will be in full compliance by June 1, 1989.
1 l
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1 DUKE POWER COMPANY REPLY TO A NOTICE OF VIOLATION DOCKET NO. 50-413, u4/89-07-03 ITEM NO. 1 I
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures shall be l
i established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities refer-enced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.
PT/1/A/4200/09A, Auxiliary Safeguards Test Cabinet Periodic Test, Step 8.1.2.5 of enclosure 13.1 requires the operator to close ISV-27A, Steam Generator 1A Power Operated Relief Isolation Valve as a test prerequisite.
Contrary to the above, on March 5, 1989 the licensee failed to implement I
the procedure in that while attempting to close ISV-27A, the operator inadvertently closed ISM-7, Steam Generator 1A Main Steam Isolation Valve, which resulted in a reactor trip and a safety injection.
RESPONSE
1.
Admission or Denial of Violationn Duke Power Company admits the violation 2.
Reasons for Violation if Admitted Operator error, the wrong push button was depressed.
Prior to performance testing of each Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valve (S/G PORV) the procedure requires the PORV block valve to be closed. The operator twice attempted to close SV-27A (S/G 1A PORV block va.9e) so SV-19 (S/G 1A PORV) could be tested.
Neither time did SV-27A close. Between the second and third attempt at closing SV-27A the operator's attention was diverted from this control board to acknowledge an annunciator. When he returned he accidentally pushed the closed button on SM-7 (S/G 1A Main Steam Isolation Valve) instead of the SV-27A close button. These switches look exactly alike and are located next to each other.
3.
Corrective Actions Taken and Results Achieved a.
The unit was stabilized and SM-7 was re-opened.
b.
SV-27A was repaired and SV-19 was tested satisfactorily.
c.
An orderly unit restart was completed.
d.
The operator involved was counselled on the importance of being sure which control device he is on prior to actuating the device, A survey was completed of all control board devices in the e.
Control Room, that if accidentally actuated, would result in a reactor trip and/or safety injection.
Protective shrouds have been placed on all these identified devices.
These shrouds will prevent accidental actuations.
f.
This incidert was covered at the Shift Supervisor's Meeting on April 14, 1989.
4.
Corrective Actions to be taken to avoid further Violations Actions taken in Section 3 above ensure avoidance of future violations.
5.
Date of Full Compliance I
Duke Power Company is now in full compliance
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