ML20247A766
| ML20247A766 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1989 |
| From: | Frantz S FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO., NEWMAN & HOLTZINGER |
| To: | Bright G, Cotter B, Harbour J Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#189-8352 OLA-4, NUDOCS 8903290185 | |
| Download: ML20247A766 (42) | |
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Paul'~ Cotter', Jr.
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U.S.] Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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. Washington, D '. c. '20555 c.
D'ocke't Nos.:50-250 OLA
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In the. Matter of Florida Power & Light Company S
'[ Turkey Point Plant, Units 3.and 4).
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Dear' Licensing Board Members:
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i In accordapce'with the Licensing Bo3rd's request ai the March 21, 1989_ oral argument"in the above-captioned--
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proceeding, attached please find a copy of a' letter from
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the NRC Executive Director for Operations, Victor 4Stello, J r., ' t o ' t h e U. S '.' Senator Lawton Chiles dated November 5,
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1986 and: a copy of a Heinorandum from. William J., Dircks i
to Chairman Palladino entitled " Differing Professional.
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. OpI.nion of D. Bandekas on-Pressurized Thermal Shock" dated l
l October'8, 1981.-
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.i Respectfully,.
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Steven P.
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TUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD q
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In the' Matter of
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FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT
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Docket'.Nos. 50-250 OLA.- 4 i
COMPANY
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50-251 OLA'- 4
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(P/T. Limits) l Units 3 and 4)
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CERTIFICATE OF_ SERVICE f
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. I hereby certify that copies of the " Letter dated i
March 23, 1989?froM Steven P.'Frantz to B.
Paul Cotter,
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Jr.,-Glenn O.' Bright and Jerry-Harbour" were served on
.the.following by deposit in the United States mail, first o
class., properly stamped and addressed, on the date shown i
' be low.
5 B.
Daul Cotter, Jr.,
Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panul-l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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. Washington, D.C.
20555 Glenn Cf. Bright Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.-
'20555 s
Jerry. Harbour Atomic Safety' and Licensing Board Panel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C..
20555
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Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 o
Office of Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention:
Chief, Docketing and Service Section (Original plus two copies) a
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Joette Lorion, Director'
'CenterLfor; Nuclear Responsibility 7210 Red Road.#217 Miami, Florida' 33143 t
Janice Moore Officc Hof General Counsel U.S.. Nuclear' Regulatory > Commission Washington, D.C.
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i John T.~ Butler' I
Steel, Hector & Davis 4000. Southeast Financial Center Miami, Florida' 33131 ll Richard Gcddard
.j U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
'f 101 Marietta St., N.W.
- 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323 1
. Dated this 23rd. day of March 1989.
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- A Steven P.
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Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
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M G d!]"3fl0 [ g r p The Honorable Lawton Chiles
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Dear Senator Chiles:
Newman & Hottzinger, P..
I' ai pleased to respond to your October 7,1986, letter. You indicated that
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a Constituent of yours, Mr. Steve Conger, has expressed concern relating to 4
an article by Ps. Joette Lorton of the Center For Nuclear Respersibility.. The f
article is entitled "The '0-Welds' of Turkey Point." You further requested an update of rccent actions taken at the Turkey Point Nue? ear Power Plant in 1
relation ?.o operation and safety.
3 6
Before I respond to the contentions raised in the article and the actions te u n to assure safe operation at the Turkta Point Plant, the following should be l
noted.. The contentions expressed in the article are related to A. Lorion's-i
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concern of reactor vessel embrittlement (pressurized themal shock) at the j
Turkey. Point Power Plant. The controlling (most embrittled) material for
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the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 reactor vesselo are the center girth welds.
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Ms. Lorion refers to these welds as "G-Welds."' M3. Lorion has made these same j
arguments expressed in_the article before the United States Court of Appeals 1
for the District of Columbia Circuit. Cnclosure'I is eur response to Ms..
1 Lorton's petition for which oral arguments were presented before the court on j
December 16, 1985. Enclosure 2 is the court's decision which ruled in favor of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC).
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In. relation to Ms. Lorion's contentions, the surveillance program for Turkey
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Point Units 3 aad 4 comprises a set cf capsules in each reactor containing samples of the weld materiale and base toetals used in fabricating the beltline
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of the reactor vessel. During construction the capsules are placed in the veisel near. the wall etera they receive neutron radiation representative of l
that received by the beltline.
In accordance with regulations, the first J-capsule is withdrawn after several years of operation when its centents have
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been exposed to neutron radiation at vessel operating-temperature and the i
specimers are then tested to determir.6 the change in resistance to brittle 1
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fracture caused by the radiation. Subsequent capsule Wtndrawals are sched. led l
at specified fntervals to monitor long-term effects throughout the reactor L
vessel (s) lifetime.
a As previews 1y utated, the controlling (most embrittled) material for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 reactor vessels are the center girth welds which are positioned at about midheight of the corcs. Fabrication records show that l-the two welds were made with the same materials, that is, the same weld wire l'
heat and the same flux lot. The surveillance welds made for Unit 3 test specimens were made with the some matedals as the cenbr girth welds in both reactor vessels. The surveillance welds for Unit 4 te'.t specimens were made with the same weld wire heat but different flux lot than the center girth l.
welds in both reactor vessels. Although the Unit 4 surve111once weld specimens vere fabricated using a different flux lot, the weld specimens are considered o
7 l
The Honorable Lawton Chiles 4 1
i to be representative of the girth welds in both reactor vesself< because flux 1
lot is considered to be of secondary importance in determining sensitivity to radiation damage.
Based on the similarity between raterials in the center girth welds and the materials used to fabricate e
' surveillance weld specimens, i
tha f.est results from capsules in either Unit 3 or ? :an be used to monitor
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the neutron radiation damage to botn reector vessels.
Tn 1985 the utility requested, and the nRC agreed to, an integrated surveillance program for Units 3 and 4.
In each vessel there are two carsules containing tha criticd weld metal, and UMer the integrated program the test results from the four captules wili be applied to vessel integrity analyses for both units.
Section II.C of 10 CFR 50, Appendix H permits an integrated surveillance program for reactors at the same or different physical sites if they meet the i
following specified criteria:
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1.
There must be sutstant N advantages to be gained, such at reduced power outages or reduced personnel exposure to radiation, as a direct result j
of not requiring surveil 106 c osules in all reactors in the set.
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The design and operating features of the reacton in the set nust be sufficiently similar to permit accurate comparisons cf the predicted l
amount of radiation damage as a function of total power outpat.
3.
There must he an adequate dosimetry program for each reactor.
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There must be a contingency plan to assure that the surveillance pregran
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for each reactor will not be jeopardized by operation at reduced power j
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level or by an extended outage of another reactor from which data are expected.
5.
No reduction in the requirements for number of materials to be irradiated, f
specimen type, or number of specimens per reactor 15 permitted, but the l
C amount of testing may be reduced if the initial results agree trith predictions.
6.
There must be adequate arrangement for data sharing bEtMeen plants, l
i An April 22, 1985, letter, which issued the amendments approving the integrated
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surveillance program, included a Safety Evaluation which identified the above criteria which must be met and an evaluation of how FpL met the criteria.
l Hs, Lorion questions the applicability of surveillance test results from pnf t 3 to analyses of Unit 4, and has quoted Dr. George Sih of Lehigh University to Support her contention that th:15 is " scientifically invaliL " This contention j
is ebntrary to the basic assumpti9ns behind the nuclear power industry and NRC i
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use of radiation damage trend curves (e.g., Regulatory Guide 1.99) derived from analysis of data from many reactors.
It is also contraxy io NRC criteria for an integrated surveillance program (e.g., Appendix H.1
' 50). Professor Sib's views were considered as part of the pressurized teer al shock studies in j
the 1981-82 time period and were rejected due to lack of '.echnical basis.
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1 i
- The Honorable Lawton Chiles '
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1 Based on the previously cited court decision and the technical basis in Su; sport of tha integrated surveillance program for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, Ms. Lorion's contentions have ne merit, It also appears that Ms. Lorton
)
believes that the only source of infomation about the neutron embrittlement of the materials in a given reactor vessel comes from the test results for specimens irradiated in that vessel as part of its surveillance program.
I must emphasize 1
that there is a sound basis for estimates of neutron embrittlement besides the infomation obtained from plant specific surveillance.
Until olants have credible surveillance data of their own (preferably from two or more capsules) their submittals for pressure-temperature limits, which take
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account of radiation embrittlement, are based on knowledge of the chemical composition and the neutron fluence. Test data from many sources is used which has been characterized according to the critical variables, chemical composition of the material tmd neutren fluence. On this basis, pressure-temperature limits have been established for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 that ensure safe operation; and the susceptibility to the pressurized thermal shock has been evaluated.
The NRC has accepted certain fomulas for calculating the degree of embrittlement.
The basis for these fomulas is the rapidly growing surveillance data base from all power ;eactors. A significant margin is added to the calculated result to account for uncertainties. The NRC has established in 10 CFR 50.61 a screening l
criterion and identified acceptable means for calculating the reference tempera-j ture to judge the condition of reactor vessels at ali sites. A PTS screening criterion of 300*F has been established for circumferential (girth) weld material. O previously stated, the center girth welds are the rest critical
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welds for PTS conserns at the Turkey Point site. The Turkey Point reactor J
I vessels critic:.1 weldt will remain below the screening criterion for their
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licensed life which assm ; continued safe operation of the Turkey Point Units.
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In summary, there certainly is a need for care in monitoring the integrity of reactor vessels in all operating nuclear power plants. The nuclear power
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indurtry and the NRC have expended considerable effort to ensynf that safety margins are maintained by assuring that the extent of neutron radiation d3 mage
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is known. Contrary to Ms. torion's opinion, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 are not i
operating in violation of NRC safety margins and their integrated reactor vessel material surveillance program confonns to NRC regulations and assures j
the best use of the available surveillance capsules containir.g the critical i
weld material for both units.
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i The NRC has an extensive inspection and enforcement program te assure that J
construction, operation and safety standards are ret at all nuclear power i
plant sites. The Tickey Point Plant has two full-time resident inspectors
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Onsite.
In addition, several announced and unannounced inspections are i
per omed by specialists from NRC Headquarters and the Region to augment the r
resident inspection ectivities. The NRC has expended approximately,3,800
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inspector hours at the Turkey Point site for the cerrert calendar year.
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l The Honoreble Lawton Chiles {
f The purpose of the NRC inspection and enforcement program is to promote and f
protect the radiological health and safety of the public by ensuring compliance
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l With NRC requirements, obtaining prompt corrective actions, deterring future j
violttlons, and encouraging improvement in licensee perforraance, Pr%pt and vigorous enforcement action is taken when licensees do not achieve the necessary a
attention to detail and the high standard of compliance which the NRC expects.
)
i Any licensee who cannot achieve these high standardt will not be permitted to conduct licensed activities, j
i The NRC staff has completed approximately 48 M censing actions relating to the Turkey Point Plant Units 3 and 4 during this calendar year. Ead licensing action is supported by a dethiled safety evaluation and results in operational changes, plant modifications or other actions resulting in an overall enhancement of plant safety.
Finally, I would like to note that Florida Pnwer ad Light Company (FPLi has developed a Performance Enhancement Program (PCP). The PEP focuses management
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atter. tion on the Turkey Point Plant facilities, operation and maintenance.
i FDL has devoted considerable resources to this program for enhancing the i
overell safe operation of the Turkey Point Plant.
In sumary, I trust you find this responsive t-o your request and of assistance f
in assuring yourself and your constituents that the Comission actions in providing protection for all reactor vessels in operating nuclear power plants, including Turkey Pcint Units 3 and 4, are based on sound technical judgarent.
i lhe criteria which are used as the bases for approving ir.tegrated surveillance programs for vartous utilities, including FPL, are bastd on sound technical j
,iu dgeme nt.
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l in addition, the ongoing activities re16ted to inspection, enforcement and licensirg at the hrrkey Point Plant assure continued safe operation. The actions t5 ken by the staff in these. aren are consistent with the Comission's 1
policy of ensuring all. operating facilities achfeve and maintain adequate j
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levels of protection of pub 71L health and safety.
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If we can be of further assistance, please do not hesitete to contact us.
Sincerely, (yrigir.al SiM N V Lctor $t*UO
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Victor Stello, Jr.
Executive Director i
for Operations q
Enclosure:
L Response to J. Lorien biSTR1RUTION: SEE NEXT PAGE Petition
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U.S. Court of Appeal Decision
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CASE SCHEDULED FOR.Ok 11 ARGUMENT ON DECEMBER 116, 1985'-
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBI A' CIRCUIT
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JOETTE LORION,-
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1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY'
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No. 82-1132 l,4 COMMISSION and the UN3TED STATES
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RESPONDEtiTG ' RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS OF RESPONDENT,AND INTERVENO_R-In this action petitioner doette Lerion contests the ed "1981 NRC denial of her request, based on her concerns about'
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radiation-induced embrittlement of.the reactor pressure L
vessel,'to consider suspending the operating ~1icense for the Turkey Polut, Unit 4 nuclear reactor.
Ms. Lorion in her October 18, 1905
- Reply to Supplemental Briefs of Respondent and Intervenor" (" Petitioner's Reply") asserts that the Turkey Point, Unit. 4 reactor vessel was more embrittled in 1981 than permitted'by the Nucicar Requiatory Commission's (*NLC" or "Comission") recently promulgated rule on pressurized thermal L
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To support this claim.Ms. Lorion cites a 1976 study, which' was based on destructive tr.sto (Charpy tests) of b
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material tahen'from capsules in Unit 4.
Ms.' Lor 16n projects
, from the data in that study', which was not.specifically.
l addressed in the NRC's denial of.her request,.that by 1981 the reference temperature, or k$NDT, f r the reactor vessel for s
Unit 4 had exceeded the Commission's current screening i
criterion of 300'F for. protection against PTS.
Petitioner's
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Reply at 11o14.
Ms. Lorion also cluilms that the.NRC has avoided this conclusion tho'gh the " legal alchemy
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data from tests or, capsules f rom Unit 3 rather than.from
- Unit'4. Id'. at 14-15.
Ms.. Lorion's I.ast-minute attempt to create an 4
j entirely new attack on the Commission's denial of her.2s206 petition is based both on a mf. understanding of the NRC's
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, practice.in responding to 10 C.F.R. 6 2.206 requests, and on invalid data.
Upon receipt of a 10.C.F,R 5 2.206 request the-NRC makes an inquiry appropriate to the facts asserted.
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Consolidated f0ison Company of New York (Indian Point, i
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Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 175 (1975).
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requestor has an obligation to set forth the basis for the
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q request, since the NE C is not required to develop such fcets J
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Public S,ervice,C0mpapy of 1
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In general terms, the reference temperature is'a I
calculated number that roughly co1 responds to the temperature below.which a precipitous drop occuro in the fracture toughness of metal.
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i Indiana (Marble' Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units ?. & 2),
CLt-80-10, 11 NTtC'438, 443 (1980).
The NRC ' car, rely on j
j information from a variety of. sources, including staf f l
analyses of' generic issues, and need onl,y explain the basir of
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Northern Indiana Public Service Compa_ny, (Bailly
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Generatir,g S tation, Nuclea$ -1)', CLI-7 8-7, - 7 N. R.C.
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I af fld Porter County Chapt.er v. Nuclear Regulat ry Cormissien,' '
J 506 P.2d 1363 (D.C, Cir4 1979).
The NRC cannot reasonably be expected to address all
-f documents in its possession which may touch.on the subject matter.of a'10 C.F.R. 5 2.206 request.
Depending on the issue raised thure may be literally thousands of documents which'
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discuss various. aspects of technict.1 concerns involving.the
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regulation of tuclear poucr plants.
It may well happen that the agency has material in its possession which'has a facial relevance to the subject'but which in fact is inaccurate or misleading.for reasons that are appa nt to experts in the l
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The agency in explaining its, decision need not go of f
. on a tangential discussion of the material it is not relying on, particularly when the request neither specifically identified such material nor suggested that it may be relevant.
Rather, the agency teed only provide a ressoned l
basis for its decision, as was done in this caso.
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As explained in the attached affidavit of Pryor Randall, the NRC had good reason not to rely on the 1976 data i
now cited by Ms. Lorion when it denied her' request in 1981.
Those data are currently invalid, and were invalid in 1961, as 3
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data tS om/alll planta to develop an equation.for determining i
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e nbrittlement at individsal plents, including Unit. 4,.cnd, contrary to pctitiene'rls asses tions, there Li3. no "aichemy" J'
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involved. JHence,,there was'no reason for the agency.to 1
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The-2 976 study at' issue here m.
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-~C~ Y Nf'( E. LEO SLAGGIE;y V,, Jf' Deputy' Solicitor' / 'i .,. y, i' q RICHARD P. LEVI Attorneyc , Office of,tNe'Guneral Counsel;. g, U.S. Nuclear hEquiatory Commission _c Washington,'D<C.,20555 ~V-o 4 IW 1 o ^ .OMT BRYSON . Attorney: s 4 Land and' Natural Resources Division. ] .U.S; Department of' Justice n '.~.i Washington, D.C. 1 4' 5. ,y i 2 Petitioner Lorion aiso appears to.be'a'rguina that't'ne q ~ j a ' Court should order the. agency to address this additional .l information under 28' U.S.C. $ 2347 (c). Petitioner's new information does not meet the standards of 28 U.G;C. 5 2347 (c).. As indicated ir. ' the attached affi.davin,- the data ') s cis - inva lid,1 and hence it is not material. ;Moreover, j petitioner-han fbiled to offer. adequate bastification for not presenting the data before thisListe date. j J h en if petitioner.had met the'. standard of section .) M 2347 (c), moreover, a remand to the agency would not-be j .Ljustified, because petitioner's appropriate remedy'would be to j. ~ file:a new 10 C.F.R. $ 2.206 petition. See Ramirez-Gonzaler j 1 Immictration and Naturalization Service, 695 F.2d 1208, v.1213-14 (9th Cir. 1983); Alasha Steam _ ship Co. v_. Federal 3 Haritime Commissio.n, 356 F.2d 59, 63 (9th Cir.1966). s .t h 1 l 3t' l,~.id1__________.________________.m__.
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. q- , f ' i,s J,. ' DECLARATION OF PRYOR N.-RANDALL e. 1 'a lg.< l. My name is Pryor N.-Randall.- I'am employed by.- j the Nuclear Regulatoiy Commission.'in'the Office of.Research. + .I';am making this: affidavit in support o'f.the NRC's response to k. Ms. Lorion's Supplemental Reply'Br.ief. Ms.iLorion relies-on a i ~ 1976 document,, Pressure Temperature Limi_tations:forLth:e Turkey i b Point UnitiNos. 3'end.4' Nuclear _ Power-Plants,; Southwest 1 'l . ResearchiInstitute Project No. 02-4383-039l (June 30,1976), to i I -argue that pressurized thermal whock (PTS) sis a curren't,. L, seriousconcernatborkeyPoint,' Unit'4' 'As explained below,.. 3 l the! data.from the 1976, study,were.not valid'in 1981', and'are not currently valid. 2. Petitioner Lorion to support her~ argument primarily relies.on the results.from the.Charpy tests on the c.
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.tnetals from a surveillance capsule from, Unit 4. Based on the ~ .m results of those 1976 tests, the Southwest'Research Institut'e t, at Turkey. Point, Uni ~t 4 wauld be projected that the RINDT l-340*F after tan equivalent full power years (EPPY). As l3. i petitioner Lorion notes, this would exceed the Commission's L. ' V i current screening criterion of 300*F. y 1 8 L 4 l l i l 1 l l 4 ..I.
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s . m;;,n v ( 4 'a m However, there are'two major Ilaws.in petitioner lc j t s , L' I s ? y.',l' First,'it is y < '!p . reliance on,this: single data point. i e data point,,such-as a Charpy. o my y inappropriate' to rely on a singl. p,. . Surveillance; data test,7t'o detemine vessel embrittlement, +, like that in the 1916 study have been shown to produce a wide-l they have a' wide error band, and are useful
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l The statistical probabilities. only. to determine trends anc Commission therefore does not permit the use of results from \\ { plant opecific capsule tests to show thet a vessel meets, or I the screening criterion. Rather, the l does not meet, Commission used the results of Charpy tests from many plants ) ] to develop an equation that can be used to calculato 1 Under this aquation, the ) 1' individual vescel embrittlement. ,4 l value is detei' mined essentially.as a funct hn of the n RTg7 d the . copper and nickel content of the vessel materisis, an intensity of the_ neutron bombardment to W idh they have'been ) This method was used by the NRC in 1981 to _ subjected, v Unit 4, and is determine the embrittlement of Turkey Point, i 2., I more accurate than.the s' ingle point method used in,the 1976-5' This method is also that adoptad by the Commission in ~ study. 3 its 1985 rulemaking. Second, the 1976 data point was measured at a Charpy l The Commission's regulations, t energy level of 42 ft. Ib. i 14, 1980, -} which were 18 sued in proposed form on November 4 4'" l l l l i 1 i i 2 1 _._____m
l l 45 Fed. Reg. 75536, require that measurements be taken at a Chacpy energy level of 30 ft. lb. 1C C.F.R. Part 50, App. G, S II.E. The Commission has dcternined (as demonstrated by th'at rulemaking) that the 30 ft. Ib. level more occurately -epresents the enange in material properties (fracture toughness) resulting f rom neutron irradiation, i.e., the vessel embritt lement. If the 30 ft. 16. value is applied to va ue w uld the 1976 data, then the projected ten EFDY RTNOT be withir the Commission's current screeniry criterjon. 3; Ms. Lorien also criticizes the une of Unit 3 data for deceemining the embrittlement of Unit 4. Each lot of welding material used in nuclear reactorc is son.ewhat different. Samples of varicus lots are put in the capsules. since PTS was not a concern when the Turkey Point reactors were built, it was not known at the time which weld would later turn out to be criticcl. It now turns out that no samples of the critical weld lot for Unit 4 were put in a J. Unit 4 dapGule, although some were put in the capsults in Unit 3. Thas a more accurate data point of embrittlement of the critical weld in Unit 4 can be obtained by using the Unit 3 sample, corrected for differences from Unit 4, than from using the Unit 4 c6paules of different welding material. Contrary to Ms. Lorion's assertions, Petitioner's Reply at 15, the licensen letter dated October 23,1981, which 3
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t , representative of Unit.4.then the surveillance capsule removed- ~ does not indicate that Charpy' tests of. Unit 3 from Unit 4,P of Onit 4.
- Rather, capsuleswereusedtodetermine'theRJNDT licensee used th's chemical' content of the Unit-3 surveillance
] b, e ause, as cap.sule in the,f ormuls for determining :R1'tIDT, g ,Y the. Onit' 3 capsult -is more repruentative 'of the 'noted above, 3 critical weld in the Unit 4 yestel. Thus there is no q -.. " alchemy"i. Petitioner's Reply at 14-15, 'in using Unit '3 surveillance data as.an. input into, determining the 1 embrittlet~ ant of Unit 4 '/- 4. With regard to Professor George Sih's comments, ,3 ,o' ,(, g e_ Petitioner *siReply.at 17-18, his statements that. embrittlemeWc depends en the " combined eff: cts of~ irradiation i and' pressurized thermal shock" and that the " loading histog ~ l plays a major role," are utisubNtantiated and are contrary to I the. basic assumptions behind the Nhc use of radiation damage i . trend curves, which are de. rived from a compilation of data S_e e, e. g.,, Regulatory Guide 1.99. from many reactors. e i Professor Sib's views were considered ac part of the PTS l studies in the 1981-82 time period and were rejected as not being substantiated by technical information. l 's i i 4 l l l l i
] i .. j 4 ,e o3, , qe c. 1 >+ c 7f ' ~ j t i 4 r m j 5 2.206 JheNRCfonreceiptof10C.F.R. i 5 2 i petit' ions reviews the information1 presented'iti 'the petition u j and.other relevant' documentation and explains its' Since the 1976 deta now cited by.Ms..Lorior. was not i -decisio.1 .referr.td to in her petition, it invalid, and was invalid in t c 1581, the NRC did not' find t necessary to addre's thist 1976~ s data, or numerous other doc 9ments, in order:adequat61y~to.I respond to Ms. tori,on's request. 6. In -sum, to assess the safety of ' individual 1 s ' plants the Commis'iion uses available data, corrected.to allow f or dif ferences between plants,- to determine :both the' omount of radiation at the~ location of the' critical wela and the. That was done for weld's ability'to withstand that radiation. ~ Turkey Point. Unit 4, in 1981. And those c31culations are rot v, affected by the outdated 1976 data points, 'I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing'is true and correct. ~' 6 -. Executed on December _g(_, 1985. i 4p 7 .~ E _a.d a T 1 n ryor l I 1 6 I l I
y---- T l e , { [' [ . l. ;.h i. ~ o - i' L j, l j. *.i t, j,. ENCLOSWlU2 .c,,',,- f l' V (. D[E-1 '} ' , ;) t .;G', h' This osin'on:lc mabjectJte fortsal revnton befom srabUcation . Notes: h . C in the Fderal 1%orte: or NLB. App,D.C. Reportaf Users au repste4
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1 i sede kleu the botmd toba.u go to prus.' 74'. '., a <4 y (fl10D kIGlPB(LU1R"t ftf 1}ipf t,th1 l l 'r ' N.t 'TIIt mirarir ar cc:umA cIltcinT. { FU21)C i - U l' DIOEt1E LORiON,d/b/a CMTER FOR > NUcLw.n UCSPONSIBIL17YiPb7MT10NER ( c 4 Y. Un:Trn STATES NUCLEAR RECCATORY COMMISS10N' s s snd UmTED STATES OF ltMEFJCA, FEPONDENTf2' '( 1 i T Lo,n0A POWER & SidFT COMPANY, INTERVEN0K ' c 1 .) On Pet! Boo for Rpiew raf an Order of the Y United Uta'ec Nur.leur F.mdatory ComtnWion d .o i r 3 Jygued Decenber 26,1995 e 7. Dacided March 419$6 Md?Hn H. Hodder, sath trham nrence J. Enderson, of counsd me on brief fer pitRione 2isard P. Lef whh whom F. Hemy Habicht, H, leistant Attormey General,.H(mel N. W. TMnt, General 'T f h; Bills of cate's.nt be fled 1ritt$a N desa after tatri of judctent. The q I eevrtlooks with dt.:fsnt vien anotient to 6ft bills of ecate oct c/ tLoe. o g } t F YL-
, y') g0[.p,~N_ t (' 'A -l i, 4 4 .,t: i 4 f 0 + W /'r_ - ,/ r f *[ j(h',7 c; nw O c y. ',' ( ' i. A6 l 1,' ' ! [ A j l ,x Coun:el, William H. Briggt, Jr., Solicitor, E. Leo Slaggie, l b i Deputy Solldtor, Dirk D. Snel, and John A. Bryeon were g.1 on brief forrfspondants.. j ,s i Harold F. Reis; with whom Holly N. Lindemon and. 1 f' Norman A. Col 6 of counsel, were on brief.for intervenor. O Before: MixvA, Circ 3(i. Judge, and MACDNNON and g Swycent,* Senior Circuit Jmfges. +, Opinion for the Coct liled by Circuit Judge MIHVA. MIEVA, Circuit l/tufge:. For more than four years, >.p, Joette Lorion Las been trying to feree the Nudear Legu. latory ~ Commission ("NRC" or "the Commission") to .o take aedon against a nucJear power plant near Miami, ."C Florida. She feam that the Turkey Point Unit pH nu. 1 chr' reactor, #nich is owned.end operated by Florida i Power & Light Co. ("FPL"), contains unsafe equipment, und that the danger of a nuclear accident it steadily. in-1 creasing. Her crusade began with a letter to the Com-mirsion; since then it hts grorn to includs a Supreme - Court decis!on, and now a second trip to tnis court. Lorion rahes a carkty of legal issues, some of them qu te complex. None of her contentions, howc"er, can - overcome the wide latitude that the NRC has in framing its criterit for hearings and its enforcement agenda. We s:-. hold that the NRC acted within its discretion in refusing E sf to hold a hearing, and therefore affirm the Commission's 'lecision. 1 9 The nuclear fuel that provides the power in a reactor is packe.ged in rods. When in use, these rods are con-3 tained in steel pressure vessels inside the reactor. The steel walls of the vessal are constantly exposed to radia- s tion; this exposura causes the metal to become "embrit-a' 1 ' Of the United States Court of Appeals for 'the Seventh I w Circuit, oltting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. I 291(a) a (1982). I l l i 1 l 9 L
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+ . e' 'y,... i f .' i .j g T 8 r tied," w$11ch means that fi; is prone to cracking.or shat-' tering when subjected to rapid danges in temperature 1 o: pressure. These sudden changes are called "pressur-i Ired thermal shock" (" PTS"). The underlying issue -in ] Lorion's appeal is the risk posed by PTS to the safety'of the steel vessels in Turkey Point Unit #4. l 1 Excessive vessel embrittlement coul' learl to severe con- - d 1 sequences. When a nuclear power plant is faced with an< l emergency, one of its safety steps is to, flood the reactor j core with cold water. Without this water, the fuel rods j could overheat and burn through the vesstl walls, result-i ing in an infamous " meltdown." The risk is that the sudden temperature change can cause embrittled walls or weld joints to crack,' allowing the radioactive coolant j water to escape. See generally Edelson, Thermal Shock-
- i New Nuclear-Reactor Safety Hozardt, Popular Science, June 1983, at 55.
In 1981, contem about the embrittlement problem led. j petitioner, or. behalf of the Center for Nuclear Respon-sibility (of which Lorion was the sole member) to write a short letter to the NRC concerning Turkey Point Unit l T_
- 4. Her letter noted that the Commission 'itseif had l
( identhled this reactor as one of eight around the country 4 that were vulnerable to tracking uused by PTS. Bisad on this,7. orion asked that the NRC initiate license review procedures, to consider suspending FPUs license until the i reactor was proven safe. See Exnkn v. Nuclear Regula-i tory Cor, minion, 712 F.2d 1472,1473 (D.C. Cir.1983). The Commission treated Lorlon's letter as an er. force-1 ment request under 10 C.F.R. I 2.206 (1985). Seet!3n I 2.206(a) provides that 9 Any person runy file a request (with the NRC) to institute a proceeding pursuant to [10 C.F.R.] IS.202 to modify, suspend, or revokeen IIcense, or l for such other action as may be proper.... The requests shall si.ecify the action requested and set ~ f l
ic 'i i 1 l m i s.. 4 forth the facts that constitute the basis for the re-~ J quest. i m l On November 5,1981, the NRC denied petitioner's re-Florida Power and Light Co.,14 N.E.C.1078 j quest. (1981). The Commission stated that its staff had been I studying the. situation, and that based on the available f information, no immediate licensing action was necessary. Id. at 1082-83. The reply acknowledged that. embrittle-j l ment could present a long term problem, but it acsured Lorion that it was monitoring Turkey' Foint #4, and that j i the "NRC will take timely action in relation to the reac-j tor vessel problem." Id. at 1083. f Lorion appealed, but this court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Lorion,712 F.2d at 1476-79. j The Supre'ne Court reversed and remanded, ordering us to reconsider petitioner's claims en the merits. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion,105 S. Ct.1598 (1985). On i the same day that it decided Lorion, however, the Court also handed down Hockkr v. Chaney,105 S. Ct.1649 (1985). In Hackler the Court held that the refusal by 1 an-agency to take enforcement action was presumptively j unreviewable. The Lorion Court therefore invited us to l consider the effects of Chaney on remand.105 S. Ct. at 1802 n.8. The case is now before us again. Lo ion's legal theory is that the NRC's decision not to take any enforcement action was an abuse of discretion; for relief, she asks { I. that this court instruct the Commission to order FPL to { m "show cause" why its operating license should not be sus; j 2
- pe.ided or revoked. In the alternative, petitioner claims l
that the court should remand to the NRC for a reconsid-l eration of her request, with the opportunity for her to provide additional evidence. II. 4 I We first address the quection of whether ths NRC's I decision not to issue a show cause order is reviewable. In i e $ o bb l l I
?m. 1 l h -\\ j V-1 i i l I 5 Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court pointed out the I difficulties of appellate scrutiny of an agency's choice not j to enforce its regulations in a particular case. The Court l c., wmte that this type of decision "often involves a compli-cated balancing of a sumber of factors which are pecu-Early within Ian. agency'o] expertise.... [t]he agency l is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the l many variables involved in the proper ordering of its pri- ? orities." 105 S. Ct. at 1656. Based on these considera-tions, Cheney held that decisions not to enforce are " pre-l sumed" to be " committed to agency discretion by law'? under the Administrative Procedure Act, and thus free ~ from judicial review. Id.; 5 ~U.S.C. f 701(a)(2) (1982). This presumption may be rebutted. A court may re-view a decision when the agency's governing statute pro-vides guidelines as to when the agency must take en-- ~ forcement action. Chaney,105 S. Ct. at 1656-57; cf. Dun-lop v. Ecchowski,421 U.S. 560 (1975) (cited by Chaney . as an example where governing statute gave court " law. . to apply"). The crucial consideration is whether Con-gress' intended to cireamscribe agency enforcement dis-cretion, and has provided statutory standards for the re-viewing court to follow.105 S. Ct. at 1657. Chaney did not decide, however, whether non-statutory standards could similarly restrict agency discretion; the Court i "[left) to one side the problem of whether an agency's rules might under certain circumstances provide courts ~# with adequate guidelines for informed judicial review of ~ decisions not to enforce." Id. at 1658 (emphasis a6ded). The parties admit that the application of Chaney to this case raises difficult questions. Although we doubt that on the facts before us the NRC's discretion is re-etricted by the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. Il 2011-2296 (1982), petitioner irgues that the regulations and NRC precedent require the Commission to initiate action when certain types of health and safety issues are raised. i 4.,. She also claims that the NRC's decision was not "analo-i e4 i e
\\ c.; I ^> 6 ~ i gous" to the type of enforcement action before the Court fn Chaney, so that the presumption of non-reviewability l ~ l does not apt y. Even thurgh it is a " threshold" question, the court need - not plunJ.) tge intricacies of this reviewability conundrum in the insLmt case. The merits of Lorion's underlying claims are sufficiently' clear that we can and should avoid the potentially far-reaching questions on the scope of Chancy. The decision to avoid a difficult threshold ques-tion 1.nd resolve the substantive dispute is not new; both the Supreme Court and this court have used the proce-1 dure to restrict cases to their narrowest possibk hi. ling, particularly when the threshold question involves impor-tant constitutional or public policy issues. In Chinese 4 American Civic Council v. httorney General of the i United States, 566 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir.1977), we re-fused to decide a complex standing question, and instead H resolved the underlying dispute. We found that "[phu-dential considerations also restrain us from decicEng the difficult and unquestionably far-reaching standing ques-- tion whan the merita of the case readily provide a fair, clear resolution of the nppbal." Id. at 325 (footnote omitted); see also Chandler v. Judicial Council, 898 U.S. 'T4, 86-89 (11970) (Court declined to reach jurisdictional question because petitioner failed to establish underlying case). We find that this case presents a similar situation, J and therefore turn to whether the Commission abused ita ,{ discretion in denying Lorion's enforcement request. ~ III. Petitioner makes three arguments that concern the merits of her appeal. First, she says that the N110 ig-mored its own policits and precedent in deciding not to institute a license review procedure. The NRC ha6 ruled that whenever a request for enforcement is made under
- 10. C.F.R. [ 2.206, the Commission is required to issue a show cause order if it decides that "a substantial health A
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3 I lw p x. 1 I ) \\ 1 and safety issue" has been raised. Consolidated Edison l ~' Co. of New York, 2 N.R.C.173,176 (1975), cited in i \\ Florida Power & Light v. Lorion,105 S. Ct. at 1601; in l l re Philadelphia - Electric Co., 22 N.E.C.149 ;(1985). } Lorion argues that 'the NRC has ' conceded that the in-q tegrity of steel pressure vessels is a substantial safety '] issue, and that it was therefore an abuse of discretion not j to take action. . Petitioner admits that the Commission never explicitly ] characterized the potential for vessel embrittlement as a j " substantial" safety issue. She notes, however, that in the NRC response to her letter, it referred to the reactor vessel " problem, and that in an unrelated policy state-ment, the NRC staff considered embrittlement a " safety concern." NRC Policy Issue, SECY-81-286, Enclosed Memo at 3-4 (May 4,1981) (April 28,1981 memo from Eisenhut to Denton). Even more significant, in Lorion's eyes,is a letter from the Commission to FPL, stating that the vessel embdttlement at Turkey Point Unit #4 was. " approaching levels of concern." Letter from Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, Office of Nu-clear Reactor Regulation to Robert E. Uhrig, Vice Presi-Jent, Florida Power & Light Co. (Aug. 21, 1981). Be-cause of this concern, the letter required FPL to submit Information, under oath, on the condition of the reactor. '"~ e
- Id.; see 10 C.F.R. I 50.54(f) (1985) (Commission au-thority to require additional information).
We cannot accept the contention that the NRC has im-plicitly categorized the concerns raised by petitioner as ) " substantial health and safety" problems. This phrase is a term of art within the Commission, beetuse it is the language reserved as a trigger for attion '.ather than a description of the severity of the concen.. The lenguage of the Commission's references here shows that it consid. cred embrittlement a problem, but not necessarily a "sub-a~ stantial" problem that would mandate a hearing proce-t dure. The Commission's precedenta make it cles.r that it y i LA----_-____..
l c e' no, F 8 i "whenever is not obligated to take enforcement act on we receive information adverse to the integrity of exist- ~b ing nuclear power safety or safeguard systems." In re Nuclear-Regulatory Commission,5 N.R.C.16,21 (1977), 1 citing Nader v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, bis I F.8d 104$,1054-55 (D.C. Cir.1975). We are not con-vinced that the NRC decided that embrittlement was a l substantial issue simply because the pr.blem was "ap-n proaching levels of concern." The broader question of whether a particular issue i should be considered substantial, and thus whether en-f forcement action is required, must be left to the Com-mission's discretion. Porter County Chapter v. Nuclear l Regulatory Commission, 606 F.2d 1363,1869 (D.C. Cir. l 1979). We find that the NRC reasonably concluded with t respect to Turkey Point Unit #4 that this was not such an issue at this time. As it pointed out in the re-sponse to Lorion's letter, the Commission had been study-ing the pressure vessel problem and had concluded that j .i the risk to public: health was very low. It acknowledged [ that there was the potential for problems in the long run, l but noted that it was working to correct the matter l through an ongoing, plant specific investigation. Florida Power and Light,14 N.R.C. at 1083. Based on the record, we car.not say that the Commission abused its f i discretion in refusing to ennsider Lorior/s concerns "sub-stantial," or to institute a licensirg procedure, { u sf Petitioner's second claim is that the NRC's rejection of her enforcement request was arbitrary because it failed to consider all the relevant evidence. She argues that two critical documents-which she believes clearly show the dar.ger of the reactor were never mentioned by the Commission in its reepnse to her letter. In her brief, Lorion also provides a long list of other docu-ments that were available to the Commission, but that either were not mentioned or not discussed in the reply. W" She suggests that the failure to even acknowledge the 0 8%. \\
y e m 1 l i j s u l 1 l 9 4 ',1 evidence meana that it was not properly considered, and l j that the ultimate decision was therefore irrational. l The tw6 crucial documents Lorion cites both purport - I to show that the steel vessels at Turkey Point are em-brittled beyond safe levels. The first is a 1976 report l to the NRC, stating that the embrittlement in Unit #4 l was both higher than expected and higher than the embrittlement !n Unit #3. The sceond document is the a response by Florida Power 'to the NRC request for s information. In this response, FPL suppl:ed dhta to show the condition of reactor Unit #4, based on data { g,athered frorn Utilt #3; the company coLcluded that i was "more representative" of the conditions at Unit #4 than the Unit..#4 data itself. Lorion implies that FPL q is trying to camouflage the problems with the #4 reactor by presenting irrelevant evidence, j It is true that an agency has a duty to consider all the evidence, and to explain its decision fully. City of Charlottesville v. Federal Energy Regtdatory Commis-sion, 661 F.2d 945, 950 (D.C. Cir.1981) ; Asarco Irc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 616 F.2d 1153,1159 (9th Cir.1980). It does not necessarily follow, however, that the failure to mention certain evidence means that it was not considered, nor does it follow that an explans-f i tion is incomplete unless it dutifully lists all the evi-dence that the Commission examined. The NRC's denial ~ .,o' of a request for a show cause order will be upheld as lang as all the necessary factors were considered, and provided that the statement of reasons given permits a " rational understanding of the basis for (the] decision." Consolidated Edison Co., 2 N.RC. at 175; see Motor g Vehicle Manufa.cturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). The Commission easily met its obligation here. The k hasis of the NRC's decision was explained in sufficient M detail to allow this court to conduct a meaningful re-view. There will be times, of course, when a reasoned i
s 1 L. y 10 e response is impossible without a discussion of contrary evidence, particularly when that evidence'is mentioned in the enforcement request. But as long as the Commis. { sion's reply fairly addresses the issues raised, the failure to rebut every argument raised by petitioner is not a per se abuse of discretion. To require the NRC_ to. men-tion and analyze ev~ery document relevant to a hearing request would completely clog an agency's decisional process. There is nothing in administrative law that. allows a complainant to filibuster the processes with a huge number of documents. Lorion's final argument warrants cnly briel mention. I She asks this court to consider the evidence on embrittle-ment and reverse the NRC's dedsfon; she claims that a the overwhelming evidence makes its " impossible" to conclude that no substantial safety issue was presented, i This misinterprets our scope of reMew, end ignores the latitude we must aff'ord the Commission's decisions. Courts are required to give their highest level of defer-ence to decisions involving novel questions at the "fron-tiers of science." Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Na-tional Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, los (1983). The susceptibility of steel reactor vessels to pressurized thermal shock seems to be just such an issue. We would only overturn the Commission's ' decision if it. were completely unsupported by the record; because . that is not the case, we decline to substitute our judg-e,' ment for that of the NRC's. See Porter County, 606 ~ F.2d at 1867-70. CONCLUSION The NRC provi&d a reasoned explanation for its de-cision in this case and thus it did not ' abuse its discre-tion by refusing to issue a show cause order. We have 'i esnsidered the rest of petitioner's claims, and find them i similarly unpersuasive. We therefore affirm. = It is so ordered. i
e[ Vf U9sm ztwovee 1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMtSSION. ,.y, j p, { =' c:Asninctow.e.c.20s:5 q*.BF)Ae 3 g, - j 1 f_' October 8,'1981 I ~ MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino l ~ FROM: Wi111am J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations ) )
SUBJECT:
DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPIllION OF D. BASDEKAS OH PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK At your meeting on September 17, 1981, with Mr. D. Pas'dekas, he discussed with you a series of his concerns related to pressurized thermal shock of WR ) pressure vessels. After that meeting, you asked Dr. Denwood Ross to provide staff views on the points raised by Mr. Basdekas. In respoase to your request, j responses as provided by the NRR and RES staffs are enclosed. ' William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
Answers to Mr. Basdekas' Concerns cc:. Commissioner Gilinsky Comissione'r Bradford Commissioner Ahearne Commissioner Roberts l l D. Basdekas, RES j R. Minogue, RES H. Denton, HRR ik e. l ', h. SECY q OGC C 4/ .0PE , x v \\' p e Y,, > { - 6, ',, y.8,
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l COMMENT 1. "$ome of the steps taken or proposed by the_ Staff may be necessary, but they are' not sufficient to provide an acceptable level of pmtection to public' heal',h and safety. Contrary to the stcff's position, this matter is urgent. It is also more extensive than the Staff states it to be." RESP 0fiSE-The staff reaards pressurized thermal shock of pressure vessels as a very important safety issue and believes that the actions taken and planned are appropriate on the basis of our current knowledge. In the judgment of the staff, there is sufficient time to eva'luate the infomation to be submitted in response to the letter to eight licensees and in the PWR Owners Groups' genreic studies before ~ deciding what further ' regulatory action is needed. ' The staff report to the Commission, SECY-81-286A (dated September 8,1981) con-veys a sense of urgency. A complete reading of Enclosure 1 to SECY-81-285A, which is. the minutes of meetinas hald July 28 30,=1931, ir,'icates that the staff position is for prompt, positive actions to prevent potentially damagi6g transients or mitigate their effects. A 4 J 1 1 1
~ o.. i The precursory operational experience on' pressurized thermal shock . C0!'FtNT 2. has been noted. but not heeded by the Staff. The probability. of severe overcooling accident sequences (particularly outside the i design basis envelope) are substantially greater than those given .by the Staff. The industry's " bounding" cases are based on design basis accidents. ) RESPONSE. .l The staff has made a study of PWR ope' rational experience to look for. severe, overcooling transients and their precursors. In 1980, the RES staff reviewed ) the operating experience'of B&W plants and found that there h3d been a number of overcooling trar.sients in B&W plants. The most serious transient was that at Rancho *Seco nn' March 20, 1978, in which the. coolant temperature dropped from j b50*F to 280'F in about I hour while the system pressure first dropped, then i returned to near its original value. Based on this experience, a probability j of 3 x 10-2/ reactor-year was estimated for a B&W plant to experience an over-tooling -transtent as severe or more severe than the Rancho Seco event was estimated. In addition, B&W plants have experienced several similar, but less severe transients such as occurred at Oconee-3 in November 1979 and Crystal River-3 in February 1980. These and otha.r small er transients that occurred in B&W plants ' lead to an estimate of 5 x 10-I small transients per year in B&W i plants as described in M. A. Taylor's memorandum of October 29, 1980. I Since these occurrences, operators have received special training in transient Babcock and Wilcox plants have added a back-up power supply to the response. nonnuclear ir.strumentation bus, whose failure initiated the three transients above. The NRR staff examined the impact of the improved power supply and operator training and suggested that these improvements might have reduced the probability to 10 / reactor year for an overcooling transieht as severe as the -3 Rancho Seco event for B&W plants. ] L
ComENT 2 (continu?g The operating experience of CE and Westinghouse plants has also-been examined. There have been no events like the Rancho Seco transient, but thers have been j ~ some precursors. These are events which typically led to secondary ster.m dump valves or steam bypass valves sticking open, but which did not result in steam flows large enough to produce very severe overcooling transients. The most severe of these transients occurred at Arkansas Nuc? ear One-2 (a CE plant) on December 27, 1978, where a main steam relief valve ' lifted and failed to reset, thereby causing the reactor csolant temperature to drop by 107'F in 52 minutes. Based on this e'xperience, the staff estimates the probability of a severe ever-cooling transient in a CE or W plant due to a large steam line break or its equivalent to be no greater than about 10~4/ reactor year. I' In sumary, the staff estimates the probability of a severo overecoling trar.sient J } l during which the primary pressure remains'high is about 10'3/ reactor year for BlW ~4 plants and 10 / reactor year for CE and Westinghouse plants. 1nere may be a s i factor of 10 uncertainty associated with these estimates. l Although some of the PWR Owners Groups' calculations have been based on design i l basis accidents, we have asked for analyses tf a wider range of overcooling 1 transients. These analyses should cover transients 'resulting from multiple \\ l l failures or operator errors. i \\ 1 t
1 '4 l The uncertainties in c.-itical parameter values are substantial C01'#.Dti 3. HDT uncertainties far greater than these given culminating in RT ~ Domestic cnd foreign experienr.e indicates a trend by the staff. for higher than estimated RTHDT'
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RESPONSE. The staff is aware that there are uncertainties in estimating RTNDT, pri xipaH y from the following sources: (1)' uncertainties in the initial RTNDT I uncertainties in copper content of the weld metal; (2) (3) uncertainties in vissel fluence estimates; (4) unce.rtainties in irradiation temperature: shift to uncertainties in the Regulctory Guide 1.99 curves relating RTHDT (5) fluente and copper content of welds In calculating RT;DT, the uncertainties have been accounted for by using con-t This is servativ~e estimates of the factors that are used in calculating RT NDT. and the prediction of RThDT.chift based on especially true of the initial RTNDT Regulatory Guide 1.95. Vessel fluence calculations will be carried out with a well bencinarked an calibrated neutron transport code to yield fluence accuracy not worse than 120%, The copper and the remaining uncertainty will have only a small effect on RT ~ t!DT. content of the weld metal is 'celieved to be known to within 10.03% copper (based en measured data) and this uncertainty will have only a small effect on RT '3T" H shi't from sur-f There is a substantial amount of information from measured RT NDT veillance tests of we' ids which shows that the curves in Regulhtory Guide 1.99 for Based on this shifts are conservat.ive for shifts aheve 150*F. predicting RTNDT information, the staff believes that there are substantial conservatism in tSe f r shifts above 150*F. predicted values for RTHOT c l 1 --C12 m _... air
/; %. r. e.,>,. - r: /_, s. y,,. -e 1 C0lNEHT 4. The sennario related thermohydrodynamic assumptions tre not-realistically conservative. The designation of the Rancho Secol event as the bounding benchmark for 180 systems initiated i overcaolir.g transients is not realistic. l l RESPONSE. The staff is evaluating a wide range of possible overcooling transients, as presented by the licensees as well as those done by us*, and will assess their ' expected frequency as well as. severity. Until this evaluat'on is completed, the staff has selected the March 20, 1978 Rancho Seco transient as a bench-mark for use in fracture mechanics calculations of pressure vessels. 'The ~ Rancho Seco transient is not intended to' be a bounding overcooling transient. , The final choice of overcooling trans ents to use as benchmarks for fracture i mechanics cK!culations will be made on the bbsis of the. staff's judgment of the probability of the transients occurring and their severity of overcooling with appropriate consideration of the uncertainties associated with such estimates. i he staf f uses ceveral system analysis models to predict the tempentura and T pressure histories,,of a primary coo' ling, system in a transient state.
y j I _C0K'4ENT 5. "A request for design information on control systems to selected utilities was blocked by NRR moagement." RESPONSE. j Mr. Basdekas recommended that the following information be requested in the 1 August 21, 1981, letter to eight licensees- " design descriptions, including ' system functional block diagrams and single-line schematics of the plar.t's control systems, and f 1 { the associated P&ID's and system flow diagrams." Hr. Basdekas believed that this information was required for the ;taff to perform a complete analysis of the potential for pressurized thermal shock incidents occurring at' these plants and also to provide some of the data for a research contract to investigate the safety significance of control system failures for which he;is the NikC contract monitor. A During development of the final versien of the letters, NRR Managers concluded that this request for control system design details, which arc in excess of those l normally reviewed in the licensing process, was not appropriate at this time, in the context of the letters or. pressurized therinal shock. (The letters do request the licensees to " provide any failure modes 'and effects analyses of { 1 control systems currently available or reference any such analyses alttady submitted...") Aftar the staff has reviewed the information to be submitted in response to the August 21 letters, and the reports of the Owners Gnups due by ] the end of the year, a decision will be made regarding the depth of staff review f I.. of control systems needed to resolve the issue of pressurized thermal shock. 1 I As to obtaining this type of information for the recarch contract to investigate the safety significance of control system failures, a different, more appropriate l method to obtain this information will be utilized. t l L {
,y um 1,y,M % g 4:. :fr%'W.b'.' ldf..'.?-(l. % :TFkQ ( . T ll'. e Fi M 41,'n..,.;.?{& T;.% %;f4&n ~8r,T,,llQ W;.;;.;4.W. f? i s & l'7A.J..m Wu. I 1.n.h.f *:.. QaktX31 e a. 1% i It should also be noted that a Task Action Plan is being deveicped for Untesolved i Safety Issue b47, "Sefety Impilc6tions of Control Systems." Cear. sideration is being given in ti;e development of that plan to the identification of contr61 i 5 system failures that can contribute to recctor vet.sei overcooling tranttents, and to the' development of criteria for plant-specific reviews of control systeins. Mr. Basdehas' coments have been, nr.d will continue i.c be, requested end con-i tidered in the developmc.t of the pl4n. l e d W +De O d 9 O e l
I a ^ C b+ COMMENT 6. The significance of the synergistic effect cf Nickel 'on the rate o f increa-se of RT is not a: counted for in Regulatory Guide 1.99. NDT R[SPONSC. The chemical content (including nickel)is known for all specimen $ from which date were derived and used in generating the curves in Regulatory Guide 1.99 Tn95, the effect uf nickel on the RT,f,0T shift is accounted for in Regulatory shtfts for sur-Guide 1.99. Past and recent information from measured RTHOT veillance tests of weld material shows that the Regulatcry Guide 1.99 curves i shif ts are conservative for materials with high and low i for preyictir.g RTNDT nickel content for shifts above 150'Fs m I 'l 1 l l i 1 l i
0!'j[,7 ~~ ~T ~~- - - --
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m m glq ]*' 1 M 00MMElli 7 One' assumption on which the staf f b'ased the in-vesut tnaterials Y ~~ g, surveillance program was tha't,the welds were not going to be ths m. critical elements for embrittlement considerauds. Hence, the-circumferential' placmneat of sample capsules were designed with -j that in 7ind. It turns. out.that in rest instances, welds are the; f.[ data are critical elements.- Furthermore, fluence and RTNDT t obtained in cycles of 5' 6 years. i- 'i : RESPONSE. 'h Surveillance capsules which consist of wsld, heat affected zoae and base mate-f this. are placed in reactor vessels to provide lead tin:e information on RTNOT 1 'shif ts an'd to.provideidata to benchurk hautron fluence calculations. I't is ) not necessary thatlthe surveillance capsules be placed at the weld locations. F sin:o the' data obtained can be extrapolated to the correct vessel locations by. L ineans' of chiculations. In fact, locating th surveillance capsules at the len2it'udinal welds would interfere with uservice inspection of the welds, l and'would actually increase the rate of embrittlement of the weld because there is a peak in the fast neutron flux just behind Ge capsule on the inside wall of the vessel, W th respect to timing of surveillance tapsele examination, aLeapsule is i Rulez for withdrawal typically pulled at the.first or second refueling. .i f schedules ar~e given in 10 CFR 50. Appendix H. 1 4 l f ~ l j
L../ ' g b "s q i p oy.. 1 l CO M NT 8, There are important aspects of tho forei n experience, concerns,. D and measures, taken on this problem that need to be examined 4 carefully. { i NESPONSE. a ,In the' context of this casser, foreign experience refers to overcooling transients l at fareign reactors. "ine concerns art. 'of course, the sarne: high thermal f } - stress; undercalculation of fast fluence; loss of fracture toughness dtt to i irradiation. The countermeasures are the same as being considered in the US: i reduce fluence, reduce challenge; restore and maintain ductility. { l i The RSS.chiHRR staffs have had regular contact with foreign experts on pressure L ~ vessel integrity for years. An extensive set of guestions relating to pressure I l vessel thermal shock has been sent to foreign regulatory authorities, and the staff has reviewed the responses received to date. As an example of the type of discussions with foreign experts, the staff cet with rep.osentatives of the German Ministry of the Interior lilM1) and the Reactor Safety Comission (RSK) ( in Bethesda on September 29, 1961, on this subject. I i l l l t f l
'(h bl 5.Sh l. 4 ) ? J o 'The in situ annealing caph.ility requirement (Appendix G, IV-C) l 4 CCfEENT 4. 'j is n0t inet by many PWRs. I l h p kESPONSE. ~ f} The 10 CFR 50 (Appendix G, IV-C) requirer that the reactor pressure vessel be designed to permit :n-place annealing to recover material fracture toughness properties if calculations predict that neutron irradiation my increase the RT to 200'F or more before the end of plant life. For licenes issued NDT after the effective date of this rule (August 16,1973), licensees who predict l ) end-of-life RTNDT > 200*F hava AsserteJ that they have the capability to anneal. l Since the' requirement was not inpesed until August 16, 1973, some older plants l have never been asked'to respond to the requirement of Appendix G. The stoft judgment, howeyce, is that the similerity in PWR designs is such that there should be no design aspects that would preclude in situ PPY annealing in any I p1Ent. l } The eight licensees
- have been specifically asked to provid2 the basis for
) demonstrating that their plants meet the requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix G, I 1Y-C. When these respanses are received in Jancary 1982, the staff will have a better basis for assessing the capabilities of these PWRs for in situ annealir.g. i l ?f h l l
- in! 47Ft. CD houn, Robinson 2, San Onof re 1, l'.aine Yankee, Decnce 't,
Turkey Point 4, Calvert Clif fs 1
l t,. p0lMEf610. The RT;g mentioned possible operational limi?, of 300"F is very . ques tion 4ble. ( RESPO!!5E.., 1 The staff has considered the possibility of establishing an upper limit on .l RT for opLrating PHK pressure vessels. Although the value of 300*F has l NDT been mentioned as an example, many mo're analyses of transient frequency and severity are needed before a limit con be established, furthermore, if an is to be imposed, it may well turn out that the limit-upper lireit on RTHDT will have to be a plant-specific limit. A e se 4 4 e 4 ^' 'd--a--
"4 . j - m_ 7 i j '. .g4 y COMMENT 13.. Not all. reasonable optiens appear to have' been conside' ed by l -n c the staf f seriously..The irpact of possible shutdowns must 4 be determined if it has not already. ] 4 p h,. cRE3PONSE. f The staff has concluded on the basis of current informtion that' correc "actior, is not necessary at this time. The actions the staff has initiated j and the information we have requested from licensees and owners grcups are 1 (ntended.to lead to driisions on any required corrective actions by the' l sumer of 1987.. or earlier if indicated. The option of plant shutdowns is i j always availa'le should the staff judge such actions are necessary to protect I o O~ the public health and safety. l t O t b e i
{ C0!'..ENT 12. For all the above, and in relation to item No.1 on this list, j it is recomended that an ad hoc group, including experts out 1 side NRC, be charged to study this matter and report '- the Comission with short-and long-term recommendations for dealirg. with it. In the interim, the Comission may consider all reason-able options available to it to assure an acceptable level of protection of public health and safety, something the staff 1 measures do not provice. l RESPONSE. Experts outside the NRC have been assisting the staif on the subject of pressure vessel integrity for a number of years. Major contributions have been made by experts from OkHL. HRL, US Naval Academy, Naval Ship R&D Center, University of liaryland..BCL, HEDL, and HBS. We have niso had critical contributions from 1 researchers in Belgium, Germany, France and England. Our 'long-stai. ding practice of involving the most knowledgeable experts continuer 'n this case. Of course, it is the staff that must be responsible for ultimate i decisions. We intend to discuss the conclusions with outside experts and with the ACRS before final disposition by the Comission. l l l l l i _}}