ML20246J796
| ML20246J796 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1989 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246J784 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8909050267 | |
| Download: ML20246J796 (13) | |
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AII6 CHM NT 1 PROPOSED CHANGES TO APPENDIX A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR OUAD CITIES UNITS 1 AND 2 DPR-29 DPR-30 3.5/4.5-4 3.5/4.5-3 3.5/4.5-17 3.5/4.5-11 l
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' QUAD-CITIES h
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b.
From the effective date of b.
Flow rate test -
After pump g
this amendment until My., November-s,#est each RHR service maintenance 490E, the ug loop of the
- 'as*
water pump shall and every containment cooling mode of deliver at least 3 months the RHR system for_ each 3500 gpm against
.n reactor may_ share the Unit E-i a pressure of 198
" A" er.d "SRHP. service _
Nc' ant 'o*
psig water pumps using cross tie line 1/2-10124 10" 0.:
2/2 -f orof.v-c.
A logic system Each Consequently, the require-o functional test refueling ments of Specifications outage 3.5.B.2 and 3.5.B.3 will impose the corresponding surveillance testing of equipment associated with
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'both reactors'if the shared RHR service water pump or
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pumps, or the cross' tie line, are made or found to be inoperable.
2.
From and after the date that one 2.
When-it is determined that one of the RHR service water pumps RHR service water pump is inop-is made or found to be inoper-erable, the remaining components able for.any reason, continued of that loop and the other con-reactor operation is permissible tainment cooling loop of the RHR only during the succeeding 30 system shall be demonstrated to days unless such pump is' sooner be operable immediately and made operable,'provided that daily thereafter.
during such 30 days all other active components of the con-tainment cooling mode of the RHR system are operable.
3.
From and after the date that one 3.
When one loop of the containment loop of the containment cooling cooling mode of the RHR system mode of the RHR system is made becomes inoperable, the operable or found to be inoperable for loop shall be demonstrated to be any reason, continued reactor operable immediately, and daily operation is permissible only thereafter, during the succeeding 7 days un-less such subsystem is sooner made operable, provided that all active components of the other loop of the containment cooling mode-of the RHR system, both core spray subsystems, and both diesel generi. tors required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available, shall be operable.
3.5/4.5-4 Amendment No. 114
QUAD-Cif1ES
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-The Containment Cooling mode of the RHR System consists of two loops.
Each. loop consists of 1 Heat Exchanger, 2 RHR Pumps, and the associated
. valves, piping, electrical equipment, and instrumentation.. The 8 flu.,_ 4*
- bindl Numler Mei). loop on' each unit contains 2 RHR Service Water Pumps.
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);C, din: M:x:Mr 24,1031, i: Aly 1,1 "2, the W" loop on each T*6')
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unit may utilize tf@ "A" r.d "0" RHR Service Water Pumos from Unit t- +--
[ Aper Number 1,May" RHR Service Water Pumps.'via a cross-tie. line Either set of equipment is capable of performing the containment cooling function.
Loss of:one RHR service..
water pump does.not seriously jeopardize the containment cooling capability, as any one of the. remaining three pumps can satisfy the cooling requirements.
Since there is some redundancy left, a 30-day-repair period is adequate.
Loss of one loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR syrtem leaves one remaining system to perform the containment cooling function.
The operable system is demonstrated to be operable each day when the above condition occurs. Based on the fact that when one loop of the containment cooling mode of the RHR system becomes inoperable, only one system remains, which is tested daily, a 7-day repair period was specified.
C.
High-Pressure Coolant Injection The high pressure coolant inje: tion subsystem is provided to adequately cool-the core for all pipe breaks smaller than those for which the LPCI mode of-the RHR system or core spray subsystems can protect the core.
The HPCI meets this requirement without the use of offsite electrical power.
For.the pipe breaks for.which the HPCI is intended to function, the core never uncovers and is continuously cooled, thus no cladding damage occurs.(reference SAR Section 6.2.5.3).
The repair times for the limiting conditions of operation were set considering the use of the HPCI as part of the isolation cooling system.
D.
' Automatic Pressure Relief The relief valves of the automatic pressure relief subsystem are a backup to the HPCI subsystem.
They enable the core spray subsystem and LPCI mode of the RHR system to provide protection against the small pipe break in the event of HPCI failure by depressurizing the reactor vessel rapidly enough to a~tuate the core spray subsystem and LPCI mode c
of the RHR system.
The core spray subsystem and the LPCI mode of the RHR system provide sufficient flow of coolant to limit fuel cladding temperatures to less than 2200*F, to assure that core geometry remains intact, to limit the core wide clad metal-water reaction to less than 1%, and to limit the calculated local metal water reaction to less than 17L 3.5/4.5-17 Amendment No. 114
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continued critter containment ctoling made of the 14 operation is permissible..
RHR shall be demonstrated to be only during the succeeding 7 operable immediately and daily days unless it'is sooner made thereafter.
operable provided that during such 7 days all active compo-nents of both core spray sub-systems,-the containment cooling
- mode of the RHR (including two
- RHR pumps), and the diesel pen-erators required f or operation
.of such components if no exter-nal source of power were avail-l able shall.be operable.
E
' 6.
If the. requirements of Specifi-
- cation 3.5.A cannot be met, an
. orderly shutdown of the reactor shall be initiated,-and the re-J actor shall be in the cold shut-down condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- B.
Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR.
B.
Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR-System-System Surveillance.of the containment-coolid.g mode of the RHR system shall -
be performed as follows:
1.
-a.
Both loops of the 1.
RHR service water subsystem
-containment cooling mode of testing:
the RHR system, as defined in the bases for Spe Item-Frequency cification 3.5.B. shall be
' operable whenever irradiated a.
pump and valve Once/3
-fuel is in the reactor operability months
~ essel and prior to reactor v
startup from a cold condition.
1.
- b. 'from the effective date of b.
Flow rate test -
After pump this amendment until each RHR service maintenance November 1, 1989 water pump shall and every the "B" loop of the deliver at least 3 months containment cooling mode of 3500 gpm against the RHR system for each a pressure of 198 reactor may share the Unit 1 psig "C" and "D' RHR service water pumps'vsing cross tie c.
A logic system Each line 1/2-10509-16"-D.
functional test refceling Consequently,'the require-outage ments of Specifications 3.5.B.2 and 3.5.B.3 will impose the corresponding
~ surveillance testing of equipment associated with both reactors it the shared RHR' service water pump or pumps, or the cross tie line, are made or found to be inoperable.
2.
From and after the date that one 2.
When it is determined that one of tFe RHR service water pumps RHR service water pump is inop.
- is made or found to be inoper-erable, the remaining components able for any reason, continued of that loop and the other con-reactor operation is permissible tainment cooling loop of the RHR only during the succeeding 30' system shall be demonstrated to days unless such pump is sooner be operable immediately and
.made operable, provided that daily thereafter.
during such 30 days all other active components of the con-tainment cooling mode of the RHR
. system are operable.
1
. 1545B 3.5/4.5-3 Amendment No. 68, 72, 96
QUAD-CITIES OpR-30 l-L
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4 3.5 LIMITING CONDITIONS l'OR OPERATION BASES A.
Core Spray and LpCI Hode of the RHR System l
This specification assures that adequate emergency cooling capability l.
is available.
L Based on the loss-of-coolant analyses included in References 1 and 2 and in accordance with 10 Cf R 50.46 and Appendix K, tore tooling systems provide sufficient tooling to the core to dissipate the energy associated with the loss-of-coolant accident, to limit the calculated fuel cladding temperature to less than 2200'F. to assure that tore geometry remains intact to limit cladding metal-water reaction to less than 1% and to limit the calculated
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local metal-water reaction to less than 17%.
The allowable repair times are established so that the average risk rate for repair would be no greater than the basic risk rate. The method and concept are described in Reference 3.
Using the results developed in this reference, the repair period is found to be less than half the test interval. This assumes that the core spray subsystems and tpCI cnnstitute a one-out-of-two system; however, the combined effect of the two systems to limit excessive cladding temperature must also be considered. The test interval specified in Specification 4.5 was 3 months. Theref ore, an allowable repair period which maintains the basic risk considering single failures should be less than 30 days, and this specification is within this period. For multiple f ailures, a shorter interval is specified; to improve the assurance that the remaining systems will function, a daily test is talled for. Although it is recognized that the information given in Reference 3 provides a quantitative method to l
estimate allowable repair times, the lack of operating data to support the l
analytical approach prevents complete acttptance of this method at this time.
j therefore, the times stated in the specitic items were established with due regard to judgment.
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$hould one re-e spray subsystem become inoperable, the remaining core spray subsystem and the entire lpCI mode of the RHR system are available l
l sheeld the need f or core cooling arise. To assure that the remaining core spray and the LpCI mode of the RHR system are available, they are demonstrated to be operable immediately. This demonstration includes a manual initiation of the pumps and associated valves. Based on judgments of the reliability of the remaining systems, i.e., the core spray and LpCI, a 7-day repair period was obtained.
l Should the lor,s of one RHR pump occur, a nearly full templement of core and containment cooling equipment is available. Three RHR pumps in tonjunttion with the core spray subsystem will perform the core cooling function. Because si the availability of the majcrity of the core cooling equipment, which will be demonstrated to be operable, a 30-day repe,ir period is justified. Il the LpCI mode of the RHR system is not available, at least two PHR pumps must be l
available to f ulfill the containment cooling f unction. The 7-day rspair period is set on this basis.
B.
RHR Service Water The containment cooling mode of the RHR system is provided to remove heat energy from the containment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.
For the flow specified, the containment long-term pressure is limited to less than 8 psig and is therefore more than ample to provide the required heat-removal capability (reference SAR Section 5.2.3.2).
The Containment Cooling mode of the pHR System consists of two loops.
Each loop consists of I Heat Ercha:ger, 2 RHP pumps, and the associated valves, piping, electrical equipment, and instrumentation. The "A" loop on each unit contains 2 RHR Service Water pumps, tintil November 1, 1989, the "D" loop on each unit may utilize the "L" and "D" RHR Service Water pumps f rom Unit i via a tross-tie line. Af ter November 1,1989, each "B" loop will l
contain 2 RHR 5ervice Water pumps. Either set of equipment is capable of performing the containment tooling function. Loss of one RHR service water pump does not seriously jeopardize the containment cooling capability, as any one of the remaining three pumps can satisf y the cooling requirements. Since there is some redundancy lef t, a 30-day repair period is adegoate. Loss of one loop of tSe containment cooling mode of the RHR system leaves one l
remaining system to perf orm the containment cooling f unction. The operable system is demonstrated to be operable each day when the ebove condition occurs.
02651:12 3.5/4.5-11 Amendment No. 68, 72, 9f,
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SUMMARY
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. The following changes have.been identified for Quad Cities Stationc
_ Units.1 and 2::
- 1) Page'3.5/4.5-4' Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)-3.5.B.I.b (DPR-29) 1 Page 3.5/4.5-3 LCO 3.5.B.l.b-(DPR-30).
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(a). Change'from:
From the effective date of this amendment until
" July'1,.1982"'to From the effective date of this amendment until:
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" November 1 1989." '
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-(b)' Change from'the."A" loop to the "B" loop.
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(c) Change-from'" Unit 2 "A" and "B" RHR Service Water pump" to " Unit.1 "C'? and' "D". RHR Service Hater pump".
'(d) ' Change from using cross-tie line "l/2-10124-16"-D" to cross-tie line "1/2-10509-16"-D".
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Page J.5/4.5-17 :.C0 Bases R!LR Service Maigt (DPR-29) l Page.2.5/4.5-11 LCO Bases Et[fLicrvice Haier (DPR-30) p (a). Change from " November 24, 1981 to July 1, 1982" to "Unt11 November 1,
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'1989".
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(b) Change from "the "A" loop on each unit may utilize the "A" and "B" RHR Service Water Sumps from l*-it 2 via a cross-tie line. After July.1, 1982, each
'A" loop...# to "the "B" loop on each unit may utilize the "C" and "D" RHR St,, ice Hater pumps from Unit 1 via cross-tie. After November 1, 1989, each "B" loop..."
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.3.
Page 3.5/4.5-11 (DPR-30) l l
(a) Correct typographical error "RHR5" to "RHR".
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dTTAQlMENT 3 p-x o
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DESCRIPTION AND BASES FOR AMENDMENT REQUESI A revision to the Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification is being proposed due to further deterioration of the Unit 2 "B" loop RHR Service Water pipe crack which'was. initially discovered in March, 1969. This attachment provides a discussion of and basis for proposed change.
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.BACKGROUED On Friday, March 10, 1989, excessive ground water leakage was observed in the tunnel which accesses the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) rooms.
Tne HPCI tunnel is not a high traffic area and the abnormal leakage:was observed during a non-routine tour. An investigation was conducted and determined that the leakage was due to a crack in the Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Hater Syttem "B" loop piping which is located underground.
Weekly surveillance have been performed on the "B" loop of RHR Service Water System since March 13, 1989. The weekly surveillance of the Unit 2 "C" and "D" RHR Service Water pumps demonstrated flows required by u
Technical Specifications and the values were trended with no further deterioration noted.
1 iDn August 25, 1989, Unit 2 was shutdown to perform various maintenance activities'to avoid a unit shutdown during the upcoming Unit 1 Refueling Outage. During the outage, the Unit 2 "A" loop of RHR was operating in the shutdown cooling made. -The "B" loop of RHR was operated periodically to support other outage activities.
Maintenance (replacement of the lubricating oil sight glass) was performed on the Unit 2 "C" RHR Service Water pump which required post maintenance testing. On August 27, 1989, the "C" and "D" RHR Service Water pumps were operated simultaneously for approximately 5 seconds and the "D" pump was secured.
The."C" RHR Servica Peter pump flow did not meet the required Technical Specification acceptance criteria for operability.
The "D" RHR Service Hater pump was subsequently tested resulting in performance similar to the "C" RHR Service Water pump.
The suspected degrada-tion of the RHR Service Hater piping was validated by visual observation of increased water table level and increased leakage in the HPCI access tunnels.
The "B" loop was subsequently declared inoperable.
0265T:5
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. FAILURE MECHANISM It is surmised that the pipe was pierced by a temporary construction support that was not renoved during the backfill operation during original plant ~ construction. This is further supported due to routing schemes of the RHR piping.. The Unit 1 "A" loop and the Unit 2 "B" loop.are the lower lying pipe.
To date, cracks have been identified in each loop.
The modification is currently in progress for'the Unit 2 "B" loop.
This modification, in addition to the completed modification on the Unit 1 "A" loop, thould ensure no further L
cracking of the piping due to this failure mechanism.
80f0 SED _BODILLCAIIDN As was performed on the Unit 1 "A" loop of the RHR Service Water in-1982, a similar modification is currently underway for the Unit 2 "B" loop of RHR Service Water.
After the discovery of the leak in March, 1989, a modification has been implemented for above ground pipe routing.
It is anticipated that the modification will be completed by November 1, 1989.
The "B" loop of the Unit 2 RHR Service Hater system is currently out of service and a plate is being installed to isolate the underground leak thereby accommodating the use of the RHR Service Water cross-tie.
The isolated piping will be abandoned in place.
ESIS_EQiLCILAEGE Technical Specification LC0 3.5.B.1(a) requires two pumps and one heat exchanger for each unit's RHR Service Water loop.
The system configuration proposed on'the Unit 1 and 2 "B" loop will be such that two pumps will be available to provide flow to either unit's heat exchanger (Figure 1).
The "A" loop configuration on Units 1 and 2 remain unchanged.
The RHR Service Water system configuration required to provide adequate
. con a nment cooling capability following a loss of coolant accident is ti described in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and consistsHof one RHR Service Water pump and one RHR pump. The same configuration of equipment is adequate on a non-accident unit to place and maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition.
lhe minimum combination of equipment described in the SAR is only experienced during degraded plant conditions, i.e., loss of off-site power, loss of coolant accident on one unit and a failure of one diesel generator to start.
The proposed change is therefore justified since the Unit 1 and 2 RHR "B" loop service water system cross-tied configuration has been previously analyzed as acceptable.
0265T:6 l
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V A. 60MERLs U
L EV16 MAIL 0N OF SIGNIFIC6NT HAZABDS CONSIDERATION As stated in the " Description of Proposed Amendment Request",-the
. proposed change. involves the use of the unit cross-tie for the "B" loop of the RHR Service Water. system'and the use of.the Unit 1 "C"'and "D" RHR Service-Hater pumps to supply either unit's "B" loop. These changes have been reviewed
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by Commonwealth Edison and the changes do not present a Significant Hazards Consideration.
B6SES FOR NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS _ CONSIDERATION In accordance with the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c), Commonwealth Edison has reviewed the proposed amendment and has determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration.
- 1) The proposed change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The RHR Service Hater system is designed to mitigate the consequences of an' accident by removing decay heat from the containment, therefore, the probability of occurrence of an accident is not increased by failure of any components in this system.
As described in Section 6, Amendments 16 and 17 to the Quad Cities Safety Analysis Report (SAR), one RHR pump and one RHR Service Hater pump provide adequate containment cooling following a loss of coolant accident. A similar combination of equipment is adequate on a non-accident unit to place and maintain the reactor in the cold shutdown condition. This minimum combination of equipment is only experienced in the degraded conditions of loss of offsite power, loss of coolant accident on one unit, and failure of one diesel generator to start.
Since this modification does not reduce the minimum RHR Service Hater system availability as described in the SAR, the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not increased. As will be discussed in detail later, redundancy of RHR Service Water pumps remains consistent with the original design.
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- 2) The proposed change does not create the possiblity of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
This cross-tie modification shares two RHR Service Hater pumps between Units 1 and 2 in the same manner that one of the emergency power supplies, the 1/2 Diesel Generator, is shared between the two units.
The cross-tie 0265T:13
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does.not-involve the addition of any. active components, electrical inter-
. locks, etc.
The cross-tie piping'and manual valve.are existing safety-related parts of the RHR Service Water System..The. installed plate will maintain.the pressure boundary of the RHR Service Water system and will be designed to equivalent standards to the original piping. Similar-use of a cross-tie.on.the,"A" loop of each unit's RHR Service Hater system was performed in 1981, L
The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin 3). of safety.
In the' cross-tie condition, the worst scenario involves an accident on
. Unit 1, loss of off-site power, and failure of the 1/2 Diesel Generator.
After. core cooling is restored by the ECCS on Unit 1, the required loads to provide RHR' Service Hater.to both units and maintain core cooling on the accident unit are within the capability-of the Unit 1 Diesel Generator.
These conditions result in the minimum operability of two RHR Service Hater pumps,.one per unit as analyzed in the SAR.
026ST:14 J.
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t, ATTACHMDE_5 ESTIFICATION FOR EMERGENCY APPROVAL OF ERQPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AMENDMENT 1)' TheTechnicallSpecificationamendmentrequestrequiresimmediateapproval to support start-up of. Unit.2 operation.
On Friday, August 25, 1989. Unit 2 was shutdown for.a short unit outage to accomplish various maintenance activities to avoid a unit shutdown during the upcoming Unit 1 Refueling Outage. During the. course of the.short outage, the Unit 2."A" loop was operating in the shutdown cooling mode.
The Unit 2 "B" RHR loop was periodically operated to support activities'.
The "D" RHR pump provided a flow of 3000 gpm at a discharge pressure of 270 psig.
Maintenance was performed on the Unit 2 "C" RHR Service Water pump which required post-maintenance surveillance. On August 27, 1989, the Unit 2 "C" RHR Service. Water pump was started. The Unit 2 "C" and "D" RHR Service Water pumps were operated simultaneously for approximately 5 i
seconds untti.the Unit 2 "D" RHR Service Water pump was secured.
The Unit 2 "C" RHR Service Water pump was unable to achieve the system operabilityrequirements.
The Unit 2 "C" pump was secured and the "D" pump was then tested.
The "D" pump also failed to provide required flows
,3 and the "B" loop of RHR Service Water system was declared inoperable.
j Technical Specification 3.5.B.l.a requires that both loops of containment
.l cooling mode of thr RHR system be operable prior to reactor startup from a l
cold condition. Without the approval of utilizing the cross-tie valve for
.j the Unit 2 "B" loop, reactor startup cannot be initiated and, therefore, 1
emergency approval of this amendment request is justified.
- 2) The need for the emergency Technical Specification amendment could not have been reasonably identified sooner.
i On March 31, 1989, Commonwealth Edison submitted a Technical Specification amendment similar to this amendment request in anticipation of further degradation of the crack in the RHR Service Hater piping.
In order to monitor any possible further deterioration of the crack, weekly surveillance were conducted on the Unit 2 "B" loop since March 13, 1989.
The Unit 2 "C" and "D" RHR Service Water pumps provided flows as specified 0265T:7 l
by Technical-Specifications during these surveillance.- The.results of
.the weekly surveillance were trended and no deterioration was noted.
Based on the results of.the weekly surveillance and discussion with the Quad Cities Project Manager, Commonwealth Edison requested that the amendment be withdr0 1 on August 7, 1989.
On Friday, August 25,1989, Unit 2 was shutdown for a short outage.to accomplish varinus maintenance activities to avoid a unit shutdown during the Unit 1. Refueling Outage. During this short outage, the Unit 2."B" RHR loop was operated periodically to support outage activities. During this period, the Unit 2 "D" pump provided a flow of 3000 gpm at a discharge pressure of 275 psig.
To accommodate post-maintenance surveillance testing of the Unit 2 "C" RHR Service Hater pump, the "C" pump was started.
The "C" and "D" pumps were operated simultaneously for appro Que.tely five-seconds and the "D" pump was subsequently secured.
The Unit 2 "C" RHR 5ervice Hater pumps provided less thaa 1500 gpm at a distharge pressure of less than 50 psig.
The Unit 2 "C" RHR Service Hater pump operation was terminated and the Unit 2 "D" RHR Service Hater pump was started.
The "D" pump no longer provided the pra*ous system flows and the "D" RHR Service Hater pump performance was simi'ar to the "C" pump performance.
The deterioration of the Unit 2 "B" loop pipe crack was further validated by observation of the water table level and significant increase in HPCI access tunnel leakage.
Based on the series of events which occurred on August 27, 1989, the accelerated deterioration of the Unit 2 "B" loop piping could not have been reasonably anticipated.
- 3) No other alternative to the emergency Technical Specification is available.
As a result of the further deterioration of the Unit 2 "B" loop of the RHR Service Water, the Unit 2 "C" and "D" RHR Service Water pumps are inoperable. Technical Specification requires that both loops of RHR Containment Cooling systems be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the vessel, prior to startup, and during power operation. The use of the system cross-tie is the only alternative to commence unit startup and satisfy FSAR requirements for RHR system requirements, i.e., one RHR pump and RHR Service Hater pump per loop.
- 4) The following Interim Corrective Measures will be imposed during the period of the proposed Technical Specification amendment.
a.
Appendix R requirements As a result of the Unit 2 "C" and "D" RHR Service Water pumps being inoperable during this period, a review of Appendix R safe shutdown paths was conducted.
0265T:8
.N Of the six shutdown paths that are affected, paths B, El and E2-require no changes.
Paths F and K require procedure changes only.
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Path A_will require placing a 5000 CFM fan in the doorway of the-purp 1
cubicle (either 1C of'1D)-in use.
This fan will be.a portable gas driven fan-and its use will be incorporated into procedures. lit has
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been demonstrated that pumps IC and ID can survive up to 83 days without cooling provided.by the cubical coolers ~.
This time period
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would provide sufficient opportunity to develop methods to restore power.to the room coolers.
These compensatory Appendix R requirements were discussed with Region III and NRR personnel on April 11, 1989.;'No concerns were identified; with the. compensatory measures during the teleconference.
b ~.
Administrative Controis-Procedures are being: revised or developed, as necessary, to address I
surveillance requirements, outage' report-requirements,'and I
operability of Unit 1 "C" and "D" RHR Service Hater pumps, and Unit 1
. Diesel Generator during this interim period.
Controls will be implemented to assure that operators are aware that a loss of Unit 1 "C" or "D" RHR Service Hater pump will render one Containment cooling loop inoperable.
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