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Forwards 10CFR50.59 Evaluation Re Util Replacement & Substitution of Temporary Battery for Plant.Revised FSAR Table 8.2-3, Major Battery Loads Following Loss of Outside Power, Also Encl
	ML20246F908
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	05/05/1989
From:	Fay C; WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:	Swenson W; NRC, NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
	CON-NRC-89-053, CON-NRC-89-53 VPNPD-89-267, NUDOCS 8905150136
	Download: ML20246F908 (18)
	v • d • e

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Wisconsin

' Electnc

' POWER COMPANY 231 W Michgan. RO. Box 2046, Mdwoukee WI 53201 (414)221 2345 VPNPD 267 NRC 05 3 May 5', 1989 Document Control Desk U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mail Station Pl-137 i Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Mr. Warren Swenson, Project Manager PWR Project Directorate III-3 Gentlemen: i DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND150-301 !

FSAR CHANGE - TABLE 8.2-3 !

MAJOR BATTERY LOADS !

POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 l l

As you are aware, Wisconsin Electric Power Company is replacing l the station batteries at our Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The D05 station battery for Point Beach Unit 1 is being replaced during j the present spring 1989 outage. The D06 station battery for Point '

Beach Unit 2 is scheduled for replacement during the fall 1989 outage.

1 In order to facilitate these battery replacements and still meet l the requirements of our Technical Specifications, we have procured l and installed a temporary battery to take the place of either D05 j or D06 while the physical replacement of the respective battery is ]

taking place. This was necessary because Technical Specification )

15.3.7.B.I.f permits power operation for only twenty-four hours if j either DOS or D06 is inoperable. Although Unit 1 will be shutdown 1 during the DOS replacement, Unit 2 could continue in power opera-tion for greater than twenty-four hours only if both D05 and D06 j were operable. ,

4 As mentioned above, our solution is to provide a qualified tem- !

porary battery during the DOS change out. This temporary battery is identical to the replacement battery, is situated in a seis- ;

mically qualified installation, and has been tested to estab- j lish its capability to carry all the loads delineated in FSAR ;

Table 8.2-3. Because the installation of the station batteries j will be done when a unit is shutdown, we plan to tag out the two l 8905150136 890505 , c' PDR ADOCK 05000266 g6 !

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Document Control Desk May 5, 1989 Page 2 major loads on the station battery that is being replaced, the

! Turbine Emergency Bearing Oil Pump and the Air Side Seal Oil Back-up Pump, during the period that the DC buses are supplied by the temporary battery. For that reason, the temporary battery can be connected to its DC bus through only a 600 amp DC breaker.

As a part of the approval process for the plant modification to replace the station batteries, a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation of the temporary battery arrangement was conducted. That evaluation concluded that the battery replacement and substitution of the temporary battery could be accomplished without prior NRC review and approval, since no unreviewed safety question was identified and no Technical Specification change was necessary. In the course of discussions held with members of the NRR and Region III staffs at the Region III headquarters on May 4, 1989, and by telephone with Mr. W. Swenson on May 5, 1989 regarding battery capacities and testing, we agreed to promptly provide the staff with copies of our relevant 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations in this regard. Copies are attached herewith.

We also are taking this opportunity to provide you with a revision to Table 8.2-3 of the Point Beach Final Safety Report. This table, entitled " Major Battery Loads Following Loss of Outside Power" is referenced in Technical Specification 15.4.6.B.4 which concerns monitoring of station battery capacity. The table has been revised to acknowledge that certain non-safety related loads, as identified by an asterisk in the revised table, may be removed from the battery loading to facilitate component maintenance.

Should these loads be removed, the table further acknowledges that the station battery capacity shall be sufficient to carry the remaining loads delineated in the table for the length of time specified in the table. Such action by the licensee, of_ course, may only be accomplished without prior NRC approval provided all the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 have been satisifed.

Please contact us if you have any questions regarding the enclosed evaluation or our revision to this FSAR table.

Very truly yours,

/

W QU C . W. Fay Vice President Nuclear Power Copies to NRC Resident Inspector NRC Regional Administrator, Region III

TABLE 8.2-3 MAJOR BATTERY LOADS FOLLOWING LOSS OF OUTSIDE POWER Station Station Station Station Battery Battery Battery Battery Unit 1 DOS D06 D105 D106 Turbine Emerg. Bearing 011 Pump (50 HP)* 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Air Side Seal Oil Backup Pump (10 HP)* 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

' Emergency Lighting (4 KW) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Feedwater Pump Lube Oil Pump 1-P73C (5 HP) 1 minute Feedwater Putnpj Lube Oil Pump 1-P73D (5 HP) 1 minute Inverter 1DY01 2 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months i Inverter 1DY02 3 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Inverter 1DY03 4 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Inverter IDYO4 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Unit 2 Turbine Emerg. Bearing Oil Pump (60 HP)* 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Air Side Seal Oil Backup Pump (10 HP)* 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Feedwater Pump Lube Oil Pump 2-P73C (5 HP) 1 minute Feedwater Pump) Lube Oil Pump 2-P73D (5 HP) 1 minute Inverter 20Y01 2 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Inverter 2DY02 3 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inverter 2DY03 4 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Inverter 20Y04 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Common Inverter DY0A l2 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Inverter DYOB 3

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Inverter DY0C 4 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months !

Inverter DY0D 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months I

These DC loads are not nuclear safety related and may be removed from the battery supplied distribution buses to facilitate maintenance of the components or for other similar reasons. Battery capacity shall be sufficient to supply the remaining loads for the specified times in order to essure operability of the station catteries as specified in the Technical Specification.

I 1,2,3,4 On'y 2 of 3 inverters can be supplying load at a given time.

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p ,.i A 9 _. e s ._ e 9 Fr R I 14816 PBNP P.O2 i POINT SE&CH NUCLEAR PLANT DOCUN DT& TION OF SERIAL REVIEW & APPROV&L DOCUMENf SMP #978, MINOR, STATION BATTERY D05 CHANGEOUT - UNIT COMMON AMb Mt &&-oMM C to e n so.re t yn wmea Revision 0 Date _ Date Performed 17 NeJ9 )

(If applicable) Unit l

NOTE: 1. THIS FORN M&T 88 USED TO RECORD THE SERIAL REVI N AND APPROVAL OF DOCUMENFS WHICH REQUIRE SUPERVISORY STAFF REVIEW AND MANAGER APPROVAL.

1

2. THE PROVISIONS OP 10 CFR 50.59 APPLY TO ALL CHANGES AND MUST BE l EVALUATED AND DOCUMErfED IN ACCORDANCE NITH QF 3-3, "AUTHORIZ& TION 4 0F CHANGES, TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS." &TTACH QF 3.3.1 IP REVIEW 15 REQUIRED.

3. TIQBfICAL SPECIFICATION 15.6.8 APPLIES FOR ALL PROCEDURAL OIENGES. A QUORUN OF MSS MINBERS (POUR) MUST REVIEW THE PROPOSED CN&NGE PRIOR TO APPROV&L ST 1958 MANAGER.

4. FOLLOWING COMPLETION PROCEDURES ARE TO BE ROFFID TO THE SUPERVISOR'-

STAPP SERVICES. ALL OTHER DocunsrPs ARE T0 at ROUTED to nit

&DNINISTRATIVE SPECIALIST - EQRS.

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, 1. will any erstem, structure, or component (s#C), as described in the PONP r$AR, including its figures, be altered? '

/ Yes too

2. Could, within reasonable selbility, the reposed change affect the function or method of a SSC which described in t e PSAAF YES # NO

). Will any procedure or procedures as described in the PbMP r$AR be altered? YES g NC

'4.

Will a test or e geriment which le not described in the r5AA be performed? YES # NC

3. Will a prior 'cocumented technical conusitment to the NRC be altered? YEG _ NO

6. Ze a potential change to the facility or its operation as described in the 18AR involved? YES y NO ,

7 Is an evaluation required fare any of the above questions answered YES)? / YES NO NOTE: If no, then provide basis for decielen in eusenary section.

List the licensing beste documente and sections where the system, structure, component, procedure, test, or emperiment is described. (rSAR Chapters i thru 15 and appendices, and technical 35C commitments),

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1. Does the proposed activity increase the orokebility of occurrence of an /

neci*at previously in t.w nApr

_ Yes i HC List the accidert(s) prewtovely evaluated in ahd sAs with which the proposed shan e to the ,$5C or procedure, or the proposed test or esperisset could have any pesettle bearing, of set, or association, and describe the bearing, effect, or assectaelon. Describe why and/or how the probah111ty of occurrence will or will not be increased.

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3. Does the proposed activity increase the r>robability of occurrence of a /

malfunet ton of equipment leportant to sarety previously evaluated in the sap? Ytd i NO List the malfunction el of equipment previously evaluated in the SAR with which the proposed change to the Sec or procedure, or the proposed test or emperament could have any poselble bearings, effect, or association, and describe the bearing, effect or association. Describe why and/or how the probability of occurrence wi!! or will not be increased.

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' 4. Does tha proposes tetivity increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to Safety p(eviously ava4uessa en the nami - j Yts 4 No Describe increased.why and/or how the consequences of the malfunction (el listed in 93 wall or will not be EU l.

Does the proposed activ&ty create the possibility of an Mcident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the SAAP YES / NO List any possible accident that may be created as e result of the propored activity. Describe why in theand/or SA8. how each accident is or le not of a different type than any previovely evalveted N O^t E f s i 4.

I Does the proposed activity create the possibilit'y of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type then any previousar evaluated in the SAA?

YES _ NO List any possible selfunction of equipment that may be created as a reault of the proposed activity.

Describe how Previously evaluated in theand/or SAR. why each malfunction is or le not of a different type than any L0$$ Of 4 "VA A !4

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Page 1 of 3 NUCLEAR POWER DEPARTMn:T 2KFR50.59 REPORT Ser, el l Reference Document al p 68 - o T 4 4 8. I cAttach addational pages af necessary)

Sectaon 3 - Determanat non af Safety Evaluation as Required l A/ St,4 L L. WM eese,asey j',e r rarary Brief Description of Proposed Change, Test, or Experimer.t tal App RocM. /

3. Will any system, structure, or component (SSC), as described in the PBNP FSAR, YES M wo including ats fagures, be altered?

2. Could, within reasonable possibil'ity, the proposed change af fect the function YES ! No or method of a SSC whach as descri' bed in the FSAR7 Wall any procedure or procedures as described in the pBNP FSAR be altered? YES # NO 3.

Wall a test or experiment which is not described in the FSAR be performed? YES / No 4.

YES NO

5. Wall a prior documented technical coramitment to the NRC be altered? I I

6. Is a potential change to the f acility or its operation as described in the YES NO h FSAR anvolved?

YES NO

l . Is an evaluation requared (are any of the above questions answered YES)?

t NOTE: If no, then provide basis for decision in summary section.

Last the 31 censing basin documents and sections where the system, structure, component, procedure, test, or experament as described. (FSAR Chapters 3 thru 15 and appendaces, and technical NRC commitments). es~. 3. 4-pg sccsosts 8,l. 8, 6.'s.1u, 6 L ) 8 4. I. It, pyA, F/Gu/LE S. 'L * / O l

yspg -rA 51.E. 82~5 J f

' Section II - Determination af an Unreviewed safety Question in Involved Does the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of an

( 3.

accadent prevaously an the SAR? YES NO List the accident (s) previously evaluated in the SAR with which the proposed change to the SSC or I procedure, or the proposed test or experament could have any possable bearang, effect, or association, and 6-scribe the bearing, effect, or assoelation. Dascribe why and/or how the M KJc.s.d48dI probability of occurrence wall or wall not be ancreased.

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pgAL S E C* TIC Af L i g 2, g-

- Av f'rY A C DC A f

l gg g as AAM AM

2. Does the proposed activity increase the consequences of an seendent prevaeusly YES y NO evaluated in the SAR?

Describe why and/or how the consequences of the accident (s) listed in el will or will not be . (

increased.

jgg $>s? ** MM l'

3. Does the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of a YES

/

V NO malfunction of equapment important to safety prevaously evaluated in the SAR?

Last the malfunction (s) of equipment previously evaluated in the SAR with which the proposed change to the SSC or procedure, or the proposed test or experament could have any possible bearangs, effect, or association, and describe the bearing, effect or assocastion. Describe why and/or how the probability of occurrence will or will not b increased.

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r;

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Psgs 2 of 3

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4. Does the proposed activity inerssas the con **outness of a malfunction of -

YES. NO equipment important to safety previously eveJusted an the 5AR7

- Deeeribe why and/or how the consequences of the malfunction (s) listed in 93 will of will not be ancreased.

k Does the proposed activity create 'the possibility of an accident of a different 7

/.

5. YES NO type than any previously evaluated an the SAR7 of the proposed activity. Describe List any posalble accident that may be created as a resultof a dif ferent type than any previously evaluated why and/or how each accident is or is not in the SAR.

N06 4

l Does the proposed activity create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment.

6.

important to safety of a different type than any previously eveJusted in the YES

/ NO f SAR7 j

List any possible malfunction of equipment that may be created asofa aresult 'of the proposed -

different type than any -

activity. Describe how and/or why each malfunction as or is not previously evaluated in the SAR.

(

Jfh 1

i

7. Does the proposed activity reduce the margin of saf ety as defined in the basis YES / NO for any technical specification? ,

or experiment has any List any technical specification with'which the proposed change, test,and describe the bearing, association, or effect. De bearing, association, or effect, why and/or how the margan of safety as defaned in the basis for the technical specifications

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h #NE C """

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1' BALN*UP PO NddA OUltA/& $ATYdAV H su, , SL sa $ Cb o4 5 bC b u,$

wAnn-our .

YES NO DOES THE CHANGE TEST, OR EXPERIMENT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SArETY QUESTIOH?

Section !!! - Determination if a Technical Specification change as Involved Does the change, test, or experiment involve a change in the technical YES [NO apecilacations?

If a change is required, briefly describe what the change should be and why it YES NO j is required.

1 I

l.

rors a w .1

o j P292 J of 3 f

~

Section IV - Evaluation Summary - (Ettach add 2tional piges af nJessstry)' .'

.1 h

y. TQ. ' A7rACHEO* :1 i

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1 e

I Prepared by i _ e we Date 7M8 N Rev&ewed by // a Date "b MSS Ho.

for the MSS p,g, Manalef

PSNP Approva} + )

2n lieu of MSS and Manager signature, attach EQR-26d if serial review has been conducted.

Form OP 3 3.3 pey, 2

- - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - _ - - - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ "------.1___________J

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< 1 M.R. 88-074*B 10 CFR 50.59 REPORT ATTACHMENT Modification Request 88-074*B is to temporarily install a 125 volt Class IE station battery in the AFP room, east of the tunnel.

I Removal of the battery will be controlled by a different design l package. The basic function of this battery will be to provide back-up emergency power to buses D01 and D02 while the existing emergency power sources, DOS and D06, are replaced. This instal-lation is required since change-out activities for one battery, which will be controlled by other design packages, will take longer than the allowed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of having one of DOS or D06 out of service while one or both reactors are generating power.

Technical Specification 15.3.7.B.1.f delineates the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months LCO by stating "One of the batteries DOS or D06 may be inoperable for a period not exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months provided the other three batteries and four battery chargers remain operable with one charger carrying the DC loads of each DC main distribution bus." While DOS and D06 are specifically called out in this LCO, the intent of l having a Class lE battery connected to the main distribution buses will be met during battery change-out.

l l Sections 8.1.1, 8.2.2, and 8.2.3 of the FSAR describe the D.C.

distribution system and Figure 8.2-10 shows the system diagram-matically. All descriptions given will still apply while the Page 1 of 6

' battery of'this design package is connected to the bus (es) except Figure 8.2-10 which shows both DOS and D06 as 60 cell strings.

This is not consistent with all other FSAR data nor is it con-sistent with the existing installations which show both DOS and

'D06 are-made of 59 cells connected in series. The battery to be installed will also be made of 59 cells. 'Therefore, Figure 8.2-10 should be changed to indicate both D05 and-D06 are 59 cell batteries, not 60 cell batteries.

I~ The design bases criteria for a station battery, as documented in the FSAR, is that it must be able to withstand, without undue risk to public safety, the forces that may be imposed by natural phenomena.such as earthquake, tornado, flooding, high wind, or heavy ice. The station battery to be installed here will be able to withstand the forces of a tornado, flooding, high wind, or heavy ice since it will be installed in the Class 1 portion of the i

Turbine Building. Some forces due to an earthquake will be transmitted to the battery. The battery system will be qualified to withstand the maximum expected seismic forces with a 100%

margin. Existing equipment in the area of battery installation may not, however, meet this criterion creating the potential for this equipment to fall on the battery system rendering it inoperable. All equipment that has a potential for falling on the battery was evaluated to determine the seismic mounting adequacy.

The evaluation shows only two flourescent lights, two service air rubber hoses, and a cover over the W46 pulleys are inadequately Page 2 of 6 l

l

supported to withstand a seismic event. The lights and hoses will be removed for the period the battery is actually connected to a bus and the pulley cover mounting will be improved in order to remove these seismic hazards. Removing the lights will cause no personnel hazard since lighting will be available from other fixtures in the room which have no potential for falling on the battery. Emergency lighting for the area, which is seismically mounted, will remain intact.

The design bases criteria for either DOS or D06, as delineated in Bechtel's Information Exchange on Electrical Design for PBNP, is that the batteries must provide power to all essential DC loads for one hour upon loss of station AC power and supply DC power required to actuate and operate the Engineered Safeguards System at any time including the one hour period following the complete loss of station power. Bechtel determined the battery size necessary to meet these criteria by considering the worst case

-(i.e., loss of station AC coincident with an SI actuation) and included a 100A contingency throughout the required one hour th duration. The battery to be installed will have the capability to exceed these maximum power delivery requirements.

Section 14.1.11 summarizes the evaluation of a loss of all AC power to the Station Auxiliaries Accident. Step 1 of the Turbine Trip sequence states that vital instruments are supplied by emergency power sources. The emergency power sources for the red Page 3 of 6

O and blue instrument buses are the emergency back-up batteries connected to Buses D01 and D02. This modification will not change the probability of this accident occurring since power avail-ability at the Station Auxiliaries is independent of ths emergency power source. The consequences of this accident remain unchanged since the battery system is designed to supply the necessary loads i

under these circumstances.

No other documented design basis criterion exists.

Since the AFP room has steam lines in it, and the DOS and D06 battery rooms do not, the battery will be more susceptible to a malfunction caused by a steam line break. If such a steam line break caused the battery to malfunction in a way to cause the loss of the associated bus, the steam line break could not be isolated by MOVs 2019 and 2020 since their control power comes from that bus. However, manual valves 235 and 237 could be used in this event. Note that these manual valves would have to be used if the j

steam line break occurred in the governor sensing lines for the l

l steam driven AFPs.

I Section 14.2.5 of the FSAR analyzes the effects of a steam line 1

break and states that the following systems provide the necessary 1

protection: 1. Safety Injection System Actuation

2. Reactor Trip

3. Redundant Isolation on Main FW lines, and

4. Trip of the Steam Line Isolation Valves Page 4 of 6

Loss of either D01 or D02 would not render any of these systems inoperable. Therefore, the consequences of the accident are not increased.

A hydrogen gas fire and/or explosion due to an excessive concen-tration buildup (i.e. greater than 2%) from the battery could hypothet0.adg 9dd Potentially cause a steam line rupture. Calculation N-89-002 shows that it would take no less than 133 days with no ventilation to reach a 2% concentration of hydrogen. The redundancy and air circulating capabilities of the existing HVAC system for the area assure such a concentration buildup will not occur. In the highly unlikely event that all air circulating capabilities were lost, the hydrogen generation from the battery could be stopped before creating any hazard by removing its float voltage since the battery only needs to be able to supply emergency power for no more than several weeks. Therefore, the probability of a steam line rupture is not increased by the installation of this design package.

Since the service water headers in the AFP room are not sleeved, I

and these headers are sleeved in the existing DOS and D06 battery l rooms, the battery will be more susceptible to a malfunction caused by a service water header leak. Such a service water header malfunction can be mitigated by isolating that portion of the pipe. Neither Bus D01 nor D02 operability is required to l

provide such isolation. Therefore, no safety issue is raised by placing an emergency back-up power supply for either D01 or D02 in Page 5 of 6 w _ __ _

2, t .,

a room with unsleeved service water headers since either or both

-units can be operated safely without such an emergency back-up I

power supply,available assuming battery loss does not cause loss of the bus. 'If the bus is: lost, the operating unit would trip due to the loss of the associated instrument bus.

Installing the. battery in the AFP room will not cause the existing Halon' fire suppression system to be overloaded. Halon is the only recommended type of fire suppression system for batteries and is used in the existing DOS and D06 battery rooms.

All Appendix R feeder cables powered by the bus to which the battery will be connected, are routed through the same fire zone that the battery will be installed in. One fire could cause all

' Appendix R loads powered by this bus to loose their power source by burning these feeder cables. If this were to occur, there would be no Appendix R need for the power source, and therefore, no Appendix R issues are raised.

The installation location of the battery will impair access to the local control stations mounted on the AFP room east wall. Suffi-cient room will be left such that no special equipment (such as ladders) will be required to access the panels.

Page 6 of 6 l

YL_-__-_-___--_.-_.

ML20246F908

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