ML20245L223
| ML20245L223 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1989 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245L220 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8905050330 | |
| Download: ML20245L223 (6) | |
Text
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- [C Hog %g UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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,E wAsHtNGTON, D. C. 20666 f
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION I
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT N05. 94 AND 70 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-70 AND DPR-75 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated July 23, 1987, as supplemented by letter dated March 16, 1
1989, Public Service Electric & Gas Company requested an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 for the Salem Generating Station, Unit Nos. I and 2.
The supplemental letter provided clarifying information only and did not char'e the original submittal. The amendmints would revise the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) proposed limiting conditicas for operation, surveillance requirements and associated basis to clearly define the emergency core cooling subsystem alignment and component availability requirements in various modes. Changes are also proposed to eliminate the requirement to issue a report when an action statement is entered as a result of inservice testing and to make the Salem 1 and Salem 2 ECCS technical specifications (TS) consistent. The-supplemental information provided by letter dated March 16, 1989 revised the actual TS pages and did not chaege the technical considerations.
In addition, the licensee agreed to administrative changes (i.e., typographical errors, page numbers, etc.) the staff made to the revised technical specification pages which are also noted by vertical bars in the right margin. None of the clarifications altered the action noticed or affected the staff's initial determination.
2.0 EVALUATION A.
Technical Specification 3.5.2 The current TS for Modes 1, 2 and 3 requires:
Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:
a.
One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump, b.
One OPERABLE safety injection pump, 8905050330 890502 PDR ADOCK 05000272 P
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One OPERABLE residual heat removal heat exchanger, d.
One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump, and e.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.
The revised TS for Modes 1, 2 and 3 would require:
Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of the following injection systems, a.
One OPERABLE CENTRIFUGAL charging pump and associated flow path-capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank and transferring suction to the residual heat removal pump discharge piping and; 1.
Discharging into each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold leg.
b.
One_ OPERABLE safety injection pump and associated flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water. storage tank and transferring suction to the residual heat removal pump discharge piping and; 1.
Discharging into each RCS cold leg, and; upon manual initiation, j
2.
Discharging into its two associated RCS hot legs.
c.
One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump and associated residual heat removal heat exchanger and flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation and; 1.
Discharging into each RCS cold leg, and; upon manual initiation, 2.
Discharging into two RCS hot legs.
These changes explicitly identify the flow paths into the reactor coolant system (RCS) which are required to be operational in Modes 1, 2 and 3.
They do not modify the ECCS injection or recirculation flow paths but will ensure the ECCS subsystems are aligned as assumed in the design basis for the ECCS-LOCA.
By making these changes the
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concern expressed in Information Notice 87-01, "RHR Valve Misalignment Causes Degradation of ECCS in PWRs," would be
' alleviated.-
An Action Statement is being added as follows:
I "With both ECCS subsystems inoperable for Surveillance Testing, restore at least one subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be'in a least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, in a least HOT i
SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and at least COLD SHUTDOWN j
within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />."'
l Certain valves identified in Technical Specification Surveillance Testing (IST)g maintained _open are also part of the Inservice 4.5.2 as bein Program and must be periodically stroke tested. Some of the valves are tested quarterly which means some stroke testing occurs while the units are at full power. Shutting the valves causes both ECCS subsystems to be inoperable. Currently, the IST for these valves is accomplished by entering Action Statement 3.0.3 which allows the LCO to be exceeded for up to one hour.
Shutdown must consnence if this time limit is exceeded. However, a License Event Report (LER) is required pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)(b) each time Action Statement 3.0.3 is entered. This change will negate the reporting requirement.of 10 CFR 50.73 while maintaining the time limits of Action Statement 3.0.3.
The staff finds the proposed changes to Technical Specification-3.5.2 to be acceptable.
B.
Technical Specification 4.5.2 (Surveillance Requirements)
The first change adds to the surveillance requirements to verify that the RHR crosstie valves (RH 19) are open every 12-hours.
In order for any RHR pump to discharge into all four RCS cold legs the crosstie valves must be open.
By adding these valves to the Surveillance Requirements it will ensure the ECCS subsystems are aligned as assumed in the design basis for the ECCS-LOCA.
The second change adds a requirement to the Unit 1 TSs to verify that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the high points and pump casing every 31 days. Unit 2 already has this incorporated into the Surveillance Requirements. This surveillance test will provide greater assurance that the ECCS system is being maintained full of l
- water, t
The third change clarifies that with the CS 14 valve inoperable, the affected system is the Containment Spray System (Spray Additive tank).
This is accomplished by adding a footnote that directs the operator to Technical Specification 3.6.2.2.
(Spray Additive Tank) if the valve is found inoperable. CS 14 is in the discharge line of the
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- w. spray additive tank and is maintained open. Consequently, when the
. valve is' found inoperable, the Action Requirements of TS 3.6.2.2 should be followed. The licensee is currently following TS'3.0.3 when the CS 14 valve is iroperable because it disables the spray additive tank for both ECCS trains. The Action Requirements of TS 3.6.2.2 allows up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore the system to OPERABLE, vice i
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> allowed in TS 3.0.3.
The staff finds this change to be acceptable and in agreement with the. limits placed on the Spray
. Additive Tank. The licensee had proposed to administrative 1y restrict -the' time the Spray Additive Tank is inoperable to one hour.
The staff concludes this is not necessary because the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> provision in TS 3.6.2.2 provides adequate safety.
The staff finds the proposed changes to Technicc1 Specification 4.5.2 to be acceptable.
4 C.
Technical Specification 3.5.3 The current TS for Mode 4 requires:
As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:
a.
One'0PERABLE centrifugal charging pump, b.
One OPERABLE residual heat removal heat exchanger, c.
One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump, and l
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d.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction.from the refueling water storage tank upon being manually realigned and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.
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The revised TS for Mode 4 would require:
As'a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of tha following shall be OPERABLE:
a.
One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump and associated flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank and transferring suction to the residual heat removal pump discharge piping and; 1.
Discharging into each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold leg.
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One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump and associated
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residual heat removal heat exchanger and flow path capable 4
of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection signal and transferring suction to the l
containment sump during the recirculation phase of l
operation and; 1.
Discharging into each RCS cold leg, and; upon manual initiation 2.
Discharging into two RCS hot legs.
These changes clearly reflect the design bases flow paths for the i
ECCS-LOCA in the TSs. They will ensure the required Mode 4 ECCS flow paths are maintained operable and thus will preclude an ECCS misalignment from occurring in Mode 4.
The changes do not modify the ECCS injection of recirculation flow paths in any way.
The second change is for clarification only. The Safety Infection (SI) pumps are de-energized whenever the RCS temperature is below 312*F except when a special surveillance test is being conducted and then only one SI pump is energized. This restriction allows the Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (P0PS) to ma'intain the RCS pressure below the 10 CFR 50, Appendix G limit in case of inadvertent mass addition from the single SI pump. The current footnote incorporates this requirement by stating that only one SI pump shall be OPERABLE when the RCS temperature is less than or i
equal to 312*F.
Implicit in this statement is the requirement that I
the centrifugal charging pump be disabled and therefore not OPERABLE.
j This change makes this requirement explicitly clear by stating that one SI or one centrifugal charging pump, not one SI pump in addition to one centrifugal charging pump, shall be OPERABLE when the RCS i
temperature is less than or equal to 312*F.
1 In Unit 1 TS, the statement, " NOTE: This particular restriction also l
applies to Modes 5 and 6," is being added to the # footnote. This statement already appears in the Unit 2 TS. This will clarify that in Modes 5 and 6 one safety injection pump or one centrifugal charging pump is to be maintained operational.
The staff finds the proposed changes to Technical Specification 3.5.3 to be acceptable.
D.
Technical Specification Bases Section 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 j
These two bases section have been updated to reflect the fact that l
each ECCS subsystem supplies all four cold legs in order to satisfy minimum flow requirements. Also, the limitation of one safety injection pump or one centrifugal charging pump may be operational when the temperature of the RCS cold leg is 312*F or less when in Mode 4, 5 or 6.
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... The staff finds the proposed changes to Technical Specification Bases Section 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 to be acceptable.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
These amendments involve a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR'Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previously issued a proposed finding that l
the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has'been no public coment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The Comission made a proposed determination that the amendm'ents involve i
no.significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (54 FR 9928) on March 8, 1989 and consulted with the State of New Jersey.
No public coments were received and the State of New Jeruy did not have any coments.
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner,
-and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the comon defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
J. Stone Dated:
May 2, 1989
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