ML20245H497
| ML20245H497 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 08/10/1989 |
| From: | Dignan T PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ROPES & GRAY |
| To: | Bollwerk J, Rosenthal A, Wilber H NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#389-9040 OL, NUDOCS 8908170129 | |
| Download: ML20245H497 (21) | |
Text
7 4
,.o /
D
&.3 ll '0{
n
/
10',i R O P E S' & G R AY 4
ONE INTERNATIONAL PLACE f
BOSTO N, M ASSACH USETTS O2110-2624
'00'"E""S * *" ""E""I'"'"
- 30 MENNEDY PA AZA (617)9517000 wh[N M.k[,EOkh d7 PROVIDENCE,et L 02903 (2021 626-3900 (40s) Sts-6dV T E L E co piC R' (202) 626 396
"..scos ER;.4 ',
L..- ov *L, August 10, 1989 I'
FEDERAL EXPRESS J.. Paul Bollwerk, Chairman Alan.S. Rosenthal Howard A. Wilber.
Atomic' Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Re:
Acolicants' ResDonse to NECNP's Letter of Aucust 2.
1989 on Seabrook Emeroency Plannina Appeal. 50-443-OL, as it Aeolies to NECNP Contention HP-1 and SAPL Contention 3
Dear Appeal Board Members:
At the end of oral argument on July 27, 1989, counsel i
for NECNP responded to a question the Board had posed to Mr.
Backus, concerning litigation in the NHRERP proceedings of the FEMA presumption that no more than 20 percent of tne EPZ ll population would report to reception centers for radiological monitoring during the first 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> following a radioactive release.
Tr. at 193, 204-05.
At that time, she stated that "NECNP had a contention.
. that there wasn't enough provision for the great numbers of people that would come to the reception centers," and that "[a]s I recall, the contention was rejected on the basis of the 20 percent limitation."
Tr. at 205.
Since counsel for NECNP could not remember the precise details, she asked leave to send the Board a letter containing a citation to the contention in question.
M.
The Board granted NECNP permission to submit such a letter, and also granted the other parties the right to respond to that letter.
M.
Under date of August 2, 1989, NECNP filed and served a letter purportedly consistent with the permission for further response granted by the Board on July 27.
A review of the letter, however, reveals that NECNP has apparently retreated from its earlier assertion that one of its contentions was rejected on the basis of the 20 percent presumption.
8908170129 890810 J
h PDR ADOCK 05000443 l
G PDR DS#3
iw.
ropes & GRAY lA
.k.
Appeal Board Members August 10, 1989 Instead, the.NECNP letter attempts to make the entirely new argument that the Licensing Board's "various inconsistent rulings left unclear the question of whether and to what extent it intended to allow the litigation of the size of the EPZ population that should be accommodated [ sic] by receptiin
' centers."
NECNP's letter thus goes far beyond the scope of the leave granted by the Appeal Board.
Moreover, even if NECNP's new argument were now to be entertained by this Board, it should be rejected.
NECNP's recitation of the histories of NECNP Contention HP-1 and SAPL Contention 3 is incorrect, and its characterization and conclusions with respect to the Licensing Board's rulings are H
patently wrong.
In November 1986, NECNP offered NECNP Contention HP-1, which states in part:
The host plans for Manchester,. Dover, Salem, and Rochester do nrt meet the requirements of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a), 50. 47 (b) (8), (10), (11), and (13), or NUREG-0695 [ sic], Sections J.12 and K.S.b.
- a. NUREG-0695 [ sic] requires that the personnel and equipment at relocation centers should be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and transients in the plume expcsure EPZ arriving at relocation centers.
Section J.12.
c.
The plan does not assure that everyone evacuated from the EPL vill go to a reception area.
Vols. 33, 35, 36, 38 at I-11.
Without an assuracce that every evacuated person and every evacuation vehicle is scanned for radiological contamination and decontaminated if necessary, a public hazard in the form of radiologically contaminated people and vehicles will go unchecked throughout the state, into other states and to Canada.
In addition, there is no assurance that people who miss decontamination services at the host community will be able to obtain them anywhere else in a reasonable amount of time, since few hospitals have l
i I
i' 1
l
)
_ = - - - - - _ _ _ _
1
o RoPEG & GRAY t
Appeal Board Members August 10, 1989 extensive decontamination capabilities.
Vol. 1 at 2.8-5.1 In Applicants' Answer to NECNP Contention HP-1, Applicants argued:
l 1
" Applicants oppose the admission of NECNP Contention HP-1 for reason that it is without sufficient basis and poses an impermissible challenge to Commission regulations.
The contention with little more than lip service to f
regulations and regulatory guides sets out in great f
detail what NECNP considers evacuee policy should be.
The contention asserts that all evacuees of whatever condition should be required to go to
/
relocation centers to be monitored and decontaminated to prevent the spread of contamination to North America and to be attended there as to every need.
Neither the Commission's regulations nor its regulatory guidance call for the funneling to and the holding of all evacuees at relocation centers nor in the manner suggested."2 NRC Staff's response to this same contention was not to oppose the contention "except to the extent that NECNP's basis asserts (a) that all evacuees of the EPZ should be required to proceed to relocation centers to be monitored and decontaminated.
"3 1
"NECNP Contentions on Revision of the New Hampshire State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans" at 17-23 (November 26, 1986), appended hereto as Attachment 1.
t 2
" Applicants' Answer to NECNP's Contention on Revision 2 of the New Hampshire State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans" at 5 (December 10, 1986).
3 NRC Staff further observed that:
"The first of these assertions, as to the need to require all evacuees to go to the relocation centers, constitutes nothing more than NECNP's personal views as to what applicable policy ought to be, and is not supported by applicable regulatory requirements or guidance."
i Ropcc & GRAY l
s Appeal Board Members August 10, 1989 l
NECNP responded to the Applicants' and Staff's arguments by re-asserting, and highlighting, its leaal theory that i
NUREG-0654 requires that 100 percent of the EPZ population report to reception centers:
f "Applicantst claim that this contention goes beyond the scope of the NRC's regulations is also without merit.
NECNP's claim in basis paragraph (a) that the relocation centers cannot monitor evacuees within a 12-hour period is tied directly to NUREG-0654, SS [ sic] J.
12.
Basis. paragraph (c) asserts that the host plans do not assure that everyone evacuated from the EPZ will go to a reception area.
Because of the contamination h
hazard posed by the exposure of thousands of people from the EPZ, NECNP contends that this constitutes a failure to provide adequate protection to the public health and safety.
We are aware, as Applicants point out, that a contention similar to this one was previously rejected by the Board.
Because the Board had also earlier declared that it was postponing litigation of the host plans until further changes were made, NECNP reasserted this contention in order to preserve its right to appeal the issue." 4 Likewise, NECNP stated:
"First, the NRC Staff objects to basis paragraph (c), which faults the plan for failing to assure that everyone evacuated from the EPZ will go to a reception center.
The Staff asserts that this contention [ sic) represents only NECNP's ' personal views as to what applicable policy ought to be.'
To the contrary, this contention is grounded in the y
NRC's requirement that there be a reasonable i
assurance that ' adequate protective measures can i
and will be taken in the event of a radiological "NRC Staff's Response to Contentions on NHRERP Revision 2" at 20-21 (December 19, 1986) (emphasis added).
4 "The New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Reply to Applicants' Answer to FECNP's Contentions on Revision 2 of the New Hampshire State and Local Radiological
{
Emergency Response Plans" et 5 (December 19, 1986).
l 1
o Ropcc & GRAY j
s Appeal Board Members August 10, 1989 emergency.'
It is eminently reasonable to expect the State of New Hampshire to protect its d
population and the population of other states and Canada against radiological contamination by evacuees during a radiological emergency."5 NECNP Contention HP-1 was rejected in the Licensing I
Board's Memorandun and Order of February 18, 1987.6 The rationale applied by the Licensing Board is found in its Memorandum and Order of May 18, 1987.7 The significant language Applicants would draw the Board's attention to (and which HECNP fails to cite in its letter) is:
"The Board finds that proffered bases (a) and (c) for this contention are predicated upon NECNP's belief that monitoring and decontamination facilities at host reception centers must be capable of handling the entire evacuating population within about twelve hours, rather than those arriving at the relocation centers, a lesser number.
NECNP is unequivocal in its interpretation in this regard.
As we previously ruled in rejecting SAPL Contention 3, and NECNP Contention NHLP-13 (Board Order of April 29, 1986, at 81-82 and 77), we find no regulatory requirement that relocation centers be able to provide for all evacuees who leave the EPZ or that there is any requirement that an evacuee must go to a relocation center.
(See also the Staff's First Objection (supra) to this contention.)"8 Thus, contrary to NECNP's assertion, the Licensing Board's rulings on the "litigability of the size of the EPZ 5
"NECNP Reply to NRC Staff's Response to NECNP's Contentions on the New Hampshire State and Local Radiological Emergency Nesponse Plans" at 2-3 (December 31, 1986).
6 Memorandum and Order (Rulina on Contentions -
Revision 2 New Hampshire Radiological Emeroency Response Plan), at 3 (February 18, 1987) 7 Memorandum and Order (Providina Basis for and Revision to Board's Rulinas on Contentions on Revision 2 of NHRERP), at 57-62 (May 18, 1987), Attachment 2 hereto.
8 Id. at 61.
l
.o-
' ropes & GRAY O-l Appeal Board Members August 10, 1989 l
I population attending reception centers" were neither q
" inconsistent" nor " unclear".
The. Board clearly and
. consistently rejected contentions -.NECNP's HP-1 and NHLP-13, and SAPL's Contention 3 -- which arguad, as a matter of a
law, that the entire EPZ population must go.to the reception' centers'for monitoring and relocation.
The Board, on the other hand, clearly and consistent 3y admitted contentions --
SAPL-7 and SAPL-33 -- which could F3 read as offering a factual' challenge to FEMA's 20% moritoring presumption.
The issue before this Appeal Board' remains what it has
~
always'been:
did the Interveners take sufficient advantage
.of their-clear' opportunity to offer a factual rebuttal to the
- FEMA presumption.
For the reasons.which have already been briefed and argued to the Board, Applicants believe that they did not, and.that the-presumption stands unrebutted in these 4
proceedings.-
Clearly Interveners had an opportunity to
-litigate the planning basis; that'they did not do so directly nor sufficiently to warrant a finding of plan inadequacy was a reasonable conclusion of the Licensing Board.
Very truly yours, G /l.n> A &
v.
Thomas G.
Dignan, Jr.
Counsel for Applicants cc: service list WXP/ced: menact.n
ATTACHMENT 2
{
8 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:
Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
Dr. Jerry Harbour In the Matter of
)
Docket Nos. 50-443-OL J
50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY
)
(A51.BP No. 82-471-02-OL) 0FNEWHAMPSHIRE,,et,g.
).
(OffsiteEmergencyPlanning) t (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
May 18, 1987 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Providing Basis for and Revision to Board's Rulings on Contentions on Revision 2.of NHRERP)
In our Memorandum and Order of February 18, 1987 this Board announced its rulings on each of the contentions filed by five parties to this proceeding, addressing Revision 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan. The following Memorandum provides the basis for the Board's rulings. The legal standa'ds for admissibility of contentions are described in our Memorandum and Order of November 17, 1982, LBP-82-16, 16 NRC 1649, 1654-56 (1982). On reconsideration, we revise parts of our February 18, 1987 Order (at 2-3) in respect to admissibility of certain bases of Town of Hampton's (TOH's)ContentionsIII,IV,andVIallegedinTOH'sMemorandadated October 31, and November 19, 1986, and bases of NECNP Contention NHLP-6.
.1 1 d W
_ a
6 l l
NECNP Contention HP-1.
In this new contention NECNP raises, for the first time, the assertion that host connunity plans do not meet certain regulatory requirements. The contention reads:
The host plans for Manchester, Dover, Salem, and Rochester, do not meet the requirements of 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)),
50.47(b)(8), (10), (11), and (13), or NUREG-0695 [ sic Sections J.12 and K.5.b.
Tne Board assumes that NECNP intended to rely on NUREG-0654, if II.J.12 and II.K.5.b, which provide certain guidance on the standards and evaluation criteria for meeting requirements of 10 C.F.R.
il50.47(b)(10)and50.47(b)(11),respectively.
(NUREG-0695 pertains to Materials License SNM-1265 and is unrelated to this proceeding.)
NECNP proffers nine basis statements in support of the contention whet tin it asserts:
(a) That the fcur relocation centers do not meet the requirements of NUREC-0654 Section J.12 that requires that the personnel and equipment at relocation centers should be capable of monitoring within about a 12-hour period all residents and transients in the plume i
exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers; (b) That the human resources according to the host plans are inadequate because all provide for 94 staff members regardless of the size of the populations each center is planned to serve; (c) That the plans do not assume that everyone evacuated from the EPZ will go to a reception area for monitoring and decontamination, with l
i l
'4 l
l i
,3; q the result that contaminated people and vehicles will go to other areas
}
)
unchecked, thus causing a public radiation hazard; (d) That the plan does not adequately acconnodate decontamination needs of evacuated hospital ~ patients and nursing home residents-l
-(e) That it is not clear that injured contaminated evacuees or j
1 internally contaminated evacuees will be acconnodated by the plans;
{
l i
(f) That there is no explanation in the piar. cf hcw the heet facilities coordinator _ will identify personnel who may provide emergency i
1 medical treatment on site, or-where such personne1'will be found; (g) That despite the letter of agreement with the American Red Cross,' there is no demonstration of a Red Cross capability.to provide for feeding, clothing, and sheltering all evacuees who have those needs; (h) That it is not clear if adequate food and clothing is stockpiled, or that the Red Cross will be able to gather its resources to provide for further food and clothing; and (i) That the plans do not contain a system for interchange of registration rosters between host facilities to facilitate reuniting of families that are split up during an evacuation; NECNP maintains that I
such a system will be necessary to maintain order.
l The Applicants oppose admission on the grounds that this contention is without sufficient basis and poses an impermissible challenge to Comission regulations. They state that the contention sets out in detail what NECNP considers evacuee policy should be, but with little i
more than lip service to regulations and regulatory guides.
In
)
j J
l 3.
Vy particular, Applicants state that neither regulations nor regulatory guidance provide for funne11ng all evacuees to host facility monitoring a
and decontamination centers to prevent the spread of contamination to North America and to provide for their every need in the manner suggested by NECNP. Applicants cite this Board's previous rejection of similar, but less comprehensive contentions in our Memorandum and Order of April 29,1986; i.e., NECNP Contention NHLP-13, at 77; SAPL Contention 3, at 81-82; and SAPL Contention 4, at 82-83.
The Staff does not oppose admission of this contention except to the extent that NECNP's basis asserts (a) that all evacuees of the EPZ should be required to proceed to relocation centers to be monitored and decontaminated (NECNP Contentions at 21, i c)0U (b) that evacuees the relocation centers are likely to abandon the centers prior to being monitoredanddecontaminated(,1d.at18-19);and(c)thatrelocation 11 Staff's n.20 (at 17) cited also in reference to the instant contention, states:
A recent decision by the Appeal Board provides a significant interpretation of NUREG-0654, i II.J.12, in which it held that provisions must be made for monitoring and decontaminating all evacuees from the EPZ who may seek such assistance, not just for those evacuees who may seek assistance in finding shelter.
Lono Island Liohting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-855, 24 NRC (December 12,1966)(slipop.
at 17-18). The Appeal BoaFleft open the question'of what percentage of the EPZ population should be expected to seek radiological monitoring and decontamination assistance, as a matter appropriate for evidentiary proof in the proceeding (id. at 18); FEMA testimony submitted in that proceeding s5 ported a reception center utilization factor of 201.
4
{
>4 s centers should be required to communicate lists of registered evacuees with other host facilities (id. at 23, i 1). As to the first and last of the objections recited above Staff states that they represent nothing more than NECNP's personal views as to what applicable policy
)
ought to be and are not supported by applicable regulatory requirements or guidance. The Staff views the second NECNP assertion to which it l
objects as-consisting of nothing more than unsupported speculation.
NECNP answers the Applicants' objections that (1) the contention has no basis and (21 goes beyond NRC regulations, essentially by stating i
I that the regulatory basis is provided in the contention itself which assertedly details the factual support for NECNP's concerns and cites to the host plans by page. NECNP further states that it has reasserted the
(
contention to preserve its right of appeal in view of the fact that this Board had previously rejected a similar contention. According to NEChP this path was chosen "[b]ecause the Board had also earUpr declared that it was postponing litigation of the host plans until further changes were made...."12 NECNP Cont n_ *!HLP-13 asserting an argument similar to that in I2 6ases (a) and.c) of the instant contention, but with fewer
, particulars, was, rejected for lack of basis in our Memorandum and
.p
/ Order of AnM12Y.1986. at 77. The more general contention on g
r, lack of host conhu]ity plans, NHLP-12 was rejected as premature (id_. at 76).
r>
k f
i
i 1
61 -
1 NECNP disagrees with the Staff's three objections to certain bases for this contention (supra) and states that at least two of them f
represent reasonable assertions under the general requirement that there be reasonable assurance that adequate measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency (i.e., under Section 50.47(a)).
I i
The Board finds that proffered bases (a) and (c) for this j
contention are predicated upon NECNP's belief that monitoring and decontamination facilities at the host reception centers must be capable of handling the entire evacuating population within about twelva hours, rather than those arrivinc at the relocation centers, a lesser number.
NECNP is unequivocal in its interpretation in this regard. As we previously ruled in rejecting S_APL Contention 3, and NECNP Contention NHLP-13 (Board Order of April 29, 1986, at 81-82 and 77), we find no r
regulatory requirement that relocation centers be able to provide for all evacuees who leave the EPZ or that there is any requirement that an evacuee must go to a relocation center.
(See also the Staff's first objection (supra) to this contention.)
Proffered basis (b) to this contention fails in that it asserts no violation of regulatory requirements or any inadequacy leading to a safety concern.
Instead it merely points out that staffing levels are the same for the four relocation centers; hence it lacks any regulatory basis.
1 j
Proffered bases (d) through (i) relate to the ability of the host centers to provide certain services to persons who will, or may, evacuate the EPZ in the event of a radiological emergency.
In its i
answer to Applicants' objections (at 6) NECNP, without any specificity,
]
attempts to relate these criticisms of the heat plans to the adequacy of l
the State's plan for " recovery" from an accident under 10 C.F.R. 650.47(b)(13). However, these bases reflect NECNP's view of what ought to be contained in the host comunity plans, not what the plans are required to contain. While NECNP cites regulatory requirements in the body of the contention and cites to pages (but not in all instances) in l
the host plan where NECNP takes issue with what it finds there NECNP provides no clear nexus between its assertions of inadequacy and
(
applicable regulations or regulatory guidance.
NECNP Contention HP-1 is reieeted for lack of basis and specificity.
Adoption of Hampton Contentions. NECNP seeks to incorporate and adopt the contentions on Revision 2 of the NHRERP raised by the Town of Hampton in its filing dated October 31, 1986. NECNP further states that Hampton's contentions raise issues that affect the entire EPZ and that NECNP has a broad interest in litigating the contentions as they relate to the entire emergency planning zore.
NECNP Contentions at 23-24.
ATTACHMENT'!
Fovember 26,19n6 4
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
I In the Matter of
)
)
Public Service Company of
)
New Hampshire, et al.
)
Docket Nos. 5 0-443 OL
)
50-444 OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2)
)
OFFSITE EMERGENCY
)
PLANNING
)
~
NECNP CONTENTIONS ON REVISION 2 OF THE THE NEW HAMPSHIRE ST ATE AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS Introduction The New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP")
submits the following contentions on Revision 2 to the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan ("RER5"), Re vision 2.
These contentions include amendments to previously admitted 1
contentions, as well as new contentions.
The Board has ordered the parties to limit the scope of con-tentions on Revision 2 to matters that are newly raised in Revi-sion 2.
In its Motion for Reconsideration and Response to Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order of November 4,1986, 1;ECNP asked the Board to reconsider that order and take contentions on matters that were raised for the first time in Revision 1 and are 1
See Licensing Board Memorandum and Order of April 2 9,1986 at 47, et seg.
4 17 -
Thus, there may be a large number of the normal school buses and drivers who will not te available during a radiological emer-gency.
B.
Contention HP-1:
The host plans for Manchester, Dover, Salem, and Rochester, do not meet the requirements of 10 CFR Sec-tions 50.47(a), 5 0. 4 7( b) (8 ), (10), (11), and (13 ), or NUREG-0595, Sections J.12 and K.5.b.
Basis:
a.
NUREG-0695 r equires that the personnel and equip-ment at relocation centers should be capable of monitoring within 1
about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centars.
Se ction J.12.
MANEHESTER:
1.
The Manchester relocation center does not contain enough equipment to assure that all individuals can be administered the quick one minute check for contamination before entering the reception facility for registration (the check would take over 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> if all of the available monitoring equipment were used only for this checkpoint), nor enough to do a more thorough check on those evacuees who are contaminated to fin:' out where the contamination is. Only 3,060 of the 20,000 expected evacuees could be scanned in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> in the decontamination fa-cility if all of.the available monitoring equipment were used only at this checkpoint.
This is only for the first scan in each
____-----___._--------_-_--__-_-__-_--__.---J
- 1? -
case.
However the plans call for several scans in the i
6 decontamination facility per person.
noreover, it is absurd to assume that ev&cuees would stand in line for this long before being able to register and begin the rendezvous process.
It is very likely that the host facility will te abandoned by most evacuees when the inef ficiency becomes 1
1 6
There will be 17 survey instruments (CDV-700) stored at the Fire Department for use in the Manchester relocation center l
Volume 3 6 a t 11-11.
Monitoring will apparently occur in 5 places:
- 1. Vehicles will be monitored before entering the parking lots.
No time estimate per vehicle is provided, but since the, shortest scan possible for a person is one minute, it seems un-likely that a whole car could be scanned in less time.
Volume 3 6 at B-3.2. The plan calls fcr a quick (one minute) scanning of each individual evacuee before one can enter the reception area. Vol.
3 6 a t E-3, E4-3.
This is both for the safety of the evacuee, whose decontamination needs should be made first priority, and for the " clean" people in the reception area who need to be pro-tected from contamination by evacuees who would be contaminated and wandering around the reception area.
All 20,000 people who come to Manchester will require this one minute scan. That will require 333 CDV-700 hours, with the monitor running constantly l
and no space between evacuees.
In Manchester, all seventeen monitors in use at once could do this in 41 hours4.74537e-4 days <br />0.0114 hours <br />6.779101e-5 weeks <br />1.56005e-5 months <br />.
- 3. Contaminated individuals will then go to the Control Point manager just outside the decontamination center.
Vol. 3 6 at B3-4.
7here they will get a thorough scan that will take be-tween 3 and 5 tinutes each.
Vol. 3 6 at E4-5.
At 4 minutes a survey, each CDV-700 can read 180 people in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- 4. Contaminated people will then remove potentially con-taminated clothing, and be rescanned.
Vol. 36 at B4-6.
The same time factors will apply.
5.
If they are still contaminated, the evacuees will go in-side the decontamination center and be remonitored.
Vol. 36 at B4-7.
They will then be scrubbed or bathed.
Then they will be monitored another time for a final reading. People who come up clean will be released and people who are still contaminated will undergo scrubbing and remonitoring again.
Those who are still contaminated after two scrubbings will be referred to the DPHS Supervisor.
Vol. 3 6 at B4-7.
1 1
l
)
19 -
apparent, leaving people without access to the organized rethod of finding one another within the reception area.
Those dis-couraged individuals may seek shelter in other parts of the State or outside the scate, thus spreading radioactive contamination as they travel.
2.
After twelve hours, the Manchester facility is scheduled to become the only facility that will hanc:le the decontamination of emergency workers.
Vol. 3 6 at B-2.
Obvious-ly, monitoring and decontamination of the general public will still be underway at that time.
Th us, there is no reasonable as-sutance that the Manchester relocation center can meet the needs of energency workers.
ROCHESTER:
3.
There will not be enough equipment in the RocheGter relocation center to assure that everyone can be ad-ninistered even the quick one minute check for contamination be-fere entering the reception facility for registration.
The plans do not clearly state how many CDV-700 surveying instrwrents will be available for use in Rochester.
However, there will be four radiological monitoring kits, and therefore no more than four CDV-700's can be counted on.
Vol. 3 5 at II-11.
It is possible that 35,000 evacuees will go to the Rochester host facility for decontamination.
Vol. 3 5 at I-10. It there are f our CDV-700's for the initial scanning, it will take the last evacuee 143 hours0.00166 days <br />0.0397 hours <br />2.364418e-4 weeks <br />5.44115e-5 months <br /> to get inside the reception facility.
This clearly will not provide adequate protection to the evacuees.
20 -
COVEF.:
4.
There will not be enough equipment at the cover host facility to assure riat everyone can be administered even the quics one minute check for contamination before entering the reception facility for registration. There will ce 43 CDV-700's available for use in Dover during a radiological emergency.
Vol. 3 3 a t 11-11.
There could be 57,000 evacuees cening to Dover
\\
f or decontamination. Vol. 3 3 a t I-10.
Just to get everyone into the reception facility after one scan will take 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />.
SALEM:
5.
There will not be enough equipment
.n the Dover host facility to assure that everyone can be administered even the quick one :cinute check for conta:uination bef ore enter {ng the reception facility for registration.
There will be 3 CDV-700's availabic for use in Salem during a radiological emergency.
Vol 3 8 at II-ll.
There could be as many as 29,000 evacuees com-ing to Salem for decontamination. Vol 33 at I-8. Just to get everyone into the reception area after one scan will take 161 hours0.00186 days <br />0.0447 hours <br />2.662037e-4 weeks <br />6.12605e-5 months <br />.
b.
The human retources available according to the plans are inaccquate to protect the public health and safety.
All of the host plans - regardlers of the size of the populations they are expected to serve - provide for 94 staff members to per-form the many diverse tasks associated with the facility.
Vols.
33, 35, 36, 3 8 a t 33-:.,
-2.
Not only are these nembers inade-quate on their face, but the State clearly has applied a general-
-- 21 ' -
~
ized f orrula without raking any attempt to determine what are the a
e-staffing needs of each separate facility, i
c.
The plan does not assure that everyone evacuated fro the EPZ will go to a reception area.
Vols. 3 3, 3 5, 3 6, 3 8 a t Y-11.
Without an assurance that every evacuated person and every evacuation vehicle is scanned for radiological contamina-tion and decontaminated if necessary, a public hazard in the form I
of radiologically contaminated people and vehicles will go un-checked throughout the state, into other states and to Canada.
In addition, there is no assurance that people who miss decontamination services at the host community will be able to
~
obtain them anywhere else in a reasonable amount of time, since few hospitals have extensive decontamination inabilities.
Vol.
1 at 2.0-5.
d.
The plan does not adequately accommodate the decontamination needs of evacuated hospital patients and nursing home residents.
Since the decontamination of these individuals will occur at their host health care faci'.ities, they will need to wait f or the arri.'al of a CDV-700 which will already be in great demand at the reception center.
Likewise, the monitoring team trained to perform decontamination to be dispatched to these f acilities will have more than enough to do at the recep-tion center.
In addition, there are no procedures for how to decontaminate these individuals in the plans.
Further, the host medical facilities may risk exposing regular residents to radiologically contaminated materials.
Vols. 3 3, 3 5, 3 6, 3 8 a t E-3.
__- ~
I 22 -
e.
It is not clear that injured contaminated evacuees or internally contaminated evacuees will be accommodated by the plans.
Both sets of peenle are to be referred to the DPas super-O visor.
Vol 33, 35, 36, 38 at B-4.
However, there is no indica-I tion of what s/he will do with them beyond the vague activity of referring them to medical authorities, how s/he will base deci-i' sions, and what facilities will be available for these people.
For example, the two Manchester hospitals that are listed in Volume 1 of the RERP are Catholic Medical Center, which has nc decontamination capability, and Elliot Hospital, which can handle one contaminated patient per hour.
There is no reasonable as-surance from this that medical care will be available for injured and contaminated or internally contaminated individuals.
j f.
The host facilities coordinator is charged with the task of identifying personnel who may provide energency medical treatment o n-s i t e.
No explanation of how this will be done or where the host coordinator will find these peop).e is demonstrated in the plans.
Vols. 3 5, 3 6 at III-7, Vols. 3 3, 3 8 at III-8.
Although there is a letter of understanding with 9
the Red Cross that it will take responsibility for feeding, clothing, and sheltering all evacuees who have those needs, there is no demonstration of a Red Cross capability to provide these services to the huge number of people who may need them.
Vol. 5, l
Statement of Understanding between the State of New Hampshire and the American Red Cross.
h.
Although the plans report that there is a day's
(
I food regularly on hand at local schools, it is not clesr whether l
l l
L_________
~'
4,
.that is a day's food for the 1,000 regular students at the school, or a' day's-food to, serve 20,000.
In addition, the State claims-that within that one day period, Fed Cross will be able to-gather-its resources to provide for further food needs..
- However, no evider.ce is given to support that projection.
Vols. 3 3, 3 5, 3 6, 3 8 at II-10.
The Red Cross will also be responsible for providing any clotaing that is needed.
Vols. 3 3, 3 5, 3 6, 3 8 a t I I-10.
Since fresh clothing is an integral part of the decontamination facility, it is not adequate to rely on receiving-clothes on an ad hoc basis.
- i. 'The host' plans'contain no system to communicate lists of registered evacuees with' other host facilities.
Vols.
3 3, 3 5, 3 6, 3 8 at II-12.
If the host facility does not keep track of the location of evacuees, order among evacuees will not
~
For families who are split up because children go'to be kept.
school in a'different area than their parents live or work, or spouses who work in different areas, a more comprehensive system of logging the whereabouts of evacuees w341 be necessary to caintain order.
~
IV.
Adoption of Hampton Contentions NECNP incorporates by reference and adopts the contentions I
on Revision 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency 31, 1986.
Response Plan filed by the Tcwn of Hampton on October NECNP shares the concerns voiced in Hampton's contentions.
More-those contentions raise issues that af fect not only the L
.over, Town of Hampton, but the entire EPZ.
NECNP believes that it will I