ML20245G594
| ML20245G594 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1989 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245G586 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8908160112 | |
| Download: ML20245G594 (2) | |
Text
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.g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7,,
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
\\.....}p-SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 33 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-42 y
WOLF-CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION 4
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-482
' INTRODUCTION The Wolf. Creek Technical Specifications (TS) were written under the premise
-that containment integrated leak rate testing (Type A tests) and local leak rate testing of penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests would be
-performed when the plant was shut down in either Modes 5 or 6.
Accordingly, TS 3.6.1.2, " Containment Leakage," was written to state that if measured leakage rates exceeded allowable limits, corrective actions must be taken before-increasing the reactor coolant system temperature above 200*F (i.e.,
going beyond Mode 5). More recently, however, licensees (which include Wolf Creek) have found it advantageous to perform local leak rate testing of pene -
trations and valves.while at power. The practice of performing local leak rate testing.at power has introduced the possibility of detecting unacceptable overall leakage rates with the reactor coolant system temperature already above 200*F. Such an occurrence would require inanediate actions to shut down the facility in accordance with TS 3.0.3.
By letter dated March 28, 1988, the licensee proposed revisions to TS 3.6.1.2 to allow for corrective actions should unacceptable leakage rates be detected-when the reactor coolant system temperature exceeds 200*F. Minor modifications to TS 3.6.1.2 proposed by the staff to improve clarity and continuity with the existing TS have been verbally accepted by the licensee and are included in this license amendment.
In addition, the licensee proposed revisions to TS 3.6.3 which address leakage concerns on containment isolation valves.
EVALUATION With respect to proposing revisions to TS 3.6.1.2, " Containment Leakage," the licensee has referenced TS 3.6.3, " Containment Isolation Yalves." TS 3.6.3 requires operability of containment isolation valves based on individual closure or stroke times. The Action statement of 3.6.3 states that when a containment isolation valve is inoperable due to unacceptable stroke times,
.the licensee must either (a) restore the valve to operable status within four hours; (b) isolate the affected penetration within four hours via closing either an automatic valve, a manual valve, or a blind flange; or (c) be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
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b The licensee has reasoned that there should be consistency between the Action statements for inoperable containment isolation valves due to unacceptable stroke times and penetrations with excessive leakage. Therefore, the licensee has proposed that penetrations identified as having excessive leakage be either repaired or isolated via a backup isolation device similar to that described in TS 3.6.3.
In addition, the licensee has proposed inserting a footnote in TS 3.6.3 that refers to TS 3.6.1.2 when valves have excessive leakage. This directs the shift supervisor to the proper specification if a containment isolation component has excessive leakage.
Considering that Wolf Creek is conducting local leak rate tests while at power, the staff agrees that revisions to TS 3.6.1.2 are necessary. Since both TS 3.6.1.2 and 3.6.3 deal with inoperable containment isolation valves (3.6.1.2 addresses leakage while 3.6.3 addresses stroke times), it is reasonable to desire consistency in the respective Action statements. The staff finds the proposed revisions appropriate for maintaining high assurance that the containment structure will restrict the release of radioactive materials to the leakage paths assumed in the safety analysis report. Therefore, based on our review, the staff finds the proposed revisions to TS 3.6.1.2 and 3.6.3 acceptable.
ENVIR0hMENTAL CONSIDERATION The amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.
The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released effsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in10CFRSection51.22(c)(9). Pursuantto10CFR51.22(b),noenvironmental impact statemant or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
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f CONCLUSION The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
I (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public i
will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will nct be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date: August 9, 1989 J
Principal Contributor: Douglas V. Pickett i
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