ML20245G434
| ML20245G434 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1989 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245G414 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8906290139 | |
| Download: ML20245G434 (5) | |
Text
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT N05.16a AND 101 TO l
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-57 AND HPF-5 GEORGIA POWER COMF ANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA EDWIN 1. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated February 3,1989, Georgia Power Company (the licensee) requested amendments to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Edwin I.
Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.
Specifically, the proposed ainendments would modify the TS for Units 1 and 2 to:
(1) Change the maximum operating times for certain primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) to account for a different method of measuring; (2) exclude several unit 1 containment penetrations and PCIVs from the local leak rate test (LLRT) program; (3) revise Unit 1 TS section 4.7. A.2 and Unit 2 TS section 4.6.1.3 to achieve similarity between the two documents, to comply with current 10 CFR 50 Appendix J testing requirements, and to specify an allowable leakage; (4) delete penetration 218A from Unit 1 TS Table 3.7-2; and (5) remove the isolation valves associated with the primary feedwater and the torus drainage and purification systems from Unit 2 TS section 3.6.1.2.
2.0 EVALUATION 2.1 Proposed Change 1 - Change the maximum operating times for certain primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) to account for a different method of measuring.
The TS for Hatch Units 1 and 2 now contain table listings (Table 3.7-1 for INit 1 and Table 3.6.3-1 for tinit 2) of power operated, automatically initiated h,IVs showing maximum operating times for isolating upon receipt of an appropriate signal.
The operating times shown in the tables are based upon a
" light-to-light" measuring method, which was used during the plant functional testing prior to reactor startup.
However, the ASME Code,Section XI, requires that valve stroke times be measured from initiation of the actuating signal to the end of the actuating cycle, more connonly referred to as a
" switch-to-light" measuring method.
The changes to the maximum stroke times proposed by the licensee are merely to account for the change in stroke time measurement from the " light-to-light" method to the "swtich-to-light" method, i
Actual valve operation does not change and the new " switch-to-light's opera ting R906290139 090620 I- )R ADOCK 0500 1
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times maintain the primary' containment design bases as defined in the Unit I and Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Reports.
Since the actual valve operation remains the same, we find this proposed change to be acceptable.
2.2 Proposed Change 2 - Exclude Unit 1 valres IE41-F021, F022, F040, and F049; valves IE51-F001, F002, F028 and F040; and containment penetrations X-212, X-213, X-214 and X-215 from the Appendix J LLRT (Type C) program.
The named valves and the associated containment penetrations are those serving the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbine exhaust and turbine drain lines, and the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) turbine exhaust and drain lines. These exhaust and drain lines terminate in the torus below the water level of the suppression pool. Since the torus water level is controlled within narrow limits at all times, continuous coverage of piping terminations is assured, thus providing a water seal between the atmospheres inside and outside the torus. Under this condition, Type C testing is not required by Appendix J.
The licensee sta'es, however, that leak rate testing of these valves will still be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME code as part of the inservice inspection (ISI) program.
The staff previously has approved the exemption of certain valves and associated penetrations from the Type C testing requirements based upon a similar argument that the piping involved terminated below the water level in the torus ', Amendment #131, Hatch Unit 1, October 30, 1986; and Amendment #140, Hatch Unl 1, June 5, 1987).
Accordingly, we find acceptable the licensee's proposal to exclude the listed valves and associated penetrations from the Type C testing program, and the deletion of these valves and penetrations from Unit 1 TS Table 3.7-4.
2.3 Proposed Change 3 - Revise Unit 1 TS 4.7. A.2 and Unit 2 TS 4.6.1.3 to achieve similarity between the two documents, to comply with current 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J testing requirements, and to specify an allowable leakage.
Appendix J,Section III.D.2.b requires that containment air locks be tested at 6-month intervals after initial fuel loading at an internal pressure of not less than Pa.
Air locks that are opened when containment integrity is required shall be tested within 3 days after being opened, at a test pressure as specified in the TS.
For Hatch Units 1 and 2, Pa is 57.5 psig and the test pressure specified for the 3-day test requirement is at least 10 psig.
The existing Unit 1 TS provide no acceptance criteria for leakage resulting from the 3-day test, while Unit 2 states "no detectable seal leakage." Neither of these is suittble to meet the requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Section III.D.2.b(iv), which requires that, "The acceptance criteria for air lock testing shall be stated in the Techtiical Specifications."
The change proposed by the licensee would ameed Unit 1 TS 4.7. A.2 and Unit 2 TS 4.6.1.3 to achieve identical wording as regards the test requirements for the containment air locks, both in conformance with the requirements of
- Appendix J, Sections III.D.2.b.(i), (ii), and (iii) and would state acceptance criteria for allowable lea ^kage in accordance with Appendix J,Section III.D.2.b(iv) for the leak tests.
For the full pressure (Pa). leak tests, the allowable leakage is 0.05 La. This acceptance criterion is now stated in the TS for each unit and would remain unchanged.
For the 3-day tests conducted at pressures < 10 psig, an acceptable leakage for each set of dcor seals would be specified as 0.01 La.
This reduced leakage rate is comparable to reduced pressure leak rates previously reviewed and approved by the staff for other plants, and is acceptable.
Accordingly, we find the licensee's proposed TS modifications regarding the containment air locks acceptable.
2.4 Proposed Change 4 - Delete penetration 218A from Unit 1 iS Table 3.7-2.
Amendment No.140, issued on June 5,1987, deleted penetration 218A from the listing of containment isolation valves subject to Appendix J 1eak rate testing (TS Table 3.7-4).
Penetration 218A should have been deleted from TS l
l-Table 3.7-2 (Testable Penetrations with Double 0-Ring Seals) at this same time. This proposed change would correct that oversight.
The change is administrative in nature and is acceptable.
2.5 Proposed Change 5 - Delute the isolation valves associated with the primary feedwater and the torus drainage and purification systems from Unit 2 TS 3.6.1.2.
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10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Section III.C states the conditions under which i
certain containment isolation valves sealed with fluid may be excluded when l
determining the total combined leakage rate.
l Primary feedwater valves 2B21-F010A & B and 2B21-F077A & B (in penetrations 9A I
and gB) are expected to remain covered by water following a design basis Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA). Note 30 to Unit 2 FSAR Table 3.8-5 states that these valves are expected to remain covered by water following a design basis LOCA.
Further, Note 8 to the same table states that the system remains filled with water post-LOCA, that the valves are tested with water, and that valve leakage is not included in the 0.50 La type B and C tests to determine total local leakage. These valves, therefore, should not have been listed in TS 3.6.1.2, and their removal from the listing merely amounts to an administrative correction.
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Unit 2 FSAR subsection 6.2.1.2.2 states that the torus drainage and purification system valves (2G57-F011 and 2G51-F012), which may be open at the time of ar, accident, receive a signal to close, and that following closure a water seal is established by the suppression pool water.
These valves thus will have no gaseous leakage and, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Section III.C, they need not be considered in determining the combined leakage rate. The removal of these valves from the listing in TS 3.6.1.2 is,
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therefore, acceptable.
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3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
These amenc'ments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the arendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of n:y effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational i
radiation exposure.
The Comission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has l
been no public coment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 651.22(c)(9).
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i Pursuant to 10 CFR 651.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental l
assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The Comission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no l
significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register l
(41 FR 13765) on April 5,1989, and consulted with the state of Georgia.
No public comments were received, and the state of Georgia did not have any comments.
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there i
is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be cndangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be l
conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the I
health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
Lawrence P. Crocker, PDII-3/0RP-I/II Dated: June 20, 1989 i
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DATED June 20,'1989 AMENDMENT. N0.101 ' TO FACILITY-OPEt% TING LICENSE NPF-5, EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT NO.164 TO FACILITY OPEPATING LICENSE DPR-67 EDWIN 1. HATCH,. UNIT 1 DISTRIBUTION:
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