Text

Report on the Visit of U.S. Nuclear Safety Delegation to the Soviet Union,August 19-31, 1988
	ML20245A346
Person / Time
Issue date:	03/31/1989
From:	James Shea; NRC OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS (GPA)
To:	;
References
	NUREG-1348, NUDOCS 8904250162
	Download: ML20245A346 (7)
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vv AVAILABILITY NOTICE Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications Most documents cited in NRC publications will be available from one of the following sources:

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l

NUREG-1348 3 i Report on the Visit of a U.S. Nuclear Safety Delegation to the Soviet L~nion, August 19-31, 1988 ssanats*=

International Programs Office of Governmental and Public Affairs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

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Abstract During August 1988 a U.S. delegation of nuclear reactor safety specialists, led i by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Lando W. Zech, Jr., visited the !

Soviet Union to initiate cooperative activities in civilian nuclear reactor safety between the two countries under their April 1988 Memorandum of Coopera- j tion. Areas of future cooperation and a schedule of working group meetings to i explore these areas were defined in a protocol signed during this visit. The l delegation met with Soviet representatives in Moscow as the Joint Coordinating

Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety. Additionally, while in Moscow, Chairman Zech held discussions with leaders and other senior officials of Soviet organizations with responsibility for nuclear power safety. Nuclear facilities were also visited, including the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (Moscow),

the Tovovoronezh Atomic Power Station, the Novovoronezh Training and Commission-ing Center, the Izhora Heavy Equipment Production Plant (Kolpino), the V. G.

Khlopin Radium Institute (Gatchina), the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station, the All-Union Center for Radiation Medicine (Kiev), and the Rovno Atomic Power ;

1 Station.

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Tabie of Contents Page Abstract................................................................... iii I. 0verview.............................................................. 1 II. Chronology............................................................ 5 III. Meetings in Moscow of the Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety..................................... 7 IV. Visits to Soviet Nuclear Facilities................................... 11 (1) The Kurcha tov Institute of Atomic Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 (2) The Novovoronezh Atomic Power Station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 11 (3) The Izhora IIeavy Equipment Production Plant. ....... ............ 12 (4) The V. G. Khlopin Radium Institute......... ..................... 13 (5) The Chernobyl Atomic Power Station............................... 13 (6) The All-Union Center for Radiation Medicine (Kiev)............... 15 (7) The Rovno Atomic Power Station................................... 15 l V. Chairman's Zech's Discussions with Senior Soviet Nuclear Officials ................................ ........................ 17 (1) N. Lukonin, Minister of Atomic Power... ......................... 17 (2) V. M. Malyshev, Chairman, and V. A. Sidorenko, First P;puty Chairman, State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN)................................. 17 (3) Closing Discussions.............................................. 19 i

l VI. Administrative Matters................................................ 23 i

APPENDICES A Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, April 26, 1988 B Itinerary for U.S. Delegation Visit to the Soviet Union, l

August 18-September 1, 1988 C Members of the U.S. Delegation, August 1988 l D Members of the Soviet Delegation, August 1988 E Guest List for U.S. Embassy Reception for the U.S. Delegation, August 23, 1988 F Agenda for JCCCNRS Discussions, August 22-24 and August 31, 1988 G Novovoronezh Facility Visit, August 25, 1988 11 Chernobyl Visit, August 29, 1988 I Rovno Atomic Power Station Visit, August 30, 1988 J Soviet Officials Met During Facility Tours Outside of Moscow, August 25-30, 1988 K Protocol of the First Meeting of the U.S./U.S.S.R. Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, August 31, 1988 l

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Table of Contents (Continued)

, . APPENDICES (Continued) 3 L Protocol on Discussions by the Delegations of the U.S.A. and r thr U.S.S.R on Problems of. Safety of Nuclear Energy and of the Visit of the U.S. A. Delegation to Soviet Enterprises Associated With Nuclear Power, August 19-31, 1988

.M Joint U.S./U.S.S.R. Press. Release on Visit of U.S. Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety Delegation to U.S.S.R, August 31, 1988, and U.S. Press Release Preceding Visit, August 16, 1988 l'

LIST OF FIGURES Page 1: Andrei Sakharov shares views with Chairman Zech and Harold Denton..... 2 2: Route map for U.S. delegation visit................................... 3 3: Chairman Zech and Chairman Protsenko sign the joint protocol concluding the visit of the U.S. delegation to the Soviet Union..... 4 4: Jim Taylor and Dr. Ponomarov-Stepnoy sign the joint protocol listing areas of nuclear safety cooperation......................... 4 5: Organization chart--The U.S.S.R. State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN).......................... 18 G.1: Chairman Zech and Dennis Rathbun being briefed by V. Kustov, the Chief Engineer at Novovoronezh...................................... G-3 G.2: Novovoronezh Unit 3 control board..................................... G-3 G.3: Harold Denton, Pat Gwynn, and Dennis Rathbun observe Novovoronezh Uni t 4 c o n t ro l b o a rd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G- 4 G.4: Chairman Zech talks to operators at Novovoronezh Unit 4............... G-4

'G.5: Chairman Zech and Victor Myagkov of the Novevoronezh Center review plant procedures in the Novovoronezh Unit 4 control room............ G-5 G.6: Novovoronezh Unit 3 and Unit 4, with Unit 4 confinement head remove d f o r r e f ue l i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G- 5 G.7: Novovoronezh Unit 4 turbine generator turndown for an overhaul during the refueling outage......................................... G-6 G.8: Novovoronezh Unit 3 turbine generator operating at full power. . . . . . . . . G-6

'H.1: Chernobyl sarcophagus from the Unit 4 end of the complex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-2 H.2: Chernobyl sarcophagus f rom the Unit 3 end of t he complex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-2 H.3: View of the Chernobyl sarcophagus..................................... H-4 H.4: U.S. delegation talks with Soviet drilling exew....................... H-4 H.5: Ed Jordan views the damaged Chernobyl Unit 4 reactor via beroscope.... H-5 j H.6: Chairman Zech and' Joe Lewin view the damaged turbine hall at Chernoby1........................................................... H-5 H.7: Some of the damage in the turbine hall at Chernoby1................... H-6 H 8: Chairman Zech visits the Chernobyl Unit 4 control room with I go r Ko z a k and Pa t Gwynn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-6 vi

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Table of Contents (Continued)

LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)

Page H.9: The U.S. delegation and Soviet hosts pose for a group photo in front of the reactor controls in the damaged Chernobyl Unit 4 control room............................... ...................... H-7 H.10: The U.S. delegation observes temporary shielding installed adjacent to the damaged Chernobyl Unit 4 control room. . . . . . . . . . . . . H-7 ,

H.11: Station for monitoring reactor parameters remotely.................. H-8 H.12: Monitoring radiation levels in the vicinity of the monitor and control point using a Victoreen-450 integrating micro-R rate meter............................................................. H-8 H.13: Jim Taylor, in anticontamination clothing, receives dosimetry before entering the Chernobyl sarcophagus......................... H-11 H.14: Chairman Zech presents portable radiation-monitoring equipment to the Chernobyl Plant Manager.................................... H-11 H.15: View of the abandoned town of Pripyat.......... .................... H-12 I.1: U.S. delegation visits the control room at Rovno Unit 3.... ........ I-3 I.2: Closeup of the reactor engineer's console at Rovno Unit 3........... I-3 I.3: Main operating station at Rovno Unit 3 showing video monitors and controls.................................. ....................... 1-4 I.4: Closeup of one of the video monitors at Rovno Unit 3................ I-4 I.5: Chairman Zech talks with operators at Rovno Unit 3 about their !

safety responsibilities........................................... I-5 l I.6: U.S. delegation visits the process computer room at Rovno Unit 3.... I-5 I.7: The Rovno Unit 3 turbine generator has one high-pressure turbine surrounded by four low pressure turbines.......... ...... 1-6 i

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l I. OVERVIEW During the period August 19-31, 1988, a 17-member U.S. delegation of nuclear safety specialists, headed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's)

Chairman Lando W. Zech, Jr. , visited the Soviet Union. The delegation's visit included the first meeting to implement a recent agreement to increase civilian nuclear reactor safety in both' countries. Signed April 26, 1988, under the auspices of the U.S./U.S.S.R. Agreement for Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, the Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) in this area between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics established the Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS);

the purpose of the JCCCNRS is to define areas of exchange and develop coopera-Live proposals in this field. Mr. James Taylor, Deputy Executive Director of the NRC, is the U.S; Co-Chairman of the JCCCNRS and Dr. Nikolai Ponomarev-Stepnoy is the Soviet Co-Chairman. Dr. Alexander Protsenko, Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy (GKAZ), was the lead Soviet official during the August visit.

Members of the U.S. delegation and Soviet officials attended the discussions of the JCCCNRS in Moscow. In addition to participating in the JCCCNRS discussions, Chairman Zech also met in Moscow with Chairman Protsenko, Chairman Vadim Malyshev of the Soviet State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN),

and Nikolai Lukonin, Minister of Atomic Energy (Minatomenergo). The overall itinerary for the visit included visits to nuclear facilities outside of Moscow.

On August 23, Chairman Zech and U.S. Ambassador Jack Matlock co-hosted a recep-tion for the U.S. delegation, which was well attended by senior Soviet officials despite August vacations. Two of the Soviet guests were Academician and Mrs. Andrei Sakharov. Dr. Sakharov (Figure 1) shared his views with Chair-man Zech and Ambassador Matlock on the need to plan for siting future nuclear power facilities underground, partly for technical reasons, but mainly for psychological reasons (i.e., to increase public acceptance). Dr. Sakharov believes this is the only way for commercial nuclear energy to enjoy a future.

The U.S. delegation also visited a number of Soviet nuclear facilities, includ-ing the Chernobyl, Novovoronezh, and Rovno nuclear power plants, the Training ;

and Commissioning Center at the Novovoronezh station, and the Izhora Heavy Equip- ,

l ment Production Plant near Leningrad. Some delegation members also visited the V. G. Khlopin Radium Institute near Leningrad and the All-Union Center for j Radiation Medicine in Kiev. Highlights of the visits included the first tour l by non-Soviets of the outer rooms of the covering (or sarcophagus) built over i destroyed Unit 4 at Chernobyl and the first visit by a U.S. delegation to the Rovno nuclear plant. Figure 2 shows the routes taken on this trip.

On August 31, the U.S. safety specialists and their Soviet counterparts met to agree upon two protocols of the visit and a joint press release. At the end of the meeting, and in the presence of representatives of the Soviet and Western press (Figure 3), Chairman Zech and Chairman Protsenko signed a protocol of the delegation's visit and issued a joint press release. They also answered ques-tions from the Soviet and Western press about the delegation's visit.

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Also on August 31, Mr. Taylor and Dr. Ponomarev-Stepnoy signed a protocol (Figure 4) listing agreed-upon areas of planned cooperation in nuclear safety and giving a schedule of meetings to implement cooperative programs.

U.S. members of the JCCCNRS spoke extensively with Soviet nuclear safety specialists in Moscow on the following 10 topics, which had generally been agreed on before the delegation cmme to the Soviet Union.

(1) Safety Approaches and Regulatory Practices (2) Analysis of the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

(3) Radiation Embrittlement of the Housing and Support Structures and Annealing of the Housings (4) Fire Safety (5) Modernization /Backfitting (6) Severe Accidents (7) Health Effects and Environmental Protection Considerations (8) Exchange of Operational Experience (9) Diagnostics, Analysis Equipment, and Systems for Supporting Operators (10) Erosion / Corrosion Destruction of Piping and Components Although the visit was short and no comprehensive studies were performed, the U.S. delegation was able to form some impressions of the Soviet civilian nuclear power program. The Soviet plants appeared to be well managed and the operating staff performed in a professional manner. At Chernobyl, the entombment structure and recovery efforts were impressive, and the Soviets had made some short-term safety improvements to their RBMK reactors. In some areas, such as regulatory organization and enforcement practices, quality assurance, plant housekeeping, 2

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fire and radiation protection, and operator training, Soviet practices differed from Western practices. Additional modifications to RBMKs and older VVERs would also help make them safer.

The Soviets agreed with the Americans on the importance of operating existing nuclear plants safely. Although plant design and approaches to safety differ between the United States and the Soviet Union, the similarities outweigh the differences, and the Soviets indicated they were using compensating measures in those cases in which Soviet designs differed from U.S. safety standards.

Senior Soviet nuclear officials also expressed appreciation for the construc-tive comments offered by the U.S. delegation on the Soviet nuclear safety program.

Overall, the delegation found the visit successful in meeting the U.S. goal of establishing a framework for civilien nuclear reactor safety cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such cooperation could help both coun-tries increase civilian nuclear plant safety.

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S:ML 4-h, i Figure 4: Jim Taylor (seated left) and Dr. Ponomarov-Stepnoy (seated right) sign the joint protocol listing areas of nuclear safety cooperation.

4

l I

i II. CHRONOLOGY-On April 26, 1988 Chairman Zech (NRC) and Chairman Protsenko (GKAE) signed the Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety in Washington, D.C. (Appendix A). In less than three months the itinerary-for the visit to the Soviet Union had been developed (Appendix B) and the U.S. delegation had been determined (Appendix C). The Soviet Union, too, selected its delegation (Appendix D). On August 18, 1988, the U.S. delegation left Washington, D.C. and arrived in Moscow in the early evening of the next day. The group enjoyed a weekend of leisure and sightseeing arranged by the Soviet hosts. On Monday, .

August 22, after visiting the U.S. Embassy, the U.S. delegation met with the Soviet delegation as the Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS).

On August 23 and 24, Chairman Zech and some members of the U.S. delegation met ,

with Soviet' officials in Moscow for briefings on (1) the history of the nuclear '

power industry in the Soviet Union, (2) changes made since the Chernobyl acci-dent, (3) future plans,.(4) the structure of GAEN, (5) regulatory decisionmaking, and (6) the. joint work program. On the evening of August 23, U.S. Ambassador Matlock and the NRC hosted a reception for the U.S. delegation at the American Embassy in Mor. cow. The guest list appears in Appendix E. While some of the U.S.

delegation were meeting with Soviet officials, the JCCCNRS continued its discus-sions. The agenda for the discussions is given in Appendix F.

10n Thursday and Friday, August 25 and 26, the U.S. delegation visited nuclear facilities outside of Moscow. The Novovoronezh plant and the Novovoronezh Training and Commissioning Center were visited on August 25 (Appendix G). At the end of the visit to Novovoronezh, Chairman Zech was interviewed by a reporter from the Soviet news agency TASS. The exchange between the two men is reported in Appendix G. The Izhora Heavy Equipment Plant was visited on August 26. The Chernobyl plant was visited on August 29 (Appendix H), and the Rovno station was visited on August 30 (Appendix I). The delegation met many Soviet officials on these trips; these officials are listed in Appendix J.

On August 27 and 28, the U.S. delegation was at leisure in Leningrad. The Soviet hosts. arranged sightseeing and cultural activities for the visitors.

The'U.S. delegation returned to Moscow on Tuesday, August 30 for wrap-up dis-cussions and three more activities the next day: (1) The protocol of the first meeting of the U.S./U.S.S.R. JCCCNRS was signed (Appendix K), (2) a protocol recording the joint discussions and the places visited was signed (Appendix L),

and (3) a press release was issued detailing the visit (Appendix M). For the purpose.of completeness, the U.S. press release that was issued preceding the visit is also included in Appendix M.

1 l

s III. MEETINGS IN MOSCOW OF THE JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY The meetings in Moscow of the Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS) produced an extensive exchange of information and ideas for cooperative programs. Chairman Zech participated fully in the opening session on August 22, which included a discussion of the first topic, Safety Ap-proaches and Regulatory Practices, as well as in the final session on the after-noon of August 24 and in selected discussions of other topics. He presented his views on issces and outlined his thoughts on U.S./U.S.S.R. cooperation in civil-ian nuclear reactor safety in these meetings and in other meetings with senior Soviet nuclear officials in Moscow.

i At the conclusion of the JCCCNRS meetings, the parties established a protocol for future cooperation, which can be summarized as follows:

(1) Safety Approaches and Regulatory Practices (1.1) The program for this work will include measures on improving regulatory activity based both on results of operational experience of nuclear power plants and on inspections. The group will meet once each year, alternating countries; the first meeting will be held in the United States in April or May 1989.*

(1.2) The two parties will develop an understanding about the methods used to ensure adherence to design and operational requirements and specifications through an exchange of inspectors at one or more sites in operation. Both par-ties will work out the details to be agreed upon at a meeting tentatively sche-duled to be held in April or May 1989 in the United States. Appropriate inspec-tion procedures and information will be exchanged before the scheduled meeting.

(2) Analysis of the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

(2.1) The two parties will exchange completed analyses of the level of safety of design of units at the Zaporozhe nuclear power plant and the South Texas nuclear power plant. After each party has studied the other's analyses, the two parties will exchange questions and comments. The co-leaders of the work-ing group will develop and recommend further safety assessment work to the JCCCNRS for its approval. The group will meet twice a year; the first meeting will take place in April or May 1989 in the United States, and another in the Soviet Union late in 1989.

(2.1.1) A seminar on the results of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) analysis of features of Soviet-designed light-water power reactors (called VVERs) will be held in the Soviet Union in November 1988.**

All meetings listed in this portion of the report (Section III) as scheduled l for April or May 1989 are currently planned for June 5-9, 1989. l

- Actually held December 5-9, 1988.

7 a

(2.2) Seminars will be held once each year on topics and directions for safety research; the first seminar will take place in the Soviet Union concurrently 3

with the DOE-VVER seminar.

(2.3) In late 1989, U.S. and U.S.S.R operations and safety experts will meet in the Soviet Union to explore and discuss how the two parties use probabilistic risk assessment techniques to increase operational safety. The working groups for Topic 1.1 and Topic 2.3 will coordinate their efforts.

(3) Radiation Embrittlement of the Housing and Support Structures and Annealing of the Housings 1

(3.1) The two parties will exchange information on mechanisms and modeling of radiation embrittlement, including the effects of chemical composition, fluence, and irradiation temperature on embrittlement. Findings from fine-scale metallog-raphy are most important. Light-water reactor (LWR) materials and operating cond-itions will be emphasized. A seminar will be held in the United States in April or May 1989, and information will be exchanged before the scheduled meeting.

(3.2) Information will be exchanged on annealing of LWR vessels, including research results on optimum temperature for recovery of embrittlement and re-duction of embrittlement rate; engineering studies of annealing procedures, measurement of results, and practical problems; and results on thermal anneal-ing of large pressure vessels, including the effect of annealing on the reembrittlement rate. Methods, procedures, and design details for the equip-ment and methods used to anneal large pressure vessels will also be exchanged.

A seminar will be held in the United States in April or May 1989, and infor-mation will be exchanged before the scheduled meeting.

(3.3) A prospective program plan for the 1990 efforts was proposed that would include: application of radiation embrittlement and system studies to the regulation of reactor pressure vessel integrity; an exchange of information on pressurized thermal shock scenarios, experimental and theoretical studies of thermohydraulics and linear-elastic and elastic-plastic fracture mechanics analyses of embrittled vessels; and results of research performed to verify the procedures used. The need for more extensive cooperation on this topic will also be examined in 1990.

(4) Fire Safety (4.1) The two parties will exchange information on the effects of hydrogen concentration levels on the propagation of flames, maximum expected pressure following an explosion, the rate of hydrogen release following a severe core-damage accident, the combustion processes of hydrogen-containing vapor-gas mixtures in large volumes (i.e., containment), the capabilities of electrical cable to withstand fire, design of cable penetration through bulkheads, methods for fighting large fires under high radiation conditions for extended periods of time, fire-suppression systems, ventilation systems to protect the control room environment from external fire, and fire protection coatings. A working group will meet in the United States in April or May 1989, and information will be exchanged before the scheduled meeting.*

By mutual agreement, the working group that met December 5-9, 1988 also discussed fire safety.

1 8

i (4.2)- Discussions will be held on regulatory criteria and standards, and their bases, for the required level of fire protection at nuclear power plants, including fire-related probabilistic risk assessment-based analyses for a U.S.

plant. Also included will be discussions and exchange on mathematical modeling of fire propagation and combustion product release. A working group meeting is

. planned for late 1989 in the Soviet Union, and information will be exchanged before the scheduled meeting.

(5) Modernization /Backfitting A joint seminar will be held in late 1989 to exchange information on the follow-ing topics: identification of the design bases against which improvements are compared, criteria used to determine the need for modernization /backfitting, and methods used to improve esalpment reliability. If necessary, a followup meeting will be held in 1990.

(6) Severe Accidents An initial working group meeting will be held in February 1989 during an inter-national seminar on hydrogen sa.'ety.* Another working group will meet in April or May 1989 to discuss core damage, release and transport of fission products,

~

formation and propagation of iodine, and filtration and venting during severe accidents. A third working group will meet in October 1989 to discuss dominant accident initiators and phenomena associated with severe accidents and core-concrete interaction. Participants in these working groups will exchange information before the scheduled meetings.

(7) Health Effects and Environmental Protection Considerations The two parties agreed that the following five subtopics are important health and environmental issues: environmental transport, health effects, radiation biology research, ecological effects, and criteria for radiation protection and for nuclear facility siting. Working groups on environmental transport and health effects will begin their activities in 1989, tentatively planning to meet in'mid-1989 in Kiev, U.S.S.R. Working groups on radiation biology research and ecological effects will begin work in 1990. The fifth subtopic has been deferred and will be considered later.

(8) Exchange of Operational Experience A joint work program was proposed. It will include a seminar in April or May 1989 in the United States to develop an understanding of national data bank structure, search capability, and methods of representing information derived from the data banks. The scope of data banks reviewed will include component and system level, operational events and incidents. During the seminar, plan-ning for initiating a bilateral exchange of operational experience between the United States and the Soviet Union will be discussed.

A seminar will also be held in the autumn of 1989 in the Soviet Union to review and develop criteria for evaluating safety of operation, including methods, scope of equipment, and safety systems.

Currently planned for May 1989 in the Soviet Union.

9 L __ _ _ ___ _ _

Future cooperation into 1990 was discussed, including: methodology for identi-fying operational events that might be precursors of severe accidents, as well as criteria for evaluating safety of operation (e.g. , methods, scope of equip-ment, and safety systems).

(9) Diagnostics, Analysis Equipment, and Systems for Supporting Operators A joint work program will include two workshops. The first will be held late in 1989 in the Soviet Union on the analysis of systems of technical diagnostics and development of algorithms for vibration, acoustic emission, and other sig-nals. A second workshop will be held in 1990 in the United States focusing on the use and development of simulators and operator support systems, personnel training, and professional [ psychological] selection of personnel.

'(10) Erosion / Corrosion Destruction of Piping and Components The two parties will exchange information on predicting piping degradation, developing criteria for controlling degradation, developing new corrosion-resistant steel for piping and equipment in nuclear plants, basic research on corrosion of zirconium alloys, developing water-chemistry processes and auto-mated programs for calia).ating corrosion, performing further studies of cor-rosion processes, and developing automated systems for monitoring corrosion.

The working group will review the work plan for 1989-1991 during the seminar on Topic 2 originally planned for November 1988* in the Soviet Union, and a workshop will be conducted in the United States in April or May 1989.

l l

Actually held December 5-9, 1988.

10 i

IV. VISITS TO SOVIET NUCLEAR FACILITIES During their trip to the Soviet Union, members of the U.S. delegation visited a number of Soviet nuclear facilities. These are described below. Soviet per-sonnel whom the U.S. delegation met at the principal facilities visited outside of Moscow are listed in Appendix J.

(1) The Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy On August 23, 1988, NRC Chairman Zech, accompanied by NRC officials Harold Denton, James Shea, and Dennis Rathbun, as well as Ted Wilkinson of the State Depart-ment and the U.S. Embassy Science Counselor in Moscow, John Ward, visited the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow. Institute officials, led by Deputy Director Andrei Gagarinsky, briefed the U.S. group on the institute's role and functions. The delegation visited the 40-megawatt (MWt) materials reactor, which is used both to test materials and for safety research. It was operating with a number of active test loops. One loop, devoted to high-temperature gas recctor (HTGR) fuel, used helium gas as the coolant at 900 C and 100 atmospheres pressure. The group also visited the zero power critical experiment involving HTGR spherical fuel pellets. The Soviets said that prediction codes were fairly good for the core itself, but that the codes for the surrounding reflector and control rods needed considerable improvement. The delegation also tourea the U.S.S.R's first reactor, the F-1, the present version of which is now used as a neutron calibration standard.

(2) The Novovoronezh Atomic Power Station On August 25, 1988, Chairman Zech and delegation members visited this five-unit site, which includes several VVER reactors, such as the VVER-440 and VVER-1000.

The delegation also toured the adjacent Training and Commissioning Center for VVER plant operators.

First Deputy Director and Chief Engineer Vyacheslav Kustov briefed the delega-tion on the history, design, status, and future plans for the station, and on pressure vessel annealing work on Unit 3. The delegation then toured selected portiors of Units 3 and 4 (VVER-440s that began operation in the early 1970s),

including both control rooms, the turbine hall, and refueling activities in progress on Unit 4. Unit 3 was operating at full power.

Chairman Zech spoke with Soviet reactor operators. He told them that in his visits to nuclear reactor sites in the United States he always talked with the operators, emphasizing the importance of their performance to plant safety and the demanding nature of nuclear technology. He also met briefly with the local

inspection supervisor of the Soviet State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety and then held a press interview with a reporter from the Soviet news agency TASS.

Later in the day, the delegation was briefed by the Director of the Novovoronezh Training and Commissioning Center, Leonid Vitkovsky, concerning the Soviet 11

training program for operators of VVER-type pressurized water reactors and training improvements made since the Chernobyl accident. There was a discussion of psychological and social screening being employed by the~ Soviets in their operator training program. A brief tour of the training facilities included discussion of training models and observation of training activities in prog-ress on training simulators for the VVER-440 and VVER-1000 reactors. The Soviets said that before the Chernobyl accident, they had neither a central training facility for operators of the RBMK (graphite pressure tube) plants nor simulators operating at any plants. In 1987 the first full-scale RBMK simulator was com-pletad at the Smolensk nuclear power plant, but no central facility has yet been planned. Chairman Zech commented favorably on Soviet efforts to make improve-ments in operator training.

Appendix G provides more details on the visit to the Novovoronezh station.

l (3) The Izhora Heavy Equipment Production Plant On August 26, 1988, Chairman Zech and U.S. delegation members met with Soviet officials at the Izhora Production Association at Kolpino, near Leningrad, where discussions were held on Soviet metallurgy and manufacturing techniques for large components for nuclear plants, and the facilities were extensively toured.

The U.S. officials were welcomed by Victor Kazakov, the First Deputy Director and Chief Engineer of the Izhora Association, who had also hosted a previous visit'to Izhora in March 1987 by a U.S. nuclear safety team. The delegation was'then briefed on the history, current status, and projections of future work at the Izhora facility by the Chief Designer for Nuclear Components and other senior members of the Izhora staff. After seeing a short video tape about the-facility, the U.S. officials toured the facility, visiting laboratories for dynamic testing, impact testing, testing of chemical composition, low-cycle fatigue testing, and examination for nonmetallic inclusions; and observing electro-slag furnace operations, press operations, rolling mill operations, and reactor component fabrication.

A great. deal of nuclear work was in progress, centered around the VVER-440 and VVER-1000 components, including pressure vessels, plate materials, piping, con-trol rod drives, and the emergency core cooling system (ECCS). The delegation was told that the facility currently makes the entire primary loop for the VVERs, and that the emphasis now focused on the VVER-1000 plarls. Twenty-one reactor pressure vessels (VVER-1000) have been completed and five are presently in production. The Soviets noted that there are no welds in the active core region of the vessels. The vessels are reportedly designed to withstand seis-mic level 9 on the Richter scale and are fabricated to the standards of the !

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ano the Code of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME),Section III. Also, the pipe nipples are forged as part of the vessel. Any welds in the vessel are 100 percent ultrasonically and radiographically tested. I Approximately 30,000 workers are employed at the facility, including a staff of 600 for quality assurance / quality control (QA/QC). Throush discussions with the Regional Director and Senior Plant Inspector of GAEN, the delegation learned that GAEN has 28 vendor inspectors stationed at the facility.

I 1

12 I

i

)

1

Other items of interest reported or observed were:

The first eigLt pressure vessels manufactured at the facility were not clad with stainless steel.

Vessel size is limited by the rail transport system, but some thought is being given to the possibility of dredging the Neva River to allow for barge transport which will permit larger-sized vessels to be fabricated.

Space has been set aside at the 960-hectare (N371-acre) facility for con-structing a plant capable of producing components for a 2000-MWe VVER.

Although completed, the Cuban reactor vessel had not yet been shipped. It was in about the same position as observed during the March 1987 U.S.

delegation visit, except for now being painted green.

(4) The V. G. Khlopin Radium Institute Late in the afternoon of August 26, 1988, at the invitation of L. Bolshov of the Kurchatov Institute and Dr. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, four U.S. delegation members (T. Speis, H. Denton, A. Reynolds, and J. Lewin) visited the Khlopin Radium Institute at Gatchina, near Leningrad, to discuss a new research program on kinetics of fuel destruction. Since 1972, the 200-member institute has con-ducted reprocessing research for VVER and RBMK fuels, utilizing CO2 laser cut-ting equipment developed at the Kurchatov Institute. B. Y. Galkin, Khlopin Director, briefed the team on the institute's past and current activities and conducted a tour through a series of interconnected hot cells, including the laser compartment and analytical benches. Bolshov, a fusion physicist currently heading severe accident analysis research at Kurchatov, aims to employ the laser and hot cells for destructive analysis of irradiated fuel samples and to perform research on the associated kinetics, simulating core degradation on a micro scale. He suggested that the new program might be suitable for inclusion under the joint program of work and invited direct U.S. participation.

The U.S. team found Khlopin facilities and equipment somewhat outdated and the work being done similar to fuel kinetics research done in the West some years ago. Bolshov was alerted to this latter poir.t. The institute was slated to analyze Chernobyl fuel specimens starting in the autumn of 1988. Accordingly, the agreed protocol of the meeting states that the United States will consider the Soviet proposal for future cooperation with the institute's work.

(5) The Chernobyl Atomic Power Station On August 29, 1988, Chairman Zech and U.S. delegation members visited the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station while delegation members M. Schulman and M.

Goldman visited the All-Union Center for Radiation Medicine in Kiev. At that point, according to the Soviets, 211 foreign delegations from 42 countries had visited the Chernobyl station.

First, the delegation was briefed on the operations at the Chernobyl plant and the status of cleanup of the surrounding area following the severe accident at 13

l l

l Unit No. 4 on April 26, 1986. Then members of the delegation were given an extensive tour of the outer corridors and rooms of the covering, or sarcophagus,

.placed by the Soviets over destroyed reactor Unit No. 4. The U.S. delegation I

was the first non-Soviet group to tour the outer corridors and rooms of the sarcophagus. According to the Soviets, although women work at the Chernobyl site, no women are allowed into the area of the sarcophagus because of concern that the elevated radiation levels could harm them.

Within the sarcophagus, the Soviets were drilling into the area of the damaged core to retrieve samples for further study and to install additional monitoring instrumentation. The delegation viewed the area above the damaged reactor via boroscope from a position approximately 50 meters (N164 feet) away from the core center. Discharge piping from the pressure tubes was heavily damaged and the concrete reactor cover was skewed from its normal installed position. The damaged turbine hall, which had relatively high radiation levels, was also visited very briefly. Severe damage from the accident was clearly evident on the turbine ball floor, and the Soviets had removed the roof from the turbine hall to improve access during decontamination procedures. Eventually a new roof will be placed on the turbine hall. The delegation also saw the abandoned control room for Unit 4, where graffiti on the abandoned control panels indicated radiation levels of 0.5 rem per hour on June 6, 1986, a little more than a month after the accident. Chairman Zech and some members of the U.S. delegation visited the control room for Unit 1, which was operating at full power, as were Units 2 and 3. The Soviets also said that at present there are no plans to continue construction on partially constructed Units 5 and 6.

The U.S delegation was impressed with the major efforts by the Soviets (1) to clean up the Chernobyl plant and surrounding area, thereby enabling resumption of cperation of the three usable reactors, minimizing radiation exposure to the operating staff, and making certain areas habitable for the population and (2) to monitor and. investigate the destroyed core of Unit 4. The Soviets said the total cost of the cleanup up to August 1988 has been about 8.5 billion rubles

($13.5 billion at the current official exchange rate). The delegation also toured the abandoned town of Pripyat, which is close to the destroyed reactor and had been home to workers at the plant and their families. It was abandoned shortly after the accident. Although the Soviets were using Pripyat for tem-porary of fice space, they said they have no plans to resettle the town.

Members of the U.S. delegation took multiple radiation level readings with their own meters throughout the Chernobyl visit; measurements were generally in good agreement with those stated by the Soviets. The town of Chernobyl read about 0.03-0.04 millirem (mr) per hour and increased as the reactor site was approached.

Levels were 0.5 mr per hour at the entrance to the site administration building.

The highest reading, in the upper level of the turbine hall, was 4900 mr per hour.

The Pripyat town center read 0.2-0.9 mr per hour at 3 feet ($1 meter) above ground and up to 3.6 ur per hour on contact with the ground, indicating that a substantial component of the radiation dose came from beta radiation. Dosimetry results for the U.S. delegation indicate that deep radiation doses ranged from 8 to 140 mr for the full visit to all the Soviet facilities; for most of the U.S.

delegation members the largest contribution to this dose came from Chernobyl.

At the end of the visit, the Victoreen-450 radiation meter and two Victoreen electronic pocket dosimeters used by the U.S. delegation were presented to Plant Manager Mikhail Umanyets.

14

Appendix H gives more details about the Chernobyl site visit.

(6) The All-Union Center for Radiation Medicine (Kiev)

On August 29, 1988, two members of the U.S. delegation, M. Schulman and M. Goldman, visited the center to discuss effects of Chernobyl radiation on human health and the environment. They noted encouraging work on health and environmental effects of Chernobyl already under way and urged that the scope and depth be expanded to make a more comprehensive data base available on the results of the accident. The center is temporarily located in a hospital; a new center (now under construction) will be ready in about a year. The staff is sti?1 small, but is growing, and may reach a total of 2000, when fully staffed (in about 1992). The center's main emphasis is to serve the evacuee population, especially those who received relatively high radiation doses. The status of the Chernobyl data base, in general, is unknown. The Soviets have released preliminary models based on limited data and both parties agreed to continue discussions in this area.

(7) The Rovno Atomic Power Station On August 30, 1988, Chairman Zech and U.S. delegation members visited the Rovno facility, which is in the Western Ukraine near the polish border, about 80 km (50 miles) from the town of Rovno. This was the first U.S. delegation to visit the facility.* Unit 1, a VVER-440, began operation in December 1980 and the second unit, also a VVER-440, began operation in December 1981. Unit 3, a VVER-1000 with a new-design high-speed turbine, began operation in 1986. Con-l struction is currently under way on Unit 4, another VVER-1000, and plans have been approved to construct two more VVER-1000s on the site.

The U.S. delegation briefly visited Unit 3 (control room, process computer room, and turbine floor) and Unit 4. Unit 3 seemed to be a good contemporary model reactor, both in configuration and control room equipment (seven video monitors with a range of displays), although it experienced a large number of shutdowns during its first year of operation, principally due to secondary loop and tur-bine problems. Since the Chernobyl accident, strong emphasis has been placed on adherence to safety regulations and assuring availability of safety systems.

Operator training has been increased and the Rovno plant seemed to have a skilled, highly motivated operating staff. The control room for Unit 3 was clean and operating personnel were attentive to their duties. Fire safety was better at Rovno than at other plants visited in the Soviet Union.

Appendix I provides additional details on the Rovno visit.

Rovno was the site of an IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (0SART) mission in December 1988.

15

)

aA V. CHAIRMAN ZECH'S DISCUSSIONS WITH SENIOR SOVIET NUCLEAR OFFICIALS (1) N. Lukonin, Minister of Atomic Power On August 23 Chairman Zech, together with J. Ward, H. Denton, J. Shea, and D. Rathbun, met with Minister of Atomic Power N. Lukonin, Deputy Minister A. L. Lapshin, Ye. N. Ignatenko (Head of Department of Scientific Research),

and other members of Lukonin's ministry. Mr. Lukonin said that his ministry was established in 1986, after the Chernobyl accident, and is responsible for oper-ating Soviet nuclear power plants, as well as for some design work.

Mr. Lukonin said that in 1986 and 1987 the Soviets installed 7500 MWe and the 5 year plan indicates that an additional 22,000 MWe will be installed. In 1988 four new units will enter operation and in the next few yc.rs five units per year will be finished. The VVER-1000 Zaporozhe model is the basic type for the future, but some RBMKs (Chernobyl type) will be completed. He described the safety changes that were made after the Chernobyl accident, and expressed full agree-ment with Chairman Zech that the future of nuclear power in the Soviet Union and elsewhere depends upon the safety of operating reactors, especially in light g of strong public concerns about nuclear power in the Soviet Union since the {

} Chernobyl event. He welcomed exchange of safety information with the United States and saw such international cooperation as a way to help reassure Soviet

/ citizens about the safety of nuclear power. He also said that he hopes to reduce present 12-hour work shifts at Chernobyl to 8-hour per,iods later in 1988.

Chairman Zech asked Minister Lukonin to describe measures being taken to pro-vide confidence of safe operation of RBMK and older Soviet VVER reactors. Mr.

Lukonin described several post-Chernobyl compensating measures to improve oper-ating ceactor safety. These include measures to reduce the void coefficient by increasing fuel enrichment from 2 percent to 2.4 percent, adding fixed neutron absorbers, improving control rod drop time from 18 seconds to 12 seconds under preaccident conditions, and improved operator training. In addition, he indi-cated that the Soviets are designing a new 1000-MWe PWR with better safety fea-tures. Through cooperative efforts with the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, the Soviets hope to restore public confidence in the. Soviet nuclear program. Mr. Lukonin indicated that either he or the Deputy Minister j receives daily reporcs on various aspects of nuclear power plant operations. '

(2) V. M. Malyshev, Chairman, and V. A. Sidorenko, First Deputy Chairman, State Committee for the Supervision,of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN) j On the morning of August 24, Chairman Malyshev of the State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN) and First Deputy Chairman Sidorenko briefed Chairman Zech and his party (H. Denton, J. Shea, D. Rathbun, and T. Wilkinson) in detail on the structure and authority of GAEN, which follows l the organization in Figure 5, previously provided by the Soviets. The over- l all personnel level is around 1000, with 170 at headquarters, 150 (to rise to l

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200) at the' Science and Engineering Nuclea~r Power Safety Center, and the re-mainder in or under.five regional offices, including about 600 plant r.afety Linspectors. Differences noted between U.S. and Soviet systems included:

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Heretofore GAEN has been enforcing rules written by others; this will change with newly available. assistance to the State Committee from the Nuclear Power Safety Center.

GAEN does not yet " license" new facilities. However, such approval is required but is less formal tha'n in the United States.

Most importantly, regulatory decisionmaking is very different. 'GAEN has a

' collegium of nine senior officials, but the Chairman (who alone is appointed by the Supreme Soviet) can overrule others. Disputes'between GAEN and other government agencies (e.g., the State Committee on Utiliza-tion of Atomic Energy, chaired by A. Protsenko, or the Ministry of Atomic Power, headed by N. Lukonin) are referred to an interagency scientific and technical ccmmittee. (The U.S. delegation was told at a later point that this committee consists of 40 high-level government officials who are designated personally as members on the basis of their nuclear-related expertise, with electric industry, metallurgical industry, and electric power authorities represented, along with nuclear-designated authorities.

The Ministry of Health is also represented.)

Chairman,Malyshev, Chairman Protsenko, and Minister Lukonin are members of this committee which can overrule halyshev's decisions. GAEN can appeal to the Council of Ministers, which has the final decision, but this has not happened to date. (Later.the U.S. d9 legation was told that only if a technical solution cannot be reached would an issue be referred to-the Council of Ministers for a

" political" decision.)

The remainder of the discussion covered the joint work program along lines par-allel to the JCCCNRS' discussions.

(3) Closing Discussions

- At the conclusion of the delegation's meetings on August 31, Chairman Zech held

[ .

a private wrapup meeting with senior officials of three Soviet organizations responsible for civilian nuclear power, including State Committee Chairmen i Protsenko and Malyshev and Deputy Minister Lapshin. Mr. Semenov and Mr. Sidorenko, deputies to Chairman Protsenko and Chairman Malyshev, respectively, also attended, as did several other Soviets and U.S. delegates Mr. Denton, Mr. Shea, Mr. Wilkin-son, and Mr. Reynolds. Chairman Protsenko asked Chairman Zech for his candid as-sessment and impressions of the visit, and Chairman Zech gave a full appraisal, L with the caution that his remarks were based only on what cculd be learned from l brief visits to a limited number of facilities.

Chairman Zech began by emphasizing that there were indeed differences in design, construction, and operational procedures. He stated that he was pleased that both delegations had agreed to discuss these differences in the formal JCCCNRS discussions. He further noted that both nations had much in common concerning the safety of their civilian nuclear power plants.

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Chairman Zech praised the Soviet postaccident cleanup and monitoring measures at Chernobyl, the quality of senior plant managers and operators, and short-term RBMK reactor safety improvements. He said the delegation was impressed with major efforts by the Soviets (1) to clean up the Chernobyl plant and surrounding area to enable resumption of operation of the three usable reactors and to make certain areas habitable by the population and (2) to investigate the destroyed core of Unit 4. He commented that the Unit 4 entombment structure seemed well designed and effective, and that the delegation was impressed by the tour through the outer rooms of the sarcophagus. The Soviets suggested that the Chernobyl recovery effort might be coupled with similar Three Mile Island activities as the basis for joint work under the Memorandum of Cooperation, and Chairman Zech agreed this should be considered by the JCCCNRS in the future, j

Chairman Zech said he appreciated the opportunity to talk to operators in nuclear '

plant control rooms. He found them safety minded and businesslike. This was also true for the inspectors from the State Committee for the Fapervision of Nuclear Plant Safety whom he met throughout his visit. Chairman Zech was impressed that all Soviet reactor vperators had 2niversity diplomas or ar equiv-alent technical education, and control room activities seemed orderly and busi-nesslike. He encouraged further use of p1r.nt simulators and improved operator training facilities in general, especially for the RBMK reactors. In 1987, I following Chernobyl, the first, full-scale RBHK simulator was completed at the !

Smolensk plant, although a central training facility has not yet been planned.

The NRC Chairman presented the U.S. perspective on safety practices and principles, including the defense-in-depth philosophy, accident prevention and mitigation, and severe-accident analysis. He said the latter was particularly important and that probabilistic risk assessment (pRA) was an excellent tool for approaching such analyses in a systematic and organized manner. U.S. and Soviet approaches differ in some of these areas.

Chairman Zech noted the acute sensitivity in the United States to fire protec-tion measures as a result of the 1975 Browns Ferry fire and said this should have a high priority in JCCCNRS work. The Soviets welcomed a continuing exchage of views in this area, where Soviet practices differ from those in the West. He also said an exchange of inspectors to remain for short periods at each other's nuclear facilities would be useful, and the Soviets welcomed this proposal.

Chairman Zech noted the significant differences in regulatory organization between the countries. The NRC is an independent body with power of safety enforcement in the construction and operation of civilian nuclear plants while the Soviet counterpart, GAEN, needed to defend its recommendations before a gov-ernment council. He added that the Soviets might wish to consider the U.S.

model, with greater re + atory authority, as the Soviet organization evolves.

Chairman Zech noted th. .

RBMK improvements after Chernobyl seemed appropriate and suggested that long-term improvements be considered for these reactors.

The Soviets said such alterations were planned and would be discussed in the joint program activities for 1989. The delegation observed that Soviet reactors designed during the last ten years, such as the Rovno plant, have additional safety features typical of those required in Western countries, and these later reactors could serve as a good example for the older plants. The Soviets agreed that backfitting and upgrading older plants was one of the top five JCCCNRS priorities.

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Chairman Zech noted that the United States maint.ained formal planning and organi-zation for emergency preparedness. He observed that the Chernobyl evacuation appeared to go very well but was not sure if coordination would be so effective elsewhere in the Soviet Union. The United States is interested in learning more about Soviet approaches in this area. The Soviets confirmed the existence of an organization to develop and execute emergency plans, and agreed the topic was a good one for information exchange under the joint program.

Radiation protection and plant housekeeping practices were also discussed and differences between U.S. and Soviet approaches were noted. Chairman Zech noted that both nations agree on the central importance of keeping current plants oper-ating safely. He also expressed appreciation for the courtesy afforded the dele-gation throughout its visit and complimented the representatives of Chairman Plotsenko's organization for the? excelleat support.

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VI. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS The delegation from the United States was joined for the Moscow discussions and the facility visits by Science Counselor John Ward from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Mr. Sol Rosen from the Department of Energy participated in the 3 days of discussions in Moscow of the JCCNRS and then returned to the United States on August 24.

The Soviet State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy (GKAE) did an excellent job arranging a complex itinerary to accommodate the U.S. delegation's desires for comprehensive discussions of safety matters as well as for visits to l a number of installations, all within 8 working days. In view of the difficulty l of making reservations for the large U.S. delegation on commercial flights during the summer tourist season, at the recommendation of the Soviets a YAK-40 25-seat jet was chartered for the delegation's exclusive use. This proved to be an excellent decision as it enabled the team to use the available time most effi-cient1;, at a cost competitive with commercial flights that covered all of the I delegation's airline travel within the Soviet Union.

The visit to the Rovno nuclear plant required a bus trip of about 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months each way from the closest airport which, when coupled with an unplanned stop for food en route, limited the time to visit the plcnt facilities to about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ; other-wise adequate time was generally available for a brief overview and a tour of the other facilities visited.

The Soviets were very gracious hosts tnroughout the delegation's meetings and visits. They provided numerous excellent meals, programs of sightseeing in Moscow and Leningrad, and tickets for cultural activities. Three members of the GKAE and a Soviet interpreter accompanied the delegation for the entire trip. No one from GAEN accompanied the delegation.

The hotels in which the delegation stayed were adequate. Some members expressed c desire, on any future trips, for a more centrally located hotel in Moscow.

The delegation brought a computer / word processor to prepare texts of important documents. Although some problems were encountered, the delegation produced the final signature copies of needed documentation, including the two protocols (one very lengthy) and a press release agreed to by the parties on the final day of the visit. Time would not have allcwed taking these documents to the U.S.

Embassy for final typing. This machine contributed to the success of the visit.

A sutject to be considered in the future is whether to continue the present approach for U.S./U.S.S.R. cooperative activities under the U.S./U.S.S.R.

Agreement for Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy whereby the travelers pay all costs involved in delegation visits (except for local trans-portation). The Soviets, noting their limited amounts of convertible currency, informally indicated a preference for the hosts to pay all in-country travel and hotel costs, while trans-ocean travel would continue to be paid by the travelers. l l

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Appendix A Memorandum of Cooperation in the Field of l , Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1,

l April 26, 1988 j.

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MEMORANDUM 0F COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), as the representative for the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy

, (SCUAE), as the representative for the U.S.S.R., hereinafter referred to as the

" Parties," desiring to establish close and long-term cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear reactor (CNR) safety:

Noting that fruitful cooperation on civilian nuclear reactor safety can enhance the safety of civilian power in the United States of America and the Union af Soviet Socialist Republics; and In accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Agreement between the United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, signed on June 21, 1973; as amended (hereafter " Peaceful Uses Agreement"]; and in accordance with the objectives outlined in discussions on this subject between the two countries in August 1986, March 1987, and October 1987; Have agreed as follows; Article I The purpose of this Meaorandum is to establish an arrangement for cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear reactor safety (CNRS) in furtherance of the Peaceful Uses Agreement in order to increase civilian nuclear reactor safety,

! and to improve the methods and practices of regulatory activity with regard to CNRs operated by the Parties of this memorandum.

Cooperation under this Memorandum shall be carried out as agreed on the basis of mutual benefit, equality, and full reciprocity between the Parties.

Article II The areas of cooperation under this memorandum will be as follows:

1. Policy and practices of regulatory activity regarding safety of civilian nuclear reactors (CNRs);

2. Problems of safety in design, construction, training, operation, and management of CNRs; i

. Research directed at improving the safety of CNRs; and A-1

4. Questions on health effects and environmental protection requirements arising from the use of CNRs.

5. For purposes of this Memorandum, CNRs can include nuclear reactor plants for civilian electric power generation, district heating, process heat-ing, and other associated technologies as may be agreed to by both Parties.

Article III

1. In order to implement this Memorandum, there shall be established a Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS).

2. The JCCCNRS shall consist of an equal number (6) of representatives from each party. All decisions taken by the JCCCNRS shall be reached by agree-ment of the Parties.

3. The JCCCNRS will coordinate and review all aspects of this Memorandum and shall take such action as is appropriate for its effective implementation.

4. The JCCCNRS will present its proposed programs, together with any recommendations for amendments if needed to add such programs to the Memoran-dum, for review and approval by the Joint Goviet-American Committee on Cooper-ation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, established under the Peaceful Uses Agreement, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Parties.

5. The JCCCNRS may organize, establish, and arrange working groups, conferences, and seminars of specialists for joint discussion and study of spe-cific topics related to civilian nuclear reactor safety (CNRS) or its regula-tion and may also review and comment on the reports of such working groups, conferences, and seminars. Specific projects and programs for nuclear safety cooperation, exchanges of scientific and technical safety information, per-sonnel and equipment, and procedures for addressing and resolving questions of such matters as payment of costs under this cooperation, and patent / publications rights for joint activities administered under the Memorandum, may be developed separately by the JCCCNRS, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Parties.

6. The JCCCNRS may assist in arranging transactions between oc among organizations within or outside this arrangement for services contracted on a commercial basis, in accordance with national laws and regulations of the Parties.

7. Consistent with Article 1, such other forms of cooperation as the JCCCNRS recommends to its respective Governments may be added by agreement of the Parties.

8. The JCCCNRS will decide on its membership and meeting schedule.

Generally, it will be convened once a year, alternately in the United States and the Soviet Union, unless agreed otherwise. Times and places for meetings will be agreed upon in adva2ce.

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Article IV

1. This cooperation may be conducted according to plans and programs of the fol]owing principal establishments and organizations as agreed to by the

- Parties in writing pursuant to Article III.5:

In the United States of America:

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Department of Energy ;

national laboratories, academies, and institutes as appropriate; and other government departments and nuclear industry establishments and/or l organizations as appropriate.

In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

+

the State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy.

the Ministry of Atomic Energy; the State Committee for Supervision of Safety in the Nuclear Power Industry; and other ministries, organizations, institutes as appropriate.

2. Each Party may unilaterally adjust the list of its establishments and organizations participating in this cooperation, and will inform the other Party of any such adjustments. l Article V

1. Cooperation under this Memorandum will be conducted in accordance with the respective international obligations, national laws and regulations of the Parties, and within the limits of available funds, on the basis of the fullest possible reciprocity in terms of equal access to facilities, informa-tion, and personnel on both sides.

2. Any questions of interpretation and implementation relating to this Memorandum that arise during the period it is in force will be decided by agreement of the Parties.

Article VI

1. This Memorandum will enter into force upon signature, will remain in force for five (5) years, and is subject to extension of additional five (5) year terms by written agreement of the Parties following joint review at the end of each five-year period.

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2. All joint projects and experiments being conducted when the effective i period of this Memorandum ends will, if agreed, be continued to their conclu-l sion in accordance with the terms of this Memorandum.

3. Either Party has the right to withdraw from this Memorandum of Cooperation on six (6) months' written notice.

DONE at Washington, D.C. on the twenty-sixth of April 1988, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR FOR THE USSR STATE REGULATORY COMMISSION COMMITTEE FOR THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC 1 ENERGY

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ne Appendix B Itinerary for U.S. Delegation Visit to the Soviet Union August 18-September 1, 1988 1

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . ' I

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q ITINERARY FOR U.S. DELEGATION VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION Thur 8/18* 6:50 PM:t Leave Washington Dulles, PA 60-Fri 8/19 9:00 AM: Arrive Frankfurt 1:00 PM: Leave Frankfurt, Lufthansa 1374 6:10 PM: Arrive Moscow Stay at Cosmos Hotel Sat 8/20 At leisure in Moscow Sun 8/21 . Sightseeing activities in Moscow arranged by Soviets, church activities Mon 8/22 AM: U.S. delegation visit with U.S. Embassy officials; Chairman Zech meeting with Ambassador Matlock 2:00 PM: JCCCNRS convenes at Sovietskaya Hotel to-introduce delegations, review proposed agenda, discuss general approach to cooperation under MOC, and begin discussion of 10 topics l

L Tues 8/23_ .

JCCCNRS continues all day l 10:00 AM: Visit by Chairman Zech to Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute

.2:00 PM: Visit by Chairman Zech with N. Lukonin (Minister of Atomic Power) 6:30 PM: U.S. reception for Soviet officials hosted by Chairman Zech and Ambassador Matlock Wed 8/24 JCCCNRS convenes all day 10:00 AM: . Visit by Chairman Zech with V. Malyshev (Chairman of State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear Potter Safety) and V. Sidorenko (Deputy Chairman), including lunch-Leave for Voronezh in evening Thur 8/25 Visit Novovoronezh Training Center and visit older PWRs at Novovoronezh Leave for Leningrad in evening Fri 8/26 Visit Izhora Heavy Equipment Plant at Kolpino near Leningrad Denton, Speis, Reynolds, and Lewin visit Khlepin Radium Institute at Gatchina

J. Shea, who made preparations for the visit, left on 8/16 and arrived on 8/17 in Moscow TTimes given are local times.

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Sat 8/27 At leisure in Leningrad Sun 8/28 Sightseeing activities arranged by Soviets. Tour of Leningrad, visit to Hermitage, tour of Petrodvoryets, Ballet.and Folk Dance, church activities Leave for Kiev in afternoon Mon 8/29 Tour of Chernobyl site, except Schulman and Goldman who visit All-Union Center for Radiation Medicine in Kiev Tues 8/30 Leave for Rovno in the morning; visit Rovno PWRs: a VVER-440 and a VVER-1000 Leave for Moscow in evening Wed 8/31 AM: JCCCNRS wrap-up discussions; signing of overall visit protocol, cooperation program protocol, and issuance of joint press release 11:00 AM: Visit by Chairman Zech with A. Protsenko (Chairman of State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy),

V. Malyshev (Chairman of State Committee for Super-vision of Nuclear Power Safety), and A. Lapshin (Deputy Minister of Atomic Power) 7:20 PM: Leave Moscow, Lufthansa 1391 8:40 PMt Arrive Frankfurt Stay at Sheraton Hotel Thur 9/1 1:45 PM: Leave Frankfurt, PA 61 4:35 PM: Arrive Washington Dulles j

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Appendix C Members of the U.S. Delegation August 1988

MEMBERS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION August 1988 Lando W. Zech, Jr. , Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Head of U.S. Delegation j NRC Representatives Dennis K. Rathbun, Executive Assistant to Chairman Zech T. Patrick Gwynn, Technical Assistant to Chairman Zech Linda E. Portner, Special Assistant to Chairman Zec-Harold Denton, Director, Office of Governmental and Public Affairs (GPA),

Senior Advisor to Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety.(JCCCNRS)

James Taylor, Deputy Executive Director for Operations, U.S. Co-Chairman of the JCCCNRS James Sniezek, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Themis Speis, Deputy Director for Generic Issue Resolution, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Edward Jordan, Director, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data James Shea, Director, International Programs, GPA, U.S. Executive Secretary of JCCCNRS U.S. Department of Energy Representa.ives Sol Rosen, Director, International Nuclear Program Division, Office of Nuclear Energy Murray Schulman, Executive Assistant for Health and Environment Research, Office of Energy Research Andrew Reynolds, Peaceful Uses Agreement Executive Secretary, Office of International Research and Development Policy Marvin Goldman, University of California (under contract to DOE)

U.S-. Department of State Representative Theodore Wi?.kinson, Director, Office of Nuclear Energy Technology, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs U.S. Embassy, Moscow Represen*ative John Ward, Science Counselor i i

Interpreters Joseph Lewin, under contract to the U.S. Government Igor Kozak, under contract to the U.S. Government j i

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Appendix D Members of the Soviet Delegation August 1988 i

MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION August 1988 j A. N. Protsenko, Chairman, U.S.S.R. State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy, Head of Soviet Delegation U.S.S.R. State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy (GKAE)

Representatives B. A. Semenov, First Deputy Chairman V. G. Asmolov, Chief of Section, Kurchatov Institute L. A. Bolshov, Chief of Laboratory, Kurchatov Institute N. I. Yermakov, Chief, Department of Nuclear Power B. A. Kuvshinnikov, Deputy Director, International Scientific ani Technical Cooperation Department l Yu. M. Nikitin, Director of Section, Scientific-Research and Design Institute l

of P.ver Engineering N. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, Academician, First Deputy Director of Kurchatov Insti-tute, Co-Chairman of Joint Committee V. K. Sukhoruchkin, Senior Scientist of Kurchatov Institute, Secretary of Committee Yu. M. Cherkashov, Deputy Director, Scientific-Research and Design Institute of Power Engineering U.S.S.R. Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatomenergo) Representatives A. A. Abagyan, Director General, Scientific Production Organization " Energy" Ye. N. Ignatenko, Chief, Main Scientific-Technical Department Ye. P. Larin, Deputy Director, Scientific Production Organization " Energy" V. P. Tatarnikov, Chief Engineer, Scientific Research Design-Construction and Research Institute Atomenergoproekt.

U.S.S.R. State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN)

Representatives V. A. Sidorenko, First Deputy Director V. N. Krushelnitsky, Office Chief V. A. Petrov, Chief, Scientific-Engineering Center for Safety in Nuclear Power U.S.S.R. Ministry of Public Health Representative L. A. Buldakov, First Deputy Director of the Institute of Biophysics D-1

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1 Appendix E Guest List for U.S. Embassy Reception Held in Moscow for the U.S. Delegation August 23, 1988

GUEST L1ST FOR U.S. EMBASSY RECEPTION HELD IN MOSCOW FOR THE U.S. DELEGATION August 23, 1988 i

A reception was given on Tuesday, August 23, 1988 at the U.S. Embassy (Spaso House) in honcr of Lando Zech, Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. delegation to the first meeting of the U.S./U.S.S.R. Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety. The reception began at 6:30 p.m.

(local time). U.S. Ambassador and Mrs. J. Matlock invited the following people:

SOVIET GUESTS State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy (GKAE) ,

Dr. A. N. Protsenko, Chairman, and Mrs. Protsenko Mr. B. A. Semenov, First Deputy Chairman, and Mrs. Semenov Academician N. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, First Deputy Director, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, and Mrs. Ponomarev-Stepnoy Mr. V. G. Asmolov, Institute of Atomic Energy, and Mrs. Asmolov Mr. N. I. Yermakov, Chief Glavatomenergo, and Mrs. Yermakov Mr. A. V. Pavlov, Deputy Chief, International Relations Department, and Mrs. Pavlov Mr. V. K. Sukhoruchkin, Institute of Atomic Energy, and Mrs. Sukhoruchkin Mr. Yu. M. Cherkashov, Deputy Director, Institute for Energy Technology, and Mrs. Cherkashov Mr. Yu. M. Nikitin, Institute for Energy Technology, and Mrs. Nikitin Mr. L. A. Bolshov, Institute of Atomic Energy, and Mrs. Bolshov Mr. V. P. Kuchinov, Foreign Relations Department, and Mrs. Kuchinov Mr. V. M. Zagorul'ko, Foreign Relations Department, and Mrs. Zagorul'ko Mr. V. S. Seleznev, Foreign Relations Department, and Mrs. Seleznev Mr. A. V. Chupov, Foreign Relations Department, and Mrs. Chupov Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatomenergo)

Mr. N. B. Lukonin, Minister, and Mrs. Lukonin Mr. A. L. Lapshin, Deputy Minister, and Mrs. Lapshin Mr. G. F. Nefedov, International Relations Department, and Mrs. Nefedov Academician A. A. Abagyan, General Director "Energiya," and Mrs. Abagyan Mr. Ye. N. Ignatenko, Chief of Department, and Mrs. Ignatenko Mr. V. P. Tatarnikov, Chief of Department, and Mrs. Tatarnikov State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN)

Mr. V. M. Malyshev, Chairman, and Mrs. Malyshev Hr. V. A. Sidorenko, First Deputy Chairman, and Mrs. Sidorenko Mr. and Mrs. A. T. Gutsalov Mr. and Mrs. A. L. Khazanov Mr. and Mrs. Y. Volodin E-1

Institute of Biophysics Academician A. L. II'in, Director, and Mrs. 11'in Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. V. M. Sukhodrev, Director, U.S. A. and Canada Department, and Mrs. Sukhodrev Mr. V. D. Sredin, Counselor, U.S.A. and Canada Department, and Mrs. Sredin Mr. E. P. Malayan, Counselor, U.S. A. and Canada Department, and Mrs. Malayan Mr. V. A. Pavlinov, Deputy Director, Peaceful Nuclear Energy and Outer Space Department, and Mrs. Pavlinov Other Soviet Agencies Academician and Mrs. Andrei D. Sakharov Academician N. G. Basov, Director, Lebedev Physics Institute, and Mrs. Basov Dr. A. N. Plotnikov, Deputy Director, Lebedev Physics Institute, and Mrs. Plotnikov Academician Yu. A. Izrael, Chairman, State Hydrometeorological Committee, and Mrs. Izrael {

Dr. Yu, E. Kazakov, Hydromet, and Mrs. Kazakov Mr. F. Morgun, Chairman, State Committee for the Protection of Nature, and Mrs. Morgun Dr. V. G. Sokolovskiy, First Deputy Chairman, State Committee for the Protection of Nature, and Mrs. Sokolovskiy U.S. GUESTS U.S. Delegation Mr. Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman, NRC, and Mrs. Zech Mr. Harold Denton, NRC, and Mrs. Denton Dr. Marvin Goldman, University of California, and Mrs. Goldman Mr. Thomas Gwynn, NRC Mr. Edward Jordan, NRC Mr. Igor Kozak, U.S. government interpreter ,

Mr. Joseph Lewin, U.S. government interpreter Ms. Linda Portner, NRC

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Mr. Dennis Rathbun, NRC i Mr. Andrew Reynolds, DOE Mr. Sol Rosen, DOE Mr. James Shea, NRC Dr. Murray Schulman, DOE Mr. James Sniezek, NRC

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Dr. Themis Speis, NRC i Mr. James Taylor, NRC Mr. Theodore Wilkinson, State Others Mr. and Mrs. W. Nocker, FRG Embassy Mr. and Mrs. G. Ogawa, Japanese Embassy E-2 1

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U.S. Embassy Mr. and Mrs. J. Blaney Mr. D. Butler l

Mr. and Mrs. T. Delare q Mr. and Mrs. E. Edelman 1 Mr. and Mrs. J. Joyce Mr. J. Kowalski Mr. and Mrs. P. Otts Mr. and Mrs. L. Patterson Mr. and Mrs. J. Rendeiro Mr. J. Steinmetz Mr. and Mrs. M. Sulick Mr. L. Surgent Mr. and Mrs. D. Tyson Mr. and Mrs. J. Ward Dr. and Mrs. S. Wolfe E-3

l Appendix F Agenda for JCCCNRS Discussions August 22-24, 1988 l

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AGENDA FOR JCCCNRS DISCUSSIONS l Monday, August 22, 1988 i

1400: Opening ceremony i >B. A. Semenov l L. W. Zech 1430: Presenting the delegations N. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy J. M. Taylor 1500: Discussion of the program 1515: Break 1530: Topic 1 (U.S.): Safety ApproacLes and Regulatory Practices Tuesday, August 23, 1988 0900: Topic 3 (U.S.S.R.): Radiation Embrittlement of the Housing and Support Structures and Annealing of the Housings 1100: Break 1115: Topic 2 (U.S.S.R.): Analysis of the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

1315: Lunch 1430: Topic 7 (U.S.S.R.): Health Effects and Environmental Protection Considerations 1630: Break 1645: Topic 4 (U.S.): Fire Safety 1830: U.S. reception, Spaso House (U.S. Embassy)

Wednesday, August 24, 1988 0900: Topic 5 (U.S.): Modernization /Backfitting 1000: Break ]

1015: Topic 6 (U.S.): Severe Accider.ts 1215: Topic 8 (U.S.S.R.): Exchange of Operational Experience 1315: Lunch 1430: Topic 9 (U.S.S.R.): Diagnostics, Analysis Equipment, and Systems for Supporting Operators 1530: Topic 10 (U.S.): Erosion / Corrosion Destruction of Piping and Components 1630: Break 1645: Final discussion 1745: Departure to the airport to visit sites outside Moscow Wednesday, August 31, 1988 AM: Wrap-up discussions i

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l Appendix G Novovoronezh Facility Visit August 25, 1988

NOV0VORONEZH FACILITY VISIT Chairman Zech, U.S. members of the Jaint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, and accompanying officials met with Soviet officials on August 25, 1988 at the Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Station and Training and Commissioning Center. A reporter from the Soviet news agency TASS accompanied the group while it toured the nuclear power station. According to the plant director, an American delegation last visited the plant in 1978.

The U.S. officials were briefed on the history, design, and status of the sta-tion and on plans for the facility by the station's First Deputy Director and Chief Engineer V. Kustov (Figure G.1). There are currently five reactor units at the site. The earliest unit, a VVER-210, was shut down in 1984 after operat-ing for 20 years. The unit has been defueled and partially disassembled for materials research purposes. Unit 2, a VVER-365, was described as a highly reliable unit commissioned in 1969. The Unit 2 reactor vessel is approaching the nil-ductility temperature limit because of neutron embrittlement, and a decision is being made regarding possible decommissioning.

Units 3 and 4 are identical VVER-440 units, commissioned in 1971 and 1972, respectively. These units are currently averaging two to three trips per year.

During the visit, Unit 3 was operating near full power and Unit 4 was in a 60-day extended maintenance and refueling outage. Discussions indicated that preventive maintenance overhauls of major equipment, such as turbines, genera-tors, and pumps, are performed on a 4-year cycle in accordance with supplier's recommendations. Unit 5, a VVER-1000 that has a containment structure, was commissioned in 1981 and currently is averaging seven to eight trips per year.

The Soviet officials expressed pride in the year-round recreational cooling lake created to dissipate Unit 5 waste heat. Units 3 and 4 use cooling towers, and Unit 2 rejects heat directly to the Don River. Construction of Unit 6, another VVER-1000, is scheduled to begin in 1988, and a decision is being made about building a seventh unit at the site. Unit 6 will produce 1000 MWe, but the Soviets would like the seventh unit, if approved, to have a higher capacity.

It was reported that there are six inspectors representing the State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN) on site. They were said to have access to all documents and to have authority over all aspects of nuclear radiation safety.

A discussion of annealing of the Unit 3 reactor vessel indicated that the nil-ductility temperature had been significantly ceduced by the process. The operational limit is currently 140 C. (The Soviets did not discuss the situa-tion at Unit 4, which was commissioned 1 year later.)

The Soviet officials stated that during the life of the station there had been no liquid releases to the environment and gaseous effluents during operation ranged from 0.5 to 5 Ci per day. Environmental samples taken routinely since 1964 were said to have shown no significant radioactivity increases in the environs during the life of the station.

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After the briefing, the Chief Engineer led a tour of Unit 3 (Figure G.2) and Unit 4 (Figures G.3, G.4, and G.5). The tour began in the Unit 4 control room, where a single reactor operator controlled the shutdown unit. The control room was quiet and neat, and business was conducted in an orderly fashion. The group observed that most plant controls and instrumentation equipment were similar to those in use in the United States during the 1950s. The group then visited a glass-walled observation booth where Unit 4 refueling operations in the radiation-controlled area could be observed (Figure G.6). Refueling opera-tions were in progress; the reactor vessel head and upper internals had been removed. Radiation levels in the booth ranged from 1 to 2 mrem per hoor. The refueling crew appe: red to consist of three or four individuals within n en-closed operating area on the refueling bridge. One full cycle of the quipment was observed to require about 10 minutes.

In the turbine hall (Figures G.7 and G.8), Mr. Taylor and others visited lower elevations of the secondary plant while the main group observed the disassembled turbine generator.

The group concluded the tour in the Unit 3 control room, where Chairman Zech spoke with three operators on duty, observed equipment controls (tagout), and reviewed station procedures. The procedures had been modernized in 1928 (re-quired once every 3 years), and crew members who had been on vacation had signed the procedures manual, indicating their review upon their return to work. Again the control room was quiet, neat, and businesslike.

Upon returning to the briefing room, Chairman Zech met with Mr. Afanasyi U. Kan, Chief of Inspectors for the State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN). Mr. Kan had the equivalent of a bachelor's degree in nuclear physics from the Engineering Physics Institute in Moscow. Nine years ago he was promoted to inspector after working for ten years at the plant as an operator.

Chairman Zech noted that this lengthy stay at a nuclear plant would not nor-mally be allowed for an inspector in the United States. Chairman Zech dis-cussed with Mr. Kan the importance of having good operators and good inspectors and encouraged him to continue focusing on safety in the important job that he and his co-workers had at Novovoronezh.

Novovoronezh Training and Commissioning Center Discussions with Soviet officials at the Novovoronezh Training and Commission-ing Center identified two functions: (1) VVER-related operator training and (2) commissioning services for new VVER units nationally and internationally.

The training center normally supplies between 40 and 100 experienced personnel to participate in the commissioning of new facilities and trains between 6 and 10 operators per shift to staff foreign units. The Soviets are expecting to participate more than is usual in the commissioning of the Cuban VVER, because the Cubans are inexperienced in nuclear plant operation.

Operators are required t o be formally trained at the center, and to be retrained after working as an operator for 2 or 3 years. GAEN takes part in the examina-tion of personnel. An individual must be an independent operator before he can become a shift supervisor. Before the Chernobyl accident, such training at the center was neither obligatory nor as extensive.

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Since Chernobyl, the emphasis on training has been substantially increased.

All operators, including secondary equipment operators, must take required training consisting of theoretical, on-the-job, simulator, and added on-the-job training, culminating in an examination. As a result of the Chernobyl acci-dent, the training course changed considerably and the training workload has tripled. The Soviets are developing testing programs and psychological pro-filing for selecting personnel and to assist in identifying individual training needs. (A surprising emphasis was given to tailoring training to the overall needs of the individual.) Reactor operators are required to have a university degree; other operating personnel are required to have a technical education l but not at the university level. The training center is being expanded extensively. Currently there are 35 classroom instructors plus other support personnel.

The U.S. officials toured a WER-440 simulator, two partial simulators for WER-1000 reactors, and a newly constructed WER-1000 full simulator that was not yet operational.

l Chairman Zech's Interview With TASS Reporter '

On August 25, 1988, during the visit to the Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Station, the delegation was accompanied by a reporter from the Soviet news agency TASS, who attended the introductory meeting, went on the tour of Units 3 and 4, and observed Chairman Zech's discussions with the station operators and the local i safety inspector. In response to the reporter's request, an interview was arranged at the end of the visit. The substance of the interview follows.

Chairman Zech began by describing the purpose of his visit. He noted that it was in connection with the first meeting of the JCCCNRS--a result of the Joint Memorandum of Cooperation signed earlier in Washington. The areas of coopera-tion covered .11 aspects of civilian nuclear reactor regulation, including protection of public health, conduct of safety research, and environmental protection. The planned visits to Chernobyl and Rovno were mentioned, as was the Izhora visit. The purpose of the visits was to establish a firm and last-ing relationship between the two cou tries in the field of civilian nuclear power safety. The Chairman noted that he had visited 104 of 108 U.S. plants and that Minister Malyshev said he had visited all plants in the Soviet Union.

The Chairman said he and Mr. Malyshev had agreed that their most important responsibility was to keep current plants operating safely. He noted that although Soviet plants do not have all the safety features of U.S. plants, Mr. Malyshev and Mr. Lukonin had explained that they were taking compensating measures since Chernobyl to ensure safe operation. He looked forward to con-tinued cooperation and improvement in nuclear power plant operations in both countries.

The Chairman said he appreciated the opportunity to speak to operators. His brief assessment was that they were confident, but not overconfident, and businesslike. This was also true for the inspector from Mr. Malyshev's committee.

The reporter said he realized the U.S. team could only make a brief assessment, but asked if the high-level U.S. experts could judge the safety of the Soviet plants. The Chairman said the purpose of the trip was to exchange information G-7

and it would be premature to make'any in-depth assessments. He noted that the United States had not had a nuclear safety arrangement with the Soviet Union for 10 years, but is beginning to exchange information on a candid and open basis.

He also noted that it is important to nurture this process and increase exchanges.

The TASS reporter asked if there is a possibility for a real exchange of tech-nological information. The Chairman said that very definitely we will have an exchange of experts and technical information, all in the field of civilian nuclear reactor safety.

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CHERN0BYL VISIT On Monday, August 29, 1988,- the team visited the Chernobyl site, which consists of four RBMK 1000-MWe plants, including Unit 4, the plant that was destroyed during the April 26, 1986 accident. The site also includes two incomplete units (Nos. 5 and 6) which the Soviets indicated would not be completed. The visit consisted of (1) an overview presentation on the Chernobyl plant and the cleanup operations, including a discussion by the site management of the changes that have been made to Units 1-3 as a result of the accident (similar changes have been or will be made to the remaining RBMK reactor plants in other parts of the Soviet Union); (2) a tour of the Chernobyl site, including the outer rooms of the sarcophagus enclosing Unit 4 (Figures H.1, H.2, and H.3) and a brief look at the turbine room and the abandoned control room of Unit 4, from which some instrumentation had been removed by souvenir hunters; (3) a visit to the control room of Unit 1 by some delegation members; and (4) a tour of the abandoned town of'Pripyat (population approximately 50,000 before the accident).

At the time of the U.S. delegation visit, there were about 3600 operations personnel at the site, and there were about 10,000 persons inside the 30-km

(*19-mile) zone. This included military personnel involved in the cleanup oper-ations and upgraded security. There were nine GAEN representatives on site.

The changes that have been made to the RBMK plant have been primarily in the area of reducing the positive void coefficient by (1) changing the fuel enrich-ment to 2.4 percent and (2) leaving a number of control rods inside the core; also discussed was the improvement made in increasing the insertion speed of the emergency control rods (from N18-20 seconds to N10-12 seconds). The Soviets stated that they have reduced the void reactivity worth from a high value of 5 times beta (the delayed neutron fraction) to less than 1 beta (N0.8 beta). It was not clear during the discussion whether the Soviets have modi-fled the graphite followers of the control rods. Calculations performed in the West had indicated that perhaps the accident was made worse by the contribution of the positive worth of these graphite control rod followers as the control rods were attempting to stop the power trensient initiated by the positive reactivity caused by voiding, or loss of water in the core.

An entombment, or sarcophagus, was built by the Soviets to contain the conse-quences of the Chernobyl accident and to provide radiation shielding. Scientists at the Kurchatov Institute have assumed the main responsibility for the total sarcophagus effort, including related research and development to monitor its integrity; to this effect they have established and implemented a program which will continue at least up to 1991 and inc1M es subcriticality studies and studies relating to the sarcophagus reliability. Among specific issues to be addressed are assessments of its present condition, properties of fuel, and conditions of structural components still there. A large number of people are involved, including some of the more senior scientific engineers at Kurchatov. No plant people are involved in the efforts relating to the sarcophagus. The Soviets said the main contributor to radiation in the sarcophagus is cesium-137; the dose is less than or equal to 50 times the maximum permissible dose equivalent; and onsite airborne activity (outside the sarcophagus) was said to be 10 14 to 10 15 curies per liter.

H-1

In answer to a question, the Soviets said that the cost of the accident mitiga-tion was 8.5 billion rubles up to August 1988; no specific breakdown was given. This would be about 13.5 billion dollars at the official exchange rate.

The Soviets mentioned that a group from the Robotics Center of Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, PA had developed a robot for cleaning up radiation-contaminated areas and had offered to sell this equipment to the Soviets. The Soviets were interested in the delegation's views on this equipment. Chairman Zech noted that the delegation was not familiar with this equipment and, in any case, could not endorse, or connent on, equipment provided commercially by U.S.

vendors. The robot was not discussed further.

The delegation was told that the regulatory people on site are present during any activities involving transient-specific procedures and control all stages of the handling of nuclear fuel, all the way to the pool.

The magnitude of the accident and its consequences impressed itself on the team during the team's brief visit to the turbine hall and when the team observed the damaged reactor via a boroscope. Within the sarcophagus, the Soviets were drilling into the trea of the damaged core to retrieve samples for further study and to install additional monitoring instrumentation (Figure H.4). The delegation viewad the area above the damaged reactor via boroscope from a posi-tion approximately 50 meters (s55 yards) away from the core center (Figure H.5).

Discharge piping from the pressure tubes was heavily damaged and the concrete reactor cover was skewed from its normal installed position. The damaged turbine hall (Figures H.6 and H.7), which had relatively high radiation levels, was also visited very briefly. Severe damage from the accident was clearly evident on the floor of the turbine hall, and the Soviets had removed the roof from the turbine hall to improve access during decontamination procedures. Eventually a new roof will be placed on the turbine hall. The delegation also saw the abandoned control room for Unit 4 (Figure H.8, H.9, and H.10) where graffiti on the abandoned control panels indicated radiation levels of 0.5 rem per hour on June 6, 1986. Chairman Zech and some members of the delegation visited the control room for Unit 1, which was operating at full power, as were Units 2 and

3. The Soviets also said that at present there are no plans to continue con-struction on partially constructed Units 5 and 6.

The delegation was impressed with the major efforts by the Soviets (1) to clean up the Chernobyl plant and surrounding area, thereby enabling resumption of operation of the three usable reactors, minimizing radiation exposure to the operating staff, and making certain areas habitable for the population, and (2) to monitor and investigate the destroyed core of Unit 4 (Figure H.11).

During the delegatica's visit to the Chernobyl station, there was an opportun-ity to take multiple radiation level readings using a Victoreen-450 integrating micro-R rate meter and/or a standard NRC-issued Xetek ratemeter (Figure H.12).

Generally, the readings agreed well with those indicated to the delegation by the Soviets. The readings in the environs of the town of Chernobyl were in the range of 0.033-0.043 mrem per hour and became higher as the Chernobyl plant site was approached. At the entrance to the administration building on site, the radiation levels were 0.5 mrem per hour. The reading in the Unit 1 and 2 control rooms was 0.07-0.08 mrem per hour whereas the radiation level in the Unit 4 control room was 5.0 mrem per hour. (A little more than one month after H-3

me - Figure 11.3 (lef t): View of the Chernobyl sarcophagus (lef t of

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H-8

the accident, as noted above, the radiation level was reported to be 500 mrem per hour in the Unit 4 control room.) In the outer rooms of the sarcophagus visited by the delegation, the radiation levels varied considerably depending on the exact location. In general, radiation levels were higher at higher

. levels above the floor. The highest reading recorded by the delegation was 4900 mrem per hour in the upper level of the turbine hall toward the No. 7 turbine side of the hall. The readings taken by the delegation while near and inside the plant are given in Table H.1.

Radiation protection practices were noted to be significantly different from those employed in the United States.

Table H.1: Chernobyl radiation measurements data. (Readings were taken with the Victoreen-450, except for those marked *, which were taken with the Xetek.)

Location Reading (mrem /hr) 30 km from plant 0.012 Town of Chernobyl .

0.033-0.043 First checkpoint near plant 0.065-0.112 l Entrance to administration building 0.5 Outside Unit 1 control room 0.05 Inside Unit I control room 0.07-0.08 i Unit 2 control room 0.08 l Hallway approaching Unit 3 1.6 Entrance to sarcophagus 12-14 Control room for sarcophagus 0.8 Sarcophagus tunnel 0.3 Hard hat and glove and dosimeter checkpoint 2.3 Inside Unit 4 control room 5.0 Outside Unit 4 control room 23 Lower level walkway 11 Lower level drilling compartment 13 3rd floor at reactor vall 43 i

Bottom of stairs to 3rd floor in sarcophagus corridors 95 Monitor and control point 0.6 Next to "A" station 70 Boroscope station 13-16 Turbine hall Unit 4 4900 Pripyat in town center (air)* 0.2-0.9 Pripyat in town center (ground)* Up to 3.6 L Note: At one location in the hallway connecting the unit control rooms, an I opening to the outside existed at a distance of between 50-100 yards (N45-90 meters) from the sarcophagus (near Unit 4 control room). Radiation levels read at this location facing the sarcophagus were 125 mrem per hour.

H-9 L___-____________----__-. -

On the-positive side, additional shielding for personnel protection had been installed in hot spots, protective eyewear was provided to shield sensitive eyes from beta activity, simple techniques to minimize airborne activity were i noted, and areas requiring respiratory protection were posted. The Soviets l indicated that radiation exposures to the work force at the site are being con-l trolled by-a shift rotation policy, remote housing, and area radiation monitor-l ing techniques. The average worker at the site presently receives 1.6 rem per year. However, the radiation situation at the site is improving and the Soviets anticipate reducing the rate to 1 4 rem per person per year based on current exposure rates. The delegation was provided dosimetry before entering the work areas (Figure H.13).

Part of the delegation visited the Unit I control room after leaving the sarcophagus. The plant was operating at iull power and refueling operations were in progress. There were three operators and a supervisor on duty, very similar to U.S. Navy watchstanding practices. The operators were constantly I'

making minor adjustments to the plant and closely monitored plant indicators in a very businesslike fashion.

Discussion with the operators revealed that there are five 3.5-HVe emergency diesel generators (EDGs) for each set of two units; only two EDGs are required for safe shutdown. Operating procedures were available, but the volume of-procedures was minimal compared with the volume of procedures at U.S. plants.

Upon completion of the plant tour, several pieces of radiation monitoring and dosimetry equipment. used by the delegation during the visit were presented to the Chernobyl Plant Manager (Figure H.14). After the delegation returned to Moscow, the Soviets presented Chairman Zech with pictures from the Chernobyl visit; some of these are included in this appendix.

In support of the delegation's trip, and its visit. to reactor sites, including Chernobyl, the NRC provided each member personnel dosimetry in the form of a film badge, a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) and a self-reading pocket chamber. Additionally, six NRC representatives wtre provided whole-body counts, both before the-trip and upon their return.

Dosimetry results for the delegation indicate that radiation doses (deep dose) ranged from 8 to 140 millirem for the visit. Radiation doses for the NRC i representatives ranged from 8 to 90 millirem; most received doses of about l 50 millirem. All of the whole-body counts indicated that no long-term inter-l nal radioactivity was picked up by ingestion or inhalation during the visit.

1 The magnitude of the accident and its consequences were recognized during a l brief visit to Pripyat, a town that once had about 50,000 residents, and that l

vas evacuated after the accident (Figure H.15). From the discussions it was made clear that the town will never be populated again, even though no one in authority has explicitly said so.

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H-12

Appendix I Rovno Atomic Power Station Visit August 30, 1988 i

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ROVNO ATOMIC POWER STATION VISIT l The U.S. delegation visited this station on August 30, 1988. A meeting with Site Manager Vladimir Korovkin and his staff for discussions preceded a brief plant tour. During the introductions, the Site Manager stated that this was the first time a U.S. delegation had visited the Rovno facility.

The Soviets selected this particular site for the station because of its prox-imity to the electrical power distribution grid, its distance from large cities (for example, the facility is 80 km [N50 miles} from Rovno and 150 km [N93 miles]

from Soviet borders), and the presence of abundant labor and other resources.

Also, the productivity of the land was not high and there was no great demand for it. He stated that plant foundations presented some problems, requiring pilings driven to bedrock to support the basemat. Construction was begun in January 1974 and the first unit, a VVER-440, began operation in December 1980.

The second unit, also a VVER-440, began operation in December 1981..

The third unit, a VVER-1000, has a new-design high-speed turbine (3000 rpm rather than the normal 1500 rpm) and began operation in 1986 af ter some diffi-culty debugging the turbine controls. The turbine was supplied by the Izhora works near Leningrad. No startup difficulties were reported with the reactor or auxiliaries.

Unit 4, another VVER-1000, is currently being built. The U.S. delegation briefly toured the construction site and noted concrete work was under way, and that another lift remains to be poured before the reactor vessel and piping installation is initiated. The government decided tc build it with the same kind of turbine found in Rovno Unit 3; this is being installed.

Plans for constructing two more VVER-1000 units on the site have been approved.

The city of Kuznetsovsk, with a population of 33,000 residents, was built to support construction and operations at the reactor site. The city is self-sufficient, having stores and schools. Agricultural products are supplied largely by local farms. The city mayor and regional mayor attended the meeting with the delegation and are highly regarded by the plant manager. The mayors in turn were supportive of the reactor facility development and operation.

Rovno received a banner for excellence in operation.

A brief discussion of the plant's operating experience identified the following:

The VVER-440s have had an average of four unplanned shutdowns per year, and have in the past experienced cracking of steam generator tubes, requiring plugging. In response to questions, the operating personnel stated that they-had not experienced problems with motor-operated valves.

The VVER-1000 has experienced a large number of shutdowns during its first year of operation, principally due to secondary loop and turbine problems.

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There are rings of enviro mental monitors, both sampling and dosimeters, at the 3-km (s2-mile) and at the 20-km (N12.4-mile) radius. Installation of automatic sampling equipment is under consideration for the plant.

Since the Chernobyl accident, a great deal of emphasis has been pla:ed on ad-herence to safety regulations and ensuring availability of safety systems.

After discussing these topics with operators, training was increased. The manager expressed pride in having developed a well skilled, highly motivated operating staff. Measures have been instituted to ensure full and complete reactor protection system operability and constant monitoring of safety systems.

The 1000-MW units have four steam generators. There is a good reservoir of water; in' case of a 1r ss of feedwater, water supply does not become a critical factor for several ho2rs.

Operating experience from other units is communicated by bulletins from the Institute for Analysis of Nuclear Power Operations in Moscow. The site per-sonnel examine each bulletin for applicability and implement appropriate actions. I More significant design faults require corrective bcckfit from a higher govern- I ment level. Provisions exist for an " Express Bulletin" if an accident occurs.

In addition, the stations are establishing means to exchange information directly.

A tour of the Unit 3 control room, process computer room, and turbine floor resulted in the following observations:

The control room (Figures I.1 through I.5) is staffed by five operating personnel: two on the reactors, two on the turbine and secondary system, I and a Shift Supervisor. The site presently has an operating shift comple-ment of 115 people working 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months per week using 7 teams of personnel.

The control room was clean and operating personnel were attentive to their duties. Each operator has an array of seven video monitors with a range of displays. Control room walls and ceiling were steel acoustic panels that had been painted. A cart with two large fire extinguisher gas cylinders was available in the control room.

l The process computer room (Figure I.6) appeared to be an important area that had the capability for displaying previous data and trends. There is some question about the capability of the computer service to provide special displays in response to emergency conditions.

The turbine generator area (Figure I.7) still looks new but housekeeping could be improved. The high-speed (3000 rpm) turbine was evidenced by a higher pitched whine than U.S. 1800-rpm units produce. Piping insulation was metal clad and had many spring hangers and supports that were similar to U.S. practices regarding piping installation.

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Appendix J Soviet Officials Met During Facility Tours Outside of Moscow August 25-30, 1988 1

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.q LS0 VIE 7 .ICIALS MET DURING FACILITY TOURS OUTSIDE OF MOSCOW 'd j

Novovoronezh Plant,' August 25, 1988 Vyacheslav Kustov, First-Deputy Director and Chief Engineer Boris Zalotnikh, Deputy Director for Science Ms. Tatiana.Shatskikh, employee cf Information Section Alexan'er d Khlyustov, Head of Reactor Shop No. 2 Electromechanical Maintenance Novovoronezh Training and Commissioning Center,- August 25, 1988 Leonid~Vitkovsky, Director Victor Myagkov, First Deputy Director and Personnel Manager Valery Serebriakov, Deputy Director, Training Center Vladimir Masliin, Chief, Psychology Laboratory, Training Center Izhora Plant, Leningrad, August 26, 1988 Victor A. Kazakov, Chief Engineer and First Deputy ~ Director

'Yu. V. Sobolev, Deputy Director L

B. /.. Maslyonok, Deputy Chief Designer V. O. Danilovskii, Director of Foreign Trade Yu. P. Arkhipov, Secretary of the Party Committee S.~I. Rivkin, Laboratory Chief, Central Laboratory Dr. V. A. Volkov, Deputy Laboratory Chief, Central Laboratory Mr. Povarov, State Committee on Nucleat Power Safety Mr. Shvedkov, Oversight (Inspection) (GAEN)

Yu. V. 11'in, Chief Designer for Nuclear Power Plants

M. F. Egorov, Deputy Chief Designer J-1 1

Chernobyl Plant, August 29, 1988 M. A. Sedov, Director General of the Industrial Assocation (PO) "Kombinat" M. P. Umanyets, Director of the Chernobyl plant Yu. N. Samoilenko, Director of the Industrial Association "Spetsatom" (" Atomic Auxiliary," or "Special Nuclear Services")

I. N. Kambulov, Head of the Composite Team (Expedition) of Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (KIAE)

V. G. Asmolov, Head of Nuclear Safety Department, KIAE A. P. Kovalenko, Head, Information and International Affairs Department, IA-Kombinat N. G. Pokutny, Deputy Director, Information and International Affairs Department, IA-Kombinat Yu. V. Risovannoi, E. I. Boroushko, V. P. Kanavera, employees, Information and International Affairs Department Rostislav Beloded, Director, International Cooperation, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Rovno Plant, August 30, 1988 Vladimir A. Korovkin, Director Vladimir N. Bondarenko, Party Organizer, Central Committee of the Communist Party Valeriy Ye. Brun'ko, Deputy Director Nikolay A. Chervotkin, Deputy Director Aleksandr A. Rozenkov, Deputy Director Sergey V. Fedorchenko, Deputy Chief Engineer Nikolay S. Panashchenko, Deputy Chief Engineer Ivan N. Butkin, Deputy Chief Engineer Porfirly P. Lavrenov, Acting Chief of Inspection, State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety Vladimir A. Dorozhko, Senior Engineer-Inspector on Operations Viktor I. Vitkovsky, Section Chief, occupational Safety and Safety Technology J-2 j

)

Aleksandr E. Rupp, Laboratory Chief, External Radiation Control Stefan R. Chepil, Acting Chief, Turbine Room No. 2 Boris N. Aristov, Deputy Chief, Instrumentation Technology Administration (ITA)

Yuriy N. Kulesha, Assistant to the Director Leonid M. Nazarchuk, member of the Rovno Nuclear Power Plant and organizer of the meeting, Instructor (ITA)

Svetlana I. Aristova, Deputy Chairman, Kuznetsovsk Executive City Council, Council of National Deputies Igor S. Tuchinsky, Deputy Chairman, Rovno Regional (Oblast'), Executive Committee, Council of National Deputies Viktor S. Mazany, TASS (news agency of the Soviet Union) correspondent Yuriy V. Kop'yev, Section Chief, Minatomenergo SSSR (Ministry of Atomic Energy of the U.S.S.R.)

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1 Appendix K Protocol of the First Meeting of the U.S./U.S.S.R.

Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety August 31, 1988 l

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" PROTOCOL OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE U.S./U.S.S.R. )

JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL 1hh NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY 1 The first meeting of the U.S./U.S.S.R. Joint Coordinating Committee for Civil-ian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS), established in accordance with the Memo-randum of Cooperation in the Field of Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of April 26, 1988, was held in Moscow, U.S.S.R. on August 22 to 24 and 31, 1988.

The U.S. delegation was headed by James M. Taylor, Deputy Executive Director for Operations of.the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The U.S.S.R. delegation to the JCCCNRS was headed by N. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, First Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy. A list of the members of both dele-gations and advisors is appended hereto (Appendices I and II).

The JCCCNRS meeting in Moscow was opened and addressed by the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Lando W. Zech, Jr., by the First Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. State Committee on the Utilization of Nuclear Power, B. A.

Semenov, and the First Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. State Committee for Safety Supervision of Nuclear Power Operations, V. A. Sidorenko.

l PROPOSED AREAS FOR COOPERATION Ten possible areas for cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear reactor safety were identified during the meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Washington in April 1988. In order to prepare for the first meeting of the JCCCNRS, the Co-Chairmen

! exchanged preliminary materials on the indicated topics. At this first meeting of the JCCCNRS, both sides provided information on the status of work and proposals of programs of joint work on each of these ten topics. It was agreed to formulate specific programs of work for 1989 in several of the areas con-sidered as high priority and to agree on more general proposals for later work in 1990. These programs of work will be circulated for the review and approval of both governments and for review and approval by the Joint American-Soviet Committee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at its next meeting in Moscow in the spring of 1989. !

In accordance with the Memorandum of Cooperation (M0C) in the Field of Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., signed in Washington, D.C. on April 26, 1988, the JCCCNRS will adhere to paragraph 3.5 with regard to forms of cooperation at a government level and to paragraphs 3.6 and 4 of that MOC with regard to participation by commercial organizations and other parties in pursuit of the purposes of the M0C.

The JCCCNRS considers that its Co-Chairmen must be kept advised of all activi-ties performed under this MOC, and both parties agree that exchanged materials will be provided via the Co-Chairmen of the respective countries.

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1. Safety Approaches and Regulatory Practices The U.S. led the discussion with an overview of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission (USNRC) activities to establish, implement, and enforce the U.S.

civilian reactor safety program. The activities described included, among others, the quality assurance program, general design criteria for nuclear facilities, the process for review and issuance of licenses for nuclear facil-ities, and programs for inspection and enforcement of the safety regulations.

The U.S.S.R. turned the discussion towards future cooperative efforts. A pro-gram of work for 1989 was proposed consisting of:

1.1 Measures on improving regulatory activity based on results of operational experience of nuclear power plants and based on inspections. Group meetings once each year, to be held in each country alternately. First meeting in U.S.,

April-May 1989. Subsequent meeting in U.S.S.R. in 1990. Date to be agreed upon later. i 1.2 Developing an understanding of the methods used to ensure adherence to design and operational requirements and specifications through an exchange of inspectors at one or more sites in operation for an agreed-upon period in 1989.

Details to be worked out by both parties and be agreed upon at April-May 1989 i group meeting in U.S. Appropriate inspection procedures and information to be exchanged beforehand.

2. Analysis of the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

The U.S.S.R. presented its proposals in this area. Their presentation was fol-lowed by the USNRC's description of the methodology and analyses it currently uses for safety assessments in the U.S. The USD0E then reviewed the analyses it has performed to date on the safety characteristics of the VVERs. The dis-cussion then turned to future cooperation. It was agreed that this topic was high priority to both sides and a proposed program of work for 1989 was worked out for review and r proval. This program will consist of:

2.1 Exchange of completed analyses of the level of safety of design of power units at Zaporozhe nuclear power plant and the South Texas nuclear power plant.

Following study of these analyses, questions and comments would be exchanged.

Working group to meet to explain selected safety important differences. The co-leaders (U.S. and U.S.S.R.) of the working group would develop and recommend further safety assessment work to the JCCCNRS for approval.

Group meeting - twice each year; the first meeting to be in April-May 1989 in U.S.

2.1.1 A seminar on the results of the USD0E's analysis of features of Soviet !

designed VVERs will be held in the U.S.S.R. during November 1988.

2.2 Topics and directions for safety research. Seminars once each year. The first seminar in November 1988 in U.S.S.R. concurrently with 2.1.1 seminar.

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f 2.3 In late 1989, conduct a joint meeting of operations and safety experts to explore and discuss our countries' uses of probabilistic risk assessment tech-niques in the enhancement of operational safety. This will be correlated with Topic 1.1.

Meeting of work groups 2.1, 2.3, and 8.2 vill be held in U.S.S.R. late in 1989.

Time and place will be determined later.

3. Radiatioa Embrittlement of the Housina and Support Structures and Annealing of the Housings The U.S.S.R. led with a description of the scope of its research on radiation embrittlement of the housings at VVERs, and thermal annealing to repair the damage from embrittlement. The U.S. followed with a presentation on U.S. irra-diation effects program under way relative to materials, compositions, micro-structures, specimen types, reactor environments, etc., and regulatory programs for the control of embrittlement. A program of work was proposed for 1989 consisting of:

3.1 Mechanisms and modeling of radiation embrittlement--an exchange of infor-mation on the effects of chemical composition, fluence, and irradiation tem-perature on embrittlement. Findings from fine-scale metallogcaphy are most important. Emphasis should be on light water reactor (LWR) materials and oper-ating conditions. Seminar with exchange of information beforehand. Seminar in U.S., April-May 1989.

3.2 Annealing of LWR vessels--an exchange of information on: (1) research results on optimum temperature for recovery of embrittlement and reduction of embrittlement rate; (2) engineering studies of annealing procedures, measure-ment of results and practical probl. ems; and (3) results on thermal annealing of large pressure vessels, including the effect of annealing on the reembrittle-ment rate. Methods, procedures, and design details for the equipment and methods used to anneal large pressure vessels. Seminar with exchange of infor-mation beforehand. Seminar in U.S., April-May 1989.

3.3 A prospective program plan for 1990 was also proposed to include:

(a) Application of radiation embrittlement and system studies to the regula-tion of reactor pressure vessel integrity. An exchange of information on pressurized thermal shock (PTS) scenarios, experimental and theoretical studies of thermohydraulics and linear-elastic and elastic-plastic fracture mechanics analyses of embrittled vessels, and research results done to verify the pro-cedures used.

(b) Examine proposal for more extensive cooperation on Topic 3.

4. Fire Safety The U.S. began the discussion with a review of the design basis developed for fire protection and prevention features used in U.S. plants. The U.S. presen-tations also addressed the methods for safe shutdown of a plant during a single fire, fire risk studies, and fire research tests. The U.S.S.R. reviewed its programs and identified proposed areas for further cooperation in improving K-3

fire prevention systems and organizational and control methods for fire safety.

. Areas of cooperation include:

4.1 4.1.1 Exchange of information on the effects of hydrogen concentration levels on the propagation of flames, maximum expected pressure following an explosion, and the rate of hydrogen release in containment following a severe core-damage accident.

4.1.2 Exchange of information on the combustion processes of hydrogen-containing vapor gas mixtures in large volumes (e.g., containments) 4.1.3' Exchange of.information on capabilities of electrical cable to withstand fire,.and design of cable penetration through bulkheads.

i 4.1.4 : Exchange of information on methods for fighting large fires m. der high radiation conditions for extended periods of time.

4.1.5 Exchange of information on fire suppression systems, ventilation systems to protect the control room environment from external fire.

4.1.6 Exchange of information on fire protection coating for structural steel.

4.2 4.2.1 Regulatory criteria and standards, and their bases, for the required level of fire protection at nuclear power plants. This topic would include fire-related probabilistic risk assessment-based analyses for a U.S. plant.

4.2.'2 Establish discussions and exchange on mathematical modeling of fire propagation and combustion product release in a typical nuclear power plant.

Working group to meet and discuss Topics 4.1.1 through 4.1.6 in April-May

[1989} in U.S., with information exchange beforehand.

Working group to meet and discuss Topics 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 in late 1989 in the U.S.S.R., with information exchange beforehand.

5. Modernization /Backfitting l

The U.S. led the discussion with a view towards obtaining a mutual understand-ing of the general approaches and processes used in evaluating what additional safety improvements should be made to existing nuclear power plants. The U.S.S.R. responded outlining their efforts in this area. Both sides agreed to the following cooperation:

(a) A joint seminar for information exchange will be held in late 1989 to discuss:

(1) Identification of the design bases against which improvements are compared.

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(2) The criteria used to determine the need for modernization /backfitting.

(3) Methods used to improve equipment reliability. Information exchange beforehand.

(b) If deemed necessary, a followup meeting will be held in 1990.

6. Severe Accidents The U.S. led the discussion with an overview of the USNRC activities in several areas of severe-accident research including severe-accident precursors, phe-nomena, challenges to various containments, USNRC policy on severe accidents and accident management. -The U.S.S.R. presentation focused on proposed areas of cooperation noting, among others, the usefulness of exchanges of information in the area of hydrogen safety and control and the interaction of molten fuel with concrete, formation and propagation of aerosols, and numerical models of processes during development of severe accidents. Both sides agreed that these areas covered the important issues associated with severe accidents.

Meetings in 1989 l

l 6.1 (a) Core damage, release and transport of fission products from the fuel, primary system and containment (b) Formation and propagation of iodine (c) Filtration and venting during severe accident Group meeting April-May, 1989; U.S.; information exchange beforehand 6.2 (a) Dominant accident initiators and phenomena associated with severe accidents (b) Core-concrete interaction October 1989; U.S.S.R., Leningrad. Information exchange beforehand. Group meeting and participation in international conference " Fiftieth Anniversary of the Discovery of Fission"; U.S.S.R., Leningrad; October 1989; special session on safety problems.

6.3 International seminar on hydrogen safety; February 1989; U.S.S.R. ,

Bakuriani; U.S. participants will be invited. Group meeting and participation in this seminar.

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7. Health Effects and Environmental Protection Considerations The U.S.S.R. led the discussion of the aspects of cooperation which they be-lieved were the most promising for prot:ction of health and the environment.

The U.S. followed with a discussion of its rules, standards and practices K-5

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pertaining to radiation protection, environmental monitoring, and emergency preparedness.

It was agreed that there are five subtopics of importance to the health and environmental issues. It was further agreed that four of these should be addressed through the formation of'four working groups. The five subtopics are:

1 - Environmental Transport 2 - Health-Effects 3 . Radiation Biology Research 4 - Ecological Effects 5 - Criteria for Radiation Protection and for Nuclear Facility Siting For.1989 it is proposed that the Environmental Transport and Health Effects working groups begin their activities and that in 1990 the Radiation Biology Research and Ecological Effects working groups begin their task. The fifth subtopic will be deferred at this time and will be addressed later. The 1989 meeting will be tentatively planned for mid year in Kiev, U.S.S.R..

(1) Environmental Transport Plan and begin a cooperative environmental transport and monitoring information exchange. This will include selected parts of data base on the radiation situa-tion in the environment in the U.S.S.R. and other countries after the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident and the validation of U.S.S.R. and U.S. models on the atmospheric and terrestrial radionuclides transport. An important goal is to verify models which can rapidly forecast radionuclides plume distribution, deposi-tion, and potential committed doses.

(2) Health Effects Cooperate in the design of a detailed protocol to conduct studies of possible late radiation effects on populations exposed. U.S. assistance will be pro-vided for computerizing data base management and analysis. Studies should be planned to include a long-term followup and will include incidence of cancers, congenital defects, and genetic effects. Also included is a review of earlier accomplished studies on the radiobiological effects on populations of Chernobyl experience for diagnosis, treatment, and management of heavily irradiated persons.

(3) Radiation Biology Research A joint study and information exchange is proposed to develop and validate specific means of measuring radiation damage and doses to cells. Included are relevant studies on molecular mechanisms of effects and their relation to both acute and late health effects in exposed populations.

(4) Ecological Effects The consequences of large releases of radioactive materials and chemicals from nuclear power plant accidents should be studied in animals and plants. The K-6

data from Chernobyl should be used to develop and validate models of ecological impact and recovery.

(5) Criteria for Radiation Protection and for Nuclear Facility Siting The concept of developine criteria for radiation protection and for nuclear facility siting will be discussed by both sides at the next meeting of the Joint Committee. Included in this topic will be planning for a joint seminar on radiation safety and severe accidents. Furthermore, consideration will be given to the design and operation of automated radiation early warning systems, and to the time of a Soviet specialist's visit to one or two U.S. nuclear facilities with available above-mentioned systems.

8. Exchange of Operational Experience The U.S.S.R. led the discussion with its proposals for joint seminars end exchanges of information to develop criteria for evaluation of safe operations, information systems to handle operational experience data from plants, methods for understanding events, and applying this knowledge to identify precursors of dangerous accidents. They also addressed the work of power plant personnel and their interaction with automatic control systems.

The USNRC discussed U.S. government and industry programs to collect, assess, and feed back operational experience to U.S. reactor facilities. They described the improvements in operational performance which the U.S. industry has made in the last four years and discussed specific examples of experience feedback in which foreign experience had been beneficial.

A joint program of work was proposed consisting of:

8.1 Conducting a seminar in April or May 1989 in the U.S. to: Develop an understanding of national data banks structure, search capability, and methods of representing information derived from the data banks. The scope of data banks reviewed include component and system level, operational events, and incidents. During the seminar, considerations for feedback of relevant operat-ing information and planning for initiating a bilateral exchange of operational experience between U.S. and U.S.S.R. would be discussed.

8.2 Conducting a seminar in the Fall of 1989 in U.S.S.R. to review and develop criteria for evaluation of safety of operation, including methods, scope of equipment, and safety systems.

Propose future cooperation for 1990 for the next Joint Committee meeting.

Areas discussed included:

(a) Methodology to determine events that may be precursore of severe accidents.

(b) Criteria for evaluation of safety of operation including methods, scope of equipment, and safety systems.

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9. Diagnostics, Analysis Equipment, and Systems for Supporting Operators The U.S.S.R. led with a discussion of their existing work on diagnostic and analysis equipment and other expert systems to support operators and other plant personnel. They proposed that future cooperative work he considered con-cerning, among other things, methods and means for centro 11ing and diagnosing the status of the core and basic engineering equipment in reactors, joint development of analysis equipment for emergency situations, and training sys-tems for nuclear power plant operators.

The U.S. followed with a presentation on various operator support systems and techniques in use in the U.S. including a safety parameter display system, safety system bypass status monitor, vibration monitoring, and diagnostic techniques.

A program of work for 1989-1990 was jointly propor ed consisting of:

(a) Conducting a workshop late in 1989 in U.S.S.R. on the analysis of systems of technical diagnostics and development of algorithms for vibration, acoustic emission, and other signals.

(b) Conducting a second workshop in 1990 in U.S. on the use and development of simulators and operator support systems, personnel training, and profes-sional [ psychological] selection of personnel.

Further planning in this area would be conducted at the next committee meeting.

10. Erosion / Corrosion Destruction of Piping and Components The U.S. led with a review of the tecanical bases underlying the causes of and means for prevention of erosion / corrosion in single and two phase piping sys-tems in nuclear power plants, prediction methodologies, and inspection or sur-veillance programs for erosion / corrosion detection.

The U.S.S.R. delegation provided a review of their studies in this area and the basic directions of joint studies concerning research on and protection from corrosion and erosion destruction of piping and equipment of nuclear power plants, including basic and applied research on carbon and stainless steel, zirconium alloys, water-chemistry processes, corrosion and mechanical proper-ties, and an exchange of operational experience.

The working plan for 1989-1991 shall be reviewed by the working group during the seminar on Topic 2 in November 1988 in the U.S.S.R. The workshop shall be conducted in the U.S. in April-May 1989.

Areas of future cooperation include:

(a) Exchange of information on prediction methods for determining piping degra-dation through erosion and/or corrosion, including primary causes, mathematical modeling, experimental verification, and prevention.

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(b) Exchange of information on methods for predicting the location of erosion /

corrosion degradation and its rate in piping systems and criteria for control-ling continued degradation.

(c) Exchange of information in developing new corrosion-resistant steel for nuclear power plant piping and equipment.

(d) Basic rer.earch on the mechanism of nodule corrosion and stress corrosion cracking of zirconium alloys.

(e) Developing future water-chemistry processes and automated programs for calculating corrosion, erosion products output, and radiolysis, taking into account physical and structural properties of reactors.

(f) Further studies of the mechanism and kinetics of electro-chemical and structural processes at the apex of maximum permissible defects which determine the corrosion and mechanical properties of the material.

(g) Deve10pic.; automated systems of control of the corrosion condition of nuclear power plai.t equipment (corrosion monitoring).

PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING WORKING GROUPS AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PRIOR TO MEETINGS AND SEMINARS Each Co-Chairman will establish working procedures for all working groups establistied by this protocol. These procedures will address working group composition, its responsibilities, and its development of agenda.

As established in this protocol, information exchanges conducted in advance of meetings and seminars, should be completed as early as possible and in any event ao later than sixty days preceding such meetings or seminars.

DATE OF THE SECOND J1EETING OF THE JCCCNRS The JCCCNRS agreed that the second meeting would be held in the Fall of 1989 in the U..S. The exact date and place will be determined by correspondence. The parties will exchange materials on cooperation planning for year 1990 and sub-sequent years as well as suggestions for the agenda of the second JCCCNRS in advance.

Done in Moscow, U.S.S.R. on August 31, 1988 in duplicate in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the U.S. For the U.S.S.R.

$_ff fJames M. Taylor 7~ Nikolai N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy Co-Chairman of JCCCNRS Co-Chairman of JCCCNRS K-9

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APPENDIX I JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY (JCCCNRS)

August 1988 Moscow, U.S.S.R.

U.S. Representatives Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

JCCCNRS Co-Chairman Jcmes Taylor, Deputy Executive Director for Operations, NRC, and U.S.

Co-Chairman of the JCCCNRS Committee Members ,

I James Sniezek, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Themis Speis, Deputy Director for Generic Issue Resolution, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Edward Jordan, Director, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Sol Rosen, Director, International Nuclear Program Division, Office of Nuclear Energy, Department of Energy (DOE)

Murray Schulman, Executive Assistant for Health and Environment Research, Office of Energy Research, DOE JCCCNRS Advisors Harold Denton, Director, Office of Governmental and Public Affairs (GPA), NRC (Senior Advisor to JCCCNRS)

James Shea, Director, International Programs, GPA, NRC (U.S. Executive Secre-tary of JCCCNRS)

Marvin Goldman, Professor of Radiology, University of California (under con-tract to DOE)

Theodore Wilkinson, Director, Office of Nuclear Energy Technology, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State Andrew Reynolds, Peaceful Uses Agreement Executive Secretary, Office of Inter-national Research and Development Policy, DOE Dennis K. Rathbun, Executive Assistant to Chairman Zech, NRC K-10

Thomas P. Gwynn, Senior Technical Assistant to Chairman Zech, NRC Linda E. Portner, Special Assistant for Administration to Chairman Zech, NRC John K. Ward, Science Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Moscow K-11

I APPENDIX II JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFEH (JCCChTS)

August 1988 Moscow, U.S.S.R.

L U.S.S.R. Representatives >

B. A. Semenov, First Deputy Chairman, U.S.S.R. State Cammittee on the Utiliza-tion of Nuclear Power V. A. Sidorenko, First Deputy Chairman, U.S.S.R. State Committee for Safety Supervision of Nuclear Power Operations JCCCNRS Co-Chairmen N. N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, Academician, First Deputy Director, I. V. Kurchatov Institute for Nuclear Energy Committee Members A. T. Gutralov, Chief, GNTU GAEN (his) Deputy for this meeting -

V. N. Krushelnitsky, Chief of the GAEN Administration A. A. Abagyan, Director General of NPO "Energiya" (his) Deputy for this meeting - Ye. P. Larin, Deputy Director General V. G. Asmolov, Chief of Section, I. V. Kurchatov Institute for Nuclear Energy N. I. Yermakov, Chief, Glavatomenergo, GKAE Ye. I. Ignatenko, Chief, GNTU MAE of the U.S.S.R.

Committee Counselors L. A. 11'in, Academician, Academy of Medical Sciences of the U.S.S.R. (his)

Deputy for this meeting - L. A. Buldakov, Deputy Director of IBF B. A. Kuvshinnikov, Deputy Chief of UMNTS GKAE of the U.S.S.R.

V. K. Sukhoruchkin, Senior Scientist, I. V. Kurchatov Institute of Nuclear Energy K-12

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l Appendix L Protocol on Discussions by the Delegations of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R on Problems of Safety of Nuclear Energy and of the Visit of the U.S.A. Delegation to Sovie; Enterprises Associated With Nuclear Power I August 19-31, 1988

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i PROTOCOL ON DISCUSSIONS BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE U.S.A. AND THE U.S.S.R. I e'l PROBLEMS OF SAFETY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND OF THE VISIT OF THE

.. A. DELEGATION TO SOVIET ENTERPRISES ASSOCIATED WITH NUCLEAR P0k'ER August 19-31, 1988 In accordance with the decisions of the Seventh Session of the Joint U.S./

U.S.S.R. Committee on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and with the signing in Washington, on April 26, 1988, of the Memorandum of Cooperation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in the field of civilian nuclear reactor safety that was registered in the joint communique of President Ronald Reagan of the U.S. and General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. on June 2, 1988, a U.S. delegation, headed by Chairman Lando W. Zech, Jr. of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, visited the U.S.S.R from August 19 through 31, 1988.

l The visit provided the occasion for the first session of the Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS), which was created in accordance with the Memorandum of Cooperation.

In discussions held in Moscow August 22-24 and August 31, representatives of both countries discussed many aspects of nuclear power stations. The delega-tions are listed in an appendix.*

Programs for cooperation were reviewed by the two sides in very productive meet-ings, and agreement was reached on specific future cooperative efforts, which are described in a separate protocol between Mr. James Taylor, the U.S.

co-chairman of the JCCCNRS, and Dr. Nikolai Ponomarev-Stepnoy, the U.S.S.R.

co-chairman of the JCCCNRS.t These proposals will be reviewed for approval by both governments.

In addition to participating in the Joint Committee discussions, Chairman Zech met with the leaders and other senior officials from the Soviet organizations working on ensuring nuclear power safety, in particular Chairman Vadim Malyshev of the State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety, and Minister Nikolai Lukonin of the Ministry of Atomic Power. In addition, Chairman Zech and various U.S. delegation members visited the following facilities and installations in the U.S.S.R. to observe Soviet approaches to nuclear safety:

(1) The Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow Here the Soviets outlined the role and functions of the Institute and the l U.S. visitors toured the materials test (MR) reactor, the experimental l facility for study of High Temperature Gas Reactors and the first Soviet reactor, now being used for neutron standards calibration.

See Appendices C and D.

tSee Appendix K.

L-1 1

l (2) The Novovoronezh Atomic Power Station The U.S. delegation was briefed on the station's activities, including l construction and operation over the years of prototypes of several WER reactors, such as the WER-440 and WER-1000 reactors. The group torted the control rooms and turbine hall for Units 3 and 4, WER-440 reactors that came into operation in the early 1970s, and observed the refueling activities under way on Unit 4. Unit 3 was in full power operation. They also received a briefing on the work of the Training and Commissioning Center and toured several training and simulator facilities.

(3) The Izhora Production Association at Kolpino, near Leningrad Discussions were held at Izhorskiy Zavod on Soviet metallurgy and manufac-turing techniques for nuclear plant components. The U.S. visitors toured various testing and examination laboratories, the electro-slag furnace operations, press and rolling mill operations, and reactor component fabri-l cation facilities. Work under way centered on the WER-1000 components and vessels. The finished reactor vessel for the first Cuban nuclear power plant has been completed but not yet shipped.

l (4) The Khlopin Radium Institute at Gatchina, near Leningrad l

Several U.S. delegation members viewed the hot cells and associated laser fuel cutting compartment at the Khlopin Institute. The Soviet side de-scribed a new program of fuel kinetics analysis for simulation of core degradation that has been initiated recent1J and will include Chernobyl fuel specimens later this year. The U.S. side was invited to participate directly in the Institute's program as a part of joint activities and will consider this proposal over the course of the next year.

(5) Chernobyl Atomic Power Station Most of the U.S. delegation members visited the Chernobyl Station (RBMK-type reactors) where they held discussions with plant personnel about such matters as the safety changes introduced since the 1986 accident and the status of radiation cleanup at the plant and neighboring areas. The dele-gation, the first foreign representatives to do so, toured the outer rooms of the sarcophagus built around destroyed l' nit 4 and observed drilling to retrieve core samples. The damaged turbine hall for Unit 4, which had high radioactivity levels, was also visited very briefly. The delegation l

I saw the control room for Unit 4 and some members also saw the control room of Unit 1, which was operating at full power. The delegation also toured the evacuated town of Pripyat, and was told there are no plans to resettle it at this time.

(6) The All-Union Center for Radiation Medicine in Kiev l

l Separate from the Chernobyl visit, and in parallel with it, two members of the U.S. delegation visited the center for discussion on health and envi-ror. mental issues and research activities related to Chernobyl. The U.S.

[ representatives] noted the encouraging work already begun in this field by regional organizations in Kiev and urged that the scope and coordination L-2 i

of this work be expanded so as to make available a more comprehensive data base on results of the accident.

(7) The Rovno Nuclear Power Station For the first time, a delegation frem the U.S. visited this plant including:

(1) a tour of the control room and turbine hall of Unit 3, a WER-1000 plant which began operation in 1986; (2) a visit to Unit 4, a WER-1000 plant now under construction; and (3) discussions about the two WER-440 reactors which began operation in 1980 and 1981. Discussions focused on various operational safety features of Unit 3, additional safety features planned for Unit 4, and the fact that a fifth unit is now planned for the site.

In all meetings and visits, Chairman Zech and his Soviet colleagues, including i those that met him at the nuclear power stations and other installations, em- j phasized the importance of a strong commitment to safety in all aspects of the ;

design, construction, operation, and management of nuclear power plants. The !

two sides noted that while there are some differences in designs and safety viewpoints between the countries, both are committed to safe operation of their l civilian nuclear power plants. The two sides agreed that safe operation of l today's reactors is a key factor in the future worldwide use of nuclear power.

Both countries look forward to continued enhancements of safety through greater understanding of each other's approaches and to making further improvements in the safety of their respective plants.

Considering the scale of the programs being conducted in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in nuclear power, the planned cooperation will be important from the standpoint of improvement of nuclear safety of reactors of U.S. and Soviet design.

W.%s.t #

Lando W. Zech,u Jr. w Alexander Protsenko Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Chairman of the U.S.S.R.

Commission State Committee on the for the U.S. Utilization of Atomic Energy for the U.S.S.R.

Moscow, Angust 31, 1988 Appendices

1. U.S. Nuclear Sufety Delegation [See Appendix C.]

2. U.S.S.R. Nuclear Safety Delegation [See Appendix D.]

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- _ _ _ _ - _ - 1

Appendix M Joint U.S./U.S.S.R. Press Release on Visit of U.S.

Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety Delegation to U.S.S.R.

August 31, 1988 and U.S. Press Release Preceding Visit August 16, 1988 1'

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JOINT U.S./U.S.S.R. PRESS RELEASE ON VISIT OF U.S.

CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY DELEGATION TO U.S.S.R.

[ August 31, 1988]

In accordance with the decisions of the Seventh Sc;61on of the Joint U.S.-

U.S.S.R. Committee on Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and with the signing in Washington on April 26, 1988 o2 the Memorandum of Cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the field of civilian nuclear reactor safety that was registered in the joint connunique of President Ronald Reagan of the U.S. and General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. on June 2,1988, Chairman Lando W. Zech, Jr. of the Nuclear Regulatory Conmission led a seventeen member U.S. delegation to the Soviet Union August 19-31 to discuss and reach agreement on specific proposals for cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear reactor safety. A

, list of the members of the U.S. delegation is attached.* Members of the U.S.

l delegation were received by leaders and senior officials of the U.S.S.R. State Committee on the Utilization, of Atomic Energy, Ministry of Nuclear Power and the State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety.

Chairman Zech's visit started U.S.-Soviet Lilateral cooperation under the Memo-randum of Cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear reactor safety, signed in Washington, D.C. on April 26 by Chairman Alexander Protsenko of the U.S.S.R.

State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy and Chairman Zech. In particular, this memorandrm established a Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, with representatives from each country, to define areas of exchange and develop cooperative proposals. Mr. James Taylor of the U.S. NRC and Dr. Nikolai Ponomarev-Stepnoy of the Kurchatov Institute are co-chairmen of this Committee.

Meetings of the Joint Coordinating Committee were held in Moscow August 22-24 and on August 31, focusing on possible areas of cooperation in civilian nuclear reactor safety:

safety approaches and regulatory practices in both countries.

exchange of completed analyses of the safety of nuclear power plants in the U.S. and Soviet Union.

-- radiation effects on reactor vessels and structures and annealing of reactor vessels.

fire protection.

-- modifications and backfitting (changes to older plants).

severe accidents.

See Appendix C.

M-1

l health effects and environmental protection.

exchange of operational experience.

diagnostics, analysis equipment and systems for supporting nuclear plant operators.

erosion / corrosion of piping.

Proposals for potential joint activities in these areas were reviewed by the two sides during very productive meetings, and agreement was reached on spe-cific future cooperative efforts, including meetings, seminars, comparative analyses, exchanges of information and visits to each other's civilian nuclear power plants and related facilities. Programs for work in the above areas will be reviewed for approval by both governments.

These discussions follow an exchange of visits in 1987 by senior safety offi-cials from the two countries. In addition to participating in the Joint Committee discussions, Chairman Zech met with leaders and other senior offi-cials from the Soviet organizations working on ensuring nuclear power safety:

in particular, Chairman Vadim Malyshev of the State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety, Chairman Alexander Protse ?o of the Soviet State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy, and Mno ter Nikolai Lukonin of the Ministry of Atomic Power. In addition, Chairman Zech and the U.S. delegation l

members toured the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow, the Cher- '

nobyl, Novovoronezh, and Rovno nuclear power plants, and the Izhora fabrica-tion plant for heavy equipment for nuclear power plants located near Leningrad.

As is his custom, Chairman Zech made a point of speaking with plant operators and inspection officials about the importance of nuclear safety.

In all his meetings Chairman Zech emphasized the importance of a strong com-mitment to safety in all aspects of the design, construction, operation and management of nuclear power plants. In these discussions, U.S. and Soviet officials noted that while there are some differences in designs and safety viewpoints between the countries, both are committed to safe operation of their civilian nuclear power plants. The two sides agreed that safe operation of today's reactors is a key factor to the future worldwide use of nuclear power.

Both countries look forward to continued enhancements of safety through greater understanding of each other's approaches and to making further improvements in the safety of their respective plants. The cooperation planned between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., with their large nuclear power programs, begins an important exchange with the objective of improving nuclear safety in reactors of U.S. and Soviet design.

M-2

U.S. PRESS RELEASE PRECEDING VISIT f""No, ,

UNITED STATES

!5mi - 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

s' *

. Office of Govemmental and Public Affairs

\ . . . '.y/ .

Washington, D.C. 20555 No.88-112 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Tel. 301/492-0240 (Tuesday, August 16,1988)

U.S. DELEGATION TO VISIT SOVIET UNION IN AUGUST FOR FIRST HEETING ON 01VILIAN NUCLI.AR SAFETY A U.S. delegation, headed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Chairman Lando W. Zech, Jr., will visit the Soviet Union in late August for the first meeting implementing a recent agreement to enhance civilian nuclear reactor safety in both countries.

The meeting, which will be held August 22-31 in Moscow, will include visits by the U.S. delegation to a number of nuclear facilities, including Chernobyl.

A Memorandum of Cooperation signed by the two countries in April of this year provides for the exchange of technical and regulatory information. The Memorandum also established a Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, vitn six representatives from each country, to define areas of exchange and develop cooperative proposals.

The six U.S. represen'.atives on the U.S. team are James Taylor, the NRC's Deputy Executive Director for Operations and co-chairman of the Joint Coordinating Committee; James Sniezek, NRC's Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation; Themis Speis, NRC's Deputy Director for Generic Issue Regulation, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research; Edward Jordan, NRC's Director, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data; Sol Rosen, the Department of Energy's Director, International Nuclear Program Division; and Murray Schulman, DOE's Executive Assistant for Health and Environment Research, Office of Energy Research.

Chairman Zech will participate in the opening session and selective topical discussions.

Discussions at the meeting in Moscow will focus on ten possible areas of cooperation in civilian reactor safety: safety approaches and regulatory practices in both countries; analysis of the safety of nuclear power plants in the U.S. and Soviet Union; radiation embrittlement of reactor vessels and structures and annealing of reactor vessels; fire protection; backfitting; severe accidents; health effects and environmental protection; exchange of operational experience; diagnostics, analysis equipment and systems for supporting operators; and erosion and corrosion of piping. .

Programs of work in these areas will be reviewed for approval by both governments.

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2 fi'f Lt AND SutliTLE 3LtavtSLANn Report on the Visit of a'U.S. Nuclear Safety Delegation to the Joviet Union, August 19-31, 1988 4 oaf t atPDef COMPLETED MONYM vsAm

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March 1989 6 DAf t alport issuto James R. Shea MO T. , TAR g

March 1989 7 s tAFOmMINGORGANilallON NAME AND MAILING ADDmits rsws,wle e C.es O PROJECT /T Asaswonn uN:1 Nuutta International Programs

'"'""^*'""a Office of Governmental and Public Affairs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 10 SPONSOmaNG OmGANi2 ATION NAwt AND MalLING ADDatas iswavele Cases 1toTYPtOFREPORT Same as 7, above. ,,,m,,,,,,,m,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

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,,eenmac,im . w During August 1988 a U.S. delegation of nuclear reactor safety specialists, led by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Chairman Lando W. Zech, Jr., visited the Soviet Union to initiate cooperative activities in civilian nuclear reactor safety between the two countries under their April 1988 Memorandum of Cooperation. Areas of future cooperation and a schedule of working group meetings to explore these areas were defined in a protocol signed during this visit. The delegation met with Soviet representatives in Moscow as the Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety. Additionally, while in Moscow, Chairman Zech held discussions with leaders and other senior officials of Soviet organizations with responsibility for nuclear' power safety. Nuclear facilities were also visited, including the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (Moscow), the Novovoronezh Atomic . Power Station, the Novovoronezh Training)and Commissioning Center, the Izhora Heavy Equipmen Chernobyl Atomic Power Station, the All-Union Center for Radiation Medicine (Kiev),

and the Rovno Atomic Power Station.

! 14 DOCUMtNT ANAL v565 - a KE wwOmD5fDi&CmiPTOR5 g av Agasmi, Joint Coordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS)

Memorandum of Cooperation (MDC)

Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy Unlimited S a cua'" c'^a'"caoa Novovoronezh Atomic Power Station Novovoronezh Training and Commissioning Center "~'

Izhora Heavy Equipment Production Plant Unclassified

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V. G. Khlopin Radium Institute Unc1assified Chernobyl Atomic Power Station , , , ,,. , ,

All-Union Center for Radiation Medicine Rovno Atomic Power Station ,.,,,,a

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UNITED STATES S"Sg/ff;"f,fe,ga' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION vswac WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 PERMff No G 67 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300 120555139531' US NRC-0ADM DIV TPS FOIA F. 1 '1 ANICJ1C Yl X Al P-209 PDR-NUREGPUBLICATIONS SVCS WASHINGTON DC 20555 i

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