ML20244D724

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 24 to License NPF-57
ML20244D724
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 04/12/1989
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20244D721 List:
References
NUDOCS 8904240086
Download: ML20244D724 (3)


Text

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.24 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS-COMPANY ATLANT_IC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

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HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354

1.0 INTRODUCTION

_N By letter dated August 13, 1987, as supplemented August 12, 1988, Public Service Electric & Gas Company requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 for the Hope Creek Generating Station. The proposed amendment would increase the response time for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCII system. Additional information was provided by the licensee by letter dated August 12, 1988 The Technical Specification (TS) change would be to Table 3.3.3-3, Emergency Core Cooling System Response Times. No change to the Bases section is proposed or required.

2.0 EVALUATION The change in TS Table 3.3.3-3 for the identification of HPCI response time was requested by the licensee to provide operational flexibility when calibrating the HPCI system. The flexibility provides relief from difficulty in meeting the response time which was encountered during the Power Ascension Testing Program at Hope Creek.

The HPCI system is a high-pressure reactor coolant makeup system that will start independent of an AC power supply. The system is capable of providing sufficient water to the reactor vessel to maintain fuel clad temperatures below acceptable post-accident limits. This is done by maintaining reactor vessel inventory after small breaks that do not depressurize the vessel. The HPCI system is also used to maintain reactor vessel inventory following a reactor isolation and coincident failure of the non-ECCS Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system. The HPCI system is signaled to start on high drywell pressure and reactor vessel low water level. The pump suction initially draws water from the condensate storage tank (CST) with a secondary supply from the suppression pool. The delay time in the Technical Specification Table 3.3.3-3 is the maximum allowable time from the initiating signal to the time when rated flow is available and the injection valve is wide open. The same delay time is associated with the sequence of events for all relevant transient and accident scenarios identified in the Facility Safety Analysis Report.

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, The justification for the proposed change is based on a review of the design assumptions for the HPCI response time used in the analysis of i

relevant transient and accident scenarios.. Those scenarios for which the HPCI may be called upon to inject water into the vessel are the Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) break spectrum, the Loss of all Feedwater Flow transient, the Steam Line Break Outside Primary Containment, and the Feedwater Line Break Outside Containment.

In response to staff concerns, the licensee, by letter dated August 12, 1988, supplemented its original reouest with a discussion of the impact of the proposed change on the limiting peak clad temperatures (PCT) and vessel inventory for the plant design transients and accidents. The additional input described the review given to the types of single failure cases considered in the ECCS performance evaluation and the feedwater transient scenarios in the plant Updated Facility Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). For the ECCS performance evaluation, the limiting design basis accident assumes failure of a DC power source which eliminates the HPCI system plus one diesel generator.

Under this single failure consideration HPCI injection is not assumed in the analysis and therefore the response time has no effect on the PCT calculated result. Certain transients, such as a steam line break outside containment and feedwater line break outside containment are bounded by the DBA and therefore give results within those of the limiting break.

The loss of feedwater flow transient was reevaluated with the result that with an assumed additional delay of eight seconds in HPCI injection over the original assumption (35 seconds vs 27 seconds), the reduction in reactor vessel water level does not result in a loss of vessel inventory sufficient to uncover fuel. Since this is bounded by UFSAR analyses which j

do not simulate HPCl or RCIC injection for the first 50 seconds of the l

transient and are therefore more limiting, the effect of the increased l

HPCI response titre does not change the original conclusions reached in the I

Safety Evaluation Report for Hope Creek.

Based on the results of the evaluation discussed above, the staff finds the proposed Technical Specification Change to Table 3.3.3-3, page 3/4 3-38 of Appendix A to License No. NPF-57 to increase the HPCI response time from 27 seconds to 35 seconds to be acceptable.

3.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, 51.32, and 51.35, an environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact have been prepared and published (54 FR 13967) on April 5, 1989. Accordingly, based upon the environmental l

assessment, the Consnission has detennined that the issuance of this amendment will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

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4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has issued a Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amenoment to Facility Operating License and Opportunity For Hearing which was published in the Federal Register (53 FR 41430) on October 21, 1988.

No petition to intervene or request for hearing has been filed on this action.

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors:

M. Wayne Hodges and Clyde Shiraki Dated: April 12, 1989 l

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