ML20244C433

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 97 & 79 to Licenses NPF-9 & NPF-17,respectively

ML20244C433
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	06/06/1989
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20244C432	List: ML20244C430 ML20244C433
References
NUDOCS 8906140301
Download: ML20244C433 (5)

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION i

i RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 97 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-9 I

I AND ANNDMENT NO. 79 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-17 l

DUKE POWER COMPANY

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DOCKET N05. 50-369 AND 50-370 MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2

1.0 INTRODUCTION

51 By letter dated February 17, 1987, and supplemented November 19,1987 and October 3,1988, Dula Power Company (the licensee) proposed amendmer.t3 to sake several chsnges to the McGuire Technical Specifications (TS) and to revise a license condition. The TS changes involve editorial, administrative and other minor changes which would add clarification, consistency and conciseness to the existing TS.

These change requests are addressed below and, to the extent practical, are grouped according to the nature of the change requested.

Some of the changes requested in the licensee submittals have been approved by previous amendments 88 and 69 to Facility Operating Licenses NPF-9 and NPF-17, respectively.

2.0 EVALUATION (1) The phrase "on recirculation flow" is deleted from b a.1.2.3.1, TS 4.1.2.4.1 and TS 4.5.2(f). This deletion permits testing the charging pumps in their normal flow path as well as in the recirculation flow path. Testing of the pumps in normal syLtems alignment is an acceptable method and provides additional advantages since it provides for detection of degradation of other components in the system as well as degradation of the pumps. The proposed change permits a more comprehensive test and is, therefore, acceptable.

(2) The following table entries are changed for clarity:

(a) In Table 3.3-3 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation, Item 7.g, which pertains to Main Feedwater Pump (MFWP)

Instrumentation used to start motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, the entries under " TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS, " CHANNELS TO TRIP" and

" MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE" are changed f rom "2/ pump," "1/ pump," and "1/ pump" to "2-1/MFWP," "2-1/MFWP," and "2-1/MFWP," respectively.

1 (b) In Table 3.3-9 Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation, Item 7, l

Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate instrumentation, the entries under " TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS" and " MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE" are changed from "1" to "1/ Steam Generator."

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Instrumentation for Reactor Coolant Temperature - tin Table 3.3-10 Accident and T Range), the entries under " REQUIRED NO. OF CHANNELSD01nd "MINib CHANNELS OPERABLE" are changed from 2" and "1" to "2/T 2/T

" and Hot Cold "1T 1/T

" respectively.

Hot

Cold, (d) In Table 3.3-3 Item 7d, Auxiliary focJwater Suction Pressure - Low, the entries under " TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS" and " MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE" are ravised from "2/ pump" to "2/ Motor Driven Pump" and "2 of the same train / pump" respectively. Also, the entries "4/ Turbine Driven Pump,"

"2/ pump," 2 of the same train / pump," "1,2,3" and "24" are added as new entries under " TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS," " CHANNELS TO TRIP," HINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE," "APPLIC.ABLE MODES" and " ACTION," respectively, to reflect the as-built condition of the plants.

1 The revised entry changes in the four items above are more specific and clarify the intent of these TS without altering their substance. They have no adverse impact on safety and are, therefore, acceptable.

(3) Several of the requested changes involve th'e addition of explanatory notes to TS items concerning the start of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

(a) A new note is added and referenced in Table 3.3-3, Item 7.f, Turbine-driven and Motor-driven Pump Start during Station Blackout Instrumentation. This new Note 1 states: " Turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump will not start on a blackout signal coincident with a safety injection signal."

(b) A new Note 1 is added at the end of Table 3.3-4, and referenced at Item 7.f, Turbine-driven Pump and Motor-driven Pumps Start during Station Blackout, Trip Setpoints. The new Note 1 states: "The turbine-driven pump will not start on a blackout signal coincidcnt with a safety injection signal."

(c)

In Table 3.3-5, Engineered Safety Features Response Times, a new Note 6 is added and referenced at Item 13b, Start Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, Response Times. The new Note 6 states: "The turbine-driven pump does not start on a blackout signal coincident with a safsty injection sigt.al."

The added notes in the three items above provide explanatory information about the as-built design of the plants and do not adversely affect either plant operation or the substance of the existing TS. The requested changes are, therefore, acceptable.

(4.)

In Table 3.3-3, Item 9, Loss of Power, 4ky Emergency Bus Undervoltage-Grid Degraded Voltage, the ' reference to existing ACTION 15 is changed to a new ACTION IFa.

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.. Existing ACTION 15 states that:

"With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />."

The new ACTION 15a states that:

"With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. With more than one channel inoperable, enter Specification 3.8.1.1. "

ACTION 15 requires commencement of shutdown if more than one instrumentation channel on a 4 kv bus becomes inoperable. However, the ACTION statements of TS 3.8.1.1 provide alternative actions on loss of one source of 4 kv power. The proposed change which adds ACTION 15a, makes the statement consistent with TS 3.8.1.1 and is, therefore, acceptable.

(5)

In Table 3.3-3, Item 7, which pertains to starting of motor-driven auxiliary 9

feedwater pumps (MDAFPs) upon trip of all Main Feeowater Pumps (MFWP),

reference is changed from ACTION 14 to new ACTION 27.

ACTION 14 states that:

"With the number of OPERABLE channeis one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE."

ACTION 27 states that:

"With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the total number of channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within I hour."

l Thus, this change allows continued operation rather than plant shutdown with l

one channel of MFWP instrumentation inoperable. We find this to be more l

appropriate than the current specification. The functional capability of the MDAFP actuation system is maintained as required in the bases of TS (B 3/4 3.1) with one channel inoperable provided that the inoperable channel is placed in the trip condition.

System operation logic with both channels operable requires that 2 out of the 2 operable channels (n out of n logic) sense a trip of the main feedwater pumps (MFWPs) prior to the automatic start of the MDAFPs. The same level of conservatism in the system logic is maintained under the proposed action statement where it would be required that with one channel operable and the other channel inoperable but in the tripped l

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' condition that the remaining operable channel (n out of n logic) sense a trip of a MFWP prior to the automatic start of the NDAFPs. The change is, therefore, acceptable.

(6) In Table 4.3-8, Radioactive Liquid Effluent Nonitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements, Items 3a and 3b, a reference is added to existi Note 4.

The note provides detail on the type of surveillance (Channel check required in Items 3a and 3b.

This clarifying detail does not alter the substance of the specification and is, therefore, acceptable.

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In Tabbs 3.3-13 and 4.3-9, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation Item 3, Condenser Evacuation System Noble Gas Activity Monitor (EMF-33,, a note under Applicability is changed from "*At all times"

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to "#When air ejectors are operable." The change thus requires that surveillance be perforced on the noble gas monitor only when the air ejectors are operable (i.e., when there is a source of gas to the monitor). The monitor serves no purpose when the source of air to the monitor is not available. Therefore, the proposed change is acceptable.

(8) Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2b.1) requires, in part, that each ECCS subsystem be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the ECCS pump casings and accessible discharge piping high points. The proposed change revises this surveillance requirement by adding the phrase: "unless that pumps and associated piping are in service or have been in service within 31 days."

If the system is in service, then the pumps and piping are assured of being full of water.

If the system has been in service within 31 days, this is equivalent to having undergone surveillance within 31 days, which is the currently allou.d surveillance interval. Therefore, the proposed revision retains the required assurance regarding the absence of voids and is, therefore, acceptable.

l (9) In the ACTION statement for TS 3.6.3, the word " containment" is inserted to make the first sentence read:

"With one or more containment isolation valve (s) inoperable...." A similar change is made in the Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.1 so as to read:

"4.6.3.1 Each containment isolation valve...," Th.ese are clarifying editorial changes that do not change the substance of the

. specifications and are, therefore, acceptable.

The licensee also requested that Item e. be added under the ACTION statement for TS 3.6.3.

This new Item e. would state:

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The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided I

that the affected penetration is isolated in accordance with ACTION

b. or c. above, and prcvided that the associated system, if applicable, is declared inoperable and the appropriate ACTION statements for that system are performed.

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l. The. nw f,Ci!ON statement e. would allow mode changes with inoperable containment. isolation valves provided that the affected penetration is 1

isolated.. The isolation is accomplished by means of ACTION b. or c. Mode -

changes under these conditions are acceptable because they are in accordance with the guidance in Generic Letter. 87-09,."Section 3.0 and 4.0 of the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) on the Applicability of Limiting l

Ccnditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements." The additional provisions in ACTION statement e. relating _ to the system associated with the ~

L penetration are conservative and, therefore, acceptable.

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'(10) Surveillance Requirement 4.11.2.4.2 to TS 3.11.2.4, which currently reader

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"4.11.2.4.2 The installed Gaseous Radwaste Treatment System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by meeting Specifications 3.11.2.1 and 3.11.2.2 or 3.11.2.3.".is revised to read "... Specifications 3.11.2.1 and 3.11.2.2

- and 3.11.2.3."

i The revised requirement corrects the specification as originally intended.

Moreover, the revised specification is more conservative than the existing one and is, therefore, acceptable.

(11) The licensee also proposed a change to License HPF-17 for Unit 2.to delete License Condition 2.C.(8) regarding the control of heavy loads.

In

'accordance with NUREG-0612 " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,"

the. license condition related to the control of heavy loads was separated into Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the condition has been compbted.. By Generic Letter 85-11. "Cogletion of Phase II of NUREG-0612," June 28,1985, the NRC deleted the Phase II conditions. Since the conditions of both Phase I and Phase II have been satisfied, the entire License Condition 2.C.(8) nay be deleted.

The removal of obsolete (completed) requirements is an administrative change l

which has no adverse safety inpact.

It is, therefore, acceptable.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

These amendments involve changes to the installation or use of facility com-ponents located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the asendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational exposure. The NRC staff has made a determination that the attendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). The amendments also relate to changes in recordkeeping, reporting or administrative procedures or requirements. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(10). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmelital impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

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4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (54 FR 19268) on May 4, 1989. The Commission consulted with the state of North Carolina.

No public comments were received, and the state of North Carolina did not ha'te any comments.

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities

- will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and I

security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor:

D. Hood, PDII-3/DRP-I/i!

S. Kirslis, PDII-3/DRP-I/II Dated: June 6, 1989 1

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