ML20244A877

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-395/89-03.Corrective Actions:Personnel Involved in Incident Received Formal Counseling Session

ML20244A877
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	04/05/1989
From:	Bradham O SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 8904180244
Download: ML20244A877 (3)

Text

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So th Carolin) Electric & Gas Company lile B dh m

' Jenkinsville. SC 29065 Nuclear Operations -

(803) 345-4040

. April 5, 1989 l

Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

. Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 Response to Notice of Violation NRC Inspection Report S9-03

-l Gentlemen:

This letter is the South Carolina Electric & Gas Company response to the Notice of Violation dated March 9, 1989.

If you should have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours, L

i

0. S. Bradham HIO/0SB: led Attachments c:

D. A. Nauman/0. W. Dixon, Jr./T. C. Nichols, Jr.

E. C. Roberts W. A. Williams, Jr.

G. O. Percival General Managers R. L. Prevatte

.l S. D. Ebneter J. B. Knotts, Jr.

C. A. Price /R. M. Campbeli, Jr.

NSRC R. B. Clary RTS (IE 890205)

J. R. Proper-NPCF l

K. E. Nodland File (815.01)

J. C. Snelson l

8904180244 890405 l

PDR.ADOCM 05000395i G

PNU f

I \\

1 i

~ to Document Control Desk Letter Page 1 of 2 Apr.il 5, 1989 RESPONSE =TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION VIOLATION NUMBER 50-395/89-03-01 I.

ADMISSION OR DENIAL OF THE VIOLATION' South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) is in agreement with the alleged violation.

Y II.

REASON FOR THE VIOLATION The cause of the violation is attributed to personnel error and inadequate procedural guidance. Following maintenance activities on valve XVD-6186, Nuclear Blowdown Demineralized Bypass Valve, the-Dang'er Tag clearance was inadequately performed, leaving XVD-6186 in an incorrect position., Subsequently, the transfer of the Nuclear Blowdown Holdup Tank to the condenser provided a path for resin to bypass the filter and be injected into the condenser hotwell. Station Administrative Procedure (SAP-201), " Danger Tagging," did not specifically. identify the equipment within the_tagout boundary to be verified.

III.

CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED The personnel involved in the incident received a formal counseling session. This counseling detailed the specific requirements to ensure proper system alignment after clearing danger tags.

A Station Order (S0-89-03) was issued to require the listing of all equipment within the tagout boundary for which maintenance is being performed. This equipment is listed on the tagout and requires position restoration and independent verification prior to the clearance of tags on the tagout boundary.

The Nuclear Blowdown Demineralized Bypass Valve (XVD-6186) was added to the locked valve tracking program which is expected to provide a higher level of control for the positioning of this valve.

These measures have provided an increased level of assurance that incidents of this nature will not recur.

IV.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION The Station Administrative Procedure (SAP-201) " Danger Tagging" will be revised to incorporate the requirements of the Station Order (S0-89-03). Those requirements are addressed in the preceeding section of this response.

L___

(L

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' to Document Control Desk Letter

.Page 2 of 2 Apr.il 5, 1989 j

The Nuclear Blowdown Demineralized System will be modified to place strainers in the inlet headers to the demineralizers. The demineralized flow path will remain isolated until this modification r

is complete.

System Operating Procedure (SOP-212) has been revised on an interim basis until the strainer modification it complete. This restricted change allows transfer of the Nuclear Blowdown Holdup Tank effluent to the condenser via the bypass line around the de'nineralizers. This transfer will only take place once Chemistry has determined by sampling that the effluent is acceptable for transfer. Another procedure revision will be implemented upon completion of the strainer modification. This revision will include the following:

(1) Verification that the demineralized bypass valve is closed

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prior.to initiation of a transfer through the demineralizers.

(2) Requirement to. isolate the demineralized beds after the transfer has been completed.

(3) When the demineralizers are bypassed, the effluent stream will be sampled prior to the transfer to the condenser.

Additional corrective action will include a Lessons-Learned presentation to the Operations Department. This presentation will be conducted by the personnel involved in this incident.

2 SCE&G is in full compliance with the corrective actions which have already been completed.

V.'

DATE OF FULL COMPLIANCE SCE&G will be in full compliance with respect to the remaining corrective actions prior to the end of third quarter 1989.

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