ML20239A449
| ML20239A449 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | University of Utah |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1987 |
| From: | Bryner C UTAH, UNIV. OF, SALT LAKE CITY, UT |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8709170350 | |
| Download: ML20239A449 (52) | |
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l q The University of Utah TRIGA Reactor AnnualOperating Report for the period July 1,1986 to June 30,1987 i
- A. NARRATIVE
- 1. Operating Experience-The TRIGA reactor was critical 141.94 hours and generated 6,407.81 kWh'of '
energy during this reporting year. The reactor was used for educational demonstrations and laboratory experiments, systems tests, power measurements, and sample irradiations.
' 2. Changes in Facility Design A check valve was installed in the water line which supplies make-up water to the TRIGA tank. The valve was installed in a vertical orientation so that the-check ball 'of the valve rested in a closed position. Incorporation of the check valve into the TRIGA water recirculation / refrigeration system further precludes backflow of TRIGA water into the potable water system.
The regulator control rod, which is connected to a rack-and-pinion drive system that is controlled manually and monitored by the computer system, continues to be classified as an experiment. On 1/27/87, the regulator rod was moved from core position D1 to position G1 in accordance with standard control rod movement and repair procedure. The movement allowed various experiments to be performed in which the reactivity of different control rod designs could be evaluated. The regulator rod was removed and repaired and the entire assembly was replaced in core position D1 following the experiments. Changes in performance of the reactor are outlined in the Surveillance Test Section (3.a).
- 3. Surveillance Tests Documentation of all surveillance activities is retained and stored by the facility.
- a. Control Rod Worths Core Configuration #19 27 August 1986 Safety $L79 Shim $1.70
. Reg under maintenance Excess Reactivity $ 1.17 Shut Down Margin $0.53 1
8709270350 870630 ' PDR R ADOCK 05000407 PDR f 1 {
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*1 1 ,1 f' ! .C Core Configuration #20 28 January 1987 Safety. . $1.81 Shim $1.24 Reg under maintenance . 1 Excess Reactivity . $0.67 Shut Down Margin $0.57 Core Configuration #20 - 4 Febr>iary 1987 I
Safety $2.19 ; Shim $ 1.24 - ' Reg- classified as experiment Excess Reactivity $0.69 !
. Shutdown Margm $0.55 Core Configuration #19 25 March 1987 Safety $1.91
- Shim . $1.74 .
Reg- classified as experiment - Excess Reactivity $ 1.17 , Shutdown Margm $0.57 j
- b. Control Rod Inspection - l The biennial control rod inspection was last conducted December,1985 through , !
February,1986 and was reported in the Annual Operating Report of the University of Utah TRIGA Reactor for the period July 1,1985 to June 30, 1986. The next control rod inspection is scheduled for December,1987. 1 Rod drop times were measured 8/27/86,1/28/87,2/4/87, and 3/25/87. All rod drop times were found to be less than 0.7 seconds.
- c. Reactor Power Level Calorimetric power calibrations were performed 8/27/86, and 2/24/87. The-following results were obtained.
. Dale Meter Reading Actual Power Level 8/27/86 90 kW 92.1 kW 2/24/87 90 kW 91.5 kW
- d. FuelInspection The biennial fuel inspection is scheduled for December,1987.
- e. Fuel Temperature Calibration Fuel temperature circuits were calibrated 8/27/86, 2/25/87, 6/12/87, and 2
i i i
4 E l l 6/18/87. The circuits were calibrated to less than a 5 *C error over the range 20 *C . to 500 *C. 1 i
- f. Area Radiation Monitor Calibration f The biennial calibration of the area radiation monitors was completed on 5/28/87.
The calibration was conducted by the facility staff with the assistance of a Health q Physicist from the UniveGity of Utah Radiological Health Department. q
- g. Reactor Safety Committee Audits Radiation Safety Committee (RSC) member J.M. Byrne performed an audit of maintenance activities of the facility. A copy of the audit report is included as Appendix I.
University of Utah Radiation Safety Officer and RSC member K.J. Schiager submitted an audit report and recommendations concerning Monthly Checks, Visitor Log, Radiation Exposures, and Environmental Surveys. A copy of the report is included as Appendix II.
- h. Analysis of TRIGA and Potable Water The University of Utah Radiological Health Department performed an analysis of water from the TRIGA tank and potable supply system on 3/30/87. The analysis indicated that there has been no contamination of the potable water supply by the TRIGA reactor facility.
B. ENER0Y OUTPUT The reactor was critical for 141.94 hours and produced 6,407.81 kWh of energy. The total hours operated since initial criticality is 1,625.59 hours and the total energy produced is 98,044.32 kWh. C. INADVERTENT SCRAMS There were seven inadvertent scrams while the reactor was critical during the current reporting period. The type, cause, and action taken by the operations staff is outline below: Ouantity Iyg Cause Action 1 High Log Signal Spike from Cautioned personnel bumping console (1) 5 Linear Power Spike (2) Restart Bumped Console (1) Cautioned personnel Improper switching Personnel warned oflinear range (2) and instructed in proper switching technique 3
l Ouantity Type Cause Action 1 High-level Hot sample removed Cautioned Radiation from reactor (1) experimenter to Alarm monitor portable meter D. MAJOR MAINTENANCE The ventilation system was modified by rotating the HEPA filters from a horizontal orientation to a vertical orientation. The recirculation pump seals were repacked to stop a small leakage of water from the impeller region of the pump which had developed since the last reporting penod. Subsequent inspections during operation have shown that the problem has been corrected. The demineralized tanks containing the ion-exchange resin beds were regenerated on 9/26/86. On 5/6/87, the uncompensated ion chamber was removed from the TRIGA tank following anomalous power readings between the power monitored by the 1 computer system and the TRIGA console. The uncompensated ion chamber is connected to the computer monitor and indicated a stable power reading while the console instrumentation indicated a power level which varied with time. A thorough examination of the equipment showed the problem to be the result of a bad connection between the coaxial cable and the connector where the cable attaches to the ion chamber. Replacement of the connector, followed by close observation of the performance of the uncompensated ion chamber during several reactor runs indicated that the problem had been rectified. The east damper of the ventilation system was inspected on 6/1/87. The ventilation duct was opened to ensure proper operation during a simulated high-level radiation alarm. The system functioned normally during the test. All moving parts were lubricated and the duct was resealed to return the entire system to normal operation. E. CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 50.59 The Reactor Safety Committee Charter was reviewed, updated and adopted by RSC on 3/19/87. A copy has been submitted to the NRC for review and approval. The cur ~ "' nbership of the RSC as designated by the licensee is as follows: C.G. Bryner, Reactor Administrator G.M. Sandquist, Reactor Supervisor K.J. Schiager, Radiation Safety Officer R.E. Turley 4
R.D. Lloyd J.M. Byrne l K.C. Crawford l P. Sheehan J.C. Giddings A check valve was installed in the make-up water line to prevent backflow of TRIGA water into the potable water system. , 1 During an audit of the facility operations log, RSC member J.M. Byrne noted apparent anomalous fuel temperature readings during the reporting period. The RSC requested the operations staff to perform tests on the fuel temperature monitoring channels. The cables which connect the thermocouple leads to the console instrumentation were disconnected. An examination found the soldered connections to be cracked and brittle with evidence of oxidation and , corrosion on the connections. The copper coaxial cable was removed and replaced with thermocouple wire and the junctions were re-soldered. The instrumented fuel element was removed from the reactor core and placed in an insulated and submersible jacket containing a heating element which insolated the fuel thermocouple from the TRIGA tank environment. Tests showed that the thermocouple responded accurately to changes in temperature within the testing apparatus. A complete description is given in the 30 Day Report to the NRC which is included as Appendix III. The SCRAM set point on the high log power channel of the TRIGA control console was changed from 150 kW to 120 kW as requested by the RSC. The TRIGA pre-startup checkout sheet B.1-4 was modified to provide for a comparison of fuel and tank-water temperatures. The SCRAM setpoint setting for the fuel temperature measuring channel was changed from 430 oC to 200 oC as requested by the RSC. Section 13.3.4 of the Operations Manual was modified to require reactor operators to perform a channel check of fuel temperature during operation. These changes are all referenced in Appendix III. The RSC reviewed, updated, and approved the Physical Security Plan which has been submitted for review and approval by the NRC and is included as Appendix IV. . The monthly inspection checkout sheet was modified so that all room numbers listed on the sheet correspond to the new room numbering system for the Merrill Engineering Building as designated by the College of Engineering. r Chapters 2 and 5 of the Operations Manual were reviewed by the RSC and amended. Chapter 2 discussed experiment classification and review; Chapter 5 deals with emergency procedures. Copies of the updated chapters are included as Appendix V. F. RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS
- 1. Liquid Waste - Negligible Decontamination of removable Co-60 contamination from the lead bricks used to 5
l i i I shield the gamma-ray spectroscopy equipment in the Radiation Measurement Laboratory resulted in approximately 10 gallons of liquid waste. The liquid was analyzed by the University of Utah Radiological Health Department for activity content which was determined to be approximately 1.3 x 10-5 Ci/ml. Since the activity of the liquid was below 10 CFR 20 limits for the unrestricted release of , water, the waste was disposed of via the sanitary sewer. The total amount of I i radioactivity released was 0.57 pCi.
- 2. Gaseous Waste - Negligible The TRIGA was run for 141.94 kWh at powers up to approximately 90 kW. At this power level, Ar-41 production is negligible. Our stack monitor will detect j 33% of 10 CFR 20.20, Table I, for Ar-41 and we have not seen an increase in I detected activity.
- 3. Solid Waste - None G. RADIATION EXPOSURES )
i Personnel with duties in the reactor laboratory on either a frequen or occasional l basis have been issued a film-badge dosimeter by the University of Utah ] Radiological Health Department. The duty category and monitoring period of l personnel are summarized below: Namt. Monitoring Period Duty Categorv -{ G.M.Sandquist 7/86 - 6/87 regular K.C.Crawford 7/86 - 6/87 regular J T.C. Gansauge 7/86- 6/87 regular regular J J.S. Bennion 7/86 - 6/87 M. Tolle 7/86 - 6/87 regular l J. Allison 7/86- 6/87 occasional P. Sheehan 7/86- 6/87 terminated ; J. Ambrose 7/86 - 6/87 terminated j R. Deadman 7/86 - 6/87 terminated 1 l l Dose Equivalent summary for Reporting Period: l Regular Dutv Annual Dose Equivalents: 20 mrem average; 70 mrem highest measured. Quarterly: 10 mrem average; 40 mrem highest measured. Occasional Dutv 3 i Annual and Quarterly Dose Equivalent: 10 mrem highest measured. ] Dose Eauivalent Limits ) 1 Maximum Permissible Dose Equivalent = 5000 mrem /yr (1250/ quarter). l Minimum Detectable per Monthly Badge = 10 mrem. I 6 i l i 1
fi Of the 771 visitors to the facility under the DOE Reactor Sharing Program for the . p repo,rting year, no visitor received a measurable dose. Therefore, the average and
- maximum doses are all within NRC guidelines.
H. LABORATORY SURVEYS Monthly ' surveys of the facility were conducted by the University.of Utah Radiological Health Depanment during the reporting period. Some of these ; surveys have identified removable contamination sources 'which were immediately cleaned. The surveys have indicated no increase in radiation levels over previous years. I. ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEYS The Air Monitoring Station, operated by the Environmental Protection Agency and located outside.the reactor building, has indicated no unusual changes in radiation or radioactive material concentrations during the reporting period. Environmental surveys conducted on 9/4/86 by the University of' Utah Radiological Health Department indicated no unusual dose rates in the areas surrounding the Merrill Engineering Building, which houses the reactor facility, l or anywhere on the University of Utah campus. Prepared by N~'R&r~ N rvis - i
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Approved / ^ or Administrator - I 1 7
e 3 i l l Appendix I: Reactor Safety Committee Audit Report on TRIGA Check Out and Operations Log I I l l l
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ENCUEl5E #1
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UNIVERISTY OF UTAH REACTOR SAFETY COMMITTEE AUDIT REPORT A. Subject of Audit: TRIGA Check Out and Operations Logs
- 1. Frequency: Semi-Annual
- 2. Performed by: J.M. Byrne
- 3. Date: 6/3/87 i
- 4. Review Period: 1/1/87 to 6/3/87 S. ' Target date next audit: 1/1/88 B. Performance Specifications and
References:
- 1. TRIGA TECH. SPEC (TTS) 6.5.5 Audits requires the RSC or a subcommittee thereof to audit reactor operations semi-annually at intervals not to exceed eight months.
The audit shall include operating records.
- 2. TTS 6.8 Operating Procedures requires operating procedures j for reactor start-up, operation, and shutdown.
- 3. TTS 6.9 Facility Operating Records requires records of
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normal reactor operation be kept for five years.
- 4. Preliminary check-out procedures should verify:
TTS 4.3. 2 (2) Channel check of safety systems TTS 4.3.4 Ventilation system'
- 5. Operational Procedures should verify:
TTS 4.2(3) Channel check of fuel temperature C. Implementing Procedures: The UUNEL Operations Manual (OM) contains the following procedures on TRIGA Reactor Check Out and Operations: OM 4.2 Operating Procedures OM 4.3 Reactor Check Out and Calibration OM 4.5 Reactor Operations Log OM 13.3 TRIGA Reactor Operating Procedures OM 13.3.1 General Rules OM 13.3.2 Preliminary Check Out Procedure (with Forms B1 & B2) OM 13.3.4 Operational Procedures at Power (Operations Log) OM 13.3.5 Termination Procedures (Form B3) i
Page 2 k D. Records Sources: l '. Preliminary Check Out Sheets B1 & B2 2.. Critical approach and termination check sheet B3
.3. Operations Logs #18 and 19 E. Determine whether all requirements are covered by implementing procedures and whether all procedures are met and documented.
- 1. TTS 6.8 is met by OM 13.3.2, 13.3.3, 13.3.4
- 2. TTS 6.9 is met by record retention practice
- 3. TTS 4.3.2(2) Safety Systems
- a. Fuel Temp. - Scram ok at Checkout Sheet B2-13
- b. Power Level (2 scram at 120%)
Checkout Sheet B2-9, Linear Power Scram at 100 KW (Review of records shows this deactivated since Jan 86) Checkout Sheet B2-10 Hi Log Power Scram at 150 KW Checkout Sheet B2-11 % Power Scram at 115% TTS 4.3.2(2) NOT MET Discussion: The original TRIGA TECH. SPECS. (TTS) required two scram channels set at 150% of maximum reactor licensed power. The facility operated with three channels, a linear power channel with scram set at full scale (i.e. 100KW), a Hi Log channel set at 150% (i.e. 150KW), and a % Power channel set at 115% (i.e. 115KW). In March, 1985 the NRC revised the TTS and required two scram channels set at 120% of full licensed power (i.e. 120KW). In approximately January, 1986 in conjunction with the computer controlled regulatory rod , experiment approved by the RSC, the it 3ar power channel was connected to the computer rather than the control console, thus disconnecting the scram circuit on that channel. The Reactor was operated with two scram channels (Hi Log at 150KW, and % Power at 115KW). It was operating in this manner in June, 1986 when the TRIGA facility was inspected by the NRC. In reviewing the Preliminary Check Sheets, I noted that their linear channel had been discon-nected, but still had in my head the old TTS requirement of two channels 150% of licensed power and this condition was met. Having reviewed the TTS, I believe this is not a Reportable Occurrence (5) ad TTS 6.10 (1) and (2) but should be reported under TTS 6.10 (3) (d) to the NRC within 30 days. The RSC should review this and decide what reporting is required.
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Page 3 k c.- Manual Scram - ok B2-13
- d. Magnet Current Key Scram - ok B2-13
- e. Console Power Supply Scram - ok B2-13 (Ion Chamber Power Supply serves this function)
- f. Reactor tank water level - ok B2-13
- g. Start up count rate interlock TTS 4.3.2(2) NOT MET Discussion:
TTS 4.3.2 (2) requires a channel check of each reactor safety systems channel- be performed before each day's operation. The Startup Count Rate Interlock is listed in TTS 3.3.3 as a Safety System or Measuring Channel. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent startup without a neutron source in . the reactor. The current Preliminary Check Sheet does not contain a channel check of this safety system channel although previous versions of this check sheet did. Several NRC inspections have occurred since this situation has been occurring. I believe that under TTS 6.10 (3) (d) this should be reported to the NRC within 30 days. In my view, it is not a " reportable occurrence" under TTS 6.10(1) & (2) and TTS 1.1(5), but the RSC should review this possibility.
$ h. Control Rod withdrawal interlock TTS 4.3.2(2) NOT MET Discussion:
TTS 4.3.2(2) requires a channel check of each reactor safety system be performed before each day's operation. The Control Rod Interlock is listed in TTS 3.3.3 as a Safety System or Measuring Channel. The purpose of this require-ment is to prevent driving two control rods at one time. The TRIGA control console is wired so that it is impossible to drive two control rods at the same time since there is a selector switch which can only be positioned on one rod at a time. Therefore, the channel check requirement makes no sense. This condition has existied ever since the reactor was licensed and has undergone many NRC inspections. I believe it should be reported to the NRC and ask for a letter ruling that this is not a violation of the TTS or is the alternative a modification of the TTS.
- 4. TTS 4.3.4 Ventilation System Requirement met by B1-5
- 5. TTS 4.2 (3) channel check of fuel temp.
This requirement can be met by comparing operations stamp Temp. Levels There is nothing in OM 13.3.4 Operational Procedures at Power to remind the operator to do this. (The operat-ors are not making this comparison)
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-Discussion:
k Previous erature operating indication washistory indicates that the Fuel Temp- i 4 temperature varied from 15- approximately 50 C and pool water 23, 1986, to 25 C. 105 to 109the8 Fuel Temperature at 90 KWOnoperation December 19 and - went up to ; March 19, C with all other conditions being equal. On anomally. 1987 I reviewed the Operations Log and noted this repeated inI other discussed that he did not know wh this with the SRO and he indicated , runs. y this happened but that it had not j I made a note ! reading high wouldin the Operations Log that the thermocouple appear be to be'a safety watched. bequestion, conservative but thatand thus this it would reading not should On May 29, 1987, operation and on Junethe Fuel Temp went to 91 -93 C at 90 KW 2, 1987 reference in the Operations Logagain or in to 91 C. There is no about this anomally or any response. the Maintenance Log
- I believe should that under be reported TTSwithin to the NRC 6.10 30(3)days.(a) It and (d) this may be "a incide reportable (2) occurrence" under TTS 1.1 (5 ) and TTS 6.10(1) &
and the RSC should discuss this possibility. Also, I believe that the reactor should not be operated again as until a test of the instrumented fuel rod is performed follows: a.(couplereadingsforallthCompare the water temp to the ree thermocouple. b.fUseagalvamometertosimulatethermocouplecurrent up to 450 C. for all three channel inputs.
- c. I Use the PVC pipe heater to test all three helevated temperaturethermocouples in the instrumented fuel ro (up to approximately 75 C) before further operation is approved.An analysis of these test OM 13.3.4 Operational Procedures modified to require channel at Power should be during reactor operation. checks of Fuel Temperature Recommendations:
I. 1 Checkout sheet B2-13 fuel temperature scramshould settingbeatmodified to include the 450 C. l
Paga 5
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- 2. Checkout. sheet B1-4 should be modified to include a
,' comparison of water temperature and fuel temperature before startup as a channel check on the . Fuel Temperature channel as per OM 13.3.2-9.
- 3. The RSC should review TRIGA- reactor operation with %
power scram at 115% and Hi Log Scram at 150 KW to determine the seriousness of the problem and the NRC reporting required.
- 4. The RSC should review the lack of a channel check on the Startup Count Rate Interlock to determine the seriousness of the problem and the- NRC reporting required.
- 5. The RSC should review the Control Rod Interlock requirements and formulate a position to present to the NRC.
- 6. The RSC should review the ansmallies observed in the operation of the Fuel Temperature channel readings and determine what- action should be required of the operations staff and what reporting to the NRC is required.
- 7. The OM 13.3.4 should be amended to include a requirement for channel checks of fuel temperature during operation.
v Appendix II: Reactor Safety Committee Audit Report
. on Monthly Inspections, Visitor Log, and q Radiation Exposures .
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THE UNIVERSITY (. OFUTM REACTOR SAFETY COMMITTEE AUDIT REPORT A. Subject of Audit: MONTHLY INSPECTIONS
- 1. Period reviewed: 1 January - 31 May 1987
- 2. Date: 6 June 1987
- 3. Frequency: Semiannual
- 4. Target date for next audit: 1 December 1987.
- 5. Performed by: Keith J. Schiager B. Performance Specifications and
References:
- 1. TRIGA Technical Specification (TTS)'4.3.2(2). requires a monthly check of the pool level channel.
- 2. TTS. 4.3.3 requires monthly verification of operability of the area radiation monitoring system and' the ;
continuous air monitoring system. 1
- 3. TTS 4.5 requires monthly measurement of the primary coolant water conductivity and pH.
- 4. TTS 3.8 requires that the conductivity shall be less than 5 x 10-6 mhos/cm and the pH shall be between 5.0 and 8.0.
- 5. TTS 5.4 "... describes the functions and essential .
i components of the area radiation monitoring equipment and the system for continuously monitoring airborne radioactivity." The specifications are: J l
"(1) Function of Area Radiation Monitor (gamma-sensitive instruments): Monitor radiation fields in key I locations, alarm and readout at control console.
"(2) Function of Continuouc Air Radiation Monitor (beta , gamma-sensitive detector with particulate collection capability): Monitor concentration - of radioactive particulate activity in the pool room, alarm and readout at control console.
"(3) Function of Argon-41 Stack Monitor (gamma- !
sensitive detector): Monitors the concentration of L l Radiological llcalth Departrnent imi ormn S imnt er llall Nlt l...Le ( Th L:tah M4112 vli biel11
4 Reactor Audit - Monthly Inspections 6 June 1987 2 { radioactive gases including Argon-41 in the building i exhaust, alarm and readout at console." (sic) C. Implementing Procedures:
- 1. Monthly Inspection form.
D. Records Sources:
- 1. Monthly Check Log E. Adequacy of Procedures and Records:
- 1. There is no procedure for accomplishing the inspections listed on the Monthly Inspection form. The form merely identifies the items to be inspected and provides spaces for entering values or simply check marks.
- 2. The requirement for the pool level channel check is satisfied by item 2 on the current Monthly Inspection form. The inspected records indicated that the pool level check has been performed monthly.
- 3. An operational check of the area monitoring system, as described in TTS 5.4 (1), is not included on the current Monthly Inspection form.
- 4. The Monthly Inspection form contains no check of the continuous air particulate monitor for the pool room, as described in TTS 5.4 (2), since there is no such monitor in place.
- 5. An operational check of the continuous argon-41 stack monitor, as described in TTS 5.4 (3), is included in the Monthly Inspection, although it is not clearly identified as to which air monitor it applies to.
- 6. The current Monthly Inspection form does not require tests of the pool water to assure compliance with the limiting conditions of T.S. 3.8.
Discrepancies:
- 1. The lack of a CAM for particulate airborne activity is a significant deviaation from the operational requirements of the new Tech. Specs. However, I don't believe it is necessarily reportable to the NRC since neither the Safety Limits nor the Limiting Conditions of Operation are violated. (TSS 3.3.2 requires only one CAM to be operable during reactor operation.)
Reactor Audit - Monthly Inspections 6 June 1987 3 I Recommendations:
- 1. Add an operational check of the area monitoring system to the Monthly Inspection.
- 2. Install a continuous air monitor (CAM) for particulate activity in the pool room (i.e. TRIGA reactor room),
with readout and alarm at the control console.
- 3. Add an operational check of this CAM to the Monthly Inspection form.
- 4. Change che label on item 5 of the Monthly Inspection form to "Ar-41 Stack Monitor" to indicate unambiguously which CAM this refers to.
- 5. Add the tests for conductivity and pH to the Monthly Inspection form; include the limiting values on the form for ease of comparison with the requirements, i.e.
conductivity <5x10- 6 mhos/cm (or resistivity >200 kohm-cm) and 5.0<pH<8.0. (NOTE: Whenever there are specific limiting values involved, they should be printed directly on the form where the operational test or surveillance result is to be recorded.) l -
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e e 1 / :e af en L - - --_---- - - ---- --- -- - --
" ~ THE UNIVERSITY ! 4 0FUTAH i REACTOR SAFETY COMMITTEE AUDIT REPORT A' . Subject of Audit: VISITORS LOG a 1. Period reviewed: 1 January - 31 May 1987 2.. 'Date: 6 June 1987
- 3. Frequency:, . . Semiannual
- 4. Target date'for next audit: 1 December 1987
- 5. Performed by: Keith J. Schlager B. ~ Performance Specifications and
References:
- 1. Physical'- Security
- Plan (PSP), Section 2.2, specifies that each visitor entering the controlled access area.
must sign the visitors log. C. ' Implementing Procedures:
- 1. Facility Operations Manual (FOM) Section 4.1.2.a b D. Records Sources:
1.- Visitors Log (bound log book) E. Adequacy of Procedures and Records: Although the Visitors Log is mentioned in PSP 2.2 and in FOM 4.1.2.a,. I could find no statement anywhere of the purpose, required' contents or retention for this log. The log contains
'date of visit, name and address of the visitor. It does not provide ~ any verification of radiation exposure or lack of exposure, since not all visitors are required to wear dosimeters or to be surveyed for contamination before leaving the facility.
The potential value of the log would be for follow-up in the event
'that any abnormal condition, e.g. contamination, missing or damaged equipment, etc. The log may not need to be retained permanently.
l l: L Railiological llcatth liepartment inn t hun spen.er 11.11
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t REACTOR AUDIT'- VISITORS LOG- 6' June 1987 2-1( F. Recommendations:
- 1. Revise the: FOM ' to define the purpose, contents and
' retention requirements for the Visitorn Log,
- 2. To expedite the collection - - of the Visitors Log data, especially when conducting group tours of the' facility, use a 3x5. card form on which visitors would enter name, address,. date, nature or purpose and' duration of visit.
The card could also include spaces for entry. of dosimeter serial number and readings,'if.one was worn. f l; i LL _ -- _ - --
l.. y h * ' r 6= June 1987 1
. REACTOR AUDIT - VISITORS LO{THE ' '/
1.. ofUNi REACTOR SAFETY COMMITTEE AUDIT REPORT A. Subject of Audit.:_ RADIATION EXPOSURES
- 1. Period reviewed: 1 January - 31 May 1987
- 2. Date: 6 June 1987 3, Frequency:- Semiannual
- 4. Target date for next audit: 1 December 1987
- 5. Performed by: Keith J. Schlager 4 B. Performance Specifications and
References:
- 1. TRIGA Technical Specification (TTS) 6.5.5(4) requires the Reactor Sofcty Committee to audit radiation exposures at the facility and adjacent environs semiannually.
- 2. TTS 3.7(1) requires an environmental radiation monitoring program to measure the integrated radiation exposure in and.around the environs of the facility on an annual basis.
- 3. University of Utah, Radiation Safety Manual, June 1983.
C. Implementing Procedures:
- 1. The Facility Operations Manual (FOM) Sections 4.4.2 and 4.7 refer to a Radiatior Survey Log Book.
- 2. University of Utah Radiation Procedures and Records:
RPR 201, Radiation User Personal Data RPR 201, Bioassay Criteria and Procedures RPR 206, Personal Exposure / Incident Investigation Report RPR 207, Occupational Radiation Exposure Summary i H.isliningioit llcalth Departnient too > >ru m sp w er it i!! sih I .mc t :n l :.sti % Ill.'
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gy*; c. REACTOR AUDIT'- RADIATION EXPOSURES '6 June.1987- 2 I(( E -D. Records sources:
- 1. . Radiation Dose Log -
I=could find no specification or procedure referring to this.. log.- It ' contains dates, names, badge number and/or pocketj dosimeter readings. This log cannot be considered to be a complete or accurate of radiation exposures and'could,.therefore,-be misleading. s 2.- All ' individual radiation dosimetry records are permanently filed at the office of the Radiological Health Department, 100 Orson Spencer Hall.
- 3. Environmental Radiation Survey reports'from prior years are filed with the Nuclear Engineering Laboratory surveys (G. M. Sandquist, responsible user) at the Radiological Health Department office. A copy of the most recent environmental survey, dated 5 September 1986, is attached.
E. Adequacy of' Procedures and Records:
- 1. -The' Radiation Survey Log. Book (FOM 4.4.2 and 4.7) does not exist. Routine monthly radiation surveys of key y
areas or equipment items are recorded on the Monthly Inspection form, item 7. Surveys of samples. removed from the reactor are recorded on the exper1 ment' . log sheet.- Special surveys performed during non-routine operations are, or may be,. recorded in the operations log or .in the maintenance log.' Surveys. performed by the Radiological Health Department are recorded on Laboratory Survey Record, RPR.301. l 2. For those individuals identified as radiation users in l the past, the individual dosimetry records on file with I the Radiological Health Department are complete. ;
- 3. The procedure used in the past for the environmental
, survey was to measure the external exposure rate at the l ground surface at 14 locations around the campus. This procedure would provide some indication of exposure due to deposited long-lived radioactivity, but could not detect or measure exposures due to short-lived nuclides, e.g. I-131, or from a cloud'of radioactive noble gases. l 5 1 l
l o . * . REACTOR AUDIT - RADIATION EXPOSURES 6 June 1987 3
.t 1
F. Recommendations:
- 1. Eliminate'the Radiation Dose Log. '
2. Revise 2riteria the FOM to implement the general University for assignment of radiation monitoring dosimeters, as contained in the Radiation Safety Manual, and as committed. to the NRC in the Response to the Notice of Violation, Appendix C, page 2, 29 October 1986, as follows:
- a. All permanently assigned staff members will be issued permanent film badges.
- b. Personnel on temporary assignments of more than ene week during normal operations, or more than a' day during operations with higher exposure potential, e.g. fuel replacement, core modifications or maintenance, etc., will be issued temporary film badges. Records of exposures obtained from these badges will be maintained permanently by the Radiological Health Department.
- c. Personnel on temporary assignments not exceeding 4
one week during normal operations will use direct reading dosimeters during work in the reactor room ), or near other radiation sources. Dosimeter ' readings will be recorded in the Visitors Log. (NOTE: The pocket dosimeter readings are for educational and exposure control purposes on;y and are not considered to be permanent, official dose records.
- d. Visitors entering the reactor room for short periods, e.g. for general orientation or )
instructional purposes, need no personal monitoring l devices if accompanied by reactor operating staff wearing their own assigned dosimeters. (NOTE: For educational purposes, it is appropriate to have one or more members of a group wear a pocket dosimeter and record the readings in the q Visitors Log.)
- 3. The Radiation Safety Officer should review the radiation exposure records semiannually and report his findings to k the corumitte e . A written summary of exposures to ;
facility staff and to visitors should be submitted to i the committee at the end of June so that it e can be < jneluded in the annual report as required .b,k TTS 6.10( 5 )( g ) . These actions by the RSO may be construed as constituting a semiannual audit by the committee. ls .
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t REACTOR AUDIT - RADIATION EXPOSURES 6 June 1987 4
- 4. Revise FOM 4.4.2 to require all radiation surveys that are performed because of, or in conjunction with, specific operations to be recorded in the operations log or maintenance log, as appropriate.
- 5. Revise FOM 4.7 to indicate that routine (monthly) radiation surveys are to be recorded on the Monthly Inspection form.
- 6. The Radiological Health Department should install several integrating radiation dosimeters at locations within approximately 100 meters of the Nuclear Engineering Laboratory. These dosimeters could be film ,
badges exchanged monthly, but thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) exchanged quarterly would be more practical. If appropriately sited and installed, such dosimeters would provide valid measurements of potential I doses from all radioactive effluents. The results of such monitoring would also be available for semiannual atiditing by the committee as required by TTS 6.5.5(4).
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Appendix III: 30 Day Report to NRC 1 l l L - _-- _-- -
O. y 3 July 1987 To: Document Control Center U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC From: Reactor Safety Committee, University of Utah, License R-126
Subject:
30 Day Report to NRC on Operational Deficiencies at the University of Utah TRIGA Nuclear Reactor : DOCKET 50-407 l l During the audit conducted on 3 June,1987 by J.M.Byrne of the University of Utah Reactor Safety Committee, severalitems of significance as potential" reportable occurrences" were presented to the Reactor Safety Committee (RSC) during its meeting on 4 June,1987. A detailed copy of the Audit Report is enclosed as enclosure (1). L The audit items were discussed in a telephone conversation with Blaine Murray of the Region IV staff on 5 June,1987 who advised that these audit items be submitted as a 30 day report to the NRC with a copy to the Region IV. The specific items disclosed by the audit were as follows :
- 1) Item : The original TRIGA Technical Specifications ('ITS 3.3.3) required two scram channels set at 150% of maximum reactor licensed power. The facility operated with three channels, a linear power channel with scram set at full i
scale (i.e.100 kW), a High Log channel set at 150%(i.e.150 kW), and a % Power channel set at 115% (i.e.115 kW) . In March,1985 the NRC revised the
'ITS and required two scram channels set at 120% of full licensed power (i.e.120 kW) . In approximately January,1986, in conjunction with the I
computer-controlled regulation rod experiment approved by the RSC, the linear power channel was connected to the reactor display computer rather than the control console, thn disconnecting the scram circuit on that channel . The reactor was operated with two scram channels, namely the High Log at 150 kW and % Power at 115 kW . Facililty Action: The High Log Channel Scram setting has been set to 120 kW and the
* .s TRIGA Preliminary Check Sheet has been modified to assure that the operators observe this setting .
RSC Action: This observed deficiency is reported as required by 'ITS 6.10(3)(d) and had been cormeted as of 3 July 1987.
- 2) Item : 'ITS 4.3.2(2) requires a channel check of each reactor safety system channel be performed before each day's operation . The Startup Count Rate Interlock is listed in 'ITS 3.3.3.as a Safety System or Measuring Channel.The purpose of this requirement is to prevent stanup without a neutron source in the reactor . The.
current Preliminary Check Sheet does not comain a test of this interlock although . previous versions of this check sheet did, before the heavy water reflector was installed .
'ITS 4.3.2(2) requires a channel check of each reactor safety system be performed befom each day's operation .The Control Rod Interlock is listed in 'ITS 3.3.3 as a Safety System or Measuring Channel. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent driving two control rods at one time . The TRIGA control console is wired so that it is impossible to drive two control rods at the same time since there is a selector switch which can only be positioned on one rod at a time. Therefore, the channel check mquirement makes no sense . This condition has existed ever since the reactor was licensed and has undergone many NRC inspections without comment.
On January 14,1982, a heavy water reflector, as provided in the SAR, was added to the TRIGA Reactor core. The neutrons released from the deuterium interaction with fission-product gamma radiation provide a background neutron source of 1360 cps. Removing the Pu-Be source from the core region does not mduce the source count rate sufficiently to test the source interlock scram at 2 cps . The fission-product gamma flux decays as 1/tt .2 where t is time after fission in days so a wait of over 6 months is required for the average background neutron 3 source count rate to fall below 2 cps . Presently, the only way for reducing the { neutron source count below the 'ITS 3.3.3 value of 2 cps is to either disconnect ,
- the source channel signal cable from the console or physically remove the heavy water reflector from the core . Either of these alternatives is impractical and I
i i s - 1 I potentially damaging to the system if repeated often . RSC Action: Performing a channel check of each reactor safety system as required by the 'ITS 4.3.2(2) for the interlock safety system channels (viz. startup count rate interlock and control rod withdrawal interlock) is not practical for the count rate interlock or possible on the control rod drives . An NRC interpretation of these interlock check mquin:ments specified in the 'ITS is requested by the RSC. , I
- 3) Item : Previous operating history indicates that the average Fuel Temperature indication has been approximately 503C at 90 kW of power. On December 19 and 23,1986, the Fuel Temperature at 90 kW operation went up to 105oC to 109 oC with other conditions apparently equal . On March 19,1987, a review of the Operations Log uncovered this anomaly. This was discussed with the SRO who indicated that he did not know why this happened but that it had not occurred in previous runs. A notation was made in the Operations leg that the thermocouple reading high would be conservative and thus it would not appear to be a safety question, but that this reading should be watched . On May 29,1987, the fuel temperature went up to 93oC at a 90 kW operation and on June 2,1987 again to 91oC ,
RSC Initial Action: Because of the repeated occurrence of this fuel temperature anomaly the RSC ordered that the reactor should not be operated again until the operating history of the fuel channel be evaluated and a test of the instrumented fuel rod be performed as follows :
- a. Compare the water temperature to the fuel temperature thermocouple readings for all three thermocouple .
- b. Use a galvanometer to simulate thermocouple current up to 450oC for all three channel inputs.
- c. Use the instrumented rod heater to test all three thermocouple in the instrumented fuel md at elevated temperature .
Facility Action : As required by the Reactor Safety Committee the Instrumented Fuel Element was subjected to extensive pre-planned and documented testing and l l E_
calibration procedures to verify proper operation of the fuel temperature thermocouple. The insulated connection between the chromel-alumel leads of the thermocouple and the shielded BNC connector which interfaces the console was found to be brittle and cracked and some evidence of oxidation and corrosion existed on the solder connection . The old connection was removed and the lines were reconnected with a thermocouple connector and reinsulated . All three fuel thermocouple channels inputs were tested and calibrated over a temperature input ranging from ambient (-20oC) to 500oC . The instrumented fuel element was inserted into a temperatum (thermocouple) instrumented heater which contains and isolates the instrumented fuel element while the water surrounding the fuel element was heated. The fuel element was slowly heated externally from 20oC to 4CPC and the performance of each of the fuel thermo- couples was verified RSC Final Action: All the thermocouple in the instrumented fuel element are operational and have been calibrated . It is believed that the discrepancies in past fuel temperature readings arose because of the faulty connections between the thermocouple and the BNC shield cable which transmitted the signal to the console meter. To verify that future performance of the instrumented fuel element is satisfactory, the following changes in operating procedures and documentation have been implemented. a)The TRIGA Preliminary Check Sheet (B.1-4) has be modified to provide for the entry and comparison of the fuel and core water temperatures befom startup . b)The fuel temperature limit scram setting has been reduced to 200oC to assure additional conservancy of the temperature limit setting . l c)Section 13.3.4 of the Operations Manual has be revised to require that operators perform a fuel channel check of the fuel temperature during reactor operations if an anomaly is observed. If an anomaly is observed the reactor operator will perform a check of the other instrumented fuel element thermocouple. The RSC has determined that this deficiency is reportable under TTS 6.10(3) ( a & d) and has been corrected as of 3 July 1987.
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'Ihe Reactor Safety Committee at its special meeting dated 2 July 1987 reviewed and-approved the above actions and approved resumption of TRIGA Reactor operations as of 3 July _
1987. Submitted on behalf of the University of Utah Reactor Safety Committee, Docket 50-407
; by the RSC Secretary, G. M. Sandquist.
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l Professor and Reactor Supervisor RSC Secretary 1
1 1 i Appendix V: Revised Chapter 2 and 5 from the UUNEL Operations Manual l w--_ . . . _ _
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- 2. EXPERIMENTCLASSIFICATION ANDREVIEW RSC Approval 4 June 87 2.1 Introduction All reactor experiments will be divided into two classes routine and modified routine and special as defined in the teactor Technical Specifications 1.2.
The classification and review procedure is summarized in Figure 2-1. Appropriate forms to be used are attached in Appendix C. Copies of all applications and reviews together with an experiment performance record are kept in the tractor control room files. 2.2 General Procedure The experimenter should make a short written application (form C.1) to the Reactor Supervisor describing the scientific purpose of the experiment, and evaluating ( the anticipated radio isotopes to be produced. He should also list the personnel to be involved. The Reactor Supervisor with the advice,if necessary, of the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) will classify and evt.luate the experiment (Form C.2). If, in the Reactor Supervisor's opinion, the experiment is " routine" he will classify the request as Class I and proceed to schedule the experiment. If the experiment is special, the request will be forwarded for evaluation to a member of the Reactor Safety Committee and then brought before the Committee for approval. When approved, the Reactor Supervisor will schedule the experiment. Copies of the respective approvals will be filed at the reactor control console until the expenment is performed. They will be examined by the reactor operator before the experiment is undertaken. 2.3 Additional Procedures for On Campus Experimenters The experimenter must have a current valid ' Application for Radioisotopes' as required by the U/U Radiological Health Committee if his experiment involves the removal of radioactive materials from the Nuclear Laboratory. The experimenter will make arrangements with the Radiation Safety Officer for the disposal of any radioactive waste if necessary. The experimenter must receive prior approval on the method of transportation to be used for any radic ntive materials removed from the Nuclear Laboratory. Transfer must comply with the regulations set forth in the U/U Radiation Safety Manual. No radioactive materials may be removed from the laboratory until these conditions are met and a final radiation survey has been performed by the rector operator in charge or Radiation Safety Officer or a designated member of the reactor or Radiological Health
, staff.
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y = . s r k- RSC Approval 4 June 87 p-2.4 AMitionni Pracadures for Off Campus Experimenters
. An Experimenter who is not a member of the University of Utah will be required to comply.with the above procedures except that in place of the ' Application for Radioisotopes' form he must make available to the Reactor Supervisor a copy of a.
valid NRC or if approriate a State Radioactive Material License prior to scheduling of
' the experiment. In addition, arrangements for any transportation ofisotoped mpst be shown to comply with Department of Transportation regulations. Delivery will not be permitted if the method of transportation.does not comply with prearranged
. specifications.- All such shipments must have the approval of the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). The person designated as the RSO on the recipient's license shall be informed Iegarding the contents of the shipment.
2.5 Exoeriment Classification Reactor experiments are classified following written evaluation by the Reactor Supervisor as described previously. Clau I (Routine and Modified Routine) . Routine experiments--comprising repeats of successful experiments and those that constitute only a minor modification of a previous successful exerent so that no j additional hazard is involved. This class of experiment may te w oved by the Reactor Supervisor on behalf of the Reactor Safety Committee. Class II(Special) Special experiments--compromising all other experiments. These experunents will be submitted by the Reactor Supervisor to the Reactor Safety Committee (RSC) for review an6 mroval. The approval must be given by the Reactor Administrator and the Reactq Apervisoc. 'The Committee may attach any requirement that it sees fit to the performance of the experiment. The Committee may also rule that repeart experiments of a particular type shall not be classified as Class I experiments. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, the RSC shall determine whether the experiment involves a change in the reactor Technical Specifications or an unreviewed J J safety question and shall not approve such an experiment unless so authorized by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1 2.6 Scheduline and Oneration All scheduling of experiments within the Reactor Facility is the responsibility of the Reactor Supervisor or his designee. The schedule shall not be changed without his permission. Neither reactors nor the neutron generator or other irradiation facilities in the Nuclear Laboratory shall be operated without the prior knowledge of the Reactor Supervisor, or, in his absence, a licensed senior operator. 4 ) l l I l l l
I'4 ' k RSC Appmval-L 4 June 87 L 2.71sotone Production (see also Section 9.0, Radioisotope Control) A mquest for radioisotope,s production will be handled in the same manner as any L other experiment. A series of irradiations for the production of several isotopes can be approved and scheduled on one application form. The expiration date for such-approvals will be January 1, of the next new year or the expiration date of the applicants Application for Radioisotopes or Radioactive Material License. An irradiation request form (Form _C.1) should be filled out for each type of reactor irradiation. Copies will be filed in the mactor office. Isotope production is limited to the terms of the experimenter's license to possess . radiative materials. In addition special limitations apply in accordance with the technical specifications for the react on(Appendix A-1, Section 6.8 and A II, Section 4): these limits may not be exceeded. For de ?urpose of estimating radation levelr; all radioisotopes must be considered - even tho q1 produced incidentally to the isotope of interest.- The amounts of significant contributors to the total activity should be calculated by the experimenter and submitted with the request. Prior to delivery, radiation measurements will be made to verify that the total amount approved are not exceeded if such measumments can masonably be used to determine isotopic contents. 2.8 Class 1 Experiments 1 2.8.1 AGN 201M Reactor
- 1. AGN 201 Reactor Specifications and Check Out*
- 2. Health Physics and Suberitical Measurements *
. 3. Period-Reactivity Measumments*
- 4. Control Rod Worths and Shape Curves *
- 5. Self Shielding and Flux Depression Factors and Cadmium Ratios *
- 6. Flux Distribution Measumments*
- 7. Reactor Power Calibration *
- 8. Reactor Kinetics Experiment (Rod Drop, etc.)*
*The above experiments are described in detail in the Undergraduate Nuclear Reactor Laboratory Course Noteboor(ME 577).
- 9. Activation Analysis of Small Analytical Samples .
Small samples (<10 grams) of unknown materials may be encapsulated in glastic vials and irradiated in the glory hole, provided that there is sufficient mowledge of the sample matrix to evaluate it under the following conditions:
- a. The total reactivity worth of all experiments with positive reactivity contributions shall not exceed 0.4% Delta K/K.
- b. The total excess reactivity of the reactor including all experiments waith positive reactivity contributions shall not exceed 0.65% Delta K/K.
- c. All samples or experiments shall be doubly encapsulated and ensund to be leak tight if release of the contained materials could cause corrosive attack to the i facility excessive contamination, or chemical mactions that could possible affect reactor safety.
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- d. No explosoves or capsules containing materials which might combine violently g shall be irradiated in the reactor (see 2.8.2).
'k RSC Approval 4 June 1987 The Reactor Su,pervisor shall make the determination as to whether each sample meets the above critena
- 10. Irradiation of Known Isotopes The Reactor Supervisor may approve the irradiation of larger amounts of known materials in the glory hole or access ports. He will approve each irradiation based on the criteria in 9 above and make calculations on the activity to be produced and safety and handling procedums to be implemented.
2.8.2 TRIGA Reactor Class I Experiments
- 1. The irradiation of solid, liquid or gaseous samples in or near the com of the mactor a is approved as determined by the SRO according to the following criteria: (See i Technical Specifications 3.2 and 3.6)
- a. No significant fissile constituents (i.e., no fissile constituents > 100 ppm) at present. i
- b. Anticipated radiation levels in the sample will satisfy current NRC and ,
1 University Radiation Safety Standards upon withdrawa ?fom the reactor tank.
- c. The reactivity associated with the sample is less than $2.80 and any sample of worth gmater than $1.00 is securely fixed in its irradiation position (Technical Specifications 3.2).
, d. In general all samples will be encapsulated or otherwise sealed in an approve container. However, non reactive solid samples such as metcals which will ,
not dissovie or significantly interact with water may be irradated without i' encapsulation if approved by the Reactor Supervisor.
- e. Samples containing known explosive materials must contain less than 25 milligrams of explosive material components and the smaple container must be l capable of containing the sample if detontated (Technical Specification 3.6). l
- f. Samples containing corrosive materials, or materials which are highly reactive j with water, or have explosive, or gaseous' components must be doubly j encapsulated. I
- g. In evaluating samples, all the mquirements of Technical Specifications 3.6 will -I be satisfied. Samples with fissile materials are limited such that the inventory i of iodine isotopes 131 throughout 135 produced in the samples will not exceed l 10 millicuries (See Technical Specifications 3.6) j
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l l Rgaittor Adifiinistrator l l l L- 1 L_ _ _ - _ _ _ _
(' RSC Approval 4 June 1987
- 5. EMERGENCYPROCEDURES 5.1 Introduction This chapter specifies the emergency procedures to be followed in the event of an accident or emergency which involves the U/U Nuclear Engineering Laboratory. It shall be the responsibility of the Reactor Supervisor to publish revisions as they become necessary and to ensure that the plan is known to the personnel who are responsible for its execution. Emergency procedures are the general responsibility of .
the Reactor Safety Committee, which shall review and evaluate them at least annually. 5.2 Ootratine Oracanizations
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l The NEL organization includes the Reactor Supervisor, Reactor operators, the Radiation Safety Officer, and academic staff pmsent. The Reactor Supervisor is responsible with the Reactor Administrator for all coordination. See front of Manual for names, addresses, and telephone numbers of personnel. 5.3 Alarm System The Nuclear Laboratory is equipped with the following detection, alarm and safety devices:
- 1. Area radiation monitor in the Reactor room and adjoining Califomium-252 Irradiation Facility.
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- 2. Continuous air monitor for radiation in the exahaust system.
- 3. TRIGA Pool waterlevel alarm.
- 4. Forced entry alarm.
- 5. Water sprinklers and heat sensing fire alarm.
The first four of these devices are connected to a visual and/or audible alarm located in the Reactor and control rooms. High radiation level, pool water and forced entry alarms are designed to signal the University Police in the event any of them are actuated. 5.4 Emercency Eauioment and Sucolies
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The following features are provided for emergencies:
- 1. Emergeeny ventilation system for the Reactor room with a HEPA filter--automatically actuated by the radiation detection monitoring system.
- 2. Fire extinguished (overhead sprinklers), chemical extinguishers in laboratories, water hose outside main door. Emergency exit may be through the Radiochemistry Laboratory if required.
- 3. Protective clothing, first aid equipment and contamination control supplies are maintained at the Fint Aid Station outside the control room.
- 4. Additional survey meters and protective clothing are available from the Radiological Health Department.
5.5 NEL Facilty 5.5.1 Personnel Emergencies
(' RSC Approval June 1987 Personnel Emergencies include accidents or occurences which involve actual or potential exposures to personnel reportable under 10 CFR 20.403. Such emergencies include radiation exposure and contamination of facility personnel although the operational status of the laboratory or Reactor is not affected and no immediate Reactor safety action is required. If radiation exposure to non-facility personnel is impossible, e.g. due to release of radioactive material, the event may be classified as an Unusual Event or as an Emergency Alert (see Table 5.2). If an accident or incident involves injury, give first aid treatment to any injured persons. If the injury requires medical treatment, but involves no radioactive contamination, the injured person may be sent ( or taken by ambulance) directly to the Emergency Room at the Univenity Hospital. ( Remember that ambulance service is obtained most rapidly through the 9-911 emergency number.) If the emergency involves actual or potential radiation exposure to an individual, notify the Radiation Safety Officer promptly (Ext. 6141). If radioactive contamination is present, conf'me the source of contamination to keep if from spreading and contaminating people. Remove contaminated clothing; rernove contamination on skin and hair by normal washing , taking care not to spread the contamination (see NEL Procedures Manual, Sec 5.6 for more detailed instructions). All facility personnel present during the emergency , and other emergency personnel present during the emergency, and any other emergency personnel who responded should not leave until they have been surveyed and found to be free of contamination. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) is responsible for determining whether or not a report as required under the provisions of 10 CFR 20.403. The RSO is also responsible for maintaining any records of radiation exposure to personnel and of release of radioactive materials to the enviroment. Facility personnel are responsible for maintaining all other mcoreds related to the emergency event. 5.5.2 Emergency Condition Alerts Emergency condition alerts include situations recognized as a potential hazard which could affect the operability of the Reactor (s) or the safety of facility personnel. Civil disturbance, breach of secunty, or severe natural disorders are examples of conditions necessitating an emergency condition alert. Emergency Response-Nuclear Engineering (Reactor) Laboratorv l If there is an alarm but no apparent damage, release of radioactive material,or security problem, determine the cause of the alarm. Inform the colice mxt. 7944) immediately of the fact that the alarm does not indicate a genuine emergency. If the emergency involves actual or potential release of radioactive material and/or radiation exposure to non-facility personnel, immediately notify the Reactor Supervisor (RS) and the RSO (Ext. 6141). In conjuction with the RSO, determine the ! Emergency Class (See Table 5.2). Notify other penonnel as required by the i l [
1 I k RSC Approval 4 June 1987 emergency classification. 5.5.3 Reactor Emergency Reactor emergencies are physical occurences which require emergency respoi,se actions although an off-site hazard is unlikely. Substantial modification of Reactor operations might by necessary if automatic protective systems are not already activated. Account for all personnel known or suspected to be in the area. The possibility for abnormal radiation exposures must be evaluated, and the appropriate Emergency Class determined. 5.5.4 Fire In the event of fire in the laboratory, the Reactor operator shall immediately scram the Reactor and/or suspend other laboratory operations and, if the fire is deemed out of immediate local control, he shall sound the building fire alarm by using the fire alarm box outside the door or telephone 9-363-4401. Operating penonnel will attempt to handle the fire using local equipment. All other persons shall evacuate immediately. If the fire seems beyond local control, the operator shall order complete evacuation of the laboratory. Such evacuation shall be via the classroom unless circumstances make this impossible, then exit through the Radiochemistry Laboratory. Responsible penons shall be summoned; see front of manual. The Operator will remain in charge until the Reactor Supervisor arrived and will offer advice to the Police and Fire Departments concerning the facilitv. Personnel involved shall be monitored as far as possible during and following the meident. 5.5.5 Facility Emergency A facility emergency is any event which involves the uncontrolled release or potential release of radiactive materialinto the air, water or ground to the extent that protective measures off-site might be rquired. The Emergency Class shall be determined by the criteria listed in the table on the following page. Establish a location for Emergency Control Center (ECC). The ECC is to be the Reactor control room unless it is not usable because damage or contamination makes it unusable. Ifit is not possible to use the control room the ECC should be set up as close as possible to the NEL. 1 Inform the following individuals promptly of any emergency situation which may involve damage to, or contamination of, any University or private property, or for which the release ofinformation to the news media or the general public may be necessary or desirable: Vice President for Research Office Home Phone Dr. James J. Brophy 7236 or Dr. Ronald Pugmire (Assoc.) 7236 1 Associate Dean for Engineering Dr.Clifford Byner 8363 467-8978 l - l
[- l (" RSC Approval 4 June 1987 5.6 Emergency Procedures in the Event of Personnel Iniurv of Contamination 5.6.1 Introduction The following emergency procedures are developed for the purpose of providing medical treatment and proper handling of victims of a Reactor incident resulting in injury or contamination of the victims. In the event of any injury or contammation of personnel, notify the RSO (Ext. 6141) immediately. 5.6.2 Obtaining Medical Attention for the Injured The primary facility for handling victims of accidents involving radioactive materials is the University Hospital Department. If an ambulance is needed, dial 9-911 and request the ambulance for University of Utah Merrill Engineering Building, West ) Entrance. ! Injured or contaminated persons will exit the Reactor room via the control rom where immediated first aid wil be rendered, primarily to stop excessive bleeding if j needed. After monitoring and decontaminate of victims if possible, they will be transported to the University Hospital Entrance. Injured or contaminated persons will exit the Reactor room via the control room where immediate first aid will be rendered, primarily to stop excessive bleeding if needed. After monitoring decontamination of victims if possible, they will be transponed to the University Hospital. I i l l _ --- -- 1
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Table 5.2 L Radiological Criteria for Determining Emergency Clacc Emergency. Classification Criteria Purnose and Response Clafdi '
. Unusual Event - Bomb threat. -. Prepare facility staff for Severe natural phenomenon. emergency itsponse, if -
necessary. . . Actualorprojected radiation Provide basis for
- exposures at site boundary: systematic recording 10 MPC (24-hr avg.) - and reporting of unusual 240 MPC-hours -
event mformation. 15 miem to whole body _in 24 hours. Alert 50 MPC (24-hr avg.) Place emergency-1200 MPC-hours . response on standby.- 75 mrem to whole body in - Provide off-site 24 hours __ authorities with current 20 mrem /hrin i hour status information. 100 mrem to thyroid Site Area 250 MPC (24-hr avg.) Initiate off-sit monitoring Emergency 6000 MPC-hours for airborne and external 1 375 mrem to whole body in exposures. Prepare for 24 hours evacuation of nearest 100 mrem /hrin I hour areas (on or off site). 500 mrem to thyroid Consult with off-site authorities. Provide
- information to the public through approved channels.
General Emergency 500 mrem /hr to whole Evacuate nearest areas body at site boundary (on and off campus). 1000 mrem to whole body Provide frequent updates 5000 mrem to thyroid ofinformation to the public.
.. .-...... =..............- ........
See definitions and explanations on next page.
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_ _ _ _______...__.__m ___________________mm.__ m ___ ____ -.
m - I J { I' j i k RSC Approval i 4 June 1987 1 Table 5.2 Definitions and Explanations "MPC" means the maximum permissible concentration of any radionuclides in an , unrestricted area. Breathing air containing 1 MPC for an entire year (8760 hours) will i result in an intake c' radioactive material that will deliver the maximum dose permitted l to a member of the general public in any year, i.e. 500 millirem (mrem) to the whole i body, or 2500 mrem to the thyroid. The annual limit on intake (ALI) for radiation j workers is the quantity of any radionuclides which, when taken into the body, will ) i deliver an effective dose equivalent to 5000 mrem. Thus, 8760 MPC-hours is e of 0.1 ALI. Since the volume of air assumed to be inhaled equivalent to an intp8760 MPC-hours is also equivalent to 0.1/7500, or one yey is 7500m , ALI/m . Under adverse meterological conditions and for the situation in which material is i
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releasedyt or gear ground level, the atmospheric dispersion factor, X/Q, is no loger than 10 s/m at 500 meters. The nearset occupied buildings are at least 100 meters fromtch NEL in the N, NE, E, and SE directions. J The radiological criterion for an " unusual event" is an integrated exposure of 240 MPC-hours, or 3.6 x 10-7 ALI/m .3 The release rate required to achieve this 3 concentration with X/Q = 10-2 s/m , the mlease limit would be 30 ALI in 24 hours. Values of ALIs for inghalation of all radionuclides of concem are available inICRP Publication 30 (in SIunits) or in the draft revision of 10 CFR Part 20, published in the Federal Register on January 9,1986. The following examples may be useful: H-3 80 millicuries Na-24 5 millicuries P-32 0.9 millicuries S-35 10 millicuries Sr-90 0.02 millicuries Cs-134 0.1 millicuries Cs-137 0.2 millicuries U-235 0.04 microcuries U-238 0.04 microcuries Cf-252 0.04 microcuries Mixed beta emitters (no alpha emitters): 0.7 microcuries 5.6.3 Preventing the Spread and Release of Radioactive Contamination A roll of polyethylene sheeting, which will be kept at the First Aid Station, will be spread on the floor of the control room in front of the door to the Reactor room in the event of contamination of persons in the Reactor room. Conscious individuals exiting the control room will remove all contaminated clothing while standing on the sheeting. The polyethylene will then be rolled up with the contaminated articles inside and disposed of by the RSO as radioactive waste. The victims will be wrapped in blankets or be given clean attire from emergency supplies. l I l I
1 k- h TC Approval
- June 1987 5.6.4 First Aid and Emergency Supplies The following First Aid and contamination control supplies are located in the First Aid Station immediately outside the control room entrance:
First Aid Kit Stretcher Plastic Sheeting Clean coveralls Magneta and yellow rope Tape The following items are maitained in the locations indicated: I.ocked box at classroom entrance: Radiation exposure rate survey meter Radioactivity contamination survey meter Spare film badges Control Room: Radiation exposure rate survey meten; Direct-reading dosimeters and charger 5.7 Procedures in the Event of Unauthorized Entry to the Reactor Facility 5.7.1 Introduction
' The possiblity exists that a person or persons intent on unlawful behavior may enter the Reactor facility and threaten violence to themselves, the community, or the facility operators and equipment. A threefold approach to minimize the effects of such an event will be followed:
- 1. Education
- 2. Routine operation stressing safety, cleanliness and security
- 3. A simple emergency plan to " disable" the facility 5.7.2 Education It is of considerable importance that the local community obbin an accurate education in the safety and usefulness of the U/U Nuclear Reactor Laboratory so that misinformation will have a minimal effect. The Reactor staff will be fully informed on all the aspects of the Reactor and should willingly discuss these at any opportunity.
Any image of secrecy of danger concerning the facility should rapidly be dispelled. Tours will be held periodically to familarize the public concerning the use of the Reactor. 5.7.3 Routine Operation Any risks following unauthorized entry into the facility will be minimized if the area is maintained in a clean, orderly and secure state. This can be accomplished by close attention of the Reactor staff to experiment performance. In particular:
- 1. No radioactive contamination should be allowed to remain within the facility.
Immediate action should be taken to decontaminate completely any spill area
n k* RSC Approval ' 4 June 1987. and to dispose of contamined equipment..
- 2. Unused experimental equipment will not be permitted to remain within the
' facility. Equipment installed in the Reactor pool will be removed and disposed ofif the project using the equipment is discontinued.-
- 3. ' Temporary" radioisotope storage will not be allowed to become pennanent.
Locked storage facilities must be used for unattended radioisotope storage.
- 4. All electrical equipment will be switched off at the circuit breaker box and kept locked excep t dunng actual authorized use.
- 5. When not in use, the fuel handling tool and other special remote handling devices for in core manipualtion (with the exception ofitems that may become too radioactive to be removed from the pool) will be stored in their designated location.
5.7.4 Unauthorized Entry Procedures In the event that unauthorized entry is attempted, threatened or deemed possible by the Reactor or other facility operators in view of reported local conditions, the Reactor or facility will be securedhy switching off the console power and removing the
- key. If there is time and opportunity, the operator will carry out as many of the following actions as possible:
1.' Immediately mform University Police (7944) and the Senior Operator on call if not present in the control room. The SRO will inform other senior memben of the Reactor staff and endeavor to act on the next items. f
- 2. If fuel loading or isotope usage is in progmss, retum all fuel or isotopes to storage.
- 3. Switch off all circuit breakers within the facility and relock the electrical boxes.
- 4. Remove all handling tools and keys from the facility.
- 5. Switch off the main facility circuit breaker in room MEB 1205. The operator will be in possession of a key to the electrical boxes.
- 6. Manually actuate the emergency alarm (unobtrusively break an electrical window tap if necessary) which signals Campus Security.
The proceduces following the above sequence are essentially similar to those for other emergencies (See 5.5). The Senior Operator present will retain responsibility for action pending the arrival of the Reactor Supervisor and will inform the University Police Department of his actions. The Reactor Supervisor and the Radiation Safety Officer or their superiors, upon anival to the laboratory will act as advisors to the Polcie Department until the emergency terminates. It shall be the responsibility of the Reactor Supervisor to report to the Reactor Administrator as soon as possible in order that a report may be made by telephone and telegraph to the NRC Region IV, telephone (817) 334-2841. If possible, the exact nature of the emergency or unusual occurence should be ascertained before this report is made, but the report should be made within 24 hours or as required. All information regarding the occurence should be coordinated through the Reactor Supervisor and the Reactor Administrator to the University Public Affain Office. Individual members of the Reactor staff should not make independent statements to 1 l l' l
k- RSC Approval 4 June 1987 any off-campus person without approval. 5.8 Notification of Authorization and Dissemination ofInformation 5.8.1 Notification (See Table 5.1) A notification scheme to assure that essential parties are appraised of the situation in all emergencies is shown in Table 5.I. The Reactor onerator or Senior Operator has the initial responsibility for assessing the incident and notifying the University and the Reactor Supervisor. Both the police and Reactor Control Room have copies of the NEL Emergency Call List which delineates a telephone calling sequence for the Reactor staffin the event that the Reactor Supervisors unavailable. The Reactor Administrator is responsible for notification of the NRC with respect to incidents involving the Reactor as specified in the Technical Specifications (Appendix A-1, Section 6.7) and 10 CFR 20.403,20.404, and 20.405. He also will notify NRC Region IV of any bomb threats made against the Laboratory or the Merrill Engineering Building. In addition, reports concerning radioactivity releases and exposures of radiation should be made to the Utah State Health Division. In order that the written repons required by the above agulations may be _ submitted within 14 days, the Reactor Supervisor and the Reactor Administrator shall submit reports (or joint report, as appropriate) to the Reactor Safety Committee,and the Radiation Safety Committee _if necessary as soon as possible following the incident and no later than 7 days. Certain incidents regarding the Reactor require the written report to be submitted within 10 days (Appendix A-2,6,7c). In any instance, the Staff re wrt should be submitted for consideration by the Committees within 5 days. It s tall be the responsibility of the Reactor Safety Committee to decide upon the further dissemination of such reports (See 5.8.2 however). 5.8.2 Dissemination of Information to the Public All information conceming any incident resulting in injuries, accidental release of radioactive materials to the enviroment, or property damage will be micased by the . Reactor Administrator to the Univen,ity Public Relations Office through the Vice President for Research. Informtion to the public and news media will be released from the Public Relations Office only. The only exception is in the event that the welfare and health of the surrounding population requires emergency action, when direct communication with State, County, and City Departments may be necessary. 5.9 Emergency Evacuation Procedure The pumose of this procedure is to outline the action to be taken in the event of an emergency or accident or of a major release of radioactive material in the Nuclear Engineering Laboratory which requires evacuation. 5.9.1 Initiation of Evacuation l
- 1. It shall be the responsibility of the Senior Reactor staff member preset (beginning with the Reactor Supervisor, Radiation Safety Officer, etc. to the mostjunior Reactor operator) to initiate the evacuation procedure and provide the following signals.
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E i ( 6 RSC Approval 4 June 1987
- 2. - Although a decision to evacuate must always be left to the judgement of the senior staff member, it shall be the laboratory pohey to cause evacuation in case of doubt.
- 3. Evacuation may be initiated if a known release of a high level radioactive sample
- occurs, if unexplained high radiation levels exist or airborne radioactivity; levels -
are indicated, or for any other hazardous' condition. 5.9.2 Evacuation Signals
- 1. The alarm signal for evacuation consists of a system of horns, bells, and visual
. signals. Individual alarms am located in the laboratory directly above the Reactor tank.
2.. The sound signal in the area above the Reactor room is a loud bell with an adjacent sign reading " RADIATION ALARM- LEAVE AREA."
- 3. The signalis initiated by a switch at the control console or by high radiation :
levels m the laboratory. The switch is such that the alarm will continue to operate in the absence of a continued alarm input signal. 5.9.3 Areas to be Evacuated
- 1. Intial Areas to be evacuated upon High Level Alarm Signal- The initial amas to be evacuated upon signal from the high level alarm system are as follows:
- a. The entire Nuclear Engineering Laboratory (i.e., MEB 1205 A,B,C,D,E, F, and G -- all rooms).
, b. . On the second floor of MEB the Wind Tunnel Laboratory directly above the i Reactor which is room 2120 MEB.
- 2. Areas to be evacuated upon MEB building Fire Alarm, High level Alarm Signal and Radiation Alert, order of University Police or other authority (via, Reactor Operators, Supervisor, Administrator, Radiation Safety Officer, etc.).~
In the event of an actual or suspected fire or high level radiation release or other severe hazard, as determined by appropriate authoity, the entire MEB building i should be evacuated. The outside area west of the laboratory should be evacuated and posted. (see Figure 5-3,"Outside Exclusion Area Posting for Labottory Emergency.") Upon order of the Reactor Supervisor, Radiation Safety Oficer, Univeristy Police, Fire Deparunent Personnel or other authority (i.e., those persons listed in the Emergency Call List) those areas to be evacuated and/or posted or 1 controlled may be increased, decreased or modified as the circumstances may require. 5.9.4 Assembly Area
- 1. Personnel being evacuated should go the the closest exit from the Merrill )
Engineering Building. 5.9.5 Laboratory Procedure
- 1. In the event of accident or emergency, the usual procedure is to scram the j Reactor or cease operation of the facilities such as the neutron generator (by switching off electrical power) or Cf-Irradiator by retuming sources to secure 1
1
a 3 RSC Approval 4 June 1987 storage. Close all doors to the Laboraton, and at the same time sound the evacuation horn. The room exhaust blower will normally be left on to prevent leakage of radioactive material into normally occupied areas.
- 2. Alllaboratoy personnel except the operator on duty and the Senior Reactor Operator pmsent, if any, should be evacuated immediately; they should evacuate as soon as they have evaluated the situation and taken vital emergency measure necessary.
- 3. It is the responsibility of the Reactor Operator to delegate personnel to go through each individual area to be evacuated to ensure that all people have heard the alarm and obey the instructions to evacuate. If evacuation of the entire building is ordered, this shall include ensuring that the sidewalk west of the Laboratory is blocked off. Ropes and placecards for blocking off this area am stored with the First Aid Supplies near the Reactor Control room.
Attachment points are indicated on Figure 5.3.
- 4. The Senior Reactor staff member present shall notify the Reactor Supervisor and Reactor Administrator as soon as possible.
5.9.6 Evacuation Termination
- 1. It is the responsibility of the Reactor Supervisor (or the most senior altemate Reactor supervisor present in his absence) to determine when the evacuation can be safely terminated (see Section 5.9.8). No one will be allowed in any evacuated area until the Reactor Supervisor or Radiation Supervisor or Radiation Safety Officer has so determined.
- 2. The Reactor or other facility ( if the cause of the evacuation) will not be reoperated until the cause of the accident has been ascertained and corrected and until safe operation can be assured.
5.9.7 Procedure for Re-Entry into Reactor Laboratory Following and Evacaution Actions of Reactor Supervisor or Radiation Safety Officer
- 1. Complete information on the reacons for the evacuation will be obtained from personnel who initiated evacuation of the area.
- 2. In the event of a spill of radioactive material, the particular hazard will be known from information contained in the " Request for Isotope Production" for the sample involved in the spill. Clean-up methods, required protection devices, and hazards from air-bome contamination will be apparent. In the event that a Reactor excursion was the cause of the evacuation, or in the event that the cause for high radiation level was not determined prior to evacuation, the actions in steps 3 and 5. will be taken.
- 3. Observe area radiation monitor and air activity monitor readings through the windowed ponion of Reactor Laboratory door to determine the radiation levels at various points in the laboratory.
- 4. Entry into laboratory will be made only with protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus ( may be borrowed fmm the SLCFD). a complete evaluation of the hazard should be made by analysis of the filter from the air monitor and samples from the exhaust stack on the roof.
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a; k .. RSC Approval 4 June 1987
- 5. . Standard emergency procedums, as included in the University Radiation Safety
. Manual, will be observed during cleanup and other subsequent action. I
- 6. If a high level of particualte air activity exists and is issuing from the air cxhaust on the roof and all personnel have been evacuated from the building, upon advice and consent of the Radiation Safety Officer the blower may be stopped and sealed to minimize air nicase from the laboratoq.
- 7. Technical Specifications will be consulted to determine if notification of the '
NRCis required. I a I a i i
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APPENDIX 5.A NEL EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR NON-NEL ORGANIZATIONS l RSC Approval 4 June 1987 GEPERALINFORMATION p Thr, Nuclear Engineering Laboratory (NEL), located in 1205 Merrill Engineering L . Building, houses the TRIGA research Reactor, the AGN 201 training Reactor, the l Caliform,um-252 neutron sources and a few small radiation sources. Because of the H presence of the research reactors, the facility is commonly referred to as the " Reactor lab". The primary entrance to the facility is from the South Main Corridor, through classroom 1205. An emergency exit connects fmm the radiochemistry laboratory, room 1205-G, to the Heat Power Laboratory next door north. (See floor plan, Figure 1.) . The alarm system for the Reactor facility consists ofintrusion detectors and radiation detectors that send an alarm signal'to the University Police. At present, the alarm does not indicate the cause, i.e. intrusion or radiation. Consequently, the . response must be appropriate for either condition. Because of the nature of the facility, the most likely reasons for any alcim are electric malfunction and/or inadvertent tripping by persons working in the laboratory. Vandahsm, resulting in a breach of security, is also possible cause for a security alarm. Unless there has been some significant physical damage, e.g. because of fire, explosion, earthquake, etc., the chance of a valid radiation alarm is remote. Local alarms and indicators at the NEL provide more detailed information on the status of the facility: A red light bulb in the hallway, directly above the entrance of 1205 MEB,is on whenever the Reactor is operating. Normally, this light will also indicate the presence of one or more operators inside the facility. A small red light inside the fire hose cabinet in the hallway beside the entrance to 1205 MEB is on when the radiation alarm has been tripped; waming bells also are tumed on by the radiation alarm. The procedures that follow are directed to specific individuals or groups who may be required to respond to an emergency. NEL EhEBGENCY RESPONSE- UNIVERISTY POLICE DISPATCHER Upon receipt of an intrusion (NR) alarm tignal from the Nuclear Engineering Laboratory the dispatcher should immediately dispatch one or more officers to Merrill
. Engineering Building. The dispatcher should then call the Laboratory (Ext. 4188 or 7372) to determine if the alarm is false. If there is no answer, the alarm shall be l assumed to be legitimate.
Upon receipt of a fire alarm in Menill Engineering Building the dispatcher shall [
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\ RSC Approval 4 June 1987 first call the Salt Lake City Fim Department. If an intmsion alarm and a fire alarm (in MEB) occur simultaneously, the dispatcher shall notify the SLCFD of this fact and ask that the Hazardous Materials Response Team be dispatched.
Call the person listed in Emergency Call List in the front of this manual in the order of priority numbers until at least one has been contacted and indicated that he is responding. If the contacted individual asks that additional individuals be contacted, proceed with additional names on the list, as requested. All contracts made in response to an emergency alarm are to be recorded, together with the time and nature or results of the contact. NEL EMERGENCY RESPONSE- UNIVERSITY POLICE Exterior Insoection The officer (s) responding to an alram from the Nuclear Engineering Laboratory shall first check the exterior perimeter of the facility for physical damage ard/or breach of security. The entrances to be checked are: (1) Exterior door to room 1205 MEB (2) Exterior Door to 1205G. NOTE: Access to this door is through the west end of room 1156. (3) Exterior windows (outdoors, west side of MEB). (4) Roll-up garage door (west side of MEB).
, Physical Damace
- If at any time, the officer observes any serious physical damage to the Reactor facility, such as would be caused by fire or explosion, further entry should be delayed until one of the individuals on the facility notification list arrives to check for radiation exposure levels.
Local Radiaiton Alarms Alarm bells and a small red light inside the fin hose cabinet beside the entrance to room 1205 MEB indicate that the radiation alarm has been tripped. (This light should not be confused with the red light above the door which is on whenever the Reactor is operating; the light above the door also indicates that an operator should normally be present.) The radiation alarm bells and licht will be on even if tripoed by an electrical malfttgtion. so they do not necessarily indicate the presence of hazardous radiation. In the absence of any noticeable physical damage, the officer should enter the facility through classroom 1205 and observe the radiation monitor mounted inside the otry directly above the door. If the alarm is not sounding,it is safe to enter the classroom to make further inspections. If the needle on the radiation monitor is in the right half of the meter dial or the alarm is sounding, there is some abnormal radiation present. The responding officer (s) should proceed further into the classroom only if necessary to rescue an injured person. (The radiation level can never be so high that it would not be safe to enter briefly to rescue someone.) Otherwise, wait for one of the Radiation Safety or Reactor Facility representatives to arrive and check the radiation exposure levels. l
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(- RSC Approval l 4 June 1987 Secunty Breach If either one of the exterior doors is open (for no apparent reason) or has been , forcibly opened, exterior windows have been broken for possible entry, or if the l officer suspects that unauthorized persons are in the laboratory, the police shall first check the radiation monitor above the room entrance. If the needle is in the left half of the meter dial, the officer should use normal procedures to search for unauthorized persons. If the monitor above the entrance is reading in the right half of the meter dial, ; the officer should wait for one of the persons on the notification list to arrive and verify the source of any mdiation exposure. l Imerior Insnection Check the classroom for physical damage, signs of entry, vandalism, etc. From ' , within the classroom 1205, the officer shall verify that the office (1205 A), the { neutron source room (1205 B) and the control room (1205 D), are secure. By looking { through the windows between the classroom and the Reactor room, the officer shall verify that the Reactor appears to be undisturbed. The water should be visible in the Reactor tank and it should be calm. (Use a flashlight if Reactor room is darh.) Treatment ofIniuries First aid should be rendered to an individual wihtout regard for the possiblity of radioactive contamination. If an injured person requires emergency medical attention, notify the University Hocoital Emergency Room (Ext. 2121) before sending the , patient. If possible, wait for the Radiation Safety Representative to survey for contamination before sending the patient to the Emergency Room. Contacts with Non-University Acencies
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In the event of a release of railicactive material to the enviroment, University Folice may be requested by Reactor Facility or Radiation Safety personnel to contact off-campus agencies to help with security or radiation control measures. Buildinc Evacuation The only reason to direct the evacuation of the building without first conferring with Reactor Facility and/or Radiation Safety representatives would be a bomb threat to the facility or know occurence of fire or other major disaster at the facility. NEL EMERGENCY RESPONSE -SLC FIRE DEPARTMENT Fire fighters required to enter the facility to resoond to an actual or potential fire or explosion shall wear full turn-out gear and self contained breathing apparatus until the absence of radioactive contamination is confirmed. In addition to any other reasons for protective clothing, this requirement is a precaution against contamination with radioactive material. Fire fightn:rs shall also wear direct- readirg radiation dosimeters provided with their equipment. 4
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RSC Approval , 4 June 1987 ImalRadiation Alarms Alann bells and a small md light inside the fim hose cabinet betide the entrance to room 1205 MEB indicate that the radiation alarm has been tripped. (Thd Jight should not be confused with the red light above the door which is on whenever the reactor is operati ng; the light above the door also indicates that at least one operator is present.) The radiation alarm bells and licht will be on even if trioned by an electrical
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malfunction. so thev do not necessarily indicate the oresence of hazardous radiation. I In the absence of any noticeable physical damage, fire fighters should enter the facility through classroom 1205 and observe the radiation monitor mounted inside the entrv directly above the door. If the meter needle is in the left hand of the meter dial and'the alarm is not sounding, it is safe to enter any part of the facility in order to fight a fire. If there is a fire in the classroom (1205), control room (1205 D) or counting laboratory (1205 C), use conventional methods for fire control. > If the r.eedle on the radiation monitor is in the right half of the meter dial or the alarm is sounding, fire fighters should not proceed beyond the classroom unless necessary to rescue an injured person. If there is a fire in the reactor room (1205 E), tre first to extinguish if from the classroom by breaking out a window between the observable fire, withdraw from the classroom until one of the Reactor Facility or Radiation Safety representatives arrives. Befom leaving the facility, wait until the Radiation Safety representative has surveyed clothing and equipment to verify the absence of radioactive contamination.
.J R ADIATION SAFETY OFFICER (RSOb NEL EMERGENCY RESPONSF, In this section,"RSO" refers ot any of the qualified radiaiton safety personnel on the notification list who is first to be notified and arrive at the NET ; this nulividual will be responsible for all radiological evaluations until the University's Radiation Safety ;
Officer arrives. ! In response to any emergency at the NEL, the RSO should b ing one or more radiaiton survey meters capable of quick determinations of external exposure rates or surface contamination. One or two radiation survey meters will be available just inside the entrance to the classroom (1205) for emergency use. The instrument (s) wil be capable of making exposure rate measurements up to at least 500 mR/hr and detecting surface contamination from alpha and beta emitters. The RSO shall determine whether or not there are injured or pote.ntially contaminated individuals pmsent and shall evaluate any injured persons for contamination. Remove contaminated clothing,if possible before sending an injured person for medical treatment. Request an ambulance, if necessary, and notify the Emergency Room '. hat a potentially contaminated victim will be arriving. Collect, or ask the Emergency Room to collect appropriate samples to be analyzed for ,~ contamination or activation products, e.g. hair, rings, nose wipes, etc. Arrange for prompt analysis an interpretations of the samples. Define area bosmdries for contamination control. Instmet University Police to set up control boundries as required. If there is any potential impact on the general public due to security measures such as traffic control, non-University civil authorities are to
h.. RSC Approval 4 June 1987 be notified by University Police. If there is r.ny potential for radiation exposum to members of the general public,
. including Univeristy staff and students not directly involved with the facility, the RSO .
or his representative shall notify city and state health departments, and the Nuclear
- Regulatory Commission, as requ,i red.
If radioactive material may have been nicased to the enviorment, or carried away as contamination on personnel or vehicals, make arrangements to collect and analyze samples as appropriate Monitor all persons directly involved in the emergency and the response personnel for contamination prior to their departure from the area,
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( ;;.; . . ' * - l , I M w unwmor UWERSfrY ==?ML OF LffAH. ::atia ce ---e l Document ControlCenter U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 September 4,1987 Gentlemen : Enclosed you will find a copy of the Annual Operating Report for the University of Utah TRIGA Reactor, Docket 50-407, covering the period from July 1,1986 to June 30,1987. This report fulfills the Technical Specification 6.10 (5). If you have any questions concerning the report please contact the staff at the facility. , 1 S' cere
' Reactor A ministrator O
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