ML20238D545
| ML20238D545 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 09/08/1987 |
| From: | Norelius C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238D534 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-87-12, NUDOCS 8709110245 | |
| Download: ML20238D545 (3) | |
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The Cleveland Electric Illuminating License No. NPF-58 Company As a result of the inspection conducted on June 2, 1987 through August 12, 1987, and in accordance with the " General Policy and Procedures for NRC 1
Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the following violations were identified:
1.
Perry Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.6.1.1.1 requires that in
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Operational Concitions 1, 2, and 3 Primary Containment Integrity shall be maintained by, in part, having all manual primary contain-i ment isolation valves locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position.
Contrary to the above, Primary Containment Integrity was not maintained in Operational Conditions 1, 2 and 3 between June 22 and July 1, 1987, in that redundant manual primary containment isolation valves IP54-F726 and 1P54-F727 were open.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
2.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, as implemented by the PNPP Quality f
Assurance Plan, Section 5.0, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by clear and complete documented procedures, instructions and/or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances.
Contrary to the above, electrical design drawings used for the installation of main steam isolation valve (MSIV) pilot solenoid power supply wiring did not completely reflect the approved final design.
e The drawings specified that the "A" and "B" solenoids for the outboard MSIVs were supplied by the "A" Reactor Protection System (RPS) electrical bus while the "A" and "B" solenoids for the inboard MSIVs were supplied by the "B" RPS electrical bus. The approved design was that each MSIV should have A solenoids fed from "A" RPS electrical bus and the B solenoids fed from the "B" RPS electrical bus.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement II).
3.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, as implemented by the PNPP Quality Assurance Plan, Section 11.0 and the PNPP Test Program Manual, Section 28 requires, in part, that preoperational testing be performed in accordance with preoperational test procedures.
Contrary to the above, during the performance of preoperational test IC71-P002, licensee test personnel failed to verify the status of MSIV pilot solenoid status lights as specified in the test procedure.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement II).
8709110245 870908 ADOCK050g0 DR
i 4.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, as implemented by the PNPP Quality Assurance Plan, Section 16.0 requires, in part, that conditions adverse to quality shall be promptly identified and corrected, and the cause of the condition determined and investigated.
Contrary to the above:
a.
Following an unplanned Balance of Plant isclation due to procedural i
deficiencies on October 24, 1986, corrective actions were not promptly identified and taken to preclude additional unplanned i
challenges to engineered safety features during procedurally I
controlled evolutions which involved the deenergization of portions i
of the onsite electrical distribution system. As a result, five additional unplanned challenges to engineered safety features due to l
similar procedural deficiencies occurred between October 25, 1986 l
and July 4, 1987.
b.
Following an unplanned Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system
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isolation on October 6, 1986, due to a violation of a surveillance test procedure by test personnel, corrective actions were not I
promptly identified and taken to assure procedural adherence during future conduct of the surveillance test. As a result, four l
additional RCIC system isolations occurred during the conduct of the same surveillance test between January 8 and May 21, 1987, due to similar procedural violations.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I ).
5.
Perry, Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.3.7.9 requires,.in part, that with liquid radwaste discharge radiation monitor D17-K606 inoperable, liquid effluent batch discharge releases may continue for up to thirty e
i days provided that independent verification of the discharge path valve lineup is conducted prior to commencing a release.
i Contrary to the above, on October 21, 1986, independent verification of l
the discharge path valve lineup was not performed prior to a liquid effluent batch discharge release.
l This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement IV)
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply, including for each violation:
(1) corrective action i
taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective action to be taken to avoid l
further violations; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
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Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause shown.
[ Q 4. b s/4 SEP '81gn Dated Charles E. Norelius, Director Division of Reactor Projects
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