ML20238A643
| ML20238A643 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1987 |
| From: | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-5-I-SC-061, OL-5-I-SC-61, NUDOCS 8708310156 | |
| Download: ML20238A643 (158) | |
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4/7/r7 U17132 POST iXERCISE L
ASS.ESSMENT
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p, February 13,19b6, Exercise of the Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO), as specified in the LILCO Transition Plan for the i
SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION at Shoreham, New York pril 17,1986 Federal Emergency Mar.c.ac. :isnt Agency Region 5 g
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-U17133 Federal Emergency Management Agency i
Washington, D.C. 20472 APR I 8 586 MIMtmANDUM PCRs Biward L. Jordan Director, Division of EsiWcy Preparedness and tlngineering Response office of Inepection and I:nforonment U.S elaar atory Omrmission Ni M g
Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and IWfinolcgical i
Hasards Programs SUE 7ECh Post Exercise Assesanent of the February 13, 1986, Exercise of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station tocal offaite Radiological Bnergency Response Plan Attached are two copies of the Post Deercise Assesment of the February 13, 1986, exercise of the Iccal Dnergency Response organization (IDO), as specified in the Shoreham Wclear Power Station Local offsite Radio 1cgical Bnergency Response Plan. The exercise was conducted pursuant to the b: lear Regulatory Omeniesion's request to the Federal Daargency Management Agency (FEMA) dated Novuuber 12, 1965.
'!he report dated April 17, 1986, was prwpared by FEMA Region II staff with the assistance of the Region II Regional Assistanos Ccranittee.
If you have any questiens, please contact Mr. Craig S. Wingo, Otief, Field operations Branch, at 646-2861 Attachment As stated t
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Federal Emergency Management Agency h
Region II 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10278 April 17,1986
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I MEMORANDUM FOR: Sa 1)W. Speck, As ociate Director G
ate d Local P graag and Support N
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FROM:
Acting gional Director I
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Post Exercise Assessment of the February 13, 1986 Exercise of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station I
Local Of fsite Radiological Emergency Response Flan W
Enclosed with this memorandum, please find five copies of the Post Exercise Assessment report which evaluates the offsite capabilities of the local Emergency Response Organization (LERO) demonstrated during the February 13, 1986 1
Shoreham exercise. This exercise was conducted pursuant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's request to Federal Emergency Management Agency, dated November 12, 1985.
1 The report, dated April 17,1986, was pr7,ared by FEMA Region II using detailed evaluations which were compiled by a team of thirty-eight (38) Federal l
evaluators.
I If you have any questions, please contact me or Roger Tovieski of my staff.
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Enclosures
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U17135 POST EXERCISE ASSESSMENT F
February 13,1986, Exercise of the Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO), as specified in the LILCO Transition Plan for the SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION at Shoreham, New York 1
April 17,1986 Federal Emergency Management Agency Region 11 26 Federal Plaza New York, NY 10278 1
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e U17130 PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS
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Local Emergency Response Organizatioit
.Long Island Lighting Company Shoreham-Wading River School District i
Impell Corporation I
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United States Department of Energy - Brookhaven Area Office j
United States Coast Guard American Red Cross NON-PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS New York State
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Suffolk County 1
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ABBREVIATIONS Argonne National Laboratory ANL American Red Cross ARC Automatic Verification System AVS Brookhaven Area Office BHO BNL
- Brookhaven National Laboratory U.S. Department of Commerce DOC DOE U.S. Department of Energy U.S. Department of Transportation DOT Direct Reading (self-reading) Dosimeter DRD EBS Emegency Broadcast System ECCS Emerge tcy Core Cooling System ECL Emergency Classification Level EOC Emergency Operations Center Emergency Operations Facility EOF U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPA EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure ENC Emergency News Center EWDF Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility Emergency Planning Zone EPZ ERPA Emergency Response Planning Area Federal Aviation Administration FAA FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency U.S. Department of Health and Human Services HHS Idaho National Engineering Laboratory INEL l
potassium iodide RI LERO
- Local Emergency Response Organization Long Island Lighting Company LILCO LIRR Long Island Railroad Memorandum of Understanding MOU U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Offsite Plan Implementing Procedures OPIP Protective Action Guidelines PAG j
Public Information Officer PIO l
Regional Assistance Committee RAC l
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Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RACES Radiological Assistance Plan RAP Radiological Emergency Area REA Radiological Emergency Communications System RECS Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan REPP Radiological Emergency Response Plan RERP Shoreham Nuclear Power Station SNPS Supervising Service Operator SSO Traffic Control Point TCP thermoluminescent dosimeter TLD
- Technical Support Center TSC U.S. Department of Agriebiture USDA k
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o CONTENTS Ix SUuwxaY................................................................
I 1 I N T R O D U C T IO N........................................................
1 1.1 Ex e rc is e B a c k gro u nd.................................................
l 1.2 F e d e r al E v al u a t o rs...................... '............................
3 1.3 F E M A C o n tro ll e rs...................................................
5 7
1.4 F E M A Si m ula t o rs................................ <..................
1.5 Evalua tion C ri t e ri a..................................................
8 8
- 1. 6 E x e rc is e O bj e c t iv e s.................................................
15
- 1. 7 E x e r c i s e Sc e n ar i o...................................................
15 1.7.1 Major Sequence of Events on Site................................
1.7.2 On Site Sce nario Ov ervie w..................................... 16 1.7.3 Description.of Local Emergency Response Organization 19 Resources....................................................
1.7.4 Actual and Simulated Off-Site Events Summary................... 23 1.7.5 Ex e rc is e T i m e li n e............................................. 24 2 E X E R C IS E EV A L U ATIO N................................................ 27 2.1 Local Emergency Response 0, organization Emergency Operations
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27 Center............................................................
2.1.1 L E R O EO C O p e r a t io ns........................................ 27 l
2.1.2 Imple mentation of Field Activities............................. 43 l
2.1.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control................ 44 l
2.2 E m erge ncy Operations Facility....................................... 46 2.3 Brookhav e n Are a O f fic e............................................. 47 2.3.1 Brookhaven Area Of fice Operations............................. 47 2.3.2 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams............................ 49 2.3.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control................ 51 2.4 E m e rg e n c y N e w s C e n t e r............................................ 52 2.5 Po r t J c f f e rso n S t aging Ar e a........................................ 54 2.5.1 St aging Ar e a Ope r a tions...................................... 54 2.5.2 Implementation of Field Activities............................. 57 2.5.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control................ 59 2.6 P a tc hogu e St agi ng Ar e a............................................. 60 2.6.1 Staging Are a Operations...................................... 60 2.6.2 Implementation of Field Activities............................. 64 2.6.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control................ 68 70 2.7 Rive rhead Staging Ar e a.............................................
2.7.1 Staging Are a Operatio ns...................................... 71 2.7.2 Imple mentation of Field Activities............................. 74 2.7.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control................ 76 2.8 Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility.......................... 78 2.8.1 E W D F Op e r a t i o ns............................................ 78 2.8.2 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control................ 79 2.9 R e c e p t io n C e n t e r.................................................. 79 2.10 C o ngr e g a t e C ar e C e n t e rs................................,.......... 82 2.10.1 U.S. Marine Corps Brigade, Garden City, NY.................... 82 i
2.10.2 LILCO Of fice Building, Mineola, N Y........................... 82 2.11 M e d i c al D r ill...................................................... 84 Vi
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, CONTENTS (Cont'd)
SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES OR AREAS REQUIRING l
3 CORRECTIVE ACTION: FEBRUARY 13,1986 EXERCISE....................
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SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE 4
A C TI O N.............................................................. 1 2 0 l
i FIGURE i
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1.1 Shoreham Exercise Evaluator Organization...............................
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TABLES l
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1.1 Emergency Classification Timeline.....................................
l 26 1.2 Protective Action Decision /Public Notification Timeline..................
3.1 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Schedule for Correcting Deficiencies 87 l
or Areas Requiring Corrective Action -- LERO EOC......................
3.2 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Schedule for Correcting Deficiencies l
or Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Emergency Operations l
98 F a c il i t y.............................................................
3.3 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Schedule for Correcting Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Brookhaven Area Office........... 99 J
3.4 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,, Schedule for Correcting Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action -- Emergency News Center..........
100 3.5 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Schedule for Correcting Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action -- Port Jefferson Staging Area..............................................................
102 3.6 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Schedule for Correcting Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Patchogue Staging Area..........
103 3.7 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Schedule for Correcting Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action -- Riverhead Staging Area..........
113 3.8 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Schedule for Correcting Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action -- Emergency Worker Decontamina tion Facility............................................ 116 3.9 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Schedule for Correcting Defielencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action -- Reception Center................
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U17151 TABLES (Cont'd) 3.10 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Schedule for Correcting Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action -- Congregate Care Centers......... 118 3.11 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Schedule for Correcting Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Medical Drill.................... 119 j
I 4.1 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action - LE RO EOC.............................
121 4.2 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action -- Emergency Operations Facility............ 12 5 4.3 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Summary of Deficiencies and Areas j
Requiring Corrective Action - Brookhaven Area Office..................
126 4.4 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Emergency News Center..................
127 1
4.5 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Port Jefferson Staging Area...............
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,4.6 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Summary of Deficiencies and Areas i
Requiring Corrective Action - Patchogue Staging Area..................
129
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4.7 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Riverhead Staging Area..................
133 l
4.8 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility............................................................134 4.9 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Sumniary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Reception Center........................ 135 l
4.10 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Summary of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action -- Congregate Care Centers.................
136 4.11 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Summary of Deficiencies and Areas i
l Requiring Corrective Action -- Medical Drill............................
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SUMMARY
On June 20, 1985, NRC requested FEMA to conduct an exercise to test offsite emergency preparedness at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. In its October 29, 1985 response to NRC, FEMA recommended two -(2) options for exercising the Local Emergency ' Response Organization (LERO), which relies upon utility employees,
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contractors, private organizations and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). These two options were as follows:
Option 1 - proposed that FEMA set aside all functions and exercise objectives related to issues of legal authority and State and local participation.
Option 2 - proposed a full-scale exercise of all functions and normal exercise objectives. This option would exercise the current version of the LERO Plan. Exercise controllers would simulate the roles of key State or local officials unable or unwilling to participate.
FEMA emphasized in its October 29, 1985 letter to NRC that "the reluctance of I
county and State officials to participate in such an exercise... would place special parameters on its conduct." FEMA stipulated that "(a]ny exercise without participation by State and local governments would not allow... sufficient demonstration (for FEMA}
to reach a finding of reasonable assurance" that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency. FEMA added that "(olbviously, the value of such an exercise in the licensing process is a determination which can only be made by NRC."
On November 12, 1985, NRC requested that FEMA conduct the exercise in accordance with parameters described in Option 2.
l The exercise was limited without State and local government participation.
Therefore, FEMA cannot measure the capabilities and preparedness of State and local f
governments if called upon to respond. The legal authority concerns have been ruled on in other forums. This report constitutes FEMA's evaluation of what was actually done during the course of the exercise.
On Thursday, February 13, 1986, a team of thirty-eight (38) Federal evaluators evaluated an exercise of the Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO) as j
specified in the LILCO Transition Plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. This was a daytime exercise, from approximately 0530 to 1730. Following the exercise, an evaluation was made by the Federal evaluator team and a preliminary briefing for LERO exercise participants was held at the Inn at Medford in Medford, New York on Friday, February 14,1986 at 1500; representatives of the State, Suffolk County, and the Long Island Lighting Company were also in attendance. A public briefing for the exercise participants, the public, and the media was held on February 15,1986 at 1000 at the Holiday Inn, Ronkonkoma, New York. Subsequent to those preliminary briefings, detailed evaluations were prepared and are included in this report.
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Federal evaluators evaluated the following operations:
Local Emergency Response Organization - Emergency Operations Center (LERO EOC)
Emergency Operations Faellity (EOF)
~ Brookhaven Area Office (BHO)
Emergency News Center (ENC)
Port Jefferson Staging Area Patchogue Staging Area Riverhead Staging Area e
Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility (EWDF) e Reception Center Congregate Care Centers -
Medical drill Bus evacuation of school children and general population Evacuation of institutionalized and non-institutionalized mobility-Impaired Traffic control points Route alerting i
Impediments to eva'cuation i
Radiological field monitoring The following is a summary of evaluatiorus made by Federal evaluators during the February 13,1986 exercise.
l LOCAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION (LERO) EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC)
The facilities and resources in the Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO) Emergency Operations Center (EOC) were very good. There was appropriate security.
Displays, equipment, and supplies were available to support emergency x
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U17154 l
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11 operations for a protracted period of time. Receipt of emergency notifications and The
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activat!on and staffing of the EOC with emergency personnel were very good.
l ability to maintain staffing on a twenty-four (24) hour basis was demonstrated through I
rosters.
All primary and backup LERO communications systems were operational and functioned well.
Dedicated telephones and radios linked the LERO EOC with the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Brookhaven Area Office (BHO), Emergency News Center (ENC), Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) station (WALK-FM), and the Port Jefferson, Patchogue, and Riverhead Staging Areas. Telecopiers were available for the transmission and receipt of hard-copy information. However, there was some confusion regarding the proper method of contacting the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and there were no procedures for notification of the Long Island Railroad.
Internal communications within the LERO EOC were generally clear and efficient. However, the dose projection status board in the accident assessment room j
should be improved so that it can better accommodate radiological field team data provided by both the LILCO and DOE RAP field teams. In addition, criticalinformation was omitted from the LERO message forms relating to the two (2) Impediments to evacuation. Concise and accurate briefings were frequently conducted by the Manager of Local Response. These briefings enhanced the flow of information within the LERO EOC.
l The overall management of LERO was good. Staff mobilized expeditiously and j
demonstrated the knowledge and capability to respond effectively to most scenario i
The LERO Director was in command and coordinated the decision-making events.
process, including making protective action recommendations.
l Actual testing of public alerting and notification systems was limited since most j
activities including activation of sirens and tone alerts, airing EBS messages, and other Prior to the public information initiatives were either simulated or no' demonstrated.
exercise, LILCO management made the decision that the siren system would not be sounded as part of this exercise. Activation of the siren system needs to be actually tested in the future.
Accident assessment objectives were partly m e t.
LERO officials were responsible for overall coordinated accident assessment and protective action recommendations. These functions were fulfilled and the Director of Local Response was able to make timely decisions based on these recommendations. In all cases, State Communications and county simulators were briefed on the status of the emergency.
were established and demonstrated to all organizations and locations, including field personnel and DOE RAP field monitoring teams. The ability to obtain, receive, and interpret dose projections c.nd plant status was demonstrated, as was the ability to determine appropriate protective actions consistent with emergency conditions, i
However, a mistake in recording data reported by one of the field monitoring teams led to an initial miscalculation of thyroid doses. Also, projected data were posted as actual measurements on the dose assessment status board. During one briefing held at the LERO EOC, the Health Services Coordinator incorrectly announced that the EPA PAG requires mandatory evacuation at a projected thyroid dose of five (5) Rem.
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The public information area at the LERO EOC was activated in a timely manner by trained and knowledgeable staff. Communication between the LERO EOC and the Emergency News Center was good. EBS messages were coordinated in advance with the county P!O (simulator). All EBS messages were aired within fif teen (15) minutes of each protective action decision as prescribed by FEMA's guidance.
Evacuation management pre,cedures and the internal flow of information regarding evacuation issues enust be improved. While evacuation personnel were well trained with respect to established procedures to ensure appropriate equipment,
, resources and the utilization of evacuation routes, there is a need for greater communication and more efficient sharing of information.
There were delays in verifying and removing impediments on evacuation routes, rerouting traffic, and coordinating evacuation deelslons with other LERO personnel.
Emergency medical services were provided effectively as ambulances, ambulettes, and special buses were dispatched to evacuate the homebound mobility-Impaired and persons in special facilities in a timely and efficient manner. Briefings and instructions to Ambulance and Ambulette Drivert shout their routes were adequate. The drivers successfully completed their routes.
Dosimetry and potassium iodide (KI) distribution and instructions on the use of dosimeters and K1 were also adequate.
However, the Ambulette Driver did not know what action he should take at cifferent exposure levels, when to take his KI, or who could authorize exposure in excess of Igeneral public Protective Action Guidiilines (PAGs).
At the Alert Emergency Classification Level (ECL), the Shoreham-Wading River iHigh School demonstrated an early dismissal of schools. Notification was received via
[ commercial telephone. Simulated movement of students occurred at two (2) schools.
, Two (2) buses were actually dispatched to run reutes for school children. A LERO bus
' was dispatched to one (1) of these schools which was outside the Shoreham-Wading School District.
The Shoreham-Wading River School District demonstrated one of its own f
l buses. Written procedures and instructions were properly used by the response staff f
including bus company and school district employees.
However, dosimetry and instructions on emergency worker radiological exposure control had not been made available to the Bus Drivers used for school evacuation nor have these drivers received adequate training in its use.
EMERGENCY OPERATION FACILITY (EOF)
The LILCO EOF staff was well trained. The Response Manager was in command i
and control at all times.
Frequent staff conferences were held and situation reports given.
Status boards, maps, and diagrams were wall-mounted in the command center
- and dose assessment area. The radiological status board displayed both projected and measured dose data.
Protective action recommendations based on both plant status and dose assessments were made in a timely manner, a.mounced to EOF staff and communiuted xii
k U17156 to the LERO EOC. DOE RAP field team data was received in a timely fashion. The LILCO ' EOF staff provided complete' information and. timely briefings; there was adequate' working space and communication equipment to accommodate State and county participation if it is to be provided.
BROOKHAVEN AREA OFFICE (BHO)
The Brookhaven Area Office (BHO) is located at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Brookhaven National Laboratory site in Upton, New York.
The Duty Officer at the Brookhaven Police Headquarters received the initial emergency notification telephone call at the Alert ECL. BHO staff were rrobilized and the BHO was operatknalin a timely manner, within seventy (70) minutes after the initial ~
notification. There was a roster indicating relief personnel who would be assigned to a second shif t.
A-Equipment and supplies were adequate to support emergency operations.
dedicated telephone serves as the primary communication link between,the BHO and the LERO EOC. Several commercial telephones also are available.
Security measures were excellent.
Brookhaven National Laboratory ir a Federally'-owned f acility, with the Brookhaven National Laboratory Police providing 'Its own guard force.
Messages were accurately transmitted and were properly logged, the status board
' was maintained, and briefings were held as appropriate. The Radiological Assistance Pltn (RAP) Team Captain was in charge 'and in control of the dose essessment func' tion assigned to the BHO.
Communications with the field were via a secure (scrambled frequency) radio system, and were successful.
The BHO demonstrated the ability to project radiation dosage to the pub!!c via plume exposure, based on plant data and field measurements. Appropriate protective measures were recommended by the BHO staff to the LERO EOC.
The radiological field monitoring teams were mobilized and deployed in a timely Upon arrival at the BHO, team. members checked their equipment and were manner.
briefed.
Both teams had the appropriate equipment and were knowledgeable of the procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.
The appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 0.1 picoeuries/cc in the presence of noble gases were demonstrated by both of the DOE RAF field teams.
The field team membars demonstrated the ability to continuously monitor and control emergence worker radiological exposure with frequent readings of their DRDs.
Each team member was issued simulated K1 and simulated ingestion of the KI tablet when they were directed to do so by the Team Captain. All of the team members understood that the Team Captain could authorize exposure in excess of the'3 Rem limit
' authorized for DOE RAP team members.
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EMERGENCY NEWS CENTER (ENC)
The LERO public information staff at the ENC kept in close contact with the EOC, briefed the press, and distributed copies of the LERO news releases and EBS Due to the malfunction of copying machines and messages to media representatives.
other problems with distribution, news releases and EBS messages were not copied and distributed to PIO staff, the press, and rumor control personnelin a timely manner. This also affected the effectiveness of the rumor control, staff.
PORT JEFFERSON STAGING AREA Implementation of the LILCO Transition Plan was generally well organized and effective at the Port Jefferson Staging Area.
The staging area. facility had adequate space, supplies, equipment and parking Activation was initiated promptly area to support emergency response operations.
following notification of the Alert ECL. The Staging Area Coordinator and other key staff arrived quickly and set up the physical arrangements and equipment needed to make the facility operational. Security checkpoints were established at the Alert ECL and maintained throughout the exercise.
At the Site Area Emergency ECL, a full
, complement of field personnel were, activated using pagers and telephone call lists.
9 Resters were presented showing twenty-four (24) hour staffing capability.
All Communications and message handling were generally timely and efficient.
, radio and telephone systems were successfully demonstrated, although radio
. communications with traffic control points (TCPs) sometimes were difficult. The flow of the staging area was facilitated by prompt forwarding of
. information throughout messages and periodle status briefings given over the public address system.
As field personnel arrived, they were systematically briefed on dosimetry procedures and on their specific assignments. Briefings were clear and very thorough.
Dispatch of field personnel was generally accomplished in a timely manner.
The Port Jefferson Staging
- Area Coordinator demonstrated excellent leadership in the assignment of personnel, briefing of staff, and implementation of procedures.
The field activities dispatched from the Port Jefferson Staging Area wereA generally well organized and implemented, although'some problems were identified.
Route Alert Driver was dispatched to alert the public following a simulated siren failure.
The alerting route was, correctly identified and correct procedures were Two (2) followed; however, the time required to complete the route was excessive.
~ Both buses were dispatched general population evacuation buses were demonstrated.
promptly and drivers were provided with dosimetry, maps, and instructions pertaining to Both Bus Drivers completed their assigned routes in a timely manner,
, their routes.
followed the correct routes, and arrived promptly at the Reception Center. Both delvers were well briefed on dosimetry procedures. However, one of the Bus Drivers neglected to read his direct reading dosimeter (DRD) at any time during the seventy-five (75) minutes he was working in the 10-mile EPZ. All Bus Drivers should be trained to read their DRDs every fif teen (15) minutes as described in the LERO Procedures.
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Several TCPs were evaluated. All Traffic Guides had the correct route maps and equipment, as well as dosimetry and simulated KI.
All traffic control personnel demonstrated that they were well trained in their procedures, including advice and guidance to motorists, and emergency worker radiological exposure control procedures.
Demonstration of the Port Jefferson Staging Area's resources for dealing with Impediments to evacuation could not be evaluated.
Prestaging of equipment and personnel according to the LERO Procedures was demonstrated when several Road Crews and tanker trucks were requested by the Road Logistics Coordinator at the LERO EOC.
However, their performance in the field could not be evaluated, since delays at the
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LERO EOC caused the Road Crew to miss its rendezvous with the Federal evaluator.
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PATCHOGUE STAGING AREA The Patchogue Staging Area was promptly opened and efficiently set up af ter the declaration of the Alert ~ ECL. All personnel were properly notified and mobilized.
Individuals were cleared through security checks, briefed upon arrival, and issued dosimetry for field assignments. Staffing rosters indicated a twenty-four (24) hour response capability.
The Patchogue Staging Area had adequate space, parking, equipment, and supplies.
Operations were well organized and clearly defined by functional areas. Communications were effective and messages were properly recorded, both to the LERO EOC and to emergency workers in the field. However, security measures need to be strengthened "at the Patchogue Staging Area and some of the security measures demonstrated were not the same as those described in the LERO procedures. Messages were properly transmitted, status boards were well maintained, and all personnel were advised of developments by periodic briefings.
Direction of emegency personnel in the field proceeded smoothly, but the dispatch of Bus Drivers out of the staging area was too slow.
Field activities originating from the Patchogue Staging Area included route alerting, traffic control, general population evacuation bus routes, removal of an impediment to evacuation, bus transfer points, evacuation of the non-institutionalized mobility-imphired, and evacuation of schools. The Route Alert Driver was deployed in a timely manner and drove his route without any difficulty. However, the required time for route alerting was excessive. Fourteen (14) Traffic Guides were evaluated at nine (9)
TCPs. These individuals were familiar with their specific assignments with regard to guiding the traffic and deployed the planned equipment, but they need training on how to properly answer motorists' questions.
Four (4) general population evacuation bus routes were dispatched from the Patchogue Staging Area. The abilities of the drivers to drive their routes as plarned varied greatly. The two (2) drivers reporting to the Brookhaven National Laboratory Transfer Point understood how to use their dosimetry, but one (1) of them omitted a small part of his assigned evacuation route. Both of the two (2) drivers reporting to the Middle Island Shopping Center Transfer Point had difficulties in completing their assignments that resulted in a deficient demonstration. One (1) of the drivers took over l
two (2) hours to get to the Middle Island Shopping Center Transfer Point because he initially went to the wrong bus garage after being dispatched from the staging area. The xv j
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- U17159, other driver initially went to the wrong transfer point and was dispatched on a bus route by a Transfer Point Coordinator who did not double-check whether the bus had come to the correct transfer point, perhaps because OPIP 3.6.4 does not require this to be verified. The driver was able to complete his route only after being prompted.by the Federal evaluator. Both Bus Drivers need more training to correct these deficiencies, and OPIP 3.6.4 should be revised.
The demonstration of a response to an impediment to eveeuation was affected by a communications problem originating in the LERO EOC. The equipment which was disostched in response to the free play message would only have been able to handle part of the impediment described in the message. One element of the necessary corrective action is to train the staging area personnel to request more information from the LERO-EOC concerning impediments to evacuation when they are encountered.
Bus transfer points were easily recognized, had free access, and were controlled t,y competent Transfer Point Coordinators. However, one (1) Transfer Point Coordinator misdirected the driver of a bus for the non-institutionalized mobility-impaired to the EWDF, rather than to the Reception Center, as had been directed by the Bus Dispatcher.
Buses also were dispatched from the Patchogue Staging Area for the evacuation of a. school and for the non-institutionalized mobility-impaired persons confined at
' home. The school evacuation was sut.cessfully completed, but additional bus dispatch staff is necessary to reduce the excess'ive tina consumed in sending the Bus Driver out of the staging area. The demonstration of evacuation of the non-institutionalized mobility-l impaired revealed that, although the Bus Driver was knowledgeable, he had difficulty
- locating the residences of some of the mobility-impaired. It is necessary to improve the quality of the maps and directions given to these drivers.
Emergency worker radiological exposure control was evaluated at all field activities originating from the Patchogue Staging Area. Most of the emergency workers demonstrated knowledge of dosimetry, but the Patchogue Staging Area Bus Dispatcher misinformed the Bus Drivers about how to read DRDs; this may have contributed to the fact that various of the Rus Drivers did not read their DRDs often enough and did not understand the implications of the readings. Similarly, Traffic Guides at two (2) TCPs did not did not know the action guidelines for their dosimetry. Re-training'of the Bus Dispatcher, the Bus Drivers, and the Traffic Guides concerning.the proper use of dosimetry, as well as dose authorization limits is necessary.
The administration of simulated El proceeded sr.oothly at the Patchogue Staging
' Area. All of the emergency workers in the field understood the proper procedures for its use, except that one (1) Route Alert Driver incorrectly believed that he would be authorized to take it in an EBS message.
Route Alert Drivers need re-training concerning the proper means of receiving authorization to take KI.
Most emergency wcekers were aware of the chain of command for authorization of excess exposure to radiation, but Traffic Guides at two (2) TCPs did not know this important procedure. Corrective action is needed to train them about this.
xvi 4
m------______m...
_m._____,______,____
U17160 e
RIVERHEAD STAGING AREA The Staging Area Coordinator and supervisory personnel were notified by pagers at the Alert ECL and the administrative staff were called by telephone. Staff notified field workers in a timely manner, using telephone callout lists.
The staging area was activated and staffed in a timely manner. The emergency.
workers, including Traffic Guides, Route Alert Drivers, Bus Drivers, Road Crews, and Route Spotters, were issued equipment and briefed.-
The Procedures maintained at the staging area contain detailed staff rosters indicating sufficient personnel for three (3) shifts.
The staging area is well-lighted, with adequate space for the _ managers-and support staff. Ample parking is provided in the visitors' parking lot, as well as in the lot established for workers and LILCO cars and trucks.
Additionally, the facility has adequate supplies and equipment to support emergency operations.
Communications with the LERO EOC were accomplished by. a dedicated telephone with commercial telephones and a radio as backup systems.
The staging area had adequate security and access control. Guards were posted as prescribed in the Plan, and only those persons with proper identification and authorization were admitted.
Messages were recorded on the prescribed LERO Message Form, but were not numbered. In several instances, it was unclear which part, if any, of the message was "new"information. While the status board was periodically updated, the posting time on l
the board was frequently incorrect, not reflecting the actual last time the information was updated.
Frequent briefings were given over the public address system at the staging area throughout the day; while this approach is adequate for transmitting information, there was no opportunity for the staff to ask questions or_ coordinate activities. Some of the public address announcements were disruptive.
The Staging Area Coordinator was in full charge of the overall response functions assigned to the Riverhead Staging Area.
Field workers were given appropriate equipment and briefings prior to their deployment to the field.
Traffic Guides and Transfer Point Coordinators communicated with the staging area via radios. The locations of Traffic Guide positions were confirmed by radios when the Traffic Guides reached their assigned locations.
Transfer Point Coordinators successfully apprised the staging area by radio of the status of the evacuation.
One (1) public alerting route was demonstrated. Mobile public address equipment was promptly mounted. All streets were traveled at an appropriate speed. However, the map provided for the Route Alert Driver had no mileage or distance scale, making it difficult to determine where portions of the public alerting function were to begin and-end. In addition,_ the amount of time, seventy-eight (78) minutes, was excessive for dispatching and executing the route alert function.
xvii
U17161,'
Eight (8) TCPs were evaluated. Personnel were well trained and provided with the appropriate equipment. However, the time between deployment of Traffic Guides and their arrival at TCPs was excessive, taking from fif ty (50) to seventy (70) minutes.
Traffle Guides successfully demonstrated the resources to control access to an evacuated area, once they arrived.
Two (2) buses to evacuate the general public were. demonstrated. The Bus Drivers were thoroughly trained and were knowledgeable about their routes.
The Brookhaven Substation Transfer Point functioned effectively. However, the access road l
is quite narrow and curving and could be impassible in inclement weather.
The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker radiological exposure, including use of personnel dosimetry, was adequately displayed by most field workers. One (1) Bus Ddver, however, took-infrequent dosimeter readings and two (2)
Traffic Guides did not understand the difference between low-and mid-range DRDs.
~
Potassium lodide (KI) was supplied to emergency workers prior' to their deployment to the fleid. Most field workers understood the instructions for taking K1 and from whom they would receive authorization to do so; one (1) Bus Driver, however, took l
the tablet prematurely, prior to being assigned an evacuation route. Emergency workers were thoroughly briefed and understood who could authorize exposure in excess of the
' general public PAGs.
+
$. EMERGENCY WORKER DECONTAMINATION FACILITY (EWDF)
The EWDF was activated in a timely manner. The facilities and equipment were adequate for the expected volume of emergency personnel to be processed. Monitoring and decontamination procedures were demonstrated on several hundred. emergency workers. EWDF workers who were in contact with potentially contaminated emergency workers continuously monitored their own dosimetry. - Sufficient supplier of K1 were available with pertinent record forms and instructions.
l RECEPTION CENTER The Reception Center at the Nassau County Veterans Memorial Coliseum was excellent for control of contaminated, uncontaminated, and unmonitored evacuees and vehicles. The Reception Center was fully mobilized by 1015, approximately one and one-half (1.5) houng after the staff was called. Approximately three h0ndred (300) people were activated initially and a roster was available demonstrating the capabilities for tnnty-four (? l) hour staffing.
Y
[
Over one hundred (100) people were actually registered and monitored, and were decontaminated (simulated) If necessary.
Procedures for monitoring evacuees were generally good, but on several occasions personnel monitoring took considerably longer than the time set forth in the LERO procedures.
l l
l l
XViii
U17162 Proper dosimetry was available'and constantly monitored.' Personnel were aware of dose authorization limits.
CONGREGATE CARE CENTER Two Congregate Care Centers (CCCs) were activated during the exercise. Mass care at the CCCs was simulated. American Red Cross staff were on hand end knew their roles and renurces.
1 MEDICAL DRILL A medical drill was conducted on Sunday, February 9,1986 in order to exercise the emergency medical response at SNPS, Wading River Fire Department, and Central Suffolk Hospital.
SNPS, ambulance, and hospital staff all performed very well. The simulated victim was treated promptly by site personnel demonstrating proper contamination control.
Vital signs and radiological data were constantly taken.
The ambulance responded promptly, was covered with herculite, and the victim.was transported to the hospital. Constant radio contact with the 1:ospital was maintained by radio.
Upon arrival at the hospital, a Rad! alogical Emergency Area was already set up.
The medical team, with the assistance of two !.2) SNPS Radiation Protection Technicians, promptly treated and decontaminated the patient.
Survey techniques, medical treatment, and contamination control were all very good. The hospital facility was well designed to handle contaminated, injured patients. All exercise objectives were met.
xix 4
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ii U17163 1 INTRODUCTION
+
1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all'off-site nuclear planning and response.
FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:
Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans developed by state and local governments; Determining wilether such plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local governments; Responding to requests by the NRC pursuant to th'e Memorandum of
~
e Understanding Between NRC and FEMA Relating to Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness, 45 Fed. Reg. 82,714 (1980)
(MOU);
Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities e
in the radiological emergency planning process:
- U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) -
- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI).
Representatives of these. agencies' serve as representatives on the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
Radiological emergency preparedness plans for-the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS), which is located in the Town of Brookhaven, New York, have not been submitted to the RAC either by the State or by affected local jurisdictions. Instead, the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO), the applicant for an NRC license to operate SNPS, esta.blished its own Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO), relying on LILCO employees, contractors, private organizations, and DOE.
On May 26,1983.
LILCO filed a series of five (5) alternate plans with the NRC, each embodying a somewhat different approach to emergency planning surrounding SNPS. On June 10,
U17164 2
1983, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearing the LILCO application ruled that it would consider only the plan entitled the "LILCO Transition Plan."
Acting at the request of the NRC pursuant to the FEMA /NRC Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the FEMA Region 11 RAC conducted reviews of successive versions of the LILCO, Transition Plan against the standards and evaluative criteria of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.
FEMA presented these results on February 12, 1986, October 8,1985, November 15,1984, March 15,1984, and June 23, 1983, respectively.
FEMA's review of Revision 6, the most recent version of this plan, revealed that five (5)
Inadequacies remain to be corrected.
On June 20, 1985, the NRC again' invoked ine MOU to request FEMA to conduct l
"as full an exercise... as is feasible to test offsite preparedness capabilities at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant." On October 29, 1985, FEMA began formally " initiating i
the process necessary to, conduct an exercise." In its October 29, 1985 letter to NRC, FEMA recommended the basle two (2) options for exercising the LILCO Plan:
Option 1 would require that FEMA set aside all functions and exercise objectives related to issues of legal authority and State and local participation. Thus, only the functions outlined for LILCO would be exerciT s
Option 2 would include all functions and normal exercise objectives.
This option would exercise the current version of the LERO Plan.
Exercise controllers would simulate the roles of key State or local off!cials unable or unwilling to participate. It would be desirable that State and local government personnel actually play. However, such a simulation mechanism would at least test the utility's ability to respond J
to ad hoc participation on the part of State and local governments.
FEMA emphasized in the October 29 letter to NRC that "the reluctance of county and State officials to participate in such an exercise... would place special parameters" on its conduct. FEMA stipulated that "[a}ny exercise without participation by State and i
local governments would not allow us sufficient demonstration to reach a finding of reasonable assurance" that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency. FEMA added that "[o]bviously, the value of such an exercise in the licensing process is a determination which can only be made by NRC." On November 12, 1985, NRC responded to FEMA's request for guidance and stated "[wle conclude that an exercise should be conducted consistent with the approach outilned in your [ FEM A's] Option 2."
This exercise was conducted on February 13, 1986, except for the medical drill which took place on February 9,1986 (see Section 1.7.3 below). An evaluator team consisting of personnel from FEMA Regions I, !!, and III, the RAC, and FEMA's contractors, evaluated the exercise.
Thirty-eight (38) evaluators were assigned to evaluate LERO and LILCO activities. The FEMA Region II RAC Chairman coordinated j
the evaluations through team leaders.
_-___--_-_-_-_a
3 U17163' e
Following the exercise, the Federal evaluators met to compile their evaluations. Evaluators presented observations specific to their assignments, the teams of evaluators developed preliminary assessments for each location, and team leaders j
consolidated the evaluations of individual team members and submitted these to the RAC Chairman. Based on these preliminary assessments, an informal critique of the exercise was held for LERO exercise participants at 1500 on Friday, February 14, 1986 at The Inn At Medford in Medford, New York; representatives of the State, Suffolk County, and LILCO also were in attendance. On February 15,1986, the FEMA Region II Director and RAC Chairman conducted a public briefing for the exercise participants, the public, and the media at 1000 at the Holiday Inn, Ronkonkoma, New York. The findings presented in this report are based on evaluations of Federal evaluators, which were reviewed by FEMA Region IL i
The exercise was limited without State and local government participation.
Therefore, FEMA cannot measure the capabilities and preparedness of State and local governments if called upoh to respond. The legal authority concerns have been ruled on in other forums. This report constitutes FEMA's evaluation of what was actua!!y done during the course of the exercise.
1.2 FEDERAL EVALUATORS Thirty-eight (38) Federal edaluators evaluated off-site emergency response f unc tions. These individuals, their affiliations, and their exercise assignments are given below:
Evaluator Agency Exercise Location / Function (s) t R. Kowleski FEMA Oversight Evaluation / Region II RAC Chairman G. Connolly FEMA LERO Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/ Team Leader T. Baldwin ANL LERO Warning Point; LERO EOC/ Communications i
P. Giardina EPA LERO EOC/ Accident Assessment H. Laine FEMA LERO EOC/Public Information A. Smith ANL LERO EOC/ Evacuation Operations H. Fish DOE LERO EOC/ Support Services Operations C. Malina USDA LERO EOC/ Medical Operations C. Amato NRC SNPS Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
M. Jackson FEMA Emergency News Center J. Keller INEL Brookhaven Area Office / Accident Assessment N. Chipman INEL Fleid Monitoring Team A
.. ~.
l 4
417M60 Evaluator Agency Exercise Location /Funetion(s)
B. Salmonson INEL Field Monitoring Team B P. Weberg FEMA Port Jefferson Staging Area / Team Leader K. Lerner ANL Port Jefferson Staging Area / Operations K. Bertram ANL Port Jefferson Staging Area / Route Alerting Impediment to Evacuation; Traffic Control Points R. Acerno FEMA Port Jefferson Staging Area / General Population Bus Route P.
Kier ANL Port Jefferson Staging Area / General Population Bu:
Route R. Reynolds FEMA Patchogue Staging Area / Team Leader E. Tanzman ANL Patchogue Staging Area / Operations l
C. Saricks ANL Patchogue Staging Area / Route Alerting; Impediment to Evacuation; Traffic Control Points t
I iM.Wu FEMA Patchogue Staging Area / Evacuation of School Requesting I
LERO Assistance 1
l S. Curtis ANL Patchogue Staging Area / Evacuation of Non-Institutionalized Mobility impaired At Home J. O'Sullivan FEMA Patchogue Staging Area / General Population Bus Route B. Houston FEMA Patchogue Staging Area / General Population Bus Route D. Jankowski ANL Patchogue Staging Area / General Population Bus Route i
I D. Santini ANL Patchogue Staging Area / General Population Bus Route S. McIntosh FEMA Riverhead Staging Area / Team Leader P. Becherman ANL Riverhead Staging Area / Operations l
J. Levenson ANL Riverhead Staging Area / Route Alerting; Traffic Control Points J. Picciano FEMA Riverhead Staging Atea/ General Population Bus Route A. Foltman ANL Riverhead Staging Area / General Population Bus Route R. Bernacki FDA Other Field Activities / Team Leader; Reception Center; j
Medical Drill i
D. Connors FEMA Other Field Activities / Congregate Care Centers l
l l
5 U17167 l
Evaluator Agency Exercise Location / Function (s)
P. Lutz DOT Other Field Activities / Evacuation of Mobility-Impaired j
(Ambulance) j D. Hulet ANL Other Field Activities / Evacuation of Mobility-impaired (Ambulette)
W. Gasper ANL Other Fleid Activities / School Evacuation j
L.
Flagle INEL Other Field Activities / Reception Center; Emergency Worker Decontamination In addition to the FEMA evaluators, a FEMA Command Post was maintained at the DOE Brookhaven Area Office, Upton, New York, in order to coordinate the exercise evaluation. FEMA personnel assigned to the Command Post included P. McIntire, A.
Davis, D. Jones, and P. Cammarata (who was stationed at the LERO EOC to serve as communications liaison between evaluators).
Figure 1.1 illustrates the organization of Federal evaluators, showing team composition and specific evaluation assignments.
~
1.3 FEMA CONTROLLERS To assist in its evaluation of 'the exercise objectives, FEMA Region !! executed certain control functions through controllers. Their responsibilities included injecting exercise messages and exercise data to specific designated exercise participants, as well as monitoring interactions between FEMA simulators and the exercise participants.
Controllers were specifically prohibited from providing exercise Information to the exercise participants regarding scenario development or resolution of problem areas
' encountered.
Eleve (11) individuals served as FEMA contrcliers during the exercise. Their names, affiHations, and assignments during the exercise follow:
i Controller Agency Exercise Location / Function (s)
R. Donovan FEMA LERO EOC/ Senior FEMA Controllcr L. Kers NRC LERO EOC/ Controller J. Brown NRC Port Jefferson Staging Area / Controller E. Weinstein NRC Patchogue Staging Area / Lead Controller M. Hawkins NRC Patchogue Staging Area / Controller J. Himes NRC Riverhead Staging Area / Controller E. Williams NRC Field Team / Controller E. Podalak NRC Field Team / Controller
U17163 2
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7 U17163 Controller Agency Exercise Location / Function (s)
B. Weiss NRC FEMA Control Cell / Controller for Simulator E. Pef. ins NRC LERO EOC/ Controller for Simulator i
C. Sakenas NRC LILCO EOF / Controller for Simulator I
1.4 FEMA SIMULATORS j
FEMA Region !! des.ignated eleven (11) individuals to simulate the interface of key State and county officials with LERO and LILCO. The purpose of the simulation efforts was to provide an opportunity for the evaluation team to determine if the LILCO and LERO plans, procedures, facilities, and preparedness could, as claimed, accommo-
.date and support State and local personnel and provide information to State and local personnel so that they could carry out their responsibilities. FEMA simulators were assigned to the LERO EOC, the LILCO EOF, and the FEMA Control Cell (located at' Brookhaven National Laboratory), where simulators conducted. their activities by I
telephone.
FEMA simulators representing State and county personnel were instructed not to assume a response posture. Their simulations were to be as consistent as possible with the New York State plans for other nuclear power plants and with the manner in which other counties have participated in the planning and exercises at other facilities in New York. They were to ask questions and request information, briefings, etc., in order to be informed. But, at all times, they were to allow the LERO staff to direct all response efforts.
Like the participants, simulators were not privy to the exercise scenario.
Certain FEMA controllers monitored the interactions between FEMA simulators and the LILCO/LERO exercise participants.
The overall responsibility for managing the simulation of State and county officials rested with the Senior FEMA Controller.
The names, affiliations, and assignments during the exercise of the FEMA simulators follow:
Simulator Agency Exercise Location / Function (s)
V. Wingert FEMA FEMA Control Cell / Simulator for State Health Commis-l sioner or Designee l
1 J. Sucich FEMA FEMA Control Cell / Simulator for County Executive G. Brown NRC FEMA Control Cell / Simulator for County Health Officer M. Landau NRC FEMA Control Cell / Simulator for other County depart-ments R. Meck NRC FEMA Control Cell / Simulator for State Health Depart-ment technical representative i
f 1
q i
to U17172' l
l
- 10.
Demonstrate the ability of the designated official to determine the need to obtain State assistance.
- 11. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, l
organizations, and field personnel.
- 12. Demonstrate the ability to receive and interpret radiation dosage projection information, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs and information received from the Brookhaven Area Office (BHO).
- 13.
Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of public alerting and instructional messages with the State and county (State and county participation l
simulated).
l I
- 14.
Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt notification siren system in f
coordination with State and county (State and county participation simulated).
- 15. Demonstrate the capability for providing both an alert signal and an informational or instructional message to the population on an area-wide basis throughout the 10-mile EPZ, within 15 minutes (to be simulated).
-r
- 16.
Demonstrate the organizational ability to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ including the water portion.
- 17.
Demonstrate the organizational ability to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.
j l
- 18. Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ.
- 19.
Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
- 20.
Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ. If this protective action is not recommended by the decision-makers, e.g., schools were dismissed early, a free play controller 3 message may be inserted to demonstrate this activity.
o
- 21.
Demonstrate the ability to prepare and imolement EBS in a timely manner (to be simulated within 15 minutes after command and control decision for implementation of protective action recommendations).
- Note: The demonstration of this objective is affected by the legal authority issue.
. -. ~ ~....
f 11 U17173-Emergency Operations Fac!Ilty (EOF) 1.
Demonstrate that the Emergency. Operations Facility has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations and interaction with LERO EOC.
- 2. - Demonstrate that the Emergency Operations Facilities have adequate access control and that security can be maintained.
- 3.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the dose projections based on plant data and field measurements with county and/or State officials (Role of State and/or county officials will be simulated by FEMA designated personnel).
~
Brookhaven Area Office (BHO) 1.
Demonstrate the ability to receive initial and follow up emergency notifications.
l l
2.
Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the-BHO in a timely manner.
3.
Demonstrate through rosters, the ability to maintain staffing in the BHO on a 24-hour basis.
4.
Demonstrate that the BHO has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.
5.
Demonstrate that the BHO can establish appropriate communication links with the LERO EOC, using both primary and backup systems.
6.
Demonstrate that the BHO has adequate access control and that security can be maintained.
7.
Demonstrate that messages 'are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed.
8.
Demonstrate that the appropriate official is in charge _ and in control of dose.
aasessment function assigned to the BHO.
9.
Demonstra.te the ability to communicate with all appropriate field locations and personnel.
!]
' Note: The demonstration of this objective is affected by the legal authority issue.
12 U17174
- 10. Demonstrate the ability to project radiation [ dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant data and field measurements, and to recommend appropriate protective measures to LERO, based on PAGs and effectively communicate them to the LERO EOC. LERO is responsible for the final decision on protective action recommendations.
Emergency News Center (ENC) 1.
Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate LERO functions at the ENC in a timely manner.
- 2. ' Demonstrate through rosters the ability to maintain staffing of LERO functions at the ENC on a 24-hour basis.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate, and timely.
manner.
- 4.
Demonstrate the ability to share information with other agencies at the ENC prior to its release.
)
5.
Demonstrate the ability to esthblish and operate rumor control in a coordinated manner.
6.
Demonstrate that the ENC has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.
- 7.
Demonstrate that the ENC has adequate access control and that security can be -
l maintained.
Staging Areas (SA) 1.
Demonstrate the ability to receive emergency notifications.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to. mobilize staff and activate the staging areas in a.
l timely manner.
3.
Der.tonstrate through rosters, the ability to maintain staffing at the staging areas on a 24-hour basis.
4.
Demonstrate that the staging areas have adequate space, parking area, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.
- Note: The demonstration of this objective is affected by the legal authority issue.
l l
______._____--________----__.____L_-__-
U17175 u
i 5.
Demonstrate that the staging areas can establish appropriate communication links with the LERO EOC using both primary and backup systems.
l
'6.'
Demonstrate that the staging areas have adequate access control and that security.
- can be maintained..
- 7.. Demonstrate that messages 'are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate' briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed.
8.
Demonstrate that the appropriate official is in charge and in control of an overall response assigned to the staging area.
- 9.
Demonstrate the ability to dispatch to and direct emergency workers in the field.
- 10. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate field locations and personnel.
Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility (EWDF) 1.
Demonstrate the ability to n$obilize staff and activate the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility.
2.
Demonstrate through rosters, the ability to maintain staffing of the Emergency -
Worker Decontamination Facility on a 24-hour basis.
- 3.
Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles including adequate: provisions for handling contaminated waste at the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility.
Field Activities (Fleld) 1.
Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure including proper use of personnel dosimetry.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and deploy BHO field monitoring teams in a timely manner.
3.
Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels (BHO personnel).
- Note: The demonstration of this objective is affected by the legal authority issue.
U17170 14 4.
Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 0.1 picoeuries/cc in the presence of noble gases (BHO personnel).
- 5.
Demonstrate the ability to provide backup public alerting, if necessary, in the event of partial stren system failure.
- 6.
Demonstrate that access control points can'be established and staffed by Traffic Guides in a timely manner.
7.
Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been mr.de to do so.
8.
Demonstrate that emergency workers understand who can authorize exposure in excess of the general public Protective Action Guidelines (P AGs).
9.
Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to implement an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ.
- 10.
Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.
- 11.
Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area (Traffic Guides).
- 12.
Demonstrate the adequacy of evacuation bus transfer points including access and parking / transfer areas.
13.
Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of the institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals within the 10-mile EPZ.
14.
Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of the non-institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals within the 10-mile EPZ.
- 15. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ (to be simulated out of sequence, if appropriate).
+ 16. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ.
- 17. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the Reception Center in a timely manner.
- 18. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate Congregate Care Centers in a timely manner.
- Note: The demonstration of this objective is affected by the legal authority issue.
U17177 c
a l
' 19. Demonstrate through rosters the ability to maintain staffing at the Reception 4
Center on a 24-hour basis.
i l
- 20. Demonstrate through rosters the ability to maintain staffing at the Congregate i
I l
Care Centers on a 24-hour basis.
- 21.. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for registration, radiological monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees and vehicles' including adequate provisions for handling contaminated waste at the Reception Center.
- 22. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees at congregate centers.
- 23. Demonstrate adequacy for ambulance facilities and procedures for handling injured and contaminated individuals. (Medical drill involves an on-site /off-site injury).
- 24. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures _ for handling injured -
and contaminated individuals. (Medical drillinvolves an on-site /off-site injury).
[
1.7 EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.7.1 Major Sequence of Events on Site Given below 1: a listing of exercise events, and the approximate times that they were projected to occur by the scenario:
Projected by Scenario Event'.
0515 SNPS is operating at sixty percent (60%) power and is near end of j
core life. Wind is out of northeast at five (5) miles per hour.
0529 Unidentified leak in the Drywellis detected exceeding five (5) gallons per minute.
0545 Unusual Event Emergency Classification (ECL) declared due to high unidentified leak rate in the Containment.
0550 Reactor shutdown commenced.
0559 Radiation monitors indicate levels _ one hundred (100) times greater -
than the high setpoint and greater than a one thousand (1000)-fold increase.
l
- Note: The demonstration of this objective is affected by the legal authority issue.
l 1^
U1717f Projected by Event Scenario 0601 Malfunction detected in Traversing Incore Probe System, accounting for the high radiation levels.
Alert ECL declared due to high radiation levels on the northeas't side 0620 of the reactor building.
0759 Failure of the only operable Condensate Pump results in a total loss of feedwater transiert.
Reactor scrams and Turbine trips.
Condensate Boo:ter Pump, Reactor Feedwater Pump, Feedpump Turbine Exhaust Diaptuam and Feedpump Turbine Exhaust.lsolation Valve all fail.
0805 Residual Heat Removal Pumps fail.
0815 Site Area Emergency ECL declared due to break in High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Steam Line and failure of HPCI Steam Supply Isolation Valves to close.
0929 Emergency power bus fails, causing total loss of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS).
0945 General Emergency ECL declared due to loss of two (2) out of three (3) fission product barriers, with a potential to lose the third.
1130 Core melt and major radiation release begin.
1228 Emergency power bus is repaired and ECCS is reactivated.
1233 Core is covered.
1330 All telephone communications fa!! between EOF and onsite f acilities.
1400 Telephone communications restored between EOF and onsite facilities.
1630 Wind shif ts from out of northeast to out of northwest.
1730 Terminate Exercise.
J 1.7.2 On Site Scenario Overview The exercise scenario begins at 0515 hours0.00596 days <br />0.143 hours <br />8.515212e-4 weeks <br />1.959575e-4 months <br /> with the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS) operating at sixty percent (60%) power on a reactor core approaching end of life. Two (2) days ago the plant was at one hundred percent (100%) power, having been
________.__.__m
u U17179 i
at that power for two (2) months, when a trip of a Condensate Pump caused a partialloss of feedwater. The reactor immediately reduced power and was settled at sixty percent 1
(60%) power avoiding a reactor scram on low water level.-.Upon investigation, it was
~ l found that the Condensate Pump lower motor bearing had failed causing the shaft.to seize and trip the pump motor on overcurrent. The motor is. presently dismantled and -
expected to be returned to service within two (2) days.
Additionally, a Core Spray Pump, is tagged out-of-service to replace a leaking 1
gasket at the flange of the pump suction.spoolpiece.
Work has commenced and is '
expected to be completed within four (4) to eight (8) hours.
Finally, the Local Power Range Monitors (LPRMs) are being calibrated by running the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) system automatically into the core making routine plots.
I Weather conditions are fair and seasonable with the wind out of the northeast at five (5) miles per hour.
The simulated accident began when excessive running of the Drywell Floor Drain Pumps sets off alarms in the Radwaste Control Rcom. The unidentitled leak rate into I
the Drywell Floor Drain System is calculated to be six.(6) gpm necessitating the I
declaration of an Unusual Event ECL. The Watch Engineer then assumes the duties of f
Emergency director and initiates the4NPS Emergency Plan. The leak is postulated to be j
from a cracked control rod drive weld and therefore cannot be isolated, it was expected that plant operations would decide to begin a controlled shutdown at this time since the high unidentified leak rate exceeds a Technical Specification limit. Due to system load, the shutdown was expected to be done slowly.
Within thirty (30) minutes after the declaration of the Unusual Event ECL, a malfunction in a TIP system probe withdrawal limit switch causes a hot probe to be withdrawn beyond the probe cask as far back as the cable reel housing. High area radiation alarms sound indicating a source of radiation of more than one hundred (100) times the high trip setpoint in the vicinity of the TIP cable drive system on the northeast side of the reactor building. This high radiation level event warrants that an Alert ECL be declared at this time and the TSC, OSC, EOF and ENC were to be activated.
As the TSC is being activated, the maintenance crew repairing the gasket of the out-of-service Core Spray Pump, locates a large crack in the flange which requires replacement. Estimated time to fabricate a new flange and weld it in place is sixteen (16) hours, extending the out-of-service time for this pump.
In the meantime, a leak at the Intake Structure was to be identified to be coming from the Service Water heacer area. The leak is sufficient to cause a decrease in header pressure to approximately forty (40) psig and initiates an annunciator. This failure never escalates beyond the initial level and was intended to spur "what-if" thinking in the TSC. A repair team was to have been dispatched from the OSC and, if they demonstrate that they could have fixed the leak, the system was to nave been restored; if not, no adverse effects on the remainder of the exercise were to be seen.
- U17180, g
Approximately two (2) hours and forty-five (45) minutes into the drill, with power level at approximately forty-five percent (45%), the only operable Condensate Pump falls when a motor winding short causes it to trip. This results in a total loss-of-feedwater transient. Reactor water level drops and a scram occurs. Collapse of bubble void due to the scram causes level to decrease further with the subsequent trip of the Reactor
)
Recirculation Pamps and closure of the MSIVs. With both Condensate Pumps off, both the running Condensate Booster Pump and Reactor Feedwater Pump trip on low suction pressure. The Feedpump Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm falls at this time resulting in air inleakage to the Main Condenser and subsequent loss of vacuum.
If the Feedpump Turbine Exhast isolation Valve is attempted to be closed, it was to have failed to close fully due to a mechanical blockage within the valve body. This loss of Condenser vacuum 8
prevents the MSIVs from being reopened.
HPCI and RCIC initiate on low water level as designed and relief valves open as pressure rises after the MSIV closure. This high pressure condition causes a leak to develop in the steam supply line to the HPCI Turbine causing a leak to secondary containment. High area temperature is sensed by the Leak Detection System and an isolation signal to'both HPCI and RCIC is initiated. RCIC trips and isolates normally, but the HPCI Steam Supply isolation Valve falls to close, preventing isolation of this steamline break. Manual closure of this isolation valve is precluded since it is inside the Drywell, which is inerted. Additionally, the outboard HPCI steam supply isolation valve '
"' has dual indication, as it falls to close completely. It was to be impossible to get to this 4 valve to close it due to steam leaking in the area. This was to result in the declaration
' of a Site Area Emergency ECL.
1 The steam leaking to the Secondary Containment from the HPCI steamline causes a Ugh airborne condition and with multiple area radiation monitors alarming, a
' Restricted Area Evacuation was to be declared. Accountability was to be started at this time. For purpose.4 of this exercise, Evacuation Plan A was to be utilized. Reactor building filters operate normally to release the steam leak contaminants to the environment via the plant vent. This release was expected to be low level, not requiring any PARS beyond the site boundary.
Operators were expected to cool down the plant quickly to r, educe the steam leak as much as possible.
Since the HPCI steamline break could not be isolated and a radiological release to the environment is in progress, a manual initiation of ADS may have been the decision of the TSC staff and Watch Engineer, but as rapid a cooldown as possible using manual control of the Steam Relief Valves was expected. With steam N being dumped to the Suppression Pool, operators were to align Residual Heat Removal (RHR) in the Suppression Pool Cooling mode.
When a RHR Pump was manually attempted to be started it was to start and then trip due to excessive bind'ng in the
' pump, causing an overcurrent condition. Backup RHR Pumps and the Core Spray Pump i
were all to operate normally. The mass loss via the open Steam Relief Valves to the Suppression Pool and the steamline leak to the Secondary Containment is greater than f
Control Rod Drive cooling water maximum flow rate so vessel level decreases during this l
pressure reduction. When pressure drops below that necessary for the low pressure ECCS pumps, Core Spray was to be used to restore vessel level to normal.
19 U17181 As reactor pressure decreases below the LPCI high pressure interlock, the Residual Heat Removal Injection Valve was to fail to open either automatically or manually. The only normal means of replacing the water mass leaking from the HPCI steamline break at this time are from Control Rod Drive cooling water, one (1) Core Spray Loop and one (1) RHR Loop which only has one (1) RHR Pump operable. These pumps maintain reactor water level until a short to ground on an Emergency Power Bus causes it to lockout all power supplies approximately one and one-half (1)) hours after
{
the SAE. The loss of this bus in turn fails the Control Rod Drive Pump, Core Spray Pump.
and RHR Pump. Since the steamline has not been isolated as yet, the mass loss through this breach of the reactor coolant pressure boundary causes a gradual decrease in reactor l
water level. These events were to result in the declaration of a General Emergency l
ECL.
Although emergency repair operations were to begin immediately after identification of each failure, ECCS was not to be restored for approximately three (3) l hours. Initially, the rate of decrease of reactor water level is slow, and estimated time before the core starts to be uncovered was to be approximately four (4) hours. As time l
advances however, the leak increases to such an extent that the core actually becomes uncovered within two (2) hours of the declaration of the General Emergency ECL. As the fuel and cladding begin to melt, the fission products are released and carried out of the reactor system with the steam leaking from the HPCI steamline. Reactor Building Filters operate normally and filter this release to the environment.
Eventually, emergency repair operations were to result in clearing the fault on Emergency Power Bus 102, the lockouts were to be reset, and the Diesel Generator was to re-energize the bus.
A Core Spray Pump and RHR Pump are now able to reflood the core, precluding further
)
core damage.
I Since the Secondary Containment has been filled with the fission products j
released while the core was uncovered, the release was to continue for several days with I
a decreasing source term. Five (5) hours af ter the start of the major release the wind shif ts from the northeast to the northwest requiring updated PARS.
When drill controllers were satisfied that all exercise objectives had been achieved, the drill wes to be terminated.
1.7.3 Description of Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO) Resources LERO was to be responsible for ensuring that its resources actua'ly were deployed in adequate numbers to reasonably test its notification, mobilization,' command, coordination, and communications capabilities. Except as noted below, LERO was to have total authority in determining the degree of mobilization and deployment of its resources in a radiological accident at SNPS. Consistent with this intent, the decision to demonstrate or to actually deploy resources was to be made at the time of the exercise.
The following personnel and resources were to be deployed by LERO to demonstrate the capabilities of its emergency resources.
i
20 U17182 Public Notification During the exercise, the public alerting sirens and the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) were to be demonstrated. Since the LILCO Transition Plan provides a backup system for notification of areas where sirens fall to notify the public, Federal evaluators also evaluated this system. The system consists of pre-planned routes which are each to b'e driven by a loudspeaker-equipped vehicle upon a determination by LERO that a given siren was not heard by local residents.
During the exercise, FEMA controllers specified in a free play message that one (1) siren to be simulated in each of the three (3) staging areas had failed; a Federal evaluator was assigned to follow the entire run of each route alerting vehicle that was deployed, and to interview the drivers regarding knowledge of their responsibilities and procedures.
Radiological Field Monitoring Teams in addition to off-site radiological field monitoring teams dispatched by SNPS, two (2) DOE RAP radiological monitori,ng field teams were to be demonstrated as provided for in the LERO Plan. Both DOE RAP teams were accompanied in the field by a FEMA controller and a Federal evaluator. The FEMA controllers were given simulated field data, which they provided to the teams to determine local dose r' ate readings consistent with the scenario.
Both DOE RAP teams were to demonstrate the equipment.ecessary to determine both gamma dose rates and airborne radiolodine concentrations.
The monitoring teams were not to be suited up in anticontamination clothing. Emphasis was to be on the rapid deployment of the teams, rapid gathering of data, and communication
, of data to the DOE Brookhaven Area Office.
I Radiological Exposure Control All emergency workers in the 10-mile EPZ were to have thermoluminescent and direct-reading dosimeters (TLDs and DRDs), access to thyroid blocking agents (KI), and radiological exposure record cards.
They were to be familiar with procedures for radiological exposure control (e.g., at what exposure levels to contact suervisors, and with procedures for obtaining clearance for excess exposures).
l l
l Completion of Bus Routes for Evacuees Each of the locations designated in the LILCO Transition Plan as playing a part f
in an evacuation of the 10-mile EPZ was to activate a limited number of the routes and 1
vehicles it would use in an actual accident, as follows:
]
l l
l A
x, U17183 Humber of Routes Non-Institutionalized Originating General School Institutionalized Mobility-Impaired' I,ocation Population Children Mobility-Impaired Special Facilities Port Jefferson 2
0 0
0 Staging Area Patchogue 4
1 1
0 Staging Area Rive'rbead 2
0 O
O Staging Area Emergency Worker
- 0 0
0 1 ambulance 1 ambulette Decontamination Facility (co-located with LERO EOC)
Shoreham-Wading 0
, 1 0
0 River High School c
TOTAL 8
2 1
2
)
Resources to complete all evacuations were to be activated in sequence with the i
scenario, based on free play messages inserted at the LERO EOC. Bus routes were not to 3
be pre-assigned. The Federal evaluators, in concert with the FEMA controllers, were to Insure that the selected routes did not affect normal public transportation.
l The drivers were tc assemble at their normal dispatch locations and be assigned routes, but were not to pick up any evacuees. Upon completion of the routes, all drivers were to report to the Reception Center to drop off the simulated evacuees, and thence to the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility for monitoring and decontamination of the drivers and vehicles. There were to be no time constraints outside of those itethe LILCO Transition Plan on running the routes.
Traffic Guides LERO was to deploy Traffic Guides from all three (3) staging areat to simulate activation of a suitable sample of traffic control points (TCPs) within the 10-m!!a EPZ.
l
/
1
/
E'
\\
,(
1 1
U17184 22 I
I Number of
{
Staging Number of Traffic Control I
Area Intersections Poines Port Jefferson 3
10 Patchogue 3
9 Riverhead 3
8 TOTAL 9
27 l
TCPs were not to be preassigned, r.or were Traffic Guides to be repositioned.
l 4
To provide a greater test of the capability to respond to an actual incident and to' allow i
l more free play in the exercise, the Federal evaluators were to provide the participants at -
i their respective staging areas who were assigned the responsibility of deploying Traffic Guides with information o'n the locations to be evaluated during the exercise, in sequence with the scenario. In order to avoid interfering with the normal flow of traffic, FEMA l
did not request that Traffic Guides attempt to demonstrate the functions they would implement during an actual incident at SNPS; instead, Traffic Guides were requested to remain in their legally-parked vehicles upon arriving at each TCP, and to submit to an interview by the Federal evaluator concerning their responsibilities, procedures, and
' equipment.
t l
l Impediments to Evacuation Federal evalcators w:re to introduce free play messages to test procedures for removing impediments from evacuation routes. A free play message was to be given to l
the appropriate LERO EOC official stating that a simulated impediment had been discovered at a given location. The demonstration was to include the actual dispatch of appropriate emergency vehicle (s) to the scene, as specified in the LILCO Transition Plan.
l Emergency Worker Decontamination The LERO Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility (EWDF), located in the basement of the LERO EOC, was to set up and demonstrate the monitoring and decontamination of LERO workers and emergency vehicles.
The processing of emergency workers who had completed their exercise participation was to be
demonstrated during the exercise.
Decontamination actions were to be simulated, although all necessary equipment was to be assembled at the EWDF and all procedures to be explained to the Federal evaluators.
5 Reception Center l
The Nassau County Veterans Memorial Coliseum, designated in -the LILCO Transition Plan as the Reception Center for all evacuees, was to be opened and staffed in
.accordance with the Plan. The LERO personnel were to obtain estimates on how many 1
U17185 23 evacuees would be arriving had the exercise been a real emergency. They were then to estimate the supplies required for the potential evacuees. Some volunteers were to be processed through the registration procedure. Procedures and equipment for monitoring evacuees and their vehicles were to be demonstrated. Decontamination was to be simulated.
Congregate Care Centers Two Congregate Care Centers were pre-selected by LERO and activated in sequence with the scenario.
Supplies required for long-term mass care (e.g., cots, blankets, food) need not have been acquired nor brought to the Congregate Care Centers. However, the LERO personne! were to obtain estimates on how many evacuees would be arriving had the exercise been a real emergency. They were then to estimate the supplies required for the potential evacuees. Sources for the required supplies were then to be located and the means for transporting the supplies was to be determined.
Medical Drill eA medical drill was conducted on Sunday, February 9,1986 in order to evaluate the emergency medical response at SNPS, Wading River Fire Department, and Central Suffolk Hospital. A separate scenario'was developed in which a LILCO worker received a contaminated injury (simulated) while working on site. He was to be treated on site by SNPS personnel, transported to the Central Suffolk Hospital by the Wading River Fire Department, and treated at the hospital. A Federal evaluator evaluated the entire drill.
Volunteer Organizations Response organizations identified in the LILCO Transition Plan were to participate in the exercise. Members of volunteer organizations such as the American Red Cross have other responsibilities, including earning a livelihood, that take precedence over their participation in an e;tercise. Therefore, the staffing of these volunteer organizations for exercise purposes was to be on an as-available basis.
Closecut of the Exercise The Federal evaluators were not to release any participants from the exercise play. That was to be a LERO responsibility. LERO was to have been appropriately staffed until such time as the exercise was determined to have been terminated.
1.7.4 Actual and Simulated Off-site Events Summary The following list summarizes each of the activities that were actually demonstrated or simulated during the February 13,1986 exercise.
1 U171M i
2' i
l Activity Actual or Simulated l
Actual
{
Call up of LERO Personnel Actual Activate LERO Organization Actual Maintain LERO Security
~
Simulated EPZ Siren Activation Simulated EBS Message I
Actual Dispatch Backup Route Alerting Actual Dispatch Field Survey Teams I
Actual Field Team Communication Actual Reception Center Setup Actual l
Personnel Monitoring Personnel and Vehicle Decontamination Simulated Actual Evacuee Monitoring Evacuee and Vehicle Decontamination Simulated Actual Congregate Care Setup Actual General Population Evacuee Buses School Children Evacuee Buses Actual j
i Actual Mobility impaired Vel.icles Actual '
Traffic Guide Deployment Actual Evacuation Impediment Response.'
Actual Dose Assessment PAG Recommendation Actual j
Actual Operate Emergency News Center School Notification (Wading-River School District)
Actual l
School Notification (all other School Districts)
Simulated l
1.7.5 Exercise Timeline Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide detailed timelines ot' events that were noted during the February 13, 1986 exercise. Table 1.1 details escalation of the ECLs, notification of e 2rgency response personnel, and times when notification was received of radiological release information by various facilities. Table 1.2 details protective action decisions and the time at which these decisions were issued to the public via the EBS.
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26 U1718S TABLE 1.2 ' Protective Action Decision /Public Notification Timeline" 1
AT =
(EBS Time)-
Affected EBS
- (Decision Areas Decision Message Time)
Decision (Zones)
Time Issued in minutes N/R 0652 N/A Alert.
Early school closing.
Site'd.ea Emergency.
A-E 0837 0841 4
Dairy animals on stored, feed.
Evacuation.
A-M, Q, R 1010 1024 14 Dairy animals on stored feed.
Evacuation.
10-mile-1146 1200 14 EPZ (add N 0, P, 5)
Populations report to Coliseum for monitoring.
A, B, F, 1331 N/R N/A C, K, Q 8N/R = not reported.
N/A = not available.
3
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37 i
U17189 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION This section provides a narrative overview of the evaluations from the February 13,1986, radiological emergency preparedness exercise for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS). The evaluations are keyed to the exercise objectives listed in Section 1.6 of this report. References to those objectives are provided in the following narrative.
l 2.1 LOCAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (LERO EOC)
The LERO EOC is located at the LILCO Brentwood Operations facility. This j
A facility is involved twenty-four (24) hours per day with LILCO business activities.
portion of this facility is dedicated to emergency response activities during a radiological e mergency.
2.1.1 LERO EOC Operations The objective of demonstrating the ability to receive initial and f'ollow-up emergency notifications was met (EOC 1)!. Initial notification of the Unusual Event Emergency Classification Level (EC1;) was received by the LILCO Supervising Service Operator (SSO) in Hicksville, New York, at appr ximately 0545 via the Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) line. Following LERO procedures, primary response personnel were/ notified by pagers at abou) 0553.
Verification of the notification was#obtained bypturn call to the SSO andrby the computjer zed automatic verification system (AVS). Verification of this initial notification had been receivedj from all responders within/ fifteen (15) minutes. Notifgation of the Alert ECL waf received over the RECS line at approximately 18 andWverification of notification of emergency workers by the pagers was complete ithin twenty (20) minutes.
LERO notifications of the Site Area and General Emergene CLs wer eceived C after that facility had ecome operational.
,over the RECS telephone at the LERO Epwere timely and the RECS telephone at the All notifications of changes in the ECL LERO EOC was/used effectively throughout the exercise.
An exercise objective was met by demonstrating the ability to mobilize ste.ff and activate the LERO EOC in a timely manner (EOC 2). The Alprt ECL notification was eceived at about4628 and the first responder arrive at the LERO EOC at 0745 most LERO employees were)present.
Appropriate maps approximately 0645. Byf Communica) ion links were and status boarp were set up as specified in tne Plan.
v efferson, and Riverhed
/ established andvverified. The activation of the Patchogu(, Porf(BHO) were t
Staging Areas and the activation of the Brookhaven Area Off e
a timely mannerf The Evacuation Coordinator conpcted is staff beginning at about 0750, institutedVa check of the AVS, and arrangedVto get replacements for any of his staff who had not reported within a reasonable time. Prior to declaring the LERO EOC operational at approximately 0810, the Manager of Local Response heldVa briefing session with the principal staff members to discuss the status of activation activities.
2b v' ox l
i I
bl7N O
28 l
In the public information arey, the Coordinator of Public Information and most of the public information ststff arrived within an hour of the Alert ECL notification.
Upon l
/ arrival at the LERO EOC, public Information staff proceeded /to make the public!
Information area operational in adimely fashipn.
Thefert ECL notification was broadcast over EBS at about 0652. Full staffing #and setuprof he area hed been achievad by about 0745 and, at about 0750, y message was received from the Emergency News l
Center (ENC) that that facility was/ operational.
Emergency mediept personnel at the LERO EOC were otified by pagfs at about Pesponders called their automatic verifije tionjiumber and receivefinstructions 0629.
The staff arrived in aMimely fashion between about 0645 to report to the FERO EOC.
' and 0730 and set up their area in the command room.
V The LERO EOC demonstrated the ability to maintain staffing on a twenty-four l
(24) hour basis through the use of rosters, thus meeting an exercise objective (EOC 3).
The Lead Communicator at the LERO EOC had<pa roster of both primary and backup personnel who could be called upon to majhtain twenty-four (24) hour staffing. Both home and business telephone numbers were/available in the roster. The effectiveness of the backup system was/ demonstrated when four 4) LERO responders who had not d
[ verified their initial notifications on the AVS were contacted by telephone by the Lead Communicator using the telephone number infor nation in the roster.
werelavailable to each of the lead j
Additional rosters for their areas coordinators.
The Emergency Medical /Public Service Communicate
. bulance
" Coordinator, Health Services Coordinator, and Hospital Coordinator pred.n ed rosters with home and business telephone numbers showing sufficient staff to support three (3)
,? shifts o a twenty-four (24) hour basis. The roster in the accident assessment area also 1
showed three (3) people available for each position except for the Radiation Health j
l Coordinator position, for which eight (8) names were available.
In! anticipation of extended operations, the, Lead Communicator eveloped a roster of secpnd shift personnel which he presented'to the Manager of Local Response who decided'that a shift change would occur at 1600 after replacements had arrived and i
l been briefed. A simulated call-out of second shift personnel was demonstrated by each l
i' coordinator.
l l
The objective of demonstrating that the LERO EOC has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations was met (EOC 4).
It was
[ observed, however, that the command roora was too crowded during some of the briefings l
'on accident assessment. LERO should consider whether operations could be improved by providing le crowded conditions during these briefings. Furniture, space, telephones, and radios ere available for all personnel. All maps and status boards required by the Plan were available. However, simulators of State and county officials did nofhave a specific area assigned to them. Operations could be improved if a particularypace for State and county persjo nel were available in the LERO EOC. Lighting waradequate.
Noise levels appeared to be acceptable. The Rou)4 Spotter / Road Crew Communicator and the three (3) Staging Area Communicators hafheadsets so that their radio receptions were not broadcast into the operations area.
N
i U17191 29 The objective of demonstrating that LERO can establish appropriate communica-tions links, both primary and backup (including communication with New York State and All p primary and backup Suffolk County via telephone) was partly met ( ' C 5).
t communications systems at the LERO EOC were perational and functioned well, includ-ing the communications link with the Eaton's Neck Coast Guard Station via the radio located on the Evacuation Coordinator's desk as specified OPIP 4.1.1.
There was some confusion regarding the prot er method of contacting the Federal i
vlation Administration (FAA). Although the FAA did not participate in the exercise, it was recognized by the LERO staff that the FAA sJould be requested to divert air traffic from the EPZ.
However, the LERO staff did%ot locate information in the LERO Procedures for accomplishing this notification. If one has not already been established, a point of contact with the FAA should be designated so that notification can be accomplished promptly.
The LERO Procedures inould be reviewed and revised as necessary, and the LEROL staff trained accordingly, to ensure that the FAA will be notified in a timely manner.
N Similarly, the Long Island Railroad (LIRR) was not notified of the exercise emergency because there are no procedures in the Plan for requesting it to divert its trains from the EPZ. If one has not already been established, a point of contact with the LIRR shn M be designated so that notification can take place promptly. The LERO Procedures aould be reviewed and zevised as necessary, and the LERO staff trained accordingly, to ensure that the LIRR will be notified in a timely manner.
The LERO EOC met an exercise objective by demonstrating that it has adequate access control and that sepurity can be maintained (EOC 6). All security points wer
. str_ffed and security wasdnaintained effectively at the LERO EOC in accordapee with
. the provisions of procedure OPIP 4.7.1.
All incoming LERp personnel wer(checked
' through security at the entrance to the LERO EOC and were issued LERO identification badges / Non-LERO personnel, including simulated State [nd county representatives, were/ checked for identification and, when this had been verified, were/ issued LERO identification badges permitting unrestricted access to the facility.
LERO partly met the objective of demonstrating assages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, that messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held, and that/
incoming personnel are briefed (EOC 7). Clear, concise, and accurate briefings we'r(
the LERO EOC command room and in the briefing room.
conducted periodically in/conducpd by the Manager of Local Res I
Additional briefings were These briefings enhanced the flow of information within the LERO EOC. There area.
was some duplication between the briefings conducted in the briefing room and those conducted in the operations area. LERO should consider whether operations could be improved by consolidating the two (2) sets of briefings in the operations room to avoid dupilcation.
/
Status boards werepeated throughout the LERO EOC n tha various functpal These boards were generally outstanding, effectively utilized, a d updated in a areas.
timely manneryThe key events status board in the operations area was maintained at all times and was visible from all functional areas in the operation:. area. Boards giving the al/ Bi i
U17192,,
30
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bus staging status and evacuation status were updated asjeeded as buses e
dispatched and the evacuation of the general population proce#ded. However, the dose assessment status board in the accident assessment area hadNo accommodate data from both the DOE RAP and the LILCO field monitoring teams. ThereUere not enough columns on the board to keep the two (2) sources of data separated. It is recommended that the dose assessment status board should be enlarged to accommodate a clear
~
separation between the data repris fro.n the DOE RAP team and those from LlLCO.
Also, there werhno key events or evacuation status boards posted in the command area.
Operations could be improved if a key events status board were available in the command v room.
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All the coordinators the traffic, transportation, and special facilj}ips areas
'kept logs angenerally used LERO message forms. In general, information wM$rovided in a timelyTashion both to and from the staging areas, the FNC, and the Emergency j
Operations Facility (EOF). For example, information properlyWdentifying the numbers of the sirens which did not activate and their associated zone designations wasdransmitted to the appropriate staging areas within twenty (20) minutes after the LERO JOC had been informed of the siren failures. Internal LJRO EOC communications wer# generally clear and efficient. The LERO EOC staff was enerally well trained in the use of LERO message forms and checklists, thus f facilitating he flow of information.
However, when the twoN2) free play impediment messages ere introduced at j
It the LERO EOC, all pertinent information was notitransferred from the free play i
timpediment message forms introduced by the exercise controller to the LERO message forms. Pertinent information wasNot included on the 1045 LERO message form from the i
' Evacuation Route Coordinator to the Evacuation Support Communicator for Route
< Spotters / Road Crews regarding the simulated impediment involving a gravel truck, including the fact that three (3) passenger cars were lavolved in the accident and the instruction that Jt e LERO responder should locate the Federal evaluator. Also, pertinent information was%ot included on the 1106 LERO message form from the Evacuation Route Coordinator to the Route Spotter / Road Crew Communicator regarding the simulated impediment involving the fuel truck, including the fact that the fuel truck was leaking, the fact that there was the, possibility of fire, the fact that both shoulders of the road were blocked, and the instruction that the LERJ responder should locate the Federal evaluator. All coordinators and those who initiate messages should be trained to
- Include all pertinent information on the LERO message forms. (The situation involved with the impediments is discussed further in this section under EOC 17.)
In addition, the 1205 message concerning the " visual check" of the fuel truck impediment from the Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Stagin,g Area to the Transportation Support Coordinator wa/ partially illegible and was7not written on a standard LERO message form.
LERO should consider whether operations could be improved by additional training stressing the mandatory use of standard message forms and the importance of legibility.
The objective of demonstrating that the appropriate official is in charge and in control of an overall coordinated response including decisions on protectivejetion
)
endations was partly met (EOC 8). The Director of Local Response wask charge
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recojm and dbordinated response actions including decisions on protective actions. Appropriate M v' l0X
a U17193 I
si 32 1
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protective action recommendations were made by the accident assessment staff in the LERO EOC and were relayeMyla the Radiation Health Coordinator to the Health Services Coord!nator. Since the scenario provided limited release data, most of the Discussions of protective action recommendations were based on projected doses.
evacuation options were81mited, and all LILCO evacuation recommendations were followed.
However, there were several times when the Director was not in the command over the RECS telephone or the dedicated telephone. At these times, room to take cal a secretary took the calls and indicated to the caller that the Directobould call Lack.
Since both ;etenhone systems are used to communicate vital emergency information, it is recommended that any personnel responsible for answering the telephones when the Director's responsibilities require his presence outside the command room should be trained to take the message in writing and then carry it to the Director immediately upon completion of the transmission.
The cbjective of demonstrating the ability to coordinate the emergency response with county and State officials was met with the role of State and/or county officials LERO had a State / county being simulatef by FEMA designated personnel (EOC 9).
liaison assigned to interf ace with.the simulators of State and county officials.
Upon aryiving at the LERO EOC, the County Executive representative Bimulated county assistance in responding to the (simulator) waspriefed in detail.
emergency was requested of him by the Director of Local Response. Although county
.. assistance w ot offered (per the simulator plan for the exercise), LERO continued to
. accommodate State and county involvement in the formulation of protective action recommendations and the issuance of EBS messages. The Cpunty Public Affairs Office representative (simulator) arrived at about 0918 and was4riefed impdiately by the Public Information Coordinator. News releases and EBS messages werMoordinated with the County Public Aff airs Office representative (simulator) prior to simulated release.
made/ numerous, / substantial briefings of i
The accident assessment staff appropriate State and county simulators.
J i
The Evacuation Coordinator contacted the county (simulator) to determine whether county assistance would be available. Near the end of the exercise when they county (simulator) made assistance available, the Evacuation Coordinator contacted them at about 1630 to begin determining the number of county police that would be required to assist with the staffing of various acosss points around the periphery of the 10-mile EPZ to prevent reentry.
LERO demonstrated'the ability of the designated official to determine the need to obtain State assistance, thereby meeting an exercise objective (EOC 10). The ab t
ade to determine the need for State assistance was demonstrated when requests were for simulated police, road clearance, anp radiological monitoring support personnel.
Simulated police and road personnel were/rpquested in responding to the impediments to evacuation.
LERO officials requested / simulated State police, radiological field monitoring, and personnel monitoring assistance at the Reception Center. Per simulator plans for the exercise, simulated State assistance was not provided. However, LERO
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ek [
U17194' 32 adequately demonstrate the ability to determine the need for such assistance. The LERO Director of Local Response, in coorJJnation with the Manager of Local Response thenTorwarded to the State Health Department representative (sim An exercise objective was met by demonstrating the ability to communicate with Dedicated all appropriate locatlogggptions, and field personnel (EOC 11).
telephones and radios linked tife LERO EOC with the EOF, the BHO, the ENC, the EBS station (WALK-JM), and the three (3) LERO emergency worker staging areas.
, Telecopiers were available for the transmission and receipt of hard copies.
In the accident assessment area, the RECS dedicated telephone was use to
' communicate with the EOF. The U.. Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Plan (DOE RAP) Team Liaison used telephonejo communicate with the DOE RAP Telephones were usedjto communicate with all thef Team Captain at the BHO.
decontamination centers'.
All these systems wereVoperational and their use wtY demonstrated throu hout the exercise.
There was one (1) dedicated telephone line between the public information area and the EfC. There wjre also three (3) standard telephone lines. Corryputers were used
'in preparing and transtnitting messages to the ENC. A copy maAine wAs also available.
N Radio and telephone comtry nications with all three (3) staging areas were
- established rapidly and maintainedvthroughout t exercise. Communications with t[
' homebound, special facilities, and schocis d wep.
After the schools had been assist in calling the contacted, the two (2) School Coordinators werev used tfo j
homebound. The Route Spotter / Road Crew Communicate was in constant contact with
' the Evecuation RouteJpotters. There were occasion interference problems on this radio, but these did norcompromise the overall effectiveness of the communications. J/i
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The ability to communicate with a fire company and Hess Oil Company was l
Amonstrated while responding to the gasoline truck impediment.
The Emergency Medical /Public Services Coordinator, the Ambulance Coordinator, and the Hospital Coordinator effectively Coordinator, the Health Serv e j affected hospft als and ambulance /ambulette demonstrated their ability o contact companies. The available communications equipment is appropriate for their emergency
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j munications with all l
The Support Services Coordinator maintained open functional elements under his jurisdiction. Security was ke informed by two (2)-way radios at the three (3) accejs points and at the main security desk in the lobby.
j Telephone communication was maintained throughout the exercise with theJERO Family
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l Tracking Coordinator. The American Red Cross Coordinator maintained contact with the Reception Center and American Red Cross headquarters in Mineola.
The. objective of demonstrating the ability to receive and interpret re.diation l
dossge projection information and to determine appropriate protective measures based J
on Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) and information received from the BHO was 47 /
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U17195 j
partly met (EOC 12). Radiation dose projections were made by the accident assessment staff in the LERO EOC. Before the release began, these projections were based on projected releases and af ter the release began, simulated release data received from the field monitoring teams were usef. Although the Radiation Health Coordinator and the Nuclear Engineer demonstrated good judgment in making correct PAG determinations.
OPIP 3.6.1, Attachment 5 should be revised to account for the case of containment failure without core failure.
In addition, the downwind distance of the ' sample was incorrectly)(reported 7000 meters instead of 700 meters for o e of the thyroid doses reported by a DOE RAP field monitoring team. This error w aused by a decimal point misplaced during the conversion of the distance units nd meant that the initial calculation of thyroid dose based on this measurement was 000 mrem /hr at 4.3 miles downwpd instead of 9000 mrem /hr a about 0.5 mi s downwind. About five (5) minutes elapsed before this error was foun nd correct 2 It is recommended that corrective action be taken to avoid such confusion by consistently reporting all downwind distances from the field in either miles or meters.
During the reporting of the initial DOE RAP thyroid doses, only one (1) field measurement,jhe 1400 mrem /hr measurement made at r.bcut 1204 at two (2) miles from the plarit, was%vailable. This value we.s4 sed in the LERO EOC to extrapolate doses at
'other distances.
However, these, extrapolated data wereNreported as actual measurements rather than as pr jected data the dose assessment status board. It took two and one half (2.5) hours t dentify and orrect this error. LERO should review the
.fleid monitoring team reporting procedures to ensure proper coordination and proper reporting.
Protective action recommendations were made by the Redia ~ tion Health
., Coordinator based on projected dose, meteorological forecasts, duration of release, plant status, and plant projections.
The prot ve action recommendations made by the Radiation Hea h Coordinator were consistent with the EPA PAGs for child thyroid dose which wat. the appropriate dose pathway for this exercise scenario.
! accurate briefings.
The Health Services Co dinator generally provided However, although he later quoted he PAG correctly when asked to do so by a Federal evaluator, the Health Services Coordinator Emisstated the EPA PAG as teing mandatory evacuation when the projected thyroid doce was five (5) Rem. This misst mentbas made during a briefing held at the LERO EOC at about 1110 and it did ot affect the decision-making process. It is recommended that the Health Services Coordinator review the EPA PAG guidance in order to avoid any possible confusion due to misinformation given during briefings.
LERO met the objective of demonstrating the ability to provide advance coordination of public alerting and instructional messages wi}h the State and county whose participation was simulated (EOC 13). Messages were/ coordinated between the LERO PIO and county PIO (simulptor) at the LERO EOC.
Both State and county representatives (simulators) wereWriefed in the issuance of EBS messages and news
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U17190 3'
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releases, and EBS messages were provided to the county PIO (simulapt r) for comment prior to release. Coordination of EBS messages prior to release was effected between i
the Director of Local Response and the County Executive representative (simulator).
The objective of demonstrating the ability to activate the prompt notification siren system in coordination with the State and county with simulated State and county participation was partly met (EOC 14). The simulated activation of the siren system was coordinated by the LERO Coordinator of Public Information with the County Executive representative Simulator). Per simulator plans for the exercise, coordination with the
, State PIO was not observed.
Prioge to the exercise, LILCO management made the 13, 1986
, decision that the siren system wouldenot be activated as part of the February
, exercise. It is recommended that activation of the siren system should be actually tested in the future.
The objective of demonstrating the capability for providing both an alert signal and an informational or instructional messaga to the population on an area-wide basis throughout the 10-mile EPZ within fif teen (15) minutes (simulated) was met (EOC 15).
OPIP 3.3.4, Section 2.1, requires that sirens be activated in coordination with the EBS system subsequent to the declaration of a Site Area Emergency ECL, the declaration of a General Emergency ECL, and the decision by the Director of Local Response to initiate
' or change protective action recommendations. OPIP 3.3.4, Section 3.1, requires that
' activation of the prompt notification ' system must take place within fifteen (15) minutes
' of a decision on the specific protective action recommendations that are to be broafeast
' to the public via EBS messages. In all cases the sirens werfrounded (simulated)%ithin/-
- the fifteen (15) minutes of the LERO EOC command decision. All EBS message werY
[ coordinat'ed in accordance with the Plan. The simulated broadcast of EBS messages j
' always%ecurred within six (6) minutes af ter the simulated siren sounding.
OPIP 3.L4, Section 2.1, requires activation only of the siren system, while Section 3.1 indicates that the prompt notification system is to be activated following a decision on protective actions.
Since the prompt notification system is defined in Section 3.4, Subsection H of tne Plan, to include not only the siren system, but also the tone alert radio system and the backup mobile public address system, a potential exists for inconsistency within the Plan which could lead to confusion. LERO should consider whether procedures wculd be improved by making Sections 2.1 and 3.4 of OPIP 3.3.4 consistent.
In addition, Section 3.0 of OPIP 3.8.2, notes only that OPIP 3.3.4 must be implemented for the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency ECLs. This reference falls to note the requirement that the sirens be activated in coordination with the EBS whenever protective action recommendations are initiated or changed (OPIP 3.3.4, Section 2.1).
LERO should consider whether procedures would be improved by making Section 3.0 of OPIP 3.8.2 consistent with Section 2.1 of OPIP 3.3.4.
The LERO EOC met the exercise objective of demonstrating the organizational ability to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ including the water portion (EOC 16).
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35 U17197 News of the f ailure of three (3) sirens to sound was received a he LERO EOC at about 0810 (simulated).
By approximately 0821, the messagg had been given to the Special Facilitiesfvacuation Coordinator, who determined which stren ones were He then led the-affected affected by using the appropriate table from the Plan.
staging areas, requesting dispatch of route aleping and verification, f both dispatch and completion of the route. These calls had been completed by about 0831.
Plans to 7plement evacuation were/made early and the flow of 1
information was checked.
As early as 0805, before the receipt of the utility the declaration of a Site Area Emergency ECL, the Bus recommendation fpcalling bus companies to determine the potential, num Coordinators were available. The Transportation Support Coordinator and Bus Coordinators worked well together using this information and the number of buses actually needed by each staging The manual system used for allocating the available buses to different routes area.
f The staff based on the/ numbers required as specified in the Plan workedvwellj.
demonstratecFthat they understood what was required and that they werp familiar with the appropriate procedures. The Manager of Local Response contacted /the Evacuation Coordinator at about 0844 to determine whether the staging areas kne of the county's (simulated) position on assistance.
Wh the Manager informed the Evacuation uation of Coordinator at about Oy32 that prestagin f personnel for the potential pgv Zones A-G was beingVconsidered, the Evacuation Coordinator requested his staff to develop lists of potentially affected TCPs, staging areas, and Route Spotters.
The Traffic Control, T,raffy Control Ppint, Evacuation Route, and Road Logistics j
Coordinators eachTroceeded to detpine the procedures required in their respective Good use was made of both the LERO forms and bulletin board areas of responsibility.
maps in determining which personnel wo d need to be dispatched. When the message to evacuate Zones A-M, Q, and R was received at approxinfately 1011, much of the identification of the re utred resources had already beerf accomplished. This' early identification expedited initiation of the evacuatio/n By 1023, telep one calls (simulated) were being made/o homebound individuals.
These calls conveyed all appropriate information,synd were made using the appropriate v
message forms. The Home Copoinator maintainflists of individuals requiring curbside pickup.
Special buses were assigned to pick up these individuals.
If the Home Coordinator does not make telephone contact with a particular individual, the Bus Driver, who has copies of the list, is told to check at the residence /o see if the individual is hpme. The Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator directed this effort and kept informed of its progress.
Listings of special facilities requiring ambulance services are maintained in OPIP 3.6.5, along with lists of ambulance companies under contract. An evacuation of the entire 10-mile EPZ would require that about eight hundred eight (808) individuals with special needs be picked up. Fif ty-seven (57) ambulances and one hundred eighteen (118) ambulette vans with a total capacity to move five hundred eighty-six (586) people in approximately two (2) hours are available under the Plan. The remaining people would be evacuated in a seco round of pickups requiring an additional one and one half (1.5) hours.
According to exercise participants, additional ambulances could be requested from volunteer fire companies and volunteer ambulance companies in the area.
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- U1719S, When the free play messages were injected at about 1030 requesting that an ambulance be sent to Our Lady of Perpetual Help Convent that an ambulette be sent to the United Cerebral Palsy Residence, messages were handled expeditiously by the LERO EOC staff Both messages ha one from e Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator to he Health Facilities Coordinator ojthe Ambulance Coordinator, according to the Plan, by about 1 55. The ambulance had been dispatched by about 1100 and the ambulette by about 111 The objective of demons trating the organizational ability to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic obstructions, was not met (EOC 17).
e flow of information on impediments needs to be improved and there were unnecessar elays in responding to the impediments.
There were two (2) simulated impediments, one (1) involving a gravel truck and three (3) cars (referred to hereaf ter as gravel truck), and one (1) involving a fuel truck, for which the free play messages were injected at about 1040 and 1100, respectively.
-(See discussion of objective EOC 7 in this section fo a summary of problems in handling these messages accurately.) Although there wer roblems verifying the gravel truck impediment in the fie d because the Federal evaluator was not at the specified location, a Route Spotter had met the Federal evaluator at the site of the simpated gravel truck impediment by about 1140. However, the Evacuation Coordinator 90Ls not inforged of
? either impediment until after about,1213, and even then was informed by th6' FEMA
' Controller. OPIP 3.6.3, Attachment 3, Section 3 requires that Evacuation Route Spotters
' report any problems to the Evacuation Route Coordinator immediately: Section 5.6.7 requires the Evacuation Route Coordinator to obtain periodie updates from the Route
- Spotters and to report problems to the Traffic Control Coordinator; Section 5.22 requires
' the Transportation Control Coordinator to periodically update the Evacuation t Coordinator on the status of traffic control activities. Although news of the simulated impediments did not originate with observations by Route Spotters, it is apparent that the intent of OPIP 3.6.3 is that the Evacuation Coordinator be kept i formed of problems including impediments or suspected impediments.
The late notification of the Evacuation Coordinator resulted 4n unnecessary delays in responding to the Impediments. By pout 1245, the Evacuation Coordinator had discussed the following with his staff: the omission of the ijn traction to meet the Federal evaluators in the field from the LERO Message Forms; thE need to inform the Road Logistics Coordinator, who 7
had not been informed of both impediments;)t e need to reroute tWfic around the impediments and the procedures for so doing; the need to contact a fire department to -
respond to the spilled fuel; and the need to supply dosimetry for the responding fire f
department.
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There was also a lack 6f lateral and downwarf communi ation in the chain of command in responding to some aspectgof the impediments. e ate as about 1240, the j
Transportation Support Coordinator haa not been nformed that bus evacuation route M-1 i
was potentially blocked by a gravel truck.
ate as about 1348, the Road Logistics
]
Coordinator hadkot been informed that there might be a need to send equipment to the site of the fuel truck impediment despite the fact that the Evacuation Coordinator had discussed the situation with respect to road logistics with some of his staff as early as about 1216.
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U17199 It is recommended that two (2) actions be taken to correct this deficiency. First, Irternal communications procedures should be reviewed and revised as necessary to j
ensure that information on impediments is passed both up the chain of command to the Evacuation Coordinator and downward and laterally to all lead coordinators under the Evacuation Coordinator and their staffs. This information flow should take place as soon as practicable after instituting impediment verification procedures and any other Impediment-related actions required by the Plan.
Dissemination of this information would facilitate advance planning, coordination, and the identification and alerting of appropriate field personnel, thereby reducing the time needed to respond to verified impediments. Second, additional training is recommended to ensure that the Procedures, whether new or current, are implemented properly.
Although there was a essage received by the Transportation Support Coordinator from pe Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area timed 1205 which indicated that a " visual check" of the fuel ruck impediment had indicated that there was i
no problem, more than one (1) hour had lapsed between receipt of this message and injection of the free play impediment essage at the LERO EOC. The Evacuation Coordinator should have been informe ore quickly to ensure a timely, coordinated i
response to the impediment after it had been verified. (See objective EOC 7 in this section for additional discussion of this message.)
After the Road Logistics Coordinator had beenl informed of the
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, equipment to the fuel truck impediment, the response to that impedim appearedv -
adequate. A Road Crew was dispatched by approximately 1350. When it etermined (by FEMA injection) that the truck belonged to Hess Oil Co., Hess w called by about 1415 and indicated that they would have the fuel transferred from the overtujned tanker in accordance with their normal procedures.
As a result of the subject ^ delays, the
, Federal evaluator could not observe a response to the fuel truck impediment.
Based on observations made by the Federal evaluator, the equipment responding to the gravel truck impedpent was inadequate for two (2) reasons: 1) since the message from the LERO EOC did' hot specify that t ee (3) cars were involved, only one (1) tow j
truck wKs dispatched, and 2) no scraper w ent to remove spilled gravel from the road, nor was a/ determination ever made as to whether any gravel had been spilled. It is recommended that corrective action be taken by training personnel in the need for additional review and discussion of the equipment required to clear impediments. These discussions should include, at a minimum, the Evacuation Coordinator and the four (4) lead coordinators who report to him.
At about 1115, af ter having tried unsuccessful to contact Route Spotter #1005, on whose route the fuel tpk impediment was located, the Route Spotter / Road Crew Communicator requested the Port Jefferson Evacuation Support Communicator to This spotter was not determine [whether Route Spotter #1005 had been dispatched.
dispatche until about 1202.
ThisXdelay of about forty-five (45) minutes, although apparently caused by the need to brief the Route Spotter at the Port Jefferson Staging Area, interfere Ith the timely verification of the fuel truck impediment. Since this time could be important in clearing impediments to evacuation, alternatives for rapid verification should have been explored in consultation with the Evacuation Coordinator and the Evacuation Route Coordinator. It is recommended that corrective action be M
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U17200' 3,
taken by training personnel in the development of alternative approaches when delays are reasonably anticipated in the field verification of impediments to evacuation.
Development of alternatives should include consultation between, at a minimum, the Evacuation Coordinator and the Evacuation Route Coordinator.
A demonstration of the organizational ability necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools withphe 10-mile EPZ could not be observed (EOC 18). Both public and private schools were simulated to have been contacted prior to JO 45. It should be noted, however, that only the Shoreham-Wading River School District' participated in the February 13,1986 exercise Prior to the exercise, LILCO management made the decision that other school districts were not to be included in the exercise. In the future all schools must be included in all Federally evaluated exercises and drills, i
An exercise objective was met by demonstrating the organizational ability necessary to control ac9ess to an evacuated area (EOC 19). The Traffic Control Point /
Coordinator determinett which TCPs needed to be staffed.
This information was communicated ty'the staging areas according to the Plan. The Evacuation Coordinator initially notifiedhhe Coast Guard at about 0755.
Access control was enhanced y coordination with the county police (simulator).
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'Near the end of the exercise, whey simulated police assistance was made available, the Evacuatifn Coordinator contacted'the, county police (simulated) at about 1630 to begin
- workint/out the numbers of simulated police that would be required at various points
- around the periphery of the 10-mile EPZ to prevent reentry.
Since schools would have already been closed, an actual demonstration of the organizational ability necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ could not be observed at the LERO EOC (EOC 20). However, this exercise i
' objective was met as demonstrated in response to a free play message inserted to demonstrate this activity. A free play message requesting school bus resources to assist in transporting forty (40) children from Ridge Elementary School was given to the Evacuation Coordinator by the Exercise Controller at the ERO EOC at approximately 1030. In a 1041 message the pertinent information was communicated the Special Population Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area, reques ng that a bus be picked up at the United Bus Company.
Coordination was effected with the superintendent of thf Longwood Central School District,p which Ridge Elementary School is located, to confirm arrivalof the bus. Arrival was confirmed at about 1323 but 5
it was noted thatpe bus had np yet arrived at the Reception Center. The Reception Center was contacted and requested to inform the Public School Coordinator at the LERO EOC when the bus arrived.
The objective of demonstrating the ability to prepare and implement EBS in a timely manner (to be simulated within fifteen (15] minutes af ter command and control decision for implementation of protective action recommendations) was met (EOC 2t).
Each EBS message that was used to cony instructions to the public regarding protective actions, was aired within fifteen (15) minutes of LEROs protective action decisions.
/7 /
JX o
U17201 DEFICIENCY
==
Description:==
Delays in responding to the two (2) evacuation impediment free-play messages inserted at the LERO EOC were caused
.by the failure to inform the Evacuation Coordinator in a timely.
In addition there was a lack of internal communication in manner.
response to these impediment problems. Pertinent information was not included on the 1045 and 1106 LERO ' Message Forms from the Evacuation Route Coordinator to 'the Evacuation Support Communicator for Route Spotters / Road Crews regarding the simulated Impediment involving the gravel truck and fuel truck problems. As a -
result of this lack of information, the impediment problems were not analyzed in a timely fashion and incomplete equipment was dispatched to handle the gravel truck impediment in the field (NUREG-0654,11 -
J.10.k).
Recommendation:
Internal communications procedures should - be reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure that information on impediments is promptly passed both up the chain of command to the Evacuation Coordinator and downward. and laterally to ' all lead coordinators under the Evacuation Coordinator and thelr staffs.
Additional training is needed* to ensure that the procedures, whether I
new or current, are properly implemented. All coordinators at the.
EOC, and those who initiate messages, must be trained to include all pertinent information on the LERO message forms and to analyze the equipment requirements to clear impediments, AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
==
Description:==
There was some confusion regarding the method for notifying the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (NUREG-0654, II F.1.c).
Recommendation 1: The LERO procedures should be reviewed and revised as necessary ti.; ensure that a point of contact with the FAA has been designated.
Recommendation 2: The LERO EOC staff should be trained in the appropriate procedures so that the FAA can be notified in a timely mnnner.
2.
==
Description:==
Since there are no procedures for notification of the Long Island Railroad (LIRR) in the Plan, the LIRR was not notified I
during the exercise (NUREG-0654,11 T.1, F.1.a).
Recommendation 1: The LERO procedures should be revised to estabush a point of contact and a means for notifying the LIRR.
l
U172d2 Recommendation 2: The LERO EOC staff should be trained in the revised procedures so that the LIRR can be notified in a timely manner.
3.
==
Description:==
The dose asse_ssment status board in the accident assessment area had to accommodate both DOE RAP and LILCO field monitoring data. There were not enough columns on the board to keep the two (2) sources of d'ata separated (NUREG-0654, II,1.10)
Recommendation:
LERO should enlarge the dose assessment status board to accommodate a clear separation between the data
)
J reports from the DOE RAP and LILCO field monitoring teams.
==
Description:==
The downwind distance of the sample was incorrectly 4.
reported as 7000 meters instead of 700 meters for one of the thyroid doses reported by a DOE RAP field monitoring team. This error was caused by a decimal point misplaced during the conversion of the distance un!ts and meant that the initial calculation of thyroid dose based on this measurement was 9000 mrem /hr at 4.3 miles do)vnwind instead of 9000 mrem /hr at about 0.5 miles downwind. About five (5) minutes elapsed before this error was found and corrected (NUREG-0654, !!,1.10, F.1.d).
Recommendation: All downwind distances from the field should be reported consistently in either miles or meters.
5.
==
Description:==
During the reporting of the initial DOE RAP thyroid doses, only one field measurement, the 1400 mrem /hr measure-ment made at about 1204 at two (2) miles from the plant, was svallable. This value was used at the LERO EOC to extrapolate doses at other distances. These extrapolated data were reported as actual measurements 6t other distances rather than as projected data on the dose assessment status board. It took two and one half (2.5) hours to identify and correct this error (NUREG-0654,11, 1.10).
Recommendation: LERO reporting procedures should be reviewed to ensure proper coordination and proper reporting.
6.
==
Description:==
Although he later quoted the PAG correctly when asked to do so by a Federal evaluator, during a briefing held at '.he LERO EOC at about 1110, the Health Services Cooedine. tor misstated the EPA PAG as being mandatory evacuation when the projected thyroid dose was five (5) Rem (NUREG-0654,11,1.10).
Recommendation: The Health Services Coordinator should review the EPA PAG guidance 'in order to avoid any possible confusion that could result due to misinformation given during briefings.
U17203 7.
==
Description:==
Prior to the exercise, LILCO management made the decision that the siren system would not be activated as part of the February 13,1986 exercise (NUREG-0654, !!. E.6).-
Recommendation:
Activation of the siren system should be J
actually tested in the future.
l l
8.
==
Description:==
There was a delay of about forty-five (45) minutes between the LERO EOCs first attempt to have Route Spotter
- 1005 verify the fuel truck impediment and the dispatch of that spotter from the Port Jefferson Staging Area. This delayed timely verification of the impediment (NUREG-0654, II, E.2).
Recommendation:
Personnel need to be trained in the development of alternative approaches when delays are reasor. ably anticipated in the field verification of impediments to evacuation.
Development of alternatives should include consultation between, at a minimum, the Evacuation Coordinator and the Evacuation Route Coordinator.
9.
==
Description:==
Only the Shoreham-Wading River School District participated in the February 13, 1986 exercise.
Prior to the exercise, LILCO management made the decision that other school districts were not to be included in the exercise.
Recommendation: In the future all schools must be included in all Federally evaluated exercises and drills.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
The command and control room was too crowded during some of the briefings on accident assessment.
Recommendation: LERO should consider whether operations could
]
be improved by providing less crowded conditions during these briefings.
==
Description:==
State and county personnel (simulated) did not have a j
=
specific area assigned to them.
Recom mendation:
Operations could be improved if a particular space for State and county personnel were available in the LERO EOC.
==
Description:==
There was some duplication between the briefings conducted in the briefing room and those conducted in the i
operations area.
U17204 Recommendation: LERO should consider whether operations could be improved by consolidating the two (2) sets of briefings to avoid duplication.
==
Description:==
There was no key events or evacuation status boards posted in the command room.
Recommendation: Key events and evacuation status boards should be posted in the command room.
==
Description:==
The 1205 message concerning the " visual check" of the fuel truck impediment from the Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area to the Transportation Support Coordinator was partially illegible and was not written on a standard LERO message form.
Recommendation: LERO should consider whether operations could be improved by additional training stressing the mandatory use of l
standard message forms and the importance of legibility.
==
Description:==
There were spveral times when the Director was not in i
the command room to tak'e calls over the RECS telephone or the
?
dedicated telephone. At these times, a secretary took the calls and 4
indicated to the caller that the Director would call back (NUREG-i 0654, !!, F.1).
l Recommendation:
Any personnel responsible for answering the telephone when the Director's responsibilities require his presence outside the command room should be trained to take the message in writing and then carry it to the Director immediately upon completion of the transmission.
Description OPIP 3.3.4,-Section 2.1 requires activation of only the i
l l
siren system, while Section 3.1 Indicates that the entire " prompt notification system" (which, according to Section 3.4, Subsection H of the Plan also includes the tone alert radio system and the backup mobile public address system) be activated following a decision on protective actions.
Recommendation: LERO should consider whether procedures would be improved by making Sections 2.1 and 3.4 of OPIP 3.3.4 consistent.
==
Description:==
The precaution in Section 3.0 of OPIP 3.8.2, notes only 1
that OPIP 3.3.4 must be implemented for the Site Area and General Emergency ECLs. This reference f ails to note the requirement that the strens be activated In' coordination with the EBS whenever protective action recommendations are initiated or changed (OPl?
3.3.4, Section 2.1).
'3 U17205
{
i Recommendation: LERO should consider whether procedures would be improved by making Section 3.0 of OPIP 3.8.2 consistent with Section 2.1 of OPIP 3.3.4.
3 I
4 l
2.1.1 Implementation of Field Activities (LERO EOC)
Field activities dispatched from the LERO EOC were evacuation of special l
facilities by ambulance and ambulette, and school evacuation.
The objective of demonstrating a sample of the resources necessary to effect an f
orderly evacuation of the institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals within the 10-l e demonstrations (Field mile EPZ was met with respect to the ambulance and ambulet;the need for ambulance I
The ambulance coordfator at the LERO EOC identified l
13).
resources and implemente.d nojlfication call-up procedu es for them. Six (6) ambulances and six (6) ambulettes were activated nd all were dispatched to pick up mobil' y-Impaired individuals. Written lists are available at the LERO ZOC which identif3 the locations of the mobility-impaired. One (1) of the six (6) pick-up routes that was run by l
an ambulance was observed by a Federal yvaluator. The route from the LERO EOC o Our Lady of Perpetual Help Convent to/he VA Hospital in Northpjo t and back to the t
l LERO EOC took two and one half (2.5) hours to complete which isWithin the evacuation i
uring the demonstration of this objective by time estimate included in the LEROj(naps.f, and instructions were given prior to disp lan the ambulette driver, proper forms, The Ambulett to find the locations of the pick-up points and complete the route in a/e Driver was abl into the field.j An additional person who could assist the timely manner.
Ambulette Driver in message handling (radio) and map reading would be beneficial.
LERO should consider whether operations could be improved by having a second person accompany the Ambulette Drivers on their routes.
A sample of resources necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools or an j
l orderly evacuation of schools was demonstrated through the simulated dispatch of seventeen (17) buses to the Shoreham-Wading River High School and the release of studejn s for transportation back to their homes (Field 15 and 16). The dismissal ac l
were implemented by the Superintendent of the school district. The bus comyny, which Is under cojrtract to the school district and available apny time, was notified and dispatched"two (2) buses to the high school. Drivers were given detailed maps of routes to follow and instructions to report back to the busppot upon completion of their Y
A sufficient number of buses and drivers are available for the transportation routes.
responsibilities required during an evacuation of schools.
DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the implementation of field activities deployed l
from the LERO EOC during the exercise.
ba/
DY
\\
I i
Ul?20G AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION No areas requiring corrective action were observed in the implementation of field activities deployed from the LERO EOC during the exercise.
AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
The Ambulette Drivers could use another person to assist them with map reading and message handling.
Recommendation A second person should accompany the Ambulette Drivers on their routes.
2.1.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Expostre Control With respect to the ambulance and ambulette demonstrations, the objective to l
demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure includ g proper use of dosimetrygas met (Fleld 1). Ambulance and ambulette personnel were issued dosimetry equipment %onsisting of 0-200 mrem and 0-5gm_ direct-reading dosimeters (DRDs), a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD), dosewecord forms, and
' simulated potassium iodide tablets
)j. Prior to deployment into the field, the l
ambulance and ambulette teams were 4iven a comprehensive briefingjn personnel dosimetry by LERO workers. The Ambulance and Ambulette Drivers were" familiar with dosimetry and its use.
j The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
l including the proper use of dosimetry, was not demonstrated by the Bus Drivers used to
)
transport school children in the event of an early dismissal or a gyneral dismissal of schools (Field 1). Bus Drivers us3d for school evacuation have not^been supplied with dosimetry nor have they receivedNdequate training in its use. It is recommended that the Bus Drivers used for school evacuation should be trained in dosimetry use and radiological exposure control, and provided with adequate supplies of dosimetry.
The objective to supply and administ r KI to the ambulette and ambulance personnel was partly met (Fleid 7).
El was available in sufficient amounts and was 1
distributed prior to deployment of the ambulettes and ambulances. However, some of f
the Ambulette Drivers were noraware of when the K1 should be taken. It is recom-mended that training on KI procedures should be given to the Ambulette Drivers.
Ambulance Drivers were given instructions to take KI prior to their deployment into the l
field.
The ability to supply and administer KI to Bus Drive used for school evacuation was not demonstrated (Field 7). Bus rivers have not bee rained in KI policy and the I
l use of Kl. Sufficient stores of KI not available for Bus Drivers. It is recommended l
that Bus Drivers used for school evacuation should be trained in KI policy and use.
l Adequate supplies of K1 should also be provided to Bus Drivers used for school evacuation.
's U17207
/
PAGs were discussed durinpthe briefing before the ambulance teams left for the Additional injf rmation is41so available on the emergency worker dose record field.
Ambulance Drivers wer forms, which were supplied to each emergency worker.
v knowledgeable in their understanding of the PAGs (Fleld 8).
However, Ambulette and School Bus Dylvers were not)(all trained reg
.W can authorize doses in excess of and what tMio in the event of an exposure beyond the general public PAGs.
The objective of demonstrating that emergency workers j
understand who can authorize exposure in excess of the general public PAGs was partly met with respect to the ambulette and school evacuation demonstrations (Field 8).
It is recommended that Ambulette and School Bus Drivers be trained regarding who can authorize exposure in excess of the general public PAGs.
DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the implementation of emergency. worker i
radiological exposure control for field activities deployed from the LERO EOC during the exercise.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE CTION 1.
==
Description:==
Desimetry and training have not been provided to the Bus Drivers used for school evacuation (NUREG-0654, II, K.3, K.5.a).
Recommendation 1: Bus Drivers used for school evacuation should be trained in the use of dosimeters.
Recommendation 2:
Adequate supplies of dosimetry should be provided for Bus Drivers used for school evacuation.
1 2.
==
Description:==
Some of the Ambulette Drivers were not aware of when to take their KI (NUREG 0654, II, J.10.e).
Recommendation: Training on KI procedures should be given to the ambulette drivers.
3.
==
Description:==
Cus Drivers used for school evacuation have not been trained in K1 policy and the use of Kl. Sufficient supplies of K! are not available for school evacuation Bus Drivers (NUREG-0654, !!,
J.10.e).
Recommendation 1: Bus Drivers used for school evacuation should be trained in K! policy and the use of KI.
Recommendation 2: Adequate supplies of K! should be provided for Bus Drivers used for school evacuation.
3/
4x
's U17208 Ambulette Drivers were not all trained regarding who
==
Description:==
4.
can authorize doses in excess of and what to do in the event of I
exposure above the general public PAGs (NUREG-0654, II, K.4).
Recommendation:
Ambulette Drivers should be trained on excessive exposure authorization and applicable procedures.
Bus Drivers used for school evacuation have not been
==
Description:==
5.
trained regarding who can authorize exposure in excess of the freneral public PAGs (NUREG-0654, II, K.4).
Recommendation: Bus Drivers used for school evacuation should receive training regarding who can authorize exposure in excess of the general public PAGs.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No areas recommended for improvement were observed in the implementation of emergency wori;er radiological exposure control for field activities deployed from the LERO EOC during the exercise.
2.2 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)
The EOF is located at the LILCO Training Center just west of Veterans Memorial Highway off the Long Island Expressway. The EOF is eighteen and one-half (18.5) miles
/
f a
/
from the SNPS site.
The EOF has adequate spacepquipmen, supplieY, and amenities to support emergency operations and interactions #ith the LERO EOC (EOF 1). Seven (7) roomsg Required displays, the Lf0 Training Cepr were utilized by the EOF operations.
sted in the command c ter and the dose assessment maps, and status boards were Status boards were wcll maintained and complete with pertinent data. Command and contrpl of the EOF was the responsibility of the Response Manager, who ef area.
during the exercise. Frequent staff conferences were
. directed 4he emergency responjs held and situation reports were given.
aintained at the EOF throughout the exercise Access control and secyity wer Proper identiflyation was required by all personnel requesting entrance into the (EOF 2). All exits were secured during the exercise. The EOF is outside of the 10-mile facility.
EPZ, with the result that no radiological exposure control measures are required.
The ability to coordinate the dose projections based on plant data and field monstrated (EOF 3). Projected measyements with Stay and/or county officials was doses, measured doses, and dose commitment values were displaypd on the radiological Differences in values were/ questioned by the EOF status board in the command cyttec.
Measured doses would be used in decision staff and appropriate answers %ere provided.
If not, the more conservative making, provided there are data for a number of points.
IW Dy
U17209 47
/
yalue would be used. Data from the DOE RAP flejd monitoring teams were received in
/ timely manner. The LILf0 EOF staff providedthompletejnformation, t adequate working space, and communication equipment /to support State and county simulators.
DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed at the EOF during the exercise.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION No areas requiring corrective action were observed at the EOF during the exercise.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No areas recommended for improvement were observed at the EOF during the exercise.
2.3 BROOKHAVEN AREA OFFICE (BHO)
The BHO is located on the DOE Brookhaven National Laboratory site in Upton, New York.
2.3.1 Brookhaven Area Office Operations The BHO demonstrated the ability to receive initial and follow-up emergency notifications (BHO 1). The Duty Officer at the Brookhaven Police Headquarters received the initial telephone call at the Alert ECL. This position is staffeFon a twenty-four (24)/
hour basis. Af ter receiving the notification of the Alert ECL, the Duty Officer consulted a DOE RAP roster and called'a E RAP Team Captain.
When this call wa[not answered, t Duty Officer called he second DOE RAP Team Captain on the roster, who then calle he other members of the DfO RAP response team. After the DOE RAP team was otified, the Duty Officer was mstructed to divert all follow-up notifications to the DOE RAP team.
4 The BHO staff was mobilized and the BHO w etivated in a timelfrmanner (BHO 2). The BHO accident assessment function was perational within seventy (70) miputes after the initial notification. The DOE RAP staff, including the Team Captain, drfd staffs for the dosy assessment function, environmental survey function, and survey teams, arrived in ydmely manner. Af ter assessingdhe situation, the DOE RAP Te m Captain mobilized' additional staff beyond that called for in the Plan to more effect ely respond to the situation.
40/
/)(
4
48 y{72{Q The ability to maintain staffing in the BHO on a twenty-four (24) hour basis was demonstrated (BHO 3). There wasM rostej of relief personnel who would be assigned to a second shift, d telephone calls were/made to ensure their availability. Other DOE facilities were contacted to assu the availability of addit onal backup staff.
Adequate radio telephone equipment and supplie4'were availap to support eny4rgency operations (BHO 4). If needed, an additional operational area was available in a$ecure building.
The BHO established appropriate communication links with the LERO EOC (BHO 5). A dedicated telephone line from the DOE RAP team at the BHO to the DOE RAP liaison at the LERO EOC serves as the primary communication link. Several commercial telephones also are avail ble.
The BHO hasTadequate access control and caiFmaintain security (BHO 6).
Brookhaven National Laboratory, the site of the BHO, is a Federal facility with the Brookhaven Nat nal Laboratory Police providing its own guardf6rce. Excellent security measures were demonstrated; no unauthorized personnel were Edmitted to the f acility.
The objective to demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and
{
timely manner, messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately l
f maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming persof nel iare briefed was met at the BHOjBHO 7). The DOE RAP Team Captain maintainecVa log of the information transmitted"over the dejficated telephone from the DOE RAP liaison at the ERO EOC. LERO staff providecf' information on the plant status by telephone every fifteen (15)/ minutes; this information wasviogg on forms by BHO clerical staff.
Data transmitted'from the field teams by radio wer ecorded on log sheets. During the j
initial stages of the incident, incoming staff wer ffectively briefed by the personnel l
who had already arrived at the response center. On several occasions, the DOE RAP Team Captain briefeddhe DpE-BHO officials on the incident and the teams' actions, and DOE-BHO persunnel briefed' DOE Headquarters personnel.
[he DOE RAP Team Captain, as designated in the Plan, wasTn charge and in f j
contrbl of the dose assessment function assigned to the BHO (BHO 8). He interacted wellV i
with DOE-BHO officials to obtain assistance and additional support.
The ability to communicate with all appropriate fieldpe~ations and personnel was i
, demonstrated (BHO jD. The DOE RAP communicator maintained radio contact with the field teams ing adecure (scrambled frequency) radio system. At one point, one of the receive transmissions over the secure syste A
ost the capability ft field teams courfi with a backup radio was dispatched to the team, and the difficulty was quickly and effectively resolved.
The BHO demonstrated the. ability to project radiation dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant data and field measurements, and to recommend effectively communicate appropriate protective measures to LERO, based on PAGs anp"what if" calculations prio them to the LERO EOC (BHO 10). The DOE RAP staff mad (
l l
to the release of radioactive material. These calculations were based on the design basis LOCA with several possible leak rates.
Once the release occurred, plant status
/ X
i i
f n
D U17211
/
Infor tion (from LERO) was used for dose projections./The computer-based systems wer ed to make the calculations. Field data were Wompared to projections. Dose l
'd The field team information wasv[used to make a plume plot which projection data were xchanged between e BHO DOE RAP operation and the LE tO a
compared ty the projections. The Information, both field data ced projections, was e,
EOC.
d
'l efficientlytfransmitted to the DOE RAP liaison at the LERO EOC.
DEFICIENCIES
)
No deficiencies were observed in the operation of ths Brookhaven Area Office during the exercise.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION No areas requiring corrective action were observed in the operation of the l
Brookhaven Area Office during the exercise.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No areas recommended for (Improvement were observed in the operation of the q
Brookhaven Area Office during the exercise.
)
2.3.2 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams The BHO mobil e and dep radiological field monitori g teams in a mely manney (Field 2). Team members were dentified from 'a list of ained personnel and
/
were/ notified by telephone. The field monitoring personnel ardved at the BHO between twenty-five (25) and seventy (70) minutes after receiving their notification. Each team had three (3) cases containing equipment for personnel protection,' air spmpling, and radiation detection.
Upon their. arrival at the BHO, team embers %onducted an inventory of the field monitoring equipment kits and checke e radiation monitoring j instruments, air sampling equipment, and radios for operability. The field teams werev f
brieff d on the meteorological conditions and %n the current plant status. - The'p were ready for deployment about one (1) hour after arriving at the BHO.
The objective to demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedu esfor determining ambient radiation levels was met (Fleld 3). Field team kits containda, tyh proper instruments for monitoring rja lation. Both low-and high-range instrunnnts wEre contained in the kits. The kits alsveonjained the necessary eggpment for air sampling.
Backup equipment and instruments weYe ava!1 ele. A, sticker was attached to ea)epiece of equipment indicating that all equipmen hed been4alibrated. Each teyn had several area maps in their kits. The tea s were provided with v. ens which wer#1arge enough to carry the equipment, and which ppeared capable of reaching the monitoring points under severe weather conditions.
5 JJ/
O x'
q w
U17212
/
L Members of Field Team A were well trained an'd kne)' the u each instrument. However, two (2) pieces of monitoring equlynentYalled during the exercise.. A probe on the modified CPV-700 failed, but was re@ laced by another orobe contained in the kit. The micro-R-meter fhled and wcs noDreplaced. While this tape left the team.without a' true low-range instrument, suffielent othyr equipment was -
available for low-range monitoring., Readings and samples'taken were' recorded on a field
~ team log sheet, and the data wereMransmitted to the BHO via radios.
Field Team B had all of the appropriate r dibrated equipmet.t and backup equipment. The field team kits contained high-range ion chambers, low raIge GM type survey pteters, and very low-range' micro-R-meter gamjna seintillators.
The team also carrieWa spare high-range ion chamber detector and a4 pare low-range GM surveypeter as well a# multiple detectors (probes) for the low-range instrument.. Equipment vras not.
adequately protected from contamination at E.11 times when the field team was in the plume. Equipment should be protected from contamination by plastic bags, or the unused equipment should remain'in closed kits when the team's vehicle is stopped within the-plume boundaries and the doors are opened. This will help prevent contamination of the monitoring equipment; a contaminated instrument could give an Indication. of the -
presence of radiation even when the instrument is' outside of the actual plume bosndaries.
The appropriate equipment. and procedures for measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrator,s as Iow as 0.1 picoeuries/cc in the presence of noble gasejs were demonstrated by both DOE RAP field teams (Fleld 4). Air samplingpulpment wa3 1
contained in the field team kits. The operability of the equipment wgs checked out j
, before the teams were deployed to the field. Spare equipment #as available at.the assembly point.
Members of Field Team A were ble to properly tak air samples. The flow rate on the air move 7 s fixed but calibrated. A stopfatch wa!used to time th i
Samples were placed in plastic bagsjand transported to a low background area before j
being read; the oamples weggainVbagged andiabeled after being rep. The sample times, places, and reydings were recorded in the team's log, and data were transmitted to the BHO. Samples were transporte? to the BHO via courier.
/ Field Team B gave n excellent demonstration of the proper use of equipment
. and $rocedures to measure radiolodine in the' presence of noble gases.
The field
, monitoring kit contained a calibrated air sampler which operated off of the vehicle power supply. Each equipment kit contained five (5) silver silica gel filters for field determination and five (5) charcoal filters' which could be u*ed,ty take samples for laboratory. analysis.
Additional supplies of both flylr medias were available in the BHO. ~ Air samples from locations which were determined top l_n the~ plume (based on
.l open and closed window radiation survey measurements) were taken to a low background 1
area outside of the plume where the samples wePe counted.
33 GX
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ - _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _. _ - _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ - - _ _ -._
i'-
51 U17213 DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the radiological field monitoring teams deployed from the Brookhaven Area Office during the exercise.
- AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION No areas requiring' corrective action were observed in the radiological field monitoring teams deployed from the Brookhaven Area Office during the exercise.
AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Description Equipment was not adequately prctected from e
contamination at all times when a DOE RAP field team was in the' i
plume (NU REG-0654, II,1.8).
Recommendation Equipment should be protected from contamination by plastic bags or the unused equipment should remain in closed kits when the team is in the plume.
l i
2.3.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control
{
The DOE RAP field teams demonstrated the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker ejposure including proper use of personnel dosimetry (Field i
1). Each tet:n member wKs issued two (2) DRDs, a 0-200 mRempnd a 0-5R, and a permanent rejord device.
Spare dos eters of each range wire available.
The dosimeters were charg d before bein issued and a charger *as available in the kits.
Teams members wer familiar with the usf and function of' dosimetry. They took
/
readings oftenjrecorded them, and reporte#them to the BHO. On one occasion, a field team stoppedlat a location within the plume and waitedko transmit their data to the BHO. The simulated exposure rate at this location was about eighty (80) mrem / hour.
The field team members could have reduced their accumulated exposure somewhat if 3
they had driven to a location at the edge of the plume (or outside of the plume) to wait j
1 while transmitting their data to the dose assessment center.
The ability to supply and administer KI, once the decisiog)ad'been made to do A supply of KI wis ltocked at the BHO.
so, was successfully demonstrated (Fleidf)u.
e Each DOE RAP field team member wy iss ed simulated El prior to depoyment to the field.- Field team members simulated ingestion of the K! tablets when ' directed to do so by the DOE RAP Team Captain.
i DOE RAP field team members demonstrated that they understood who could authorize esposure in excess of the general public PAGs _(Fleid 8). BHO field team members are classified as radiation workers and can receive up to 3 Rem per quarter and j
5 Rem y year; they were authorized up to 3 Rem for the exercise. Each team member underst5od that the DOE RAP Team Captain could authorize exposure in excess of the limit.
/E/ ax
I U17214
(
DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the implementation of emergency worker radiological exposure control for field activities deployed from the Brookhaven Area Office during the exercise.
i AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION No areas requiring corrective actions were observed in the implementation of emergency worker radiological exposure control for field activities deployed from the Brookhaven Area Office during the exercise.
1 AREA RECOMMENDED F.OR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
One of the DOE RAP field teams stopped at a location within the plume and waited to transmit their data to the BHO. The exposure rate at this location was about eighty (80) mrem / hour.
The field team members could have reduced their accumulated exposure, somewhat, if they had driven to a location at the edge of the plume (or outside of the plume) to wait while transmitting their data to the dose assessment center.
Recom mendation: DOE RAP field teams should be trained to drive away from the plume to a location at the edge of the plume (or outside of the plume) to wait while transmitting their data, thereby reducing their accumulated exposure.
2.4 EMERGENCY NEWS CENTER (ENC)
The ENC is located in the Holiday Inn, Ronkonkoma, New York.
3 The activation of the LERO functions and the mobilization of thepaff at the ENC were demonstrated inj timely manner (ENC 1). LERO personnel began arriving at 0641 to begin set-up and activation of the news center. Ap")toxirrately one (1) hour f
, later, the telephones were/operat!7al. The first press briefing was conducted at 0844.
V
' Overall activation of the ENC was done well.
1 The objective to demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing of the LERO function at the ENC on a twenty-four (24) hour basis through rosters could not be observed because the ENC roster is kept at the LERO EOC (ENC 2).
Briefing of the media in a clear, accurate.gyd timely manner was partly a
demonstrated (ENC 3).
Additional displays and maps are needed at the ENC. An EPZ map should be displayed in the media briefing area which tracks protective actions and the plume exposure pathway. A stetus board providing ECLs and times declared wjuld be beneficial to media personnel. Altho gh the lead LERO P!O at the ENC receivy the contenta of EBS messages promptl by telephone, hard copy transmissions we not f
U17215 33 i
reproduced and provided to the press. For example, EBS mesypes #3 and #4, which were alred to the public at 0937 and 1003, respectively, were nel postedj p written form for i
viewing by the press until 1045. Due to this time lag, reporters did'h61 have an accurate or timely picture of protective actign recommendations to the public. Also, some hard copies of EBS messages that were pAvided to the press contained extraneous information (clearly marked fer deletior.) that should heve been omitted to avoid possible confusion.
Hard copies of EBS messages posted in the ENC for use by the press should contaig n
that information which was broadenst to thje puhile.
Six (6) news briefingsrwerfe conducted during the exercise. ' Briefings provided requested info.mation and answered questions presented by media representatives.
Emergency personnel at the ENC adequately demonstrated the ability to share es prior to its release (ENC 4). LERO and LILCO PIO staff information witp other agenc}d information throughout the exercise.
members exchanged and share The objective to demonstrate the ability to establish rumorjepntrol in a coordinated manner was not met (ENC 5). The rumor control operation wis" set up at the ENC quickly and efficiently. The pubile would get through to rumor control by calling LILCO offices. However, because of the slowidistribution of EBS messages to rumor control from the LERO PIO, the rumor control staff didkot have current information concerning protective actions.
Specifically, during a test call to a rumor cont
, operator, current details concerning evacuated Zones werekot available. This call as made at 1319 following the airing of an EBS message at 1206 which announced that the entire EPZ had beenjecommended to evacuate. The information available to the rumor' control operator wasroutdated, identifying only Zones A-M Q and R for evacuation.
J f
/
In general, the ENC has adt:quate space, equipment, and, r.upplies to support l
emergency operat ons. However, due to the inadequacy of theRopying capabilities, which resulted in insufficient an ntimely message distribution, the objective was not met (ENC 6).
Security measures at the ENC were/
good. Adequate access control and the ability to maintain security were demonstrated (ENC 7).
DEFICIENCY J
==
Description:==
Insufficient copying capabilities at the ENC resulted in delays in the distribution of information. These delays affected the following two G) areas: (NUREG-0654, II, G.4.b, G.4.c).
Hard copies of EBS messages were not provided to the media in a timely manner.
Rumor control personnel were not able to answer questions received from the pubile because they were not given accurate up-to-date status reports.
IV 9x
5' U 1 7 2.t 3
Recommendation: LERO should make provisions for rellaole and rapid equipment to reproduce, in hard copy, all appropriate messages for d!stribution to the ENC staff.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION i
1.
==
Description:==
Maps and displays in the media briefing room were insufficient (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.b).
Recommendation:. The following displays should be posted in an area easily visible to reporters:
- An EPZ map which tracks protective actions and plume pathway.
A status board which provides ECLs and their times of
' declaration, j
2.
==
Description:==
Some hard copies of EBS messages that were
{
provided to the press contained extraneous information (clearly marked for deletion) that should have been omitted to avoid possible confusion.
Recommendation: Hard copies of EBS messages posted in the ENC for use by the press should contain only that information which was broadcast to the public.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT l
No areas recommended for improvement were observed in the ENC during the exercise.
2.5 PORT JEFFERSON STAGING AREA l
The Port Jefferson Staging Area is located at a LILCO fossil fuel power plant.
The main part of t staging area,is the turbine deck for one of the generator units.
Briefingfeas -wer set up in two (2) rooms that open onto the turbine deck. Another briefing'trea and a communications room were set up in an adjacent office area.
2.5.1 Staging Area Operations,
The staging area wjis promptly notified of each stage in the exercise emergency (SA 1). Lead staff wereWotified of each ECL via the LERO pager system. Once the W
0x l
....i - -
I
l s3 U17217
/
/
(
communication room was set up, primary notifications were received via the dedicated telephone system.
Staging area activation was itiated at the Alert ECL and w ecomplished in a timely manner (SA 2).
The Staging Area Coordinator, Bipr Dispatcher, Lead Traffle j
V Guides, Dosimet*y Record Keepers, and support staff arrifed promptly and set up the ents Lnd equipment necessary for the facility's emergency jf netions.
physical arrange 7eclared operational at 0745. Computerized roster lists were set up for The facility was d personnel sign-in, listing staff by emergency role, and including work and home telephone numbers. The roster listed three (3) shifts for each lead staff position. Field positions such as Route Alert Drivers, Traffic Guides, Route Spotters and Bus Drivers were listed on the roster at approximately one hundred fifty percent (150%) of projected need (S The facility's physical arrangements, equipment, supplies, and parking area were p
adequate to support emergency operations (SA 4). The turbine deck provided ample space for field personnel awaiting assignments. Three (3) separate briefing rooms were used for briefing personnel prior to dispatch: one (1) for dosimetry distribution, one (1) for briefing Bus Drivers, and one (1) for briefing Route Alert Drivers, Route Spotters.
Traffic Guides and Road Crews. Command, control, and communicationjsere conducted in a separate communications room. One potential concern is that the/ noise levelin the staging area might be excessive if the turbine - which was shut off during the exercise
- actually were operating during an emergency.
LERO should consider whether a commitment should be made by LILCO that the turbine not be operated during any emergency at SNPS which necessitates activating the Port Jefferson Staging Area.
Communications with the LERO EOC were ge ally good. Dedicated telephone (primary), commercial telephone and LILCO radio We used to communicate with the LERO EOC throughout the exercise (SA 5).
Security eekpoints were promptl establis d at the f acility's two (2 gates, and security w aintained throughout the exerpise (SA 6). All entrants wer hecked or LILCO identification. Security guards were equipped with walkie-talkies and could Once call up to the coordinator in the communieftlons room if any questions arose.
inside the staging area, all personnel signed'the roster list and were Tssued color-coded LERO badges.
f Message handling and distribution alp were very goodpA 7). Incoming messages Transcription and handlihg of messages was [ced, and difs ritKite t
were recorded on messyge forms, reprodu ompt and &ccurate. The system performed well at getting information to and from the correct sta.ff person, despite the staff's being tions throughout the building. In addition, ityhould be scattered in several different loyexamine incoming information snd displayed" excellent noted that the staff critically initiappin identifying and resolvin any ambiguous or unclear items. Status boards were maintained in four (4) locations: the communications room, the Bus Driver briefing rooys, p Traffic Guide briefing room, and the turbine deck.
All of thesefoards were kept p to date on key exercise events. The Staging Area Coordinator also gave periodic j
oral briefings to the entire facility over the public address system.
1 A3d
/g
56 U17218 The ging Area Coordinator was clearly n charge of the facility and impleme tation of procedures (SA 8). He kept[ informed of all st demonstrated
.eadership in the assignment of personnel, briefing of staff and ensured that appropriate written projedures were utilized and followe/. He assigned personnel where needed, maingt ined contact wi'h the EOC, obtained information on plume direction and estimatedFdose rates, and conducted periodic briefings to update staff on the current situation.
Dispatch and direction of field workers from the Port Jefferson Staging Area was well organized (SA 9).
Under the direction of the Staging Area Coordinator, the Bus Dispatcher was responsible for sending out Transfer Point Coordinators and Bus Drivers, and the Lead Traffic Guides were responsible for dispatching Evacuation Route' Spotters.
Route et Drivers, Traffic Guides, and Road Crews. Prict to dispatch, all personnel were systemapally briefed on dosimetry and on their particular ass) ts.
The briefings were clear and, thorough. For example, the Traffic Guides - r briefed on radio protocol, traffic guidance procedures, interaction with police, dosimetry and dose call-in points, and use of protective clothing. Specific information on the briefings given to each group of field personnel is discussed directly below in Section 0.5.2.
One (1) radio channel was used for communication with the activated bus
' transfer point (Miller Place) a d with Traffic Guides in the field (SA 10). Communication "with the transfer point was good at all times. Communication with Traffic Guides at
^TCPs was sometimes Nifficult due to poor reception; the noisy transmissions alsd<
' occasionally interfered with the conversations of other personnel in the communication room. Consideratica should be given to improving the radio system, by using a headset,
'or relocating the radio operator to an adjacent room.
DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the operation of the Port Jefferson Staging Area during the exercise.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION No areas requiring correcti,ve action were observed in the operation of the Port Jefferson Staging Area during the exercise.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
The noise levelin the staging area might be excessive if the turbine actually were operating during an emergency.
Recommendation Consideration should be given to whether a commitment should be made by LILCO that the turbine not be
)
operated during any emergency at SNPS which necessitates activating the Port Jefferson Staging Area.
/e2.v' 2Y
)
U17219
==
Description:==
Communication with Traffic Guides at TCPs was sometimes difficult due to poor reception; the noisy transmissions also occasionally interfered with the conversations of other I
personnel in the communication room (NUREG-0654, II, F J.10.j).
Recommendattom Consideration should be given to improving the radio system by using a headset, or else relocating the radio operator to an adjacent room.
4 i
2.5.2 Implementation of Field Activities Thg numerous field activities deploy d from Port Jefferson Staging Area were j
generallyFwell organized and implemented according togh Plan. The first activity demonstrated was route alerting (Fleld 5). A message wasfreceived at the staging area alerting 1
at 0822 indicating siren #26 had not sounded (simulyfed) and that backup rou would be required.
A route alerting crew was pro ptly briefed, given a packetf j
containing a map of the failed siren's coverage area, andpdispatched. The driver obta j
a mobile public address systen} from the emergency equipment van located inpe staging attachedvlt to his car. The Route Alert Driver followed procedures area parking lot apt a realistically slow speed (approximately five (5) miles per hour) and orrectly, driving a i
fcovering the area in a systematic fashion.About half of the total assigned area was
)
covered. It shou d be noted, however, that alerting half of the siren coverage area took
, the driver ninet (90) minutes; presumably it would take three (3) hours for one (1) driver to cover' the entire area. It is recommended that each siren coverage area should be assessed to determine an appropriate number of drivers that would be required to drivs the area. Where necessary, multiple drivers should be deployed to reduce alerting time.
/
Ten (10f) fCPs were evaluated during the exercise. Traffic Guide teams were briefed and dispatched in priority order, as planned. Timeliness of TCP setup could not be evaluated because the Federal evaluator was delayedJ another location (see discussion of Field 10 below). Howevejr all the TCPs werehstablished at the correct locations, and each team pemonstratedrthorough knowledge of their assignmegt (Field Each team understood its role in providing guidance to motorists and was aware of
. 6).
LERO policy regarding interaction with county / local police.
Each TCP team was g equipped with a set of written procedures and diagrams, a radio, and a traffic guidance V kit consisting of traffic cones, flares, and flashlights (Fleid 11).
The objective to demonstrate resources for dealing with Im' pediments tjo evacuation could not be evaluated (Fleld 10). Prestaging under standard procedures wEs demonstrated when several Roed Crews and tanker trucks were requested by the Road Logistics Coordinator from the LERO EOC, in a message ree'eivfe at the Port Jeffpeon Staging Ayr a at about 1040.
The Road Crews were issued dosimetry, briefed, and dispatched'from the Port Jeffegon Staging Area at 1150. In response to the simulated fuel truck impediment, delays at the LERO EOC meant that the team assigned to respond to the simulated traffic impediment in Port Jefferson's rea of responsibility did not hive at the scene of the impediment uptil approximately 1410) This was caused by internal communications problems observedTat the LERO EOC (see also discussion of it/
U
58 U17220' objectives EOC 7 and EOC 17 in this report). The Federal evaluator was there from 1130 until 1400, when it become necessary for him to proceed to other assignments.
i Therefore, the Federal evaluator and Road Crew never met. Due to this delay the Federal evaluator was unable to observe the arrival times of the Traffic Guides (see discussion of Field 6 above).
by/activating a bus transfer point and running /s o evacuate the public were demonstratedthje bu Resodrce f
Transfer Point was@ ell-managed and wasWdequa,e in terms of access and parking area t
(Fleld 12). Activation of the transfer point wasdnitiated at the Port Jefferson Staging th Dispatcher and Area, whe[e! e Transfer Point Coordinators weredriefed by the Busf were issued emergency kits and protective clothing. The transfer pointWas set up at the l
Miller Place shopping. plaza, which has large open parking lot suitable for transfer operations. Operations there were well organized; when one (1) of the evaluated buses arrived at the transfer point, there were between ten (10) and fif teen (15) vehicles ahead l
of it in the queue, but it only took eight (8) minutes for the bus to reach the Transfer Point Coordinators and receive a route assignment.
Both A
Q (2) randomly selected bus routes were evaluated for the exercise.
routes wFre implemented according to plan (Fleid 9).
t the staging area, the drivers we,p briefed, assigned /tp a bus company, and issued route maps to the assigng~ bus r
- cornpany lot, and fromhhe lot to the transfer point. fach driver was issuedToute-/
,spee!!!6 maps and diredtions at the tr'ansfer point, drove the route' correctly, and arrived
' promptly at the Reception Center.
DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the field activities dispatched from the Port l
' Jefferson Staging Area.
l l
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION No areas requiring corrective action were observed in the field activities dispatched from the Port Jefferson Staging Area.
AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Description Ninety (70) minutes elapsed from the time the LERO EOC informed the Staging Area of the simulated siren failure until public alerting of only half of the route was completed.
Recommendation Plans for backup route alerting should be reviewed and revised as necessary to reduce the time needed for route alerting.
/1/
0X
l i
5, U17221 2.5.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency woper radiological exposure was partly. demonstrated (Fleid 1). All field personnel were issued dosimetry kits and thoroughly briefe&on their use prior to dispatch. The kits consisted of a low-range (0-200 mrem) D R D,. a mid-range (0-5 Rem) DRD, a TLD, yd assorted instructional, consent, and record-keeping forms. Most of the persorpel demonstrated proper procedures for use of the DRDs. One Bus Driver, however, negected to read his DRD at any time during the seventy-five (75) minutes he.was working in the.10-mile EPZ. All Bus Drivers should be trained to read their DRDs every fifteen (15) minutes as described in the LERO procedures.
The abfi ty to supply and administer K! was also demonstrated (Fleld 7). All field personnel were given a briefing on KI use at the staging area prior to dispatch, including why it would be administered, authorization procedures for use, and the danger posed tof lodine-allergic individuals. Interviews in the field confirmed that e personnel were familiar with the K! authorization procedure. The Bus Drivers were nstructed to in est their first KI tablet while still in the staging area. The Traffic Guides indicated at they would offer their K! and instruction sheetsfo police if the police took over their traffic assignments. Federal evaluators verifiedMhat an adequate supply of Elis on hand onsisting of one hundred twenty-seven (127) bottles of fourteen (14) at the staging area,[in a heated equipment v tablets each, stored The field personnel evaluated wer amiliar with their call-in dose limits and the -
procedure for authorizing exposures in excess of the general public PAGs (Field 8).
DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the implementation. of emergency' worker radiological exposure control for field activities deployed from the Port Jefferson Staging Area.
AREA REQUIRING CORRECTfVE ACTION -
==
Description:==
One (1) Bus Driver neglected to read his DRD at any time during the seventy-five (75) minutes he was working in the EPZ (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a. K.3.b).
Recommendation: All Bus Drivers should be trained to read their DRDs every fifteen (15) minutes as described in LERO Procedures.-
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No areas recommended for improvement were observed in the implementation of emergency worker radiological exposure control for field activities deployed from the Port Jefferson Staging Area.
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/X
a U17222 2.6 PATCHOGUE STAGING AREA The Patchogue Staging Area is located in a LILCO building at the intersection of Main Street and Conklin Avenue in Patchogue, New York. The second floor of the building is used to dispatch LILCO repair crews. The ground floor and part of the basement have been dedicated for staging area purposes.
The main floor of the facility consists of three (3) rooms used for distinct purposes. The largest room, capable of accommodating four hundred (400) people, is used as a waiting, briefing, and dispatching area for emergency workers. An area exists at the south end of the room for dispensing food and beverages. A smaller room, located at the north end of the facility, is used to brief emergency workers on dosimetry and issue DRDs, TLDs, and KI. This room seats about forty (40) individuals. A third room, located adjacent to the largest room, is dedicated to communications.
The Patchogue Staging Area building also has a basement for storage of emergency supplies and a second floor not planned to be used in an emergency.
2.6.1 Staging Area Operations The objective of demonstrating the ability to receive emergency notification j
- was met at the Patchogue Staging ' Area g 1).
All emergency notificatJgp were LERO personnel were notified by a combination of pagers and receiveppromptly.
telephone call-outs at the Alert, Site Area Eme$ncy, and Gfneral Emergen"y ECLs as specified in OPIPs 3.3.2 and 4.5.1. The staging area itself was notified of all changes in the ECL and protective actions as planned via dedicated telephone.
The objective of demonstrating the ability to mobilize staff and actpate the Patchogue Staging Arey was met (SA 2).
The Patchogue Staging Area was pfroptly opened and efficientifset up f ter the Alert ECL. Responding individuals were clearedj by security checks, briefed upon arrival atjthe Pa hogue Staging Area, and issued dosimetry for field assignments. Staff were promptly notified by individual pagers and a r
commercial telephone callout process. Approximately three hundred (300) indivi6uals reported to the Patchogue Staging Area for the exercise.
Staffing rosters demonstrated a three (3) shift / twenty-four (24) hour capability at the Patchogue Staging Area, thus meeting the objective of demonstrating an abilyi to
, maintain staffing around the clock (SA 3). The staging area administrators tracked the actual staffing of each position until its full planned complemynt was met or exceeded.
The roster of backup staff showed that three (3) shifts were available for all pcsitions except Bus Drivers, Traffic Guides, and Route Alert Drivers; the latter positions have between two and three (2-3) shifts planned since these are relevant only to evacuation.
It is assumed in the Plan that evacuation can be accomplished in two (2) or fewer shif ts.
The Patchogue Steging Area met the objective of demonstrating adequate space, parking area, eqpipment, and supplies to support emergepey operations (SA 4).
All operations were/ conducted on the first floor, which was4arge enough to comfortably accommodate approximately four hundred (400) emergency workers, except initial Alert bN
U17223 u
ECL telephone callouts; these were done on the second flo - (see discussion of SA 6 below). Two (2) large parking lots are adjacent to the staging area. All equipm The ntire inventory as stated in OPIP kept in aJocked storage room in the basement.
5.3.1 wa(verified. Howt er, only one (1) first aid kit as available. It is recommended as well as additional goggles, that consideration be given to acquiring more first aid klp,repared for ready use, with gloves, and boots.
Sypties' for each function were p additional replacement materials on hand.
The objective of demonstrating that the Patchogue Staging Area can establish appropriate communication links with the Lg EOC using both primary and backup
. systems was met (SA 5). Three (3) systems were used: dedf! ated telephone, commercial d two-way radio. Both telephone systems wofked flawlessly. The two-way telephoney,successfully tested at 1114.
radio was 1
The objective of 'de'monstrating that the Patchogue Staging Area had adequate access contr and that security could be maintained was partly met ( A 6). Access was sufficiently controlled at the Patchogue Stagi es, but not as escribed in OPIP 4.7.1. The planned complement of guards was ted at all three (3) entrances, and sign-access o the staging area, she was)r.in badging was implemented pr When a reporter appeared at 1245 requesting 7
denied it by the Staging Area Coordinator and urged to go o the ENC. Howevet four (4) deviations from the Plan which require corrective s
actions were noted.
First^, the acqess point that was demonstrated was the north entrance es,ther than the Conklin Ave'nue main entrance as specified in OPIP 4.7.1, Page If the north entrance is the best access point, then it is recommended that OPIP 41.
4.7.1 should be revised to reflect this practice. SecondfLERO personnel used telephones l
on the second floor to carry out emergency notifications. This contradicts security
. provisions in OPIP 4.7.1, Page 38, item #2, which explicitly bars all LERO personnel from the upper floor. It is recommended that either OPIP 4.7.1 should be revised to reflect
' this practice, or additional telephones should be provided on the first floor to carry out the necessary emergency notifications. ThirYthe south door was not kept locked as specified in OPIP 4.7.1, Page 3, item #1. It is recommended that the Staging Area Coordinator or a designee should be trained to verify that all doors required by the Plan to be locked are, in fact, locked. Fourthfunauthorized entrance from the street to the staging area could be achieved through the open fire escape on the second floor of the east side of the building. It is recommended that a guard should-be stationed at this location and that this fire escape should be designated as a guard post in OPIP 4.7.1.
The objective of demonstrating that messages were transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, messages were properly logged, status boards were accurately-maintained and updated, appropriatpiefings were held, and incoming personnel wp briefed was met (SA 7). Messages were transmitted and logged properly; key items were bryfght by the S,taging Area Coordinator to the recipients and the appropriate response w1s decided lyediately.. Theytytus boards located in the command room and the main staff room were updatfe and 'tasy to read.
Briefings of incoming staff and those j
l continually present were at regular andirequent intervals, as the situation dictated. The -
only area recommended for improvement is that the person carrying out briefingspeuld better versed in their underlying meaning. On occasion, the Bus Dispatcher announced adiation readings, plant conditions, and wind directions (in degrees) to the staff without J1/
6K
U1722f 6a elaboration; when questionef by the Federal evaluator about the meaning of the wind dire on in degrees, he didMot know its meaning. Also, questions from the staff never licited. Given the nature of the activities at this location, this probably would not were adversely affect the response to a real emergency, but it is an area that could be improved by training the person carrying out briefings more thoroughly, and by requiring that staff questions he elleited.
The objective of demonstrating that the appropriate official was in charge and in control of an overall response assigned to/he Patchogue Staging Area was met by the hator (SA 8). He used his emergency response checklist (from OPIP Staging Area Coord/all operations thfr ph his principal subordinates. The Bus 4.5.?.) and directed anc Lead Traffic Guide demonstrated thorough familiarity with their own responsibilities.
The objective of demonstrating an ability to dispatch to and direct emergency workers in the field was' partly met (SA 9). Personnel were to be dispatched to the field from the staging area for general population bus evacuation, school evacuation, ascuation of the mobility-impaired, route alerting, traffic control, an emoval of uaffle impediments. The Bus Dispatcher and Lead Traffic Guide clo oversaw the ere briefed on dispatch of indiv) pals under their control. They emergency workers dosimetry, wereTtssued dosimeters, and were issued instruction packets for Jheir assignments prior to being dispatched to the field. However, the first Bus Driverrwere
- not dispatched until approximately 1045 - over two (2) hours af ter the 0832 declaration
' of the Site Area Emergency ECL. This is not according to the timetable for prestaging Bus Drivers stated in OP!P 3.6.4.
It is recommended that Bus Dispatchers should be trained in the importance of promptly dispatching Bus Drivers. Also, an additional area a
should be es".blished for dosimetry distribution to reduce Bus Driver processing time, and an additional trained individual should be available to assist the Bus Dispatcher.
i The objective of demonstrating the ability to communicate with all appropriate fleid locations and personnel was met (SA 10). Communications with the field staff wer maintained a5 planned with the Traffle Guides and Transfer Point Coordinators. Status reports were obtained every thirty (30) minups' from each. When thyradio of one (1) v Traffic GuideNalled, tp Traffic ulde found a telephone and called the staging area. A replacement radio was promptl ispatched.
DEFICIENCY,
Description Bus drivers were not dispatched until two {2) hours after receipt of the Site Area Emergency ECL declaration (NUREG-0654, !!,
J.9, J.10.g).
Recommendation 1: An additional area should be established for the distribution of dostmetry to reduce Bus Driver processing time.
Recommendation L Additional trained staff should be provided to the Bus Dispatcher to assist him in deploying over three hundred (300) 1
/6 /
MX
i 63 U17225 drivers and Transfer Point Coordinators who are deployed from the Patchogue Staging Area.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
==
Description:==
OPIP 4.7.1 speelfles that the only personnel entrance is to be the Main Entrance on the Conklin Avenue side of the building. The entrance actually used for this purpose was the one on the north side of the building (Main Street) (no NUREG-0654 reference).
Recommendation: Since the system actually used seems to be superior to the Plan due to reduced congestion, OPIP 4.7.1 should be revised to indicate that personnel are to enter the Patchogue Staging Area through the Main Street entrance to the building.
2.
==
Description:==
LERO personnel entered the upper floor repeatedly to use telephones for emergency notification. This practice is explicitly prohibited by OPIP 4.7.1 (page 38, item #3)(no NUREG-0654 reference).
Recommendation: Elther OPIP 4.7.1 should be revised to reflect the actual practice of using telephones on the second floor of the Patchogue Staging Area building, or more telephones should be provided on the first floor for LERO personnel to perform their emergency notifications.
3.
==
Description:==
The south door was not locked for security as specified in OPIP 4.7.1 (no NUREG-0654 reference).
Recommendation:
All doors required to be locked by the Plan should be verified as actually locked by the Staging Area Coordinator or a designee.
4.
==
Description:==
Unauthorized entrance to the staging area could be achieved through the open f' ascape on the second floor of the east side of the building (no NUREG-0654 reference).
Recommendation: The fire escape on the second floor of the east side of the building should be designated as a guard post in the Plan and an Individual should be assigned to staff this guard post.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
The Bus Dispatcher was not well enough versed in the
+
meaning of the information he communicated to the staff during briefings. Questions from the staff were never elicited.
U17226
y Recommendation: Persons carrying out briefings should be trained sufficiently about the meaning of terms associated with plant conditions and wind direction so that _they can explain these things in understandable terms to the staff. Also, it should be made a routine part of the briefing process to ask'if any of the staff have questions.
==
Description:==
Only one (1) first-ald kit was available at the Patchogue Staging Area.
No boots, gloves, or goggles were available for aiding in emergency work.
Recommendation:
Consideration should be given to acquiring additional first aid kits, boots, gloves, and goggles at the' Patchogue Staging Area.;
2.6.2 Implementation of Field Activities The objective of demonstrating the ability to provide backup public alerting, if necessary, in the event of partial stren system failure was partly met (Fleid 5). Mountiny/
and operation of the mobile public address units assigned to the RoutejAlert Drivers wir
- demonstrated at the staging area. The driveryho was evaluated had' good knowlepge of l the route plan in the affected area and drove at an appropriate speed. He knewvhow to give verbal instructions if anyone should approach the vehicle with questions regarding
' the prescripted message. Total time from dispatch to the beginying of the route was nineteen (19) minutes, with another fif ty-one (51) minutes neededfto complete the route itself because of the length of the route. It is recommended that the plans for backup route alerting should be reviewed and revised as necessary to reduce the time needed for j
public alerting.
t The objective of demonstrating that access control points can be established and gtAfed by Traffic G es in a ti ly manner was partly met (
d 6). All nine (9) TCPs V ev1TQated were fully taffed in a imely manner. All personne derstood the concept of J
P operations at their t'aspective locations, including timely radio communication and
@h check-in, as well as proper placement, as appropriate, of barricades and cones. However, y
only4ne (1) Traffic Guide out of the fourteen (14) who were interviewed at nine (9) TCPs knew the location of the Reception Center, and one (1) Traffic Guide thought that the.
, general public w o be directed to the EWDF. it is recommended that all Traffic Guides be trained to advise motorists with questions to tune to the EBS. station (WALK-FM) for the latest information'on all matters related to the emergency, including the location of the Reception Center.
The objective of demonstrating a sample of resources necessary to implement an j
orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ was not met (Fleid 9). Four (4) Bus j
Drivers dispayed from the Patchogue Staging Area were evayl pted. Two (2) of the '
j drivers were a to pick up buses at designated yards, proceed to assigd transier points, and dri their assigned routes, although one (1) of them missed part of his
~
assigned evacuation route. More confusion was vident on the part of the other drivers.
/W XX
65 U17227
/
d One ()1 driver proceeded to the wrong transfer point, and completed his route only after/
I being')rompted by the Federal evaluator. The other driver took over twoM) hours to get to his transfer point from the staging area because he initially went to the wrongX us l
b garage. It is recommended that training be provided to Bus Drivers to assure that they will be able to follow directions given to them and to drive their routes from the staging area to the bus garages to transfer points, and to complete their entire assigned pickup routes. In addition, it is recommended that OP!P 3.6.4, Attachment 2 (Pages 13-14) and (Pages 10-12) be revised to require, respectively, the Bus Driver to present, and the Transfer Point Coordinator to verify, each Bus Driver's copy of the Bus / Van Dispatching Form (OPIP 3.6.4, Attachment 7, Page 62) to assure that the Bus Driver has arrived at the proper transfer point.
The objective of demonstrating a sample of resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic obstructions, as partly met (Fleld 10). This demonstration was impaired by two (2) factors. First the LERO EOC falled to transm)t the entire free play message with the result that Road Crews could not" locate andhecognize the Federal evaluator at the impedimjt (see discussion y
e of objectives EOC 7 and EOC 17 in Section 2.1.1 above). This delayecrevaluation of the g
response by over an hour. Second, the Ro$ Crew was fTet informed that the impediment was a multi le vehicle accident, and only'dne (1) tow truck was dispatched. This would
' have been 'nadequate for removal of the impediment, which the Tow Truck Driver
' estimate would have re utred thirty. (30) minutes to clear with the proper equipment.
I Rerouting of traffic w ot observed. it is recommended that the appropriate personnel at the Patchogue Staging Area be trained to request more information regarding impediments from the LERO EOC when impediments to evacuation are indicated.
The objective of demor. rating a sample of resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area (Traf'. Guides) wa et (Fleld 11). Equipment and resources evaluated by the Federal evaluator were adequate to control access to the areas evacuated.
For example, entire complements ofgarricags7 cones, and personnel identified in the Plan were demonstrated at TCPs #31 and #32. Though Traffic Guides could not position their vehicles in roadways adjacent to the actu3 spot where they 1
would guide traffic, interviews by the Federal evaluator indicatedMhat they had ample 3
krowledge of correct positioning.
j 1
The objective of demonstrating the adequacy of evacuation bus transfer points, I
lheluding access and parking /transf.er areas, was partly met (Field 12). Transfer points l
were evaluated at Brookhaven National Laboratory and Middle Island Shopping Center.
These locations were egily ecognized with free access and ample parking. Transfer
?oint Coordinators weVe clearly in control at both locations. However, one (1) problem was noted. The driver of the bus for t.
non-institutionalized mobility-impaired (see i
discussion of Field 14 below) proceeded o the Brookhaven National pboratory Transfer Point upon completing his route (as planned), where he was directed @ the EWDF despite the fact that a message from the Bus Dispatcher at 1145 to be transmitted to all l
Transfer Point Coordinators had requested all drivers arriving before 1600 at a transfer point to be directed to the Reception Center. It is recommended that Transfer Point j
Coordinators be trained to follow instructions from the Staging Area regarding directions i
that are to be given to special population evacuation route Bus Drivers, since the Bus i
/C v'
/3 Y
\\
~
~
U17226 66
/
Drivers are trained to return to the transfer points for instructions as specified in the Procedures.
The objective of demonstrating a sample of resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of the non-institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals within the 10-mile EPZ was partly meJField 14). Evacuation of non-institutionalized moplity-t impaired individuals was demonstrated by a p!ver who was knowledgeable about procedures for obtaining an evacuation vehicle, Wiving a route for curb-side pickup, and Septeen (17) vreturning to the Brookhaven Na[onal Laboratory Transfer Point.
mobility-impaired individuals werF located from the route map, the route was completed in less than two (2) hours, and the bus returned to the transfer point at 1459. The estimated time for driving the entire ' route, stopping at the transfer point, and
' proceeding to the Reception Center (this latter segment was not observed) was ov r three (3) hours.
However, the residences of some mobility-impaired persons ere difficult to find using the map provided. It is recommended that drivers designated to
~
pick up non-institutionalized mobility-impaired persons at their residences should be provided with more detailed maps and clearer descriptions of pickup points.
The objective of demonstrating a sample of resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ was partly met aJ the Patchogue Staging Area (Field 16). The Bus Disp,atcher at the staging area arranged for one (1) bus
'to simulate the evacuation of fortg(40) children to the Reception Centefr based on a
'LERO EOC request. The driver was famillay with his function and followed his directions very well. Howeyer, the staging area took/ forty (40) minutes to dispatch the driver af ter the request was received. It is recommended that the Bus Dispatcher be provided with
' trained staff support so that Bus Drivers can be dispatched in a more timely manner.
l DEFICIENCY l
==
Description:==
A Bus Driver took two (2) hours and ten (10) minutes to proceed from the staging area to the transfer point. Another driver i
went to the wrong transfer point, and his mistake was not recognized by the Transfer Point Coordinator.
Yet another driver missed a segment of nn assigned evacuation route (NUREG-0654, II, J.9, J.10.g).
Recommendation 1:
Bus Orivers for general population evacuation routes should receive training to assure their ability to follow directions given to them so they can (a) follow routes from the staging area to bus garag2s and then to transfer points, and (b) follow an I
assigned bus route.
Recommendation 2:
OPIP 3.6.4, Attachment 2 (Pages 13-14) and (Pages 10-12) should be revised to require, respectively, the Bus Driver to present, and the Transfer Point Coordinator to verify, each Bus Driver's copy of the Bus / Van Dispatching Form (OPiP 3.6.4, Page 62) to assure that the Bus Driver has arrived at the proper Transfer Point.
ll/
A ><
l
67 U17229 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
Description Traffic Guides do not have complete or correct information'on the appropriate destination for evacuees (NUREG-0654, D, J.9,'J.10.g).
)
Recommendation All Traffic Guides should be trained to advise motorists with questions to tune to the EBS station (WALK-FM) for the latest information on all matters related to the emergency, including the location of the Reception Center.
2.
Description Appropriate personnel and equipment were not dispatched to clear the multiple vehicle accident simulated as an impediment to evacuation (NUREG-0654,11, J.10.k).
Recommendation The appropriate personnel at the Patenogue Staging Area should be trained to request more infc?mation from the LERO EOC when impediments to evacuation are fdcated.
3.
Description Instructions for the driver of the non-Institutionalized mobility-impaired bus to proceed. to the Reception Center were not properly transmitted to the Bus Driver at the Brookhaven National Laboratory Transfer Point (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.d).
to llow in true lo ort oming f o he staging en re d ng directions that are to be given to special population evacuation route Bus Drivers, since they are trained to return to the Transfer Point for instructions as specified in the LERO Plan.
4.
Description Residences of some non-institutionalized mobility-impaired persons were difficult to find (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.d).
Recommendation:
Drivers designated to pick up non-institutional! zed mobility-impaired evacuees at their residences should be provided with more detailed maps and clearer descriptions of pickup points.
5.
Description it took forty (40) minutes from receipt of a LERO request to dispatch a Bus Driver to simulate the evacuation of-forty (40) school children (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.g).
Recommendattom The Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area should be provided with trained staff support so that Bus Drivers can be dispatched in a more timely manner.
I
~.... -. -.
U17230 68 AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Drx:riptiom Seventy (70) minutes elapsed from the time the LERO EOC informed the Staging Area of the given simulated siren failure until public alerting was completed.
Recommendation Plans for backup route alerting should be reviewed and revised as necessary to reduce the time needed for route alerting.
2.6.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control The objective of demonstrating the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure, including proper use of personnel dosimetry, was partly met at the Patchogue Staging Area (Fleld 1). Most of the emergency wor rs evaluated --
including six (6) Bus Drive,rs.j Route. Alert Driver, a Road Crew, anf. afgGuid_es at three (3) locations - demonstrated knowledge of use of dosimetry and actions required in
~
response to certeln readings as called for in OP!P 3.9.1.
However, there were exceptions. Distribution of dosimetry to theyneral population evacuation route Bus Drivers at the Patchogue Staging Area was accompanied by the careful reading of instructions by the Dosimetry Record Keepers covering all features of OPIP 3.9.1,
, including the use and meaning of readings on the 0-200 mrem and 0-5 Rem DRDs.
However, t Bus Dispatcher later made repeated statements witn a bullhorn which emphasize nly that general population evacuation r ute Bus Drivers were to call in when a reading of 3.5 was reached on the DRD; he did et give the units associated with g
the 3.5 number, nor did he* mention the use of the 0-200 mrem DRD which is supposed to trigger the first call-in at a reading at or above 200 mrem.
These bullhorn announcements may have ledTo confusion, because one (1) general population evacuation route Bus D iverThought the 0-200 mrem DRD was for use if the 0-5 Rem DRD reached 5 and did d k[bw which DRD would give him the 3.5 Rem call-in reading. In addition, this general population evacuation route Bus Driver read'his DRDs onlyNhen it was convenient to do so, when the bus stopped for other reasons, abop every thirty (30) g minutes. Another bus driver read his DRDs onif twice, when reminded to do so by the Transfer Point Coordinator. For example, he did n[t know that 3.5 Rem was his call-in reading. It is recommended that the verbal instructions given to general population evacuation route Bus Drivers by the Bus Dispatcher over the bullhorn be more precise to emphasize the proper use of both DRDs and the careful reading of exposure control instructions for emergency workers. General population evacuation route Bus Drivers should also be trained to read their DRDs approximately every fifteen (15) minutes when they are inside the 10-mile EJP, stopping the bus to do so if necessary. Traffic Guides at two (2) TCPs did not know tf6s'e authorization limits. It is recommended that all Traffic Guides should be trained so that they know dose authorization limits.
The objective of demonstrating the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision is made to do
, was partly met at the Patchogue Staging Area (Field 7).
Emergency workers wer thorized to take simulated K1 at about 0953, while gs 11 in the staging area. All of the mergency workers, with the exception of a Route Alert Driver, V
/3 g
U$7231 69 f these tood the proper procedure for authorization and use of Kl; a numbejr undpeasserted that they were no) allergic to it. The Route Alert Driver understood the 1
purpose of EI, but was unsPware of tfe automatic ingestion instruction in OPIP. 3.3.4,, item #9, and believed'1 hat he would receive KI authorization in an EBS -
Route Alert Drivers should be trained so that they know that K! authorization message.
is to be issued to them by their supervisor as specified in the LERO Plan.
The objective of demonstrating that emergency workers understand who can Patchogue cuthorize exposure in excess of the general public PAGs was partiv met at pt Most of the emergency workers evaluated were aware of the Staging Area (Field 8).
chafnff command for authorization of exposure in excess of the at two (2) TCPs did not f y understand that the chain of command for excess exposure l
authorization gives the Lead Traf c Guide authority to authorize excess exposure by radio, and some Traffic Guides in :cated that they might question the authority of the It is recommended Lead Traffic Guide to issue the authorization for excess exposure.
that all Traffic Guides should be trained to know that the Lead Traffic Guide can authorize exposure in excess of the general population PAGs by radio.
DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the implementation of emergency worker radiological exposure control for field activities deployed from the Patchogue Staging Area.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
==
Description:==
The Patehogue Staging Area Bus DisputMer made
~
repeated statements with i bbilhorn which emphasized only that general population evacuation route Bus Drivers were to call in if a reading of 3.5 was reached on their DRD; he did not give the units associated with the 3.5 number nor mention the use of the 0-200 mrem DRD which is supposed to trigger the first call-in at a reading at or above 200 mrem (NUREG-0654, II, K.3, K.4).
Recommendattom The verbal instructions given to the general population evacuation route Bus Drivers by the Patchogue Bus Dispatcher over the bullhorn should be more precise to emphasize the proper use of both dosimeters and the careful reading of
^
exposure control instructions for emergency workers.
2.
Description One general population evacuation route Bus Driver read DRDs only twice at the instructions of the Transfer Point Coordinator and another read his DRDs only when it was convenient (NU REG-0654, II, K.3.a. K.3.b).
i
)
70 Ul?232 Recommendation:
General population evacuation route Bus Drivers should be trained to read their dosimeters approximately
{
every fif teen (15) minutes when they are inside the 10-mile EPZ, stopping the bus to do so if necessary.
3.
==
Description:==
Traffic Guides at two (2) TCPs did not know dose authorization Ilmits (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a, K.3.b).
Recommendattom Train the Traffic Guides so that they know the dose authorization limits.
4.
==
Description:==
The Route Alerting Dr ver observed believed he would receive KI authorization in an EBS message. This is inconsistent with OPIP 3.3.4, Attachment 1, item #9 (NUREG-0654,11, J.10.e, I
J.10.f).
Recommendation: Route Alert Drivers should be trained to know that K1 authorization is to be issued to them by their supervisor as specified in the LERO Plan.
5.
==
Description:==
Traffic Guides at two (2) TCPs did not fully
{
y understand that the ch'ain of command for excess exposure authorization gives the Lead Traffle Guide authority to authorize excess exposure by radio, and some Traffic Guides indicated that they might question the authority of the Lead Traffic Guide to issue the authorization for excess exposure (NUREG-0654, !!, K.4).
Recommendation: All Traffic Guides should be trained to know that the Lead Traffic-Guide can authorize exposure in excess of the general population PAGs by radio.
i AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No areas recommended for improvement were observed in the implementation of emergency worker radiation exposure control for field activities deployed from the Patchogue Stag'ing Area.
- !.7 RIVERHEAD STAGING AREA The Riverhead Staging Area is located in the basement of a LILCO facility in Riverhead, New York. A large workspace is divided into an office for the Staging Area Coordinator, and sections for the administrative support staff, and communications staff. There are several other rooms specified for field personnel and related staff.
L____--___________________________________
=mw temerer b
71 U17233 i
2.7.3 Staging Area Operations The ability to receive emergency notification was demonstrated (SA 1).
The Staging Area Coordinator and supervisory staff were notified at the Alert ECL by y
All administrative support staff and field personnel were activation of their pagers.
successfully notified by commercial telephone either at the Alert ECL or at the Site Area Emergency jCL, as appropriate.
N activated in a imely manner (SA Staff were mo.lized, and the staging area w eclared operational at 0810 when the Staging Area Coordinator, 2). The facility was administrative support staff, supervisory personnel, and most Route Alert Drivep!( h arrived. Other field staff were called out at the Site Area Emergency ECL and reported to the staging area.
The Procedures maintained' at the staging area contain detailed staff rosters indicating adequate pnagement and administrative personnel for three (3) separate shifts, demonstratingrthe ability to maintain staffing on a twenty-four (24) Lour basis (SA Field workers would be relieved by those who had not yet been activated./In 3).
addition, in re ponse to a message to simulate a sylft change, replacements were identified, and telephone calls t the replacements were initiated or simulated.
adequate facples to support emergency operations (SA The staging en ha well-li hted area' with ample space for managers as well as support The facility is 4).
Adequate parking is provided in the visitors' parking lot as well as in t e parking staff.
lot for company cars and trucks. The facility has a generator which is capable of emergency communications equipmeny, and also has jfshower for maintaining the Adequate supplies and equipment Me available and are stored in a emergency workers.
secured trailer.
The staging area hafd appropriate communication links with the LERO EOC A commercial telephone serves as the^ primary communication system and a (SA 5).
dedicated telephone and a radio serve as backup. In addition, there are commercial telephones which are used jby the supervisory and administratgi personnel.
Communication systems performed well. All telephones and the radio were checked to ensure that they were in servi e during the initial activation of the facility.
i l
The staging area ha adequate security with guards post d at the site gateyuse and at all doors to the facility (SA.6). Only those persons liste on rosters and snowing 1
proper identification were admitted.
The objective to demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and j
l timely manner, that messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefingspe held, and that incoming personnel are briefed was partly met (SA 7). Mess es were recorded on the prescribed LERO ot numbered in the space provided on the l
However, messages wer Message Form.
LERO Message Form. Since messages are'sent to the Staging Area Coordinator, as well l
as directly to other supervisory staff in the facility who are located in different rooms, perhaps a numbering scheme should be developed which would reflect the order in which each recipient received each message.
W/X
U17234 y
The Procedures (OPIP 4.1.2, Section 3.0, Page 1) state:
"All event status information to be passed to the Staging Area should be recorded on the Emergency Event Status Form, Attachment 2, by th'e Lead Communicator and communicated to the Staging Areas,.,"
At the Riverhead Staging Area, in several cases, the LERO Message Form merelyheferred to the attached Emergency Event Status For7, which contains eight (8) subsets of data and "new" information wasfnet clearly designated.
It was unclear which, if any, of the eight (8) subsets of dataNere "new"information. The LERO Message Form should be reviewed and revised, if appropriate, to indleate which item, if any, is the "new" message.
/
While the status board was updated periodically, the time of posting information wasIhot always incit.ded when,new information was posted. For example, the status boarpposting time of 1350 was' hot updated when new information on expected dose was added at 1455D One briefing w actually held "in person" at the activation of the staging area.
Additional brieffi gs were given throughout the day over the public 3ddress system. Wh this approachJs adequate for transmitting information, there is no' opportunity for asking questions or ' discussing coordination of activities.
In addition, yoe of inese public address announcements wee disruptive - ft e Bus Dispatcher Nas interrupted by the
' public address system four (4) times whip briefing the Bus Drivers. Briefings with field
" personnel prior to their deployment w'ere comprehensive.
[ The Staging Area Coordinator, as designated in the Plan, was in charge and in contM1 of the response assigned to the facility (SA 8).
The ability to dispatch to and directgergency workers in the field was demonstrated (SA 9).
The field workers were all given appropriate equipment and briefings prior to their dispatch to their assigned activities.
However, Route Alert Drivers and Traffic Guides should be more expeditiously dispatched (see Field 5 and Field 6).
Traffic Guides and Transfer Point Coordinators communicated with the staging area via radios, demonstrating the ability to cojn'municate with all appropriate field locations and personnel (SA 10). Traffic Guides called into theptaging area upon arriving at their assigned locations. Transfer Point Coordinators radioed reports to the staging area on the status of bus routes for the general populapn evacuation at thirty (30) minute intervals. Road Crews and Route Spotters mamtained radio contact with the l
l LERO EOC, not the staging area, but were provided with a telephone number to reach the staging area in case of an eme,rgency. Thfeoute Alert Driver did not have direct communications with the staging area but telephoned upon completing the route.
DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the operation of the Riverhead Staging. Area during the exercise.
lb f
U17235 AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Desertption: While the status board was updated periodically, the time was not always included when new information was posted (No NUREG-0654 reference).
Recommendattom Personnel should be trained to record the time that updated information is posted on the status board.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Description Messages were not numbered in the space provided on the LERO Message Form.
Eecommendatiom Messages received at the Riverhead Staging Arts should be numbered on the LERO Message Form to reflect the ordt.' in which messages are received.
Description in several cases, the LERO. Message Form merely referred to the attached Emergency Event status Form, which contains eight (8) subsets of data and "new" information was not clearly designated.
Recommendation: The LERO Message Form should be reviewed and revised, if appropriate, to indicate which item, if any, is the "new" information.
Description Only one briefing was actually conducted in person at the activation of the Riverhead Staging Area. Additional briefings j
were given throughout the day over the public address system.
While this approach is adequate for transmitting information, there is no opportunity for asking questions or discussing coordination of activities.
Recommendattom Some of the briefings at the Riverhead Staging Area should be conducted in person to enable the. emergency workers to ask questions and discuss activities.
Description Some of the public address announcements were disruptive - the Bus Dispatcher was interrupted by the public
)
address system four (4) times while briefing the Bus Drivers.
Recommendattom The timing of announcements made over the 3'
public address system should be coordinated with'other activities in the staging area to ensure that these announcements do not disrupt other activities.
I
U17235 7'
2.7.2 Implementation of Field Activities The objective to demonstrate the ability to provide backup public alerting, if necessary, in the event of a partfi siren system failure as partly met (Field 5). The Route Alert Driver was thoroughly briefed and provide with a kit which included a map
)
I of the area covered by siren #89. However, the ma had no mileage or distance scale, making it difficult to determine where to b in and end route alepting on rpads in the f'
area covered by the siren. Mobile public dress ' equipment was promptly mounted on Jhe assigned vehicles and was demonstrat d to b,e' operable. A yritten message was All streets were/ traversed at inappropriate speed, and p/provided but was not broadcast.
f the driver comple ed/the entire route in thirty-five (35) minutes. However, seventy-eight (78) minute lapsed from the time the LERO EOC informed the staging area of the simulated siren failure until the public alerting was completed. A portion of the elapsed j
it is time included fifteen (15) minutes for holding a briefing and distributing the packet, recommended that the Plan for backup route alerting should be reviewed and revised as necessary to reduce the time needed for route alerting.
The objective to demonstrate that TCPs can be established and staffeg j
Traffic Guides in a timely manner was partly met (Fleld 6).
Eight (8) TCPs were l
observed in the Riverhead Staging Area's jurisdiction. The time between deployment of Traffic Guides from the staging area and their arrival at TCPs /as excessive, taking between fifty (50) and seventy (70) mitiutes. According to the Traffic Guide dispatch log, tyhTraffic Guides were given their assignments between 1053 and 1101. They did not j
i aYrive at their TCP assignments until between 1150 and 1210 which was about two (2)
.ho f ter the General Emergency ECL was declared. Travel times from the staging area to the TgPs were up to twenty (20) minutes. On average, ene) Traffic Guide spent additionaPthirty (30) minutes in line at the staging area receiving field kits and
'ja briefings. A more expeditious means of dispatching the Traffic Guides is recommended, particularly for those locations within the 2-mile EPZ (this includeyTCPs #73, #127, and
- 128 of the eight (8) locations observed). Each Traffle Gye communicated successfully p with the staging area. The Traffic Guidepere all at the proper locations and by ra were fylliar with where to guide traffic, how to interact with the county police, and the limitations of their authority.
A sample of resources necessary to implement an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ was successfully demonstrated at the Riverhead Staging Area ation bus routes (Field 9). The staging area andy the twoJ( i general population eva and re-pacyked kits with)nstruments, forms, and
. had'K! tablets, protective clothing /,and clothing is stored 1p tilmate-controll directions. Emegency equipment By 1028, one hundred twenty-one (121) Bus Drivers were at the staging area, wp exceeding the forty eight (48) Bus Drivers required at that time. All drivers were provided with thepper equipment. Both Bus Drivers who drove bus routes evaluated at j
ed the Procedures (OPIP 3.6.4, Attachment 2), and the exejr ise were well trained, to all required locations, including th)eus company obeyed traffic laws. They trav e yard, the transfer pointphe general population evacuation route,pthen Teturned to the transfer point, and then proceeded to the Reception Center and the EWDF.
The Traffic Guides successfully demonstrated a sample of resourgenecessary to control access to an evacuated area (Field 11). Each Traffic Guide had traffic cones, 65V SX
U17237 l
23 1
flashing ghts, and ares. The resources ppeared equate to demarcate the desired flow of traffic. Each Traffic Guide was upplied with highly visible yfe ow protective A sufficient number of Traffic Guides #s Each Traffic Guide had procedure rain gear d a reflective day-glo vest.
were thoroughly derstood his assignment.
available to staff all of the TCPs which were activated.
The Brookhaven Substation Transfey Point partly demonstrated the adequacy of transfer points (Fleld 12). The access road 1s narrow and curving an'd could be impassable in inclement weather.
Consideration should be given to relocating the Brookhaven Substation Transfer Point to a different location.
l DEFICIENCY I
==
Description:==
The time between depioyment of Traffic Guides from the staging area and their arrival at TCPs was excessive, taking between j
l fifty (50) and seventy (70) minutes; approximately thirty (30) minutes wu spent in line at the staging area receiving field kits and procedures (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.j).
Recommendation: A more expeditious means of dispatching the Traffic Guides from the staging area to the field should be developed.
)
i AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION
==
Description:==
The access road at the Brookhaven Substation Transfer Point was narrow and curving and could be impassable in inclement weather. (NUREG-0654, II, H).
Recommendation:
Consideration should be given to relocating the Brookhaven Substation Transfer Point to a different location.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
The map provided for the Route Alert Driver had no mileage or distance scale, making it difficult to determine where to begin and end route alerting on roads in the area covered by the siren.
Recommendation:
The maps provided for Route Alert Drivers should clearly indicate where public alerting along the routes begins and ends.
==
Description:==
Seventy-eight (78) minutes elapsed from the time the LERO EOC informed the staging area of the simulated siren failure l
until the public alerting was completed.
I 5/
/X i
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)
U11235 16 Recommendation Plans for backup route alerting should be reviewed and revised as necessary to reduce the time needed for route tierting.
i L7.3 Emergency Werker Radiological Exposure Control Emergency workers in the field partly demonstrated the ability to continuously l
cluding proper use of personnel dosimetry (Fleld monitor and control t eir exposuref,istributed at the staging area.
1).
Dosimetry was charged nd d Briefings by the dosimetry record keeper were excellent. The Route Alert Driver ad the appropriate dures (OPIP DRDs (0-200 mRep and 0-5 Rem) and a TLD, as specified in the Pro l
l 3.9.1). The drivert, aused to read his DRDs while driving his route. Value ere recorded rior to dispatt.h asdell as at the end of his assignment. The driver was eli trained and l
aware of readings that required specific action on his part.
1
,/
1 One (1) of the two (2) drivers for general population evacuatJon bus routes read his DRDs every fifteen (15) minutes as required (OPIP 3.9.1), knew dose authorization limits, and appeared very well trained. The driver for the other general population I
evacuation bus route read both of his DRDs onlyTthree (3) times, rather than every l
fif teen (15) minutes as stated in OPIP 3.9.1, although he was in the 10-milpEPZ for two (2) hours. He did, however, know how to use the dosimetry and was aware of dose j
i authorization limits. It is recommended that Bus Drivers should be trained to read their l
low-and mid-range DRDs every fif teen (15) minutes.
At the eight (8) TCPs observed, all Traffi ' Guides h the DRDs (0-200 mrem and 0-5 Rem) and TLDs. Each Traffic Guide,was aware of the requirement to read the DRDs every fifteen (15) minutes and was awaYe of dose auttpqization limits. Although able to read the DRDs, two (2) of the eight (8) Traffle Guides alsnot fully unprstand the difference between the lo range and mid-range DRDs. The remainder were very well trained and competent in continuously monitoring their own exposure. It is recommended that Traffic Guides should be given additional training in the use of low-and mid-range DRDs.
The ability to supply and administer KI, once the d[ision has been made to do so, was partly demonstrated feld 7). Sufficient real K1 was stocked at tpstaging area, All Traffic Guides understood the and all field workers were givenjimulated Kl.
instructions for taking I and from whom they would receive authorization to do so. The Traffic GUldes were directed to simulate the ingestifo of the tablets prior to their deployment to the field. Tpe Route Alert Driver was given K1 prior tjis deployment o
into the fleid, understoocVthe instructions for ingesting it, and from whom he would receive instructions for taking it.
Bus Drivers for the general population evacuatyi bus routes were old to ingest KI prior to entering the EPZ. One (1) Bus Driver followed instructions, taki g the K1 as directed. The other Bus Driver simulated the ingestion of his K1 tablet re maturely, prior to being assigned an evacuation route. It is recommended that Bus Drivers should be trained in procedures for ingesting Kl.
M/
YX
U17239
,1 All emergency field workers understo d who could authorize exposure in excess of the general public PAGs (Field 8). Both Bus Drivers,gt gransfer Point Coordinator, the Traffic Guides, and tha Route Alert Drivers understood that their Immediate supervisors, going through the chain of command, could authorize exposures in excess of the general public PAGs.
DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the. Implementation of emergsney worker radiological exposure control for field activities deployed from the Riverhead Staging Area during the exercise.
1 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1.
==
Description:==
One (1) of the drivers for the general population evacuation bus routes dispatched from the Riverhead Staging Arca did not read his DRDs every fif teen (15) minutes as stated in OPIP l
3.9.1 (NU REG-0654, !!, K.3.b).
l I
Recommendation:
Bus :. Drivers for the general population bus routes should be given additions.1 training to read their low-and l
l mid-range DRDs every fif teen (15) minutes.
2.
Descr!ption: Two (2) of the eight (B) Traffic Guides did not fully understand the difference between low-and mid-range DRDs j
9 (NUREG-0654, !!, K.3.b).
l Recommendation:
Traffic Guides should be given additional training in the use of low-and mid-range DRDs.
l 3.
==
Description:==
One (1) Sus Driver simulated the ingestion of his El tablet prematurely, prior to being assigned an evacuation route l
(NUREG-0654, II, J.10.e).
Recommendation: Bus Drivers should be given additional training
)
in procedures for ingesting KI.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No areas recommended for improvement were observed in the implementation of emergency worker radiological exposure control for finid activities deployed from the Riverhead Staging Area during the exercise.
/
og
U17240 78 2.8 EMERGENCY WORKER DECONTAMINATION FACILITY (EWDF)
The EWDF is located in the basement of the LERO EOC,1650 Islip Avenue, Brentwood, New York.
2.8.1 EWDF Operations The ability to mobilize staff fnd activate the EWDF was demonstrated (EWDF a
/
,1). p eall-out procedu e is availableMor activation of personnel at anytime. Th
. was operational on a imely basis and was provided'with a full complement of operating e
personnel.
{
Rosters wer available to show that sufficient personnel were trained and i
available to provide continuous operation of the EWDF on a twenty-four (24) hour basis (EWDF 2).
objective to demonstrate that adequate equipment and procedures for The decontamination of emergency workers' equipment and vehicles, including adequate (EWDF 3).
The provisions for handling contaminated waytes at the EWDF, was mylibrated, and was equipme used by the EWDF staff was+ ell maint/ned, had been ca properly used by the personnel. The facilities were adequate for the expepted volume of emergency personnel to be processed: Decontamination f acilities were/ adequate, Ith re j
the establishment of separate contaminated andlncontaminated areas. Procedures f
well written and / utilized by the emergency staff.
Monito}r ng procedures erfe
, demonstrated on several hundred emergency workers as they were checked and procepet through the decontamination f acility. Waste handling procedures demonstrated were Solid wastes would be stored, collected, and r moved for processing / storage j
adequate.
at the SNPS site. The generation of liquid waste was minimized by not using ficodingj methods.
As an alternate to flooding, decontamination of vehicic surfaces was I
accomplished by paper towels, swipes, and damp cloths which were included in the solid waste.
DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the operatfor' rf the EWDF during the exercise.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION No areas requiring corrective action were observed in the operation of the EWDF during the exercise.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No areas recommended for improvement were observed in the operation of the EWDF during the exercise.
/ 7/
oX i
U17241 2.8.2 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control 1
The objective to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure including the proper use of personnel dosimetry was met (Fleid 1). All peyonnel who were wearing the were in contact with potentply contaminated emergency workey' fficient. Requyi e ood condition andpe them. Record keeping wks eavailable in and knew how to required dosimete dosimetry was in their DRDs at the prescribed intervals.
Sufficient supplies of KI were allable at the EWDF for issuance to Ambulance and Ambulette Drivers. El as issued o the appropriatjgemergency workers, along with structions. Briefings werFriven at the time of issuance of j
pertinent record 4orms an El on the prope' procedures by which K1 would be authorized for in estion (Field 7). The Emergency Wo"ker Decontamination Leader at the EWDF was aware of the proper procedures for obtaining authorization for exposure in excess of the general public PAGs (Field 8).
i DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed in the implementation of emergency worker radiological exposure control at the EWDF during the exercise.
' AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION No areas requiring corrective action were observed in the implementation of emergency worker radiological exposure control at the EWDF during the exercise.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No areas recommended for improvement were observed in the implementation of emergency worker radiological exposure control at the EWDF during the exercise.
2.9 RECEPTION CENTER The Nassau County Veterans Memorial Coliseum in Uniondale, New York is the designated Reception Center for the general population who would evacuate the 10-mile The Coliseum is approximately forty (40) miles from SNPS and would serve as a
,EP Z.
monitoring and decontamination facility for evacuees, and as a preliminary registration '
center for the American Red Cross.
The monitoring and controlling of emergency worker exposure, including proper use of personnel dosimetry, was demonstrated by the emergency workers p the
,v Reception Center (Field 1). Issuance of dosimetry to the emeyency workers was done in an efficient manner and according to the pla Workers wer(br efed by the Supervising Decontamination Leader.
Dosimetry was n ample supply, good condition, properly l
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l U17242
\\
so d whom notify amiliar with dosimetry use an! appropriate and alibrated, and agged. Personnel were Record forms were If a problem deveJoped with the equipment.
I instruction sheets / issued with the dosimpters contained concise and pertinent data.
Personnel werednstructed, and reminded 4requently, to read their DRDs at fifteen (15) minute intervals.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so, was not applicable at the Reception Center (Field 7).
El is not stockpiled at the Reception Center, nor is it required to be according to procedure OPIP 3.6.2.
ware of the general public P AGs.
rvising Decontamination Leader as The St. e name of the Individual at the LERO EOC who must authorize, by use of He also knew the " Emergency Exposure Authorization Form," exposure in excess of the general population PAGs (Field 8).
The Reception Center was staffed with about three hundred 300) LERO personnel within ninety (90) minutes following notification. All perspnnel re notified by commercial telephone using a written call list. The center wasMully perational by 1130 and ready to receive evacuees. Approximately one hundred fif ty (150) personnel are needed to operate the facility, seventy-eight (78) of whom were present to perform monitoring functions (Field 17).
at sufficien ined Duty rosters displayed at the Reception Center showe personnel are available to maintain operation, at the expected demand rates, on a twenty-four (24) hour basis (Field 19).
The objective of demonstrating procedures for the registration, radiological monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees and vehicles, including adequate provisions for handling contamina d wastes, was partly met at the Reception Center (Fleid 21).
Separate areas were established for contamy' ated and uncontaminated personnel and vehic es, and incom)ng traffic was properly Youted to the applicable areas. Security was p and maintaTned to control the ingress and egress of evacuees.
1 set Personnel radiological monitoring was demonstrated by thy seventy-eight (78) monitors available.
Dver one hundred (100) people were adfually registered and monitored, and were# contaminated f necessary.
On several occasions personnel radiological monitoring tood(simulated) I d
approximately four (4) to five (5) minutes per individual, which is considerably longer then the ninety (90) seconds specified in the A large number of evacuees could result in a$lgnificant queue of j
LERO procedures.
indyiduals waiting to be monitored. /. sufficient supply of calibrated equipmentys available for use by the monitoring personnel.
Emergency workers appeared very familiar with the operation and function of the equipment.
/The facilities at the Reception Center, as demonstrated during the exercise, (32,000) evacuees within the required were capable of handling thirty-two thousafn twelve (12) hour time per!od. A message was received at the Reception Center from the LERO EOC which indicated that the expected number of evacuees to be prytessed would be increased to 100,000. The Supervising Decontamination Leader informed his staff of u
i 81 U17243
/
)
the anticipated increase in numbers and implemented (simulated) an alternate plan which is available to handle evacuees in excess of the thirty-two thousand (32,0'00) planned.
I This alternate monitoring plan (OPIP 4.2.3, Section 5.11, Page 16-17) provides for the monitoring of the wheelwells and hoods of vehicles and the hands and thyroid area of-drivers of all vehicles arriving at the Reception Center to reduce the time yeded to process groups of evacuees. Also, the Supervising Decontamination Leader contacted the LERG EOC to make arrangements for additional monitoring personnel to be provided by other support organizations (i.e., the Institute for Nuclear Power Oprja ions, DOE, etc.)
I and the estimated arrival times for these additional personnel wect provided by the LERO EOC. However, the alternate evacuee monitoring plan for the Reception Center was not evaluated at this exercise.
/
The decontamination facility at the Reception Center was set up in accordance with the Plan, with operational activities generallyIn well. However, on ene4ccasion an evacuee with a contaminated hand (simulated) was told to put bber booties on, which could have resulted in their contamination.
Further, he was told to put ant! contamination gloves on after he used his contaminated hand to put the booties on.
Since his feet were not contaminated, the bootles were not necessary. Decontamination personnel assigned to the Reception Center s,hould receive additional training on evacuee i
decontamination procedures described in the LERO Plan.
\\
DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed at the Reception Center during this e:tercise.
1 AREA REQUIRING CORRECTWE ACTION Description On several occasions, personnel radiological monitoring took approximately four (4) to five (5) minutes per individual, which is considerably longer then the ninety (90) seconds specified in the LERO Procedures (NUREG-0.654, II, J.12).
Recommendattom All monitoring personnel assigned to the Reception Center should be trained to monitor individuals within ninety (90) seconds as prescribed in the LERO Procedures.
AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
An evacuee, who required decontamination, was erroneously instructed to don anticontamination clothing.
Recommendattom All decontamination staff assigned to the Reception Center should be given additional training on evacuee decontamination procedures established in the LERO Plan.
[
[
U17244 4
82 2.10 CONGREGATE CARE CENTERS The Nassau County Chapter of the American Red Cross has made arrangements to use numerous facilities as congregate care centers in case of an emergency at SNPS.
Two (2) facilities were activated and staffed for evaluation during the exercise.
However, neither of these facilities are identified in the latest submission of the LERO Plan. It is recommended that the Plan should be revised to include all facilities intended,
These facilities for use as shelter facilities during a radiological emergency at SNPS.
should be included in the list attached to LERO's letter of agreement with the American Red Cross.
2.10.1 U.S. Marine Corps, Brigade, Garden City, NY Mobilization [of staff and activation of the Congregate Care Center whs demonstrated in atimely manner, th eby meeting an objective of tyl exercise (Field 18). Twenty-four (24) hour notificati n of the staff and activattori/ser up of the facility were implemented through the local American Red Cross Chapter.
The ability to maintain staffing on a twenty-four (24) hour basis at the Congregate Care Center was demonstrated (Field 20); staffing is the responsibility of the American Red Cross.
f Procedures and activities flemonstrated for the Congregate Care Center ere e adequate (Fleid 22). The center isMiesigned to facilitate handicapped and has ample floor
> space, parking, feeding aree.s, and medical assistance to support the anticipated numbers of evacuees. OPIP 3.7.1 ("Public Health Support") was not demonstrated. The purpose of OPIP 3.7.1 is to ensure support services for the operation of Congregate Care Centers.
l The Shelter Manager wasVfware of how to get any required assistance or support; these I
would be acquired through the American Red Cross coordinator in the LERO EOC.,
Copies of the Procedures should be made available to the emergency staff at each Congregate Care Center.
2.10.2 LILCO Office Building, Mineola, NY The ability to mobilize staff and activate the Congregate Care Center in a Janner was demonstrated by the American Red Cross staff (Fleld 18). Personnel timep!
i wertr mobilized using a written call-up procedure. There wahimited participation by l
l American Red Cross volunteers during this exercise due to personnel work-related conflicts.
The capability to staff the songregate Care Center on a twenty-four (24) hour basis was demonstrated through th presentation of duty rcsters (Fleid 20).
The facilities areTadequate for the mass care [f evacuees at the fineola Congregate Care Center (Field 22).
The center hasvsufficient space andVfeeding capability in two (2) multifloored vacgn't buildings which are available for use by the American Red Cross.
Parking is ' limited to approximately four hundred (400) 7/
2 X'
f U17245 83
[
automfo lies. The f acilities for haptiicapped evacuees were limited. The She knew to request resources andvsupplies through the LERO EOC and American Red Cross.
available aAt Congregate Care Center, and the Shelter Manager followed proper There was no counseling procedureY by' requisitioning one through the LERO ego.
demonstrated at the center, but the staff woes with the local mental health capabilit team.
Emergency radio capability was not available at this center during the exercise, but an agreement with the local radio club is being developed to assist in this capacity.
DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were observed at the Congregate Care Centers during this
{
exercise.
I AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION
==
Description:==
Neither of the two (2) congregate care facilities activated for the February 13, 1986, exercise are identified in the latest submission of the LERO Plan (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.h).
Recommendation: The Plan should be revised to include all facilities intended for use as shelter facilities during a radiological emergency at SNPS. These f acilities should be included in the list attached to LEROs letter of agreement with the American Red Cross.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT
==
Description:==
The availability and implementation of the procedure e
for public health support (OPIP 3.7.1) was not demonstrated at the Marine Congregate Care Center.
Recommendation: OPIP 3.7.1 should be made entlable and utilized j
at each Congregate Care Center.
==
Description:==
The Mineola Congregate Care Center needs to upgrade the facilities for handicapped evacuees.
Recommendation: Facilities needed for the handicapped should be identified and proper actions should be taken to accommodate them at the Mineola Congregate Care Center.
)
U172,46 sc 2.11 MEDICAL DRILL A medical drill was conducted on Sunday, February 9,1986 in order to exercise the emergency medical response of personnel from SNPS, Wading River Fire Department, and Central Suffolk Hospital. This drill required response to an accident involving a simulated injury and contamination of a worker at SNPS.
The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure including proper use of personnel dosimetry was met during the medical drill (Field 1).
All emergency workers, including plant, ambulance, and In addition, the hospital personnel were provided with the required TLDs and DRDs.
hospital medical team had ring-type TLDs. DRDs were checked at appropriate intervals and emergency personnel appeared familiar with dosimetry fundamentals.
Radioiodine was n'ot a factor during the medical drill, with the result that the objective to supply and administer K! once the decision has been made to do so, was not applicable (Field 7).
SNPS personnel and ambulance team members were aware of exposure control guidelines and who can authorize exposure in excess of those guidelines, thereby meeting an objective of the drill (Fleld 8).
The performances of the SNPS personnel and the Wading River Fire Department ambulance crew, who were called on during the medical drill, were good. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy for ambulance facilities and procedures for handling injured and contaminated individuals was met (Fleid 23). The scenario involved an injured plant worker who suffered a deep laceration of the right thigh, which was also radiologically contaminated. Personnel on-site at SNPS treated the victim promptly, took necessary vital signs, surveyed the entire victim, as well as the injured area, and isolated him.
During this entire process the control room at SNPS was kept informed of the status of the injured victim. An ambulance was requested from the Wading River Fire Department to provide transportation to Central Suffolk Hospital.
Along with this request, all necessary information was communicated to the Fire Department dispatcher in Wading River. Security at SNPS was notified and instructed to direct the ambulance to the proper location within the site. The ambulance arrived within ten (10) minutes and the victim was transported by stretcher to the vehicle.
Contamination control was continuously maintained. Site personnel gave medical
'in*ormation to the ambulance crew, along with a radiological report on the victim. The ambulance personnel were given protective clothing and dosimetry. The interior of the ambulance was covered with hcrculite to mitigate the spread of contamination.
A Radiation Protection Technician (RPT) accompanied the ambulance to the hospital. The ambulance maintained radio contact with the hospital during transit, relaying the estimated time of arrival information and status reports on the vital signs of the i
accident victim.
The adequacy of the hospital facilities and procedures for handling injured and contaminated individuals were well demonstrated, thereby meeting an objective (Field 24). Performances by the Central Suffolk Hospital personnel and the SNPS health physics
85 U17247 i
Due to the information radioed from the ambulance, the hospital was staff were good.
all set up with the appropriate staff ready to treat the injured upon arrival. The RPT put on protective clothing in order to assist the medical team with the radiological A number of recently calibrated survey instruments, provided by LILCO, evaluation.
were available for use by the medical team. Procedures were posted on the wall of the i
emergency room and proper security measures were taken to isolate the Radiological Emergency Area (REA). A second SNPS RPT arrived to survey the ambulance, crew, and supplies prier to their release. The patient's clothing was removed and he was monitored, revealing contamination of the thigh laceration and chin. Samples were collected and properly labeled. Decontamination procedures were initiated and survey results recorded Waste was properly managed and held for after each decontamination process.
transportation to SNPS in marked containers. After the patient was determined to be An SNPS RPT was decontaminated, he was sutured and transferred out of the REA.
available to perform the exit survey of the patient and the gurney. The two (2) RPTs also assisted the medical team with the removal of their protective clothing. The step-Dosimetry off pad procedure was used and complete body surveys were performed.
(TLDs, ring badges, and DRDs) were collected and documented.
The layout of the Wpital facility is very well adapted for a safe and efficient Direct access from the outside and the ambulance radiological emergency respvase.
arrival area to the REA was utilized, thereby reducing the possibility of spreading contamination to other parts of the hospital.
In addition, this feature enabled the hospital to have a tighter and better controlled security operation. Another step taken to assure a minimal possibility for the spread of contamination outside of the REA was that the floor was covered with herculite.
DEFICIENCIES No deficiencies were c.,bserved at the medical drill during the exercise.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION No areas requiring corrective actions were observed at the medical drill during the exercise.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT No areas recommended for improvement were observed at the medical drill j
during the exercise.
U11243 86 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES OR AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: FEBRUARY 13,1986 EXERCISE Section 2 of this report !!sts deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action based on the observations and recommendations of Federal evaluators at the radiological emergency preparedness exercise for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station ' held on February 13, 1986. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP 1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980), and objectives for the exercise agreed upon by LILCO, FEMA, and the RAC.
FEMA recommends to NRC that LILCO submit a schedule of actions it has taken or intends to take to correct these inadequacies. FEMA also recommends that a detailed plan, including dates of completion for scheduling and implementing recommendations, be provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted immediately.
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SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Section 3 of this report provides a schedule for the correction of deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action noted during the February 13,1986 exercise. Tables 4.1 through 4.6 summarize recommendations to correct those deficiencies or areas requiring f f corrective action. e L____ _ _ __
t 1 121 U17283 o TABLE 4.1 SHORERAM NUCLEAR POVER STATION -
SUMMARY
Of DEFICIENCIES AND ARIAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION February 13. 1986 LER0 EOC Page 1 of 4 j q Recommended 1 NUREC-0654 Corrective Aetten FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 2/13/86 Status i DEFICIENCT 1 Delsys in responding to the two (2) evacuacion J.10.k X 1 impediment f ree play sensages inserted at the LERO EOC were caused by the failure to inf o r's the Evacuation Coordinator in a timely manner. In addition chara was a lack of internal communication in response to these impediment problems. Pertinent information was not tecluded on the 1045 and 1106 1.ERO Message Forma from the Evacuation Route Coordinator to the Evacuation Support Communicecor for Route Spotters / Road Crews regarding the stulated impediment involving the gravel truck and fuel truck problems. As a result of this lack of information, the tapediment problems were not analyzed in a timely fashion and incomplete equipment was dispatched to handle the gravel truck impediment in the field. Internal communications procedures should be reviewed and revised as neces sa ry to ensure that inf o rsation on tapediments is promptly passed both up the chain of counsand to the Evacuation Coordinator and downward and laterally to all lead coordinators under l the Evacuation Coordinator and their staffs. Additional i l training is needed to ensure that the procedures, j l whether new or current, are properly implemented. All ) coordinators at the
- EOC, and those who initiats
~ messages, sust be trained to include all pertinent l inf ormation on the LERO message forma and to analyse the equipment requirements to clear tapediments. j AREAS RFQUIR.1HC CORRECTITE ACT105 1 There was some confusion regarding the method for F.1.c notifying the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). X 1 (1) The 1.ERC orocedures should be reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure that a point of contact with the FAA has been designated. (2) The
- 1. ERD EOC staff should be trained it the I
I appropriate procedures so that the FAA can be notified in a cisely manner. i
.- =..... U17284 122 TABLE a.1 580RIMN1 NUCLEAR POWER STATION ~
SUMMARY
OF der!CIENCIES AND AREAS RIQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION February 13. 1986 LERO EOC (Cont'd) Page 2 of 4 Recommended NUitIG-0654 Coreeeeive Aeeion TEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Exercise Present Reference 2/13/86 Status Recommended Corrective Action No. 2 Since there are no procedures for notification of the E.1, j long Island Railroad (LIRR) in the Plan, the LIRR was F.1.s not notified during the exercise. X 1 (1) The LE10 procedures should be revised to establish e point of contact and a means for notifying the LIRR. 1 1 (2) The LIRO EOC staf f should be trained in the revised procedures so that the LIRR can be notified in a l timely manner. 3 The dose assessment sectus board in the accident I.10 I 1 j assessment area had to accommodate'. both DOE RAF and LILCO field monitoring data. There were not enough columns on the board to keep the two (2) sources of data separated. LERO should enlarge the dose assessment accommodate a clear separation between status board to the data reports from the DOE RAF and LILCO field i sonitoring teams. 4 The downwind distance of the sample was incorrectly 1.10 K 1 F.1.d reported as 7000 meters instead of 700 asters for one of the thyroid doses reMrted by a DOE RAF field monitoring l t e s s. This error das caused by a decimal point sisplaced during the conversion of the distance units and meant that the initial calculation of thyroid dose based on this measurement was 9000 mrem /hr at 4.3 miles dovowind instead of 9000 mRes/hr at about 0.5 miles downwind. About five ($) sinutes elapsed before this found and corrected. All downwind distances error was true the field should be reported consistently in either siles or esters. 5 During the reporting of the initial DOE RAF thyroid 1.10 K I doses, only one field Lassurement, the 1400 mrem /hr esasurement nede at about 1204 at two (2) miles from the plant. was available. This value was used at the LER0 EOC to extrapolate values at other distances. These extrapolated data were reported as actual asseurements. other distances rather than as projected data on the at dose assessment status board. It took two and one half (2.5) hours to identif y and correct this error. LERO reporting procedures should be reviewed to ensure proper coordination and proper reporting, i
m u17295 l i TABLE 4.1 SHORDL#t NUCLEAR FOWER STATION -
SUMMARY
OF der!CIENCIES AND ARIA $ REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Februa ry 13, 1986 LERO EOC (Con t ' d) Page 3 of a Re comme nded NUREG-0654 Corrective Ae: ton F EMA-RE F-1 Rev. 1 Exercise Fresent Reference 2/13/86 Status Recommended Corrective Action No. I.10 X 6 Although he later quoted the FAG correctly when asked to do so by a Federal evalustor, during a briefing held at the LERO EOC at about 1110, the Health Services Coordinator ' misstated the EFA FAC as being sandatory evacuation when the projected thyruid dose was five (5) The 1ealth Services Coordinator should review the Res. EFA FAC guidance in order to avoid any possible confusion that could result due to misinformation given during briefings. 7 Prior to the exercise, LILCO management made the E.6 X I decisien that the siren systes would not be activated as part of the February 13, 1986 exercise. Activation of the siren system should be actually tested in the future. 8 There was a delay of about forty-ti.e ( a '-) sinutes E.2 K I between the LERO E0C's first attempt er eve Route Spotter fl005 verify the fuel truck impedi' c and the dispatch of that spotter f rom the Fort Jeffe.aon Staging Area. This delayed timely verification of the impediment. Personnel need to be trained in t he development of alternative approaches when delays are reasonably anticipated in the field verification of impediments to evacuation. Development of alternatives should include consultation between, at a minimum, t he Evacuation Coordinator and the Evacuation Route Coordinator. 9 only the Sho reham-Wading River School District N/R X 1 participated in the February 13, 1996 exercise. Prior to the exercise, LILCO management made the decisten that j other school districts were not to be included in the j esercise. In the future all schools must be included in l all Federally evaluated exercises and drills. 10 Dosimetry and training have not been provided to the Bus K.3, R.S.a Drivers used for school evacuation. (1) Bus Drivers used fot school evacuation should be X I trained in the 'use of desteeters. (2) Adequate supplies of dosimetry should be provided X 1 for tus Drivers used for school evacuation.
124 TABL.E 4.1 SMORDLAM NUCLEAR F0VER STATION - SIMtARY OF DEFICIENCIES AND ARIAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION February 13, 1986 1.ERO EOC (Cont'd) j Page 4 of 4 1 Recoenended j NUM C-0654 correezive Ac: tan FFN -REP-1 Ra t. 1 Esercise 'Present No. Recommended Corrective Actiom Reference 2/13/86 Statup awa're of when to J.10.e I I 11 Some of the Ambulette Drivers were not take their KI. Training on K1 procedures should be given to the Ambulette Drivers. 12 Sus Drivers used for school evacuation have not be en J.10.e trained in KI policy and the use of Kl. Sufficient supplies of K1 are not available for school evacuation Bus Drivers. (1) Bus Drivers used for school evacancion should be X I trained in KI policy and the use of Kl. (2) Adequate supplies of KI should be provided for Sua X 1 Drivers used for school evacuation. 13 Ambulette Drivers were not all trained regarding who can K.4 X 1 i I authorite doses in excess of and what to do in the event of exposure above the general public FAGS. Ambulette Drivers should be trained on excessive exposure authorization and applicable procedures. 14 Bus Drivers used for school evacuation have not been K.4 K I trained regarding who can authorize exposure in excess of the general public PAGs. Due Drivers used for school e evacuation should receive training regarding who can authorise exposure in excess of the general public FACs. i i 1
. a :.._ - - ~ ~ ' - - - ~ - - - - - ~ - ~ - - - - - - - - - 4 U17288 125 i i i T AB LF. 4.2 SHORERAM NUCLEAA F0WER STATION -
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES l AND AREAS REQUIRING CORAECTIVE ACTION February 13. 1986 [MERGENCY OPERATIONS TACILITY Page 1 of i f l l Recommended { NOREC4654 Correettve Action rExA-REr-t l Rev. 1, Esercise Present No. Reconnended Corrective Action Reference 2/13/86-Status 1 1 No recommendacient, i ~ \\ d l L l
.U17287,' a .y, ,-'9 TABLE 4.3 SHORERMI NUCLEAR POWER STATION -
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION February 13. 1966 BROOKKAVEN ARIA 0FFICE Page'l of 1 Recomieided-NUREG-0654 corree:1ve Action FE.MA-REP-1 Rav. 1, Exercise Present Reference 2/13/66-Status Recommended Corrective Action No. 1 No recommendations. l
27 U17288 TABLE 4.4 SHORDiAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - 5thetARY Of DEFICIENCIES AND ARIAS REQUIRING CORRICTIVE ACTION February 13. 1986 i DiERCENCY NEWS CElffER Page t of L s Recommended NPREC-0654 Corrective Action TEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Exercise Present Reference 2/13/86 Status Recommended Corrective Action Sio. DEFICIEleCT 1 Insufficient copying capabilities at the ENC resulted in C.4.b. X 1 delays in the distribution of information. These delays C.4.c affected the following two (2) areas: i Hard copies of EBS messages were not provided to the i e media in a timely manner. e Rumor control personnel were not able to answer questions received f rom the public because they were not given accurate up-te-date status reports. LERO should make provisions for reliable and rapid equipment to reproduce, in hard iopy, all appropriate l messages for distribution to the ENC staff. AREAS REQUIRIMC Cot 1ECTIVE ACTION f 1 Maps and displays in the media briefing room were J.10. b X 1 insufficient. The f ollowing dispisys should be posted in an area easily visible to reporters: An EPZ asp which tracks protective actions and plume e pathway. A status board which provides ECLs and their times of j e declaration, 2 Soise hard copies of ESS messages that were provided to N/R X 1 the press contained estraneous information (clearly marked for deletion) that should have been omitted to avoid possible confusion. Hard copies of EBS messages posted in the ENC for use by the press should contain only that information which was broadcast to the public. l l l l l
U1728D' us - TABLE 4.5 1 SH0ggBAM NUCLEAR POWit STATION ~ 511HMARY OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRINC CORRICTIVE ACTION february 13. 1986 i PORT JEFFERSON STACING A).EA I Page 1 of 1 i Recommended NURIC-0654 Corrective Aetto, FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Exercise Presegt Reference 2/13/86 Sta:us Recommended Corrective Action No. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACT'.C 4 i R.3.a. X I l One (1) Bus Driver neglected to reed his DRD at any time j 1 R.3.b during the seventy-five (75) minutes he was in the EFZ. j All Bus Drivers should be trained to reed their DRDs every fifteen (15) ainutes as described in I.ERO Pro-cedures. t l l l l I l l
~ 4 129 ggg o TABLE 4.6 SHORF.MAM NUCLEAR F0WER STATION - SUMMAltY OF DUICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRICTIVE ACTION February 13. 1986 FATCHOGUI STAGING ARIA Page 1 of 4 Recommended NUREG-0654 Curreetive Aetion FLM-REF-1 Rev. 1. Exercise Present Reference 2/13/86 Status Reconnended Currective Action-No. l DEFICIDsCIES l I sus drivers were not dispatched until two (2) hours J.9, after receipt of the Site Area Emergency ECL J.10.g j 1 declaration. l (1) An additional area should be established for the X 1 l distribution of dosimetry to reduce Bus Driver processiog time. X 1 (2) Additional trained staf f should be provided to the Bus Dispatcher to assist his in deploying over three hundred (300) drivers and Transfer Point j Coordinators who are deployed from the Fetchogue j Staging Area. 2 A bus driver took two (2) hours and ten (10) minutes to J.9, proceed from the staging area to the transfer point. J.10.g Another driver west to the wrong transfer point. and his sistake vaa not recognized by the Transfer Foint i Coordionsor.. Yet another driver missed a segment of an assigned evacuation route (NUREG-0654, II, J.9, J.10.g). (1) Bus Drivers for general population evacuation X-1 routes should receive training to assure their ability to follow directions. given to thes so they l can (a) follow routes f rom the staging area to bus garages and then to transf er points, and (b) follow an assigned bus route. (2) 0FIF 3.6.4, (Pages 13-14) and X I (Pages 10-12) should be revised to require. respectively, the nus Driver to present, and the Transfer Point Coordinator to verify, each las Driver's copy of the Bua/ Van Dispatching Form (0FIF 3.6.4, Attachment 7 Page 62) to assure that the tus Driver has arrived at the proper Transf er Point. 'i AREAS IsQUIElmG CotazcTIVE ACTIost 1 0FIF 4.7.1 specifies that the only personnel entrance is N/R X 1 to be the Main Entrance on the Conklin Avenue side of the building. The entrance actually used for this on the north side of the building l purpose was the one (Main Street). Since the systes actus11y used seese to be superior to the Plan due to reduced congestion, OFIF 4.7.1 should be revised to indicate that personnel are to enter the Patchogue Staging Area through the Main Street entrance to the building. i
U17291 130 TABLE 4.6 SMOREHM NUCLEAR POWEP. STATION - SUHitARY OF DEFICIENCIF.$ AND ARIAS REQUIRING CORRICTIVE ACTION Fe b rua ry 13, 1986 FATCHDCUE STACING ARIA (Cont'd) Page 2 of 4 Recommended NUREC-0654 Corrective Actic, FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Exercise Present Reference 2/13/86 Status Recommended Corrective Action No. N/R X 1 2 LERO personnel entered the upper floor repeatedly to use telephones for energency notification. This practice is explicitly prohibited by OPIP 4.7.1 (page 38, item the 83). Either OPIP 4.7.1 should be revised to reflect actual practice of using telephones on the second floor of the Patchogue S t aging Area building, or more telephones should be provided on the first floor for LERO personnel to perform their energency notifications. locked for security as specified N/R I 1 3 The south door was not in OPIP 4.7.1. All doors required to be locked by the Plan should be verified as actually locked by the Staging Area Coordinator or a desigpee. 4 Unauthorized entrance to the staging ares could be N/R X I achieved through the open fire escape on the second floor of the east side of the building. The fire escape on the second floor of the east side of the building should be designated as a guard post in the Plan and an individual should be assigned to staf f this guard post. 5 Traf fic Guides do not have complete or correct inf o rma-J.9, X I tion on the appropriate destination f or evacuees. All J.10.g Traffic Guides should be trained to advise motorists with questions to tune to the EB5 station (WALE) for the latest inf o rsation on all matters related to the energency, including the location of the Reception Center. o Appropriate personnel and equipment were not dispatched J.10.k I 1 to clear the multiple vehicle accident simulated as an impedime nt to evacuation. The appropriate personnel at the Patchogue Staging Area should be trained to request more inf ormation from the LERO EDC when impediments to evacuation are indicated. 7 Instructions for the driver of the non-institutions 11:ed J.10.d I I mobility-impaired bus to proceed to the Reception Center the properly transmitted to the Sue Driver at were not trookhaven National Laboratory Transf er Point. Transfer l Point Coordinators should be trained to follow instruc-tions forthcoming from the staging area regarding directions that are to be given to special population evacuation route Bus Drivers, since they are trained to return to the transfer point for instructions as specified in the LER3 Plan. l l
U17292 s TABLE 4.4 SHORDiAM HUC1. EAR F0WER STATION ~
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIAING C011ECTIVE ACTION Februarv 13, 1986 l FATCM0 CUE STACING AALA (Cont'd) Page 3 of a Recome nd ed MURIC-0654 Corteettve Action FEMA-REP-L Rev. 1 Esercise Present Reference 2/13/86 Status Reconnended Corrective Action No. 8 Residences of some non-institutionalized mobility-J.10.d X 1 impaired persons were difficult to find. Drivers designated to pick up non-institutions 11:ed mobility-their residences should be provided impaired evacuees at with more detailed. maps and clearer descriptions of pickup points. 9 It took forty (40) minutes from receipt of a 1.ERO J.9, X 1 request to dispatch a Bus Driver to simulate t he J.10.g evacuation of forty (40) school children. The Bus Dispatcher at the Facchogue Staging Area should be provided with trained staf f support so that Bus Drivers can be dispatched in a more timely manner. 10 The Facchogue Staging Area Bus Dispatcher made repeated K.3, X 1 statements with a bu11 horn which emphasised only that K.4 to general population evacuation route tus Drivers were call in if a reading of 3.5 was reached on their DRD; he did not give the units associated with the 3.5 number J not mention the use of the 0-100 mRee DRD which is supposed to trigger the first call-in at a reading at or above 200 mRes. The verbal instructions given to the general popuistion evacuation route Bus Drivers by the Patchogue Bus Dispatcher over the bu11 horn should be j more precise to emphasize the proper use of both dosimeters and the careful reading of espesure control instructions for emergency workers. K.3.a. X 1 11 One general repopulation evacuacion route tus Driver read DRDs only ce at the instructions of r.he Transfer K.3.b and another read his DRDs only when it Foint Coordid tot was convenient. General population evacuation route Bus Drivers should be trained to read their dosimeters approximately eve ry fit teen (15) sinutes when they are inside the 10-sile EFZ, stopping the bus to do so if necessary. 12 Traffic Guides at two (2) TCPs did not know dose K.3.s. X 1 authorization limits. Train the Traf fic Guides so that K.3.b they know the dose authorization limits. 13 The Route Alerting Driver observed believed he would J.10.e. X 1 receive El authorization in an ESS message. This is J.10.f inconsistent with OPIP 3.3.4, Attachment 1, ices #9. Route Alert Drivers should be m *ned to know that K1 authorization is to be F-to them by their supervisor as specified in #, -J Flan. L
7- - - - U11293 u2 TABLE 4. 6 SH0ltEHM NUCLEAA POWER STATION ~
SUMMARY
OF DCTICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 1 Feb rua ry 13. 1986 [ PATCMOCLfE STACING AREA (Cont'd) f Page 4 of 6 i Recomended l NUREO-0654 Correettve Ae: ton TEttA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Exercise Present Reference 2/13/86 Status Reconutended Corrective Action No. 14 Traffic Guides at two (2) TCPs did not fully understand K.4 x 1 that the chain of command for excess esposure the h ad Traffic Guide authority to authorization gives authorise excess exposure by radio, and some Traffic Guides indicated that they might question the authority of the Lead Traf fic Guide to issue he authorization f or All Traf fic Guides should be trained excess exposure. to know that the Lead Traffic Guide can authorise exposure in escess of the general population FACs by radio. l t
m._ j i U17294 1 m TABl.E 4.7 580gDiAM NUC1. EAR POWEA STATION -
SUMMARY
OF DEFICII,NCIES AND ARIAS REQUIRING CORAECTIVE ACTIO> February 13, 1986 EIVERHEAD STACING ARIA Page i of 1 l Recommended NUCC-0654 Correettve Ae: ton PEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Exercise Present Reference 2/l3/86 Status Reconnended Corrective Action No. DEFICImeCT 1 The time between deployment of Traffic Guides from the J.10.j x 1 staging area and their arrival et TCPs was excessive, taking between fif ty '(50) and seventy (70) ainutes; i approximately thirty (30) sinutes was sp6nt in line at J the staging area receiving field kits and procedures. A more expeditious means of dispatc* ting the Traf fic Guides f rom the staging area to the field should be developed. ARIAS RgQUIR1100 Cot 1ECT!?E ACT10ef updsped periodically. the. N/R X 1 I While the status board was time was not alveys included when new information was posted. Personnel should be trained to record the time. that updated information is posted on the status board. 2 The access road at the Brookhaven Substation Transfer R X 1 Point vsa narrow and curving and could be impassable in inclement weather. Consideration should be given to relocating the trookhaven Substatier. Transfer Point to a different location. 3 One (1) of the drivers for the general population K.3.b K 1 evacuation bus routes dispatched from the Riverhead Staging Area did not reed his DRDs every fif teen (15) sinutes as stated in Orl? 3.9.1. Sus Drivers for the general population bus routes should be given additional training to read their low-and mid-range DRDs every fifteen (15) minutes. 4 Two (2) of the eight (8) Traffic Guides did not fully K.3.b K 1 understand the difference between low-and mid-range DEDe. Traffic Guides should be given additional l s training in the use of low-and mid-range DRDs. 5 One (1) Bus Driver simulated the ingestion of tis KI J.10.e X 1 i tablet prematurely, prior to being assigned an evacuation route. Sus Drivers should be given additional training in procedures for ingesting Kl.
,. i ! UJ7293' u4 l TABLE 4.4 j SBORERAM MUCLEAR POWER STATION - SUW.ARY of DEF1CIENCIES j AND AREA 3 REQUILING COUICTIVE ACTION J Tebruary 13, 1966 j EMERGENCY WORKER DECONTAMINATION TACILITY i Page 1 of 1 Recommended NUREC-0654 Correettve Action TEMA-REP-1' Rev. 1, Exeretos Ptesent j Reference 2/13/86 Status j Recommended Corrective Action f No. J i No reco end.iion.. 4 ) l l ' h l i 4 d l I 1 i l ,1 l 1 1 1 i l 1 o I i i
us U17296 s TABLE 4.9 SHORIRAM NUC12AR POWER STATION -
SUMMARY
Of DEFICIENCIES AND ARIAS REQUIRING CORAICTIVE ACTION February 13. 1986 RECEPTION C1ff!ER Page 1 of 1 Recommended HURIG-0654 Corrective Action FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Exercise Present Reference 2/13/66 Status Reco - nded Corrective Action No. AREA REQUltluc CORRECTIVE ACTION 1 On several occasions, personnel radiolosteal monitoring J.12 X 1 took approximately four (4) to five (5) minutes per individuel, which is considerably lonRet then the ninety (90) seconds specified in the IIRO Frocedures. All monitoring personnel assigned to the Reception Center should be trained to monitor individuals within ninety (90) seconds se prescribed in the IIRO Frocedures. l l i l i
U1729I I " ', 136 i ) TABLE 4.19 SHORERAM NUC1. EAR POWER STATICN -
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES AND ARLAS REQUIKING CORRECTIVE ACTION February 13, 1966 CONCREGATE CAAE CENTERS Page 1 of 1 Recommended NURIC-0654 Carrective A: tion FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, Exercise Present Reference 2/13/86 Status Reconsunded Corrective Action No. J.10.h K 1 AngA REQUltlmc CORAECTIVE Action 1 Neither of the two (2) congregate core facilities activated for the February 13, 1986 exercise are identified in the latest submission of the LERO Plan. The Plan should be revised to include all facilities intended for use as shelter facilities during a radiological emergency at SNPS. These facilities should be included in the list attached to 1.ERO's letter of agreement with the American Red Cross. 1 I i
~ 1 j ~ 137 U17293 c. p. TA8LF. 4. !! SHORDL*M HUCLEAR POWER STATION - SIMKARY OF DEFICIENCIES AND ARIAS RIQUIRING CORAICTIVE ACTION February 13, 1986 ftEDICAL DRILL Page 1 of 1 Recommended NURIC-0654 Correettve setton FLM-REP-1 Rev. 1 Exercise Present Reference 2/13/86 Status Recoweended Corrective Action No. ~ 1 No recommendations. l i 4 I i I** - -. -. - - -. _ _ _ _.....}}