ML20237L482

Summary of ACRS Subcommittee on Auxiliary Sys 870723 Meeting in Washington,Dc Re Status of Fire Risk Scoping Study Being Performed by Sandia for NRC

ML20237L482
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/03/1987
From:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
ACRS-2516, NUDOCS 8708280121
Download: ML20237L482 (97)

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SUMMARY

/ MINUTES OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON THE AUXILIARY SYSTEMS JULY 23, 1987 WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTRCCUCTION The ACRS Subcommittee on the Auxiliary Systems held a meeting on Thurs-day, July 23, 1987 at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., to discuss the status of the Fire Risk Scoping Study being performed by the Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) for the NRC. The entire meeting was open to public attendance. Mr. Sam Duraiswamy was the coanizant ACRS Staff for this meeting. A list of documents submitted to the Subcommittee is included in Attachment A, and the presentation schedule for the meeting is included in Attachment B.

ATTENDEES:

ACRS: C. Michelson (Subcommittee Chairman),

J. C. Ebersole, G. A. Reed, and C. J. Wylie Sam Duraiswamy (Cognizant ACRS Staff)

Principal Soeakers NRC: A. Datta and J. Flack SNL: D. Berry, M. Bohn, J. Lambright, S. Nowlen, and A. Payne l

EXECUTIVE SESSION Mr. Michelson, the Subcommittee Chairman, convened the meeting at 8:30 a.m., and stated that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the following: I

• FY 1986 NRC Fire Protection Research Termination Report

• Need for Fire Risk Research DESIGNATED ORIGINAL 6 DR -------.

. . l Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987  ;

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' Overview and Status of the ongoing Fire Risk Scoping Study at SNL l l

• Results from Tasks 1 and 2 of the Scoping Study i j

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• Risk Methods Integration and Evaltation Program (RMIEP) Fire Risk Analysis

• Identification of New Fire Risk Issues

• Quantification of Fire Risk Issues

• Review of Past Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Methodologies (Note: Owino to lack of time, the item on Review of Past PRA l Methodologies has been postponed to a future meeting).

He said that the Subcommittee had received neither written comments nor requests for time to trake oral statements from members of the public.

Prior to holding discussions on the scheduled items, Mr. Michelson solicited general comments from the Subcommittee members.

Mr. Ebersole commented that several n1> ts extend sensitive circuits l from the control room terminal boarua a various regions of the plants to provide capability to shut down the plant from outside of the control room. These extensions are vulnerable to fire and is difficult to provide adequate protecticn to these extensions. Fe believes that this is a bad practice and the Staff should require the licensees to eliminate such extensions.

Mr. Michelson asked whether these extensions were looked at under the Appendix R analysis to make sure that shutdown capability is

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6 O Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987 invulnerable to control room fires. Mr. Flack responded that they will try to address this issue during the afternoon session. l FY 1986 NRC FIRE PROTECTION RESEARCH TERMINATION REPORT - MR. A. DATTA,  ;

0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATOP.Y RESEARCH (RES) l Mr. Datta discussed briefly the FY 1986 NRC Fire Protection Research Program. There were two separate research programs associated with fire. One was the Fire Risk Study which is still a part of the RMIEP Program. The other one was a Physical Study intended to obtain physical data on the environment produced by fire sources and its impact on safety-related systems. He discussed the main objectives of the Fire Protection Research Program (Attachment C, Page 1).

As a result of the budget constraints, the Fire Protection Program intended to obtain physical data on fire environments and its impact on safety systems was terminated at the end of FY 1986. Some of the projects that had been terminated as a result of budget constraints are (Attachment C, Page 2):

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• Room-to-Room Migration Tests

• Smoke Removal Tests

• Work associated with the "3D-SAFFIRE," " HARVARD," and "COMPBRN" Computer codes

• Cable and Component Damage Tests j l

He reviewed briefly the impacts resulting from the termination of the Fire Protection Program (Attachment C, Page 3), and the achievements of l the past Fire Protection Research (Attachment C, Pages 4 and 5).

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Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987 j Mr. Michelson asked whether they planned to look at the systems inter-action effects resulting from the fire mitigating efforts in the control room. Mr. Datta responded that it was one of the issues that they intended to look at under the previously planned research.

Indicating that Appendix R requires 20-foot physical separation barrier i l

between trains, Mr. Michelson asked whether there are any technical j basis to justify this 20-foot barrier, and also whether they have any )

information on how fast smoke and heat propagate across this barrier.

f Mr. Datta responded that they do not have adequate information on these issues.

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1 Mr. Michelson commented that the 20-foot separation test did:not look at  !

all important issues. It did not prove that heat and smoke will not propagate beyond 20-foot. All it showed was that the cable will not autoignite.

Stating that as a result of budget reductions, the work related to resolving issues associated with control room cabinet fires raised by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) has not been completed, Mr.

Michelson asked additional information on this matter. Mr. Datta respondea that the ASLB was concerned about the risk of fire in electrical control cabinets in the control room. As a result, it directed RES to perform additional research to determine the severity of this problem. However, because of budget constraints the research requested by the ASLB was not done.

Mr. Michelson asked on what basis RES ignored the ASLB request and what are the legal ramifications. Mr. Flack responded that he will try to provide the a.'swer later.

At the later portion of the meeting Mr. Datta provided clarification stating that the ASLB did not actually ask RES to perfonn additional

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research on this issue. Instead, it asked RES to keep the Board in-formed of the ongoing research in this area.

Mr. Michelson asked for a copy of the Board Notification 84-033. Mr.

Detta agreed to provide a copy.

Mr. Ebersole asked whether the SAFFIRE code would be caoable of predict- i ing the nature and amount of protection needed to protect the remote shutdown center from fire. Kr. Datta responded that this Ccde has a limited purpose. It would help to determine the environment in a given room or number of rooms that are interconnected.

Mr. Michelson commented that although there were a large number of reports published to document the results of various research in the fire protection area, ne could not find one single report which inte-grates the results of all research performed so far. He believes that there should be ene integrated document and it should identify the problem areas. Mr. Bohn from SNL responded that they are in the process of preparing such a report and is expected to be completed in the beginning of next fiscal year.

Mr. Ebersole and Mr. Michelson commented that Appendix R requirements are intended to patch up problems in the operatine plants. Those 3 requirerrents should not be applied for future plants. l i

NEED FOR FIRE RISK RESEARCH - MR. J. FLACK, RES l Mr. Flack discussed briefly the need for fire risk research (Attachment C, pages 6-10). He said that some of the basic questions to be answered prior to deciding the need for additional fire risk research are:

• hhat is the risk of fire at nuclear power plants?

• What is the uncertainty?

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Acriliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987

• Is fire a major accident contributor?

• Has the risk / uncertainty changed over the last three to five years?

The answers to these above questions should incorporate:

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• Current state-of-the-art methodology i

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• Most up-to-date data

• Appendix R backfits

• Consideration of potential fire risk issues He said that the Fire Risk Scoping Study at SNL is expected to answer all these questions and provide information for use in deciding the need for additional fire-related research.

Mr. Flack said thut the concerns expressea by the ACRS in its letter cated July 16, 1986 are factored into the Scoping Study (Attacheent C, Page 8).

Mr. Michelson commented that when corisidering the effectiveness of Appendix R backfit in the study, they should keep in mind that all Appendix R backfits are not contributing to plant safety. Mr. Flack responded that it will be reflected in the risk analysis.

Mr. Michelson commented that if it was found that Appendix R require-ments are not effective, it should be pointed out in the summary report.

Mr. Michelson asked whether they have thought about the possibility of a major fire causing a severe accident situation. Mr. Datta responded

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Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987

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I that fire has never been included as a root cause of severe accidents.

Hcwever, they have thought about this issue and he believes that if some of the research planned previcusly had been completed, it might have answered issues such as this.

Mr. Michelson suggested that in the summary report they point out the question of severe accident policy as it relates to fire. He believes that fire is as good a contributor to generating severe accident condition as a seismic event beyond Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).

Stating that operating experience shows that restoring power after a station blackout could inadvertently actuate the fire protection sys-tems, Mr. Michelson asked whether they have thought about the effects of restoring power after station blackout on fire protection systems. Mr.

Flack responded that this concern has been passed on to SNL for consid-eration in the Scoping Study.

Mr. Reed commented that he does not believe that fire protection re-search is going to sclve all the issues. Each decade there may be a major breakthrough in the fire mitigation equipment and systems. He believes that fire protection activities are without end or conclusions.

He quoted certain parts of a report prepared by him and Mr. Flack (when l he was an ACRS Fellow) about two or three years ago:

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" Fire Protection continues to be one of the most controversial and f

costly backfits in nuclear power plants. For example, a $20 '

million fire protection backup is currently being considered by a utility not known to have had serious fire protection problems.

Inadvertent actuaticn of fire suppression systems can threaten safety grade equipment, and fire protection barriers can interfere with routine maintenance and emergency operation. A dedicated diverse principle decay heat removal system will provide the i

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. . 1 Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987 diverse decay heat removal protection and eliminate the need for continuous state-of-the-art patching of present systems."

INSIGHTS FRCM PAST FIRE PROTECTION RESEARCH - MR. D. BERRY, SNL Mr. Berry discussed the insights frcm past fire protecticn research (Attachment C, Pages 11-17). He mentioned some of the major accomplish-ments of the past fire protection research (Attachment C, Page 11). He said that past fire research has:

• Pesolved many questions

• Established bases for new concerns

• Focused Scoping Stuoy efforts '

Based on the information obtained, they cbserved that:

• Fires occur about once every six years in nuclear plants

• Fire makes up about 25 percent of core-melt frequency

• Several fire problems have been overlooked Mr. Berry provided a comparison of the results of PRA done for Zion, Indian Point 2, Limerick, Seabrook, and Oconee which compares the risk 1 contributions from aircraft crash, external flooding, fire, hurricane, )

internal flooding, and seismic event (Attachment C, Page 12).

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Mr. Berry stated that some of the issues such as control systems interactions, smoke control, seismic / fire interactions (Attachment C, j Page 13) that were not addressed in the past work will be analyzed in the ongoing Scoping Study. l l

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. . j auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987 He mentioned that based on the results of 22 tests conducted, they )

observed that for Heptane, Prophylene, and Cable fires with ventilation l fren 1 to 10 room changes /hr and with peak fires of 500-2000 kw, smoke l

reached about 6 feet within 2.5 to 8 minutes. 1 Mr. Ebersole commented that although large Loss-of-Coolant Accident- l (LOCA) makes up about 5 percent of core-melt freauency which is much i

less than that from fire (about 25 percent), he does not understand why l more resources are allocated to research associated with LOCA, and no resources allocated to fire-related research. He wondered about the I Staff's philosophy in allocating resources. He asked why didn't the NRC use PRA techniques for allocation of resources to various research issues. Mr. Berry responded that he does not believe that PRA techniques are mature enough in many cases to allow an appropriate allocation of resources.

In response to a question from Mr. Wylie, Mr. Berry stated that fire contribution to core-melt frequency is based on data obtained from about 165 fire occurrences.

Mr. Michelson asked whether they plan to document their finding that remote shutdown centers are not protected by all problems resulting from a fire in the control room. Mr. Berry responded that it will be docu-mented.

In response to a question from Mr. Wylie, Mr. Berry stated that they  !

l were able start fire easily in unqualified cables. However, they found it very difficult to ignite the qualified cables with the same fire source used to ignite the unquai fied cables.

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4 4 Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 19E7 t Mr. Michelson asked whether all plants use cualified cables in the control rooms. Mr. Berry responded that requirements for use of quali- 3 fied cables were not in place until 1974 Therefore, plants which were 1 licensed before 1974 were not obligated to use qualified cables. Since l

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there is about 25 percent of the plants which were licensed before 1974, I

he assumes that those plants do not use qualified cables.

Mr. Ebersole stated that SNL seem to be developing a lot of valueble data on fire-related issues. He suggested that other federal agencies,

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such as the Department of Energy (DOE), Navy, etc., get involved in I evaluating the data developed by SNL to determine whether that could be I applied to reactors under their control.

Mr. Michelson asked whether they plan to look at how fast a fire in the control should be put out. Mr. Berry responded that early detection of fire plays an important role on this matter. If the fire is detected early, it could be put out sooner. However, they do not know how to do early detection because of the involvement of several other factors.

Mr. Ebersole asked whether they have thought about using some sort of foam suppressant to put out the fire in control room cabinets. Mr. 1 Berry responded that test results showed that hanging halon bottles on the walls of the cabinets helped put out the fire immediately. However, they are not sure about the consequences of inadvertent release of halon in the control room.

Stating that NRC requires that there should be a hose station outside i the door of the control rooni, Mr. Michelson asked whether they have given any thougnt about the consequences of using that hose to put out the control room fire. Mr. Berry responded that, in his opinion, use of such hose to put out the fire in tne control room will aggravate the i

problem. '

1 Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987 Mr. Reed stated that since the fire brigades are well trained, they should be able to use that hose effectively to put out the fire.

Mr. Michelson commented that even a well-trained fire brigade will have difficulty in locating the fire because of dense. smoke. Under such situation, he will end up spraying on wrong equipment thereby aggravat-ing the problem.

Mr. Reed reiterated that, in his opinion, the fire protection activities will never have an end; they will continue to grow forever. He believes that emphasis should be given to installir.g dedicated diverse decay heat removal systems in nuclear plants. He believes that the ultimate problem is to assure decay heat removal and not to prevent all kinds of other problems.

With reference to a statement made by Mr. Berry that they are not sure about the effectiveness of manual fire mitigation activity to put out large cable fires, Mr. Wylie asked whether they have done any tests to determine the effectiveness of manual fire fighting. Mr. Berry respond-ed that they have adequate test data to show that autematic fire sup-pression system will put out the fire. They have not conducted any tests to determine the effectiveness of manual fire mitigation activity in putting out large fires.

Mr. Wylie commented that it is important to run some tests to find out whether marual fire suppression activity will be effective in putting out large cable fires Mr. Wylie asked whether any research has been done on the effectiveness of early detection of fires in putting out fires. Mr. Berry responded that no such research has been done.

Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987 i

Mr. Wylie commented that some sort of research on the early detection of fires should be done. He believes that if a fire is detected fast enough, manual fire mitigation might be very effective. Mr. Berry responded that based on their evaluation of detectors and associated standards, they found that there are no specific guidance on where these detectors should be located in a plant. Also, there is no requirement that the effectiveness of these detectors to detect fires from combusti-ble substances should be demonstrated.

OVERVIEW AND PROGRESS OF FIRE RISK SCOPING STUDY - MR. M. 80HN, SNL

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fir. Bohn provided an overview and status of the Fire Risk Scoping Study (Attachment C, Pages 18-21). He said that the Scoping Study includes .

the following five Tasks:

Task 1: Assess Uncertainties in Four Previous PRAs Task 2: Requantify Fire Scenarios from Past PRAs Task 3: Identify Potential Fire Risk Issues Task 4: Assess the Risk Significance of Potential Issues Task 5: Evaluate Completeness of Appendix R Requirements He said that Tasks 1 and 2 have been completed and the preliminary findings have been documented in a draft report. The completion of the overall Scoping Study is scheduled for December 1987.

RESULTS FROM TASKS 1 AND 2 0F THE FIRE RISK SCOPING STUDY - MR. J.

LAMBRIGHT, SNL Mr. Lambright discussed the results of Tasks 1 and 2 of the Fire Risk Scoping Study. He said that a requantification of fire scenarios

Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987 I

incluced in four (Lirerick, Oconee, Seabrook, and Indian Point 2) previous PRAs indicates major uncertainties in the following areas: j 1

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• Quantification of Fire Frequencies

• Fire Propagation Modeling i

• Fire Suppression Model

• Initiators that could be caused by fire transients and LOCAs j

He said that initiating event frequencies for all four PRAs were requan- 1 tified using the data base developed by Ted Wheelis (Sandia Fire Pro-gram). A comperison of the reauantified initiating event frequencies to the original PRAs for Limerick and Indian Point 2 is included in Attach-ment C, Pages 22 and 23. Based on the comparison, it was found that at Limerick the initiating event frequencies for cable fires and electrical panel fires increased, and for oil fires it was found to be decreased.

The main reason for this difference is that SNL used data from 23 events as compared to Limerick PRA which used data from 5 events.

A comparison of the requantified propagation times (using COMPBRN III Code) for all four plants is included in Attachment C, Page 24. This comparison indicates that COMPBRN III propagation times can be consid-erably less than the times reported in the original PRAs. However, l Sandia's experience with the COMPBRN III Code indicates that there are a num')er of inadequacies in the Code, inclt. ding convergence problems, non-physical behavior, and inconsistencies. Therefore, the results of  !

the C0f1PBRN III calculations shculd be viewed as tentative at this point.

Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987.'

j A comparison of tb requantified sequence frequencies to the original PRA frequencies for all four plants is included in Attachment C, Pages i

25-28, and a comparison of the requantified total core-melt frequency to  !

l the original PRA frequency is contained in Attachment C, Page 29. '

1 Mr. Lanbright discussed briefly the effects of Appendix R modifications at Indian Point Unit 2 (Attachment C, Page 30).

Mr. Michelson asked whether any of these four plants use liquid-filled transformers inside the building. Mr. Lambright responded that he was not able to obtain that information from the previcus PRAs. Mr. Nowlen stated that they are : aware of the problem with transformer fires and they have been looking into this issue.

Indicating that the Limerick PRA seems to assume that 87 percent of the core-mcit frequency is attributed to self-ignited panel fires and self-ignited cable fires, Mr. Wylie asked whether qualifiea cables are used at the Limerick plant. Mr. Lambright responded that Limerick PPA states that the Limerick plant uses predominantly IEEE qualified cables.

Mr. Wylie commented that to his knowledge all the tests conducted on qualified cables showed that they.cannot self-ignite. Mr. Nowlen responded that~results of several tests conducted at SNL showed that qualified cables could be ignited but the fire would not be self-sustaining and would not spread. He believes that the assumption used in the Limerick PRA was very conservative.

Mr. Michelson asked whether the wiring inside the packaged power supply  ;

boxes that are installed inside the cabinets as well as the inter-connecting wiring are qualified. Mr. Berry responded that they were (

also concerned about the quality of such wiring when they were conduct-

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ing the cabinet test. They reviewed the vendor-supplied specifications I

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Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987 )

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for components inside the cabinets with the help of Architect Engineers i to fino out whether those wirings were qualified. They could not find clear cut specifications for such components. In most cases, it was specified that the components inside the cabinets should be fire-retardant. I Mr. Ebersole and Mr. Michelson asked whether there are ony regulatory requirements that prohibit splicing of power cables. Mr. Sullivan responded that IEEE 283 Standard provides information on splicing. To his knowledge, there are no regulatory requirements that prohibit  ;

splicing.

Stating that SNL had analyzed the potential for fire risks associated with different operating modes of the plants, Mr. Michelson asked how serious is it to have a fire during the cold shutdown condition. Mr.

Lambright responded that he does not believe that effects of fire during a cold shutdown would be as serious as the fire that occur during plant operation. Mr. Bohn added that SNL has not analyzed this situation in detail. Therefore, they cannot say for certain what would be the effects of fire during the cold shutdown condition.

Mr. Ebersole asked whether the Linerick PRA includes any Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) events. Mr. Lambright responded that they do not have any information from the Limerick PRA to determine whether it used any event that lead to an ATWS condition.

Mr. Michelson asked whether the existing computer codes are capable of predicting the propagation of heat and smoke, and also temperature of the thermal links in the area where essential equipment for safe shut-I down are located. Mr. Nowlen responded that currently that capability is beyond the state-of-the-art of fire modeling. Mr. Flack added that they did not have adequate funding to develop new methodology to deal {

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with this issue. This is one of the shortcomings of the existing codes j and it will be pointed out in the summary report.  !

Mr. Michelson asked whether they have considered the effects of automa-tic initiation of fire protection system on the train that it not involved in the fire. Mr. Lambright responded that they din not look at this issue.

Mr. Michelson asked what did they learn from making these kinds of calculations and corrections to the ola PRAs. Mr. Bohn responded that they have learned that:

• Uncertainties are driven almost completely by judgmental factors.

• COMPBRN code should be used with a considerable understanding of its limitations.

• The effects of fire suppression on fire growth have not been included in the old methodologies.

PMIEP FIRE RISK ANALYSIS - MR. A. PAYNE, SNL Mr. Payne said that RMIEP is an integrated level 3 PRA of the LaSalle nuclear plant which is intended to provide an integrated analysis of the external events such as fire, flood, and seismic event (Attachment C, Pages 31-41). This program is not funded as part of the ongoing Fire '

Risk Scoping Study. Some of the tasks in the RMIEP are to:

• Review Current Fire Risk Analyses

' Identify LaSalle Fire Barriers

• Assess Fire Barrier Characteristics

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• Update Fire Ignition Frequencies I

• Perform Integrated Systems Analysis to Identify Important Fire Scenarios q

• Analyze Fire Growth and Spread l

• Analyze Component Fragilities

• Quantify Fire Scenarios l

• Determine Satety Options f

I He reviewed briefly the general approach used in the RMIEP (Attachment ,

i C, Page 31), some general and major concerns (Attachment C, Pages 32 {

and 33). He discussed briefly fire PRA areas needing further test-ing/ analysis and the significant accomplishments of RMIEP (Attachment C, Pages39-41).

Fr. Michelson asked to what extent does this study look at the "secon-dary interactions," i.e., interaction of non-safety equipment that are )

affected by fire on equipment essential for safe shutdown. Mr. Payne I l

i responded that when they did the analysis for safe shutdcwn systems they J i

traced the interaction of these systems as far as they could go.

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Mr. Michelson asked whether water from the fire suppression system I flowing through an open conduit and eventually getting into a control cabinet is included in the fault tree. Mr. Payne said no.

1 Indicating that the COMPBRN Code has limitations, Mr. Michelson asked how do they plan to use that code to analyze the growth and spread of i fire at multiple level floors. Mr. Bohn responded that the insights 1

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Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987 sained from Tasks 1 and 2 of the Scoping Study associated with the COMPBPN Code have not yet been incorporated into the RMIEP. In some areas, RMIEP will be able to use the COMPEPN Code, recognizing its limitations. In other areas where this Code cannot be applied, they have to reassess how to evaluate the fire growth and spread.

Stating that water from the fire suppression system will flow to various regions of the building, Mr. Michelson asked whether the RMIEP analysis will trace the water path through out the building. Mr. Bohn respondec that this issue has already been analyzed in the flooding analysis.

Stating that if there is fire in one room and if the Heating, Ventilet-ing, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) damper fails to close until the tem-perature gets real hign, heat will be transferred to the adjacent room, Mr. Ebersole and Mr. Michelson asked what is being done to determine the environment in the adjacent room. Mr. Berry responded that tools and '

data base to do the inter-rcom type calculations are not available. The models to do the system interaction effects between rooms have not been developed.

Stating that use of manual fire fighting may dump large amount of water in a rocm, Mr. Michelson asked hcw do they account for the effects of water from manual fire mitigation. Mr. Payne responded that for most of the rooms of concern, they performed the analysis assuming maximum possible flood occurring in that room. Mr. Berry added that for those  ;

rooms which contain just electrical equipment and which do not have any l; water pipes, they have not analyzed the. effects water from manual fire i nitigation activities.

Mr. Michelson asked whether RMIEP looks at the effects of drains clogged by debris created by fire. Mr. Bohn responded that new issues such as l

this one are not intended to be looked uncer RMIEP. However, clogged l

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orain is an item of concern in the flooding analysis and it is being looked at under that analysis.

l Stating that if there are two critical equipment in one room, one in each corner of the room, and if one of them is affected by fire, how do they determine the probability of accidentally spraying the other ,

equipment with the fire hose while trying to put out the fire on the i affected equipment. fir. Payne responded that they realize that this is a significant concern. However, they do not have adequate data to l analyze this issue.

Stating that the real significance of inadvertent actuation of fire protection systems may not be derived from the LaSalle PRA because LaSalle does not have automatic equipment, by and large, Mr. Michelson asked what kinds of useful products are expected of the LaSalle PRA from  !

l the view point of fire challenge. Mr. Payne responded that since '

LaSalle uses a Mark II containment, the information obtained from the LeSalle PRA could be used by the NRC in its analysis of the general BWR l designs. From the overall PRA results, they expect to cbtain informa-l tion for use in determining the relative importance of fires, flocas, and other external events in relation to internal events. They expect to perform an integrated uncertainty analysis in all of these areas to determine the relative Contribution to plant risk.

IDENTIFICATION OF NEW FIRE RISK ISSUES - MR. S. N0WLEN. SNL Mr. Nowlen discussed briefly some of the fire risk issues that have not been addressed in the past PRAs. Some of these unaddressed issues are:

• Control Systems Interactions

• Smoke Control l

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• Seismic / Fire Interaction

• Manual Fire Fighting Effectiveness

• Spurious Suppression System Actuation

• Cable / Component Total Environment Survivability He said that another issue related to the effects of fire during cold shutdown that was raised by Mr. Michelson during the earlier part of the meeting may also be included in the list of unaddressed issues. Identi-fication of all potential fire risk issues will be handled under Task 3 of the Fire Risk Scoping Study. They plan to solicit opinions of experts in various fields associated with fire safety, fire research, fire protection, risk analysis, plant aesign, and plant regulation. He said that they have not been successful in obtaining information from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0).

Mr. Nowlen discussed briefly the main concerns associated with each issues identified above (Attachment C, Pages 42-54).

Mr. Ebersole asked whether they have solicited the opinion of DOE on this matter. Mr. Nowlen responded that they have been discussing this issue with DOE. So far, they have found that DOE facilities are unique and much of the information available in DOE may not be applicable to the commercial nuclear plants.

Mr. Michelson asked whether the industry has any ongoing efforts on this matter. Mr. Nowlen responded that there are several research topics being pursued by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and Factory Mutual. They have had contact with these groups to obtain the available information on this issue.

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Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987 l Fr. Michelson asked whether there are any regulatory guidance en purging smoke.- Mr. Nowlen responded that purging of smoke during a fire situc- q tion is very desirable because it would enable personnel te get into the fire area and suppress the fire. However, he is not aware of any specific regulatory requirements on this matter.

Mr. Michelson asked whether they plan to.look at the effects of losing off-site power during a seismic event. Mr. Nowlen responded that they plan to look at only those issues that are directly related to fire during a seismic event.

Mr. Ebersole asked about the probability of water hammer affecting the fire protection system piping. Mr. Nowlen responded he does not have a specific answer to this question. Mr. Flack stated that recently he read an article on this issue and he would try to send a copy of that article to Mr. Ebersole.

Mr. Nowlen mentioned that INP0 has sponsored a study on the spurious actuation of fire suppression systems. However, they are not able to ,

obtain the information on this study. Mr. Michelson suggested that the NRC Staff try to obtain information on the INP0 Study. Mr. Flack said he wculd try.

Mr. Michelson said that he might invite INP0 and EPRI to the next Subcommittee meeting to obtain some information on their fire protection activities.

Stating that if the fire hose associated with the manual fire fighting '

activities is dropped accidently it will spray water on several equip-  !

ment not affected by fire, Mr. Michelson asked what is the range of the spray nozzle attached to the hose. Mr. Nowlen responded that this is one of the areas where they do not have adequate data base.

Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987 CUANTIFICATION OF FIRE PISK ISSUES - MR. M. 00HN, SNL i Mr. Bohn described briefly how they plan to quantify the unaddressed i 1

fire risk issues (Attachment C, pages 55-69). He said that the unad- j dressed risk issues can affect one or more of the following steps in a 'f PRA (Attachment C, Page 55): l 1

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\

• Screening Analysis a

• Quantifying Fire Initiator Frequencies I

• Characterizing Fire Growth and Spread

• Calculating Time to Component Failure l

• Performing Uncertainty Analysis Mr. Bohn provided scme emmples of unaddressed fire risk issue quanti-fication (Attachment C, Pages 65-69). He identified those arecs that need more analytical efforts and data to help them understand better the unaddressed fire risk issues (Attachment C, Page 70).

Mr. Michelson asked whether the inability to fight a fire effectively in a dense smoke due to poor visibility could be alleviated by the use of proper lighting. Mr. Nowlen responded that based on the results of the test conducted on this issue, they found that auxiliary lighting would i not help much to alleviate this problem.

Mr. Michelson suggested that the inability of the auxiliary lighting to help the visibility in a dense smoke situation be highlighted i n the '

I summary report.

~

', k '

Auxiliary Systems Minutes July 23, 1987 ~A 1 '

Mr. Ebersoie asked whether they have looked at the effects of r.etal Jack,ets used at tile cable ends.09..the spread of fire. Mr. Bohn respond-s 5

} ed r. hat they haven't loo,ked at tem'iissue.

-s .,

SUBCOMMITTEE REMARKS -

Mr. Mictielson stated that he plans to prepare a letter, including comments on.the adequacy of the scope and direction of the Fire Risk Scoping Study and submit it to the full Ohmmittee for ,consideratfod and hpprovalduri,ngtheAugust 6-8, 1987 ACKS meeting'. ha'said that this will be an. interim letter on this ' issue. Sv5 sequent to the completion of the Study, ar.other letter will be written co7n;enting on the results of the overall study. He suggested that the Sta'f and SNL provide presentation to the ' full Committee during the August ACRS meeting on the '

following- -

s

' thed for Fire Risk Research '

s i

• Overv'iew and Status of Cire Risk Sccping Study 1

• ResultsofTasks1and2oftheScopingSgudy 1 ,.

• Potential Fire Risk Issues '

Mr. Michelson thanked all pa'rticipants and adjourned the meeting at 6:dC p.m.

h NOTE: Additional meeting details can be obtained from a trdnscript of this meeting available in the hfC- Public Document Raom, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington. 0.'., or can be 60cchased '

from,ACI-Federal Report 6rs, 444 Narth Ctvitol Street, Wash-ingto9)s D .C. 20001, (202) 347-3700.

t 1

4 s

%, 9

...\. '

A. AL

l

.. e l LIST OF 00CUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE 3 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING JULY 23, 1987 1

1. Presentation Schedule.

2. ACRS Report to the Commission related to: ACRS Views on Fire Protection Research and Fire-Related Systems Interactions, dated

'. July 16, 1986.

3. Materials associated with the FY 1986 Fire Protection Safety Research Program. (Submitted to the Subcommittee during the June n 26, 1986 meeting.)

v 4. NUREG-1148, Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection Research Program, prepared by RES, dated July 1985.

5. Memorandum from B. Morris, RES, to R. G. Rematowski, DOE, request-ing to authorize Sandia National Laboratories to undertake the Fire Risk Scoping Study, dated January 12, 1987.

6. Fire P.isk Scoping Study Technical proposal attached to the Memoran-dum from V. Nicolette, SNL, to J. Flack, RES, dated April 24, 1987.

7. Description of the Five Tasks.

8. Description of various locations to be looked at in four plants. >

9. RMIEP Fire Risk Analysis.

10 Large Scale Tests to Evaluate Enclosure Fire Environments by Steven "m Nowlen, Sanaia National Laboratories (SNL). )

11. Screening Tests of Component Survivability in Secondary Environ-ments Produced by Fires by Mark Jacobus, SNL.

1 l 12. Presentation Paterial on Fire Risk Scoping Stuay by Michael Bohn, l

SNL.

l 13 Presentation Material on Review of Past PRA Methodologies by Jess Lechance.

14 Preliminary Results of Tacks I. and 2 of the Fire Risk Scoping Study, dated July 15, 1987 (Rough Draft).

15. Presentation Materials Submitted to the Subcommittee by RES and SNL on July 23, 1987.

4 ATTACHMENT A

i TENTATIVE PRESENTATION SCHEDULE-ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON THE AUXILIARY SYSTEMS JULY 23, 1987 ,

ROOM 1046, 1717 H ST., N.W. j WASHINGTON, D.C, ACRS CONTACT: Sam Duraiswamy 202-634-3267 NOTE:

• Presentation Time should not exceed 50% of the Total Time allocated for a specific item. The remaining 50% of the time is reserved for the Subcommittee questions and answers by the Staff.

' Number of Copies of the Presentation Materials to be submitted to the Subcommittee: 25 copies.

I TOTAL PRESENTATION ITEM PRESENTER TIME A_CTUAL TIME

1. EXECUTIVE SESSION 15 min 8:30 - 8:45am

2. FIRE PROTECTION Amar Datta, 15 min 8:45 - 9:00am RESEARCH TERMINATION NRC/RES REPORT

)

i

3. NEED FOR FIRE RISK John Flack, 15 min RESEARCH

'9:00 - 9:15am NRC/RES

4. FIRE RISK SCOPING Mike Bohn, 30 min 9:15 - 9:45am STUDY Sandia National  ;

Overview and status report of the on-going Fire Risk Scoping Studies at SNL A r7A CH HENT b S-I ,

Auxiliary Systems Schedule July 23, 1987 j l

- Tentative Presentation Schedule -  :

TOTAL '

PRESENTATION ITEM PRESENTER TIME ACTUAL TIME

5. REVIEW 0F PAST PRA John Lambright, 60 min 9:45 - 10:4 Sam METHODOLOGIES SNL/

Jeff LaChance,

a. Selection of Science Applica-critical fire tion International areas -

Corporation (SAIC)

b. Identification of fire sources and barriers

c. Likelihood of h

ignition (o

d. Propagation analysis o b I[

e. Fire risk S 4 [g QO quantification ) $

4 d

f. Completeness g

g. Areas of cor.ser-vatism, non j conversatism

• • • BREAK *** 15 min 10:45 - 11:00am

6. FIRE RISK SCOPING John Lambright, 60 min 11:00 - 12:00N STUDY RESULTS FROM SNL TASKS 1&2

a. Assess uncertain- l ties in four previous fire PRAs

b. Requantification '

of fire scenarios in four previous '

i fire PRAs

• • • LUNCH *** 60 min 12:00 - 1:00pm B-2

Auxiliary Systems Schedule - July 23, 1987 i

- Tentative Presentation Schedule -

TOTAL PRESENTATION. ,

ITEM PRESENTER TIME ACTUAL TIME

7. RISK METHODS INTEGRA-IIDH AND EVALUATION Arthur Payne,-

SNL 60 min 1:00 - 2:00pm j PROGRAM (RMIEP) FIRE'  ;

RISK ANALYSIS

8. IDENTIFICATION OF NEW Steve Nowlen, 60 min 2:00 - 3:00pm FIRE RISK ISSUES SNL/

Dennis Berry,

a. Overview of the SNL approach to identify g

potential fire risk

{

issues

b. Current list of potential fire risk issues 1

• • • BREAK *** 15 min 3:00 - 3:15pm

9. 00ANTIFICATION OF ~FIRE Mike Bahn, 60 min 3:15 - 4:15pm RISK ISSUES SNL i

a. Methodology to quantify potential fire risk issues

b. Methodology to evaluate the risk significance and uncertainty of potential fire risk issues l

I0.SUBCOMMITT_EEREMARKS --

30 min 4:15 - 4:45pm

• • • ADJ0 URN *** 4:45pm i

8 -3

APRIL 3, 19E6 DET FIRE PROTECTION RESEARCH PROGRAM OBJECTIVES:

1. TO CONFIRM THE ADEOUACY OF THE NRC REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN 10CFR50, APPENDlX R FOR THE FIRE PROTECTION OF THE SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHAS!S ON SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE REDUNDANT TRAINS AND DAMJGE TO SENSITIVE ELECTRICAL COMPCNENTS.

2. TO EVALUATE THE EXTENT OF TifE HAZARD AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF A CONTROL ROOM FIRE ARISING OUT OF AN ELECTRICAL CONTROL CABINET AS SOURCE.

3. TO CREATE DATA AND DEVISE IMPROVED METHODOLOGY TO PLACE FIRE PRAs ON A MORE CREDIBLE STANDING.

/A TT A C H M E n 7 ()

C-l

)

i FIRE PROTECTION RESEARCH PROGRAM (DET)

PHASE I PROGRAM-(NUREG-1148)

ORIGINAL BUDGET: FY86: $1000K; FY87: $700K REVISED BUDGET: FY86: $658K; FY87: 0 NOTE: PROGRAM ELEMENTS IN THE PARENTHESES ARE DROPPED BECAUSE OF BUDGET CUT.-

o F_JRE SOURCE CHARACTERIZATION ELECTRICAL INITIATION EXPERIMENTS ELECTRICAL CABINET SOURCE (CABLE TRAYS, FLAMMABLE LIQUID SPILLS) o FULL SCALE ROOM ENVIRONMENT TESTS BASELINE TESTS: EFFECTS OF COMBI'STIBLE TYPES, FIRE LOCATION, VENTILATION, (CEILING HEIGHT, ROOM GE0 METRY) .

CONTROL ROOM TESTS: EFFECTS OF CABLE TYPES, (CABINET l TYPES, LOCATION, VENTILATION CEILING HEIGHT)

(R00M-TO-R00M SM0KE MIGRATION TESTS)

(SMOKE REMOVAL TESTS)

-l o

VALIDATE FIRE ENVIRONMENT COMPUTER CODES AGAINST FULL-SCALE ROOM TESTS j

LASALLE CONTROL ROOM FIRE ANALYSIS i (3D "SAFFIRE" CODE)

(" HARVARD" AND "COMPBRN" CODES) o COMPONENT FAILURE THRESHOLD TESTS:

CONSTRUCT 2 TEST CHAMBERS CABLE DAMAGE TESTS: THERMAL ENVIRONMENT ONLY (CABLE DAMAGE TESTS: TOTAL ENVIRONMENT, INCLUDING SUPPRESSION)

COMPONENT DAMAGE TESTS: RELAYS, SWITCHES, (LOGIC CIRCUITS, POWER SUPPLIES, RECORDERS, CONTROLLERS)

IN THERMAL ENVIRONMENT ONLY (COMP 0NENT DAMAGE TESTS: TOTAL ENVIRONMENT)

C-2

1 FIRE PROTECTION RESEARCH PROGRAM (DET)

IFPACT J 1

o FIRE CHARACTERISTICS DATA REMAIN INCOMPLETE, NOTABLY ON CABLE TRAY SOURCES, i

o FIRE TEST SERIES TO RESOLVE CONTROL ROOM ISSUES RAISED IN BOARD NOTIFICATION 84-033 IS NOT C0ffLETED, i o WITHOUT THE "SAFFIRE" CODE THERE IS NO EANS OF EXTRAPOLATING ROOM FIRE ENVIRONMEf6 TEST DATA TO OTHER ROOM CONFIGURATIONS, o COMPONENT FAILURE THRESHOLD DATA IS UNAVAILABLE, o AS CONSEQUENCE OF THE ABOVE, UNCERTAlfRIES IN FIRE PRAs PERSIST, LICENSING DECISIONS CONTINUE TO BE BASED ON JUDGMENT, l

l

\

o THE SPECIALIST STAFF AT SANDIA AND BROOKHAVEN DISPERSE, o I-II: Z T IACIL:T::: EL'!LT AT l;r,C C00T AT FAGC?N lLTUAL ? TJRCH CCPZ P!TI0t; A!S AT :lf :A APC 0:S"!?T S ,

i o INFLATION FURTHER RAISES COST IN CASE OF RESUMPTION OF THE PROGRAM, I

C-3 i l

E__________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _

I 1

FIRE PROTECTION RESEARCH PROGPAM (DE)

PRODUCTS OF THE PROGRAM c 1975: ABOUT 40 RESEARCH REPORTS, INCLUDING 20-FT SEPARATION TESTS f

CABLE-PENETRATION FIRE STOP TESTS CABINET FIRE TESTS I

O 1983-86: PUBLISHED REPORTS, INCLUDING l FIRE PROTECTION RESEARCH PROGRAM, NUFEG-1148 USE OF FIELD MODEL TO ASSESS FIRE BEHAVIOR NUPEG/CR-4479 POTENTIAL FIRE DAf%GE TO SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT,NUREG/CR-4310 O 1986-87: FUBLISHED REPORTS ELECTRICALLY INITIATED FIRES THROUGH SIMULATION OF A FAULTY CONNECTION, SAND 86-0299 FIRE BEHAVIOR OF COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL FOUND IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, SAND 86-0311, NUREG/CR-4679 HEAT AND F%SS RELEASE PATES FOR TRANSIENT FUEL SOURCE FIRES, SAND 86-0312, NUPEG/CR-4680 INTERNALLY IGNITED FIRES IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONTROL CABINETS: PART I - CABINET EFFECTS TESTS, SAND 86-0336, NUREG/CR-4527 l

)

1 I

C-4

~

I I

4 FIRE PROTECTION PESEARCH PROGRAM (DE) - CONT'D PRODUCTS OF THE PROGRAM SUPPRESSION METHODS FOR ELECTRICAL CABLE FIRES, SAND 83-2664, NUREG/CR-3656 TESTS OF REPRESENTATIVE NUCLEAR P0kER PLANT COMPONENTS EXPOSED TO FIRE ENVIRONMENTS, SAND 86-0394, ENCLOSURE ENVIRONMENT CHARACTER!ZATION TESTING FOR THE BASELINE VALIDATION OF COMPUTER FIRE SIMULATION CODES, SAND 86-1296, REPORTS UNDER PREPARATION:

INTERNALLY IGNITED FIRES IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONTROL CABINETS, -

PART 11 - ROOM EFFECTS TESTS, SAND 86-xxxx, ANALYSIS OF CONTROL ROOM FIRE ENVIRONMENTS ARISING FROM ELECTRICAL' .

CABINET FIRES, BNL-xxxx, j

)

Slft%RY STATUS REPORTS.

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i T E R I S N I R T A R G S R I M E R F S O I

M D O E E T E L I E P R R R C R L R O P A T

I F O T F P I

F E.

k' N D I C A U "

A E T A N I I S "

T W N R I T I C S R E A P I I E I E O I U S N R F U P V Q E A I N I I S M E R

E H W R F C S I

R T E B E I A R M " P E E N T I O E S W V V I A F C N - E A A D * *

• T N H I I E N "

E D W A E A E L O W WM N P N

• * *

• 3 9

l !

Y O L T L U N O S I D E A 0l R T i R T A E E E R H C M P T N

U K E H S R S T F I I E I O R F U W S

S E T S L' E R S I A

C I A S E R F P E E D U R U O G N I S S S N O F S E I I L Y T T S ) U D N S E D " R

_ U A N

I S E W T X A S E R

_ S I E B S N

_ M E " X

_ G O F A R I N D O T D D I

A D lE i N P E S D A T E O l i E P

_ C T S " Y F P

_ S G S W L O A

_ D N E E S

_ K N I N N U E l S A D K iC

_ " O C I U A I N l R

E L E V

_ F A l W i E

C N

C N

O E C W R I

_ R A I D T P F O I C N C I T F I , A A T N F S P O G E

_ F I E S M N I E O N U l i I ( S R

_ G S T G S I S G E " K E T S N W l

_ I i S D C E T E I

_ U K K R N R E

- D S S T F " H O

_ I I S O E T R R R F l P

i

_ F G O T F E E O N O L H R I N F

_ A T I T D O O N .

N F N N I O S I F E A T E I E

_ F O l i M T A T T U

_ T S S C A A S

- T I S R I M U S NW E E F I L I E S D I T A M D S N T S V "

S E A U

_ N E EW S T E E E A N N D N N N S I A A I A A "

_ S C * * *

• A O

• _ S

_ N S A A e

l-I INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCIES (YR-1)

REQUANTIFIED l PLANT / LOCATION / SEQUENCE PRA VALUE VALUE LIMERICK 13KV SWITCHGEAR ROOM )

CABLE 5.5E-5 1.1E-4 ELECTRIC PANEL 1.8E 5.3E-3 OIL 1.3E-5 9.3E-6 -

SAFEGUARDS ACCESS AREA f

l CABLE 1.7E-4 3.8E-4 ELECTRIC PANEL 1.3E-3 4.0E-3 OIL 1.7E-5 1.1E-5 CRD HYDRAULIC EQUIPMENT AREA CABLE 1.2E-4 2.5E-4 ELECTRIC PANEL 6.6E-4 1.3E-3 OIL 1.7E-5 1.1E-5 GENERAL EQUIPMENT AREA 1 CABLE 1.1E-4 2.4E-4 ,

ELECTRIC PANEL 1.1E-3 2.0E-3 OIL 1.7E-5 1.1E-5

.l l

l l

C-22.

l

~~

1 1

1 I

1

. ,. 4, l, t

'j f

i b

INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCIES (YR~l) i I

l

) REQUANTIFIED PLANT / LOCATION / SEQUENCE PRA VALUE VALUE Li INDIAN POINT 2 SWITCHGEAR ROOM MEAN 3.4E-2 3.2E-2 1 f

'i

, -)

ELECTRIC TUNNEL SLF MEAN 3.4E ,3.2E-2 ,

j SEF MEAN 3.4E-2 > 3.2E-2 SE MEAN 3.4E-2 3.2E-2 l

CABLE SPREADING ROOM TEFC MEAN 7.2E-3 2.6E-3 TE MEAN 7.2E-3 2.6E-3 l l

i

')

i i

I C-23

,, t.  ? .,

, , . +

e

,,w., ,,..A -

.. y

'*h .

3 COMPERN I VSn COMPBRN III S '  ; m '

FIRE PROPAGATION TIMES- s 1 ._ '

( s ,

,s a  ;

t COMPERN 1 1 ,2 COMPBRN III i 1 QilHUILS L;_ 't '

(MINUT. Ell 4 y~

INDIAN POINT 2 , , i *' 1 SWITCHGEAR ROOM 24.2 ' ' t 8 l ELECTRICAL TUNNEL

• i AISLE FIRE 15.8 14 l TRAY FIRE 14.4 "

3 CABLE SPREADING R00M4 22.6 25 1 OCONEE '

CABLE SHAFT 6. 7 ' '

.- 15 AUXILIARY BUILDING ,

AISLE FIRE 9.3 9 TRAY FIRE 5.4 , 7 SEABROOK PCC PUMP AREA 18.1 4 CABLE SPREADING R00M5 1 MEDIUM FIRE 16.1 14 LARGE FIRE 48.4 8 LIMERICK Al L LOCATIONS 10 NO DAMAGE l

l i

l i

c-2 9

3. ' "

b SEQUENCE FREQUENCIES (YR-1)

^ i REQUANTIFIED PLANT / LOCATION / SEQUENCE PRA VALUE VALUE LIMERICK 13KV SWITCHGEAR ROOM  ;

CABLE 2.4E-6 1.7E-5 ELECTRIC PANEL 3.2E-6 3.2E-5 Q1L 5.9E-7 1.3E-6 TOTAL 6.2E-6 5.1E-5 SAFEGUARDS ACCESS AREA s.

CABLE 4.1E-6 2.2E-5 ELECTRIC PANEL 1.5E-6 1.3E-5 s Q1L 4.1E-7 6.8E-7 i TOTAL 6.0E-6 3.6E-5 I i

CRD HYDRAULIC EQUIPMENT AREA CABLE 4.7E-6 2.1E-5 ELECTRIC PANEL 1.0E-6 4.7E-6  :

Q1L 6.6E-7 9.7E-7 4 TOTAL 6.4E-6 2.6E-5 l GENERAL EQUIPMENT AREA j 1

CABLE 1.2E-6 8.7E-6 (

ELECTRIC PANEL 5.2E-7 3.1E-6 Q1L 1.8E-7 4.2E-7 TOTAL 1.9E-6 1.2E-5 i l  !

I C-15

SEQUENCE FREQUENCIES (YR-1)

REQUANTIFIED PLANT / LOCATION / SEQUENCE PRA VALUE VALUE INDIAN POINT 2 SWITCHGEAR ROOM MEAN 5.6E-5 1.0E-4 ELECTRIC TUNNEL SLF MEAN 2.4E-5 4.9E-5 SEF MEAN 1.0E-7 2,0E-7 SE MEAN 5.6E-5 4.0E-5 CABLE SPREADING ROOM TEFC MEAN 1.6E-6 8.6E-7 TE MEAN 3.0E-7 9.5E-8 C-26

1 SEQUENCE FREQUENCIES (YR-1)

REQUANTIFIED PLANT / LOCATION / SEQUENCE PRA VALUE VALUE OCONEE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM

1. 1 7.1E-9 1.3E-8

1. 2 8.5E-9 1.7E-8 )l CABLE-SHAFT

1. 1 1.2E-6 1.9E-6 .

l

1. 2 5.3E-6 8.4E-6 '

1. 3 3.6E-6 5.7E-6

)

l 1

l i

C-27

1 SEQUENCE FREQUENCIES (YR-1)

REQUANTIFIED i PLANT / LOCATION / SEQUENCE PRA VALUE VALUE SEABROOK CABLE SPREADING ROOM

1. 2 MEAN 3.6E-6 3.9E-6

1. 4 MEAN 3.9E-7 4.2E-7

1. 6 MEAN 8.4E-8 9.2E #8 MEAN 4.5E-8 4.9E-8 CONTROL ROOM ZONE C MEAN 9.0E-6 2.7E-6 ZONE G MEAN 2.1E-6 6.30E-7 ZONE H MEAN 2.1E-6 6.30E-7 i

PCC PUMP AREA SMALL FIRE MEAN 6.8E-5 6.12E-5 LARGE FIRE MEAN 4.2E-6 1.41E-5 l 1

c:-ze l

COMPARISON OF TOTAL CORE M$LT FREQUENCY 1 i

1 REQUANTIFIED PLANT PRA VALUE VALUE LIMERICK 2.3E-5 1.2E-4 i i

INDIAN POINT 2.0E-4 2.5E-4' ]

OCONEE 1.0E-5 1.6E-5 SEABROOK B.9E-5 8.3E-5

-)

I c - 29  ;

ea (

1 t c n fi 69 6699 i t Af - - - - - - .

n i EE EEEE d 1 s e d - l602 e e m o 6. O. - . . . t t i d H 29 1299 l n c n u e n e s m e m e d u A n r n q o e e S i ) s m r Set 2 y A F Pra ( a

_ Poc w S e lI fi 5 55 l S t I ef - - - a P a - Bi E EE P t r d 6 - 46 n I

_ S y o .A - . . AA o

_ ( M 5N 25NN i n s

e t i g n y a a io c c P

_ m n n i E a t e o f S uy Dac qd i

t i

d o t f i eura o t rt ec n

- n a id F__S f ft i 68 69698 m

i e

_ l - - - - - - -

P o ngAi EE EEEEE

_ r d

_ M an d 76 25848 o e ei o . . . . . . f n 2 .r Mo M 41 291 61 e i e c b b t

t e m

_ i f S o o n A .

n i c U d k o r

_ s i a e n

t iet n r n a R ra

_ e e i oc 4 575 c w

_ o r e efi - ) - - - s P o ref E1 EEE . F iBi 3( 475 eA E F

n e f d 0 900 rC S a o .A . . . AA iO i B M 1 N 424NN t L d d n 4 el a 1

e ca t

ne P f is L o a s S t p n S em s o

e l u e s g bp t i

a a a r m ct t a a l in s p l a m D e pl e o m n po g C t o n FF F ao a n o EE u LEEEE c m a R ST T SSSTT t a l

P r or d l No

/ a a t t n e c c n o g i a a i h r  : Ae l t c t s Nr P a t c e c i e t o w l o . .

L S E N 1 2

9 4 1

)

GENERAL APPROACH ANY STATE-0F-THE-ART ANALYSIS HAS TO MAKE A FUNDAMENTAL DECISION AS TO THE APPROACH TO BE USED.

A. REFINEMENT B. REEXAMINATION OF INTERACTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MODEL SANDIA FEELS NEWER PLANTS WILL NOT HAVE THE OBVIOUS FIRE HAZARDS IDENTIFIED IN PREVIOUS EFFORTS SINCE THEY WERE DESIGNED TO CURRENT STANDARDS.

THEREFORE, A STATE-0F-THE-ART FIRE ANALYSIS MUST NOT ONLY LOOK AT REFINING AVAILABLE DATA, BUT ALSO LOOK AT HOW SUBTLE INTERACTIONS CAN CAUSE FIRE PROBLEMS.

IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THIS G0AL, WE INTEGRATED THE FIRE ANALYSIS WITH THE DETAILED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS PERFORMED FOR INTERNAL EVENTS.

i (2-3/ .

e l

l I SOME GENERAL CONCERNS BARRIER PROTECTION SCHEMES CR-CSR TRANSITIONS i VENTILATION EFFECTIVENESS  !

SECURITY DOORS DETECTOR / VENTILATION REQUIREMENTS OVERDEMAND FIRE SYSTEM i CR-REMOTE S/D PANEL ISOLATION SPRAY WRONG EQUIPMENT BRIGADE ROUTING i

ALARMS (D0 ORS / SYSTEMS)

]

l 1

C -32

MAJOR CONCERNS FOR THIS ANALYSIS VENTILATION MANUAL FIRE FIGHTING INADVERTENT SUPPRESSION REMOTE SHUTDOWN i

l l

C-33

4 SYSTEM MODELS AND ACCIDENT SEQUENCE ANALYSIS OVERVIEW i

INTERNAL EVENT SYSTEM FAULT TREE MODELS INCLUDED ALL FIRE SUSCEPTIBLE COMPONENTS IN RESPONDING SYSTEMS CABLES WERE IDENTIFIED AND MAPPED INTO FAULT TREE SOLUTION USING TRANSFORMATION EQUATIONS l

LOCATIONS WERE DETERMINED FOR ALL COMPONENTS AND CABLES AND

]

MAPPED INTO FAULT TREE SOLUTION USING TRANSFORMATION EQUATIONS l

SYSTEMS AND ACCIDENT SEQUENCES WERE S0LVED AND LOCATIONS l WERE MAPPED INTO FIRE ZONES i

• RESULT: ACCIDENT SEQUENCE CUT SETS CONSISTING 0F MULTIPLE FIRE ZONES AND MULTIPLE RAND 0M FAILURES 1

\

4 C-34

i1l! i l r _

3 -

C .

_ S

_ I LS .

O Y R L .

R T A O N N D I OA E I

C 1 E F 1

N N H . 1 E I T N

V S E . N T E C I C D E T A I R E D T N S L U. E I . D O T _

A l

l S U C N _

T A L L E _

N E F E C Y A O

_ D_ A )

. N N A I L P E X P E M D S 0 D R O I H . N C L S A 0 E E K U 1 D V R C B D N E U A E N A L L L . l W O S I B S f E P A ( E. l D E F l i L

_ I S B N D B M l 1 A E E A R l N C D L C U E I E C N F S D F R O O E T O O _

M 5 I P R I _

C M S A H S _

1 C S N _

1 O N R 0 _

l L C 0 ll l u

l 1 _

_ O l I C u 1 R R R l U 1 T O A C C A _

N R C f N J C R _

O A 0 I O I O _

L C C M 1 C I L _

T O A R

I *

• U *

• _

R T C

O A C _

$"I

Eign scpern UTILIkEAREACUTSETINFORMATIONFROMSYSTEMSGROUP ,

~4 FROM TRUNCATE ON RANDOM FAILURE PROBABILITIES OF 10 THE AREA CUTSET VALUES USE A FIRE FREQUENCY OF 10-3

- FOR ADJACENT AREAS, USE A .1 BARRIER FAILURE CRITERIA l

i

- IF DOUBLE AREAS ARE PHYSICALLY VERY DISTANT, ELIMINATE FROM CONSIDERATION l

- PRODUCT OF FIRE FREQUENCY, BARRIER FAILURE, RANDOM FAILURE PROBABILITIES MUST BE GREATER THAN OR EOUAL TO 10

-8 TO KEEP FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS 1

UNIQUELY IDENTIFY AREAS 1

l 0

C-36

SFCOND SCRFEN REFINE FIRE FREQUENCIES USED PHYSICAL ASSESSMENT / PLANT WALKDOWN REQUIRED BARRIERS EVALUATED A. DETERMINISTICALLY B. PROBABILISTICALLY UTILI2E 10-8 CORE MELT FREQUENCY CUTOFF l

PRIORITI2E AREAS LEFT NEEDING ANALYSIS I

C- 3 7

i i

I i

FINAL QUANTIFICATION ]

)

k FOR IMPORTANT FIRE ZONES IDENTIFIED PREVIOUSLY, COMPONENT I J

LEVEL CUT SET INFORMATION WAS DETERMINED.  !

PHYSICALLY LOCATE COMPONENTS OF INTEREST ]

j DETERMINISTIC FIRE CODES USED TO DETERMINE ENVIRONMENT IN ROOM COMPONENT FRAGILITY CURVES USED TO ASSESS POTENTIAL DAMAGE FIRE SCENARIOS POSTULATED SUPPRESSION PROBABILITY FACTORED INTO ANALYSIS UTILIZE A FIRE EVENT TREE  !

1 i

C-38

l s

u e r

s e e l u R a t t k c n a r s s e r o i m e w e n p e s g t

n o m m y r es a e r t s l

a m i r a l n v e f n o n h r s

R o r e gt s e d

/ t ,i i p e g )

v y h y l n l mn e l a

i i

l a o o

e k o

l am t

t a

t ur s e s s m rl m t e s a s d en l d

e ot sih o b c T t o nt st i ae

ic e t cf r

e n

o m

o t

er- a u f e f

s

, sf o n h i og sf - rt o t t r n ee st ec n i r a C i n a eor t u z k e yaa gi a c

F i

t r vrGH s u ns a s g e a r r a i a r e o m td o r eh e o t ph cn**i r c t n c s c e o r ept n

i d

a r

n an e f c f e u

p d pi iuw I e a rb es s ws s m e h t e N C  :

t n s s e  :

y r s o y S a i e i t

e F d s l r o s i o

A e C e l r

c r i g t r e p R p a n R u r u r o P o i S F C S F e '

r - - - -

i F

O$

~

l l!

E . .

y 4

'J i

e M

M w

I I

' m H Z

2 . O w O z H M Z g H yl w r m o m <

<t e c N  !

O e

$ w m

W b $

m m ^ E m

u w

a w

q o CC M w WW 4 m 4 >

>  % > H y E d 2.sg; M M <

2)

W e3 er w g

6 H C CC 4

C h u

I o

Z w H 2 w W y M M H I 6 < A w 8 h m E o

d. w w m u s< t W m

E 5- m o W e >- W u; < z m = I 4 2 < E g E z C i 5;

W ea o

w 5

Z E

R -

<. s' w w W w e 5 W w x y

i 2 o

u O Z >

W Z E h H D

1

- y c Z u

%g- - = - - w w G

I hH  % C Q

85 o 3 $ $ 2 z w w w

w z =

W

= $ h >

w x <

6 W W A

, . . e * *

, ..+:e.e.

. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .i

SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO DATE (CONT.)

• IDENTIFIED AND LOCATED ALL COMPONENTS AND CABLES-

• SOLVED SYSTEM FAULT TREES AND ACCIDENT SEQUENCES l

• PERFORMED INITIAL SCREENING

• IN PROCESS OF PERFORMING FINAL SCREENING 1

1 e

- c-w ;

l

s s e l )

as e t k cn u s o io g s e mn ri n s T eSi t s i g

I a ns cs n e s mim eu i r e a e l c a k i t Dtl Es r s s Fr u nb i T

i e h n e e o g]

R u m/i k s r n' e s ohm o eP mr iC d Ro-c gR a e s r1 0 SP r o aM g r I i o ef mF i i l an tb a( r F d e

o- i l D y

B rmh eo a d s t rt l ti er e s l n i b t s kt r e e o o0W ad nt os i s r r C1 r ne n mu F d e ut e s d t t e n oo m Sd e d n dn ar l FP n n n r a o i gu o oI i d n C a vp ea nV s gr t r

U i

eni e d e eim tddi v ea k a k rtI uce y snit n ue o n f o s eur aE Dl m U o m fl TooFl c n c S o f r i

eu n S l e e e sC hdnio cN f f o c nv gt I s n- o o  : nI e a nf s en i

s n E e

S me oet re an i o n n s r egy Dol a p rN o e e i o u c l rt pel p pr t i c aui t mvuu xo t s n c Pl n Cl o e cS Ef i

n a i o S eb i

e i t p g D C - n o omga a m eh r c ki st e o s sn c i

r gmi poiPD oe e f o rSV mSH Lm R a

i t

f L - - Co- - ei p

l n s gu a L L rq v e i s N N aE a d S S L N I a B - - - -

s ee e e h s u l h t a s o k ot e s gt n a trr dl e ea I i e e n o sR e t r r of u r k a e B C a mA ch t C e s s oW eoi t m i

e L nt u ) s o o d yyo R u ent i

Lr n rSR s ri a o a e s i s r eC r nl ya ooo

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l ef r eSB e e o Ff er c e e l pe s r r i Fmy d uh s t s D nt ol eSt e

d n n d U aW yF sri t t an d o w e e r a r a C  : o cr n rhE i

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n c nE ep o sC u f o ( e r u e a umy b o i i

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c e s a r I r i V r c j i o f o c d d P f l t R A F e u a c s e S me eso s d s l

d s rt d r wn e e o a h a o e t eND aeTi a r g gi s r t i i r i r gr s d n r wAh n t o r r nT i e d o B dl ii B a vt r a C  : e aWt Bl n d n ) e t n a e o a d U r pr sl r evd e . i e ni ir n n a k t F i

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r i r p l O i f a f i m B t p a. F o n n _

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/ e n m i i e o f

n c S i p f S s c i o i p i o s u t o i m i u n e d a s s e P q y o r n d a

n s s E t i p I o u i

r o i t p r c e e t f l c u y g i

s S o i e S l e _

t v e b t l D a i D

d u g a e s a c R d n l D u c c _

i i i o i i f d y a e i m m l

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i c r o f y F d t i p t a S e c f S S s a i e - c c s r l d k n i e e e a e o o m s r u t m N s s t Q c S i d n e d e e d  :

c p e n S r a :

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s s o a b

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a i n riat t u u o D o i pl n n D o C c C uieo e H i cPRC m d s 2 r e p e s s R - - - i t a e i

o u f e c t f o q o r c n N E L A A e s d i - - - - -

s a

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