ML20237L019
| ML20237L019 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1987 |
| From: | Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Wilgus W FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| References | |
| IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8708270382 | |
| Download: ML20237L019 (4) | |
Text
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AUG 181987
,jFlorida Power Corporation v Mr. W. S.. Wilgus.
Vice President Nuclear Operations ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Licensing P. 0.. Box 219 Crystal River, FL 32629 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING CRYSTAL R RESPONSES TO IEB 85-03.(DOCKET N0. 50-302)
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is continuing its review of responses to IEB 85-03, " Motor Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transient Due to The review indicates the need for additional
' Improper Switch Settings."
information before the program to assure valve operability can be approved for your facility.
It is Please provide the additional information as stated in the enclosure.
requested that you submit the additional information within 30' days of the date of this letter.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please.
}
contact us.
Sincerely.
W Alan R. Herdt, Chief Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety c
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information kccw/ enc 1:P. F. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations VE.C.Simpson, Director,NuclearSiteSupport bec w/ enc 1:
Document Control Desk 1 State of Florida 4NRC Resident Inspector A. Gibson A. Herdt
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l ENCLOSURE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI) RE:
Review of Responses to Action Ites e of IE Bulletin 85-03 Licensee:
Unit (s): Crystal River 3 Florida Power Corpora, tion Date of Response: 05-13-86 3201 Thirty-Fourth Street South P. O. Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Respondent:
Rolf C. Widell, Manager Nuclear Operations Licensing and Fuel Management The information provided in your response to Action Item e of IE Bulletin 85-03 was found to be deficient in some areas.
Please provide the additional information necessary to resolve the following comments and questions:
- 1. Unlisted MOVs CFV-5 and CFV-6 in discharge lines of the core flooding tank safety injection system are shown normally open on FSAR Figure 6-2, Revision 7 (Drawing FD-302-702, Revision 15).
The possible problem that the system would be inoperable if the MOVs were left closed inadvertently should be addressed.
Based on the assumption of inadvertent equipment operations Ju required by Action Item a of the bulletin, revise tables 1 and 2 of the response of May 13, 1986 to include these valves.
- 2. The following MOVs are not included in the list of valves of the safety injection system to be examined for maximum differential pressure.
That is, they are not identified in tables 1 and 2 of the response of May 13, 1986.
As a general question, what controls are placed on these valves to ensure that they will be in the proper position when needed?
In accordance with the request of Action Item a of the bulletin to assume inadvertent equipment operations, revise the tables to include these valves.
(a) MUV-62 (normally closed) and MUV-69 (normally open) are shown in series in the suction crossover line.
Refer to zones G-4 and G-6 of Drawing FD-302-661, Sheet 5. Revision 6
Note that Pump 3B would be deprived of suction from the BWST if MUV-69 were to be left closed inadvertently.
,' Enclosure 2
(b) MUV-3 and MUV-9 are shown normally open in series in the discharge crossover line.
Refer to zones F-4 and'F-6 of Drawing FD-302-661, Sheet.5, Revision 6 Note that the pattern of pump discharge to the four injection lines would be affected grossly if MUV-3 in particular were to be left closed inadvertently.
(c) MUV-53 and MUV-257 are shown normally open in series in the line leading to the seal return coolers.
Refer to Zone F-7 of Drawing FD-302-661, Sheet 5, Revision 6 Equivalent MOVs are shown in safety injection systems of three other B&W facilities, and are listed to be examined for maximum differential pressure.
- 3. Differential pressures for safety injection valves MUV-23 through MUV-26 have been compared with those listed for equivalent HOVs at three other B&W plants.
This comparison indicates that the delta-Ps for Crystal River 3 should be about 1.65 times greater for closing.
Please justify or correct this apparent discrepancy.
.EFV-11, -14. -32 and -33 have been compared with those listed for equivalent MOVs at another B&W facility: Arkansas 1.
This comparison indicates that the delta-Ps for Crystal River 3 should be about 1.34 times higher for closing, and about 3.12 times higher for opening.
Please justify or correct this apparent discrepancy.
It appears that these delta-Ps vary too widely to be explained by the fact that different architect-engineers are involved.
- 5. Has water hammer due to valve closure been considered in the determination of pressure differentials?
If not, please.
explain.
- 6. Inspection Report 86-23 (09-02-86) indicates that the response
[of 05-13-86] does not address all of the bulletin concerns.
Sp(cifically, the inspector noted that differential pressures for both opening and closing were not tabulated, and observed that some differential pressures appeared to be low.
Please address these matters in your revised response.
- 7. Please state che planned date of completion of Action Item f of the bulletin.
Note that the due date specified by the bulletin is January 15, 1988..
- 8. Please expand the proposed program for action items b, e and d to include the following details as a minimus:
(a) commitment to a training program for setting switches, maintaining valve operators, using signature testing equipment and interpreting signatures.
l
l Enclosure 3
- '81 (b) justification of testing at " normal test conditions" instead of anzimum differential pressures, such as describing a method of extrapolating valve stem thrust, and (c) comattaent to justify continued operation
' a valve
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determined to be inoperable.
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