ML20237G452

Amend 7 to License DPR-21,changing Tech Specs to Allow Startup W/Flow Indication from 19 Jet Pumps & Rev of Jet Pump Surveillance Provisions for Period Through End of Cycle 12 Operation

ML20237G452
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	08/06/1987
From:	Thomas C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20237G411	List: ML20237G410 ML20237G452 ML20237G493
References
NUDOCS 8708240091
Download: ML20237G452 (7)

Text

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UNITED STATES

!" o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g ;E W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

% ,. . . . . ,o NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

• DOCKET NO. 50-245 MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 7 License No. DPR-21

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Consnission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, (the licensee) dated July 23, 1987, as supplemented by a letter dated July 30, 1987, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), >

and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in complit..ce with the Commission's regulations; i

D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common  ;

defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and l E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. ,

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendmentan.dParagraph2.C.(2)ofFacilityOperatingLicense No. DPR-2I is hereby amended to read as.follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised

'through Amendment No. 7 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee'shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical' Specifications.

3. This license. amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION tA$0 &h.p,s@&~

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Cecil.0. Thomas, Director Integrated Safety Assessment Project Directorate Division-of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: August 6, 1987 l

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 7 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE No. DPR-21 DOCKET NO. 50-245-Revise Appendix.A Technical Specifications by removing the pages indentified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by

'the captioned amendment' number and contain marginal-lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE INSERT 3/4 6-13 3/4 6-13 3/4.6-14* 3/4 6-14*

B 3/4 6-5* B 3/4 6-5* ,

B 3/4 6-6 8 3/4 6-6

• 0verleaf page provided to maintain document completeness. No changes contained on these pages.

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LILTTING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY

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G. Jet Pumps

Whenever the reactor is in the STARTUP/ HOT STANDBY or RUN modes, all 1.

jet pumps shall be intact and all operating jet pumps shall be e operable. If it is determined that a jet pump is inoperable, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a CO.LD SHUTDOWN or REFUEL CONDITION within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

2. Flow indication from each of the twenty jet pumps (except that flow indication from only 19 jet pumps is acceptable prior to and during Cycle 12 operation) shall be verified prior to initiation of reactor startup from a cold shutdown condition.

3 The indicated core flow is the sum of the flow indication from each of the twenty jet pumps. If flow indication failure occurs for two or more jet pumps, immediate corrective action shall be taken.

If flow indication cannot be obtained for at least nineteen jet' pumps, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and the reactor shall be in a COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUEL CONDITION within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY G. Jet Pumps

1. Whenever there is a recirculation flow with the reactor in the STARTUP/ HOT STANDBY or RUN modes, jet pump integrity and operability shall be checked daily by verifying that the following two conditions do not occur: l

a. The recirculation pump flow differs by more than 10% from the established speed-flow characteristics; or l

b. The indicated total core flow is more than 10% greater than the core flow value derived from established power-core flow relationships.

2. Additionally, when operating with one recirculation pump with the equalizer valves closed, the diffuser to lower plenum differential pressure shall be checked daily, and the differential pressure of any jet pump in the idle loop shall not vary by more than 10% from established patterns.

3 The baseline data required to evaluate the conditions in Specification 4.6.G.1 and 4.6.G.2 will be acquired each operating cy cle.

Amendment No.1, 7 Millstone Unit 1 3/4 6-13

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY H. Recirculation Pump Flow Mismatch

1. Whenever both recirculation pumps are in operation, pump speeds

.shall be maintained within 10% of each other when power level is greater than 80% and within 15% of each other when power level is less than 80%. -

, 2. If Specification 3.6.H.1 cannot be met, one recirculation pump shall e be tripped. Operation with a single recirculation pump is permitted for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> unless the recirculation pump is sooner made operable.

l If the pump cannot be made operable, the reactor shall be in COLD i SHUTDOWN or REFUEL CONDITION within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

l 3 .' The reactor shall not be operated unless the equalizer line is j isolated.

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• 4. With the mode switch in the STARTUP/ HOT STANDBY or RUN MODE, operation without forced circulation shall not be permi,tted.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM B0UNDARY H. Recirculation Pump Flow Mismatch

1. Recirculation pump speed shall be checked daily for mismatch.

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, Amendment No. 1 MillstoneUnit,1j 3/4 6-14 j

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3.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY

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i BASES

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of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as +1% of design pressure.

. An analys'is has been performed which shows that, with all safety valves set 1% higher, the reactor coolant pressure safety limit of 1375 psig is not exceeded.

The relief / safety valves have two functions: 1.e., power relief or self-actuated by.high pressure. The solenoid actuated function (automatic pressure relief) is that in which external instrumentation signals of coincident high drywell pressure and low-low water level initiate the valves to open. This fonction is discussed in Specification 3.5.0. In addition, the valves can be operated manually.

The safety function is performed by the same relief / safety valve with a pilot va.1ve causing main valve operation. .

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It is understood that portions of the Valve Position Indication System cannot be repaired or replaced during operation, therefore, the plant must be shutdown to accomplish.such repairs. The 30-day period to do this allows the operator the flexibility to choose his time for shutdown; meanwhile, because of the redundancy provided by the valve discharge temperature monitor and the continued monitoring of the remaining valves by both methods, the ability to detect the opening of a safety / relief valve would not be compromised. The valve operability is not affected by failure of the Valve Position Indication System.

When the setpoint is being bench checked, it is prudent to disassemble one of the' relief /s.afety valves to examine for crud buildup, bending of certain actuator members or other signs of possible deterioration.

Testing at low reactor pressure is required during each operating cycle.

It has been demonstrated that the blowdown of the valve to the torus  :

I causes a wave action that is detectable on the torus water level instrumentation. The discharge of a safety valve is audible to an individual located outside the torus in the vicinity of the line, as experienced at other BWR's.

F. Structural Integrity See Bases Section 3.13 and 4.13.

l G. Jet Pumps Failure of a jet pump nozzle assembly holddown mechanism, nozzle assembly, and/or riser increases the cross sectional flow area for blowdown following the postulated design basis double-ended recirculation line break. ,

Therefore, if a failure occurs, repairs must be made to assure the  !

validity of the calculated consequences. l The following factors form the basis for the surveillance requirements:

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l Millstone Unit 1 B 3/4 6-5

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• 3.6 and 4.6 PRIMARY SYSTEM BOUNDARY BASES A break in a jet pump decreases the flow resistance characteristic of the external piping loop causing the recirculation pump to operate at a higher flow condition when compared with previous operation.

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The change in flow rate of the failed jet pump produces a change in the

> indicated flow rate of that pump relative to the other pumps in that loop.

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Comparison of the data with a normal relationship or pattern provides the indication necessary to detect a failed jet pump.

For gycle 12 operation, flow indication for jet pump "K" will be determined by flow indication ~ from the adjacent, paired jet pump "J,"

based upon historical jet pump performance characteristics.

The jet pump flow deviation pattern derived from the diffuser to lower plenum. differential pressure readings will be used to further evaluate jet pump operability in the event that the jet pumps fail the tests in Sections 4.6.G.1 and 2.

Agreement of indicated core flow with established power-core flow relationships provides the most. assurance that recirculation flow is not bypassing'the core through inactive or broken jet pumps. This bypass flow is reverse with respect to normal jet pump flow. The indicated total core flow is a summation of the flow indications twent) individual jet pumps.

The total core flow measuring instrumentation sums reverse jet pump flow as though it were forward flow. Thus, the indicated flow is higher than actual core flow by at Icast twice the normal flow through any backflowing pump. Reactivity inventory is known to a high degree of confidence so that even if a jet pump failure occurred during a shutdown period, subsequent power ascension would promptly demonstrate abnormal control rod withdrawal for any power-flow operating map point.

A nozzle-riser system failure could also generate the coincident failure of a jet pump body; however, the converse is not true. The lack of any substantial stress in the jet pump body makes failure impossible.

H. Recirculation Pump Flow Mismatch The LPCI loop selection logic is described in the FSAR, Section 6.2.4.2.

For some limited, low probability accidents, with the recirculation loop operating with large speed differences, it is possible for the logic to select the wrong loop for injection.

For these limited conditions the core spray itself is adequate to prevent fuel temperatures from exceeding allowable limits. However, to limit the probability even further, a procedural limitation has been placed on the allowable variation in speed between the recirculation pumps.

The analyses for Quad Cities indicate that above 80% power the loop select logic could not be expected to function at a speed differential of 15%.

Below 80% power the loop select logic would not be expected to function at a speed differential of 20%. This specification provides a margin of 5%

in pump speed differential before a problem could arise. If the reactor _

is operating on one pump, the loop select logic trips that pump before making the loop selection.

Millstone Unit 1 B 3/4 6 6 Amendment No. 7 i  ?' _______ -