ML20236T720
| ML20236T720 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/05/1987 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2518, NUDOCS 8712020049 | |
| Download: ML20236T720 (58) | |
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IN skskh DATE ISSUED: 8/5/87 r/n /r7 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Thermal Hydraulic Phenomena Subcommittee Meeting Minutes August 4, 1987 Washington, D.C.
PURPOSE The purpose of the meeting was to discuss:
(1)Developmentof Uncertainty Methodology for BE ECCS Codes, (2) Status of the Generic Issue addressing Steam Cenerator/ Steam Line Overfill Issues, (3)
Status of the Water Hammer Issue, and (4) a potential issue regarding long-term core cooling given'a LOCA.
i ATTENDEES Principal meeting attendees included:
ACRS NRC D. Ward, Chairman N. Anderson, NRR J. Ebersole, Member W. Beckner, RES C. Mark, Member R. Hernan, NRR C. Michelson, Member R. Jones, NRR I. Catton, Consultant N. Lauben, RES V. Schrock, Consultant W. Lyon, NRR i
H. Sullivan, Consultunt A. Serkiz, RES l
C. L. Tien B. Sheron, RES P. Boehnert, Staff L. Shotkin, RES N. Zuber, RES SCIENTECH L. Ybarrando EPRI J. Kim -
MEETING HIGHLIGHTS, AGREEMENTS AND REQUESTS 1.
A. Serkiz (RES) reviewed the status of water hammer in U.S. nuclear power plants. Reviewing the incidence of WH from 1969 to the l
DESIONATED ORIGINAL 8712O20049 870005 ACRS Certified By PDR
i T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes August 4, 1987 i
i present, Dr. Serkiz said the frequency of occurrence was 0.32/RY
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for 1969-1980 and 0.12/RY for 1981-87.
In response to Mr.
j Ebersole, Dr. Serkiz'noted that some events (SONGS-1) resulted in i
However, equipment damage has generally been limited to pipe-hangers, snubbers and occasionally pumps.
Figure'l shows the annual WH occurrence rate through the first 6 months of 1987.
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Dr. Sullivan noted that EPRI reports that WH events are occurring i
at a rate 10 times higher than reported. Dr. Serkiz indicated this may or may not be the case, but the events reported usually l
resulted in plant-damage. Mr. Michelson asked if the change'in LER l
reporting requirements in v 1983 or so impacted the WH frequency data. Dr. Serkiz indicated that he didn't think this was the' case.
Further discussion on this point ensued.
In response to Mr. Ward, Dr. Serkiz indicated that he believes the current frequency is due i
to operator errors. The Subcommittee questioned the validity of l
the frequency of occurrence data, given the change of LER reporting requirements in 1983.
Dr. Catton said the data needs to be l
renormalized to the 1983 reporting change in order to obtain meaningful statistics.
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[ J. Ebersole expressed concern over the integrity of valve function, particularly check valves, given a WH event.
Citing statistics on the rate of WH occurrence from EPRI and INPO, Dr. Sullivan asked if RES will relook this information. Dr. Serkiz welcomed receipt of this type of material from any source and indicated he would review such information.
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Dr. Sheron noted the following points: (1) the USI A-1 resolution effort showed there is no one fix for WH, as each plant is unique; (2) including in a series of minor WH events to the data base will I
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3 T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes August 4,.1987
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l result in misleading statistics; (3) events NRC has seen are costly from an economic standpoint and NRC cannot justify taking action; (4) RES sees no justification for additional retearch in this area; rather the Industry should examine WH's as part of the" Severe Ac'ident Policy program.
In response to Dr. Sullivan, Dr. Sheron c
indicated that if. operating data showed that the A-1 resolution approach was invalid - NRC would take another look at the Issue.
Mr. Ward asked if WH's threaten the single failure criterion'(i.e.,
I damage could cross redundant plant systems, etc.). Mr. Serkiz indicated this can happen and is treated as a common cause event in-PRAs.
RES indicated that, to date, no WH has totally failed a given safety system. Mr. Michelson disputed this point, and Dr.
I Serkiz clarified his statement to indicate ~ that no safety system function has been totally disabled.
l Mr. Ward pressed his concern noted above, asking if WH's can potentially challenge an entire safety ~ system (e.g., like an earthquake).
Dr. Serkiz said his study of the data shows WHs have
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been confined to a single train and have not challenged entire l
safety systems.
In response to Mr. Ebersole's concern with the check valve issue, Dr. Sheron said the Backfit Rule would prohibit action by NRC.
In response to Dr. Catton, Dr. Serkiz indicated that the Backfit Rule would also preclude a reopening of the WH Issue at this time.
l Further clarification was given by Dr. Serkiz on this point in that l
the core melt probability seen for the WH contribution at this time l
doesn't justify a reopening of the Issue.
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T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes August 4, 1987 i
Discussion between Mr.' Ward and Dr. Catton indicated that Dr.
Catton is uneasy with the " unknowns" associated with the damage potential for WH.
Dr. Sullivan indicated that he isn't sure whether WH is a safety J
issue or not and the Comnittee may need to comment here.
Dr. Sheron committed to requesting the EPRI/INPO data base noted above. He also said that evaluation of potentially " fatal WHs'"
will be sought via the IPEs. He also will confer with AE0D to see if they can evaluate the WH data base for any new significant findings. Mr. Ward indicated that he isn't sure NRC has a good focus on the risk contribution from WH. Dr. Sheron proposed further Subcommittee discussion on this Issue following the NRC actions noted above. Mr. Michelson made some recommendations for issues that AE00 should persue for this Issue. Mr. Ebersole also suggested that hRC evaluate WH as a contributor not just an initiator of a serious event.
Dr. Serkiz reviewed the reported significant WH's seen in CY 1987 (Figure 2 & 3).
In response' to Mr. Michelson, Dr. Serkiz said he is not aware of WH's that have been experienced at foreign plants.
Figure 4 lists RES's conclusions for the WH issue. Mr. Michelson j
asked if NRC has looked at WH's resulting from station blackout.
Dr. Sheron indicated that he didn't believe NRC is looking at this.
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He said the concern should be addressed as part of the issue of proper plant start up procedures.
N. Zuber reviewed the RES program jointly funded with EPRI to i
investigate water hammer potential due to check valve failure.
Figures 5 and 6 outline the program and its three Tasks.
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J T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes August 4, 1987 1
7-12 outline the details of the three Tasks and the current status; Mr..Michelson indicated that the scope of this Program appears Mr. Kim (EPRI) indicated' that EPRI has a broader scope-i narrow.
program on check valve failure.
In response to Dr. Catton and Mr.
Michelso'n, Dr. Zuber said that one goal of his Program.is to develop a flow-regime-versus-subcooling " map so that one can avoid flow regimes (filling rates) that may cause a WH. The-map will be characterized as functions of *..Jw regimes and piping geometry.
This program is due to be completed in late 1989 - early.1990.
C. Troutman (RES) discussed the-RES effort to develop a.WH Guide-book. Creare is the contractor.for this effort.= The two objec-tives of this Project are:
(1) develop a field Guidebook to support U.S. NRC inspectors and investigative teams for event diagnosis,.and (2) use the Guidebook as a training manual that consolidates the main elements of'the technology. There is a 1
guidebook review Team' composed of people from the NRC Regional Office, NRR and AE0D. The Guidebook will focus on:
(1)NRC i
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inspector needs, (2) condensation-induced waterhammmer phenomena and (3), assured determination of cause and significance of damage.-
l This Project will also be coordinated with the EPRI WH Project noted above.
l The Project schedule calls for completion of the draft Guidebook in February 1988, with the final Report delivered to NRC in April 1988. Dr. Tien indicated the Project would be more aptly titled as a diagnostic Guidebook.
2.
B. Sheron reviewed the philosophy and long term plans in the area of T/H research.
Key points noted were:
- With the advent of PRA and risk analysis, our perception of i
areas important to safety has changed, and concerns have l
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T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes August 4, 1987 shifted to maintenance, management performance, human factors, and prevention and mitigation of severe accidents as' areas requiring regulatory attention; thus RES is moving more resources in these areas commensurate with this shift.
' Most major planned programs (ex:
ICAP,20/3D, ROSA-IV,' final.
version of T/H Codes) will be finished in the 1991/2 time frame. There is no immediate need for a continuing experi-mental capability but.this need will be reviewed periodically.
B&W testing will be a major program over the next' 4 or 5 l
years.
Current and future research Users include AE0D, and the Regional offices. NRR's needs are not clear at this time, but specialized needs will arise from time-to-time. RES will'use the T/H Codes for support of major research Programs (ex:
the l
Accident Management Program).
Future direction of the thermal-hydraulic program is planned as follows: Long-term declining emphasis and resources on l
code development and assessment, but a solid base of program l
effort in this area will be maintained to make necessary code improvements based on new'information. RES will retain a cadre of experts and address new issues as necessary. The T/H technical support center was formed to efficiently accomplish both immediate and long-term goals. Dr. Sheron noted that the INEL TIC has been changed to a technical support Center, in l
large part in response to Subcommittee criticism.
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- Future T/H research emphasis will be on applications (Figure 13). Dr. Sheron offered to brief the Subcommittee on the Accident Management Program which is fast becoming the focus j
of the T/H effort.
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T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes August 4, 1987 I
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l In response to Dr. Sullivan, Dr. Sheron said RES has established a Committee to. develop a priority list for code changes.
Professor j
Schrock asked if the ICAP is free to identify any future experi-
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j mental research needs. Dr. Sheron indicated that this is possible, and if such a need arose it would probably be addressed at a foreign research facility. Dr. Sullivan suggested that a Com-l mittee, similar to the ICAP Group above, be formed to evaluate the U.S. T/H code needs. Dr. Sheron indicated that RES has put the code Developers on notice that they must thoroughly justify any proposed changes to the Codes.
He further indicated that the Accident Management Program will be a key element in excising the J
Codes to determine whether additional experimental data is needed.
l In response to Dr. Catton, Dr. Sheron indicated that NRC cannot afford to build and run an integral test facility without Industry support and the Industry has indicated no intention of providing such support.
In response to Mr. Michelson, RES said NRR has not supported need for a new integral test facility.
Mr. Ward asked if the current T/H codes will serve the Agency given the possible need to analyze a different LB LOCA (say a pipe split) for a future plant design (i.e., a different DBA scenario). Dr.
Sheron said the codes would need to be revised in that case.
There was further discussion on the need for a new integral facili-ty/ test capability. Dr. Sheron indicated that absent a specific User Need, he cannot justify additional T/H research work.
In response to Mr. Ebersole, Dr. Sheron said RES is establishing a priority for research Projects based on the amount of risk reduction associated with a given need.
1 3.
R. Hernan (NRR) provided the NRR position on water hammer (WH).
He said NRR is in agreement with the positions noted by Dr. A. Serkiz
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T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes August 4, 1987 l
i above. Mr. Hernan proceeded to detail the various regulatory requirements / Staff guidance for addressing WH concerns. Mr.
Michelson noted that NRC review does not address the issue of what l
is the risk of a given system seeing a WH.
In response to Dr. Sullivan, NRR indicated that they are satisfied l
that they have sufficient regulatory tools to address this Issue.
4.
J. Kim overviewed -the EPRI program on WH.
Key points of the presentation were:
- Plants are seeing damaging WH events. There are#v 11 WH
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events occurring / year at U.S. plants. EPRI'provided figures
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on the nuniber of events (Figure 14).
In response to Mr. Ward, Mr. Kim said & 5 to 10 times the number of WH events are believed to be occurring than_are reported. EPRI defines
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" event" as one that results in some monetary damage.
j The rate of WH events / plant year is 0.20.
The consequences of WH events were broken down as followsi pipe support damage ~ 60%, component damage - 17%, reactor j
trip
- 10%, plant shutdown ~ 7%.-
The last two causes account for the majority of economic losses.
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- The EPRI perspectives on WH are:
(1) water hammer keeps j
recurring, (2) water hammer is not a serious safety risk, (3)
.l water hammer incurs significant financial losses (availabil-ity/operationrisk),(4)waterhammereventsweretreated I
case-by-case in the past, and (5) a comprehensive generic approach to prevent, mitigate, and accommodate water hammer is i
necessary. Concerning the EPRI statement that WH.is not a i
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I T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes August 4, 1987 serious safety risk, Mr. Ward asked for EPRI's basis for this statement. Mr. Kim indicated that the operating experience backs ut this position. Dr Sullivan expressed concern that the WH's seen in various safety systems could lead to trouble.
Further discussion indicated that EPRI was unable to provide a basis for the above position other than indicating-that:
"most experts have concluded such."
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g TheEPRIWorkshoponWH(July 9-10, 1986 - Boston, MA) result-i ed in a number of recommendations in the areas of prevention.
mitigation and accommodation.
Figures 15 and 16 provide details. The EPRI " goal" is to reduce the WH frequency by/v 20%. Specific R&D recommendations coming out of the Workshop were:
(1) Develop a water hammer '! handbook"; (2)' develop testing to understand WH phenomena methodology; (3) development of fluid-structure interaction analyses; and (4)
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provide economic evaluation of water hammer impact.
j The EPRI WH program has as its ultimate product the Handbook
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noted above. The Program will investigate mitigation and accommodation of WH including:
(1)investigationofphysical mechanisms,(2)evaluationofsystemsandcomponents,(3) designimprovement,(4)developmentofanoperational" map",
and (5) evaluation, updating, and refinement of operational procedures and guidelines. An outline of the Handbook i
Chapters are given in Figures 17-20.
Figure 21. lists the specific Program Tasks. The Handbook is scheduled to be completed in late 1990.
In response to Dr. Catton, Dr. Kim indicated that this Program should be a logical conclusion to the WH Issue.
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J EPRI has established a WH Advisory Committee'to act as a
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l liaison with the Utilities and assure a useful Project.
In a
response to Mr. Michelson, Dr. Kim said the WH Issue is I
costing Utilities over $10 M/ year. -
- EPRI is interacting with NRC on the WH. issue. They expect to I
conduct an information exchange with the Agency on each other's respective Programs.
5.
N. Anderson and L. Ybarrondo reviewed the resolution status of GI-135:
" Steam Generator and Steamline Overfill-Issues."
L.
Ybarrondo is the principal Contractor (Scientech) for GI-135.
Figure 22 lists the various subissues involved. in GI-135.
Included in this effort is the resolution approach for USI's_A-3
-4 and -5, j
(SG tube integrity), steam line WH studies, and overfill-and WH mitigation studies.
(The last Item is at the behest of the ACRS).
The GI-135 Work Plan is detailed in Figure 23.
The status of the various sub-issues was detailed by Mr. Anderson (Figures 24-29).
In response to Mr. Ebersole, Mr. Anderson indicated that reliance on the PORY and the possibility of its sticking open needs to be address by the' correct operating procedures.
In response to Mr. Ward, NRR said that some simulators l
cannot properly model a SGTR event.
1 In response to Mr. Ward, Mr. Anderson said the W SGTR studies were required as a result of the Ginna event which resulted in NT0L plants having licensing conditions imposed on them.
Discussing the steam line WH studies performed (Figure 30), Mr.
Anderson noted that the result of the studies showed that WH's can't be predicted, pipe failure can't'be predicted nor could WH parameter thresholds be established. A major (multi-$M) effort
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T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes _ August 4, 1987-4 would be needed to' resolve this Issue. Dr. Catton strongly' dis--
agreed with this conclusion and suggested NRC confer with Dr. P.
Griffith' (MIT) as he has conducted experimental work on 'this Item.
. Mr. Anderson indicat'ed he would look into this.
Drs. Catton and Sullivan indicated that the above conclusions appear to centradict the NRR position that WH is not a safety.
l issue. Mr. Anderson said NRR will approach resolution of this concern by adopting a mitigation l approach.
Figure 31 outlines the schedule of GI-135 resolution.
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l L. Ybarrondo (Scientech) reviewed their effort under the.GI-135 resolution effort. There are' four Tasks involved. These are:
Task 1 - Assess the adequacy of Eddy Current Testing (ECT) for use as an inspection Standard.
Task 2 - Propose modifications to Standards Review Plan (SRP).
Section 15.6.3 (" Radiological Consequences of SG Tube Failure").
Task 3 - Reassess pending issues for Generic Issue (GI) 67.
Task 4 - Review water hammer, overfill, and water carryover effects on secondary systems.
Figures 32-35 detail the approach and status for each of the above Tasks. Discussion brought out the fact that the T/H codes (TRAC,-
RELAP-5) cannot model WH phenomena.
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T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes -
AugustL4,1987 6.
W. Beckner (RES) discussed the schedule and status-for the Proposed ECCS Rule.
The public comment period has closed. There were 26 comments on Rule - 4 from. individuals and the remainder from Industry. No major changes in the final Rule are likely as_a result of the coments. The Industry strongly supports the revision, and 'little or no opposition was expressed by others.
ACRS review of the final Rule. version is requested at.the November Meeting.
7.
N. Zuber detailed the CSAU Methodology approach in support of the use of BE codes for the new ECCS Rule. Dr. Zuber noted that the methodology has been developed and was implemented by NRC RES in May 1987.
The methodology was developed to evaluete:
(1) Code capability to scale-up phenomena observed in small scale test facilities to full scale NPP.
(2) Code capability to address a particular scenario or a set of scenarios or a given plant design, and (3) Code uncertainty to calculate important parameters, say the peak cladding temperature (PCT), in a full scale NPP.
Completedocumentation(CodeManual,QAdocument,UserGuideand Assessment Report) is required to support the methodology. RES has now specified the above requirements for the code developers (LANL, INEL,BNL,etc.).
i The CSAU evaluation method is outlined in Figure 36.. The end result addresses the problems of scalability (scale distortion),
compensating errors, and the resultant total uncertainty associated with the BE T/H code calculation.
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I T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes August 4. 1987 Discussing the CSAV applicability to LB LOCA, Dr. Zuber noted that l
test data for the blowdown phase are prontypical.
For the re-fill /reflood phase, scale distortions are 9 resent and must be j
addressed. The methodology for determining total _ code uncertainty is given on Figure 37. A key feature of this methodology is the j
requirement that both the SE and integral calculations must be performed with'the same number of nodes in the code.
'l An effort is underway to quantify the overall PCT uncertainty via a Technical Program Group. The effort is divided between LANL, BNL.
and INEL;'INEL has responsibility to develop the overall Report on this tcpic. The code used is TRAC PF-1/M00-1. 'The milestones and schedule for this effort is given on Figure'38, i
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Dr. Zuber said a set of Lessons Learned is being developed by the l
above Group as they progress in their efforts. These Lessons will
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i be catalogued for future use.
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RES is requesting ACRS review of the uncertainty methodology. A l
Peer Review Group will also be formed to evaluate this methodology.
Mr. Ward suggested ACRS review after the peer Group has completed l
its review. The Group Members have not yet been named by RES.
l In response to Professor Schrock, Dr. Zuber indicated that the l
above PCT uncertainty exercise is just a first step and that other calculations (except SB LOCA's) will need to be performed.
L 8.
W. Lyon (NRR) provided a progress report on a recent issue raised I
concerning long term core cooling following a LOCA. Key points j
noted by Mr. Lyon were:
- Long term cooling following a LOCA is unanalyzed.
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4 T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes -August 4, 1987
- The assumption has been made that a clear path exists for steam to exit the reactor coolant system following cold leg breaks and that no other effects occur to affect unimpeded steam flow.
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1 These assumptions are unsubstantiated.
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' Regulatory Requirements may not be met.
This concern may apply to large end intermediate break LOCAs.
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is not a concern for B&W plants, given core vent valves, and is I
less of a concern for CE plants. Mr. Lyon noted, however, that this is a low probability event (need a CL break of some undetermined size at the top of the pipe) thus, no immediate safety issue exists.
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Figure 39 (Plates 3 and 4) diagrams the potential problem. Because of the loop seal phenomenon, there is concern that steam trapped behind the seal could, for certain break sizes, sufficiently depress the core liquid level to cause core damage.
There was extensive discussion of the proposed scenario.
In response to Professor Schrock, Mr. Jones (NRR) said the issue is what is the effect of the loop seal on~ the core liquid level.
NRR has not evaluated this Item in detail. Mr. Lyon said the concern becomes acute at low decay heat levels when the boiling and level swell phenomenon becomes quiescent.
Further cooldown of the steam generators could exacerbate the problem if water is held up in the.
SG-further blocking steam flow out the break.
'NRR indicated that investigation of this issue remains to be done.
In response to Mr. Michelson, NRR said that the LOCA codes have never been run out beyond 3-5 minutes nor have the codes been validated for the_ phenomena involved in the above scenario. Of
~ August 4, 1987-T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes specific interest is:
the heat generation rate, break size', RCS pressure, effect of hot leg injection and steam generator cooling, f
Staff. response to the issue'is to:
(1) develop an understanding of the problem and its implications, (2) assess the time period
(" window") of concern,-and (3) initiate discussions with Industry.
N. Lauben (RES) provided a preliminary evaluation of the above problem. Key points noted include:
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Existing experiments applicable to this problem run in Japanese facilities (CCTF and ROSA-IV) show that the loop seals cleared but decay heat and pressure were higher than that of concern here.
l Examination of the bypass capabil'ity of the upper head cooling vents shows that, depending on the bypass capacity, the probleni can exist for anywhere'from 5.1 houn to 12 days.
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- An evaluation of core exit temperature versus froth elevation in the core showed that the core exit temperature is-very sensitive to the froth level'(Figure 40).
Hand calculations were run to determine the expected froth level for a " worse case" collapsed liquid level (N 6.2 ft).
Results based on various assumptions (Figure 41) show froth levels ranging from 6.4 to 13.4 feet. The results are quite sensitive to the correlation used in the calculation.
The above evaluations indicate this problem can't be ignored.
RES will look at the sensitivity of this problem to loop seal.
and pump flooding (since current work is based on maximum loop 1
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T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes August 4, 1987 seal depression, the problem should improve).
RES will also await a User Need letter from NRR.
I R. Jones (NRR) indicated NRR will take expeditious action on this Issue. NRR will meet with W OG representatives in the near future.
i (Note: a meeting is scheduled for August 13,1987.) NRR believes this problem should be resolved by the Industry.
In response to Mr. Michelson, Mr. Jones said no Part 21 Letters are needed in this case, as NRC discovered the Issue.
9.
Dr. Shotkin noted the Subcommittee concerns with the INEL Technical Integration Center (TIC), Thus, RES has changed the name to the Technical Support Center. He also said that there will be an extensive B&W experimental program. There is also extensive cooperation between NRC and various' international entities which give the Agency access to various test facilities.
RES'also said they see no safety issue associi:ted with WH; the Programs they have in this area are in response to ACRS concerns.
- 10. Mr. Ward, referring to the WH issue, noted that the Subcommittee's problem is that there is a lack of a definitive argument as to why there is no safety problem. Of particular concern, is that a'WH could be a contributor to a particular accident scenario.
EPRI's l
I Program appears to address WH initiators but it is not clear whether it will address the issue in a comprehensive manner. Mr.
Ward requested that RES provide a presentation to the Subcommittee on risk based studies vis-a-vis WH when it is timely to do so.
- 11. The Chairman requested written reports from the Consultants on the day's Items.
He said the CSAU uncertainty methodology approach will be reviewed at the September ACRS meeting and requested specific comments on this Item.
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l T/H Phenomena Meeting Minutes August 4, 1987 12.
In response to Mr. Ebersole, Mr. Jones (NRR) said the above' LOCA
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issue will receive prompt attention from NRR. Mr. Ward asked the Subcommittee if they feel further action or more prompt action is
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need. The Subcommittee indicated that NRRs posture on this Item is l
appropriate.
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The meeting was adjourned at 6:40 p.m.
i NOTE:
Additional meeting details can be obtained from a transcript of this meeting available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., or can be purchased from ACE-Federal Reporters, 444 North Capitol Street, Wash-ington, D.C. 20001,(202)347-3700.
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Reported Water:aammers CY 1987 South Texas
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3 /12 / 8 7 4
Damaged CCW supports and piping Operator error while initiating RHR operation Faulty procedures cited, operators will be briefed 1
and operator training modules modified to cite I
this WH potential.
1 Saearon Earris Uni:
1 4/28/87 l
. Snubber G piping support damage on SG 1A blowdown system piping.
. Cause attributed to WH occuring when the isolation valve for the line from containment 4
l was opened.
. Stroke time for valve was increased to minimize future reoccurrence.
3yron "Jnit 1
SI9/87
. WH in IB Main Steam line: 15 hangers G snubbers damaged: 20 inch piping deflection in 200 foot run.
. Cause - inadequate pre-warming of downstream piping plus backslope of piping to MSIV station.
. Snubbers G hangers repaired: pipe welds inspected; unit back in service within several weeks Warming G draining procedures re-reviewed.
TRO"AK 6/87
. Failed seismic restraint found during refueling inspection.
. WH cited a probable cause based on loads analysis to cause pedestal failure.
Estimated loads on SR 8 were well within design capability of piping G other pipe supports.
. Design modifications made to SR. 8 mounting prior to return to service.
g JfSSWd A
i Reported Waterdammers CY
- 987 C
Corr!d
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Pa;o Verde Uni':
2 6/29/87
. WH ruptured, Train A circ water piping welds adjacent to main condenser inlet and outlet water boxes.
. Cause - rapid closure of butterfly control valve due to shearing of valve gear bolts.
. Piping and welds have been repaired; butterfly restraint mechanism has been redesigned with better bolt design.
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Lasale
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?I18I87 Cold Shutdown inspection revealed locked mechanical snubber
!n RHR line.
Cause attributed to flashing of water in line when valve is opened to initiate Steam Condensing mode of RHR operation.
. Corrective action was to add a warming line around valve to avoid steam flashing in the future.
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CONCLUSIONS I
CONTINUED REVIEW OF REPORTED WHs l
HAS NOT REVEALED NEW PHENOMENA WHs WILL CONTINUE TO OCCUR DAMAGE HAS BEEN PRIMARILY LIMITED TO PIPING SUPPORTS FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE HAS DECREASED NEWER PLANTS WERE NOT THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS SIXCE :.980 OPERATOR TRAINING INCLUSI0X OF WH CONSIDERATIONS IX PREPARING l
~ EMERGENCY PROCEDURES WOULD HELP.
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......-~-:.::......................- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
. W...~.......
OVERALL WATERHAMMER ii!
i:
STUDY COMPARISON 9
d EPRI / ITI NRC / EG&G y_
.~.
DATES INCLUDED 1981 - 1985 1969 - 1981 CALENDAR YEARS 5
12 BWR EVENTS 30 81
- [
PWR EVENTS 26 40 SGWH EVENTS 2
27 TOTAL EVENTS 58 148 l-l
- /-
- -::,.......... :....... :... :::...... :. :....... ::.. ::... ::. :::... ::. ?.'
^
p/6 14l
s RECOMMENDATION l
PREVENTION i
PERIODICAL REVIEW OF PLANT OPERATION FROM 2
WATER HAMMER STANDPOINT l
1 ATTENTION TO MAINTENANCE.
TRAINING OF 1
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL l
l VALVE OPERABILITY TESTING METHODS NEED IMPROVEMENT I
l l
I PLANT DESIGN REVIEWS AND IMPROVEMENTS EDUCATE PLANT OPERATING PERSONNEL I
i JHK:3993ST87v
]_
MITIGATION KEEP MITIGATION SYSTEMS (E.G., KEEP-FILL SYSTEMS)
RELIABLE AND AVAILABLE DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS ON SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS VALVE CLOSURE TIME RELAXATION INSTALLATION OF SYSTEM VOID DETECTORS l
ACCOMMODATION 1
POTENTIAL WATER HAMMER IMPACT ON DEGRADED EQUIPMENT AVOID AGITATED FAILURE MODES PERFORMANCE OF PROPOSED NON-RESTRAINT PIPING SYSTEM
+
JHK:3993ST87v
s l
WATERHAMMER HANDBOOK 1.
INTRODUCTION PURPOSE OF HANDBOOK PROGRAMMATIC DISCUSSION l
l IMPLICATIONS ON PLANT OPERATION AND SAFETY 2.
OVERVIEW (TECHNICAL)
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR)
PLANT EXPERIENCE PHENOMENOLOGY SENSITIVE COMPONENTS AND EFFECTS TECHN!0VES AVAILABLE TO UTILITIES SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS:
(DISCUSSION OF i
EROSION / CORROSION EFFECTS ON WATERHAMMER ISSUE) 3.
PLANT CONFIGURATIONS l
PIPING ARRANGEMENTS l
REVIEW 0F FLUID SYSTEMS INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS (FUNCTIONS, HOW THEY CAN CAUSE OR BE AFFECTED BY WATERHAMMER) 1 JPS/cs/3724ST86
WATERHAMMER HANDBOOK 4.
OPERATING EXPERIENCE STATISTICAL OVERVIEW LWR EXPERIENCE FOREIGN DATA NON-NUCLEAR DATA CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF EVENTS REMEDIAL ACTIONS SPECIFIC KEY (TYPICAL) EVENTS INCLUDING SPECIFIC REMEDIAL ACTIONS l
5.
PHENOMENOLOGY TYPES OF WATERHAMMER TYPICAL SEQUENCES LEADING TO WATERHAMMER FLOW-STRUCTURE INTERACTION i
GENERIC REMEDIAL ACTIONS j
SCALING 6.
MODELING EXISTING MODELS EXISTING COMPUTER CODES l
l OPERATING MAPS VALIDATION EFFORTS 4
1 i
JPS/cs/3724ST86 I
4 WATERHAMMER HANDBOOK i
7.
COMPONENT RELIABILITY:
MAINTENANCE, OPERATION, TESTING CHECK VALVES, STOP CHECK VALVES MOTOR OPERATED VALVES 1
SG J-TUBES OPERATIONAL PUMP OTHERS?
l 8.
PROCEDURES AND TRAINING SYSTEM BY SYSTEM CURRENT PROCEDURES RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED PROCEDURES TRAINING (MODULES)
I OPERATION MAINTENANCE TESTING (SURVEILLANCE) l l
l JPS/ca/3724ST86
& j ey,
s WATERHAMMER HANDBOOK 9.
DIAGNOSTIC AND EVALVATION METHODS SIMPLE EVALVATION TECHNIQUES EVALUATION OF CONFIGURATION, PROCEDURES AND FAILURE MODES DIAGNOSTICS USE OF EXISTING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PREVENTING AND EVALUATING WATERHAMMER REALISTIC LOAD LIMITS APPENDIX & INDEX t
i i
i JPS/cs/3724ST86
.- IfAwl
s 1
SPECIFIC TASKS (EPRI PROGRAM)
TASK 1:
COMPILE AND CLASSIFY DATA ON PLANT OPERATING EXPERIENCE IN WATER HAMMER.
TASK 2:
TECHNICAL SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF KNOWN WATER HAMMER EVENTS.
1 TASK 3:
EVALUATE AVAILABLE EXPERIMENTS.
TASK 4:
ASSESS ANALYTICAL MODELS AND CODES.
1 TASK 5:
DEVELOP DIAGNOSTIC METHODOLOGY (OPERATING MAPS AND CORRELATIONS) AND VALIDATE THEM, TASK 6:
COLLECT INFORMATION ON PLANT CONFIGURATIONS, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS.
PERFORM AN ANALYSIS OF THESE PLANT CONFIGURATIONS USING TOOL DEVELOPED IN TASKS 3 AND 5.
l TASK 7:
REVIEW OPERATING PROCEDURES AND DESIGNS.
TASK 8:
EVALUATE AND DEVELOP TRAINING MODULES.
JHK:3993ST87v
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