ML20236T480
| ML20236T480 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/14/1987 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2527, NUDOCS 8712010285 | |
| Download: ML20236T480 (50) | |
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DATE ISSUED:
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON THE AUXILIARY SYSTEMS OCTOBER 1, 1987 WASHINGTON, D.C.
INTRODUCTION The ACRS Subcommittee on Auxiliary Systems held a meeting on Thursday, October 1,1987, at 1717 H Street, N.W., Vashington, D.C., to discuss problems associated with Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems and Instrument Air Systems and their impact on safety systems. The entire neeting was open to public attendance. Mr. Sam Duraiswamy was the cognizant ACRS Staff Engineer for this meeting. A list of documents submitted to the Subcommittee is included in Attach-nent A, and a copy of the presentation schedule for the meeting is included in Attachment P.
ATTENDEES URS:
C. Michelson (Subcommittee Chairman),
J. E. Ebersole, D. W. Moeller, G. A. Reed, and and C. J. Wylie Sam Duraiswamy (Cognizant ACRS Staff Engineer)
Principal NRC Speakers:
J. Wemiel, J. Ridgely, H. Ornstein, and V. Benaroya EXECUTIVE SESSI,0N Mr. Michelson, the Subcommittee Chairman, convened the meeting at 8:30 a.m. and stated that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the following with representatives from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRP) and the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Opera-tional Data (AE0D):
DESIG HTED ORIGINAL,
8712o10285 871014 MRS
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Auxiliary. Systems Minutes October 1, 1987
- Regulatory requirements and/or guidance for HVAC and Instrument Air Systems design.
- Recent incidents associated with the HVAC System malfunctions end/or design deficiency and their interaction on safety systems (example, December 24, 1986 incident at Brunswick Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2).
- Problems experienced with the Instrument Air Systems and their interaction en safety systems.
- AE0D findines concerning Instrument Air System malfunctions and its recommendations to alleviate this problem.
He said that the Subcommittee had received neither written comments nor requests for time to make oral statements from members of the public.
Dr. Moeller and Mr. Michelson comended Dr. Ornstein of AE0D for the superb job he has done in evaluating the Instrument Air System problems.
They also stated that the report, AE0D/C701 entitled, " Air Systems Prob-lens at U.S. Light Water Reactors," prepared by Dr. Ornstein to document the results of the evaluation of the Air Systen problems is well or-ganized.
HVAC SYSTEMS l
Regulatory Requirements and/or Guidance for HVAC System Design -
J Mr. J. Ridgely, NRR Mr. Ridgely stated that requirements and/or guidance for designing and
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reviewing HVAC Systems in various parts of the plant are contained in j
the following sections of the Standard Review Plan (SRP):
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- 9.4.1, " Control Room Area Ventilation Systems" w_________:_
l Auxiliary Systens Minutes October 1, 1987
- 9.4.2, " Spent Fuel Area Ventilation System"
- 9.4.3,~" Auxiliary and Radwaste Area Ventilation System"
- 9.4.4, " Turbine Area Ventilation System"
' 9.4.5, " Engineered Safety Features Ventilation System" In addition, several General Design Criteria and Regulatory Guides include requirements and/or guidance for use in designing HVAC Systems (Attachment C, Pages 1 and 2). The Staff reviews the design of all HVAC Systers to ensure that:
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- A sirgle active failure cannot result in loss of the rystem func-tional performance capability.
- Failures of non-seismic Catenory I equipment er components will not affect the HVAC System.
Mr. Ridgely discussed briefly requirements included in the Technical Specifications for the operation and surveillance of HVAC Systers (Attachment C, Paces 3 and 4).
i Statina that fire protection systems are not seismically qualified, Mr.
Michelson asked whether the Staff intended to say that actuation of the fire protection systems would not affect the function of the HVAC Systems. Mr. Wermiel responded that the Staff's intent is to make sure that the actuation of the fire protection system wnuld not affect both
-l trains of tbc HVAC Systems. Under such situation, with one train in operation the HVAC System will not lose its function.
Mr. Michelson commented that the Staff's response is not consistent with I
the statement in the SRP which states that failure cf the non-seismic Category I equipment or component will not have adverse effect on HVAC j
I System equipment; however, the Staff is saying that HVAC System will not lose its function.
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'h Auxiliary Systems Minutes October 1, 1987 Mr. Michelson asked, when buying equipment associated with HVAC Systems, will they make sure that it is qualified to withstand water sprays resultina from pipe breaks or actuation of fire protection systems. Mr.
'Wermiel responded that he does not be'ieve that they are qualified in that respect.
If such equipment is going to be located in an area where water pipes will elso be located, they may have to protect that equip-ment as reeded.
I Mr. 'Ebersole asked whether HVAC dampers are designed so that they could be relied upon te isolate the fire area and prevent the spread of heat and smnke to areas housing critical components. Mr. Ridgely responded that fire protection engineers nnrmally specify requirements for the desigr. cf dampers.
Mr. Wermiel stated that these dampers are to be designed to certain applicable criteria. However, the design of these dampers are not within the scope of the HVAC System design criteria.
Mr. Ebersole commented that it is not specified in the SRP as to how long they can survive in the event both HVAC System trains become inoperable. He believes that survival time is important and should be 1
I specified.
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Mr. Michelson stated that sometimes the ventilation systems have attach-j ments to both safety and non-safety devices. There is a possibility I
that one of the non-safety attachments might be drawing air from an area where combustible gases, such as hydrogen, are present.
If the ventila-tion fans stop running due to loss of offsite power, the combustible pas L
will accumulate inside the ventilation ducts, and there is a possibility this might cause an explosion which in turn may have some impact on l
certain safety systems. Also, sometimes water may get into ventilation ducts and finds its way into the control room.
If that happens, it may cause some system interaction problems.
Stating that there seems to be no guidance on these types of system interaction problems in the l
1 j
y Auxiliary Systems Minutes October 1,1987 Regulatory Guides associated with HVAC Systems, Mr. Michelson asked what j
the Staff plars.to do to deal with these kinds of system interaction
. problems essociated with HVAC Systems. Mr. Wermiel responded that they do not have ary plan to write edditional Regulatory Guides to provide guidance for older plants on this issue. He believes that prnblems of' this nature might be picked up by the licensees. He stated that, in j
more recent plants, the Staff tries to ider.tify such problems in their
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review.
Dr. Moeller stated that during a Joirt meeting of the ACRS Subcommittees on Occupational and Environmental Protection Systems and or fuxiliary Systems held on June 27, 1986, Mr. Busiik of NRR stated that results of PRAs showed that failures of air cooling systems for areas housing key components, such as RHR pumps, switch pear, diesel generators, etc., in certain nuclear power plants contribute significantly to core-melt frequencies (Attachnent C, Pages 5-10). Because corrective measures are often taken once potential cooling system failures are identified, the impact of these failures on the proper functioning of these systems has not been reflected in the final PRAs issued for these plants. Conse-quently, some members of the NRC Staff as well as other plants with similar deficiencies may not be aware of these problems. He asked vbether the Staff has done a survey of other portions of the plants to find out whether similar problems exist. Mr. Wermiel responded that he is ret aware of the information provided by Mr. Busiik. However, inspections performed on certain parts of the plant indicated similar probl ems.
Mr. Michelson stated that the Chilled Water System design at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant is unique.
It uses ore chiller on one train to chill control rooms, pump room, etc.
Loss of this one chiller would affect several rooms.
He suggested that the Staff look carefully at the Chilled L'eter System arrangement at this plant to make sure that it is maintained and operated properly.
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n Auxiliary Systems Minutes October 1, 1987 Mr. Michelson asked how many plants meet the SRP requirements. Mr.
Wermiel responded that SRP'has been in use since 1975.
He'is not sure how many plants meet the requirements of SRP.
Mr. ' Ebersole asked whether the Staff plans to check _ the older plants to see whether they meet the existing SRP requirements. Mr. Wermiel responded that they do not plan to do that.
Recent incidents Associated With HVAC System Malfunctions-and Their Interaction on Safety Systems - Mr. J. Ridgely Mr. Ridgely discussed.briefly the events' associated with HVAC Systems (Attachment C, Pages 11-13). 'He said that there are 1423 events related to HVAC Systems reported under.the Licensee Event Reporting (LER) system between 1975 and-August 1987.
Based on the evaluation of these events, he believes that significant improvement of the HVAC System may be possible by reducing personnel errors and component failures.
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Stating that there are about 22 events (Attachment C, Page 13) associ-q
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ated with inadequate HVAC Systen design, Mr. Michelson wondered why these design deficiencies were not identified during the pre-operational testina.
He asked whether there are any requirements for retesting these systems to make sure that they function properly. Mr. Wermiel responded that there are no specific requirements for retesting.
Retesting is normally done to confirm that these systems function so as to meet the technical specification requirements.
1 DIESEL GENERATOR COOLING - PR. J. RIDGELY Mr. Ridgely stated that SRP Section 9.5.5, " Emergency Diesel Engine
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Cooling Water System," provides guidance for diesel generator cooling.
He said that some plants use service water and some use air to cool diesel generators ( Attachment C, Page 14).
Mr. Michelson suggested that the Staff provide a listing of those plants
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that use service water and those that use air to cool diesel generators.
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Auxiliary. Systems Minutes October 1, 1987 Mr. Ebersole stated that some of the plants have a CO system in the 2
diesel generator room for suppressing fire. The instrumentation of this fire protection system is designed such that under severe shaking it will cause automatic closure of the HVAC System dampers, thereby pre-venting air entering into the room. He asked how they plan to keep continuous air flov into the diesel room so as to cool the diesel engines, if these dampers are closed due to severe shaking resulting from a seismic event. Mr. Wermiel responded he believes that since the support systems associated with the diesel generator cooling are i
seismically qualified, such an event should not affect the air flow to the diesel. rooms.
Mr. Michelson commented that he was told by the Staff dealing with fire protection matters that fire protection systems are not required to be seismically qualified. He suggested that the Staff provide fire pro-q tection systen arrangements for a typical diesel generator room, and also provide information as to whether the licensees have seismically qualified the actvation mechanism for the C0 system in the diesel p
rooms.
Mr. Ridgely stated that TMI, Unit 1 plant that uses air to cool the diesel engines recently claimed that ventilation system is not necessary to adequately cool the diesel engines. They claimed that the radiator fan would provide adequate air circulation in the diesel room so as to cool the diesel engines.
Mr. Michelson asked whether this radiator fan would be operable in the presence of C0. Mr. Ridgely said he was not sure.
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I Stating that closure of ventilation dampers might have some impact on the pressure within the diesel rooms, Mr. Michelson suggested that the Staff look into this issue.
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L Auxiliary Systems Minutes October 1, 1987 INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEMS I
Regulatory Requirenerts and/or Guidance for Instrument Air Systems Design - Mr. J. Ridgely Mr. Ridgely stated that regulatory requirements and guidance for Instru-nent Air. Systems design are contained in the followina documents:
- SRP Section 9.3.1, " Compressed Air System"'
- ANSI MC 11.1-1976 (ISA-57.3), " Quality Standard for Instrument Air"
- Regulatory. Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification"
- Regulatory Guide 1.68.3, "Preoperatienal Testing of Instrument Air Systers"
- Applicable General Design Criteria of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
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Mr. Ebersole asked whether the impact of using contaminated air on the Safety systen: function has been looked at by Staff. Mr. Wermiel re-sponded that this issue is normally looked at by the Staff during their review.
Mr. Reed asked how do,they protect critical air-operated safety devices from water intrusion resulting from the failure of jackets or heat l
exchangers. Mr. Ridgely responded sensors in the dryers would detect any water or moisture in the air.
AEOD EVALUATION OF INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM PROBLEMS AND IT'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO ALLEVIATE THESE PROBLEMS DR. H. ORN5TEIN, AE0D Dr. Ornstein stated that on March 10, 1980, a prolonged loss of salt water cooling occurred at San Onofre Unit-1 as a result of Air System problems. A significant cause of this event was attributed to desiccant contamination found throughout the Air Systems. An evaluation of the
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tuxiliary Systems Minutes October 1, 1987 San Onofre event revealed that numerous safety-related systems could have been adversely affected by the desiccant. Subsequent to the San Onofre event, many other events occurred due to deficiencies in Air-System design, operation, and maintenance.
A study performed by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) found that Air System problems do not pose a significant challenge to plant safety, and thereby concluded that no changes to the existing NRC regulations were required (Attachment C, Pace 15). The ORNL study did not consider potential common-cause failures resulting from Air System depredations. Also, it did not focus on Air System' malfunctions or degradations that might initiate, complicate, or increase the severity of transients or accidents.
Mr. Michelson requested a copy of the ORNL Study.
Dr. Ornstein stated that he would provide a copy.
Dr. Ornstein steted that in 1981, based on the evaluation of several incidents related to Air System contamination problemt, AE00 recommended that:
l The NRC issue a bulletin requiring licensees to furnish listings of l
their experience with Air System conterination.
Each licensee provide an assessment of the safety implications of-these events.
Each licensee evaluate its plant's susceptibility to Air-System l
induced common-cause failures.
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Each licensee determine corrective ection if appropriate.
Subsequently, NRR prioritized the issue of Air System contamination and assigned a LOW priority ranking; NRR recommended that this issue not he pursued. However, AE00 did not agree with the NRR recommendation and pursued this issue further.
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l Auxiliary Systems Minutes October 1, 1987 l.
AE0D initiated a study to perform a comprehensive review and evaluation of the actual operational experience and the potential safety implica-tions associated with Air Systems problems. AE0D findings and recommen-dations are contained in the report AE0D/C701, " Air Systems Problems At U.S. Light Water Reactors," dated March 1987.
Dr. Ornstein discussed briefly equipment and systems which use instru-ment air (Attachment C, Pages 16 and 17).
He discussed briefly opera-tional events associated with Air Systems. malfunctions ~and/or design deficiencies (Attachment C, Pages 18-24).
Dr. Ornstein discussed the findings from the AEOD study (Attachment C, Pages 25 and 26). Some of the AE0D findings are given below.
' Mismatched equipment - the air quality capability of the Instrument Air System filters and dryers do not always match the design requirements of the equipment using the air.
- Maintenance of the Instrument Air System is not always performed in accordance with manufacturers recommendations.
' Air quality is not usually monitored periodically.
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- Plant personnel frecuently do not understand the potential conse-quences of degraded Air Systems.
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- Operators are not well trained to respond to losses of instrument air, and the emergency operating procedures for such events are frequently inadequate.
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- At many plants, the response of key equipment to a loss of instru-ment air has not been verified to be consistent with the FSAR.
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Auxiliary Systens Minutes October 1, 1987
- Safety-related. accumulators do not necessarily undergo surveillance testing or monitoring to confirm their readiness.
- The size and seismic capability of safety-related backup accumula-tors at several plants have been found to be inadequate.
Some of the recommendations of AEOD to alleviate the Air Systems problems are given below (Attachment C, Page 27).
- Ensure thr.t Air System quality meets the requirements specified by the manufacturers of the air-operated equipment.
' Ensure adeouate operator response by formulating and implementing anticipated transient and systen recovery procedures for loss-of-air events.
Improve training to ensure that plant operators and maintenance personnel are sensitized to the importance of Air Systems and the vulnerability of safety-related enuipment served by the Air Systems to common-moc'e failures.
Confirm the adequacy and reliability of safety-related backup accumulators.
- Verify equipment response to gradual losses of air to ensure that such losses do not result in events which fall outside FSAR analy-ses.
Dr. Ornstein stated that subsequent'to the completion of the AEOD study, Information Notice 87-28," Air Systems Problems at U.S. Light Water Reactors," dated June 22, 1987 was issued to all nuclear plants -
L (Attachment C, Pages 28-and 29).
He discussed briefly the actions being L
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Auxiliary Systems Minutes October 1, 1987 taken in response to the AEOD findings and recommendations (Attachment C, Page 30).
Dr. Ornstein-discussed briefly some specific events associated with Air Systems prob 1 cms.
Mr. Michelson asked which plants require air to shut down the diesel engines.
Dr. Ornstein responded that he has not done' a ennplete study i
on this matter.
Stating tFat in the event of CO release in a diesel penerator room due 2
to inadvertent actuation of fire protection system, the compressor associated with air-start system for. diesel cenerators may start drawing CD, Mr. Michelson asked what effect will it have en starting the diesel g
erpines.
Dr. Ornstein responded that new diesel generators designed and hdit by Cooper-Bessemer have pneumatic control systems which operate j
off the air-start systems. ~These can be started with the air stored in the air receivina tank associated with the air-start system. Once started, they do not need air to continue to operate. As long as the air receiving tank js not filled with air when the CO is released, he 2
does not see any-problem in starting the diesel engines.
Mr. Ebersole asked whether they have looked at the effect of CO or 2
water, resulting from inadvertent actuation of fire protection systems, on the performance of compressor in other parts of the plant. Dr.
Ornstein responded that they have not looked at this issue.
Mr. Michelson asked whether they have looked at the effects of inad-vertent intrusion of steam into the Air Systems compressors. Dr.
Ornstein responded that even if steam mixes with air and enters into the l
compressor-, it still has to go through the dryers which he believes would absorb most of the moisture in the air.
Further, the discharge l
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Auxiliary Systems Minutes October 1, 1987 volume of the compressors is so high,- he does not see any problem associated with steam intrusion.
'In response-to a question.from Mr. Reed, Dr. Ornstein stated the air system compressors in most plants are of oilless type. However, some plants use oil-type compressors and have experienced oil _ contamination of their air systems.
Mr. Reed and Mr. Michelson were surprised to hear that some plants'use non-oilless compressors in the-Air Systems.
Mr. Ebersole asked whether there are any means to remove the oil from the Air System that is contaminated with oil. Dr. Ornstein responded that there is no way of getting rid of the oil. They have to change all
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the. lines affected'with contaminated oil.
Mr. Ebersole asked whether any studies had been done to determine the cost associated with plant shutdown resulting from contaminated instru-ment air supply.
Dr. Ornstein responded based on his conversation with Nine Mile Point, Unit 2 olant personnel, he believes that it is about
$25/second.
Statino that several BWRs use pneumatic seals on personnel air locks, Mr. Michelson asked how do they make sure that adequate air supply is provided to these seals during post accident periods to make sure that they function properly. Mr. Ornstein responded that he was not sure.
Mr. Michelson wondered why pneumatic seal issues are not discussed in the AEOD report. Dr. Ornstein responded that there was a study recently done on pneumatic seals, and it did not identify any major problems.
Mr. Michelson requested a copy of the results of the study on pneumatic seals. Dr. Ornstein said he would provide a copy.
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L Auy.iliary Systems Minutes October 1, 1987 i
I Mr. Michelson commented that failure of an air-operated equipment may cause the HVAC dampers to close; if this occurs during loss of offsite power and gets restarted after the power resumes, all the dampers may not open. Under such circumstance, there may be some. damage to the HVAC Syster ducts.
He asked why the interaction of Air System problems on HVAC System is not discussed in the AE00 report. Dr. Ornstein responded that they have been aware of this problem and it has been brought to the attention of NRR long time ago.
-fir. Ebersole commented thet the role of NRC has been defined such that NRC should.only regulate nuclear power and should not try to design
' systems. As a reculator, it is supposed to specify requirements for use in the regulatory review of industry design. This philosophy will work as long as everything is going smooth.
However it may not work when several systers in nuclear plants start failing because of design
' deficiency and other problems thereby affecting the safe operation of nuclear plants.
Mr. Fichelson commented thet be does not believe that NRC should delve into designing systems.
Instrument Air Systems problems are the respon-sihility of the utilities.
He is concerned that utilities are not doing a better job in designing these systems properly. NRC should only specify requirements and utilities should assume responsibility to take care of the probler,s.
NRR RESPONSE TO AE0D RECOMMENDATIONS ON INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEMS PROBl. EMS
- MR. WERMIEL Mr. Wermiel stated that NRR realizes that degradation of Instrument Air Systems could result in common-mode failure of safety systems.
Generic Issue 43 associated with Instrument Air Systems problems is being prioritized by RES, and NRR in awaiting the results of that priori-tization.
NRR intends to send AE00 report to INP0 and other Owners
.a Auxiliary Systems Minutes-October 1, 1987 Groups to make them aware of the problems associated with Instrument Air Systems.
SUBCOMMITTEE RFMARKS Mr. Michelson asked whether the Subcommittee should prepare coments on the Air Systems problems at this time and submit then to the full Comittee for consideration or it should wait until the generic issue associatec' with Air Systems has been prioritized by RES.
Fr. Wylie stated that it would be better to wait until the priori-tizatior of the generic issue on Air Systems has been completed.
Mr. Reed connented that, 'n his opinion, Air Systems are not the key systens in protecting the reactors. The key systems are reactor sys-tems, containment, and Decay Heat Pemoval Systems. However, he believes that Air Systems which declared as " fail safe" by designers have not been adequetely reviewed for their overall performance durina accidents.
He believes that the review process associated with the Air Systems should be improved.
Further, the root cause of the Air Systems problems has not been made explicit in the AE0D report.
Mr. Wylie commented that the trainirp of maintenance personnel associ-ated with Air Systems seems to be inadequate. He believes that the designers should educate the plant personnel, including maintenance persernel, on the design details as well as on the nature of maintenance needed to keep the system perform properly.
Dr. Moeller commented that the interaction between HVAC Systems and Air Systems should be analyzed.
Further, he was surprised to hear that the results of the PRA performed several years ago, which showed that Air Cooling System failures in certain areas of the plant contribute significantly to estimated core-melt frequencies, were not nade available to other NRC offices.
q' Auxiliary Systems Minutes Octobe'r 1,1987 Mr. Michelsen thanked all participants and adjourned the meeting at 2:00 p.m.
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NOTE:
Additienal meeting details can be obtained from a transcript of this meeting available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., or can be purchased from' Heritage Reporting Corporation, 1220 L Street, N.W.,
Washingttn, D.C. 20555,(202)628-4888, i
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LIST OF DOCUMENT SUBMITTED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE
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AUXILIARY SYSTEMS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING I
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OCTOBER 1, 1987 1
1.
Presentation Schedule.
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Brunswick 1 and 2, Emergency Diesel Generator Room. Cooling Design Deficiency, dated December 24, 1986.
3.
SRP Section 9.4.1, " Control Room Area Ventilation System."
4.
SRP Secticn 9.4.2, " Spent Fuel Pool Area Ventilation' System."
5.
.SRP Section 9.4.3, " Auxiliary and Radwaste Area Ventilation Sys--
tem."
1 6.
SRP Section 9.4.4, " Turbine Area Ventilation System."
7.
SRP Section 9.4.5, " Engineered Safety Feature Ventilation System."
8.
Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, " Design, Testing, and Mainte-nance Criteria for Post Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmo--
sphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
9.
Regulatory Guide 1.140, Revision 1. Design, Testing, and Mainte-nance Criteria for Normal Ventilation Exhaust System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
10.
SRP Section 9.3.1, " Compressed Air System."
13.
Regulatory Guide 1.68.3, "Preoperationel Testing of Instrument and Control Air Systems."
- 12. AE0D Report - AE0D/C701, " Air Systems Problems at U.S. Light Water Reactors," dated March 1987.
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13.
NRC Information Notice No. 87-28: Air Systems Problems at U.S.
Light Water Reactors, dated June 22, 1987.
14.
Presentation materials provided by the Staff to the Subcommittee at the meeting.
ATTACHMENT A
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-TENTATIVE PRESENTATION SCHEDULE -L d
4 ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON THE AUXILIARY SYSTEMS OCTOBER 1, 1987 P
ROOM 1046, 1717 H ST., N.W.
7 WASHINGTON, D.C.
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L r ACRS CONTACT:
Sam Duraiswamy
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202-634-3267 3%
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NOTE: ' Presentation Time should not exceed 50% of the Total Time L} ',
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allocated for a specific item. The remaining 50% of the time is reserved for Subcommittee questions and answers by the u
Staff.
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' Number of Copies of the Presentation Materials to be submitted S
ji to the Subcommittee:.s 25 copier.
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TOTAL 1
PRESENTATION PRESENTER TIME ACTUAL TIME ITEM
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1.
EXECUTIVE"SESS'.0N 15 min 8:30 - 8:45am 5'
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HVAC SYSTEMS.
90 min 8:45 - 10:15am i
a.
Regul6to;ry Require-NRR I
ments ar;d/or
.ha Assmsty Guidance 'for HVAC
System Design
b.
Recent Incidents NRR Associated with the HVAC Systen Nd 40ML1
'qi Mau1 function and jJ Their Impact on..
W Safety Systems (e.g., Brunswick
't'. ' r Incident on December 24,1986) e c i
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- BREAX ***
15 min 10:15 - 10:30am
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o-TOTAL PRESENTATION ITEM-PRESENTER TIME ACTUAL TIME g.,
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HVAC SYSTEMS (Cont'd) t ns N
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Means by which NRR
{l3 Diesel engines are rena g,3acty generally cooled w
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Impact of HVAC System malfunction on the performance of air-cooled'
,, g'lf' Diesel engines
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(e.g. Diesel
- Q generator cooling
{7 for Surry)
'3.
INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM a.
Regulatcry Require-NRR 30 min 10:30 - 11:00pm ment.c and/or d 'N 'T Guidance for Instrument Air
System Design
s b.
Problems Experi-Harold Ornstein 120 min 11:00 - 1:00pm P
enced With the (AEOD)
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Instrument Air
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Systems and Their Interaction on g
Safety Systems-
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AE0D Findings jpf
'o' Concerning the Instrument Air K
' System Malfunc-F.; M, W*
tions and Its Recommendations b'
to Alleviate This
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' Auxiliary Syste,ms Schedule October 1.-1987
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PRESENTATION e
ITEM
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TIME ACTUt0c TIME j
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3.
INSTRUMENT AlrjsVSTEM (Cont'd)
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I e' >c-d.,NRR Response to NRR."
30 min 1:00 - 1:30pm
. AE0D Findings and
'/,'ir#. 4 commendations on I' W 8 H'l '
m Instrument Air Systems Problems.
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' W: 7 n. ' SUBCOMMITTEE REMMKS-30 min 1:30 - 2:00pm y
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r; CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS C.'
REACTOR ENCLOSURE RECIRCULATION SYSTEM
'LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION 3.6.5.4 Two independent reactor enclosure recirculation subsystems shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.
l ACTION:
a.
With one reactor enclosure recirculation subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
b.
With both reactor enclosure recirculation subsystems inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS r
4.6.5.4 Each reactor enclosure recirculation subsystem shall be demonstrated
(-
0FERABLE:
I a.
At least once per 31 days by initiating, from the control room, flow l-through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying.that the subsystem operates properly.
b.
At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following painting, fire,-.or chemical release in any ventilation zone communi-j cating with the subsystem by:
1.
Verifying that the subsystem sati,sfies the in place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria ci less than 0.05%
and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions c.5.a.
1 C.5.c, and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, j
l and the system flow rate is 60,000 cfm i 10%.
j i
2.
Verifying within 31 days after removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with
]
Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, 3
March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory i
Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Re: vision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than 1%; and l
3.
Verifying a subsystem flow rate of 60,000 cfm t 10% during system q
operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980.
O i
LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-55 i
C-3 14
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Y.
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
{
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
After every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying c.
within 31 days af ter removal that a laboratory analysis of a repre-sentative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Fegulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratorj testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration cf less than 1%.
d.
At least once per 18 months by:
1.
Verifying that the pressure drop across the combined prefilter, j
upstream and downstream HEPA filters, and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 6 inches water gauge while operating the i
filter train at a flow rate of 60,000 cfm i 10%, verifying that the prefilter pressure drop is less than 0.8 inch water gauge and that the pressure drop across each HEPA is less than 2 inches water gauge.
t 2.
Verifying that the filter train starts and the isolation valves i
which take suction on and return to the reactor enclosure open on each of the following test signals:
Manual initiation from the control room, and a.
b.
Simulated automatic initiation signal.
3.
Verifying that the reactor enclosure recirculation system can be placed in the cooldown mode from the Control Room, After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank by e.
verifying that the HEPA filter bank satisfies the inplace penetration and leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 while operating the system at a flow rate of 60,000 cfm i 10%.
f.
After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorber bank satisfies the inplace penetration and leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a halogenated hydro-carbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of 60,000 cfm i 10%.
o, LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-56
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OPENING 0F D0 ORS, P03 TABLE FANS TRANSFERRING ELECTRICAL LOADS i
- RE-ANALYSIS USED MORE REALISTIC ROOM HEATUP CALCULATIONS
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IN 87-18 i
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7/[
, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
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WASHINGTON, D.C.
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4 June ??, 1987 NRC !NFORMATION NOTICE NO. 87-28:
AIRSYSTEMSPROBLIMSATU.S. LIGHT VATER REACTORS
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Addressees:
y Allpuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license er a con-st'uction permit.
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Pur ge:
'%ay This it.formatier, notice is being providdd :tio alert recipients to potentially-
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The significa'nt problems pertaining to air systems at light water reactors.
NRC expects that recipients will review this notice for applicability to their facilities. The suggestions in this notice do not constitute.NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
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Background:
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The NDC Of' ice for Analysis end Evaluation of Operational Data (AE00) has recently issued a case study report entitled " Air Systems Problems at U.S.
Light Water Reactors," AEOD/C701.* The report discusses degradations of air systems.and plant responses to air systems losses It also highlights more than two dozen events in which, contrary to liew(sing assumptions, a safet related system failed as a result of an air'systen degradation or failure.
Opsrating events involving the loss or degradation of air systems were.iudged to he safety significant because they may lead, under different circumstances, tM 90tentia11y serious events and condition = that have not been analyzed.
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[1scussion:
- The' study provides a comprehensive review and evaluation of potential safety implications associated with air systems problems. The report analyzes oper-ating data, focusing on degraded air systems, and,the vulnerability of safety-related equipment to common mode failures associated with air sy' stems. The report analyzes these data from the perenectives of trends and* patterns, risk as:9ssments, and cost / benefit studies.
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A T i c y of the study report is available in the HRC Public Document Room, 1717 H :+reet NW, Washington, DC 20555, for inspection and copying.
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June 22,1987 Page 2 of 2 e - =
Air systems are not classified as safety-related systems at most operatirg As a result, plant accident analyses assume that safety-related plants.
equipment dependent on air systems will either " fail safe" I
This report highlights T9 failures of safety-related air accumulators.
These systems that resulted from degraded or malfunctionirq air system on air systems will always either fail safe on loss of air or perfom its Some of the intended functi.on with the assistance of backup accumulators.
systems that were significantly degraded or failed were decay beat removal, auxiliary feedwater, BWR scram, main steam isolation, salt water cooling, emergency diesel generator, containment isolation, and the fuel pool seal systems.
For example:
Leakage of 140,000 gallons of radioactive water from the spent fuel poel at the Hatch Nuclear Plant on December 3,1986, was caused by the 1
mispositioning of a single valve in the instrument air system.
Failure of several main steam isolation valves to close at Brunswick on September 27, 1985, was due to contaminants in the instrument air.
2.
A less of the auxiliary feedwater systems at Turkey Point 3 and 4 in July 1985 was caused by water and dirt particles in the air system.
3.
The inability to scram four control rods at Susquehanna 1 on October 6, 4
1984, was caused by oil in the air system.
A loss of decay heat removal and significant primary system heatup at Palisades in 1978 and 1981 were caused by water in the air system.
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The root causes of most of the failures were traceable to design and/or The design and operating problems eppear to maintenance de'iciencies. reflect a lack o' adequate attention to the design, m and administrative control of air systems.
No specific action or written response is required by this infomatien notice If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Pegional Administrator of the appropriate regieral office or this office.
W 1
arles E. Rossi, Director
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Division of Operational Events Assessment Office cf Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical Contacts:
C. Vernon Hodge, NRP (301) 497-8196 Hal Ornstein, AEOD C-21
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(301) 497 4439 i
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