ML20236T441
| ML20236T441 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/17/1987 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-023, REF-GTECI-093, REF-GTECI-124, REF-GTECI-NI, TASK-023, TASK-093, TASK-124, TASK-23, TASK-93, TASK-OR ACRS-2519, NUDOCS 8712010252 | |
| Download: ML20236T441 (30) | |
Text
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c3 TDR ll/AGM DATE ISSUED:
8/17/87
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Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Decay Heat Removal Systems f
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Subcommittee Meeting O'
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v PURPOSE The purpose of the meeting was to review the status of the NRC resolution effort for:
(1) GI-23:
"RCP Seal Failure," (2) GI-93:
" Steam Binding of AFW Pumps, and (3) GI-124:
"AFW System Reliability."
f ATTENDEES Principle meeting attendees included:
j ACRS NRC D. Ward, Chairman N. Anderson, RES J. Ebersole, Member S. Diab, NRR W. Kerr, Member J. Wermiel, NRR C. Michelson, Member A. Spano, RES G. Reed, Member J. Jackson, RES I. Catton, Consultant A. Thadani, RES P. Davis, Consultant P. Norian, RES R. Bear, NRR MEETING HIGHLIGHTS, AGREEMENTS AND REQUESTS 1.
D. Ward noted that for GI-124, "AFW System Reliability " the Committee had earlier reviewed the Staff's resolution approach.
d The ACRS had commented on this approach, expressing concern with a lack of a definitive reliability criterion to judge the acceptabil-ity of the seven plants' AFW systems which are of concern here.
In response, NRC asked the ACRS to " suspend judgement in lieu of the Staff's completion of a few more plant reviews - thus this Meeting.
Dr. Kerr requested that the Staff discuss resolution of this issue DESIGNATED ORIGINAL 8712010252 870817 certified By h N
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S. Diab (FRR)discussedthestatusofGI-124. Mr. Diab noted that' this issue arelies to seven plants (Prairie Island 1 & 2 AN0"~1 &
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2, Crystal Aiver, Ft. Calhoun and Rancho Seco). -Mr. Davis asked
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what criterion were used to judge-that these plants' AFW systems are not sufficiently reliable. / Mr. Diab said these plants were found to have an unreliability of ul0~4/ demand,' independent of feed and bleed (F&B)i apability.
In response to Mr. Ebersole~, NRR saidthattheyconsijrthechallengefrequency,abilityofMFWto g
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function after-tEip, 'Ntc., in evaluating the need to take action.
"r Further discussign noted thai other plants have 2-train AFW systems y
4 but have compe dating features to improve reliability (ex:
auto crossconnection to an adjacent unit's AFWS).
" q Mr.Nardnotedthat'despitethefactthatthe10~4 unreliability 1 n criter{on did not fully account for all credible failures, it was und $ evaluate these plants., In response to'Dr. Kerr[NRR said Cl-124didnotp#sswe t' hat the A-44 (Station Blackout) resolution
.; effort was implemented. Dr.Kerrsuggested,thatACpoNdr'reliabil-itz pas nlarge impact on AFW reliability.g Mr.' Thadani indicated ttdstheStaff'sanalisesforthisissuewasconducted<in'1980and were rektively simplistic.
In response to Mr. Reed, NRR said
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there hTre multiple sturces-of steam to the AFW turbines.
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r InJuly3987,theleadforGI-124wastransferredbacktoNRRfrom RES after the April 1987 reorganization. This was done since the Issue is essentially plant specific and the AFWS Team Members remained with NRR after the reorganization.
Figures 1 and 2 detail the review scope and schedule for GI-124 r6 solution. To date, the Prairie Island and ANO-2 reviews are i
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,4 complete.
In response to Mr. Ebersole, Mr. Enos (AP&L) said the largeblowdownvalve(3")installedonANO-2hasbeencreditedfor
.use in F&B situations.
l Mr. Diab said there are three possible review outcomes from a Review. Team visit.
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- The review team.is reasonably assured that the AFWS is ade-quate and sufficiently reliable, example:
Prairie Island 1 &
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- Providedcert'ainhlant-spcificmeasuresweretaken. The AFWS is adequate and sufficiently reliable, value-impact analysis included, example: ANO-2.
Without substantial changes to the AFWS' design maintenance, testing and/or operation, the review team cannot.be reasonably assured.that this safety system is sufficiently reliable, j'
In response to Dr. Kerr, Mr. Thadant indicated that the Review Team's conclusions are reviewed by NRC management before final conclusions /results are issued. Mr. Reed indicated that the AFW failure rates seen in actual practice do not approach the i
10~4/ demand value above (i.e., they are more unreliable than 10~4).
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Mr. Ward noted that the ability to recover AFW is credited by the l
Staff, thus a 10-4 reliability is in fact " achievable".
In re-1 sponse to additional discussion, Mr. Thadani noted that B&W plants can feed water'to the primary at high pressure and this capability is factored into the Staff's analysis, I
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DHRS Meeting Minutes August 5, 1987
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-To date, the Prairie Island and AN0-2 reviews are complete, the Crystal River 3'and Ft. Calhoun reviews'are underway and the Rancho Seco and ANO-1 site visits are pending.
In response to Mr. Reed, Mr. Hernan said there is at present no submittal from the Davis Besse (DB) Licensee vis-a-vis-their proposal to install a primary blowdown system.
(Note: Mr. Hernan provided a Letter. from the DB-Licensee.that indicated they would not install such a blowdown
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system - rather modifications would be made to enhance the plants feed capability for F&B cooling.)
NRR discussed their observations on the Prairie Island AFWS review.-
Figures 3 and 4 provide the details. Discussion on the use of main feedwater pumps brought out the fact that the Prairie Island MFW pumps can be ramped down to handle plant power levels as how as 1
5-10%; thus, AFW need not be used until *v 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after scram. Mr.
Ward asked how NRC is assured acceptable AFWS reliability is maintained. Mr. Diab said the reliability will change, and if future problems develop vis-a-vis AFW reliability (ex: SALP, PI.
reviews) there may be new requirements imposed at that time.
In response to Mr. Ebersole, Mr. Diab said he believed that the Prairie Island PORV is environmentally qualified to survive the high ambient caused by its operation.
(Note: Mr. Diab confirmed i
this fact and reported such via telecon to P. Boehnert) i There was extensive discussion of the assumptions involved in the
.l AFW unreliability calculations.
It was noted that' the' analysis
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assumed with some probability that a loss of all AC power occurs.
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Items that NRR found that should be addressed at Prairie Island included the following:
Discrepancies in procedures between the two units - evaluate for potential revision.
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'DHRS Meeting M'inutes,. August 5, 1987 1
I Condensate storage tank discharge valve should be positively locked open.
Improved access to cooling water supply valves.
DC lighting illumination is poor.
- Engineering / operations should.be trained on maintenance trouble shooting.
Flow control valve access is poor.
Mr..Ebersole expressed concern with the integrity of check valves given an upstream pipe break.
Mr.- Diab detailed NRR's observations from the ANO-2 plant Report (Figures 5-8).
Key points of the discussion included:
- In response to Mr. Reed, Mr. Enos said the AN0-2 MFW pumps can ramp flow down to e/3% plant power.
In response to Mr. Michelson,'NRR said they did not recall that the AFW procedures (especially restart procedures) cautioned against water hammer potential.
Mr. Thadani said the Team obs'ervations (Figures 7 & 8) have been included in the draft ANO-2 Report that RES sent to NRR.
The Licensee (AP&L) has received the Report and NRR is solic-iting AP&L's comments on the Report.
In response to Mr. Ward, Mr. Dieb indicated that the above observations may or may not be cast into Staff recommendations.
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' A' major observation is that the Licensee provide an alternate method to get water to the SG's.
A possible method would be to install a crossconnect to the ANO-1 AFWS.
In response to Dr. Kerr, Mr. Thadani noted that this observation ~has not yet
-been evaluated by NRR management.
Dr. Kerr asked what basis the Team used to make the above recommendation. Mr. Diab said the Licensee's AFWS reliability analysis showed an unreliability of M 10-3/ demand.
For the Crystal River AFWS, the review Team's findings are given in Figures 9'8 10. The review Report is currently in preparation and should be available by September'1987.
Mr. Ward noted the following:
The recommendations for the above plants were not clearly spelled out and led to confusion on the Subcommittee's part.
He still has a problem with the lack of any objective criteria for determining the acceptability of the AFW systems. The above approach is highly subjective in its recommendations.
Mr. Reed expressed concern that some plants have such low AFWS reliability as noted above (10-3/ demand), and he felt that in the long run we should look into diverse DHR. Dr. Kerr said he is concerned that this effort seems to be decoupled from other GI's and USI's (except A-44) and other efforts such as the NUREG-1150 effort. He felt the concern with AFW reliability should be integrated into an overall effort (goal) to evaluate plant reliability.
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DHRS Meeting Minutes August 5, 1987 Mr. Davis noted that the A-45 effort focused on six plants and one.
of these (AH0-1), was also reviewed by NRR for this Issue. He expressed concern that the A-45 resolution effort may invalidate the GI-124 concern. Mr. Mazetis indicated that the A-45 plant studies were screening studies and were selected as representative of Groups of plants.
Further discussion noted that the selected plants were considered to have DHR vulnerabilities.
Mr. Ward again decried the above approach for the GI. He is concerned that the above review should be done by the Licensee, not the NRC. A more generic (objective) approach should be used here rather than a plant specific review (e.g., NRC set a reliability goal and the Licensee conducts the review and necessary modifica-tionstoachieveanacceptableAFWSreliability).
Mr. Diab said'the alternate approach is to return to a numerical reliability criterion and they see this as difficult (impossible) to enforce.
Dr. Catton said he sees no evaluation of the acceptability of the
. engineering design of the AFWS's in the Reports.
NRR said they did pronounce the designs acceptable in that they meet NRC require-nents. These studies focused on the maintenance of acceptable system reliability.
Mr. Ward said the payoff for the above approach seems to be very poor vis-a-vis the extensive resources expended by NRR and he believes this approach does not reflect good regulatory policy.
3.
The resolution of Generic Issue 93 " Steam Binding of AFW Pumps" was reviewed by A. Spano (RES). The issue concerns a potential common cause failure of all AFW pumps as a result of steam binding
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DHRS Meeting Minutes August 5, 1987 due to _backleakage of RCS water past isolation check valves'. Mr.
Reed'noted that his experience with check valves shows that a high quality valve, that's been leak tested, generally prevents the backleakage problem. He opined that insistence on the above requirements for check 51ves should be the resolution for this 1
- concern, i
As a result of a number of AFW pump steambinding events, NRR identified.GI-93 as a high priority generic issue in late 1984, and I&EissuedaBulletin(85-01)in1985. The Bulletin required, among other things, periodic-(every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />) monitoring of the AFW pump piping discharge temperature. These actions significan'tly reduced the probability of steam binding.
In-response to Mr. Ward, Mr. Spano said if backleakage is suspected the operator turns the pump on to cool the line and prevent steam binding. This' procedure may have to be repeated depending on the amount of check valve backleakage.
Mr. Michelson raised the concern of WH associated with this Issue.
He suggested that the procedures concerning restoration of a steambound pump take cognizance of WH.
In order to assure an AFWS unreliability n 10~4/ demand, NRR needed to assure that the Bulletin 85-01 requirements are sufficient to meet this objective. NRR undertook a study of the actual backleakage experience based on the 85-01 monitoring / reporting requirements.
The study's results (Figure 11) showed that there are two well defined groups of PWR plants:
a large Group (56) with little or no instances of.backleakage and a small Group (7) with a very high l
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4 DHRS Meeting Minutes August 5, 1987 frequency of such events. Evaluation of the core melt risk and cost / benefit due to steam binding (Figures 12-13) do no support additional action beyond the 85-01 requirements.
In response to Mr. Ward, Mr. Spano noted that the above 7 " problem
- plants" have installed continuous temperature monitoring on the AFWS piping that is alarmed in the control room.
Mr. Ward asked if the C/B analysis would have supported installa-tion of a continuous monitoring system on the problem plants if
.they had not already done so. - NRR couldn't speculate on this point.
Mr. Spano reviewed the status of the.7 problem plants (Figures 14-15 )'.
For most plants, replacement / repair of the check valves seems to have resolved the backleakage problem.
NRR noted that system monitoring must be continued, since backleak-age cannot be ruled out.
Mr. Ward asked if.the Subcommittee is satisfied with the Staff's resolution approach. Mr. Ward also asked if the NRC is satisfied the plants will repair leaking check valves. Mr. Spano indicated he is satisfied they will address this point. Mr. Reed suggested
-l that NRC recommend that plants evaluate the pros and cons, from a risk standpoint, of closing the discharge M0V.(located between the pumpandsteamgeneratorfeedline),toeliminatethebackleakage problem. He felt this course of action would be superior to the AFW pump cycling activity noted above. Altogether, Mr. Mazetis said NRR believes they have a " clean" resolution for this Issue.
The Subcommittee indicated their overall satisfaction with NRC's 4
1 resolution of GI-93.
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J. Jackson (RES) discussed the status of resolution of GI-23, "RCP l
Seal Failure." This was assigned a "high" priority status.
Currently, the technical work is essentially complete, proposed
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resolutions have been drafted and the associated regulatory f
analysis is underway. The objectives of GI-23 are:
(1) improve reliability of RCP seals during normal operations, and (2) prevent a small break LOCA resulting from RCP seal failure during station blackout.
RES reviewed the details of the technical work associated with this issue.
Key points noted included:
For the W RCP seal, NRC believes the maximum leakage expected in a station blackout event for a worse case assumption is e/
480 ppm / pump seal. At the a normal 20 gpm leakage rate with pumps stopped, the core won't uncover for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Most seal failures seen during normal operation were the result of poor maintenance and/or QA/QC, a lack of adequate instrumentation, and procedures for off normal events.
In response to Mr. Reed, NRC said no single problem can be pointed to as a major failure contributor. Mr. Reed opined that his experience shows the major seal failure contributor is RCS coolant contamination upon plant startup.
For station blackout scenarios, it was found that secondary seal material could be improved (more resistant to high water temperature). Hydraulic seal stability is an important parameter vis-a-vis the potential for its poping open. The uncertainty associated with seal failure scenarios is very large.
In response to Mr. Ebersole, Mr. Jackson said some plant's seal cooling systems are not safety grade.
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RES has-proposed three Alternatives for resolution of GI-23. These are:
Alternative 1 - Define the RCP-seal as part of primary coolant pressure boundary and consider it safety related equipment..
Alternative 2 - Provide instrumentation to monitor and provide on-line analysis of seal performance and alarm / indicate i
degradation.
Alternative 3 - Provide a dedicated, self powered, indepen-dently driven, emergency cooling-system to assure sea'l in-jection and/or thermal barrier cooling for the RCP shaft seals for extended off-normal plant conditions.
Mr. Michelson expressed surprise that the seal package is not considered part of the RCP boundary. Mr. Reed said that seals and gaskets were not considered in the ASME code to be part of the pressure boundary.-
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Mr. Reed said that requiring the seals to be safety related will only increase cost with no improvement in seal quality. Mr. Bear said that the rate of seal failure has been a concern to NRC. Mr.
Ward said PRA's have shown little difference in performance of safety.related vs non-safety related equipment. The real problem may be the QA/QC associated with installation of the seals. Mr.
Reed again said that contamination of the seals on startup results in many seal failures. The Subcommittee urged NRC to reevaluate the first Alternative with the goal of addressing the real problem while avoiding unnecessary Utility expense.
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Regarding Alternative 3, Mr. Jackson said this system need not be safety grade, single failure proof, etc. Mr. Michelson questioned not requiring a safety grade system here. NRC said this system is only required for station blackout - an extremely degraded situation.
There are two so-called controversial issues associated with GI-23.
These are: the possibility of seal hydraulic instability, and the.
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i inclusion of seal stability in the risk models. NRC and W are still discussing'these issues and further NRC review is expected.
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-The resolution schedule for GI-23 was shown (Figure 16). ACRS review of the resolution Package is scheduled for May 1988.
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Mr. Ward asked the Subcommittee for their recommendations vis-a-vis action on the above Generic Issues.
Key point of the Subcommittee
' discussion were:
GI-124 --Since no resolution is available yet, Mr. Ward suggested
-that the Committee could comment on the resolution approach (process). Mr. Reed suggested the discussion focus on the reliability of the AFWS design, the testing of the system and the details of its operation. Mr. Hernan noted that the basic problem.
with the Prairie Island and ANO-1 plants' AFWSs is that they are of a marginal design. Mr. Ward said the Subcommittee will bring'this Generic Issue to the ACRS in September. Mr. Davis raised the issue of a holistic versus piecemeal resolution approach to this and i
other GI's. Mr. Ward said the ACRS may well comment on this point.
Mr. Davis noted INP0's efforts in this area. He also noted a lack of any coordination with A-45. Mr. Hernan said this was by design, as a quick resolution of GI-124 was sought.
l DHRS Meeting Minutes August 5, 1987 GI Mr. Ward said there's a-proposed ' resolution and the' ACRS should review and comment on this at the September meeting. There was a question raised of whether the check valve issue should be addressed. Mr. Reed suggested comment on the issue of operating with AFW MOVs open or closed as a possible resolution approach and the rationale therefor.
GI Resolution is not scheduled until May 1988 - NRC's approach appears reasonable and thorough. Mr. Reed proposed the Subcom-mittee report the status of the Staff effort. -The Subcommittee was satisfied with the Staff approach here and will so report to the ACRS.
The Chairman requested written comments from the Consultants on the above issues for perusal before the September-ACRS meeting.
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The' meeting was adjourned at 5:05 p.m.
NOTE:
Additional meeting details can be obtained from a transcript of this meeting available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., or can be purchased from ACE-Federal Reporters, 444 North Capitol Street, Wash-ington, D.C. 20001, (202) 347-3700.
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. REVIEW SCOPE
-AFW AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS DESIGN POST TMI MODIFICATIONS AUDIT SR FCTED PREVENTIVE AND CORECTIVE MAIN 1ENANT ACTIVITIES DURING LAST 12 MDS, AUDIT SELECTED SURVEILLAN E TESTING PROCEDURES AND POST MAlffTENANT TESTING o.
EERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDUES (LOSS OF HEAT SINK / INADEQUATE CORE COOLING)
AFW SYSTEM WALK-DOWN C0ftDN CAUSE VULNERABILITIES CONTROL FDJM ADEQUACY FOR INDICATION, C0h7ROL AND PEC0VERY EASE OF LOCAL ECOVERY, AND INDICATION AND CONTROL TRAINING ALTERNATE DECAY EAT REPOVAL EANS L
OPERATING EXPERIENE AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS kmi c
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-7 RESOLUTION SCHEDULE PLANT VISIT DRAFT REPORT PPAIRIE ISLAND-182 8/86* '
11/86*
AND 12/86' 2/87*
CRYSTAL RIVER-4/87*
9/87 FT,CALHOUN 7/87*
10/87 AND-1 11/87 12/87 j
RANCHO SECO 12/87 1/88 e
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STAFF OBSERVATIONS ABotrr PRAIRIE ISLAND AFhS l
POSITIVE FEATURES DESIGN EACH UNIT HAS ONE MDP AND ONE TDP, MANUAL CAPABILITY FOR l'0PS CROSS CONNECTION THREE CSTS WITH 150,000 GALLONS OF WATER EACH i
FLOW PATHS NORfMLLY OPEN 18 85-01, I
CHECK TEMP. EVERY 4 HRS, CHECK-VALVE BACKLEAGE (DISCHARGE PIPING HAS HEAT SENSITIVE PAltC SPOT)
LONG STEAM GENERATOR DRY TIME AFWS used for startug and shutdown SYSTEM ENGINEER MAINTENANCE, sat HIGH PRIORITY WORK ONLY ABOUT 2/YR REPEAT FAILURES ARE RARE VIBRATION ANALYSIS OF l'f%'PS VERY LOW PERSONNEL TURNOVER E0PS ON LCN PS USE CONDENSATE PLNPS (HIGH DISCHARGE PRESSURE - 600-700 PSIG)
F&B PROCEDURES CLFAR WAlkDCHN ACCESSIBILITY IS GENERALLY GOOD C0fttJNICATION MEANS ARE GOOD OPERATING EXPERIENCE fW FAILURES = 0.014/YR-EDG = 0.02/0.00 Fou/DFJ%ND (Propod R.C,dde = o.cas)
UNPLANNED TRIPS = 2/0 PER YEAR (1985)
't.'d S e e 6 4 -
AFW5 unava'itability t4uRw - o 6 n t = i E-3 per demand (LOMG Plant wc4t = 2 9 E-6 per demona @M lki n L
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I NEGATIVE FEATUPES S&T W IIM "##
l lt.IUTENANCE DISCREPANCIES IN PROCEDURES BETWEEN THE TWO UNITS-twde M[' M unLwps.Ja% M f
-T CST-DISCHARGE VALVE SHOULD BE POSITIVLY LOCKED o#84V IMPROVE ACCESS TO, COOLING ATER SUPPLY VALVES i
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DC LIGHTING P c
FJJGINEERING/0PERATIONS SHOULD BE TRAINED ON t%INTENANCE TROUBLE SHOOTING G
FLOW CONTROL VALVE' ACCESS IS POOR 1
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- i STAFF OBSERVATIONS APOUT AND-2 AFks-FOSITIVE FEATURES DESIGN 1
STEAM SUPPLY LINE IS INSULATED NO HAS STEAM TRAPS i
'l TURBINE OIL COOLED BY ARI FLOW i
PUMP 8 MOTOR BEARINGS DO NOT REQUIRE COOLING AFWS USED FOR PLAYT STARTUP AND SHUTDOMJ V
E0PS PROCEDURE ENTRY CONDITIONS - IfEEDIATE ACTION LIST - EXPECTED RANGES GOOD INFORMATION
'A.
CST WATER REQUIREMENTS AT DIFFERENT TIMES B.
EDG FUEL OIL INVENTORY MONITOR C.
ECONOMIZING STATION BATTERIES STARTING THE tFWP UNDER DEGRADED CONDITIONS IF NECESSARY REMINDERS ABOUT RUNNING CAPABILITIES OF EQUIPMENT ~
WALKDOWN RELABELLING WILL BE COMPLETED STEAM TRAPS / VALVE LINEUP PRIOR TO START (VALVE LINEUP WILL CHECK LOCKS ALS0)
PRE-HEATUP VALVE POSITION CONFIPfMTION (DIFFERENT PERSON)
SIMPLIFIED EXHIBITS AT TD AFWP l M El
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Positive FEATU RES (Cont.)
MAINTENANCE, SilRVEILLANCE AND TESTING l
Sl$, WCC ARE GOOD IMPROVEMENTS; IIILL BE MORE USEFUL AS DATA ACCLEULATE SERC (SIGNIFICANT EVENT REVIEW C0ft.) REVIEWS tilPLANNED TRIPS PROCEDURE MODS - SHORTER & SIMPLER STEPS I
(UNDEPWAY)
- FORMAT & CONENT I
- CHECK VS, TECH. MANUAL OPERATING EXPERIENCE t
LICENSEE'S STATISTICS FOR COMPONEATS SHOW NO FAILURES AFTER 1983
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EDG FAILURE / DEMAND = 0.02 i
(PROPOSED R. GUIDE = 0.025) i e
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' STAFF OBSERVATIONS ABOUT AND-? AFhS (COUTINUED)
NEGATIVE' FEAWRES DESIGNi
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JUSTIFY DISCHARGE. VALVES BEING'NORMALLY-CLOSED PPOPOSE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR' vet!T VALVES 8 LTOP CONFIRM THAT ONE'LTOP VALVE IS SUFFICIENT FOR fab E0PS'
' TIME WINDOW FOR F8B EFFECTIVENESS AMBIGUOUS E0P STATEE NTS (E.G., ABNORMAL TEMPERA W RES)
A ICC SHOULD REQUIRE TDP AS WELL AS PDP OPERATION MKDOHN y.pmflf' N"##
MTA SG LEVEL REACHES ZERO
-AFWS VALVES.NOT EQ'D.
PA BROKEN AT TURBINE ROOM DARK STAIRWAYS.
DC LIGHT MISAIMED RELOCATE AND RE-ORIENT TEMP, PR,' SPEED GUAGES ATTDP l
l.ACK OF CLEANLINESS POOR ACCESS LOOSE PIPE SUPPORT TRAINING DC-RO, -SRO ARE NOT ENCOURAGED TO KEEP THEIR LICENSES CURRENT DUE TO EXCESSIVE TRAINING DEMAND.
TRAINING SHOULD EMPHASIZE RECOGNITION OF TOTAL LOSS OF FEED WATER, AND INITIATION OF fab
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NEGATwE FEATune.s (cont 3 OPERATING EXPERIENCE l
8 SCRAMS /YR -1985
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4,3 SCPAMS/YR -1985 (INDUSTRY AVERAGE) 1981-1986 = 12 LOFW (RECOVERABLE) 5/YR (1981)-0/YR (1986)
COMPLETE RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 8 IMPLEMENT IDENTIFIED IMPROVEMENTS
- PROVIDE AN ALTERNATE E m0D TO GET WATER TO THE STEAM GENERATORS t-t Benchrnark. HuREG-vo35 = l 1 E. -3 fa'd uet pu de,na nd Bayedan Upache.= 949 E-4 Ai.\\wu. per dannd 4
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STAFF OBSERVATIONS ABotfr CR-3 AFWS' POSITIVE FEATURES DESIGN SAFETY RELATED EFIC MINIMAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS (CLOSED CYCLE COOLING OF PDP LUBE OIL; EP LUBE OIL IS COOLED BY AFh9 WARMING STEAM BYPASS LINE PRECLUDES WATER SLUG OVERSPEED j
IEB 85-01, CHECK TEMPERATURE EACH SHIFT FOR CHECK-VALVE.BACKLEAKAGE
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NORMALLY OPEN FLOW PATHS
.O MAINT, S8 T l
MANAGEMENT / MINT. TEAMS TOUR THE PLANT (TROUBLE SHOOTING)
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ONLY 5 PRIORITY 1-WORK REQUESTS / YEAR (GOOD MAINTENANCE).
RARE REPEAT FAILURES SINCE1984(GOODROOTCAUSE)
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DETERMINATION
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TRENDING' ANALYSIS / CONTRACTOR.(BEARING VIBRATION, OIL ANALYSIS,*F)
FORMAL ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS ON MJOR FAILURES, TRANSIENTS, TRIPS, AND IMPORTANT SYSTEMS (E.G. AFWS)
~NEW " SYSTEMS ENGINEER" POSITION WILL ENHANCE ROOT CAUSE/ TRENDING i
l EDP BATTELLE LABS, INC ARE REVIEWING CR-3 E0PS/ HUMAN FACTORS IMPROV & PROCEDURAL AMBIGUITY.
WALKDOWN d
l EQUIPMENT 8 SURROUNDINGS CLEAN WELL-LABELLED, EASILY ACCESSIBLE OPERATING EXPERIENCE ONE FAILURE TO START IN 147 EP STARTS
- ZERO FAILURE To START IN 128 FDP STARTS EDGS=0.02 FAIL /DEMND (PROPOSED REG. GUIDE 0.025)
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STAFF OBSERVATIONS ABOUT CR-3 ARG(CONrINUED)
NEGATIVE FEATURES 1
MAIfJTENANCE.$LT SOME MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES DID NOT HAVE DRAWINGS, ISOLATION REQUIREMENTS OR FIRE PROTECTION PRECAUTIONS.
l 1
3 MONTHS TO COMPLETE 25% OF MIFTENANCE WORK. LICENSEE SHOULD SET A GOAL FOR MAINT. WORK COMPLETION.
DISCREPANCIES, TEST /PEPAIR EQUIP, NOT LISTED, REFERENCES NOT LISTED, AMBIGUQUS LANGUAGE (CHECK FOR OUT-OF-CALIBRATION,
" EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE," DETERMINATION = RECONNECT) 4 AFWP TURBINE ONLY F%INTAINED ON AS-NEEDED BASIS; SHOULD DEVELOP A PROCEDURE AND A FPEQUENCY FOR OVERHAUL.
E0PS NEED TO IMPROVE SPECIFICITY ON fab INSTRUCTIONS; NOT JUST OPERATORS MEMORY.
PROVIDF " TIME WINDOW" FOR fab TO CORE UNC0VERY, TRAINING / SIMULATOR WALKDOWN i
DC LIGHTING INADEQUATE STDP (TTV AND GOVERNOR VALVE)
OPERATING EXPERIENCE 4.4/Y LOSS OF W W, 2.3/Y OF WHICH REQUIRED AFWS AVERAGE 3 YEAR = 6.3 TRIPS / YEAR 0985; CR 9/YR, IFDJSTRY 4.3/YR)
NUREG-0611 = 4.7E-4 Per daead PLANT SPECIFIC = 1.9E-4 wde.ma i
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