ML20236T112
| ML20236T112 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001201 |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1996 |
| From: | Carr C FRAMATOME |
| To: | Ebneter S, Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 70-1201-95-02, 70-1201-95-2, NUDOCS 9807270439 | |
| Download: ML20236T112 (8) | |
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l February 23,1996 L
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1 Mr. Luis A. Reyes t
'Mr. Stewart D. Ebneter
{
U. S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission
]
i-Region II -
101 Marietta Street, N. W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323-0199 i
Subject:
. NCyTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL i
j.
PENALTY - $12,500 (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 70-1201/95-02, 70-1201/95-03, and 70-1201/95-202) i Gentlemen:
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Framatome Cogema Fuels (FCF) received your January 30,1996 correspondence on this subject and in accordance with the provisions of 10CFR2.201 submits the following response.
Framatome understands and recognizes the NRC's important role in maintaining a strong safety culture at licensed plants.. We endorse the highest standards and believe that our record of L
performance supports that position. The detailed response to the subject notice is attached and recognizes the importance of both FCF's primary responsibility for safety and the NRC's over--
site responsibility.
L FCF accepts that the circumstances, cited law, and facts in your letter are essentially correct.
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However, there are two items that were discussed during the November 21,1995 predecisional enforcement conference which do not appear to have been' considered in your findings.
l The first is the applicability of the FCF Quality Assurance Plan for Shipping Containers. The
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- requirements of 10CFR71.12(c)(2) reference subpart H.. Your notice of violation quotes l
'71.12(c)(2) in paragraph A in part. A full reading of 71.12(c)(2) (emphasis ~added for clarity) is as follows: "The general license applies only to a licensee who: (2) Complies with the terms and ~
- conditions of the license, certificate, nr athar annenval am aanlicahle nna the nnnlienhie
, requirements of Subparts A, G, and H of this part; and".
l-It (oes not appear that the action proposed under this notice recognizes that there is another
- document, submitted and approved by the NRC under subpart H, which guided FCF (BWFC) actions in the case of the BW-2901 shipping container. Your approval indicates to FCF that we th i d d eraantad to act as specified in the "B&W Fuel Company Radioactive Material gO. are au or ze an 3
Shipping Container Quality Assurance Plan" which we believe constitutes the "other approval as applicable" discussed in 71.12(c)(2). The information from the predecisional enforcement 1
conference and the notice indicate that FCF acted entirely in accordsnce with our approved l
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Quality Assurance Plan which allows and requires FCF to disposition all deviations to the container design basis. One of the dispositions allowed is "use as is".
After the bolt hole problem was noted by Siemens, FCF took the position that our QC documentation from 1983 was questionable, therefore we inspected all attributes of the containers and determined the extent of all deviations to the design basis documents. Deviation Reports were prepared, safely analysis performed, and appropriate dispositions entered, all in accordance with the approved document (QAP). With respect to the deviations themselves, corrective action was taken to prevent recurrence in 1990 with a re-design of the procedures which govern shipping i
container manufacture and use. These procedures were demonstrated to be effective during the procurement of new Model 51032 containers in 1993. It is not true that "B&W Fuel would have continued to use nonconforming packages without NRC involvement and without performing an adequate safety analysis."
l The NRC staff's new assumptions imposed during the review of our submittal under 10CFR71.95 i
make the analysis appear inadequate and that is not the case. We consider some of the required assumptions to be not credible and therefore beyond the requirement of 10CFR71.55(b)(1) and (2). The NRC ultimately agreed with our analysis and authorized us to use the containers with the deviations present. FCF agreed to purchase and install borated aluminum poison plates when used after March 31,1996. The cost of this action has exceeded $200,000.
The foregoing explanation of our actions notwithstanding, FCF has agreed to comply with the l
l NRC position on 71.12(c)(2) and did so voluntarily on July 20,1995. We have operated in i
accordance with NRC's wishes and are not using the provisions of our Quality Plan (QAP) which allows us to use containers with deviations which are shown by analysis to have no safety significance.
When the current Part 71 was invoked, most fissile material container users adopted quality
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programs which mirror 10CFR50 requirements. 10CFR71.131 clearly anticipates that deviations to the COC may be found during use, and it does not require that the licensee cease to use the packaging. It does require, under subpart H, that the safety significance be determined prior to L
further use and that the conditions be reparted to the NRC. NRC's approval of our Quality Plan l
caused FCF to handle shipping containers in the same manner that we handle design deviations under our Part 50 Program.
The second issue which is discussed, but in a context that FCF does not understand, is the credit for our corrective actions. FCF has been very proactive in this case and took action which prevented any reduction in the protection of the public's health and safety. FCF has never used a fissile material package which did not have an adequate safety analysis in place. As we demonstrated at the enforcement conference, the analysis was more than adequate. The NRC i
does not have a basis in the regulations for requiring the incredible assumptions such as an -
optimized volume fraction in post accident assumptions.
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O containers without an' adequate safety analysis. An adequate sa As stated above, it is not true that, absent NRC action, FCF would have continued to use i
deviations were found and prior to further use. When NRC management indicated that they considered our action outside their interpretation of Part 71, FCF immediately stopped using the j
l containers and submitted a request for modification of the COC. We have acted in good faith with the understanding that the differences in interpretation of Part 71 between the NRC and the l
licensees would be addressed and resolved in an industry forum. To fine FCF for being in opposition to your position before an industry discussion, creates an unnecessary adversarial l
atmosphere for resolution of these issues.
'FCF believes that none of these issues taken by themselves would constitute a Severity Level III violation, therefore taken together we cannot tell what part of the civil penalty is applicable to each part. We do not understand why the NRC gives us no credit for corrective actions or the cost of meeting the requirements imposed by the NRC assumptions in the analysis for the BW-l 2901 shipping containers (Violation A). Violations B and C are correct as stated and we believe that our corrective actions has been and will be effective. It is our conviction that none of these issues has real safety significance. Therefore, reconsideration of both the violation severity level and the resulting civil penalty is requested.
Sincerely,
(
Charles W. Carr Vice President, Manufacturing &
Field Services FRAMATOME COGEMA FUELS l
Docket No.: 70-1201 License No.: SNM-1168 Attachment I - Violations Summary and FCF's Response ec:
leslie P. Foldesi, Director Bureau of Radiological Health Division of Health Hazards Control Department of Health 109 Governor Street, Room 916 Richmond,' VA. 23219 cc:
J. R. Bohart R. L. Gardner J. H. Taylor i
T. D. Corkran K. S. Knapp O
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ATTACHMENTS L
VIOLATION A:
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l 10 CFR 71.12(c)(2) requires, in part, that the licensee comply with the terms and conditions of the Certificate of Compliance and the applicable requirements of Subparts A, G, and H of 10 CFR l
Part 71.
j' Effective' April 25, 1983, to September '11,1992, Condition 5(a)(3) of the Certificate of l
Compliance No. 6294 specifies that the packaging is constructed in accordance with Babcock &
0 Wilcox Company Drawing Nos. MS-135E and MS-82B.
Effective September 11,1992, through August 4,1995, Condition 5(a)(3) of the Certificate of
- Compliance No. 6294 specifies that the packaging is constructed in accordance with B&W Fuel Company Dmwing Nos. 1215598B and 1215599E.
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Contrary to the above:
1.
From August 1983 though July 10, 1995, the licensee made multiple shipments using UNC-2901 and/or BW-2901 shipping packages which were not constructed by B&W Fuel Company in accordance with, and did not conform to, Certificate of Compliance No. 6294 and 9251. Specifically, the dimensions on drawings Nos. MS-135 E, MS-82B,1215598B L (
and 1215599E.
2.
From August 1983 though July 10, 1995, the licensee made multiple shipments using UNC-2901 and/or BW-2901 shipping packages which were not constructed by B&W Fuel Company in accordance with, and did not conform to, Certificate of Compliance No. 6294 and 9251.
Specifically, the hole locations in the closure lids were outside the
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specifications of drawings Nos. MS-135 E, MS-82B,1215598B and 1215599E. (01013) j
RESPONSE
. Ad-leeinn nr Denial of the A11eoed Vinistinn We acknowledge the validity of the. facts contained in the notice of violation. We do, however, as presented in our cover letter, take exception to the accusation that FCF was negligent in reacting to the deviation. FCF was very responsive upon identifying the deviations'and acted in accordance with our NRC approved QA Plan which we felt was appropriate and acceptable.
Damenn for Vinintinn l
Manufacturing dmwings were made to allow for an easier understanding for the manufacture of I
i these parts. 'Ihese drawings were dimensioned diffemntly from the licensing drawings with much i
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more detail for manufacturing of the parts. The parts were inspected in accordance with the manufacturing drawings, not the license drawings.
l The inspection of these parts was performed during the part manufacturing stage, prior to assembly of the parts. The 10.750" dimension of the insert body was inspected with calipers at
. the open end of the part. The bolt hole pattern for the insert cover was' inspected on a small quantity of these parts. One of these was selected as a template and used to verify the remaining covers.
Corrective Rtene Tnken and Results Achieved 100% inspection was pufoinmi on all the containers. The COC drawings were revised to bound the inspection results and were submitted to the NRC for approval.
Corrective Rtene that will he Taken and Results Achieved To ensure that additional FCF licensed containers are acceptable, FCF is working with the NRC Transportation Branch to obtain NRC acceptance of a plan for corrective actions to be taken for similar containers.
On future packaging fabrications, FCF will perform inspections using licensed drawings in O
addition to manufacturing drawings. This was done on the recent procurement of Model 51032 l Q fresh fuel shipping containers in 1993 and was effective in assuring that the containers comply with the COC.
The Date nf Full Cnmnliance We are in compliance at this time.
VIOLATION B:
1 Items 6C, 7C, and 8C of Special Nuclear Materials License No. SNM-1168 limited the possession of natural uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF.) to 350 grams of uranium in l
consecutive license amendments beginning with No.13 dated July 21,1993 through No. 22 which
- was superseded by amendment No.23 on November 2,1995 Contrary to the above, between July 21,1993 and November 2,1995, the inventory of natural uranium in the form of UF. exceeded the authorized possession limit. Specifically, the inventory contained approximately 109 kilograms of uranium in the form of natural UF within 30 UF6 cylinders each containing between one and nine kilograms of uranium. (01023).
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RESPONSE
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' Admiecinn nr nenin1 nf the Alleend Vinistinn We acknowledge the validity of the facts contained in the notice of violation.
Denenn (nr Vin?ntinn The Nuclear Material Control Organization was part of Production and Inventory Control and had l
other material responsibilities. Mis-communication occurred between the NMC and Licensing organizations. There was insufficient follow up by the Licensing organization to ensure compliance with the license limits. In addition, our audit program was inadequate by not identifying the violation.
Cnrrective Rtene Taken and Remite Achieved Effective September 1,1995, the plant staff was reorganized to combine the Nuclear Materials Control and Licensing organizations. - Nuclear Materials Control now has a single task. Physical Inventory and audit check lists have new check items to assure that possession limits in the license are not exceeded. FCF's SNM License has been amended to reflect the UF stored onsite.
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Cnrrective Rinne that will he Taken and Reen1ts Achieved i
6 No further steps will be taken.
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The note nf Full Pnmnliance We are in compliance at this time.
VIOLATION C:
- 10 CFR 70.9(a) requires that information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee or information required by statute or by the Commission's regulations, j.
orders or license mnditions to be maintained by the applicant or the licensee shall be complete and l
accurate in all material respects.
Contrary to the above, the licensee submitted information to the Commission that was not
. complete and accurate in all material respects on three occasions as evidenced by the following examples:
'1, On August 22,1995, the licensee submitted inaccurate information by facsimile to the Commission concerning the receipts and shipments made in the BW-2901 transportation 3
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F shipping package during the period May 23,1995 to August 22,1995. Specifically, on l
August 22,1995, the licensee stated that multiple shipments had been made using the BW-2901 shipping packages between May 23,1995, and August 22,1995 when in fact no shipments were made between July 20 and August 4,1995, using the BW-2901 shipping t
package. This information was material because on July 20,1995, the NRC informed the
-licerisee that the BW-2901 package could not be used until an amendment to the COC was mquested and approved and it prompted the NRC to divert resources from other regulatory activities, including the performance of an expedited special inspection concerning the licensee's use of the BW-2901 shipping package.
2.
On November 9,1993, the licensee submitted inaccurate information in an evaluation supporting a request for an exemption from the requirement for NRC approval of the Commercial Nuclear Fuel Plant Emergency Plan. Specifically, the evaluation was based, in part, on an authorized possession limit of UF of 350 grams, rather than the amount of 6
material the licensee actually possessed, approximately 109 kilograms. This information was material because it influenced the NRC's decision as to whether the exemption to 10 CFR 70.22(i) would be granted based on the licensee's evaluation showing that the maximum intake of soluble uranium to a member of the public offsite could exceed the limits with a 350 gram UF source term.
6 3.
On June 16,1993, a license amendment was requested to reduce the possession limit of w
natural uranium in the form of UF from 1.4 million kilograms to 350 grams to reflect the i'
status of the licensee's operations; however, the licensee actually possessed material h.
iN excess of the quantity specified in the amendment request. This information was material because it indicated that only small quantities of UF would be used onsite and that limited t
6 NRC inspectica activity would be required in the future for UF cylinder storage. (01033) 6
RESPONSE
l Arimiccinn nr Denial of the Alleperl Vintatinn We acknowledge the validity of the facts contained in the notice of violation.
l Dencnn for Vinlmtion 1.
There was mis-communication between the Nuclear Material Control and Licensing organizations and an insufficient review to insure data was correct. The data was generated on an expedited basis to meet an NRC request.
2.
Because of the oversight of the material as addressed in Violation B, the November 9, 1993 submittal for the Emergency Plan exemption did not include UF in the evaluation.
6 However, the amount of UF stored onsite at the time of the submittal did not exceed the 6
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, g i-l l q amount that requires either an evaluation to demonstrate that the maximum intake of uranium does not exceed 2 milligrams or an emergency plan under the provisions of 10 CFR 40.31(j)(1). Therefore, had the license reflected the actual amount of UF possessed onsite, the exemption request still would not have considered UF. in the evaluation.
3.
As addressed under Violation B, the Nuclear Material Control Organization was part of Production 'and Inventory Control and had other material responsibilities.
Mis-communication occurred between the NMC and Licensing organizations. There was insufficient follow up by the Licensing organization to ensure compliance with the license l_
limits. In addition, our audit program was inadequate by not identifying the violation.
Cnrrective Sten's Taken and Resnits Achieved l
l 1.
The data error was discovend and corrections submitted to the NRC on October 5,1995.
The plant organization was changed so that collateral duties for the Nuclear Material i
Control Group are removed and that group now reports to the Safety and Licensing organization. The occurrence has been discussed with all personnel involved and each is aware of the importance ofinformation submitted to the NRC.
2.
On October 18,1995, BWFC submitted an amendment request to increase the possession limits of UF to cover the actual amount stored onsite. Under the provisions of 10 CFR 40.31(j)(1), the increase in the UF possession limit did not mandate that either an evaluation to demonstrate that the maximum intake of uranium does not exceed 2 milligrams or an emergency plan be submitted.
3.
On October 18,1995, BWFC submitted an amendment request to increase the possession limits of UF. to 1000 kilograms to cover the actual amount stored onsite. As indicated within your report, at one time BWFC was authorized to possess 1.4 million kilograms so the reduction was still quite significant compared to prior possession limits. Although our possession limits were reduced, our program remained unchanged therefore safety was I
never jeopardized.
This was reflected in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report that accompanied the amendment approval which concluded that "... the natural UF will have no 'effect on the licensee radiation safety program and poses no external or internal l
radiation safety problems."
l Cnrrective Stene that will he Taken and Recults Achieved No further steps will be taken.
The Date nf Full Cnmnlinnee We are in compliance at this time.
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