ML20236P391
| ML20236P391 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1987 |
| From: | Nobles L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 87-16, NUDOCS 8711170277 | |
| Download: ML20236P391 (3) | |
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'Sequoyah Nuclear Plant T-Post' Office Box 2000.-
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'Novemb~erf6, 1987
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U, S2; Nuclear lRegul'atory CommiNsion t
? Document' Control Desk-Washington,.~DCl20555' Gentlement l'F
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. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH. NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND'2 - DOCKET
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NOS.;50-327 AND -328;-; FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 AND DPR-79'--
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LSPECIAL-REPORT 87 The" enclosed special report provides' details concerning twb1 doors which were
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. breached greater'than 7 days. This; event'isLreportedjin;accordance with actionstatementf(a)Jof'. Limiting'ConditionsforOperation'3.7.12.;
(Very)tiulyyours.-
TENNESSEE. VALLEY AUTHORITY.
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- L. M. -Nobles
' Plant Manager, u
' Enclosure'
'cci(Enclosure):
- J..' Nelson-Grace, Regional Administrator
- U. S.-Nuclear Regulatory:Commisslon Suite' 2900 101'Marietta Street, NW'
. Atlanta,. Georgia 30323
' Records Center-
- Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
- Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway
' Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC! Inspector,SequoyahNuclearPlant L.
8711170277 871106.
PDR ADOCK 05000327 L
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1 An Equal Opportunity Employer
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SEQUOYAH' NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND-2 SPECIAL REPORT 87-16 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT Event Number 1 On October 8,'1987, with unit 1 in' mode 5 (0 porcent power, 3 psig.
128 degree F)'and unit 2.in mode 5-(0. percent power. 150 psig,
.120. degree'F), a fire beach permit issued on September 30, 1987,.for' fire door.A-71 (to 2A containment' spray heat exchanger room, Elevation
- 690, Auxiliary Building) exceeded the seven-day limit. allowed by Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12.
Event Number.2
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On October 19, 1987; with unit 1 in mode 5-(0 percent. power, 3'psig,'
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120 degree F) and unit 2 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 65 psig, 130 degree F), the fire breach permit issued on October 11; 1987, for fire' door A-72 (to 2B containment spray heat-exchanger room,. Elevation 690, Auxiliary Building) exceeded the seven-day limit allowed by rTechnical Specification LCO 3.7.12.
( !I Temporary hoses for service air, demineralized water supply, and heat exchanger-drain were required to be connected to the permanent connections located outside the rooms, for wet layup of shell side of
=the heat exchangers..The fire breaches were issued to keep the file l,
= doors open~so that temporary hoses could'bo taken through the door L"
openings.
CAUSE OF EVENT For bothLevents described above, the wet layup of 2A and 2B containment spray heat exchangers work was not completed within the seven-day period due to the. extent"of the work involved to meet the heat exchangers chemistry
. specification. requirements. -A decision was made to maintain the breaches for the duration of the wet layup activity to ensure proper amount of chemicals (corrosion inhibitors) were added to prevent corrosion of the heat exchangers. As a result, the fire breaches exceeded the seven-day limit of action statement A of LCO 3.7.12.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT
'Both events are being reported in accordance with the requirements of action statement A of LCO 3.7.12.
A roving fire watch was established to inspect the containment spray heat exchanger rooms.2A and 2B on an hourly basis as required by the action' i
statement of LCO 3.7.12.
The existing fire detection and fire suppression systems for the heat exchanger rooms were operable and would have actuated in the event of a fire. Therefore, there was no danger to redundant safety i
related equipment. Additionally, with both units in mode 5, the containment spray heat exchangers are not required operable.
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.. CORRECTIVE ACTION -
i; A. roving fire watch at a regular interval of one hour was established for both 2A and 28 heat exchanger rooms immediately and maintained until the wet layup activities were completed, and the fire doors A-71 and A-72 were returned to functional status on October 11 and October 19, 1987, respectively. No further actions are required, l.
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