ML20236M849
| ML20236M849 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1998 |
| From: | Curry D AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUM2-PPNR-1719, NUDOCS 9807140282 | |
| Download: ML20236M849 (26) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _
s PARSONS Daniel L Curry, vice President. Nuckfar Sorvitw
- Parsons Power Group inc.
267.5 Morgamown Road e Reading. Pennsylvania 19607 * (610) 855-2366
- Fax: (G10) 655-2602 July 9,1998 Docket No. 50-336 Parsons NUM2-PPNR-1719-L U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 2 Independent Corrective Action Verification Procram (ICAVP)
Gentlemen:
This letter transmits sutumaries of telephone conferences between Parsons Power Group Inc., the U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NNECo and NEAC on June 2, June 4, June 9, June 11, June 16, June 18, June 23, June 25 and June 30,1998.
Please call me at (610) 855-2366 if you have any questions.
Sincerely, Daniel L. Curry Parsons ICAVP Project Director DLC:djv Attachments 1.
Telephone Conference Notes from June 2,1998 2.
Telephone Conference Notes from June 4,1998 3.
Telephone Conference Notes from June 9,1998 4.
Telephone Conference Notes from June 11,1998 5.
Telephone Conference Notes from June 16,1998 6.
Telephone Conference Notes from June 18,1998 7.
Telephone Conference Notes from June 23,1998 8.
Telephone Conference Notes from June 25,1998 9.
Telephone Conference Notes from June 30,1998 cc:
E. Imbro (2)- USNRC Rep. Terry Concannon - NEAC
(
J. Fougere - NNECo Project Files
)
R. Laudenat - NNECo 9807140282 980709 PDR ADOCK 050C0336 p
PDR I
PPNR1719. doc L_________-
CONFERENCE NOTES J:ne 2,1998 DATE:
6/2/98 PURPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC, and Parsons to discuss:
1.
PDCR 2-013-83 2.
Engineering Evaluation M2-EV-97016 Rev 0,"Effect on EDG Room Temperature due to Exhaust air Reentering Fan F-38A/B Inlet Airstream" 3.
Cancellation of PDCR 2-150-92 4.
HVAC Calculation LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Panons Bob Skwirz Ralph Architzel Wayne Dobson Gary Komosky Don Marks Chris Cristallo Bill Clemenson Andre L.assonde Dom Ramos Jim Nicholson Roger Mauchline tru1n Zinnes Babu Gupta Amnt Kaptish
- 1. Topic: PDCR 2-013-83 (Irwin Z nnes)(Continuation of Topic #1 from 5/28/98)
Reference:
PDCR No.: 2-13-83, MP2 - Containment Air Recirculation Damper Replacement
Background:
This modification involves the direct replacement of four dampers in the Enclosure Building Ventilation System with dampers of similar function. but of much heavier duty construction. The codes and standards governing manufacture and design of these dampers equal or exceed those invoked during original plant construction. The dampers replaced were 2-AC-1, -3, -57 and -58.
Inter OfIice Memo dated 3/28/84, contained within Reference 1, stated as follows: " Presently 2-AC-58 has not been proved operable and is bypass jumpered open. During the next available cold shutdown the damper will be tested and any unresolved deficiencies rectified via another PDCR. The bypass / jumper tag number is 109."
Note:
DCN DM2-00412-97 (8/1/97) deleted the L.O. designation for this backdraft damper.
Questions:
a) N/A. Answeralon 5/28/98.
b) N/A. Answered on 5/28/98.
Background Continued: Reference I referred to " Calculation 81-102-186 GP for determination of the seismic adequacy of the present damper design and requirement of a seismic support on 2-AC-1."
c) Were calculations done for the dampers 2-AC-3 and the combination of 2-AC-57 and -58, since all the replacement dampers were much heavier duty?
Response: Deferredto 6/4'98.
2.
Topic: Engineering Evaluation M2-EV-97016 Rev 0,"Effect on EDG Room Temperature due to Exhaust air Reentering Fan F-38A/B Inlet Airstream" (Bill Clemenson)(Continuation of Topic # 2 from 5/28/98)
PAGE 1 l
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CONFERENCE NOTES June 2,1998
Background:
M2-EV-97016 was issued to determine the impact of short circuited exhaust ventilation into the supplyJouvers of the emergency DG Ventilation System. The following questions are associated with this EV.
Questions:
j a) Re: Section I, pg. 4. Is "Q-motor" based on nameplate or measured current?
b) Re: Section I, pg. 4. It is stated that "TD" for the EDG rooms are calculated based on the average of " supply air tempera *ure" and "outside air" The referenced attachments do not contain parameters identified as such.
c) How were the TDs of 5.98 and 8.26 calculated? Please provide references to Attachment 1 & 2 data, the type ofinstrumentation used and the accuracy of the instmments.
d) Re: Section I, pg. 3. Air flow values are based on References d and c. When were these measurements made?
e) Re: Section II, pg. 5. The following statement is made, "The final room temperature (FT) is, FT = DB +
DTD + NAST." What is the basis for this equation?
f) What were the general wind conditions during data acquisition?
g) Re: Section IV, pg. 7. The terms Q-in, Q-out, are introduced but are not defined. Please define these terms and the basis for equation 1 and equation 2.
h) Re: Justification, 3rd paragraph, pg. 8.
What is the basis for stating that the percentage of in-leakage is unaffected by total airflow? Please explain the relationship of the referenced fan law to the amount of non-ducted short circuited air flow that can be captured in the supply air louver.
i) Re: 5.0 Conclusion, pg. 8.
This effort to quantify and evaluate the effect of short circuited air would be greatly simplified if NNECo would simply quantify the amount of short circuited air for each train and use that value in the other HVAC calculations. For instance the load calculation of record for the DGV,92FFP-849ES, provides an acceptable percentage of re-circulated air, yet this EV seems to purposefully avoid making this simple calculation.
j) Why doesn't this EV calculate the percentage recirculation for each train?
Response: NNECo declined to answer the questions and stated that any errors associated with this calc should
\\
be written up in a DR..
3.
Topic: Enclosure Bldg Filtration System Filter, Charcoal Temperature (Babu Gupta)
Background:
FSAR Section 6.7.3.1 states " Thermocouple are located within the filter units between random charcoal elements to alarm excessive bed heating" EBFS Filter Specification 7604-M-534 Rev 7, section 6.5.i states "Chromel-constantan (ISA Calibration E) thermocouple shall be provided to record random charcoal bed temperatures" Drawing 25203-29133 sht. 2 Rev 1 a'so shows ' conduit conn. for thermocouple'.
FSAR Section 6.7.4.1.3 also describes the thermocouple placed between random charcoal filter elements and states that an alarm set at 200F is prosided in the control room to provide sufficient time for remedial action [to prevent radionuclides desorption).
P&lD 25203-26028 sht. 5 Rev 17 shows RTDs TE-8072 and TE-8076 measuring the temperae of the filter outlet air, but no instrument installation details are available that describe whether the RTDs are measuring mixed outlet air temperatures, or locali7ed charcoal bed heating. Per the P&lD, no alarms are associated with these RTD loops to alarm on high temperature. It is not clear whether the RH)s are intended to accomplish the function of the T/Cs described in the FSAR (localized charcoal temperature) or to provide an averaged temperature measurement of the mixed filter discharge air.
PAGE2 1
CONFERENCE NOTES JInc 2,1998 i
Questions:
a) Please clarify whether T/Cs are provided to measure localized charcoal bed overheating as described in the FSAR and in the filter purchase specification. Also, please clarify the function and installation techniques for the two RTDs.
b) If T/Cs and associated alarms are provided, please identify the schematic, wiring, and logic drawings for showing the T/Cs and alarms. Please identify the alarm setpoint and setpoint calculation, the alarm location, and the alarm response procedure.
c) If localized charcoal bed temperature alarms are not provided, please identify the change documents which removed this feature from the plant design as described in the FSAR. Also, if not included in the change j
documents, please identify the engineering evaluation which justified the removal of these features (charcoal bed temperature and alarm).
Response
a) There are no thermocouplesfor the charcoalfilter. One RTD (on each train) is located upstream offilter unit. R7D is mounted as a pointed sensor in thefilter enclosure box.
b) Alarm is generatedfrom computer at 170 *F (Refer to OP2314G and Calibration Procedure IC2435A).
c) FS4R has been revisedfor changing Alarm setpointfrom 200 *F to "200*F or less"per FS4R Change 97 MP2-76.
Note: Parsons nill urite a DRfor FSAR discrepancy nith Design Documents and Plant Con)iguration.
l 4.
Topic: Cancellation of PDCR 2-150-92 (Amrit Kaptish / Ken Mayers)
Background:
Per canceled PDCR 2-150-92, Facility 1 power (VRil65) goes to FS-8069 and Facility 2 power (VR2105) goes to FS-8068. This is reversed from the way they are shown on the current drawings (25203-31141, Sheets 7 and 8 Revision 2; 25203-32022, Sheet 74, Revision 1,etc.). PDCR 2-150-92 was initiated to correct this discrepancy (i.e., correct field condition to ref!cct the configuration on the drawings) but it was canceled prior to approval by NUSCO Engineering Supervisor.
Questions:
a) Was another modification package issued to correct the above discrepancy?
b) If so, what documentation authorized the above modification?
Response: Deferredto 6/498.
1 I
- 5. Topic: HVAC Calculation (Bill Clemenson)
Reference:
1.
HVAC Calculation Initiative Completion Report, Stone & Webster letter MP2-98-S-005 2.
Parsons /NNECo Telecon Dated 2/18/M, Topic 1 3.
Parsons /NNECo Telecon Dated 2/19/98 Topic 7 4.
CEBPS HVAC Calculations: 1K12-1, IK12-2, IK12-3, IK21-10, IK42-05 5.
CEBPS HVAC Calculations: 95-ENG-01225-M2,95-ENG-01221-M2,95-ENG-01222-M2 l
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CONFERENCE NOTES
~
Jua 2,1998.
i l
Background:
References 2 and 3 discussed the status of CEBPS calculations listed in reference 4. It was f
understood from NNECo's response that the reference 4 calculations would be resised in Phase III of the HVAC
- Calcul4 tion Initiative and that these calculations would be placed in Passport under the EBF designator. Per reference 1, all but one of the CEBPS cales listed in reference 4 are grouped in section 7 of the report (HVAC Misc.) and are superseded by Historical " Calc. 7" and "New Calc. 8". Calc 1K21-10 is listed in section 3.5 (EBF) and no status is prmided except that it will be addressed separately. None of these calculations can be found in Passport system EBF.
Questions:
a) What is Historical Calc 7 and New Calc 87 l
b) What is the status of the reference 4 cales?
l c) Under what system designator are these calculations listed in passport?
d) The system ID for these cales is listed in reference I as 2314G, but deal with CEBPS which is system 2314B.
Is the 2314G system ID correct?
Background Continued: The reference 5 calculations address HVAC cales for the CEBPS and cannot be located in the HVAC Calculation Initiative Completion Report, reference 1, nor can they be located in Passport.
Questions:
l e) What is the status of these three calculations and under what Passport system designator are they listed?
Response
a) These are calculations that have>vt to be issued, thus the old calcs have not been superseded.
l b) These cales are still valid.
c) They are not in passport >vt.
d) IVillbe correctedlater.
c) These calcs are valid and are in Passport System A.W.
I I
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l l.
PAGE 4 iL _____
CONFERENCE NOTES June 4 1998 0
DATE:
6/4/98 i
l P RPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC, and Parsons to discuss:
- 1. PDCR 2-013-83 2.
Vendor Information on NSSS Safety Related Components j
- 3. Cancellation of PDCR 2-150-92 l
4.
EDG Instrument Tubing Design Qualification
- 5. DCR-M2-S-1177-87 LIST OF ATTENDEES:
l NNEco NRC NEAC Panons Bob Skwirz Ralph Architzel Wayne Dobson Gary Komosky Don Marks Rich Ewing Irwin Zinnes Dan VanDuyne Claude Didier Don Becker Amrit Kaplish Chris Keating Thomas Flemming Mike Ober Roger Mauchline Frank Cobb
- 1. Topic: PDCR 2-013-83 (Irwin Zinnes) (Continuation of Topic #1 from 5/28/98 and 6/2/98)
Reference-PDCR No.: 2-13-83, MP2 - Containment Air Recirculation Damper Replacement
Background:
This modification involves the direct replacement of four dampers in the Enclosure Building Ventilation System with dampers of similar function, but of much heavier duty construction. The codes and standards governing manufacture and design of these dampers equal or exceed those invoked during original plant construction. The dampers replaced were 2-AC-1, -3, -57 and -58.
Inter Office Memo dated 3/28/84, contained within Reference 1, stated as follows: " Presently 2-AC-58 has not been proved operable and is bypassjumpered open. During the next available cold shutdown the damper will be tested and any unresolved deficiencies rectified via another PDCR. The bypass / jumper tag number is 109."
Note:
DCN DM2-00-612-97 (8/1/97) deleted the L.O. designation for this backdraft damper.
Questions:
a) N/A. Answered on 5/28/98.
b) N/A. Answered on 5/28/98.
Background Continued: Reference I referred to " Calculation 81-102-186 GP for determination of the seismic adequacy of the present damper design and requirement of a seismic support on 2-AC-1."
c) Were calculations done for the dampers 2-AC-3 and the combination of 2-AC-57 and -58, since all the replacement dampers were much heavier duty?
Response: NNEco stated that a search was completed and nc, calculations were done.
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l PAGE 1
CONFERENCE NOTES
~
Jrne 4,1998 2.
Topic: Vendor Information on NSSS Safety Related Components (Claude Didier)
Background:
In teleconference on 5/28/98 MP2 defined the NSSS scope cf supply as regards to VETIP to include those components where ABB/CE had manufacturing or oesign responsibility and maintained '
support responsibility for vendor information. These components wen selected from a review of PMMS and MIMS and selection from the manufacture and model fields. 'Ihe result was a list of approximately 500 components from the systems and components originally supplied by the NSSS vendor ABB/CE.
Question:
a) What is the count of safety related components provided by the NSSS vendor within the original NSSS scope ofsupply?
Response: Deferredto 6/9/98.
3.
Topic: Cancellation of PDCR 2-150-92 (Amrit Kaplish) (Continuation of Topic #4 from 6/2/98)
Background:
Percanceled PDCR 2-150-92, Facility 1 power (Vkii65) goes to FS-8069 and Facility 2 power (VR2105) goes to FS-8068. This is reversed from the way they are shown on the current drawings (25203-31141,
(
Sheets 7 and 8. Revision 2; 25203-32022, Sheet 74, Revision 1,etc.). PDCR 2-150-92 was initiated to correct this discrepancy (i.e., correct field condition to reflect the configuration on the drawings) hut it was canceled prior to approval by NUSCO Engineering Supenisor.
Questions:
a) Was another modification package issued to correct the above discrepancy?
b) If so, what documentation authorized the above modification?
Response
i a) Yes, PDCR 2-067-94 was issued to correct she discrepancy.
b) DCN's: DM2-5-0055 95 and DM2-S-0175-95 associated with PDCR 2-067-94.
i l _
4, Topic: EDG Instrument Tubing Design Qualification (Mike Ober / Ken Gabel)
Background:
EDG instrumentation was upgraded to a Seismic Category I classification via MEPLs' MP2-CD-l l
1782 and MP2-CD-1974. The subject instruments include: 1) PS-7985 A/B/C/D, 2) PI-8729/8730/8833/8834, 3) j LC-7000/7009,4) LG-7003/7012, and 5) LT-7002/7011.
l I
Questions:
a) Were the associated instrument tubing lines also seismically qualified, i.e., cales7 b) is the instrument tubing shown on isometric drawings, and if so, what are the drawing numbers?
c) In lieu of calculations for instrument tubing scismic qualifications, what documentation or other calculations exist to substantiate that the loss of the pressure retaining integrity of the systems associated with this instrumentation will not result in the inability to start the diesel generators in the. vent of a loss of voltage emergency?
Response: Deferredto 6/9/98.
PAGE 2 L___________________
CONFERENCE NOTES Jxne 4,1998 5.
Topic: DCR-M2-S-1177-87 (Frank Cobb)
Background:
- Fire damper installation details associated with DCR-M2-S-1177-87 and shown on drawing 25203-24079 Sht-1 indicate that for dampers installed outside the fire barriers, a fire coating is to be applied that extends the barrier to the outside edge of the damper.
Questions:
a) Why do similar EBFS damper installations (2-HV-37A(B) & 2-AC-9) exists without this protective coating?
b) How does this comply with SMACNA requirements for fire damper installations outside fire barriers?
Respense: Deferred to 6/9/98.
f i
PAGE 3 t
CONFERENCE NOTES June 9,1998 DATE:
6/9/98 PURPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC, and Parsor.s to discuss:
1.
Vendor Information on NSSS Safety Related Components 2.
EDG Instrument Tubing Design Qualification 3.
DCR-M2-S-1177-87 LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Panons i
Joe Fougere Ralph Architzel Frank Cobb Bob Skwirz Don Marks Bruce Woodsby Claude Didier Dan VanDuyne Mike Ober Ken Gabel 1.
Topic: Vendor Information on NSSS Safety Related Components (Claude Didier) (Continuation of Topic # 2 from 6/4/98)
Background:
In teleconference on 5/28/98 MP2 defined the NSSS scope of supply as regards to VETIP to ir:clude those components where ABB/CE had manufacturing or design responsibility and maintained support responsibility for vendor information. These components were selected from a review of PMMS and MIMS and selection from the manufacture ar.d model fields. The result was a list of approximately 500 components from the systems and components originally supplied by the NSSS vendor ABB/CE.
Question:
a) What is the count of safety related components provided by the NSSS vendor within the original NSSS scope ofsupply?
Response: Deferredto 6/16:98.
2.
Topic: EDG Instrument Tubing Design Qualification (Mike Ober / Ken Gabel) (Continuation of Topic # 4 from 6/4/98)
Background:
EDG instrumentation was upgraded to a Seismic Category I classification via MEPLs' MP2-CD-1782 and MP2-CD-1974. The subject instruments include: 1) PS-7985A/B/C/D, 2) PI-8729/8730/8833/8834, 3)
LC-7000/7009, J) LG-7003/7012, and 5) LT-7002/7011.
Questions:
a) Were the associated instmmer.! tubing lines also seismically qualified, i.e., cales?
b) is the instrument tubing shown on isometric drawings, and if so, w hat are the drawing numbers?
c) In lieu of calculations for instmment tubing scismic qualifications, what dxumentation or other calculations exist to substantiate that the loss of the pressure retaining integrity of the systems associated with this instrummtation will not result in the inability to start the diesel generators in the event of a loss of voltage emergency?
Response: Parsons will write an MIfor information on the above components.
PAGE 1
CONFERENCE NOTES June 9,1998 3.
Topic: DCR-M2-S-1177-87 (Frank Cobb)(Continuation of Topic # 5 from 6/4/98)
Background:
Fire damper installation details associated with DCR-M2-S-Il77-87 and shown on drawing 25203-24079 Sht-1 indicate that for dampers installed outside the fire barriers, a fire coating is to be applied that extends the barrier to the outside edge of the damper.
Questions:
n) Why do similar EBFS damper installations (2-HV-37A(B) & 2-AC-9) exists without this protective coating?
b) How does this comply with SMACNA requirements for fire damper installations outside fire barriers?
l Response: Dampers in question were identafledin the 1986 timeframe as being deficient in their installation. An evaluation (GMB 555, NEECo Memo) was completed and determined the dampers were satisfactory. 7his detennination concluded that, while installed at a wallseparating two areas, the two areas were in the same " Fire Zone" and did not require anyfire dampers. Currently the this zone is being divided into two separatefire zones and the ongoing revision to the Appendix R Compliance report willinclude continuedjustification that the damper installation is still satisfactory.
Parsons will write an RAIfor NNECo memo GMB-86-555 of 9/5/86. This will be tracked as an open item on the Fonn 3x (ME-DS-EBFS-008) "Openitem Traveler" form.
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PAGE 2
CONFERENCE NOTES Jus 11,1998 DATE:
6/11/98 i
i PORPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC, and Parsons to discuss:
l 1.
Calculation W2-517-860-RE l
LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC l
NEAC Panons Joe Fougere Eric Eenner Ikm Marks Bob Skwirz Milton Capiotis l
Martin Van Haltern 1.
Topic: Calculation W2-517-860-RE (Milton Capiotis) (Cominuation of Topic # 1 from 6/11/98)
Background:
Calculation W2-517-860-RE Rev.1 & 2 (MP2 Terry Turbine /AFW Performance for Degraded Steam Flow Conditions) predates the Steam Generator replacement and the installation of the cavitating venturis.
The calc. is still shovm as active.
Questions:
I a) is this still the cale of record?
b) Ifit is, will it be superseded or revised?
Response
a) l'es, but still need to check with the seismic group.
l b) Deferred to 6/16'98.
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CONFERENCE NOTES JInc 15,1998 DATE:
6/16/98 PURPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC, and Parsons to discuss:
1.
Calculation W2-517-860-RE 2.
Vendor Information on NSSS Safety Related Components 3.
P pass Line -Ilydrogen Purge System Modification, M2-97008 3
4.
NUSCo Memorandum GEE-86-78 5.
Seismic and Tornado Wind Load Qualification of Emergency Diesel Generator Intake Filters LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC l
NEAC Panons l
Joe Fougere Ralph Architzel Milt Capiotis Tom LaFaucy Don Marks Fred Mattioli Jack Lawton Bob Skwitz Tom Flemmmg Jim Petrosky Dom Ramos Andres Matias Irwm Zinnes Martin Van Haltern 1.
Topic: Calculation W2-517-860-RE (Milton Capiotis) (Continuation of Topic # 1 from 6/11/98)
Background:
Calculation W2-517 860-RE. Rev.1 & 2 (MP2 Terry Turbine /AFW Performance for Degraded Steam Flow Conditions) predates the Steam Generator replacement and the installation of the cavitating venturis.
The cale. is still shown as active.
Questions:
a) is this still the cale of record?
b) Ifit is, will it be superseded or resised?
Response: 7he calculation isproblematic and as a result CR M2-98-1741 has been gener sed.
2.
Topic: Vendor Information on NSSS Safety Related Components (Claude Didier) (Continuation of Topic # 2 from 6/4/98 and 6/9/98)
Background:
In teleconference on 5/28/98 MP2 defined the NSSS scope of supply as regards to VETIP to include those components where ABB/CE had manufacturing or design responsibility and maintained support responsibility for vendor information. These components were selected from a review of PMMS and MIMS and selection from the manufacture and model fields. 'lle result was a list of approximately l
500 components from the systems and components originally supplied by the NSSS vendor ABB/CE.
Question:
a) What is the count of safety related components provided by the NSSS vendor within the original NSSS scope ofsupply?
Response: The count ofthese components is 486.
PAGE1 L_________
1 CONFERENCE NOTES Jrne 15,1998 j
- 3. Topic: Bypass Line - Hydrogen Purge System Modification, M2-97008 (Imin Zinnes) l
Background:
N/A l
Questions:
a) What is the status of this modification?
Response: NNECo stated that the Mechanical and Electricalportions ofthe mod were complete, the Test Plan l
was approved, and they were ready to test (estimated test completion in 2 weeks).
I I
l l
- 4.
Topic: NUSCo Memorandum GEE-86-78 (Jack Lawton) l
Background:
This memo requests a seismic evaluation for the General Electric type UD differential relays used l
to replace the type CFD relays under PDCR 2-100-86.
l Questions:
a) Was this evaluation performed?
l b) If so, what is the document number?
)
Response: Deferredto 6!)8/98.
l
)
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5.
Topic: Seismic and Tornado Wind Load Qualification of Emergency Diesel Generator Intake Filters
(
(Thomas Flemming)
Background:
Intake filters L-727 and L-728 for the Diesel Generator combustion air supply are located on the Auxiliary _ Building roof at elevation 54'6" These filters were apparently supplied by the Diesel Engine i
l manufacturer under Emergency Diesel Generator specification M 160. Although the specification listed these l
filters as a requirement (see section 6.5.2.e) no listing for them is found under section 2.2, scope of work. It is therefore not clear as to how the requirements of equipment qualification (ref section 7.0, scismic requirements) detailed in spec M-160 were invoked upon the vendor, Colt, and the manufacture of the housing /filte:, Burgess.
Normal wind and tornado wind / missile loads on components are not addressed in Spec M-160, and are in fact l
only applicable to the intake and exhaust components external to the building. UIR 2679 titled " Qualification of Diesel Generator intake and exhaust air systems on roof of Auxiliary Building for Tornado Wind and tornado
- Missile in accordance with GDC-2" notes that the intake piping system has be n designed for tornado wind and scismic and normal design wind loading. UIR-2679 does not specifically mention qualification of the intake filter / housing on the roof, w hich is the component most susceptible to potential tornado / wind / seismic damage.
i I
Questions: In accordance with 10CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 2, structmes, systems, and j
components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as 1
l earthquakes, tornadoes, etc to perform their safety functions.
a) What design documents demonstrate that the Diesel Generator Intake filters are designed to withstand or be protected from seismic and wind loads, including tornado and tornado missile loads?
Respcnse: Deferred to 6/18/98.
)
PACE 2 l
l CONFERENCE NOTES l
Jrne 18,1998 l
DATE:
6/18/98 PURPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC, and Parsons to discuss:
1.
Unlabeled lifted leads in EDG Control pancis C38, C39 Relay Panels T040, T041, and D/G Gauge Panel
- 2. NUSCo Memorandum GEE-86-78 j
- 3. Seismic and Tornado Wind Load Qualification of Emergency Diesel Generator intake i
Filters LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Parsons l
Joe Fougere Ralph Architzel Wayne Dobson Bob Skwirz Don Marks Mike Champagne Vmny Bhayana Farid Elsabee Clark Tracy Roy Terry lhemas Flemming Bob Moyer 1
- 1. Topic: Unlabeled lified leads in EDG Control panels C38, C39, Relay Panels T040, T041, and D/G Gauge Panel (Vinny Bhayana) t
[
l'
Reference:
ACR M2-97-1587. AWO M2-97-08416, M2-97 6319, and completed AR 9701999-01, and -02
(
Background:
Per condition stated in this ACR, the lifted leads were not properly labeled and wire terminal lugs insulated with electrical tape on the ends as opposed to Raychem shrink tubing per the existing procedure in the referenced panels. A resiew of AWO'S indicate no specific usage of RAYCHEM shrink tubing for the purpose of repairs.
NOTE: An effort was made through field walkdown group to physically verify the installations but were declared as ' INACCESSIBLE' for inspection since the EDG is in standby.
l Questions:
a) Need clarification of the proper wire end terminations with appropriate insulation materials (Raychem)..
Resyonse: Question was clargied and response deferred to 6/23/98.
2.
Topic: NUSCo Memorandum GEE-86-78 (Jack Lawton) (Continuation of Topic # 4 from 6/16/98) j
Background:
This memo requests a seismic evaluation for the General Electric type IJD differential relays used l
to replace the type CFD relays under PDCR 2-100-86.
j l
l Questions:
a) Was this evaluation performed?
b) If so, what is the document number?
Response
a) Yes, an evaluation wasperformed.
b) Document number PSE Etf-86-395.
i PAGE 1 l
r
l CONFERENCE NOTES Jzne 18,1998 3.
Topic: Seismic and Tornado Wind Load Qualification of Emergency Diesel Generator Intake Filters (Thomas Flemming) (Continuation of Topic # 5 from 6/16/98) l
Background:
Intake filters L-727 and L-728 for the Diesel Generato combustion air supply are located on the Auxiliary Building roof at elevation 54'6" These filters were apparently supplied by the Diesel Engine manufacturer under Emergency Diesel Generator specification M-160. Although the specification listed these filters as a requirement (see section 6.5.2.e) no listing for them is found under section 2.2, scope of work. It is therefore not clear as to how the requirements of equipment qualification (ref section 7.0, seismic requirements) detailed in spec M-160 were invoked upon the vendor, Colt, and the manufacture of the housing / filter, Burgess.
Normal wind and tornado wind / missile loads on components are not addressed in Spec M-160, and are in fact only applicable to the intake and exhaust components external t the building. UIR 2679 titled " Qualification of i
Diesel Generator intake and exhaust air systems on roof of Awiliary Building for Tornado Wind and tornado l
Missile in accordance with GDC-2" notes that the intake pipirg system has been designed for tornado wind and seismic and normal design wind loading. UIR-2679 does not specifically mention qualification of the intake filter / housing on the roof, which is the component most susceptible to potential tornado / wind /scismic damage.
Questions: In accordance with 10CFR Part 50, Appendix A General Design Criteria 2, structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, etc to perform their safety functions.
a) What design documents demonstrate that the Diesel Generator Intake filters are designed to withstand or be protected from seismic and wind loads, including tornado and tornado missile loads?
l Response: To be continued on 6/23/98.
l t
i t
l PAGE 2
!w_-__________-______-
0 CONFERENCE NOTES June 23 1998 0
l j
DATE:
6/23/98 l
PORPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC, and Parsons to discuss:
1.
Unlabeled lifted leads in EDG Control panels C38, C39, Relay Panels T040, T041, and D/G Gauge Panel
- 2. Jumper Device 2-96-083 l
- 3. Seismic and Tornado Wind Load Qualification ot Emergency Diesel Generator Intake Filters 4.
Intake Structure Repair 5.
MOV Program Status l
I 6.
DR-036 l
- 7. Schedule update for Tier-2 Accident Re-analyses 8.
DCR M2-96067 l
LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Parsons Joe Fougere Paul Norbert Wayne Dobson Fred Mattioli Don Mhs i
Bob Skwirz Wnod Bhayana l
Steve Stadnick Jack Lawton l
Madison L,ong Dan Womidell l
Greg Tardif John Ililbish Ron Jackson Rich Freeman John Kennedy Joe Groncki i
Mike Champagne Rich Glaviano l
Roy Terry Eric Blocher l
l 1.
Topic: Unlabeled lilled leads in EDG Control panels C38, C39, Relay Panels '11140, T041, and D/G Gauge Panel (Vinod Bhayana)(Continuation of Topic # 1 from 6/18/98)
Reference:
ACR M2-97-1587. AWO M2-97-08416, M2-97-6319, and completed AR 9701999-01, and -02
Background:
Per condition stated in this ACR, the lified leads were not properly labeled and wire terminal lugs l
insulated with electrical tape on the ends as opposed to Raychem shrink tubing per the existing procedure in the referenced panels. A review of AWO'S indicate no specific usage of RAYCHEM shrink tubing for the purpose of i
repans.
NOTE: An effort was made through field walkdown group to physically verify the installations but were declared as ' INACCESSIBLE' for inspection since the EDG is in standby.
Questions:
a) Need clarification of the proper wire end terminations with appropriate insulation materials (Raychem)..
Response: A physical venfication performed by John Kenne& (NNECo) on the Control and Relay Panels in EDG 'A' and 'B' confirms that the proper 71 eat Shrink Tubing' was utili:edfor repairs of the hfled (spare) leads and also they were appropriately labeledper procedure.
1 PAGE1
)
CONFERENCE NOTES l
Jrne 23,1998 l
2.
Topic: Jumper Device 2-96-083 (Richard Freeman)
Reference:
Jumper Desice Control Form 2-96-083 l
Background:
Jumper Device 2-96-083 installed internal parts in a check valve in order to make the valve l
functional. This valve is in the drain header from the Diesel Generator rooms. From the wording in the hmper Device Control Form this appears to be maintenance activity and not a temporary design change.
Questions:
a) What is the purpose of thisjumper?
b) What is the plan to remove thisjumper?
Response
i a) This Jumper was written to track the disc andhinge pin since the material was not QA and the disc and hinge pin werefabricatedin the maintenance shop. This brought the check valve into an operable state while replacement parts or valve were procured.
b) The IEEprogram will evaluate an equivalent valve. Afost likely a DCR wdl not be necessary 3.
Topic: Seismic and Tornado Wind Load Qualification of Energency Diesel Generator Intake Filters (Thomas Flemming)(Continuation of Topic # 3 from 6/18/98) l
Background:
Intake filters L-727 and L-728 for the Diesel Generator combustion air supply are located on the Auxiliary Building roof at elevation 54'6".
These filters were apparently supplied by the Diesel Engine manufacturer under Emergency Diesel Generator specification M-160. Although the specification listed thesc filters as a requirement (see section 6.5.2.e) no listing for them is found under section 2.2, scope of work. It is therefore not clear as to how the requirements of equipment qualification (ref section 7.0, seismic requirements) detailed in spec M-160 were invoked upon the vendor, Colt, and the manufacture of the housing / filter, Burgess.
Normal wind and tomado wind / missile loads on components are not addressed in Spec M-160, and are in fact only applicable to the intake and exhaust components external to the building. UfR 2679 titled ' Qualification of I
Diesel Generator intake and exhaust air systems on roof of Auxiliary Boilding for Tornado Wind and tornado Missile in accordance with GDC-2" notes that the intake piping system has been designed for tornado wind and seismic and normal design wind loading. 'UIR-2679 does not specifically mention qualification of the intake filter / housing on the roof, which is the component most susceptible to potential tornado / wind /scismic damage.
i Questions: In accordance with 10CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 2, structures. systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as
{
earthquakes, tornadoes, etc to perform their safety functions.
a) What design documents demonstrate that the Diesel Generator Intake filters are designed to withstand or be protected from seismic and wmd loads, including tornado and tornado missile loads?
Restm: Seismic and windloadsfor the dieselintakefilter housings are addressed in calculation 77-619 GAf Rev.1, change notice 1 dated 12/5/97. Newfilter housings were recently installed and were provids d in accordance with the originalBechtelSpecification Af-160. A new equivalency evaluation (number to be provided to Parsons' Wayne Dobson later) was performed demonstrating that the replacement housings are equivalent to the originalhousings.
4.
Topic: Intake Structure Repair (Wayne Dobson)
Background:
DCN DM2-01-0128-97 was issued to document a repair to corroded cover plates and curb angles l
in the Intake Structure. The DCN docs not reference a NCR or Trouble Report associated with the repair / restoration work.
PAGE 2
4 CONFERENCE NOTES Jrne 23,1998
)
, Questions:
a) Was a NCR or Trouble Report initiated for the repair / restoration?
Response: Deferredto 6/25/98.
l 5.
Topic: MOV Program Status (NNECo initiated Topic)
NNECo to provide an update ou the status of the MOV program.
Response: The current A10V Program Afanual is Rev. 9. As part of CAfP corrective actions, currently all Unit 2 Af0V calculations have been redone. NNECo is currently reviewing a number of Af0V related DRs prepared during thefall of1997. NNECo wanted to ensure Parsons was aware that all of the Af0V calculations I
have been redone as they believe that it would be ofno benefitfor Parsons to prepare a ty additional DRs on the old A10 Calculations. NNEco is planning to disposition the existing A10VDRs as prev o istv discovered.
6.
Topic: DR 036 (NNECo initiated Topic)
NNECo would like to obtain some clarification on this DR.
Response: Deferredto 6/23/98.
7.
Topic: Schedule update for Tier-2 Accident Re-analyses (Rich Glaviano)
Background:
N/A Questions:
l a.
Please confirm that the below accident analyses have been accepted by NNECo:
14.1.3 Increase in Steam Flow 14.1.5 Main Steam Line Break (RCS Analysis) 14.2.7 Loss ofNormal Feedwater Flow 14.6.3 Steam Gen Tube Rupture - Mass Release
- b. Please confirm the projected NNECo Accept date for the following analyses:
14.6.5.2 Small Break LOCA 17 Jul 98 14.6.5.1 Large Break LOCA (RCS Analysis) 31 Aug 98
- c. Design inputs are required for the below analyses. Please provide schedule for providing these to Parsons:
14.7.4.2.1 Fuel Handling Accident in Spent Fuel Pool 14.7.5 Spent Fuel Cask Drop 14.8.4 Radiological - Design Basis Accident (Balance from list provided on 12 June)
- d. Please confirm the projected NNECo Accept date for the following radiological analyses:
PAGE 3
CONFERENCE NOTES Jrne 23,1998 14.6.3 Steam Gen Tube Rupture - Mass Release 31 Jul 98 14,.7.4.2.1 Fuel Handling Accident in Spent Fuel Pool 31 Jul 98 14.7.4.2.2 Fuel Handling Accident in Containment 31 Jul 98 14.7.5 Spent Fuel Cask Drop 31 Jul 98 14.8.4 Radiological - Design Basis Accident 31 Jul 98 Response: StatussuppliedbyNNECo.
8.
Topic: DCR M2-96067 (Jack Lawton)
Background:
This DCR replaces Enclosure Building Filtration System damper motors, along with damper motors in other systems. On the first page of the DCR, the 10 CFR 50.59 Evahution, question A is checked "Yes" (it was initially checked "No"), indicating that an FSAR change is required. The Basis statement in the same section and DCM FORM 3 2B, page 9 of 1I indicate that no change is required.
l Question:
a) Please provide clarification as to why the response to question A was changed from "No" to "Yes".
Response: NNECo 's interpretation ofthe question was that, since the system is describedin the FS1R, that the question should be answered 'Tes", even though no FS1R change was required.
l l
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l I
PAGE 4 l
I 1
CONFERENCE NOTES June 25,1998 DATE:
6/25/93 PURPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC, and Parsons to discuss:
l.
PDCR 2-71-77, " Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Supply" 2.
Vendor Information on NSSS Safety Related Components 3.
NNECo's Response to DR-0208 4.
Damper 2-AC-11 LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Panons Joe Fougere Steve Reynolds Wayne Dobson Fred Mattioli Don Marks Bob Skuirz Frank Cobb Steve Stadnick Claude D4dier Don Becker Kent Russell Lany Wig:ey Dan Curry Dom Ramos 1.
Topic: PDCR 2-71-77, " Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Supply" (Wade Russell)
Background:
LER 77-20 described an event in which both emergency diesel generator fuel oil supply valves were found shut during a routine inspection. The LER indicated that a plant design change would be j
implemented to annunciate a change in fuel oil supply valve position. PDCR added pressure switches downstream 1
of 2-FO-79 and 2-FO-80 to provide annunciation in the event the respective fuel oil supply valve is closed. Per IC2434 a drop in fuel oil pressure to 3 psi is required to provide a " fuel oil supply valve shut" alarm. From a review of the P&lD (25203-26010 sht 1, Rev 12) it appears that under normal standby conditions there would be no fuel oil leak-oft path to cause a fuel oil pressure drop upon closure of the supply valve.
Question:
a) Please explain how closure of S-FO-79 and 2-FO-80 will result in a " fuel oil supply valve shut" alarm with the EDGs in standby.
Response: For closure ofS-FO-79 and 2-FO-80, NNECo is counting on an un-quantified amount ofleakage from pumps connected to thefuel oil system, uhich are not shown on the P&lD.
NOTE: There was no response to thef>llow-on question: uhere is the design requirementfor a pump that leaks the amount necessary to make the pressure drop efect take place.
2.
Topic: Vendor Information on NSSS Safety Related Components (Claude Didier)
Background:
In teleconference on 5/28/98 MP2 defined the NSSS scope of supply as regards to VETIP to include those components where ABB/CE had manufacturing or design responsibility and maintained support responsibility for vendor information. These components were selected from a review of PMMS and MIMS and selection from the manufacture and model fields. The result was a list of approximately 500 components from the systems and components originally supplied by the NSSS vendor ABB/CE.
Subsequently MP2 has identified this list as 486 in telecon of 6/18.
Question:
a) With regard to GL 90-03, has NNECo identified the safety related components originally specified and provided during plant construction under the scope of the contract with CE, for which ABB/CE no longer maintains support responsibility for vendor information?
PAGE 1
CONFERENCE NOTES
,'~
kne 25,1998 l
b) If so, what is the name of this list and what program controls obtaining current vendor information for these items?
l Response: During the telecon the question was clarified to determine ifNNEco had quantified the safety related components within the original scope afsupply ofthe NSSS vendor; i.e. the safety related components manufactured by CE and by other vendors that were within the Reactor Coolant System and other safety systems such as HPSI and LPS1 originally provided by CE. It was also expressed thatpart ofthe concern and reasonfor the question was Parsons was trying to understand how NNECo was addressing safety relatedNSSSscope of supply components manufactured by vendors other than CE.
Don Becker responded that NNEco had not quantified the components in that manner. AfP2 had looked at PA1AIS and selected those components that ABB'CE was the manufacturer ofor maintained design support responsibility as the being the NSSS scope ofsupply. 7'he other components, since CE did not provide my support informationfor and the utility had to contact the vendorfor this information, were included in the populationfrom which the KSREL was selected.
As there was afair bit oftime expended on this question in this andprevious calls, rather that try to wntinue further discussion, NNECo requested that Parsons write a DR ifconcerns were not satisfied.
3.
Topic: NNECo's Response te DR-0208 (Dan Wooddell)
Background:
NNECo's response to DR-0208 references CRs M2-98 0099 and M2-98-0999. Only CR M2 0099 was supplicc as part.of the DR response.
Questions:
j I
a) Are references to CR M2-98-0999 typographical errors or was this CR initiated to track DR-0208 potential issues 7 i
Response: References to CR AI2-98-0999 are typographical errors.
4.
Topic: Damper 2-AC-11 (Frank Cobb)
Background:
Ventilation system 23148, CEBPS, consists of a supply fan and associated ducting / dampers to the containment. The exhaust portion of the system consists of ducting / and associated dampers all of uhich are attached to the Auxiliary Building Main exhaust. The supply side of this system is used temper the containment emironment with outside air for access to the containment during modes 5 & 6. The exhaust portion of this system is used during modes 5 & 6 in conjunction with the supply side to help maintain pressure considerations within the containment.
During normal plant operations the exhaust portion of the system is used to ventilate the enclosure building by opening a flow path through air operated dampers 2-AC-8 and 2-AC-11 If a CIAS is received these dampers automatically change positions to re-direct air flow to the EBFS Filter system.
Questions:
l a) During a CIAS Damper 2-AC-1I will be required to close against airflow from the additional main exhaust fan that continues to run. Does the operator on this damper have enough closing torque to completely close the damper?
Response: Deferredto 6'30'98.
PAGE 2 L_________________
l CONFERENCE NOTES June 30,1998 l
l DATE:
6/30/98 PURPOSE:
Telephone conference with NNECo, NRC, NEAC, and Parsons to discuss:
l.
DR-036 2.
UIR 2625 Single failure Vulnerability in PORV Control Circuit 3.
Schedule update for Tier-2 Accident Re-analyses 4.
DR-0137 5.
Issue: Containment flydrogen Sampling for LOCA l
6.
Hydrogen Monitor Upgrade 7.
DR-0060 Applicability of Program Indicators in PMMS 8.
Damper 2-AC-Il 9.
Enclosure Building (EB) Excessive Pressure Protection LIST OF ATTENDEES:
NNECo NRC NEAC Parsons Bob Skwirz Steve Reynolds Wayne Dobson Fred Mattioli Peter Koltay Don Marks Greg Tardif Al Cross Jim Nicholson John Archer Rick Bonner Colin Patton Cris Cristallo Rich Glaviano Frank DeCampo Dave Lengel Marcel Ranieri Dan Wooddell Dave Bajumpa Mark Fitzgerald Ron Jackson Frank Cobb Bill Cushman Dom Ramos Norbert Carte 1.
Topic: DR-036 (NNECo initiated Topic) (Continuation of Topic # 6 from 6/23/98)
NNECo would like to obtain some clarification on this DR.
Response: Discussionfocused on the testing ofthe valves 2-S1-659 and 660.
2.
Topic: UIR 2625 Single failure Vulnerability in PORV Control Circuit (Mark Fitzgerald)
Background:
As part of the Corrective Action Program resiew the NRC identified a number of UIRs for resiew.
UIR 2625 is one of those identified for review. The UIR disposition was to be accomplished through AR 97010389-10. AR 97010389 Task 10 was canceled on 2/5/98 to the "FSAR Sweep".
Question:
a) What is the "FSAR Sweep"?
b) Is it a bonafide tracking mechanism that can be used for closure of the UIR?
c) How will the UIR be updated to denote the cancellation of AR 97010389-10 and the new mechanism; the "FSAR Sweep"?
Response
l a) The FS4R Sweep was a project undertaken to review the FS4R and implement any needed upgrades.
b) No it is not a tracking mechanism.
c) The denotedAR was infact Canceled, therefore the UIR was canceled' closed as well. The particular concern was addressedin an FS4RCR 97-MP2-203; the U1R was updated to reflect this.
PAGE1
l CONFERENCE NOTES J ne 30,1998 3.
Topic: Schedule update for Tier-2 Accident Re-analyses (Rich Glasiano)
, Questions:
Please confirm that the below accident analyses have been accepted by NNECo and prmide an estimated date a.
for transmittal to Parsons:
14.2.7 Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow 14,6.3 Steam Gen Tube Rupture - Mass Release
- b. Please confirm the projected NNECo Accept date for the following analyses:
14.1.3 Increase in Steam Flow 30 June 98 14.1.5 Main Steam Line Break (RCS Analysis) 30 June 98 14.6.5.2 Small Break LOCA 31 Jul 98 l
14.6.5.1 Large Break LOCA (RCS Analysis) 31 Aug 98
- c. Design inputs are required for the below analyses. Please provide schedule for prosiding these to Parsons:
14.7.4.2.1 Fuel Handling Accident in Spent Fuel Pool l
14.7.5 Spent Fuel Cask Drop 14.8.4 Radiological - Design Basis Accident (Balance from list prmided on 12 June) d.
Please confirm the projected NNECo Accept date for the following radiological analyses:
14.6.3 Steam Gen Tube Rupture - Rad. Analysis 31 Jul 98 14.7.4.2.1 Fuel Handling Accident in Spent Fact Pool 31 Jul 98 14.7.4.2.2 Fuel Handling Accident in Containment 31 Jul 98 14.7.5 Spent Fuel Cask Drop 31 Jul 98 14.8.4 Radiological-Design Basis Accident 31 Jul 98 NU/Siemens evaluated the RC Pump flow coastdown curve for poible changes. Parsons understands that c.
the 4-pump trip coastdown curve will n_o1 be changed in the event re-analyses. Please confirm.
f.
An evaluation was performed for the Reactor Trip on Containment High Pressure for the MSLB reanalysis.
Please discuss the results of this evaluation.
Response
Note: Updatefrom conference callprovided in italics Please confirm that the below accident analyses have been accepted by NNECo and provide an estimated date for a.
transmittal to Parsons:
14.2.7 Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow Rec *d 6/30'98 14.6.3 Steam Gen Tube Rupture - Mass Release Sched 7<6/98
- b. Please confirm the projected NNECo Accept date for the following analyses:
14.1.3 Increase in Steam Flow 30 June 98 Rec'd 6/30'98 14.1.5 Main Steam Line Break (RCS Analysis) 30 June 98 Partial 6/30 98 14.6.5.2 Small Break LOCA 31 Jul 98 As Listed 14.6.5.1 Large Break LOCA (RCS Analysis) 31 Aug 98 As Listed
- c. Design inputs are required for the below analyses. Please provide schedule for providing these to Parsons:
14.7.4.2.1 Fuel Handling Accident in Spent Fuel Pool TBD 14.7.5 Spent Fuel Cask Drop TBD 14.8.4 Radiological - Design Basis Accident (Balance from list provided on 12 June) - TBD d.
Please confirm the projected NNECo Accept date for the following radiological analyses:
14.6.3 Steam Gen Tube Rupture - Rad. Analysis 31 Jul 98 Sched.14 Aug 98 14,7.4.2.1 Fuel Handling Accident in Spent Fuel Pool 31 Jul 98 Sched.14 Aug 98 14.7.4.2.2 Fuel Handling Accident in Containment 31 Jul 98 Sched.14 Aug 98 14.7.5 Spent Fuel Cask Drop 31 Jul 98 Sched.14 Aug 98 14.8.4 Radiological-Design Basis Accident 31 Jul 98 Sched.14 Aug 98 PAGE 2
1 CONFERENCE NOTES JIne 30,1998 NU/Siemens evaluated the RC Pump flow coastdown curve for possible changes. Parsons understands that e
the 4-pump trip coastdown curve will p_o1 be changed in the event reanalyses. Please confirm.
Assessment complete. No changes to Loss ofRC Flow Analysis. Item Closed.
j f.
An evaluation was performed for the Reactor Trip on Containment High Pressure for the MSLB reanalysis.
Please discuss the results of this evaluation.
Results scheduledfor NNECo approval on 7/10 98 4.
Topic: DR-0137 (Al Cross)
Background:
AFW flow transmitters FT-5278A & B, shown on 28408 sht. 978, are separated by approximately one foot as per field walkdown. Spec 7604-MS-67 states physical separation between redundant vital channels is "open space-no direct probability of physical damage, requirement-1.5 ft between channels."
NNECo's reply; non-discrepant because the physical separation for the transmitters meets licensing basis.
I Questions:
a) What is the licensing basis referred to in NNECo's reply?
Response: Deferredto 7/2i98.
1 5.
Topic: Issue: Containment Hydrogen Sampling for LOCA (Dave Lengel)
Background:
EOP 2540E, " Functional Recovery of Containment Integrity", identifies that the H2 Re-combiners are to be started when the H2 concentration in containment exceeds 1.5% (step 2.17). It also states that the l
containment pressure must be less than 10 Psig to place and keep the hydrogen monitors in senice. Step 2.14 of l
this EOP requires operation of the hydrogen re-combiners with a contingency action of having Chemistry obtain a containment sample.
OP 2313C, " Containment Post incident Hydrogen Control, section 5.4 note, indicates the preferred H2 Re-I combiner start time as within one day following the incident, or when hydrogen concentration reaches 1.5%.
Parsons' understanding of the operation is that the re-combiners are started on H2 concentration which is measured by the monitors whenever the monitors are available and that the grab sample is used when the monitors are not available ( i.e. containment pressure greater than 10 Psig) 1 i
Questions:
a) Are the H2 re-combiners staned based on time (day s) or on H2 concentration?
b) If based on H2 concentration, what does the operator use to determine when 1.5% is reached? (i.e. H2 j
monitor, containment grab sample)
Response
a) 7he 112 recombiners are started on ll2 concentration.
b) The 112 monitors are used to determine the l12 concentration uhenever the monitors are available. Ilhen both the monitors are not available, containment grab san.ple are utili:ed.
7he above answers confirmed Parsons' understandmg ofsystem operation.
i l
PAGE 3 L
CONFERENCE NOTES
~
June 30,1998 6.
Topic: Hydrogen Monitor Upgrade (Dave Lengel)
Background:
U2 PI-7, Graded System Resiew, Samplimg/ PASS /H2 Control System Package, states that the H2 monitors are planned to be replaced.
Questions:
a) Have they been replaced yet?
b) If not, when are they scheduled to be replaced? (Prior to startup of Millstone 2 or in a futme cycle?)
c) If replaced, wht.t change document accomplished the replacement?
Response
i i
a) The H2 monitors are currently being replaced. The modification is in progress.
b) Replacement will be completedprior to Restart.
c) Replacement is being accomplished by PDCR M2 96-051 1
7.
Topic: DR-0060 Applicability of Program Indicators in PMMS (Don Marks)
Background:
Parsons would like to discuss NNECo's second response and ou; comment which has been drafted.
1 Response: Parsons explained that it did not agree with NNECo 's claim that the discrepant condition described in DR 0060 had been discovered by the CMP. NNECo agreed that their response dealt with identifying and correcting the problems associated with the Program 1ndicators and did not deal with the problem ofprocedural non-compliance. Parsons also explainedit agreement with the corrective actions associated with DCN DM2 0731-98 andARs: 97022099-03 and OL 1
8.
Topie: Damper 2-AC-11 (Frank Cobb)(Continuation of Topic # 4 from 6/25/98)
Background:
Ventilation system 2314B, CEBPS, consists of a supply fan and associated ducting / dampers to the containment. The exhaust portion of the system consists of ducting / and associated dampers all of which are l
attached to the Auxiliary Building Main exhaust. The supply side of this system is used temper the containment emironment with outside air for access to the containment during modes 5 & 6. The exhaust portion of this system is used during modes 5 & 6 in conjunction with the supply side to help maintain pressure considerations within the containment.
During normal plant operations the exhaust portion of the system is used to ventilate the enclosure building by l
opening a flow path through air operated damper.,2-AC-8 and 2 AC-11 If a CIAS is received these dampers l-automatically change positions to re-direct air flow to the EBFS Filter system.
Questions:
a) During a CIAS Damper 2 AC-1I will be required to close against airflow from the additional main exhaust fan that continues to run. Does the operator on this damper have enough closing torque to completely close the damper? PARTIAL RESPONSE ON 6/25/98: The damper and actuator was recently replaced with one with more torque, which NNECo believes would be capable of closing the damper in this situation. However, they have not found any test data to confirm this as of yet. DCR-97-002 is the modification that changed this equipment.
l PAGE 4
CONFERENCE NOTES Jnne 30,1993 Response: Damper and motor were changed out yet no documentation can be recovered that provides acceptable retest results that the damper can close against thefullfanflow.
Follow up Question:
a) Does the modification (damper / operator replacement) and supporting documentation provide analysis, evaluation of specify that the damper / operator must close against the flow pressure of the remaining main exhaust fan?
Response: Deferredto 7/2/98.
9.
Topie: Enclosure Building (EB) Excessive Pressure Protection (Dom Ramos)
Background:
To prevent damage to the ED by over pressurization or by drawing excessive negative pressure during EB purge mode of operation, PDCR 2-91-77 proposed to install two 3' x 4' relief dampers set to relieve pressure in either direction at 0.5" ug. NU letter G/ME-78-1655 proposed an alternative solution using one power operated guillotine damper set to open on either a positive or negative pressure of 0.5" wg. The advantages of the alternative solution are described in the aforementioned letter.
The proposed alte native,clution was accepted. PDCR 2-91-77 was canceled. Project Assignment PA 80-041 requested a detaiicd desipi/ procurement to install a power operated guillotine damper.
Parsons could not find the PDCR that installed the damper, but found PDCR 2-32-84 that noted PA 80-041 as the applicable document. PDCR 2-32-84 is an entirely difTerent modification than requested by the PA. The PDCR revised the controls to automatically stop the purge supply fan F-23 and close damper 2-AC-11. These actions occur if the EB pressure reaches the + 0.4" wg setpoint. The PDCR's did not address the excessive negative pressure concern.
According to OP 23148, Rev 16, page 5: the pressure in the EB must be maintained between +0.4 and -0.4'\\vg to prevent potential buliding damage, i.e., loss of integrity due to scam cracking.
Questions: What is the document mimber that:
a) Explains why an entirely difTerent modification, from that requested by PA 80-041, was installed.
b) Justifies why the excessive negative pressure concern was not addressed.
Response: Deferredto 7/7/98.
PAGE5
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