ML20236M654
| ML20236M654 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1998 |
| From: | Andersen J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Bowling M, Loftus P NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| References | |
| TAC-MA2047, NUDOCS 9807140185 | |
| Download: ML20236M654 (6) | |
Text
t July 10, 1998 Mr. Martin L. Bowling, Jr.
Recovery Officer - Technical Services Northeast Nuclear Energy Company c/o Ms. Patricia A. Loftus Director-Regulatory Affairs P. O. Box 128 Waterford, Connecticut 06385
SUBJECT:
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3 - REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES (TAC NO. MA2047)
Dear Mr. Bowling:
By letter dated June 4,1998, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) provided the NRC with changes to Technical Specifications (TSs) Bases Section 3/4.7.1.5. NNECO provided the TSs Bases page to the NRC for information only.
As you are aware, the TSs Bases are not part of the TSs as defined by 10 CFR 50.36. Changes to the TSs Bases may voluntarily be made in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
Should the proposed change involve an unreviewed safety question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2), or involve a change in the interpretation of implementation of the TSs (i.e., constitute a TS change), then the proposed change is to be provided to the staff pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59(c) and 10 CFR 50.90 for prior NRC review and approval.
The TSs Bases you provided are hereby returned to you and should be inserted in the TSs to ensure the NRC staff and NNECO have identical TS Bases pages. The staff did not perform an evaluation of your TS Bases revisions and staff concurrence with the revisions is not implied by this letter. The staff may review the evaluations that support these TS Bases revisions during the next inspection of Millstone Unit 3's implementation of 10 CFR 50.59.
Sincerely, Original signed by:
James W. Andersen, Project Manager Special Projects Office - Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-423 Er 'sure: As stated pna-
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July 10, 1998 Mr. Martin L. Bowling, Jr.
Recovery Officer - Technical Services Northeast Nuclear Energy Company l
c/o Ms. Patricia A. Loftus Director-Regulatory Affairs P. O. Box 128 Waterford, Connecticut 06385
SUBJECT:
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3 - REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES (TAC NO. MA2047)
Dear Mr. Bowling:
By letter dated June 4,1998, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) provided the NRC with changes to Technical Specifications (TSs) Bases Section 3/4.7.1.5. NNECO provided the TSs Bases page to the NRC for information only.
As you are aware, the TSs Bases are not part of the TSs as defined by 10 CFR 50.36. Changes to the TSs Bases may voluntarily be made in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
Should the proposed change involve an unreviewed safety question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2), or involve a change in the interpretation of implementation of the TSs (i.e., constitute a TS change), then the proposed change is to be provided to the staff pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59(c) and 10 CFR 50.90 for prior NRC review and approval.
The TSs Bases you provided are hereby retumed to you and should be inserted in the TSs to ensure the NRC staff and NNECO have identical TS Bases pages. The staff did not perform an evaluation of your TS Bases revisions and staff concurrence with the revisions is not implied by this letter. The staff may review the evaluations that support these TS Bases revisions during the next inspection of Millstone Unit 3's implementation of 10 CFR 50.59.
Sincerely, mes W. Andersen, Project Manager pecial Projects Office - Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-423
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl:
See next page
Millstona Nuclasr Pow:r Station Unit 3 cc:
Lillian M. Cuoco, Esquire Joseph R. Egan, Esquire Senior Nuclear Counsel Egan & Associates, P.C.
Northeast Utilities Service Company 2300 N Street, NW P. O. Box 270 Washington, DC 20037 Hartford, CT 06141-0270 Mr. F. C. Rothen Mr. Kevin T. A. McCarthy, Director Vice President - Work Services Monitoring and Radiation Division Northeast Utilities Service Company Department of Environmental Protection P. O. Box 128 79 Elm Street Waterford, CT 06385 Hartford, CT 06106-5127 Emest C. Hadley, Esquire Regional Administrator, Region 1 1040 B Main Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 549 475 Allendale Road West Wareham, MA 02576 King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. John Buckingham First Selectmen Department of Public Utility Control Town of Waterford Electric Unit Hall of Records 10 Liberty Square 200 Boston Post Road New Britain, CT 06051 Waterford, CT 06385 Mr. James S. Robinson, Manager Mr. Wayne D. Lanning Nuclear Investments and Administration Deputy Director of Inspections New England Power Company Special Projects Office 25 Research Drive 475 Allendale Road Westborough, MA 01582 King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415 Mr. John Streeter Mr. M. H. Brothers Recovery Officer - Nuclear Oversight Vice President - Millstone Unit 3 Northeast Utilities Service Company Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P. O. Box 128 P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 Waterford, CT 06385 Deborah Katz, President Mr. M. R. Scully, Executive Director Citizens Awareness Network Connecticut Municipal Electric P.O. Box 83 Energy Cooperative Shelbume Falls, MA 03170 30 Stott Avenue Norwich, CT 06360 Mr. Allan Johanson, Assistant Director Office of Policy and Management Mr. David Amerine Policy Development and Planning Vice President-Human Services Division Northeast Utilities Service Company 450 Capito! Avenue - MS# 52ERN P. O. Box 128 P. O. Box 341441 Waterford, CT 06385 Hartford, CT 06134-1441
Millst:ne Nuclerr Power St: tion.
Mr. WilliIm D. Mrintrt l
Unit 3 Nuclear Engineer Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale cc:
Electric Company The Honorable Terry Concannon P.O. Box 426 Nuclear Energy Advisory Council Ludlow, MA 01056 Room 4035 Legislative Office Building Attomey Nicholas J. Scobbo, Jr.
I Capitol Avenue Ferriter, Scobbo, Caruso, Rodophele, PC l
Hartford, CT 06106 1 Beacon Street,11th Floor l
Boston, MA 02108 Mr. Evan W. Woollacott l
Co-Chair Citizens Regulatory Commission Nuclear Energy Advisory Council ATTN: Ms. Susan Perry Luxton 128 Terry's Plain Road 180 Great Neck Road Simsbury, CT 06070 Waterford, CT 06385 Mr. John W. Beck, President Little Harbor Consultants, Inc.
Millstone -ITPOP Project Office P.O. Box 0630 Niantic, CT 06357-0630
. Mr. B. D. Kenyon (Acting) 1 Chief Nuclear Officer-Millstone Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 Mr. Daniel L. Cuny Project Director 1
Parsons Power Group Inc.
2675 Morgantown Road Reading, PA 19607.
Mr. Don Schopfer
. Verification Team Manager Sargent & Lundy 55 E. Monroe Street Chicago,IL 60603 Mr. P. D. Hinnenkamp Director-Unit 3 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 Senior Resident inspector Millstone Nuclear Power Station clo U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 513 Niantic, CT 06357 l
o
.e REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES i
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49 l
QQCKET NO. 50-423 Replace the following page of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications Bases, with the attached page. The revised page contains a verticalline indicating the area of change.
Remove Insert B 3/4 7-3 B 3/4 7-3 j
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7' PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION V Ryil BACKGROUND The main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs) isolate steam flow from the secondary side of the steam generators following a high energy line break (HELB). MSIV closure terminates flow from the unaffected (intact) steam generators.
One MSIV is located in each main steam line outside, but close to, containment. The MSIVs are downstream from the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump turbine steam supply, to prevent MSSV and AFW isolation from the steam generators by MSIV closure. Closing the MSIVs isolates each steam generator from the others, and isolates the turbine, Steam Bypass System, and other auxiliary steam supplies from the steam generators.
The MSIVs close on a main steam isolation signal generated by low steam generator pressure, high containment pressure, or steam line pressure negative rate (high)2 The MSIVs fail closed on loss of control or actuation power.
Each MSIV has an MSIV bypass valve. Although these bypass valves are normally closed, they receive the same emergency closure signal as do their associated MSIVs. The MSIVs may also be actuated manually.
A description of the MSIVs is found in the FSAR, Section 10.3.
AP11ICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS The design basis of the MSIVs is established by the containment analysis for the large steam line break (SLB) inside containment, discussed in the FSAR, Section 6.2.
It is also affected by the accident analysis of the SLB events presented in the FSAR, Section 15.1.5.
The design precludes the blowdown of more than one steam generator, assuming a single active component failure-L (e.g., the failure of one MSIV to close on demand).
The limiting temperature case for the containment analysis is the SLB inside containment, at 75% power with mass and energy releases based on offsite power available following turbine trip, and failure of the MSIV on the affected steam generator to close.
At hot zero power, the steam generator inventory and temperature are at their maximum, maximizing the analyzed mass and energy' release to the containment.
Due to reverse flow and failure of the MSIV to close, the additional mass and energy.in the steam headers downstream from the other MSIV contribute to the total release. With the most reactive rod cluster control assembly assumed stuck in the fully withdrawn position, there is an increased possibility that the core will become critical and return to power. The reactor is ultimately shut down by the boric acid injection delivered by the Emergency Core Cooling System.
.MI LSTONE - UNIT 3 53/47-3 Revised by IEtC letter dated _ July 10, 1998 1