ML20236M294

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Forwards Summary of 1987 Emergency Plan Exercise Scenario & Objectives,Per Commission 840209 Request
ML20236M294
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun 
Issue date: 05/08/1987
From: William Jones
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To: Martin R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
LIC-87-314, NUDOCS 8708110006
Download: ML20236M294 (7)


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Omahr Public Power District wmtm C. Jones 1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102 2247 l

Sena Vce Presdent l

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May 8, 1987 7

N LIC-87-314 1

1 MAY t i 1987 b

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e Mr. R. D. Martin, Administrator UL-c j

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011

Reference:

Docket No. 50-285 l

RE: Fort Calhoun Station 1987 Emergency Preparedness Exercise The Commission requested Omaha Public Power District by February 9,1984 correspondence to provide the description of the scope of the annual emergency exercise and the objectives to be fulfilled by this exercise approximately 75 days prior to the exercise. Accordingly, the subject information is provided in Enclosures 1 and 2 for the upcoming Fort Calhoun Station's 1987 emergency exercise.

Copies of this information are also being provided to the Federal Emergency Management Agency and to the Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response.

Sincerely, J

W. C. Jo s Senior V ce President WCJ:rg Enclosures c:

Mr. James Overstreet, Regional Director Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VII Old Federal Office Building, Room 300 911 Walnet Street Kansas City, Missouri 64106 Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20556 87C8110006 B70508 PDR ADOCK 05000285 7

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SUMMARY

OF 1987 EXERCISE SCENARIO On the morning of July 22, 1987, the Fort Calhoun Station will be at 100% power after completing a refueling outage within the last two months. The wind is-from the NNW with winds variable 5-10 mph. The only critical equipment problem is that one of three seals on RC-1B is failed with acceptable leakage through the remaining two seals. Another concern is the recurring loose parts monitoring system alarms that have been experienced since startup with activity levels being slightly higher than expected. OPPD management has been l

evaluating the need to shutdown and investigate this concern.

i The other significant discrepancies will be related to the j

high volume of waste and general debris leftover from the i

outage.

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At 0659, an anonymous call to the main switchboard will be received stating that there is a bomb hidden in the plant and is set to go off in about an hour. Two actions should occur following the call; the shift supervisor should declare an Notification of Unusual Event emergency class per EPIP-OSC-1 and the security force should implement its contingency plan procedures applicable to the event. A partial emergency team call up should be initiated in accordance with EPIP RR-1.

A complete search conducted by the security force and others will fail to locate any explosive device. Then at 0752, a muffled explosion will be heard followed almost immediately by fire alarms in Room 69. The fire sprinkler system will fail to activate. The first two persons who attempt to enter the fire area will receive severe burns.

Additionally, a worker in room 69 at the time of the explosion will be severely burned and contaminated. The stairs entering room 69 will be destroyed and the door through Room 26 cannot be opened. Ten minutes after detecting the fire, the Site Director should declare an Alert emergency classification per EPIP-OSC-1. The alert classification shall be required as a result of the fire of >10 minute duration and/or the sabotage to the plant resulting in a threat to safety systems. At 0813 a smaller secondary explosion will occur. Any attempts to enter the area will be thwarted by loss of the access stairs and extreme heat in the room. At 0815, the operators will receive a PAL DOOR AJAR alarm. When investigated the doors will be found to be intact. At 0823, the containment spray isolation valve HCV-344 fails open followed by a large number of valve position indications being lost. At 0835, AC-3A trips off line if in operation or standby indication is lost. Over the next hour, several nuisance alarms will occur and radiation monitors, including RMO-50, 51, 52, 60, 61 and 62 will be lost. At 0956, AC-3C trips off line; AC-3B will continue to operate normally. At 0959, AC-3B will trip off, any attempts to restart will fail.

Plant should be tripped as well as the RCP's.

At 1001 the operators will receive indication of a seized rotor for RC-1B followed shortly by an alarm from the Page S-1

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' area radiation monitor located closest to the pump. This will be followed by high coolant avtivity readings. RM-063 will also indicate increased readings as a result of leakage by valves PCV-742 B and D and the fuel failed from the locked rotor event and loose part damage. A Site Area Emergency per EPIP-OSC-1 should be declared due to loss of two fission product barriers (Fuel and Containment integrity) and/or loss of the redundant trains of a safety system (CCW pumps). From 1001 until 1055 the RCS leak rate will remain constant at about 15 gpm; at which time the leak will rapidly escalate to well above 120 gpm. In addition, the accident range (RM-063) stack radiation monitor will be exhibiting. slowly increasing levels and at about 1100 will abruptly increase to wel] above the alarm limit.

A General Emergency per EPIP-OSC-1 should be declared at this time because of the loss of all three fission product barriers. Maximum radiation released will indicate dose levels requiring evacuation out to five miles in downwind sectors. The situation will continue to degrade; however, the release rate to atmosphere will fall off with containment pressure.

At about 1300, fire fighting attempts will finally be successful and the fire in Room 69 will-be extinguished.

r Shortly after access is gained, an operator will successfully l

shut HCV-742D using the handwheel. Additionally, reactor pressure should be sufficiently reduced such that the RCS leak rate is within the Charging pump capacity. The recovery organization will then begin planning for reentry and recovery. Plans for deescalating the emergency classification should also be discussed among the participating agencies as i

a precursor to exercise termination.

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Omaha Public Power District 1987 Emergency Exercise Obiectives 1.

Demonstrate the ability of the Operating Shift to recognize and implement the appropriate Emergency Action Levels.

D.1 Objective accomplished by the Operating Shift when the loss of l

fission product barriers are recognized and the appropriate E AL's are implemented.

2.

Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the Initial Response Organization and activate the appropriate f acilities promptly when required by the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

F.le, B.5, H.4, C.2b Objective accomplished by the involvement of all groups assigned by the EPIP for initial response to the condition established by the exercise and by the Site Director verifying the appropriate f acilities are adequately manned and activated.

3.

Demonstrate the ability to effectively utilize the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's) to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

B.7 Objective accomplished by the Operating Shift and the Operations Support Center personnel by using the EOP's to take the appropriate actions to place the unit in a safe condition following the loss of fission product barriers.

4.

Demonstrate the ability of the Initial Response and Emergency Recovery Organization Supervisors to make the proper decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

B.7, C.4 Objective accomplished by the Shift Supervisor, Site Director, and other key personnel associated with each of the support groups while taking action required to stabilize plant conditions and protect the public.

5.

Demonstrate the satisfactory communications ability of all emergency OPPD support resources.

F.1d Objective accomplished by all participants effectively utilizing communications equipment, links, and procedures.

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6.

Demonstrate the Initial Response and Emergency Recovery Organization's I

ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely fashion.

I.7 Objective is accomplished by the deployment of the Field Monitoring and Dose Assessment Teams as required by EPIP's.

i 7.

Demonstrate the ability to warn the public of the emergency situation.

E.6 This is accomplished by the Emergency Organization notifying county authorities to activate the public warning system in accordance with EPIP-EOF-17.

i 8.

Demonstrate the ability to expeditiously notify

state, local and I

federal authorities and provide update information (Recommendations) as necessary.

F.lc, F.1d, E.lf, J.7 Objective is accomplished by the Operating Shift and EOF when contacting and interfacing with the off site response center.

9.

Demonstrate the ability to collect and disseminate data to assess and i

project whether sheltering or an evacuation is indicated.

H. 7, H.12, I. 3 a, I. 7, I.10, J.1, J. 3 Objective is accomplished by the Operating

Shift, Technical Support
Staff, And Emergency Operations Facility to collect radiological release data and determine recommended protective actions guidelines per EPIP-EOF-7.

10 Demonstrate the ability to account for onsite personnel within the allotted time period.

J.5 Objective is accomplished by accounting for onsite personnel within 30 minutes per EPIP-EOF-9.

11 Demonstrate the ability of determine whether or not there is core damage.

M.1 Objective is accomplished by the TSC staff conducting Estimation of Core Damage per procedure (EPIP-TSC-8).

12 Demonstrate the ability of the Initial

Response

and Recovery Organization to detect and measure the radioactive plume.

E.6, H.6a, H.7, I.7, I.9 Objective is accomplished by the Offsite Monitoring Teams (Tag No.

5, 6,

7, and 8) to satisfactory perform offsite radiological surveys per EPIP-EOF-18.

13 Demonstrate the ability of disseminating information timely and accurately to the public and rumor control.

B.7c, E.3, E.4 Objective is accomplished by the Media Release Director and his staff to control outgoing and incoming messages per the Public Information Procedure EPIP-PI-1.

14 Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Recovery Organization to determine and implement appropriate measures for a controlled recovery and re-entry plan.

M.1, M.2, B.7a Objective is accomplished by the Operating Shift, OSC, TSC and l

the EOF by devising an acceptable plan for a containment re-entry and recovery from the LOCA.

15 Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Team to identify the extent of the damage and control the spread of radioactive contamination, l

I.7 Objective is accomplished by the Emergency Team when the radiological controlled area is established, surveys completed, and a decontamination and re-entry plan is developed.

16 Demonstrate adequacy of EMS transportation, personnel and procedures for handling injured and contaminated individuals.

L.4 Objective is accomplished by the response of offsite emergency medical support.

17 Demonstrate adequacy of onsite emergency first aid equipment and procedures for contaminated injured person.

L.2 Objective will be accomplished when the injured worker has been adequately examined and appropriate first aid measures taken to limit further injury or complication of the injures present.

Proper decontamination or contamination control measures and surveys must also be completed.

18 Demonstrate the capability of offsite medical facilities to handle contaminated or radiation related injury.

L.1 Objective will be accomplished when the injured worker has been examined and medical measures have been planned or initiated.

19 Demonstrate the ability to provide respiratory equipment, protective clothing, and radioprotective drugs to individuals arriving / remaining onsite during the emergency.

J.6 Objective is accomplished by the Emergency Organization when utilizing the temporary radiological support facility in the G.E.T. building per EPIP-OSC-16, EPIP-EOF-10, and EPIP-RR-22.

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20 Demonstrate the capability for decontamination o'f personnel, including provisions for extra clothing.

K.7 Objective is accomplished by Emergency Teams or H.P. ' Technicians demonstrating proper decontamination procedures to-decon

-a maintenance workers per EPIP-EOF-10.

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