ML20236M277
| ML20236M277 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1987 |
| From: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236M281 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-87-163, NUDOCS 8711130069 | |
| Download: ML20236M277 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1987026
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OCT 2 81987
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Docket No. 50-369
License No. NPF-9
EA 87-163
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Duke Pown, company
ATTN' Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President
Nuclear Production Department
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Gentlemen:
,
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY
(NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-369/87-26)
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This refers to the inspection conducted on August 3-7, 1987, at the McGuire
Nuclear Plant, Huntersville, NC. The inspection included 'a review of the
circumstances surrounding the inoperability of the Unit 1, Train A, Emergency
Diesel Generator (D/G-1A), which occurred between July 26 and July 30, 1987.
This event was identified by the plant staff and reported to the NRC.
The
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report documenting this inspection was sent to you by letter dated September 10,
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1987.
As a result of this inspection, significant failures to comply with NRC
regulatory requirements were identified, and accordingly, NRC concerns relative
to the inspection findings were discussed .at an enforcement conference held on
September 15, 1987. The report documenting this conference was sent to you by
letter dated October 9,1987.
On July 26,'1987, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Removal and Restoration (R&R)
No.17-169 was issued by the Assistant Shift Supervisor. to the Nuclear Equipment
Operators (NEO) to remove Unit 1, Train "A," Nuclear Service Water Cooling Pump
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(RN-1A) and associated equipment from service to permit RN-1A oil sampling.
The D/G-1A was included in Train "A" safety-related equipment that was removed
from service to prevent its operation without cooling water. On July 27, 1987,
the maintenance staff completed the oil sampling activities and two NEOs were
directed to restore RN-1A and its associated safety-related equipment (as
listed on R&R 17-169).
The NE0s subsequently reported control power restored
to all components and R&R 17-169 completed. At approxitnately 5:00 a.m, the
control room declared all equipment associated with R&R 17-169 operable,
despite the fact that the control power had not been restored to D/G-1A.
As a
result of the error, the 0/G-1A control power breaker remain'd open, rendering
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D/G-1A and associated Train "A" safety-related equipment inoperable.
On July 29, 1987, a Reactor Operator observed that the D/G-1A control switch
lights (red / green) in the control room were not illuminated which indicated
that 125VDC control power was not available to start D/G-1A. Additionally, the-
Reactor Operator observec ? rom the indication lights on the Unit 1 Bypass Panel
that D/G-1A was inoperable.
Despite the multiple indicators available to him,
the Reactor Operator assumed the switch lamp socket was faulty and initiated a
work request to repair =the switch without attempting to verify the existence of
control power to D/G-1A.
85.1130069 871028
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ADOCK 05000369
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OCT 28198T
Duke Power Company
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On July 30, 1987, at approximately 3:30 a.m., R&R 17-185 was issued to remove
RN-1A from service to support the rodding out of the motor cooler heat exchanger-
While additional safety-related equipment was being removed from service the NEOs
discovered the D/G-1A control power breaker in the de-energized position and
reported their finding to the control room at approximately 5:30 a.m.
At this
time, D/G-1A had been in an inoperable status for more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
On
July 30, 1987, at approximately 12:30 p.mc, the operability tests were completed
for D/G-1A which had then been inoperable for 90.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
This sequence of
events resulted in D/G-1A being out of service for more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, leaving
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the Train "A" emergency bus without an' emergency power supply.
Unit 1 did not
commence plant shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to reach a HOT STANDBY condition as-
required by Technical Specifications.
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There are two basic concerns with this event.
First, we are concerned that
your Independent Verification Procedures, as well as Removal and Restoration
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Procedures, were not followed by plant personnel.
In particular, we are
concerned that a Senior Reactor Operator failed to properly review the R&R
document which, if done properly, would have.resulted in his detecting the
D/G-1A control power problem.
Second, we are concerned r. bout the adequacy of,;
training for licensed Reactor and Senior Reactor Operators as well as NEOs.
During the time period while 0/G-1A was inoperable, six shift turnovers occurred =
without proper corrective action being_taken for the lack of control power
indication on the D/G-1A start /stop switch. . The six shift turnovers also
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occurred without an adequate response to:the D/G-1A' inoperable indicator being
illuminated on the Unit 1 Bypass panel, as required by Operations Management
Procedure 2-2.
Training for NEOs regarding the removal and restoration of
safety-related equipment is also suspect and there are previous examples where
inadequate training may have significantly contributed to operational problems.
There were two earlier events documented which contained a number of similarities
to the incident for which this Notice is written.
The first occurred on
January 3, 1985, and is addressed in Station Investigation Report 2-85-01 which
concerned an incident where a control board switch with indicator lights
extinguished went unnoticed for an unknown period of time.
The second~ incident
occurred on October 22, 1985, and was addressed in Ctation Investigation Report
1-85-47 and Licensee Event Report '369/85-37. . This second event listed improper
independent verification as a primary cause in a Train
"A" Engineered Safety
Features actuation.
To emphasize the need to improve independent verification, strict-compliance
with procedures, and attention to detail, I have been authorized, after consulta-
tion with the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the Deputy Executive Director
for Regional Operations, to issue the enclosed Notice.of Violation and Proposed
Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of One Hundred.Thousand Dollars
(5100,000) for the violations described in the enclosed Notice.
In'accordance-
with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
10 CFR Part 2,. Appendix C (1987) (Enforcement Policy), the violations described '
in the enclosed Notice have been categorized as al Severity Level-III problem
because of the safety significance involved.
The base value of civil. penalty
for a Severity Level III violation or problem is $50,000.
It is recognized
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OCT 281987
Duke Power Company
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NRC Resident Inspector
D. Hood, NRR
Document Control Desk
State of North Carolina
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that the violations were eventually identified and reported by your staff;.
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however, the violations involved significant errors and there was ample oppor-
tunity for discovery and co' erection.
The escalation and mitigation factorsLin
the Enforcement Policy were considered.
The base civil penalty' amount has been'
increased by 100 percent because of:
(1) past poor performance in the area of
concern as documented generally by Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance
(SALP) in the operations area and specifically by the similar occurrences discussed
earlier, (2) the corrective actions taken on July 29, 1987 were not only inadequate
and non-conservative, in that it was assumed the problem was in the control panel.
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indicators and not in the diesel generator itself, but untimely in that it.was.
not recognized promptly that the indicator light was out.
Specifically, multiple
shift turnovers occurred during the time the diesel generator was inoperable yet,
none of the licensed operators involved recognized the significance of the
multiple indications of the problem available to them.
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You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions
specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response.
In your
response, you should document the specific. actions taken and any additional.
actions you plan. to prevent recurrence.- After reviewing your response to this.
Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future
inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is
necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements. Additionally,
your future plant operations will be closely reviewed to assure the NRC that
these events are, in fact, isolated problems.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject
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to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required
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by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL No,96-511.
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Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
M. L ERNST
J. Nelson Grace
Regional-Administrator
Enclosure:
Proposed Imposition
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of Civil Penalty
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cc w/ encl:
T. L. McConnell, Station Manager
Senior Resident Inspector - Catawba
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