ML20236K081

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Safety Evaluation of Util Response to Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Ltr 83-28, Equipment Classification (Reactor Trip Sys Components). Licensee Response Acceptable
ML20236K081
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/29/1987
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20236K073 List:
References
GL-83-28, TAC-52855, NUDOCS 8708060403
Download: ML20236K081 (2)


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Enclosure 1 )

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 2.1 (PART 1)

EQUIPMENT CLASSIFICATION (RTS COMPONENTS)

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-336 l

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMAD.Y On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem i Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal.

The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an automatic trip signal was

' generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant stsrt-up. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.

Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (EDO), directed the staff to investigat . and report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant.

The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents ace reported in FUREG-1000, " Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." Asaresultofthisinvestigatign, the Commission (NRC) requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8,1983 )

all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating ilcense, and holders of construction pennits to respond to generic issues raised b" the analyses of these two ATWS events.

This report is an evaluation of the responses submitted by Northeast Nuclear .

Energy Company, the licensee for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, for item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic letter 83-28. The actual documents reviewed as part of this evaluation are listed in the references at the end of the report, t Item 2.1 (Part 1) requires the licensee to confirm that all Reactor Trip System components are identified, classified and treated as safety-related as indicated in the following statement:

Licensees and applicants shall confirm that all components whose functioning is required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related on documents, procedures, and information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities, including maintenance, work orders, and parts replacement.

870B060403 870729 hDR ADOCK 05000336 PDR

1 EVALUATION The licensee for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 responded t 2 the requirements of item 2.1 (Part 1) with submittals dated November 8,1983 and May 9, 1985 . The licensee stated in these submittals that all components that are required to perform the reactor trip function are identified as safety-related on their Materials. Equipment and Parts List (MEPL). The licensee further stated that safety-related activities on these components including maintenance, work orders, and parts replacement will be completed using Category 1 controls.

CONCLUSION Based on our review of these responses, we find the licensee's statements confirm that a program exists for identifying, classifying and treating components that are required for performance of the reactor trip function as safety related. This program meets the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 1) of the Generic letter 83-28, and is therefore acceptable.

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REFERENCES

1. NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to all Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits,

" Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28)," July 8,1983.

2. Letter, W. G. Counsil Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., to D. G. Eisenhut, NRC, November 8,1983.
3. Letter, J. F. Opeka, Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., to J. A. Zwolinski, NRC, May 9, 1985.

Attachment:

EGG-NTA-7305 Dated: JUL 2 91987 _

Principal Contributor:

D. Lasher